Chapter 3
Committee view and response to the commission's recommendations
3.1
This chapter will summarise the committee's concerns about the National Commission
of Audit's (the commission) processes, assumptions and recommendations.
Commission's flawed processes
Composition of commission
3.2
In its first interim report the committee commented on the composition
of the commission.[1]
The commission was weighted with hand-picked individuals from the business
community and former senior public servants from Treasury and the Department of
Finance. In addition, the commission was supported by officials from only three
departments, the Treasury, Department of Finance and the Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet.[2]
3.3
The committee reiterates its concerns that there was no representation on
the commission by people from the community, health or welfare sector or the
union movement to bring their expertise to the commission's deliberations. Further,
secretariat support given to the commission was not drawn from a sufficiently
broad cross-section of the public service. As pointed out by the Australia
Institute:
Proposals to increase the efficiency of service delivery need
to be vetted by people who understand how systems work, not just what they
cost.[3]
A predetermined outcome
3.4
The terms of reference for the commission were engineered by government
and the commissioners were selected in order to achieve a pre-determined ideologically-driven
outcome. The recommendations will benefit the business community and high
income earners at the expense of hard working low and middle income Australians
and the most vulnerable in the community. This outcome is certainly evident in
the budget with analysis from the National Centre for Social and Economic
Modelling showing:
The poorest 20 per cent of Australian families will pay $1.1
billion more into government coffers than the richest households as a result of
the budget, highlighting the huge inequity in the government's four-year
blueprint for fiscal repair.[4]
Conflicts of interest
3.5
The chair and secretariat head for the commission appear to have only
considered the question of conflicts of interest with their previous positions
at the Business Council Australia (BCA) in a superficial way. While a guide for
how to address any conflicts was made available on the commission's website[5]
none of the conflicts identified by the commissioners have been considered
sufficient for commissioners to exclude themselves from discussions. When the
handling of the BCA submission was discussed, Mr Peter Crone, head of the
commission's secretariat, who was on leave from his position as Chief Economist
and Director of Policy at the BCA, said he saw no conflict of interest in dealing
with that submission.[6]
3.6
The committee considers that where a person refuses to see the potential
for the conflict of interest it can't be adequately addressed. The committee
called for the commission to make public the full declarations of conflict of
interest signed by the commissioners and a list of any times when they have had
to be excluded from discussions or receiving submissions due to conflicts of
interest. This has not been provided with the commission arguing that it is not
appropriate to make the declarations public.[7]
Lack of transparency
3.7
As highlighted in the committee's first interim report, the processes
being used by the National Commission of Audit to gather and analyse
information lacked transparency.
3.8
The committee is pleased to note, however, that public submissions are
now available from the commission's website.[8]
Prior to this, submissions were only available to the public in cases where a
submitter took steps to make their submission public through publishing it on
their own website. This process of leaving people to search for the information
the commission was using in its deliberations was clearly inadequate.
3.9
The processes around meeting with the commission were ad hoc. The
commission said it had over 100 meetings. Commissioners met with those who
requested a meeting but not everyone who made a submission. The committee asked
the commission to provide details of meetings with stakeholders but this was
not provided as the commission considered it would be an 'inappropriate diversion
of resources to compile this information for the committee by the deadline for
responses'.[9]
3.10
While the committee is pleased to see the submissions to the commission were
eventually made available on the commission's website, it is disappointed that information
on the meetings with stakeholders has not been provided.
Timeframe too short
3.11
The committee considers that the rushed timeframe set for the commission
by government was too ambitious for it to examine the size and scope of all
Commonwealth expenditure and formulate advice to government that will encourage
evidence-based policy decisions.
3.12
Mr Tony Shepherd, chair of the commission, suggested the commission's
recommendations were all 'sensible' and should be adopted in full. However, Mr
Shepherd admitted that the commission did not have time to work through each
proposal in full with the relevant departments.[10]
This is discussed in more detail below in relation to the lack of evidence for
recommendations.
Secrecy
3.13
The committee agrees the work of the commission is important, if for the
only reason that it has clearly informed the 2014-15 budget. The committee
heard that 'everything is on the table'[11]
but the timing of the release of the commission's report by the government
occurred too late to provide proper scrutiny of the proposals before the budget
was released.
3.14
The interim report was provided to the government two weeks late in
mid-February and the final report was provided at the end of March. Neither
report was released to the public until 1 May 2014 which was well after the
South Australian and Tasmanian state elections and the Western Australian Senate
election. Clearly the government wanted to keep the size and scope of the
possible cuts from the public for as long as possible.
Disjointed reviews
3.15
The government has stated that tax expenditure will be the subject of a
separate review which has not yet started. In the committee's second interim
report it was noted there is also a welfare review being undertaken by Mr
Patrick McClure, which is being conducted separately to the work of the
commission and has not yet been released.[12]
3.16
The committee believes this fragmented approach to the review of government
expenditure and revenue, with separate processes being conducted in isolation,
will result in an approach which lacks cohesion and awareness of any possible
unintended consequences.
Lack of costings
3.17
The committee requested the costings for each of the commission's recommendations.
The commission admitted that it did not prepare costings for all of its
recommendations and did not undertake detailed financial modelling:
The Commission has prepared indicative savings from its
Recommendations. However, without decisions on detailed programme design and
timing of implementation – which are matters for government – it is not
possible to be definitive.
Detailed costings undertaken as part of the budget process
would give greater clarity around the financial implications of the
Recommendations.[13]
3.18
Instead, the commission provided advice on the 'broader order of
magnitude of savings potentially arising from its Recommendations', emphasising
that without detailed financial modelling, the estimates provided should be
treated as indicative only.[14]
Lack of evidence
3.19
Not only was the committee concerned by the lack of costings for each
recommendation, it was also concerned by the limited evidence base.
3.20
As noted by the Australia Institute:
...an audit report, like any well researched report, usually
contains extensive notes, clarifications and references to external sources of
data. For a document of its length and breadth, the Commission of Audit is
sparsely referenced, and, of greater concern for those interested in evidence-based
policy, the references that are provided are overwhelmingly to publications by
the government itself.[15]
3.21
The committee questions the lack of transparency and depth regarding the
evidence base for the commission's recommendations. For example, when
discussing the evidence which led the commission to recommend GP co-payments, Mr
Shepherd admitted the commission did not have the technical expertise for that
analysis and ultimately recommended that the Minister for Health review the
issue. He also admitted:
The evidence that we have relied on was basically just the
ever-increasing cost.[16]
3.22
The committee requested the evidence relied on for overservicing by GPs.
The commission's response again emphasised the broad aim of improving the
overall healthcare system but no specific evidence was provided.[17]
Â
Terms of reference based on flawed assumptions
3.23
The terms of reference make a number of assumptions which the committee
has proved incorrect. For example, the real picture of the economy and public
service, discussed below, is at odds with what the commission and government have
been saying.
Government spending
3.24
The committee heard that Commonwealth spending is not 'out of control'
as assumed in the terms of reference for the commission. Government spending is
reasonable, small and efficient, not only by historical Australian trends but
also by international comparisons.[18]
Debt and deficit
3.25
The terms of reference assume there is a debt crisis which can only be
achieved by cutting expenditure. In fact the committee heard that when compared
with other OECD countries Australia's level of debt is reasonable and modest.[19]
Mr Shepherd admitted there is no immediate crisis but he stressed the need to
take action to avoid one in the future.[20]
3.26
The committee considers the case for a 'budget emergency' to be
considerably overstated. The only budget emergency is one confected by the
government.
Targets
3.27
The commission was asked to make recommendations to achieve savings
sufficient to deliver a surplus of 1 per cent of GDP prior to 2023-24. As
discussed in the committee's first interim report, this was a target chosen by
government and there was a lack of clarity around how it was chosen. Witnesses
suggested that, if current growth trends continue, the economy may be in surplus
before 2023-34 even without substantial cuts to government spending.[21]
Limitations
3.28
The commission's terms of reference are one-sided as the tax or revenue side
of the equation is not included. The committee has previously noted the
disjointed approach by the government with expenditure and revenue being
reviewed separately.[22]
3.29
Given the government forgoes a considerable amount of revenue in tax
expenditures and concessions, the committee decided to look into this area to
examine possible savings. The committee found it is not an area which is regularly
reviewed and lacks transparency. The committee believes that if the government
is prepared to consider a co-payment fee to visit a GP, which would affect the
health of the most disadvantaged, it should also be considering over $100
billion of tax concessions. However, the Treasurer has already moved to
reassure the mining industry that there will be no cuts to the diesel fuel
rebate which is expected to cost $2.4 billion over the next financial year.[23]
Instead, breaking one of its own election promises not to increase taxes, the
government has announced that the fuel excise will now increase in line with
inflation twice a year.[24]
3.30
Even the commission admitted it was necessary to go outside its terms of
reference to offer a view on some areas of taxation such as the GST (recommendation
9) and comment on superannuation tax concessions.[25]
The committee also notes the following recommendations which are outside the
commission's terms of reference:
- to ensure that taxation receipts remain below 24 per cent of GDP
(recommendation 1); and
- the view that the level of the minimum wage is too high
(recommendation 28).[26]
3.31
The committee notes the commission's report is silent on the government's
Direct Action Policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Mr Shepherd indicated
that consideration was not included as no information or detail was available
during the timeframe of the audit. Given the policy is expected to cost $3.2
billion,[27]
and the statement by Mr Shepherd that 'everything is on the table', the
committee finds this omission remarkable.
Employment
Public service
3.32
The terms of reference also assume the public service is too large and inefficient.
In fact, the committee heard that the public service is very efficient by world
standards.[28]
The public service has already been subjected to efficiency dividends and one
off increases to efficiency dividends so there is little left to cut without
affecting front line services.
3.33
In the committee's view the public sector is efficient, reasonably sized
and provides good value for money for the Commonwealth. No consideration has
been given to the effect of further job cuts to the public servants, the loss
of services provided to the community as well as the flow-on effects to the
local economies such as the ACT. Signs of an economic downturn in the ACT are
already evident.[29]
The further cuts to the public service announced by the government in the budget
will further compound this effect.[30]
Privatisation
3.34
The commission appears to accept uncritically that privatisation of
government services leads to more efficient outcomes. This was certainly the
view of Mr Shepherd:
The results have been mixed, but I would say that
overwhelmingly the privatisations have been successful. Some lessons learnt, I
guess, would be that when you do privatise you should ensure that you retain
the level of public service that is already being provided and you do not put
in jeopardy the quality and competence of the services that have been provided.
You can do that, and you can build that into a privatisation so that you can
protect the future. I have been involved in many infrastructure projects—PPP [public
private partnerships] projects. The last major one I was involved in was a toll
road in Melbourne, and we had instituted on us standards of customer service
that had never been seen in a toll road in Australia before, and we met those
standards. That is a private development, and the customer service is far
superior to anything else being offered by the private sector or Public Service
in Australia, because that is built into the contract. There is a price to pay
for that, but you can do that. I think the trick with privatisations is not to
throw the baby out with the bathwater, and not to do it for ideological reasons
but to do it for sound economic and business efficiency reasons.[31]
3.35
However, there has been no consideration of examples of privatisation where
increased efficiency has not been the outcome. The ACTU stressed to the
committee:
We also take issue with a number of the terms of reference
which really are one way towards an in-principle view that matters such as
outsourcing and contracting out are always more efficient. We detail in the
submission that recent experience both here and in the UK has shown that
privatisation and outsourcing have not always proven to be efficient and
cost-effective means of delivering services.[32]
3.36
The Australia Institute indicated that the commission ignored a large
body of research highlighting problems with privatisation and stated:
Providing a list of assets that should be sold the Commission
of Audit provides scant evidence that such privatisations would deliver lower
costs to consumers or increase the efficiency of the markets they operate in.
Of even greater concern the Commission of Audit provides no effective guidance
about the kinds of assets that are most suited to privatisation and the kinds
that are not, nor does it provide meaningful guidance about the best process by
which different kinds of assets should be privatised. Despite empirical
evidence to the contrary, the Commission of Audit simply seems to believe that
any privatisation is good privatisation.[33]
3.37
The commission's assumption that privatisation will result in more
efficient outcomes has not been the result in every case. The committee
believes further work is required before making privatisation decisions.
Relevant examples in other jurisdictions should be reviewed and each decision
should be subject to a full cost-benefit analysis.
Welfare and support
Youth unemployment
3.38
The committee heard about high levels of youth unemployment.[34]
The commission recommended that young people aged 22 to 30, who do not have dependants
or special exemptions, should be required to relocate to higher employment
areas or lose benefits (recommendation 27).
3.39
Requiring individuals to relocate is a blunt instrument which does not
take account of practicalities such as transport and accommodation or loss of
social support networks and is not supported by the committee.
3.40
As part of the budget the government has announced a package of reforms
in this area. Job seekers applying for Newstart or Youth Allowance, who have
not been previously employed, will be required to wait for six months before
they are eligible for payments by participating in the Work for the Dole
program. In addition, individuals under 25 will have to apply for Youth
Allowance which is about $100 less per fortnight. Newstart and Youth Allowance
will also be frozen for the next three years.[35]
3.41
The committee believes that in order for young Australians to find a job,
government needs to provide good education, training and support. The budget
seems based on a premise that young Australians don't want to work, rather than
the reality faced by many that it is difficult for them to find employment. The
committee fails to see how denying these young Australians support so they can
pay for rent and food while they look for work is going to improve their
situation. Indigenous Australians are likely to be particularly affected by
changes to the welfare system.[36]
3.42
Given these budget measures and the negative effect they will have on
many young people, the committee finds it of great concern that funding for the
national peak body for youth affairs has been cut and the Australian Youth
Affairs Coalition will be forced to close its doors at the end of June 2014.
Four full-time and two part-time staff will be made redundant. Parliamentary
Secretary to the Minister for Education, Senator the Hon Scott Ryan responded:
This government does not believe that a single peak body is
necessary for it to hear the views of Australian youth, nor that a single peak
body is capable of representing the diverse interests, experiences and
background of young Australians...The government is currently developing plans to
consult with young Australians using a more focused and targeted approach.[37]
3.43
This move shows the government is treating the views of young
Australians with complete disdain by forcing an organisation which provides a
national voice for young people to close its doors.
Disability Support Pension
3.44
The commission recommended changes to the Disability Support Pension
(recommendation 29). The committee notes the government has gone even further
to include a review of the eligibility of those aged under 35 and participation
in compulsory programs if they are deemed to be able to work more than eight
hours a week.[38]
3.45
The committee notes that many Australians with a disability want the
chance to work if they are able. Taking support away from people does not, as a
consequence, create a job for that person. Real jobs and appropriate support
for them at work are critical for a successful transition to work and the
committee can see no evidence of these wider considerations by the government.
National Disability Insurance Scheme
3.46
While supporting the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), the
commission recommended a slower phasing in of the scheme (recommendation 16).
This is not supported by the committee. The NDIS will significantly improve the
quality of life and services for those living with a disability who have
already been waiting for assistance for too long.
Health
3.47
All Australians should have access to high-quality health care not just
those who can pay for it. The recommendations from the commission's report for GP
co-payments (recommendation 17) would result in the end of universal health
care. As noted in its second interim report, the committee received no evidence
to support the argument that there is overservicing by GPs and, as noted above,
no evidence has been provided by the commission. People visit their GP for
preventative measures including screening and vaccinations. They also visit the
GP to manage chronic diseases such as diabetes or heart disease.
3.48
Evidence received by the committee indicated that putting a barrier in
place to seeing a GP, such as a co-payment, has the potential to hurt the most
vulnerable in our society and may cause people to delay treatment and tests, resulting
in a need for more expensive hospital care.[39]
Co-payments
3.49
In a discussion with Mr Shepherd he stressed that the commission's recommendations
had not been worked through with the relevant departments and the co-payment
issue has been referred to the Minister for Health.[40]
3.50
The committee is very concerned that the recommendations made by the
commission in this area do not have a sound evidence base. In addition, they do
not appear to have been thoroughly reviewed and tested for unintended
consequences.
3.51
It has also been pointed out that while the commission suggests people
are visiting the doctor too often, it does not take account of regional
circumstances 'where people visit the doctor less often, have less access to
GPs and have poorer health outcomes as a result'.[41]
3.52
The committee was concerned that in the rush for savings, these
recommendations would be accepted by the government with little or no further
work. Unfortunately this is exactly what has occurred with the government
announcing a $7 co-payment for GP visits and medical tests. Since the budget, medical
professionals have already repeated the concerns expressed to the committee
that some people, particularly those on low incomes, will defer care or go to
hospital emergency department rather than pay the GP fee.[42]
3.53
Evidence reinforcing these concerns continues to emerge following the
budget announcement:
Data collected by researchers at the University of Sydney for
the Bettering the Evaluation and Care of Health program shows almost a quarter
of GP visits result in pathology or diagnostic imaging tests being ordered.
Helena Britt, director of the family medicine research centre
at the university's school of public health, said such tests were crucial to
help doctors care for patients with multiple chronic conditions.
''We've had people in our study with 16 diagnosed chronic
conditions,'' she said. ''You've got multiple pharmaceutical products and other
treatments going on. They all have to be kept an eye on. But if the patient
can't see really why they need to have the pathology tests done, and it's
another $7 cost - that's $14 in all, then maybe they just won't go and have the
tests".[43]
3.54
The effect on Indigenous Australians is also likely to be particularly
severe. Mr Mick Gooda, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice
Commissioner, has pointed out:
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people access Medicare
services at a rate which is almost one third lower than what is required on a
needs basis. Our people need encouragement to access medical services, not more
barriers. Increasing out-of-pocket expenses for health care will further entrench
barriers to equitable healthcare.[44]
3.55
The government is trying to sell the end of universal health care with
the announcement that the money from the co-payment will go into a $20 billion Medical
Research Future Fund. There is very little detail available about this proposed
fund.[45]
This proposal does nothing to address the looming crisis with the government
taking billions out of the health budget which will result in fewer hospital
beds, crowded emergency departments and longer waiting times for hospitals.
Other recommendations
3.56
The committee was concerned to see the recommendation to reform national
disaster relief (recommendation 41). The government's test stated in the
commission's terms of reference is 'government should do for people what they
cannot do, or cannot do efficiently for themselves, but no more'.[46]
The committee considers that a natural disaster is surely a text book example of
such a situation.
Conclusion
3.57
The committee supports the regular review of government expenditure and
the need to find sensible efficiencies. However, it considers the work of the
commission has been a missed opportunity to have a conversation with the
community concerning questions such as what kind of society Australia wishes to
promote.
3.58
The committee does not agree with the direction and society envisaged by
the commission. Rather than a compassionate society to assist the most
vulnerable, the commission provides a blue print for a 'dog eat dog' world.
3.59
The recipe for an American-style health system is of particular concern.
Instead of tearing down Medicare, the government should be building it up and
extending it to dental care.
3.60
The committee process has shown that the government rhetoric about a
budget emergency is not supported by the evidence. The recommendations are
unfortunately entirely predictable: cuts to services for the most vulnerable.
3.61
The commission's recommendations are unbalanced. All the work to find
savings is being done by cuts to government expenditure but revenue is not
included. A complete and cohesive picture is needed rather than the disjointed approach
being undertaken by the government.
3.62
The committee is fundamentally concerned with the lack of costings and evidence
to support the commission's recommendations. Given many of the recommendations
of the commission have already been translated into budget measures and others
may be adopted in future budgets, the committee calls on the government to
provide greater transparency for each recommendation.
Recommendation 3
3.63
The committee recommends that the government release the costings and
evidence base for each recommendation from the National Commission of Audit.
Recommendation 4
3.64
The committee recommends that by 31 December 2014, the government
provide a response to each of the recommendations made by the National Commission
of Audit. The response should indicate whether the recommendation has been
accepted by government and when it will be implemented and where a
recommendation has not been accepted, the government should provide reasons.
Senator Richard Di Natale
Chair
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