Opposition Senators' Report
1.1
The Australian Research Council Bill 2000, and
its companion bill, together represent a flawed attempt at establishing a
proper legislative basis for the Australian Research Council. They represent
also a wasted opportunity for the Government to show a strong commitment to
research funding for universities, and they foreshadow an accelerated program
for increased dependence of universities on their own commercial operations and
on commercially sponsored research from outside the universities.
Power without policy
1.2
Opposition senators have a number of
reservations about these bills, notwithstanding the fact that the Minister, the
Hon David Kemp MP, has taken some note of Opposition objections to the 1999
White Paper which forms the policy basis to this legislation. These
reservations are dealt with below. It needs to be stated at the beginning,
however, that the first and major concern of the Opposition is that, in the
midst of all the Government’s rhetoric on the dawn of a new age of research,
there is not one additional real dollar for national research attached to this
bill.
1.3
The Opposition’s broad concerns about this
legislation, extensively canvassed in the second reading debates in the House
of Representatives, highlight particular contradictions in Government policy in
regard to this legislation. In later paragraphs to this report problems and
dangers are identified in relation to ministerial discretions that are
exercised without proper parliamentary scrutiny. Yet, there is little
indication that the Government is interested in showing leadership in arresting
the decline in overall national research and development expenditure.
Ministerial power is to be arbitrarily exercised within a policy vacuum. The
point was made in evidence to the Committee given by the president of the
Council of Australian Postgraduate Associations:
Research is fundamental to the whole innovation push that we are
trying to develop in this country. The problem with the minister being able to
control that totally—which is what he is able to do currently—is that you are
setting up strong probabilities that short-term objectives, perhaps politicised
objectives, will dominate agendas. Establishing new areas in research requires
long-term investment, so you need a more strategic and longer term view. I can
point to many examples around the world where governments have embarked on 10-,
20- or 30-year plans to develop particular research directions—for instance,
the research triangle in North Carolina. That is another point. Understanding
research is highly complex: it is beyond the scope of any one person—minister
or otherwise—to understand all the relevant issues. That is why you need a
professional, well-resourced organisation that can look broadly, and that is why
you need an independent, broadly based Australian Research Council that can
take all those things on board.[1]
1.4
Opposition senators argue, in support of this
statement, that ministerial control is not the same thing as Government (or
ministerial) leadership on broader issues of policy and funding, which is
currently so lacking.
1.5
An element in the policy behind these bills
suggests a refined version of a ‘growth through efficiencies’ policy which has
been characteristic of funding of the vocational education and training sector.
In these bills the emphasis on efficiencies is indicated by the advocacy of
competitive funding processes and concerns about completion rates. Opposition
senators observe that the Government is unable to acknowledge that the policy solutions
it proposes are directed at a problem resulting from several years of
inadequate government funding. Unless the decline in real funding levels for
research is arrested and reversed, Australia will inevitably fall further behind in terms of international
competitiveness.
Ministerial powers and accountability
1.6
Under the proposed legislation, the minister
assumes powers and discretions which are, in the opinion of a number of
interest groups, excessive. These relate to matters of funding eligibility and
to matters of ARC administration, matters of concern to Opposition senators
considering these bills.
1.7
In the first of these issues, clause 52 of the
ARC Bill allows a minister to ignore advice from the ARC in approving or
rejecting a funding proposal. The Government argues that the minister must have
a discretion to take note of other sources of advice, although without giving
any reasons. Opposition senators agree with critics of the legislation who
argue that issues of propriety arise here. As a submission from the Council of
Australian Postgraduate Associations argues, ministerial veto potentially opens
up research to allegations of ‘cronyism’ and may undermine peer review,
verification and quality.[2]
1.8
There can be little argument that ministers
should take a ‘hands off’ approach to direct funding decisions, even when the
processes of peer review make ministerial intervention a risky practice. It is
a minister’s role to give general policy direction and allow independent
decisions to be made in accordance with these directions. At the very least the
Opposition supports the recommendation made in the submission from the National
Tertiary Education Industry Union that:
in the interest of maintaining the independence of decisions
made in relation to research funding, any decision made by the Minister in
relation to funding of research proposals should be on the advice of the ARC.
At the very least, the Minister should be required to table in Parliament the
particulars of any funding decision taken contra to recommendations made by the
Council.[3]
1.9
The second issue of ministerial power was raised
in a considerable amount of evidence presented to the Committee which was
critical of the provisions giving to the minister powers more properly
exercised by those whom the minister appoints to the Board of the ARC. A
minister should be able to back his or her judgement in appointing the Board by
remaining at arm's length from ARC administrative processes. To this extent the
drafting of the ARC Bill departs from traditional practice.
1.10
If the ARC is a truly independent body, charged
with giving advice to a minister on research trends and in anticipating the
unforeseen, it should have the power to initiate its own inquiries. The
National Health and Medical Research Council has such an independent power, one
reason for this being, no doubt, the obvious one that medical research is
esoteric, and any ministerial interference in such matters would appear
ludicrous. Beyond that, however, the ARC should be charged with the responsibility
to maintain an oversight of trends and directions in national research policy,
independent of immediate party political concerns and priorities. Therefore it
is appropriate - even essential - that the Council have the power to initiate
inquiries.
1.11
Strong evidence was given to the Committee from
representatives of the Federation of Australian Scientific and Technological
Studies (FASTS) about the consequences misinformed decisions made by ministers
in the face of professional scientific advice. Professor Sue Serjeantson referred to the British
Government’s BSE inquiry, in which it was found that public confidence in the
Chief Medical Officer and in scientific advisory committees was put at risk by
ministers' misuse of advice for political purposes. It was recommended that
scientific advice should be seen to be objective and independent of government.[4]
1.12
Transparent processes are regarded very
seriously by the academic community, not only because of the need to account
for the expenditure of public dollars, but because academic research
reputations are at stake. This perspective was explained to the Committee in
the evidence presented by the Federation of Australian Scientific and
Technological Studies. For FASTS, the current plan for the ARC as set out in the
legislation is a pale shadow of what the organisation should be. Professor John White explained
that the original concept was a ‘rather grand’ vision. Professor White questioned
the need for such ministerial control.[5]
1.13
Opposition senators consider it desirable,
therefore, that the ARC Bill to be amended to allow a minister to make broad
policy directives, and for a minister to routinely approve recommendations of
the ARC Board which are made in accordance with a minister’s directions. In
addition, the bill should allow for the Council to initiate inquiries.
Parliamentary scrutiny of funding decisions
1.14
This legislation, which gives increased
discretionary power to a minister, compounds this deficiency by providing for
reduced parliamentary scrutiny of ministerial decisions. The majority of
submissions put to the Committee comment on the lack of transparency and
accountability in funding processes. Under the current act, and under the
National Health and Medical Research Council Act, the minister is required to table
advice within 15 parliamentary sitting days. There is no good reason why this
requirement should not be maintained under the proposed legislation. Opposition
senators do not consider the listing of decisions in an annual report to be an
adequate substitute for the tabling of decisions within a set time limit.
Course completion and quality of research
1.15
The Government has seized upon postgraduate
course completion rates as a major justification for the funding measures
provided for in this bill. Early drafts of the 1999 White Paper proposed a
maximum period of three and a half years to complete a Ph.D degree. It appears
uninformed of the Government not to see the nexus between failure to complete
courses and need for students to return to jobs in order to survive.
Universities are found to be at fault for failing to nurture the academic
progress of postgraduate students. This problem also, to the extent that it
exists, is a consequence of the underfunding of universities.
1.16
The Government’s particular mindset on this
issue is closely related to the managerialist doctrine of university
administration that is now prevalent: which is in turn the result of a crisis
in funding. It is now considered desirable that research must be closely
related to commercial values, even though the value of much university research
lies in the generation of original ideas, or ‘pure’ research. Postgraduate
students are the cheap intellectual labour upon which the research industry
edifice is built. Such issues go to the core of quality research. The Committee
noted in the submission from CAPA a concern expressed that eligibility
criteria for research may be so prescriptive under the new bill that it is
likely to entrench a tendency toward isomorphism between institutions. That is,
that research would tend to become trapped in narrow paths and original ideas
may not be developed or exploited. This would mean too much reliance on too
narrow a range of input and output measures for funding purposes.[6]
1.17
Both the AVCC and CAPA drew the Committee’s
attention to the tenuous basis for the Government’s reliance on non-completion
rates as a reason for providing funding time limits on courses. It was claimed
that the statistical basis of the figures used by the Government, showing high
rates of non-completion was flawed. The AVCC told the Committee that it had
sought in vain to have DETYA release the internal memorandum, and was now
considering whether the AVCC should undertake its own survey of postgraduate
students. Without access to DETYA's data it was not possible to assess its
validity. The AVCC told the Committee that completions data did not tell a
complete story. In particular it often failed to take into account people who
were pausing in their studies.[7]
1.18
CAPA claimed that data about completions and
attrition which had formed the basis of the White Paper was ‘deeply flawed’.
CAPA gave evidence that:
The claim is that 60 per cent have completed after seven years.
Forty per cent of postgraduate research students are, in fact, part time. In the
current funding arrangements there is five-year funding for doctorates, which
could be 10 years for part time. Given that 40 per cent are part time, you
would not have expected many to have completed within seven years. Because that
data does not compress to effective full time it is highly misleading.
At other times the minister has claimed the attrition rate is
too high. The data for the attrition rate is highly flawed. For instance, a
higher degree research student submits their thesis and then ceases to be a
student, and there can be a three-, six- or 12-month period for the examination
process. Any student who is in that period is counted as an attrition in the
data. To say that they are an attrition in any meaningful sense of the
word—say, drop out—is patent nonsense. That is the quality of data that has
underpinned all the government’s arguments about completion rates, attritions
and so forth.[8]
Funding eligibility: Research Training Scheme and
Institutional Grants Scheme
1.19
The Australian Research Council (Consequential
and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2000 amends the Higher Education Funding Act
1988 to provide funding for two competitive funding schemes, the Research
Training Scheme (RTS) and the Institutional Grants Scheme IGS). Institutions
registered with the Australian Qualifications Framework may apply for funds
from the two new Schemes. The Opposition is concerned that a provision
contained in clause 23 (1D) and (1E) will give a minister power to determine
that non-university research bodies, including commercial research companies,
will be eligible for funding under these schemes. The Labor senators note,
however, that it is already possible for institutions and organisations other
than universities to apply for research grants under the ARC Large Grants
Scheme.
1.20
Of great concern to Labor senators is the
potential eligibility of organisations other than properly-established
universities to offer research training under the Research Training Scheme.
This would effectively allow organisations not listed on the AQF register, and
not duly accredited by the appropriate authorities, to teach postgraduate
research students - and, presumably, to award degrees. While there are
arguably separate legal impediments to the awarding of degrees by bodies not expressly
accorded the power to do so by means of legislation, the concern here is that
the bill allows the minister to circumvent existing higher education
accreditation processes and structures. This could happen, theoretically, at
the whim of a minister. It undermines the integrity of existing structures and
processes, and also flies in the face of the intentions underlying the new
Australian Universities Quality Agency. The awarding of doctorates and other
higher degrees should remain the province of universities: it goes right to the
heart of their role as centres for learning, research and scholarship.
1.21
While the Opposition notes Government assurances
that non-university research bodies are unlikely to be eligible for grants
under either of these schemes, this assurance has limited value, and then only
in the short term. It is inevitable that private research organisations will
attempt to meet guidelines which are currently being drawn up to allow scarce
research funds to be disbursed more widely. While these guidelines will be
disallowable instruments, this provides insufficient protection for the rights
of public institutions to research and research training funding.
1.22
As Opposition senators noted earlier in this
report, the expected contribution of universities to research lies largely in
‘pure’ research, without which there can be no commercial application of
research. There is a link between basic research, as well as applied research,
and economic growth. In both areas Australia’s research efforts are declining, relative to other comparable
nations. As far as basic research is concerned, this neglect is all the more
outrageous considering that funding needs for a broad spectrum of basic
research are relatively modest. In evidence to the Committee, Professor Christopher Fell provided a
concise example of the need for pure research driven by the requirements of
knowledge rather than the market place:
I think also that if areas of research are overly directed—if
one can conceive of that situation occurring—our coverage will drop off. I can
give you no better example than this: the NHMRC allowed virology to continue
when people thought it was an old science and Australia’s very effective
response to AIDS was a clear response to the fact that we had a few good
virologists. You simply cannot push research in a certain direction; you really
have to keep a lot of flowers blooming. They are not very costly flowers in
terms of the nation’s total investment.[9]
1.23
The Opposition also notes a view expressed in
the submission from the University of Melbourne Postgraduate Association stating that proposals permitting private research bodies to
compete with universities is fundamentally counterproductive because it
undermines existing cooperative arrangements which support industrial research.
The submission notes that the CSIRO has had successful links with industry over
most of the past century. This kind of collaborative effort is threatened by
allowing universities and business to compete for the shrinking pool of ARC funds.[10] Opposition members of the
Committee concur with the view that this provision owes much more to
ideological posturing than it does to any reasoned analysis of Australia’s overall research needs.
1.24
Labor senators believe that eligibility for
access to RTS and IGS funds should be limited in the bill to those institutions
listed in Schedule A of the Higher Education Funding Act 1988. They note
the view expressed by the NTEU in this matter:
The need to ensure parliamentary scrutiny here is particularly
important, given that the new national protocol dealing with accreditation
agreed to by the states and the Commonwealth has still to be given legislative
force. NTEU believes that, if greater contestability is required, new
institutions in receipt of moneys should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny
and accountability in the same way as other institutions, through the Higher
Education Funding Act and its associated schedules, as well as being included
on both AQF registers. Parliamentary scrutiny is an important public safeguard
in areas where substantial public funds are being expended.[11]
Conclusion
1.25
Labor senators have grave reservations about
these bills. Some of these concerns go to the general direction of the
Government's White Paper reforms, although we are pleased to see that some of
the more extreme proposals originally put forward by the Government have been
wound back in the legislation. It is crucial that the Government recognise,
moreover, the need to provide higher levels of public funding for both basic
and applied research, and to recognise also that measures to encourage industry
involvement in, and support for, research must be improved.
Recommendations
1.26
It is recommended that the bills be amended to:
- require the minister to table in the Parliament the details of
any funding decision taken that goes against the advice of the ARC;
- allow the ARC to initiate its own inquiries, under the broad
policy direction set by the minister; and
- provide that institutions eligible for funding under the
Institutional Grants Scheme and the Research Training Scheme be subject to
Parliamentary approval.
Senator Kim
Carr Senator
Trish Crossin
Deputy Chair
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