Summary
In response to the global financial crisis, and following calls
for action by the Opposition, the Government introduced in October 2008 two
guarantee schemes for authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs); one for
deposits and one for wholesale funding.
The Opposition had called on the Government to lift the cap on
its proposed Financial Claims Scheme from $20,000 to $100,000. The Government
instead went much further, introducing an unlimited deposit guarantee. This led
to a large impact on financial institutions not covered by the guarantee, which
then faced difficulties in raising both wholesale and retail funding.
A fee is charged for the wholesale funding guarantee, and for
deposits of over $1 million. The fee is tiered, with ADIs with credit
ratings of AAA to AA- paying 70 basis points per annum; those with credit
ratings of A+ to A- paying 100 basis points and others paying 150 basis points.
Despite the government guarantee, markets are still requiring
higher interest rates to provide funds to lower-rated ADIs. This means the
lower rated ADIs are in a sense 'paying twice', which may be putting them at a
significant competitive disadvantage relative to the major banks.
While Treasury are coy about the extent to which the market was
anticipated to 'look through' the guarantees in this way, the lack of clear
explanations for this behaviour suggest it was probably not expected. The
Committee therefore regards it as a reason to review the extent of tiering of
the premia to ensure that lower-rated ADIs are not 'paying twice'.
Recommendation 1
The Committee recommends that, in view of the experience of
markets not pricing all guaranteed debt identically, the Government review the
need to apply differential premia for ADIs with different ratings for the
wholesale funding guarantee (and hence also that applying to deposits over $1
million).
The global financial crisis has had a severe impact on
securitisation markets, and those lenders who relied on them to raise funds.
The Committee believes that the securitisation model of
financing should be supported through its current difficulties, as well as the
ADI lending model. It therefore supports calls for some form of guarantee for
residential mortgage-backed securities. However, there will need to be care taken
in the design of such a scheme to avoid any further unintended consequences.
Recommendation 2
The Committee recommends that the Government introduce an
appropriately designed guarantee scheme for residential mortgage-backed
securities.
There is always a tension between solvency and competition. To
take an extreme case, a monopoly bank would be very profitable, and therefore
robust in a crisis, but would be unlikely to provide low-cost or innovative
products to its customers.
During financial crises, the balance of concern tends to move
from competition towards solvency. One manifestation of this is that the
authorities tend to be more likely to allow mergers. The Committee regards it
is appropriate for greater weight to be given to solvency concerns in a crisis.
But a fine judgment is required as to how much the emphasis should shift, as it
may be hard to revive competition once the crisis has passed.
In the medium term, there are real concerns that a diminution
in competition can lead to borrowers facing higher interest rates and
depositors receiving lower rates. The Committee notes that the four major banks
now account for around 80 per cent of new home loans, and that bank interest
margins, which had been narrowing for a long while, have recently widened
again. With less competition, there is more scope for banks to raise loan
interest rates even without any increase in official interest rates by the
Reserve Bank.
Once the global financial crisis eases, there should be a
prompt transition to a more limited, permanent, scheme of depositor protection
and a complete withdrawal of support for wholesale fundraising. The Government
has done little to indicate how or when this might occur. The removal of the
wholesale funding guarantee may need to involve a degree of international
coordination to avoid disadvantaging Australian institutions in global markets.
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