4.1
Throughout the pandemic the Australian Government (government) has failed to take advice, repeatedly sought to shift blame, publicly attempted to minimise its responsibilities and frequently doubled down on its failures. This failure of leadership has meant COVID-19 measures were often too little, too late, or were marred by design and implementation shortcomings.
Economic assistance
4.2
While the government's economic support measures offered much-needed assistance to the businesses and workers hard-hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, the government's support was repeatedly too late, too limited, and ended too soon.
JobKeeper
4.3
The JobKeeper wage subsidy was the Australian Government's largest COVID-19 economic support measure and the 'largest single fiscal measure in Australia's history'. The Secretary of the Department of the Treasury, Dr Steven Kennedy PSM, described the importance of the support:
[T]he JobKeeper program in conjunction with the JobSeeker enhancements, appear to have been especially successful in preserving employment while supporting incomes and encouraging rapid recovery.
4.4
The government announced $130 billion for the JobKeeper subsidy in March 2020 to 'help keep Australians in jobs' and to 'tackle the significant economic impact from the coronavirus'. Just two months later, in May 2020, the government announced that it had revised down the estimated cost for the JobKeeper program to $70 billion due to a data administration error. In its year of operation, JobKeeper provided critical financial support to approximately one million businesses and around 3.8 million workers, and cost the Australian Government $88 billion—some $42 billion less than initially projected.
Limited eligibility
4.5
As discussed in the committee's first interim report, from the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic there was a clear need for a national wage subsidy to support businesses and workers to manage the severe economic disruption. Despite this, the Australian Government ignored calls from the opposition to provide a wage subsidy. When the government did implement JobKeeper, the program's eligibility criteria excluded many workers, including: casual employees, temporary visa holders, local government employees, employees of foreign owned companies, including airport catering services firm Dnata, and university employees.
4.6
Notwithstanding the government's JobKeeper costing error, the Treasurer, the Hon Josh Frydenberg MP, maintained that the subsidy's eligibility criteria should not be expanded to groups excluded in the initial announcement as the program was funded with 'borrowed money'.
4.7
In August 2020, the government announced JobKeeper would be extended for a further six months, from its scheduled end date of September 2020, and would be paid at a reduced rate.
Ending JobKeeper too soon
4.8
The Australian Government announced JobKeeper would end on 28 March 2021, a little over a year into the pandemic, and claimed the program had 'achieved its objectives of supporting businesses and saving jobs, preserving employment'. Treasury officials anticipated that the end of JobKeeper would 'lead to some businesses closing and jobs being lost', predicting 100 000 to 150 000 people could lose employment as a result, but noted there was a 'wide band of uncertainty' around the estimate and that not all jobs lost would result in unemployment.
4.9
At the time that JobKeeper ended, Australia's international borders remained shut and active COVID-19 cases were low (155). However, many businesses and 1.5 million workers, including 40 000 travel agents, were still reliant on the program. By July 2021, the COVID-19 Delta variant had slipped through Australia's border management system, resulting in lockdowns that affected half of Australia's population. Treasury officials estimated the cost of the lockdowns to the national economy was in the order of $20 billion in the September 2021 quarter. Despite the severe impacts, the Prime Minister insisted JobKeeper would not be reintroduced:
When you go through a pandemic or in any sort of policy challenge, you don't address last year's challenges. You address today's challenges. And, today's challenge with these lockdowns is very different to what the Treasurer and I and the Government were confronted with last March and April when we put JobKeeper in place. That was a national scheme that went across all businesses in Australia and it was designed with the prospect of having Australia in that situation for at least six months, which indeed it was in.
4.10
In December 2021 and January 2022, the Omicron variant caused an exponential spike in COVID-19 cases and extremely challenging conditions for business, including lockdown-like impacts and a 'triple blow' from staff shortages, supply chain disruptions and reduced consumer activity. Despite many businesses calling for increased support, the Australian Government left businesses and workers without a comprehensive economic safety net.
4.11
While the JobKeeper program provided essential support to millions of Australians, the program has been widely criticised as poorly designed and administered. In some instances, businesses appeared to have curtailed their operations to maintain their eligibility for the JobKeeper program. In other cases, JobKeeker was paid to companies that were not eligible under the program's rules.
4.12
Reporting of analysis by the Parliamentary Budget Office revealed that up to $38 billion of JobKeeper payments were made to ineligible companies, including $1.3 billion paid to companies whose turnover had tripled. In the July–September 2020 quarter alone, over $18 billion was paid to ineligible companies—approximately 58 per cent of the JobKeeper payments in that period.
4.13
While the government was warned about JobKeeper overpayments, it did not make changes to the scheme until September 2020. By failing to ensure the JobKeeper program's eligibility criteria were appropriately administered, the Australian Government wasted billions of dollars of public money in making payments to companies that were ineligible for program, including some companies that were highly profitable throughout the pandemic.
Early access to superannuation
4.14
The Australian Government provided individuals experiencing financial hardship due to COVID-19 early access to their superannuation in two tranches of up to $10 000 each, between 19 April 2020 and 31 December 2020. While financial support was much needed by those who made withdrawals, the government's scheme was poorly designed, poorly administered and compounded the adverse financial impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic for many Australians. As the committee found in December 2020, in the early months of the pandemic the government's scheme led to the Australian economy being supported by 'the private savings of people who were hardest hit by COVID-19 restrictions'.
4.15
Approximately 4.8 million early super withdrawals were made under the scheme, at a combined value of $36.4 billion dollars. The average amount withdrawn was $7638, and for people who made two withdrawals the average withdrawal increased to $8268. Australian Taxation Office data shows withdrawals were often made by people who had their working hours reduced (44 per cent), or people who were unemployed (19 per cent), and were overwhelming made by people paid low-to-middle incomes. Most people who made withdrawals used the money to pay their mortgage or rent (29 per cent), or to pay household bills (27 per cent). However, in some instances, the government's design of the scheme allowed for people who did not see a decline in their income to make a withdrawal.
4.16
By shifting the burden of economic support to individuals, the government has increased the risk of Australians experiencing long-term adverse financial impacts. The scheme encouraged people to make withdrawals as financial markets bottomed, which served to lock in super balance losses. Super industry data from less than three months into the scheme, and prior to the scheme's second withdrawal tranche, shows approximately 480 000 Australians had 'wiped out' their super account balances through the withdrawals. Recent research by the Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia suggests the early access to super scheme has:
…lead to around one million accounts being left with less than $1,000 with around 160,000 accounts being entirely cleaned out and closed. There is no evidence of any significant catchup contributions being made to such accounts in the period up to February 2022.
4.17
Younger people who made the maximum withdrawal amount could be up to $95 000 worse off in retirement. For women whose super balance is, on average, significantly lower than their male counterparts, the early access to super scheme has further eroded their retirement savings.
4.18
Analysis by the Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees of more than 750 000 withdrawals in the scheme's first tranche has confirmed the disproportionate impact of the scheme on Australian women. Analysis from the Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees found that female applicants aged 25–34 had on average a starting balance before COVID-19 of $19 906, which was 21 per cent less than the average male balance of $25 200 across this age cohort. After accessing their super through the scheme, this gap widened to 46 per cent.
4.19
Despite the serious impacts of the scheme on Australians' retirement savings, the government has done little to remedy the situation. In March 2022, the government announced people who had made withdrawals under the scheme could 'rebuild' their super by making personal super contributions.
Other payments
4.20
Under pressure to be seen to do more to support Australians impacted by lockdowns, the government introduced two income support payments for individuals affected by state and territory decisions relating to COVID-19 public health measures.
4.21
On 3 August 2020, the Pandemic Leave Disaster Payment was announced, consisting of a lump-sum payment of around $750 for each week during which an individual lost income as a result of government directions to self-isolate or quarantine, or to care for someone subject to such government directions. The disaster payments largely replaced support already on offer from the Victorian Government. On 18 January 2022, the scheme was scaled back and a financial hardship test applied. All payments under the scheme are due to end on 30 June 2022.
4.22
On 3 June 2021, the COVID-19 Disaster Payment was announced as a temporary measure of between $200 and $750 per week for those who had lost income as a result of state and territory public health restrictions. Once 70 per cent of a state's population over 16 years were fully vaccinated, the disaster payments would not be renewed, and the payments would end completely at the 80 per cent threshold. The committee understands that all payments under the COVID-19 Disaster Payment scheme have now ceased.
4.23
The criteria for eligibility for these payments were widely criticised as being overly restrictive, which at times excluded those with access to more than $10 000 in savings, those receiving welfare payments, or people still working but with significantly reduced hours, among other restrictions. Critics pointed out that such limitations had not been applied to payments rolled out during previous disasters. Moreover, COVID-19 Disaster Payments were not equally distributed between states and territories. While NSW residents received $7.4 billion, a little over half that amount ($3.8 billion) was allocated to Victorians, despite Melbourne experiencing one of the world's longest lockdowns.
4.24
The COVID-19 disaster and leave payments were supplemented by business support payments. This was also inequitably distributed between states and territories. For example, the government provided joint economic support with the NSW Government to support that state's economy during the Delta lockdown, while the Victorian Government claimed equitable support was not being provided in that state by the Australian Government.
4.25
As the Australian Government moved to ease public health measures, paving the way for the spread of Omicron, it rolled back key economic support measures. Workers and businesses were therefore left particularly vulnerable.
Aged care
4.26
In December 2020, the committee raised serious concerns about the government's aged care response, particularly that COVID-19 deaths of residents were disproportionately high and, at that time, accounted for over 74 per cent of Australia's total COVID-19 deaths. This made Australia's COVID-19 death rate in residential aged care facilities (RACFs) among the worst in the world.
4.27
Australia's aged care system was already in crisis in the lead up to the pandemic. In October 2019, the Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety (the Royal Commission) reported on systemic underfunding and the need for urgent reform of aged care in Australia. Despite the Australian Government's acknowledgement of the pressure on the aged care system, and the early evidence of the risk of COVID-19 to residents, almost two years into the pandemic the government did not ensure that RACFs were properly prepared for the Omicron variant in the wake of the relaxation of public health measures in the broader community.
4.28
Aged Care and Community Services Australia said that the 'cracks' in the aged care system were turned into 'chasms' by the COVID-19 pandemic, causing a crisis in the sector that has had a 'tragic human cost'. Residents' care was compromised; family visits have been limited; and staff and providers have been forced to provide care with inadequate resources.
4.29
Despite this, the Minister for Senior Australians and Aged Care Services, Senator the Hon Richard Colbeck has, at various times, claimed the aged care system is performing 'incredibly well', 'exceptionally well', and has sought to minimise the government's responsibilities for the continually poor outcomes in the aged care sector.
Vulnerability of aged care residents
4.30
In late November 2021, prior to the Omicron outbreak, Australia had 259 active cases of COVID-19 across 29 RACFs (188 resident cases and 71 staff cases). Just two months later, in late January 2022, infections had rapidly escalated to 23 900 active cases (9643 resident cases and 14 257 staff cases) across 1261 facilities.
4.31
Tragically, infections too often translated into COVID-19 deaths. In the first two months of 2022, Australia's rate of COVID-19 related deaths in RACFs nearly doubled with a further 877 deaths, three times higher than the 282 deaths recorded in 2021 and surpassing the 685 deaths recorded in 2020 (see Figure 4.1).
4.32
The committee remains deeply concerned about the death rate in RACFs and that more could be done by the Australian Government to mitigate COVID-19 related deaths. Approximately 30 per cent of Australia's total COVID-19 related deaths (6384 people as of 1 April 2022) were among aged care residents, despite less than 0.7 per cent of Australians living in RACFs.
4.33
The Australian Government has sought to downplay the high rate of RACF COVID-19 related deaths in 2022 as being of older Australians in palliative care. At the same time as COVID-19-related deaths in RACFs were peaking, the Minister for Health and Aged Care, the Hon Greg Hunt MP, claimed:
And I think an important piece of information as well, the latest advice that I have is that approximately 60 per cent of those that have agonisingly passed have been in palliative care.
…but the notion of those that were in the absolute latest days of their lives, who may have contracted COVID, the definition is that they have passed with COVID, and they are absolutely rightly counted as a national loss.
4.34
The committee rejects Minister Hunt's comments. Health practitioners have observed that while many aged care residents who die with COVID-19 have underlying conditions, being infected with COVID-19 demonstrably reduces their quality of life, can hasten their death, and limited families' ability to visit their loved ones.
4.35
Preventing death is one of the government's key public health aims in the pandemic response. The fact that aged care deaths were at record highs two years into the pandemic shows that the government has failed to protect older-Australians in RACFs from the worst impacts of COVID-19. It also reveals that the government's claims that it had learnt from its experiences in managing COVID-19 in RACFs were critically misjudged and misleading.
4.36
The Australian Government mishandled the vaccine rollout to older Australians, leaving them 'sitting ducks'. While older Australians were among those prioritised in phase 1a of the rollout, as detailed in Chapter 2, the government missed its original target by over 3.4 million.
4.37
Several factors compounded the slow rollout in RACFs. The lack of advance notice of availability of vaccine supplies in early 2021 made it hard to obtain timely informed consent from residents in aged care facilities, exacerbating delays in the rollout. Further, from early January 2022, providers reported shortages of essential supplies. Personal protective equipment and rapid antigen tests were particularly scarce, despite assurances from the government in August 2021 that they would be made available to residential aged care facilities for regular screening of staff and visitors. One study found more than half of staff surveyed in mid-January had not been supplied with rapid tests.
Aged care workforce
4.38
Aged care staff have worked throughout the pandemic in extremely difficult conditions. By mid-January 2022, the sector was warning it had reached 'breaking point'. Large numbers of aged care staff tested positive to COVID-19 or were deemed to be close contacts and furloughed for up to two weeks. This led to massive staffing shortfalls and a decline in the quality of care.
4.39
While aged care staff frequently went above and beyond in their commitment to caring for residents, in some instances, aged-care residents faced deplorable conditions, with some left without food, water, or help showering and toileting. It also left residents with increased exposure to the risks of COVID-19 and other serious health complications.
4.40
The government provided surge workforce funding to the highest risk residential aged care facilities facing COVID-19 outbreaks through a $47 million support package. The Department of Health reported that 260 facilities had been supported through the surge workforce from December 2021 to February 2022—representing under 10 per cent of Commonwealth-supported facilities. Providers reportedly waited as long as 10 days for support, labelling the scheme 'sluggish', and 'inadequate', and claiming it covered only a fraction of the staffing shortfall.
4.41
The Australian Aged Care Collaboration (a group representing around 70 per cent of the aged-care sector) estimated that around a quarter of all shifts in residential aged care facilities were going unfilled each week, despite the surge workforce. The Department of Health estimated in mid-February 2022 that on average, some 4000 staff were on furlough and nearly 5 per cent of facilities were still facing staffing shortages. However, the department of Health was unable to provide data on the number of shifts going unfilled, again highlighting the lack of timely data provided throughout the response.
4.42
From mid-January 2022, there were calls for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to be deployed to aged care facilities. The Prime Minister initially rejected the proposal, claiming 'defence forces are not a shadow workforce for the aged care sector'.
4.43
But on 4 February 2022, the ADF began preparing to deploy to priority aged care facilities, with the first health augmentation teams arriving on-site the following day. On 7 February 2022, the Prime Minister announced the deployment of up to 1700 ADF members to support the troubled aged care sector. Providers broadly welcomed the deployment but expressed concern that it had taken the government weeks to get underway.
4.44
Only a fraction of the promised surge workforce was delivered. Most of the ADF personnel made available to support the sector were general duties staff, whereas facilities overwhelmingly needed clinical staff. As of 17 February 2022, only 152 ADF staff had actively supported the sector in 29 of the highest priority facilities (around 1 per cent of Commonwealth-funded facilities).
4.45
On 21 February 2022, the government announced its plan to bolster the aged care sector with volunteers to address the ongoing workforce crisis. The Health Services Union NSW called the plan a 'cop-out', describing it as a move from relying on an 'underpaid' to an 'unpaid' workforce.
4.46
This crisis in aged care was entirely predictable and—to a large extent—avoidable. Just 10 months before Omicron ripped through aged care facilities, the Royal Commission identified a range of workforce measures which would address staff shortages over time and improve the capacity of staff to offer quality care. Among its recommendations to build the workforce was for aged care workers to be paid a proper wage. Three years prior, the government had been warned by the Aged Care Workforce Strategy Taskforce that the value and contribution of aged care staff was not properly reflected in their low pay.
4.47
Despite calls from providers and unions for a 25 per cent pay rise for aged care staff, on 31 January 2022, the Prime Minister announced that eligible aged care staff would receive two pre-election 'bonus' payments of up to $400 to 'support the aged care workforce to continue to care for older Australians during the COVID-19 pandemic'.
4.48
The Minister for Health and Aged Care said the payments 'acknowledged the response of the aged care workforce to the ongoing challenges of the pandemic'.
4.49
Providers and unions largely dismissed the payments as failing to address the structural issues faced by the sector. The Health Services Union described the payments as 'a disgrace' and 'too little, too late'. Chief Executive Officer of National Disability Services, Ms Laurie Leigh, stated the payments 'did not scratch the surface' of what was needed in the sector. These additional payments to aged care workers are also at risk of being offset by persistent low wage growth and rising cost of living.
4.50
Applications for the bonuses opened on 1 March 2022, but as at 25 March it is reported that as many as 97 per cent of workers had not yet received their bonus, and that well over half of the 1600 providers expected to apply for payments on behalf of their staff had not yet done so. Despite this, it is reported that a spokesperson for the Aged Care Services Minister has insisted that the rollout 'was on track'.
4.51
The committee recommends that the Australian Government commission an expert review of the National COVID-19 Aged Care Plan and the impact of COVID-19 and the pandemic response on residents and staff in residential aged care facilities.
4.52
The committee recommends that the Australian Government make a submission supporting higher wages for aged care workers in the work value claim currently being heard in the Fair Work Commission.
4.53
The committee recommends that the Australian Government review and strengthen the Intergovernmental Agreement on data sharing between Commonwealth and state and territory governments to address any gaps in access to timely and relevant data—particularly related to public health and aged care. This agreement should ensure systems and processes are in place to enable data sharing arrangements between jurisdictions in support of a robust national public health intelligence capability.
People with disability
4.54
In evidence to the committee, the Department of Health conceded that the vaccine rollout to people with disability was suboptimal, and the committee found the justification for delay was alarming: authorities had 'pivoted' from people with disability to aged-care residents. As put to the committee:
[T]he initial slow start in aged-care residents required us to pivot to make sure we focused on them, on the basis that they have been, both in practice and on our advice, the most vulnerable group. So we are now returning our attention to the disability piece.
4.55
While expediting vaccination in aged care was critically important, it is beyond comprehension that the government would not have adequate resources in place (almost 18 months into the pandemic at that stage) to enable both aged care and disability care residents to be vaccinated as a matter of priority.
4.56
By June 2021, the rollout to this cohort was even more woeful. Disability care residents were understandably frustrated at the lack of consultation and communication from the government.
4.57
Sadly, the sluggish start was a sign of things to come. More than a year later, in February 2022, the Royal Commission into Violence, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of People with Disability raised concern that the Australian Government was still not prioritising people with disability in its vaccine rollout. The Royal Commission expressed particular concern with what it described as an 'overall de-prioritisation of people with disability and a lack of regard for their health and wellbeing'. It also described issues with a lack of access to vaccinations for people with disability and disability support workers, as well as 'insufficient levels of immunisation when restrictions were eased' in late 2021.
4.58
The committee recommends that the Australian Government implement urgently and in full all recommendations contained in Public Hearing Report 5 and Public Hearing Report 12 of the Royal Commission into Violence, Abuse, Neglect and Exploitation of People with Disability.
Children
4.59
In September 2021, the committee noted that Australia was months behind countries such as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Israel, Singapore, France, and the Netherlands with its rollout to the 12–15 year old cohort.
4.60
Children aged five to 11 years were approved to receive a vaccine from 10 January 2022. However, many parents were initially unable to book their child's appointment through the Australian Government's error-laden online booking system. The government also did not provide timely information to GPs on the arrival of orders for children's doses of the vaccine, undermining the ability of doctors to plan and take advanced bookings.
4.61
Supply and delivery issues also stalled vaccinations for children, prompting the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners (RACGP) to call on the government to 'urgently repair' the rollout for children. Concerns were raised that children with disabilities were not prioritised in the rollout.
4.62
Misinformation and complacency also hampered the vaccine rollout to children—some spread from within the Morrison Government's own ranks, as discussed in Chapter 3. In February 2022, the RACGP raised concerns that parents and expectant parents had encountered vaccine misinformation discouraging them from having their children vaccinated against COVID-19 or being vaccinated themselves. Experts warned that the pace of vaccinations among primary school-aged children had 'slowed dramatically' by mid-February, with more than half of that age group completely unvaccinated.
4.63
One of the most significant and harmful effects of this slow rollout to children is the risk it will prolong remote learning for some children. With children largely unprotected throughout most of 2021, the burden imposed on Australian children by school closures and lockdowns has had an immeasurable effect on their social development and mental health. These effects have been disproportionately borne by the most vulnerable, exposing pre-existing societal inequality and exacerbating emotional and financial stress for families.
4.64
Whilst lockdowns and school closures were epidemiologically justified and necessary in order to curb the spread of the virus and save lives while vaccinations were underway, their duration and resulting impact on children could have been improved had the government ensured a more efficient vaccine rollout.
4.65
The committee recommends that the Australian Government commission an expert review of the impact of COVID-19 and the pandemic response on children including on their education and learning, mental health, and social wellbeing and development.
First Nations Australians
4.66
The Australian Government was advised early in the pandemic that COVID-19 posed a significant and heightened risk to the health and wellbeing of First Nations Australians, resulting from pre-existing inequities in health and
socio-economic outcomes when compared to the general population.
4.67
The Hon Greg Hunt MP, Minister for Health and Aged Care, explicitly acknowledged that First Nations Australians were intended to be a priority for vaccination, stating in September 2021 that: 'Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have been a priority for vaccination since the beginning stages of the national vaccination program.'
4.68
Despite clear advice to government of the risks posed to First Nations Australians by COVID-19, particularly those in remote and regional communities where health disparities are pronounced, in October 2021 the committee heard evidence from organisations delivering vaccines and other primary health services across Australia that the government did not adequately consult, or subsequently revise its vaccination strategies effectively, when its rollout encountered difficulties.
4.69
It took a serious outbreak of Covid-19 in Western NSW in August 2021 for the Australian Government to put in place additional strategies to boost vaccination rates in 30 priority areas. It is not clear how these priority areas were identified by the Commonwealth or whether any evaluations were put in place to monitor the effectiveness of these approaches.
4.70
This evidence was exemplified by witnesses for the Rural and Remote Medical Services who told the committee that with respect to the vaccine rollout for First Nations communities:
There was poor or no communication about who was doing what or about what was happening, and almost no coordination around program delivery on the ground, resulting in duplication and waste.
4.71
Early into the pandemic, Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Organisations (ACCHOs) and public health experts identified the need for tailored messaging for First Nations' communities.
4.72
ACCHOs struggled to coordinate a vaccine rollout while competing with mixed messaging from the Commonwealth and state governments. In evidence to the committee, the South West Aboriginal Medical Service noted:
We have seen very mixed messages here coming from both the Commonwealth and the state government with regard to how culturally safe and appropriate those messages are. How we're getting down into distributing that understanding amongst our local communities is a significant challenge.
4.73
ACCHOs were not given adequate resources to handle multiple challenges throughout the pandemic, including countering misinformation and hesitancy. The Commonwealth’s heavy reliance on only one vaccine—AstraZeneca—had a profound impact on the vaccine rollout in First Nations' communities. In evidence to the committee, the Department of Health admitted 'there was no option to pivot really quickly to change to ACCHOs delivering Pfizer,'. First Nations people were directly impacted by the Government’s failure to secure a diverse supply of vaccines.
4.74
In its evidence to the committee, the Department of Health conceded that it was aware as early as 'mid to late April' of 2021 that First Nations vaccination rates had begun to lag the general population, following the program's commencement in February 2021.
4.75
Lieutenant General John Frewen, Coordinator-General, Operation COVID Shield, acknowledged in October 2021 that a 'wide gap' persisted between the vaccination rates of the First Nations Australians and the general population, more than 6 months after the gap was first identified.
4.76
Lieutenant General Frewen conceded in evidence to a public hearing that the first dose vaccination rate for First Nations Australians was just 57.5 per cent, while rates of two vaccinations was 42.3 per cent. When compared to the broader population, this represented a 26.1 per cent gap for first doses and a 23.1 per cent gap in rates of full vaccination.
4.77
It is unacceptable that the government failed its responsibility to ensure First Nations Australians were adequately protected through vaccination from COVID-19 prior to the widespread easing of public health restrictions in late 2021.
4.78
It is the committee's view that the Australian Government must act urgently to address the persistent gap in rates of full vaccination between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. It is clear from the serious failures in the vaccine rollout that First Nations must be able to self-determine solutions for managing all aspects of COVID-19 in their communities.
4.79
The committee recommends that the Australian Government adequately address the social determinants of health, which have been exacerbated by the pandemic, when delivering responses to COVID-19 with First Nations communities, including food security, fuel security, water security, quarantine facilities, transport, infrastructure, housing.
National Cabinet
4.80
On 13 March 2020, the National Cabinet was established to oversee the health and economic response to COVID-19. Meeting at least monthly and chaired by the Prime Minister, it included state premiers and territory chief ministers. Implementation of decisions taken at the National Cabinet remained the responsibility of the Commonwealth, state, and territory governments.
4.81
The National Cabinet should have been the operational arm of the pandemic response. It could have served as an effective vehicle for securing agreement and consensus and managing the interface between the Commonwealth and states and territories. And it should have facilitated information sharing between jurisdictions to inform and shape the response.
4.82
It did none of these things effectively.
4.83
An effective response to COVID-19 required a seamless and consistent approach across the Federation. The National Cabinet was intended to provide just this. The Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Mr Phillip Gaetjens, described the body as the 'central governance mechanism through which Commonwealth, state and territory leaders together could make quick decisions'. Yet, from the outset, the Australian Government was unable or unwilling to lead and foster consensus through the National Cabinet. States and territories were left to implement highly-localised and often highly-differentiated responses.
4.84
The Australian Government's failure to lead through the National Cabinet meant local responses were often inconsistent and failed to complement one another. The Institute of Public Affairs described the result as 'a confusing patchwork of arrangements which varied widely state-by-state'.
4.85
State and territory leaders increasingly found themselves at odds with other leaders. For example, in mid-2021 a prolonged public spat between Victoria and New South Wales over vaccine supplies and public health restrictions shook public confidence in the national response.
4.86
Throughout the pandemic, the Australian Government not only failed to unite the country but at times even fostered divisions, apparently for political gain. For example, in October 2020 the Prime Minister praised the NSW response as the 'gold standard' even whilst undermining Victoria's response and labelling Melbourne's COVID-19 outbreak the 'Victorian wave'.
4.87
The Hon Peter Dutton MP, then-Minister for Home Affairs, added to national divisions in August 2020 by condemning Queensland's premier for being 'a panicker' and describing the state's temporary border closure as 'devastating'. Days later, the Treasurer, labelled Victoria's response, 'the biggest public policy failure by a state government in living memory'.
4.88
States have also seen very different economic support measures made available by the Australian Government—with assistance seemingly handed out along party lines. In July 2021, for example, the Victorian Government accused the Prime Minister of a 'double standard' when the Australian Government provided a multibillion-dollar support package to NSW during its lockdown, in contrast to Victoria having to 'beg for every scrap of support', according to the spokesperson.
4.89
The Grattan Institute summarised this role played by the National Cabinet:
The National Cabinet dealt the Prime Minister into discussion of state decisions, and gave the states political cover for difficult choices. Because it was set up in haste, there were no real rules for its operation. It has no decision-making power—that still rests with each of the participants—and there is no collective accountability to the public through any of the parliaments. Often the outcome of a National Cabinet meeting was a 'decision' in name only. Often, behind the fig-leaf of unity, each state and territory went its own way.
Communication failures
4.90
The Australian Government repeatedly put out mixed signals that fostered complacency and undermined public health messaging. As vaccination targets slipped and pressure mounted from early 2021, a coordinated government campaign insisted the vaccine rollout was 'not a race'. Dr Brendan Murphy, Secretary of the Department of Health, appears to have coined the infamous phrase on 10 March 2021, at which time he stated:
This is not a race. We have no burning platform in Australia.
4.91
The following day, the Prime Minister adopted the slogan in a series of public appearances, repeatedly insisting the rollout was 'not a race'. The message continued to be used by Prim Minister Morrison and other senior government officials throughout the first half of the year.
4.92
Messages like this fed complacency and a lack of urgency in the face of the pandemic. A survey conducted in May 2021 found almost a third of Australians were unlikely to get a COVID-19 vaccine. Some were hesitant over potential side effects, but many saw little reason to get vaccinated while international borders were closed and infection rates remained low. But as the vaccine rollout fell even further behind schedule, the Prime Minister in July 2021 expressed regret for using the phrase and acknowledged the need to 'make up that ground'.
4.93
Statements by the Prime Minister may also have fuelled anti-vaccination sentiment and undermined the authority of states to impose public health measures. For example, following violent protests over public health restrictions in Victoria in November 2021, the Prime Minister condemned the violence but expressed sympathy with Australians 'who have had a gutful of governments telling them what to do'.
4.94
The Prime Minister again muddied the waters in February 2022 when protesters objecting to vaccine mandates marched on Parliament House. Mr Morrison said, 'I understand their concerns', and blamed state governments for imposing the mandates.
4.95
Messages like these from our most senior government representatives undermine community acceptance of public health and infection control measures and contribute to delays in vaccine uptake, jeopardising the safety and wellbeing of us all.
Operation COVID Shield
4.96
The government's self-imposed vaccine targets have repeatedly been walked back and missed, as detailed in Chapter 2. Throughout the first six months of the rollout, the government managed to oversell and overpromise. Early failures of the rollout led to the word 'strollout' entering our vernacular, and it was named 2021 word of the year by the Australian National Dictionary Centre.
4.97
On 8 June 2021, after the rollout had already fallen months behind schedule, the Prime Minister appointed Lieutenant General John Frewen to lead the National COVID Vaccine Taskforce within the Department of Health, known as Operation COVID Shield. Lt General Frewen was tasked with getting the vaccine rollout back on track and bolstering public confidence in the response. Whilst vaccine coverage improved markedly under Operation COVID Shield, the Prime Minister later acknowledged, 'if I had my time over, I would have put [the vaccination programme] under a military operation from the outset… I wish we'd done that earlier'.
4.98
The early failings in the vaccine rollout had profound implications for Australians across the country—and overseas. Had the original targets been reached, public health experts argue Australia would have been in a significantly stronger position to contain the spread of the virus. While the rollout eventually picked up pace towards the end of 2021, and now compares favourably with other jurisdictions, the considerable delays in launching the rollout strategy put Australia months behind much of the rest of the world (see Figure 4.6, below). Australians faced longer lockdowns, extended infection prevention measures, prolonged economic pressures, and many remained stranded overseas, battling to return home.
4.99
The rollout strategy was hastily prepared and was not backed by sound delivery mechanisms, leading to a slow launch that took six-months to gain traction.
4.100
The government initially relied on a GP-led rollout to reach priority groups, instead of the mass vaccination clinics used in many other countries. But early vaccine shortages and uncertainty over the allocations to each state delayed the scheduling of appointments and resulted in frustration and lost months.
4.101
The logistical challenge of getting each dose into the hands of a GP also proved highly complex, contributing to the delayed rollout and leaving high-risk cohorts particularly vulnerable for longer. Many GPs invested heavily in the capacity to store and administer large numbers of doses. But when clinics received only a fraction of the anticipated number of doses, countless patients were turned away.
4.102
On 5 March 2021, the Minister for Health and Aged Care insisted Australia had 'more than enough' vaccine doses and expressed confidence in his government's ability to maintain sufficient volumes to keep the rollout on schedule. Days later, the Prime Minister also defended the pace of the rollout: 'It's steady. It's safe. It's well-planned'.
4.103
But as targets were repeatedly missed, the Australian Government erroneously pointed the finger at states, accusing them of stockpiling vaccines, 'sitting on their hands', and failing to administer the supplies they had been given. States responded that they had been given little notice of delivery schedules or the number of doses they were to receive from the Australian Government, undermining their ability to administer the vaccines.
No urgency on mRNA vaccine
4.104
As discussed in Chapter 2, the lack of vaccine diversity meant supply shortages plagued Australia's vaccine rollout from the start. It became apparent from more efficient vaccine rollouts in other countries that mRNA vaccines were proving to be the most effective at combatting COVID-19, as well as being more easily adapted to new variants. The Australian Government should have done more to secure local manufacturing capability for these vaccines as soon as their significance became clear.
4.105
However, there was no sense of urgency from the Australian Government. The Prime Minister did not announce plans for developing local manufacturing capability for mRNA vaccines until December 2021, a full year after these vaccines began to be rolled out overseas. Although this was a welcome announcement, the committee notes that production is unlikely to begin before 2024.
COVIDSafe app
4.106
The Australian Government launched the COVIDSafe app in April 2020 as a critical COVID-19 contact tracing tool. In its first interim report, the committee noted the Prime Minister's claims that the app was the 'ticket to ensuring we can ease restrictions' and likened Australians' use of the app to the application of sunscreen. However the COVIDSafe app has been roundly criticised for its high cost and significant limitations as a practical measure for contact tracing.
4.107
As of 4 October 2021, the COVIDSafe app had cost Australian taxpayers $9.19 million, including GST, of which $2.77 million were costs associated with hosting the app using Amazon Web Services. The government has estimated the monthly maintenance costs of the COVIDSafe app to be between $75 000 and $60 000.
4.108
Concerns have been raised about the COVIDSafe app's reliance on Bluetooth technology as an ineffective proxy for close contacts; parameters that fail to account for COVID-19 variants of increased infectiousness; and the app not meeting citizens' privacy expectations. In February 2022, a study of the app's use in NSW between May and November 2020 found that from approximately 25 300 close contacts, the app detected just 17 additional close contacts which were not identified through conventional contact tracing methods (under 0.1 per cent of all cases).
4.109
An evaluation of the COVIDSafe app, commissioned by the government and released in response to a freedom of information request in August 2021, also noted the app's low rate of novel COVID-19 detection and warned of the serious efficiency challenges this created for contact tracers:
…while all app potential contacts need to be validated by contact tracers, a significant number of those individuals are either 'false close contacts' or individuals already identified by standard contact tracing. This is compounded by existing processes to access datastore information.
4.110
When the government was asked to provide an update on how many additional contacts the COVIDSafe app had identified, it failed to do so, and claimed the states and territories were responsible for reporting the number of cases identified.
4.111
The future use of the COVIDSafe app appears uncertain, in no small part due to states having reportedly given up on using the app. In September 2021, officials told the committee that the app would not be used to support a national app for unified access to digital vaccine certificates due to concerns about the interoperability of the COVIDSafe app with check-in apps used by the states and territories. In October 2021, government officials suggested there was no intention to update the COVIDSafe app.
4.112
The Minister for Health has sought to defend the value of the app, telling Parliament that 'any single case can lead to many others. So it's played an important role.' By not recognising the app's faults, or seeking to fix the app, the government has continued to oversee an application which is not fit for its intended purpose, has cost millions of dollars, and offered limited public value.
4.113
The committee recommends that the Australian Government cease any further expenditure of public funds on the failed COVIDSafe application.
The COVID Commission: an expensive failure
4.114
On 25 March 2020, the National COVID-19 Coordination Commission was formed to advise the government on mitigating the economic and social impacts of the pandemic. On 27 July 2020, it was renamed the National COVID-19 Commission Advisory Board (NCC). Terms of reference for the group were published online a month after it was formed by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, but this page has since been removed. Members of the commission were hand-picked by the Prime Minister, with no transparency or accountability around the process.
4.115
The NCC was chaired by Mr Neville Power, the former CEO of Fortescue Metals and board member of Australian Securities Exchange-listed gas company Strike Energy. Mr Power received $267 345 plus GST for six months in the role. Other commissioners were engaged on a part-time basis at a daily rate of up to $2000. The NCC also commissioned hundreds of thousands of dollars of work from external consulting firms.
4.116
All in, the NCC had cost taxpayers $6.5 million by the end of 2021. Yet there is no public record of its work.
4.117
Also advising the commission and leading its manufacturing taskforce was Mr Andrew Liveris, a director of Saudi Aramco (the world's biggest oil producer), a former CEO of Dow Chemical, and adviser to former United States President Donald Trump on domestic manufacturing and deregulation. The government appears to have embraced the recommendations of the taskforce:
on 20 April 2020, Minister for Industry, Energy and Emissions Reduction, the Hon Angus Taylor MP, promoted the idea of a 'gas-fired recovery' from the pandemic; and
on 21 May 2020, a leaked report from the NCC detailed plans for taxpayers to underwrite a massive expansion of the domestic gas industry.
4.118
The expertise and backgrounds of commissioners raised significant concerns around actual, perceived, or potential conflicts of interest, as detailed in this committee's first interim report.
4.119
Darebin Climate Action Now submitted that the strong mining and resources background of commission members was concerning, given several 'own shares in petrochemical companies, and/or work for or sit on the boards of companies that stand to gain from a gas expansion'. The submission also expressed concern that 'little information is publicly available about the way in which the commission operates or the advice it provides to the Government'. Dr Geraldine McCarron submitted that the appointment of the NCC lacked transparency and parliamentary oversight.
4.120
Another submitter described the Prime Minister's choice of commissioners as 'farcical', expressing concern the NCC would 'facilitate the taxpayer-funded bailout of the industries they represent, and [would] broker the transfer of vast swathes of public money to private coffers'. A further submission pointed to what they saw as the 'vested interests' of NCC members who may gain financially if government were to implement its advice, as well as the NCC's 'lack of transparency around interests and decision-making'.
4.121
Mr Peter Harris, CEO of the NCC, conceded to the committee, 'the process is opaque for where [the work of the NCC] goes once it's completed.
4.122
Mr Harris also detailed for the committee how commissioners were required to complete a conflict-of-interest declaration. They were also asked to declare any conflicts of interest at the outset of each meeting, following which the respective commissioner may elect to step aside for the specific discussion. Officials refused to disclose the conflict-of-interest declarations of NCC members to the committee.
4.123
Officials and departments also declined to answer the committee's questions relating to advice provided by the NCC, claiming it was subject to cabinet confidentiality. Officials also failed to respond to requests from the committee for a list of the NCC's reports to government.
4.124
The NCC was beset by allegations of infighting and power struggles between Ministers and Departments. On 3 May 2021, the Prime Minister announced the NCC had 'concluded' its work and would be immediately disbanded. The NCC's website was promptly deleted the following month.
4.125
Ultimately, Australians were left to foot the bill of at least $6.5 million for a body that lacked transparency, seemingly operated with only the oversight of the Prime Minister, released no work publicly, and failed to demonstrate how its commissioners' conflicts of interest were managed.
4.126
The committee recommends that the Australian Government make all reports of the National COVID-19 Commission Advisory Board public, along with all declarations of actual and perceived conflicts of interest made by commissioners.
Foreign students
4.127
When the borders closed, many international students were cut off from their homes and families, and lost casual jobs in services, retail and hospitality.
4.128
Education services are an important export market for Australia, with over 750 000 international student enrolments in Australian education institutions in 2019.
4.129
Despite the significant contribution made by international students to Australia's economy and society, they were not eligible for government financial assistance. Many subsequently returned to their home countries.
4.130
The committee was told of how the loss of foreign students had placed the tertiary education sector under 'severe stress'. A witness from the Department of Education, Skills and Employment cautioned that the university sector would have to adjust significantly to reduced numbers of international students.
4.131
In October 2020, the government allocated $1 billion to university research in an attempt to offset the impact of decreased foreign student numbers on the higher education sector. Lost revenue from international students in 2021 was expected to be twice that.
Vaccination rates in Pacific countries still shocking
4.132
The committee received submissions calling for increasing Australian assistance to the Pacific region and strengthening initiatives to support broader coverage of COVID-19 vaccination programmes and future outbreaks.
4.133
Australia has a particular responsibility to our Pacific neighbours. Our help in supporting the region to stave off the worst effects of the virus and help Pacific countries vaccinate their people is essential. This assistance will also have public health benefits for Australians. Experts warn that the next COVID variant could emerge in the Pacific due to exceedingly low vaccination rates across the region.
4.134
Vaccination rates in the Pacific remain well behind schedule. Under two-thirds (60 per cent) of Vanuatuans are vaccinated, less than a third of Solomon Islanders (32 per cent), and just 7 per cent of Papua New Guineans have been fully vaccinated against COVID-19 and the country is expected to reach only a third of its population by late 2026.
4.135
By early 2021, the Government of Australia had in place advance purchase agreements for vaccine supplies to be provided to the region, had supported the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access facility, and had created a regional vaccine access and health security initiative to support vaccine initiatives across the Pacific and beyond. The government also claimed to have 'ample redundancy of vaccines for boosters', enabling it to supply Pacific neighbours, if required.
4.136
As of 21 November 2021, Australia had contributed 11.4 million doses predominantly of the AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccine to the Pacific, constituting two-thirds (66 per cent) of the region's supply. However, uptake was extremely slow across the region following safety concerns with the vaccine. Lieutenant General John Frewen, Coordinator of the National COVID Vaccine Taskforce, told the committee that, wherever possible, 'we are moving AstraZeneca to [the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade] for sharing out into the Pacific'.
4.137
The committee recommends that the Australian Government increase its contribution of COVID-19 vaccines to Pacific regional countries and increase its provision of technical support related to the promotion and delivery of mass vaccination campaigns.