Chapter 2
Problems with program conception, funding and design
2.1
This chapter sets out the stated aims of the BER and then considers a
range of issues that were highlighted during the inquiry concerning:
(a) how the P21 program was costed;
(b) how the funding was delivered through the federal financial relations
framework; and
(c) how the implementation guidelines for the program were designed.
Aims of the BER
2.2
The primary aim of the BER, as stated by the Department of Education,
Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) in its submission to the inquiry, is
to 'provide economic stimulus to national and local economies through the rapid
construction and refurbishment of school infrastructure'.[1] A secondary aim is 'to
build learning environments to help children, families and communities
participate in activities that will support achievement, develop learning
potential and bring communities together'.[2]
2.3
The BER is the largest component of the Council of Australian
Governments' (COAG) Nation Building and Jobs Plan announced on
3 February 2009.[3]
According to COAG, the primary objective of this plan was to apply timely
stimulation to the economy in response to the global financial crisis, by focusing
on nation building and supporting economic growth and jobs.[4]
2.4
The plan parameters were agreed on 5 February 2009 and detailed in the National
Partnership Agreement on the Nation Building and Jobs Plan: Building Prosperity
for the Future and Supporting Jobs Now (the National Partnership Agreement).[5]
2.5
The committee majority notes that the legislation required to enact the
Nation Building and Jobs Stimulus Plan, introduced into the House of
Representatives on 4 February 2009 as a package of six related bills,
was initially rejected by the Senate on 12 February 2009.[6]
Following amendments and reintroduction into the House of Representatives on 12
February 2009, the Senate passed the bills on 13 February 2009.[7]
The committee majority further notes that the bills did not have the support of
the Coalition in either chamber.[8]
2.6
The Coalition's concerns with the government's package were reflected in
the Coalition senators' dissenting report to the Senate Finance and Public
Administration Committee's February 2009 inquiry into the package. These
concerns included that:
- the package would not achieve the objectives the government
claims;
- was poorly thought through;
- was a poor quality use of $42 billion of taxpayers’ money; and
- lacked ingredients that should be part of packages of this kind,
being measures to increase employment, productivity, efficiency and
competitiveness.
2.7
Evidence presented to the committee during this inquiry to date confirms
many of these concerns.
Has the BER as a stimulus package met its objectives?
How many jobs has the BER created?
2.8
Given support for economic growth and jobs was a key objective
identified in the National Partnership Agreement,[9]
the committee sought definitive information concerning the extent that the BER,
as a stimulus package, and in particular the P21 program, had achieved this key
jobs objective.
2.9
Ms Lisa Paul, Secretary, DEEWR, gave evidence to the committee of a
Treasury estimate on the overall number of jobs supported under the stimulus
package:
Treasury has estimated that the overall impact of the
economic stimulus plan, of which the BER is the single largest element, is
support for 200,000 jobs - that is, 200,000 Australians avoided unemployment
because of the stimulus.[10]
2.10
Ms Paul’s evidence did not address the committee's specific question in
relation to how many jobs have been supported and created under the P21
program.
2.11
When pressed about the effectiveness of the P21 program in terms of job
creation, Ms Gillian Mitchell, Branch Manager, DEEWR, gave evidence that under
the P21 program 'there is no specific target':
Senator BARNETT—And what about jobs?
Dr Bruniges—They are not in the funding agreements.
Ms Mitchell—Jobs are being measured at the level of
the entire economic stimulus plan.
Senator BARNETT—Yes, I am aware of that. We are
talking about this particular program, P21.
Ms Mitchell—There is no specific target.[11]
2.12
When further questioned as to what the key performance indicators are
for the P21 program if they are not job creation and support, DEEWR indicated
that 'number of projects is a key indicator'.[12]
2.13
Ms Paul gave evidence to the committee that the National Partnership
Agreement contains a single performance indicator:
I note that the single performance indicator in relation to
the P21 element of the BER contained
in the National partnership agreement on the Nation Building and Jobs Plan is
the number of new or refurbished facilities, including libraries and multipurpose
halls in primary schools.[13]
2.14
The committee asked the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) whether
it had been able to determine the number of jobs created under the P21 program
when conducting its own performance audit of the P21 program.[14]
The ANAO gave evidence that, due to the way in which data on the program has
been collected, it is not possible to quantify the number of jobs directly
supported or created. The ANAO also stated that Treasury did not have a role
in reporting on sub-elements of the overall stimulus package of which the P21 program
is an element. The ANAO’s evidence was:
...As you would have been advised previously by the
department, it has been unable to date to collect information on the number of
jobs created by the program since its inception. There are a couple of points
to note. The role of the Department of the Treasury is significant here. It has
a role in oversighting and monitoring the impact of the stimulus package as a
whole, including jobs created or supported; however, it does not have a role in
reporting on sub elements of that overall stimulus package of which BER and BER
P21 are elements.
The second thing is that the department has been gathering
jobs information but it is at the project or site level. That information
has...some caveats and uncertainties around it. The education authorities raised
with us a number of concerns about the reliability and comparability of the
information that was being gathered and the usefulness of it, too.[15]
Committee view
2.15
Given that the primary objective of the BER (as set out by COAG) was to
apply timely stimulation to the economy in response to the global financial
crisis by focusing on nation building and supporting economic growth and jobs,
the government was under an obligation to ensure that adequate mechanisms were
established to enable the number of jobs created by the P21 program to be
calculated accurately, so that the success or otherwise of the program could be
properly assessed, according to one of its two key indicators, by the
parliament and the taxpayers.
2.16
It is an indictment on the government and DEEWR that there is no
effective mechanism to enable the accurate calculation of the key criteria of
the P21 program as set out in the National Partnership Agreement on the National
Building and Jobs Plan, being 'support for economic growth and jobs'.
2.17
The committee majority is concerned that the National Partnership
Agreement failed to include appropriate indicators to determine whether or not its
key objective was met.
2.18
The committee majority notes that the ANAO in its performance audit
report states that 'there would be scope for DEEWR and ultimately the
Coordinator General to have considered alternative options to obtain data that
would facilitate reporting against program measures and outcomes for the BER
program'.[16]
2.19
On the evidence presented to the committee, regrettably, it appears that
no other alternatives were considered. The ANAO in its report further
expressed its concern by stating:
where it is not possible to identify alternative options that
yields valid data at the program level, it would have been prudent for DEEWR,
in consultation with the Coordinator General, to advise Government accordingly.[17]
2.20
The committee majority observes that projects do not equal jobs. On the
evidence presented to the committee, the government has spent in excess of
$14 billion of taxpayers' money without establishing adequate mechanisms
to properly quantify the number of jobs created under the P21 program.
Statistical data relating to building projects is not an accurate measure of
actual job creation.
2.21
With in excess of $14 billion of Australian taxpayers' money being spent
on the P21 program, the committee majority believes that Australian taxpayers are
entitled to more accountability from the government.
Questions over timeliness of the implementation of P21 projects
2.22
As noted, the primary aim of the BER is to 'provide economic stimulus to
national and local economies through the rapid construction and refurbishment
of school infrastructure'.[18]
2.23
Evidence was given to the committee that raised concerns regarding the
timeliness of the implementation of P21 projects. The question of timeliness is
a critical element in determining whether the P21 program is meeting its
primary aim.
2.24
The ANAO reported that the progress of some P21 projects has been slow:
The original government decision, and subsequent BER
Guidelines, also established completion milestones for BER P21 projects,
according to school size. Up to 18 months was allowed for the completion of
projects in schools larger than 150 students, with seven months allowed for the
completion of projects in smaller schools with 150 students or less.
Eligibility for BER P21 funding was conditional on schools meeting agreed
commencement and completion milestones for building works. While the majority
of milestones for project completion are yet to be reached, smaller schools in
Rounds 1 and 2 of BER P21 were required to have completed their projects by 20
January 2010 (452 projects) and 28 February 2010 (1630 projects) respectively.
DEEWR has advised that only 15 per cent of Round 1 projects (68 projects) and 8
per cent of Round 3 projects (131 projects) in smaller schools have been
completed by the respective milestones set by the Government. Education
Authorities have been able to seek extensions to the completion dates for BER
P21 projects on a case-by-case basis. DEEWR has advised that 250 Round 1
projects (55 per cent) and 260 Round 2 projects (16 per cent) have had an
extension to their completion milestones approved. This means that 34 per cent
of Round 1 projects and 9.6 per cent of Round 2 projects have been completed in
accordance with revised milestones.[19]
2.25
DEEWR has also recently confirmed that large numbers of P21 projects
remain behind schedule:
Senator MASON—The
round 1 date of completion was 20 January this year. Round 2 is 28 February
this year. Round 3 is 31 May this year. They all should have been completed.
How many have been?
Ms Mitchell—I
will have to add this up. In round 1 there are 69.
Senator MASON—Would
you like my calculator?
Ms Mitchell—I
do need your calculator. I have this in three separate amounts. It is 69 plus
104 plus 34, which comes to 207 in total.
Senator MASON—207?
Ms Mitchell—From
round 1.
Senator MASON—Out
of how many?
Ms Mitchell—Out
of 453.
Senator MASON—That
is for round 1?
Ms Mitchell—That
is correct.
Senator MASON—So
less than half are completed?
Ms Mitchell—For
round 2, some 361 projects have completed.
Senator MASON—Out
of how many?
Ms Mitchell—Out
of 1,634.
Senator MASON—That
is about one-fifth. That is not very good. That is about 20 per cent. And I do
not even need my calculator. That is round 2. A failure mark there, but I am
generous. How about round 3?
Ms Mitchell—For
round 3, some 55 projects have completed.
Senator MASON—Out
of how many?
Ms Mitchell—Out
of 1,348. However, I would like to note that the completion date for round 3
was 31 May and we will not receive the data on round 3 until 21 June.[20]
Committee view
2.26
Given the extent of the many P21 projects that remain behind schedule
and that have not been completed in accordance with the project completion
dates, it is implausible for the government to justify its claims that the
stimulus spending was timely.
2.27
Furthermore, the committee majority is concerned that the non-timely
spending of the stimulus money is now leading to an overstimulation of the
economy, well after the worst of the global financial crisis has passed.
Flaws in P21 program costings - $1.7 billion cost blow-out
2.28
In February 2009 when the P21 elements of the BER were announced, the government
claimed the program was expected to cost $12.4 billion. The committee notes
that in August 2009, the government was required to allocate a further $1.7
billion to the program.
2.29
The Minister for Education told the Parliament that the additional funding
was required to be allocated to the program due to its popularity:
...Within
that $42 billion stimulus we have made an extra allocation to Primary Schools
for the 21st Century because it is going gangbusters and more primary schools
want to be involved in it than were originally costed for...[21]
2.30
DEEWR gave evidence to the committee that additional funding was
allocated to the P21 program from other elements of the stimulus plan in
response to high demand.[22]
2.31
The Commonwealth Coordinator-General gave evidence that the need for the
further funding was as a result of the high degree of interest from primary schools
across Australia:
[t]he P21 element has been extremely successful, attracting a
high degree of interest from primary schools across Australia. The original
costing was based on 2007 schools and school enrolment data and assumed a 90
per cent utilisation rate of total potential funding. This has meant higher
funding costs than was originally anticipated. This is a result of the
program's success, through its flexible delivery arrangements including
allowing schools to apply for more than one project, and the release of 2009
enrolment data which shows an increase in the number of students and schools.[23]
2.32
However, the committee majority notes that the ANAO came to a very
different conclusion for the reason for the additional funding. In its Building
the Education Revolution – Primary Schools for the 21st Century,
Performance Audit Report No. 33 2009-10, the ANAO found that:
Ultimately, the need for the additional funding provided by
the Government in August 2009 arose from most schools having sought the maximum
payments available. It did not flow from any deficiencies identified in the
procurement processes or other activities of Education Authorities in
delivering the program, nor was it the result of more schools seeking to
participate than had originally been forecast.[24]
2.33
Contrary to the views of the Minister for Education, the DEEWR and the
Commonwealth Coordinator-General on the reason for the allocation of additional
funding, the ANAO concluded there was an inherent tension between the
government's policy intention to make maximum payments available to all schools
and the total funding provided in its original decision. If all or nearly all
schools applied for the maximum available funding amount per school announced
in February 2009, then the cost of the program would have exceeded the
funding originally allocated.[25]
2.34
The government considered that the costings issue was the fault of the
Department of Finance and Deregulation (Finance) which undertook the final
costing for the program.[26]
Finance gave evidence to the Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee
during an estimates hearing that it had only one week to undertake the costings
and estimated a 90 per cent utilisation rate.[27]
Mr David Tune, Secretary, Department of Finance and Deregulation, stated:
Basically what we said, and you will appreciate the time
frames we were doing this within, is that it is likely there will be a range of
factors that may lead to less than 100 per cent coverage. As you know, each
school by size was given a maximum amount of grant and so forth. So the calculations
were done, multiply A by B for all the different categories, and you could come
up with a number that was 100 per cent. Then we said that we think on the basis
of a couple of things—one around possible take-up, number of schools who might
take it up—it is possible, not certain but possible, that a number of schools
may not take it up. It is also possible that not all schools will take the
maximum amount of grant that is on offer for their particular size of school.
Throwing that all into the mix in I will admit a non-scientific way because we
did not have the data at that point to be able to demonstrate this—we said 90
per cent seems like a reasonable assumption in which to do the costing.[28]
2.35
The ANAO performance audit also revealed a lack of clarity around the
basis of the BER costings:
During the development of the policy proposal, different
views on the likely funding requirements flowed from different assumptions
about how the program would operate. DEEWR, Finance and the Department of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet (which was closely involved in finalising advice to
ministers) did not clarify and agree policy parameters for the proposal before
the costing was finalised. Consequential misunderstanding of the costing basis
ensued.[29]
Costings confusion between
departments
2.36
The initial costings undertaken by the Department of Finance and
Deregulation were signed off by the Strategic Priorities and Budget Committee
(SPBC). DEEWR advised the ANAO that it had not been provided with the final
version.[30]
The committee noted that the ANAO’s performance audit indicates there was
confusion between the various departments on the final costings for the P21
Program. At paragraph 5.18 of its performance audit the ANAO stated:
The final version of the new policy proposal prepared by
DEEWR was sent to Finance and PM&C several days before the government
decision. Although DEEWR had costed earlier versions of the proposals
(including several options in the proposal that became BER P21), Finance
undertook and supplied the final costing. PM&C provided the papers for
ministers on which the Government made its decision. DEEWR has advised that it
had “not been provided with the final papers that were provided to SPBC [and]
it is unclear [to DEEWR] what was put to it.[31]
2.37
On the evidence provided to the committee it is clear that the
assumptions which underpinned Finance's costings had not been clarified and
agreed between the agencies as envisaged in the Cabinet Handbook.[32]
Finance reduced to 90 per cent the theoretical maximum funding. The BER
National Coordinator raised concerns about the 90 per cent assumption with
Finance and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) but it
appears that the reduction to 90 per cent in the costing was misinterpreted as
a forecast of a 90 per cent take up rate by schools.[33]
As noted by the ANAO, this confusion and uncertainty on the need for the
additional funds continued and showed:
...that a consistent part of DEEWR's explanation for needing
more funds for BER P21 was that the number of schools likely to participate in
the program had been underestimated in the costing. In fact, Finance always
expected take up to be very high but that schools would use an average of only
90 per cent of their maximum possible funding.[34]
2.38
In relation to the government funding decision, the ANAO noted the
wording reflected a 'policy decision to fund schools to the maximum amount but
provided insufficient funds in the event that most schools sought access to the
maximum'. The ANAO noted that it was advised that SPBC ministers were aware
that there may be a need to provide more funding.[35]
2.39
The committee notes that it would have been unrealistic to assume that
schools would not seek maximum available funding.
2.40
The additional funding was ultimately provided by making offsets from
within the $42 billion Nation Building and Jobs Plan. These included
reallocating funds from the Science and Language Centre element of the BER
program and the social housing program and axing the Low Emission Assistance
Plan for Renters. The ANAO noted that until the funding issue was resolved
DEEWR was unable to announce the outcome of Round 3 funding which:
...led to a delay of a month in project start dates for Round 3
from August – September 2009 to September-October 2009, slowing program
delivery.[36]
Committee view
2.41
The Minister maintains that the need for the additional funding was due
to the P21 program's popularity. On the evidence of the respective parties on
the need for the additional funding, the committee majority places greater
weight on the objective and disinterested evidence of the ANAO.
2.42
The confusion between DEEWR and Finance as referred to in the ANAO
report over costings of the $14 billion P21 program astounds the committee
majority. This confusion demonstrates a lack of communication and understanding
which has impacted negatively on the P21 program delivery.
Parliament unable to fully scrutinise P21-related spending
2.43
P21 funding has been passed from the Commonwealth to the states for project
management and implementation. The following schematic outlines the governance
arrangements for the program.
Figure 1 Governance
arrangements for the economic stimulus plan
Source: Department of Education, Employment and Workplace
Relations, Submission 22, p. 6.
2.44
Under the National Partnership Agreement, a condition for the provision
of P21 funding to the states and territories is that the funding is to be additional
to planned spending—that is, it is to complement, rather than replace, state-based
spending efforts on primary school infrastructure.[37]
2.45
Schedule B to the agreement sets out that maintenance of state funding would
be monitored through reporting to Heads of Treasuries and the Ministerial
Council and that sanctions for any state's failure to meet spending benchmarks
may include making this failure public.[38]
2.46
During the early stages of its inquiry, the committee sought
confirmation that the states were meeting their spending obligations. DEEWR
informed the committee that the Treasury monitored the maintenance of the states'
spending effort on a quarterly basis, through the provision of quarterly
reports by the states.[39]
2.47
The committee wrote to Dr Ken Henry, Secretary to the Treasury,
requesting provision of the quarterly reports to assist the committee in
assessing whether the states were meeting their planned spending efforts and to
ensure accountability of the spending of Commonwealth monies under the
P21 program.[40]
Dr Henry declined to provide the reports to the committee, claiming that to do
so may harm relations between the Commonwealth and the states.[41]
2.48
The committee then wrote to the Treasurer, the Hon Wayne Swan MP, in
February 2010[42]
and again in March 2010,[43]
after failing to receive a response to its first letter, requesting the release
of the quarterly reports on the following basis:
- If all states and territories have complied with the requirement
to maintain their spending effort, it is difficult to see how any damage could
be caused by providing confirmation of this fact.
- If any state or territory has not complied with the requirement
to maintain its funding effort, it is an explicit feature of the National
Partnership Agreement on the Nation Building and Jobs Plan that such a failure
may be made public.
- State and territory capital spending on schools will ultimately
be made public through various budget papers and reports. The committee is
seeking this information in a more timely fashion in order to progress its
current inquiry.
2.49
The committee majority was not satisfied with the reasons given by the
Treasurer in April 2010 for refusing to provide access to the documents[44]
and determined to seek the support of the Senate for its request that the
quarterly reports be provided. Senator Michaelia Cash, Chair of the EEWR References
Committee, duly moved the following motion in the Senate on 12 May 2010:
That the Senate:
(a) notes that:
(i) under the
agreement reached between the Commonwealth Government and the states, stimulus
funding under the Government's Nation Building and Jobs Plan is to be additional
to existing state spending efforts;
(ii) as part of its inquiry
into the Primary Schools for the 21st Century school building program, the
Education, Employment and Workplace Relations References Committee is seeking
to ensure that states and territories have maintained their planned spending on
primary schools and have not reduced their spending as a consequence of
receiving stimulus funding through the Government's Nation Building and Jobs
Plan;
(iii) the committee received evidence
in November 2009 that maintenance of spending effort is being monitored through
quarterly reports by the states and territories to Heads of Treasury;
(iv) the committee wrote to the
Secretary of Treasury (Dr Ken Henry) in December 2009 requesting copies of
these quarterly reports;
(v) the Secretary of
Treasury wrote back to the committee, also in December 2009, declining to
provide the reports on the basis that to do so would not be in the public
interest as it would damage relations between the Commonwealth and the states,
but noting that a decision on whether to provide the reports was ultimately a
matter for the Treasurer (Mr Swan);
(vi) the committee then wrote to the
Treasurer on 8 February 2010, noting its disagreement with the Secretary of
Treasury's assessment that provision of the reports would damage relations
between the Commonwealth and the states, and requesting provision of the
quarterly reports by no later than 26 February 2010;
(vii) having received no
formal response, the committee again wrote to the Treasurer on 15 March 2010,
asking that the reports be provided by 26 March 2010;
(viii) when
the Treasurer finally responded to the committee's correspondence on 20 April
2010, he refused the committee's request on the basis that to release the
quarterly reports (either publicly or in camera) could reasonably be expected
to cause damage to relations with the states and would therefore not be in the
public interest; and
(ix) the committee continues to
disagree with the grounds advanced by the Treasurer for failing to provide the
reports, for the following reasons:
a) if
all states and territories have complied with the requirement to maintain their
spending effort, the committee does not see how any damage could be caused by
providing evidence to confirm this fact;
b) if
any state or territory has not complied with the requirement to maintain its
funding effort, it is an explicit feature of the National Partnership Agreement
on the Nation Building and Jobs Plan that such a failure may be made public;
and
c) state
and territory capital spending on schools will ultimately be made public
through various budget papers and reports. The committee is merely seeking this
information in a more timely fashion in order to progress its current inquiry;
and
(b) orders that there be
laid on the table by the Minister representing the Treasurer no later than
4.00pm on Thursday 13 May 2010 the quarterly reports as requested.
2.50
The Senate agreed to this motion. However, the government refused to
produce the documents. The following statement responding to the Senate’s
resolution for the production of the documents was tabled on 13 May 2010 by Senator
the Hon. Nick Sherry, Assistant Treasurer:
I have noted the Committee's arguments in support of the
release of these reports. However, contrary to the Committee's assertions, I
consider the fact that making the assessment public is an explicit sanction in
the agreement ...supports the Treasurer's conclusion that releasing the reports
would not be in the public interest.
I consider that the release of the quarterly reports on
progress under the National Partnership Agreement on the Nation Building and
Jobs Plan would harm the national interest on the grounds that their release
could reasonably be expected to cause damage to relations with the States.
Further, I consider that the damage could result equally from the disclosure of
the information or document to the Committee as in camera evidence.[45]
Committee view
2.51
The committee majority does not agree with the reasons given by the
government for refusing to disclose the quarterly reports to the committee.
2.52
Ensuring that the states are properly discharging their spending
commitments under the P21 program is integral to the Commonwealth government’s
responsibility to ensure that taxpayers' money is properly spent.
2.53
The committee majority has grave concerns about the broader implications
of its inability to properly scrutinise the spending of Commonwealth government
money under the federal financial relations framework, particularly in relation
to the government's proposed healthcare reform agenda. This is discussed
further in chapter 4 of this report.
2.54
The committee majority’s concerns about its inability to scrutinise
government spending extend beyond the P21 program to other programs being
delivered under, or planned to be delivered under, the new federal financial
relations framework.[46]
The government has stated that this framework is intended to improve scrutiny
and accountability:
This will greatly improve public transparency of these
payments and the ability of the Parliament to scrutinize the payment
arrangements.[47]
2.55
The government’s claims of improving public transparency are made hollow
by its failure to comply with the Senate resolution to produce the quarterly
reports on the maintenance of state spending, which would enable the committee
to properly scrutinise the expenditure of Commonwealth monies in relation to
the P21 program.
Recommendation 1
2.56 The committee majority recommends that all quarterly reports on
maintaining state spending on primary school infrastructure be made available
immediately.
Poorly designed P21 program delivery guidelines
2.57
Evidence was given to the committee that the P21 program delivery
guidelines were poorly designed and contributed to:
- a lack of clarity;
- a lack of flexibility in targeting to areas of need; and
- unnecessary duplication of existing facilities.
Lack of clarity
2.58
The committee heard evidence that some schools found that the guidelines
were unclear, did not cover key elements of the program and lacked certainty.
Mrs Iona Eichstadt gave evidence to the committee that:
The guidelines were very, very vague. There were not clear
and concise guidelines provided to the school about what they should do at
every stage.[48]
Lack of flexibility
2.59
The ANAO survey of 622 school principals found that almost 70 per cent
of school principals were either dissatisfied or strongly dissatisfied with the
degree of flexibility and individual customisation when using the education
authority's template design.[49]
2.60
The ANAO in its performance audit found that DEEWR was unnecessarily
prescriptive in administering the P21 program:
While designed to give effect to the objective of the
stimulus package, the approach adopted by the department has reduced the
capacity of school systems to take account of system priorities and the
differing needs of schools in their systems, within the Australian Government’s
policy parameters for the program. Additionally, some of the administrative
arrangements put in place by the department were unduly complicated and time‐consuming for
Education Authorities. It was open to the department to have adopted a more
streamlined approach to program delivery in consultation with Education
Authorities, while still meeting the policy objectives of the program.[50]
2.61
The committee also heard from a number of witnesses who were frustrated
that people with knowledge of the local school community and its needs were not
able to have adequate input into what buildings the school would receive from
the program. Instead the schools were required to operate under inappropriate
one-size-fits-all models whether they suited the specific or individual needs
of the school or not.
Overly prescriptive use of
template designs
2.62
The BER Guidelines stipulate that design templates should be used
wherever possible on BER projects.[51]
The government referred to the 'flexible use of design templates' that the
guidelines allow 'to reduce costs and accelerate the rollout' of the program.[52]
Under the guidelines, it is clearly possible to forego using templates where
justified.
2.63
The committee majority notes that the guidelines specifically stipulate
that:
[t]o further enhance efficiency and early take-up, design
templates will be used by states, territories and BGAs, wherever possible.
These templates must be used by each project unless a school or system has a
pre-approved design available, or can demonstrate that the non-use of a
template is reasonable, appropriate and that the building process can still be
expedited and achieved within the prescribed timeframes. Following the
provision of design templates by individual states, territories and BGAs, the
Commonwealth will disseminate the design templates to states, territories and
BGAs for their use with schools for the purposes of the BER.[53]
2.64
Because schools were required to show the capacity to commence projects
immediately to be eligible for first-round funding, most schools that were
allocated funding in Round 1 of the program utilised template designs.[54]
2.65
The Queensland Catholic Education Commission (QCE Commission) in its
submission to the inquiry cautioned that, while school communities were mostly
able to select appropriate facilities, a wider choice of facilities would have
led to better outcomes. The QCE Commission commented that:
...there was flexibility to choose appropriate facilities but [it]
believes the philosophy behind the 'lock-step' decision making was
unnecessarily cumbersome and that schools and their communities should have
been given greater initial choice of facilities to contribute to improved
educational outcomes and learning for their community.[55]
2.66
The short time frames imposed for the delivery of the P21 program,
combined with one-size-fits-all templates, do not adequately allow for individual
site requirements. Evidence was given to the committee that templates are
particularly unsuited to sites that have special considerations such as steep
slopes, limited access or particular architectural requirements. Coogee Public
School Parents' and Citizens' Association informed the committee that:
...the one-size fits all templates (employed by the NSW
Department of Education and Training) do not work within school communities
situated on a complex site with historic significance...[56]
2.67
Some critics highlighted inadequacies in using inflexible templates, stating
that such designs do not meet general school or community needs. Evidence was
given to the committee that the NSW Education Department's template which was
used in the project at Coogee Public School did not include a basic food
preparation facility.[57]
A food preparation facility will however in all probability be required when community
groups use the hall. Using a template in this circumstance clearly did not adequately
accommodate the P21 requirement of community access to facilities funded under
the BER program.
2.68
Jindera Public School Parents and Citizens Association (JPSPCA) also
gave evidence to the committee concerning template inflexibility. JPSPCA
believe that many new P21 facilities were not suited to the individual schools
and their needs. Far from complementing schools and aligning with their
long-term planning strategies, the inflexible template meant that buildings
were being forced to fit into school landscapes. JPSPCA stated that the 'template
approach' was inefficient.[58]
2.69
Evidence was also given that templates provide little flexibility in
design prior to and during construction. This lack of flexibility became
contentious for a number of schools. The principal of Warrnambool East Primary
School saw the lack of consultation with the local community and lack of design
flexibility as a lost opportunity to enhance the project at his school. The
school would have benefited greatly from adding a performance stage. Despite
initial optimism, it became evident as the project progressed that no
alterations to the template design would happen. Consequently, the school faced
the prospect of raising extra funds to buy a stage in order to meet students'
needs. The Principal informed the committee that:
[w]hile it is fine to have a basic template there needs to be
much more input at the local level into the finishing touches on each project.[59]
2.70
The NSW Catholic Block Grant Authority also rejected using templates,
noting that this type of approach was not 'part of [its] historical and ongoing
building program'. The BGA gained DEEWR's agreement with this decision and
reported that:
...all [NSW Catholic Block Grant Authority] P21 projects have
been architecturally designed, designed to site and in permanent construction.
There were of course opportunities to utilise commonalities in design to hasten
the process.[60]
2.71
Professor Brian Caldwell, previously Dean of Education at the University
of Melbourne and now Managing Director of Educational Transformations Pty Ltd,
also criticised the use of templates. He contrasted the process in government
and private schools, noting that the use of template designs was far less
common in private schools:
I drive past too many schools where new classrooms look too
much like the old classrooms – factory-style reflecting mass-production
technology – that will be obsolete within a very short time and probably
run-down in condition...Public schools around the country have had to conform to
government templates in the design of new facilities. Many if not most private
schools have had no such constraints with the next stage of their master plans
ready to roll when funding became available.[61]
Unnecessary duplication of
facilities
2.72
Other witnesses drew the committee's attention to media reports of
duplication of buildings in the P21 program. In a submission lodged with the
committee, the Western
Australian Council of State School Organisations claimed that schools were
'encouraged' to apply for facilities that were not actually needed.[62]
2.73
The JPSPCA gave the committee a specific example of the problem relating
to the duplication of buildings. Although the JPSPCA wanted to apply for a
bigger multipurpose hall, it failed to see the benefit of its proposed BER
project which merely duplicated existing facilities. The JPSPCA explained that:
[t]he hall that was offered to our school was the same size
as the existing hall which would be doubling up buildings and of no benefit to
our school as we hoped for a hall that will accommodate the whole school...[63]
2.74
The JPSPCA also stated that
the BER funds could have been more effectively directed towards other
infrastructure that the school already planned.[64]
2.75
The Coogee Public School Parents' and Citizens' Association noted that
short timeframes and a consequential lack of consultation and planning
sometimes caused duplication.[65]
Money not appropriately targeted
2.76
The Western Australian Council of State School Organisations gave
evidence in its submission that the amount of funding that a particular school
could apply for was not variable as it was set in the BER Guidelines. Although
schools 'were not required to submit applications for P21 funding',[66]
some schools may have decided to apply for less funding if given the option.
The council believed that some schools received unnecessary funding and that
excess funds could have been more effectively spent elsewhere 'to enable a
broader delivery of funding across the spectrum'.[67]
2.77
Mr Angelo Gavrielatos, Federal President, the Australian Education Union
(AEU), gave evidence to the committee that the P21 program represented a 'missed
opportunity to better target...demonstrable need'.[68]
The AEU highlighted this point in an answer to a question on notice to the
committee:
In response to raising the issue of The King’s School in Sydney
receiving $2.5 million for a school library, the Chair asked whether the school
would already have had a library. We are able to confirm for the Committee that
the school’s website indicates that the school has a centre of learning and
leadership incorporating a computerised library, as well as its own museum,
rugby fields, football fields, cross-country tracks, 50-metre swimming pool,
heated pool, sports centre, advanced cricket facilities, rowing, indoor rock
climbing, indoor shooting range, tennis and basketball courts, information
technology centre, science centre, 320-seat professional theatre, comprehensive
music centre, boatshed on Parramatta River, and a historic sandstone chapel. We
trust this clarifies the matter.[69]
Inadequate monitoring and compliance
mechanisms
2.78
At paragraphs 2.15 to 2.17, the committee majority noted its concern
that the only performance indicator for the P21 program included in the
National Partnership Agreement related to the number of projects on foot. The
ANAO in its report also commented negatively on the monitoring and compliance
arrangements designed into the P21 program. Noting that DEEWR commenced its
monitoring performance and information plan for P21 Program in July 2009 but
did not complete it until late 2009, the ANAO found:
...the plan and framework were not in place sufficiently early to
inform the department’s initial consultations with the Coordinator‐General on the
appropriateness of monitoring arrangements, or to guide departmental monitoring
activity over the establishment and early implementation phases of BER P21.[70]
2.79
The ANAO further stated:
The design of the monitoring arrangements agreed between the
Coordinator‐General
and DEEWR for BER P21 did not adequately reflect the devolved nature of the
program implementation or acknowledge that detailed monitoring at the project
level is most suited to arrangements between Education Authorities and schools.
Under current arrangements, Education Authorities have provided DEEWR with a
broad range of data, some of which the authorities were not well placed to
collect or interpret, which the department and the Coordinator‐General have been
unable to use effectively to inform an assessment of program progress. A
substantial majority of Education Authorities questioned the usefulness of some
of the monitoring arrangements they were expected to undertake for the BER
program. In particular, arrangements established to monitor the effect of the
BER program on employment have relied on data collected at the project level.
This data cannot be aggregated in any meaningful way to inform an assessment of
progress against BER program employment outcomes that would complement the
macroeconomic modelling for the broader Nation Building and Jobs Plan undertaken
by the Treasury. In instances such as this, where it has not been possible to
obtain valid data to effectively assess progress against measures and outcomes
established for the BER program in Schedule D of the NPA, it would have been
prudent for DEEWR, in consultation with the Coordinator General, to advise
government accordingly.[71]
Conclusion
2.80
The P21 program was ill‑conceived. It was not accurately costed,
and there was confusion in respect to its funding and the design of its
implementation guidelines. The poorly designed guidelines resulted in a lack of
clarity, a lack of flexibility in targeting areas of need and unnecessary
duplication of existing facilities. The following chapter explores the poor
outcomes being achieved under the program by many schools.
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