Peace and security in the Blue Pacific
4.1
The Committee heard that shared security and stability in the Pacific region are fundamentally important regional requirements, which are key Step-up objectives. The Australian Government’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper framed the Pacific region as being of strategic and economic importance:
…In this dynamic environment, competition is intensifying, over both power and the principles and values on which the regional order should be based.
4.2
At the 50th Pacific Islands Forum in Tuvalu in 2019, Forum leaders agreed to develop a ‘2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent’. The Pacific Islands Forum 2050 Vision is:
In 2050, the Blue Pacific Continent is a region of peace; harmony; security, social inclusion; and increased prosperity so that all Pacific people are leading free, healthy and productive lives.
Our Blue Pacific identity reinforces the potential of our shared stewardship of the Pacific Ocean and reaffirms the connections of Pacific peoples with their natural resources, environment, cultures and livelihoods.
We understand that this vision can only be achieved through regional collective action.
4.3
The current significant relationship established between Australia and the countries of the Pacific island region to date was highlighted in evidence by Mr Nic Maclellan:
Australia by far remains the leading actor in aid, trade and military co‑operation in the region.
4.4
However, Mr Maclellan also stresses that Australia is not the only relationship being fostered for security and stability:
But increasing South–South diplomacy from India, Korea, Indonesia, China and other partners runs counter to the notion that Canberra alone has the answers to governance, security, stability and prosperity in the Pacific. As one small example, Cuba has actively engaged with Pacific countries as a fellow member of the Alliance of Small Island States … working together on issues such as the effects of climate change, the training of medical officers, decolonisation and collaboration over sugar policy in global trade forums. This was unthinkable years ago, when Cuba was seen as a Soviet proxy.
4.5
While the Committee received evidence related to defence security, most contemporary facets of defence security in the region have been explored in the Committee’s defence relationships inquiry, which was conducted parallel to this inquiry. As such, this inquiry has primarily focussed on the soft power aspects of regional security and stability and indirect strategic influence.
4.6
The following areas which influence broader and foundational regional stability were raised by contributors and discussed in this chapter:
Climate change and frequency of natural disaster impacts;
Security of natural resources;
Robust governance frameworks; and
Pacific health and health services.
Climate and disaster resilience
4.7
Climate change was repeatedly quoted in inquiry evidence as posing the biggest threat to the Pacific island region. His Excellency Mr Robert Sisilo, Solomon Islands High Commissioner, stated at the Committee’s roundtable hearing with Pacific island diplomats and heads of mission:
Lest we forget climate change, not COVID-19, not even China, is the biggest threat to our security.
4.8
A large percentage of submissions identified a variety of threats stemming from rising sea-levels and increased frequency of severe weather events, for example:
…the Pacific Region is facing higher frequency, severity and unpredictability of storms, increasing salination of the groundwater, rising temperatures and severe air pollution, as a result of changes in the climate for which it is minimally responsible.
4.9
Mr Graeme Dobell placed the threat of natural disasters to Pacific island countries in context:
Islanders are among the most vulnerable in the world to natural disasters. The 2019 World Risk Index lists five Pacific island countries among the top 10 most at-risk countries, with Vanuatu ranked first, Tonga third, Solomon Islands fourth, and Papua New Guinea sixth. In the top 20 of the index, Fiji is at 12, Timor-Leste is 15, and Kiribati is 19.
4.10
This was also detailed by the Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, UNSW Sydney:
Climate change also exacerbates the frequency and/or severity of certain sudden-onset disasters, such as cyclones, and contributes to slower-onset processes, such as drought and sea-level rise. Sudden and slow processes also interact: for instance, the impacts of drought may be felt through more immediate triggers, such as food insecurity becoming a famine.
4.11
In 2020 alone some Pacific island countries were impacted by several natural disasters as well as COVID-19 suppression measures and the resulting economic impacts. For example, Ms Elizabeth Naru Pecham, a Vanuatu hotelier, wrote of her experience in an article published by the Development Policy Centre news blog in early February 2021:
I have been impressed with the Vanuatu Government’s response to and preparedness for the pandemic, which has been enacted while simultaneously tackling two natural disasters, a severe tropical cyclone and a volcanic ashfall. I discovered technical groups doing incredible work on formulating a national response to the pandemic, on top of their normal work and with the added burden of limited available capacity.
4.12
The Pacific Islands Forum’s 2019 declaration on the threat to the survival of the Blue Pacific notes that:
Right now, climate change and disasters are impacting all our countries. Our seas are rising, oceans are warming, and extreme events such as cyclones and typhoons, flooding, drought and king tides are frequently more intense, inflicting damage and destruction to our communities and ecosystems and putting the health of our peoples at risk.
4.13
The Australian Government updated and formally submitted its climate pledge to the United Nations in late December 2020. The document states that Australia is committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 26 to 28 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030. The pledge states that:
The Australian Government is investing in climate adaptation to build resilience and adapt to the challenges of a changing climate, both domestically and in our region.
4.14
The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) submission further recommended:
The Australian Government needs to set stronger emissions-reductions targets to achieve net-zero emissions no later than 2050, and shorter-term targets consistent with that trajectory, to make a greater contribution to global efforts under the Paris Agreement.
4.15
DFAT’s Climate Change Action Strategy commits to integrating climate change action and disaster resilience across Australia’s development assistance program in a whole-of-government manner. This includes in the infrastructure, renewable energy, agriculture, health and education sectors.
4.16
In relation to the Climate Change Action Strategy the International Women’s Development Agency (IWDA) submission recommended that the Australian Government:
Elevate the aim of DFAT’s Climate Change Strategy ‘Australian development assistance supports the goals of the Paris Agreement to address climate change and strengthens socially inclusive, gender-responsive sustainable development in our region’ to be a standalone priority of the Pacific Step-up, and embed gender analysis of all climate investments across design, implementation monitoring and evaluation.
4.17
In January 2021 the World Bank stated that:
As countries formulate policies for recovery, they have a chance to embark on a greener, smarter, and more equitable development path. Investing in green infrastructure projects, phasing out fossil fuel subsidies, and offering incentives for environmentally sustainable technologies can buttress long-term growth, lower carbon output, create jobs, and help adapt to the effects of climate change.
4.18
In keeping with the World Bank’s commentary above, Australia’s Partnerships for Recovery (May 2020) plan focuses on helping Pacific island countries build stronger post-pandemic economies which have greater climate and disaster resilience. The Australian Government has pledged to ‘assist countries build back better, including in climate resilient ways’, primarily to be delivered via ‘transformational and climate resilient infrastructure’.
Sustainable energy sources and climate resilient infrastructure
4.19
Submissions received emphasised the need to reduce the economic vulnerability of Pacific island states on traditional energy sources and to strengthen their renewable energy sector.
4.20
The University of Sydney suggested that the Pacific islands’ reliance on traditional sources of energy can be adjusted:
…in small island developing states there is scope for policymaking to at the same time: reduce economic vulnerability due to dependence on imported fossil fuels; reduce environmental impact; and progress sustainable development. Such progress can be implemented through peer-to-peer learning programs facilitated by targeted international cooperation and partnerships.
4.21
The Australian Academy of Science raised the potential broader geo-political benefits of assisting the Pacific islands with their climate resilient infrastructure, stating that:
Science diplomacy has great potential to enhance the impact and realisation of the Pacific Step-up priorities and Australia’s soft power diplomacy in general.
4.22
Professor John Blaxland detailed how, as the Pacific islands continue to develop, so too does their reliance on more sophisticated means of energy and technology, currently complicating responses following natural disasters:
…there is a real sense that the pace of these cyclones, the storms, the sea level surges is uncomfortably frequent. The awareness of the stakes is greater now because of us being so connected and so dependent on electricity. Many of these societies lived for generations without electricity. They've now come to be dependent on electricity and aware of their environment and developments in their neighbourhood…
4.23
Other inquiry contributors emphasised that when catastrophes now strike the Pacific its communities are less equipped and less able to use traditional responses of resilience:
COVID-19 has also highlighted the importance of engaging indigenous leaders and using indigenous local knowledge and skills to increase local community resilience, especially in the areas of livelihoods and food security. In some cases, the crisis has forced communities to go back to some of the ‘old ways’ where survival knowledge and skills are learned from the elder members of the community.
4.24
Moerk Water Solutions Asia-Pacific noted that desalination will increasingly be needed in emergency situations as ‘climate-related disasters increase in severity due to climate change effects’. In relation to climate impacts more broadly they also recommended the following water initiatives:
…install solar powered reverse osmosis desalination plants in rural and coastal areas and thus providing a sustainable, reliable and constant source of safe water all year round. Additionally, the water produced by the desalination plant, can be supplemented with rainwater collected through improved systems, including UV-filters, sanitary and closed piping and storage. This will foster and improve the communities’ independence, health and economic strength.
4.25
Similarly, Mr Tom Muller, WaterAid Australia, emphasised climate change initiated water security issues:
While the immediate focus is on COVID-19 and there’s a significant response in looking at COVID-19, the longer term threats to the Pacific really do relate to climate change, and water security issues would be prioritised in how Australia thinks about the long-term Pacific step-up.
4.26
The University of Sydney stated that greater continuity and sustainability may need to be implemented in these sort of projects to ensure their long term success, saying that there is a ‘history of technology implementations on small islands that have failed’:
…because of a lack of continuing skills and financial resources needed for ongoing operation and maintenance.
Climate adaptive planning in development partnerships
4.27
Save the Children Australia suggested a ‘regional climate adaptive plan’ to:
Collaborate with partners and multilateral donors to scale up the construction of a climate-adaptive social protection system that is organised regionally, leveraging the architecture of Pacific regionalism to cover all the Pacific Island Countries, thereby resolving problems and disincentives created by small economies located far apart from each other.
4.28
The proposed ‘regional climate adaptive plan’ includes:
…cash transfers for short-term disaster relief, income support and job protection payments for the medium to long term, investments in new jobs in green and adaptive industries, and strong health and education systems. It should include a suite of payments created specifically for supporting children.
4.29
A variety of support mechanisms have been included in Step-up initiatives to help with impacts of climate change and natural disasters. For example the Pacific Church Partnerships Program is designed to build leadership capabilities in Pacific churches with a focus on crisis management. It is intended to boost capabilities to contribute to development outcomes and to help respond to impacts of natural disasters like Tropical Cyclone Harold (April 2020) and Cyclone Yasa (Fiji in December 2020) and health outbreaks like COVID-19.
4.30
Mr Nic Maclellan highlighted the importance of embedding climate change impacts into regional stability plans, with a focus on climate displacement issues:
Relevant government agencies and departments should better integrate political ecology and climate risk analysis into their response to regional instability and conflict. Departments should enhance planning, implementation and evaluation processes to monitor climate fragility in our region. There needs to be a particular focus on how climate displacement will affect security in our region.
Committee comment
4.31
The Committee heard evidence from a range of contributors, such as WaterAid Australia, WASH Reference Group, the Lowy Institute, Save the Children, the ACTU and the ANU Development Policy Centre, stressing that there are critical infrastructure needs in the Pacific, especially in providing access to clean water, basic sanitation and sustainable energy.
4.32
Any infrastructure built to meet these requirements, and energy distribution modes, must consider the vulnerability of services when natural disasters strike and to mitigate these—and climate impacts—in the design and development phases.
4.33
The Committee recognises this considerably adds to the up-front cost of these projects but would be expected to improve reliability, reduce longer-term maintenance and at worst avoid complete rebuilds. This should be factored into the assessment of infrastructure proposals, especially those in the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP).
4.34
The Committee notes the Government commitment to ‘assist countries build back better, including in climate resilient ways’ primarily to be delivered via ‘transformational and climate resilient infrastructure’.
4.35
The Committee acknowledges that the direct and indirect impacts of climate change remain one of the gravest concerns of Pacific nations. The Committee recommends that support for climate change mitigation and adaptation continue to be a high priority in Australia’s immediate regional assistance program.
Relocation assistance following displacement
4.36
Evidence to the Committee was that Pacific islanders, in particular those domiciled on low-lying island countries and archipelagos—now face a higher frequency of natural disaster impacts due to global climatic change. As a result, some people will choose to permanently relocate from these more vulnerable locations; while those who stay will face increasing long-term climatic impacts and severe weather events.
4.37
The Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law highlighted the threat of climate change disruption and displacement in the Pacific:
The adverse impacts of disasters and climate change are prompting millions of people around the world to move. Some people are evacuated or displaced; others migrate in search of better conditions; while others are relocated permanently to safer areas. Without international land borders, Australia does not directly bear witness to the displacement impacts of disasters in our own region. But king tides, cyclones, drought and flooding continue to displace our Pacific neighbours, and the capacity of certain countries to sustain themselves over the longer-term raises existential questions for states like Kiribati and Tuvalu.
4.38
The majority of Pacific islanders wish to stay in their homelands, albeit accepting that this may not be possible forever:
Most Pacific Islanders want to remain in their homes for as long as possible. At the same time, there is widespread recognition that planning for mobility is necessary and that ‘[f]ailing to do so will be like burying our heads in the sand’. Even so, Pacific perspectives on the role of migration in responding to the impacts of climate change vary, depending in part on the underlying development, economic and environmental challenges facing each country and existing options for movement.
4.39
Climate change factors exacerbate other development concerns, played out after the two tropical cyclones of 2020:
Climate change is a ‘threat multiplier’ that compounds existing stressors (such as poverty, resource scarcity, poor-quality land and existing displacement). The recent intersection in the Pacific of Cyclone Harold—a high-intensity extreme weather event, consistent with climate change—with the COVID-19 global pandemic was an example of the perfect storm. However resilient people may be, there is a tipping point when their capacity becomes overwhelmed.
4.40
The Kaldor Centre also suggested, however, that with careful forward planning very costly displacement issues could be largely avoided:
The UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction has estimated that there could be a 60-fold return for each dollar spent on preparing for disasters.
4.41
The Kaldor Centre explored the idea of temporary disaster displacement visa options especially due to severe natural disaster impacts and loss of dwellings and key facilities.
Finally, Australian law should provide expressly for the temporary entry and non-expulsion of non-citizens affected by a disaster, where it is unsafe or unreasonable for them to remain at/return home. At present, this is a matter of executive discretion and thus provides no security for those affected. Policymakers should also consider ways to regularise status so that people admitted on a temporary basis can remain here if return proves to be unreasonable or impossible.
4.42
There is significant disturbance to the normal environment after tropical cyclones, including, importantly, people’s housing. There may be many thousands of displaced persons after these events—for example, in Fiji, following Cyclone Harold, ‘Prime Minister Bainimarama reported more than 180 000 Fijians had their homes and livelihoods affected’.
4.43
Compounding the impacts of climate change is the fact the Pacific islands sit within the Pacific ‘ring of fire’. For example, the undersea volcanic eruption located 65km away from Tonga which occurred 15 January 2022 resulted in a tsunami which extensively destroyed buildings and infrastructure in Tonga, estimated to have affected 85 per cent of the population.
Committee comment
4.44
The Committee saw merit in elements of introducing a temporary displacement visa as suggested by some contributors to the inquiry. However, while the Committee recognised these are well intended proposals they have limited practical application during the pandemic given international borders remain closed and COVID-19 health concerns persist.
Access to natural resources and food security
4.45
Access to sustainable natural resources impacts both economic prosperity (as discussed in chapter 3), and, particularly in the case of the small Pacific island countries, also impacts food security, which primarily rests within the maritime exclusive economic zones (EEZs).
4.46
A significant aspect of climate change impact is the potential for food grown or accessed in the Pacific to be increasingly vulnerable to environmental changes (rising sea levels), sudden shocks (from natural disasters, impacting with greater regularity) and depletion. Other aspects of food security were raised in evidence, in particular sustainable management of coastal water fish that are ‘critical to the food and nutritional security of rural Pacific islanders’.
4.47
Mr Graeme Dobell wrote that there are lessons from the way the Pacific has responded to protect its various resources, with differing levels of success:
Individual nations have done poorly on logging, compared to the collective action of the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, which works to manage, monitor and control the distant-water fleets from China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
4.48
Mr Dobell indicated a unified approach is worth pursuing going forward when ‘the islands consider future prospects for exploiting seabed resources’.
4.49
The region is a lucrative fishing location and the Pacific islands have improved sustainability and thus productivity over the last decade:
Professor Wallis, in her submission to the Defence Sub-Committee references Forum Fishing Agency figures suggesting that the value of tuna caught in the western and central Pacific rose from US$3.04 billion in 1997 to US$5.78 billion in 2014. Chinese fishing fleets pose a significant threat in this regard.
4.50
Mr Jonathan Pryke, Director, Pacific Islands Program, Lowy Institute, said ‘fisheries is a remarkable story of a Pacific-driven governance model that has generated profound benefit to the region’. Mr Pryke highlighted:
The Forum Fisheries Agency, with the parties, through a Nauru agreement, have done an incredible job in developing a governance structure that generates one of the most sustainable fisheries left on the planet. Something like 60 per cent of tuna is caught in their EEZs, so it’s a very valuable resource. But the challenges are getting greater because we have the huge Blue Ocean Chinese fishing fleet. There are something like 16 000 Blue Ocean fishing vessels now. But it’s not just the Chinese; it’s Japan and Spain. Everyone wants what the Pacific has, so the pressure is greater.
4.51
Mr Chris Gardiner suggested Australian Defence Force personnel could enforce island countries’ maritime EEZs to protect economic interests and food security which would provide much greater economic self‑reliance. He outlined the threat of foreign fishing interests in the maritime waters of Pacific island countries:
China’s is the world’s largest distant-water fishing fleet, and as an example of its activities in the Pacific, its tuna-fishing fleet in the western-central Pacific grew from 244 vessels in 2014 to 418 in 2016. The threat Chinese fishing fleets pose is compounded by the incorporation of maritime militias into the fleets. Increased deterrence and enforcement of EEZs by ADF must be seen as a priority for both island state security and economic development.
4.52
Mr John Mote, Officer Commanding Police Maritime, Kiribati Police Service stated at the Pacific diplomats’ roundtable that Kiribati would value assistance to obtain additional maritime enforcement capability, noting that one patrol boat currently covers a vast area.
4.53
In relation to agriculture, the Australian Government, in Vanuatu, worked with agricultural policymakers to support a trial of resilient crops and other infrastructure resilience actions:
Climate change is causing more extreme rainfall events, severe flooding, and storm surge, accelerating coastal erosion. These events take a toll on essential infrastructure, like roads, which can result in communities being cut off. Australia is helping Vanuatu to ensure its rural road network is resilient to the impacts of extreme weather events.
Governance and capacity building
4.54
The Committee received evidence about frameworks of governance in Pacific island countries (PICs) as an important consideration in the region especially given high degrees of remoteness and small populations in most island countries which ‘compounds economic disadvantage’:
Eight PICs are ranked in the lower half of the world’s countries for government effectiveness, using the World Bank ranking. Eight (almost, but not exactly the same eight) are also classified by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank as ‘fragile states’.
4.55
Professor Stephen Howes argued, however, that the relatively less effective aid program outcomes in the Pacific region are not so much to do with governance issues but other intrinsic aspects:
The main findings are that it’s not really due to governance; it’s due to intrinsic features of the Pacific that make government operations difficult and so make aid difficult. We talk about isolation, remoteness and smallness in size.
4.56
Mr Graeme Dobell noted the positive governance attributes of these countries, despite constraints:
South Pacific states have been able to transplant and grow Western democratic forms—a better collective record than anywhere else in the developing world. Fiji proves the power of the Pacific’s democratic norm by clawing its way back to elections from its military coups.
Pacific democracy is beset by ‘big man’ politics and corruption, but democracy reigns across the region—often rough, yet admirably robust. The next challenge is for Pacific women to get their share of political power.
4.57
Good governance is central to stable and secure environments in developing communities; and with civil stability, greater development can follow.
4.58
The Committee also acknowledges evidence which highlights the value of civil society checks on employment and workplace practices. For example, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) noted that ‘unions, as democratic, mass workers’ organisations, are important actors in development that can help to end poverty and inequality, and build democracy and participation’. The ACTU suggested that:
…the Australian Government should allocate ongoing funding for building the capacity of the trade union movement in Pacific countries, ‘recognising the role of the union movement as a key contributor to social and economic development and a leading component of civil society’.
4.59
Noting also the facilitation role played by these civil society groups:
Trade unions in the Pacific are an important network for the Australian Government to engage, as they are organisations that cut across gender, ethnic and religious lines and provide a vehicle for vulnerable workers to advocate on their own behalf. Trade unions in the Pacific have national, regional and international structures that should be engaged, and the Australian trade union movement can assist with building these connections.
4.60
The role of churches in strengthening governance was raised in evidence. The Committee heard about the Pacific Church Partnerships Program, established in PNG in 2004 and in Vanuatu in 2009 which works together with leading churches and their Australian Partners:
…to utilise church relationships to achieve outcomes in areas of improved service delivery, institutional strengthening and improving governance.
Judicial strengthening
4.61
The Committee heard from Ms Helen Burrows, Director, International Programs, Federal Court of Australia that Australia, through a variety of Australian court jurisdictions, has been involved in providing support to build capacity in legal governance systems in the Pacific island region for decades. The Federal Court of Australia stated:
A significant number of Australian courts have enduring relationships with courts across the Pacific region based on trust and respect. …These are not so much educational challenges as professional challenges and engagements. These partnerships enable the Australian judiciary to provide a broad range of ongoing advice, guidance, support and resources that have measurably benefitted our partner courts and the people they serve.
4.62
Ms Burrows told the Committee that ‘the Federal Court’s approach has always been, firstly, to build institutional relationships based on individual relationships, and, then, to provide ongoing, mainly remote, support’. The emphasis of the judicial building program has also been to foster local capacity within the Pacific islands, for example:
One of the other benefits has been an ability to train a lot of people to become trainers locally, so there's less reliance on external people, including people from the Federal Court and its partners, coming in to provide training. …This has largely reduced reliance on external actors and increased capacity to do that themselves.
4.63
The program has also led to local performance evaluation and improvement, noting the courts have:
…demonstrably higher levels of capacity to plan and to execute plans related to court developments and various priorities and also to respond and react to deficiencies in their own performance that have been evidenced by exercises that they've gone through to review their own performances.
4.64
Ms Burrows elaborated on improvements to the governance and transparency of Pacific island judicial and court systems:
In addition to governance related changes and some of the attitudes I mentioned earlier related to rights-based approaches to the interpretation and application of the law, we've seen much greater efficiencies in courts. ...We've seen significant levels of automation of judicial and court administration. We have seen really, really encouraging levels of transparency …about multiple facets of the courts' performance.
4.65
Additionally, the Federal Court of Australia highlighted that over time improving the judicial and legal systems has been shown to have a trickle-down effect on social norms and community standards. The Federal Court of Australia stated these judicial efforts can have broader impacts amongst the Pacific island communities regarding greater adherence to legal systems and rules:
Investment in rule of law and justice sectors abroad represents a tremendous opportunity for Australia, both directly and indirectly, to impact positively on peace, security, prosperity, and development both regionally and internationally.
4.66
The Federal Court of Australia’s submission highlights a wide range of positive externalities which accrue when communities adhere to the rule of law:
Justice is indivisible from those priorities as it is fundamental to regional and local security, social stability, economic development and individual wellbeing. There is a well-recognised link between adherence to the rule of law and respect for human rights, economic development and social well-being. Thus, for the first time, justice and governance are included in the global development agenda through Goal 16 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals – “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions”.
4.67
This capacity building program, administered by the Federal Court of Australia and long delivered by Australian experts, is ironically funded by the New Zealand Government. Ms Burrows said that:
…we would all feel great comfort if it were possible for the Australian government to partner with us and/or the New Zealand government to enable the continuation of regionally focused work, given it has quite different benefits, or additional benefits, to bilateral engagements.
4.68
Ms Burrows explained:
With the types of funding arrangements that we've been able to access to date, it makes it incredibly difficult for us to achieve any meaningful, lasting outcomes among our counterparts. A committed line of funding for a decade or more, as we put in the proposal, would enable us to plan properly and work properly with each of the courts, and project the possibilities of really strong transformational change at that level.
Committee comment
4.69
The Committee believes the judicial capacity building undertaken by the Federal Court of Australia is a pivotal element of strengthening broader community stability and legal systems in the Pacific. It also assists in building regional relationships and exchanging valuable lessons over time between Australia and our Pacific island neighbours.
4.70
The delivery of these judicial programs by Australians and the retention of the relevant skill sets developed over time should not be contingent on foreign administration and financing. This hinders continuity, long-term planning and ability to consult effectively over time.
4.71
These programs are valued in the Pacific and have resulted in peer to peer exchange and sustained and constructive judicial and social developments. Such activities should have ongoing support. However, while these programs are currently valued, and employees of the Federal Court of Australia have delivered them and witnessed the results which can only accrue incrementally over many years; the ongoing delivery of the program is not guaranteed, and the visibility of Australian expertise is shrouded, as it is delivered through a New Zealand initiative.
4.72
The Committee considers the judicial system in the Pacific island region as a primary and critical platform of governance and to consider ongoing opportunities to supplement local capacity in this sector.
4.73
The Committee recommends that to enable program certainty, and retain and attract expertise, that the Australian Government consider providing a dedicated budgeted line item to the Federal Court of Australia to directly deliver the successful judicial capacity programs in the Pacific islands region.
Pacific health and health services capacity
4.74
Submissions emphasised that the Pacific island region grapples with poor health in communities and under-resourced health facilities. Concerningly, one of the critical areas of public health provision which is lacking in the Pacific is access to clean, safe, drinking and ablution water; and modern sanitation facilities.
4.75
Mr Graeme Dobell explained pre-existing health issues have not disappeared from the Pacific region during the COVID-19 pandemic:
Non-communicable diseases such as diabetes and heart disease cause three out of four deaths in the Pacific. These conditions are fuelled by a pipeline of risk factors such as high levels of smoking, unhealthy diets and reduced levels of physical activity. These conditions cause considerable personal costs such as blindness and kidney and heart failure.
4.76
RESULTS International points out the prevalent diseases in the Pacific islands—which vary—noting the high rate of tuberculosis (TB) in PNG:
…the health needs of Pacific countries vary. For some countries, a key problem is the impact of infectious diseases, such as HIV, TB or Malaria, while for others non-communicable diseases such as diabetes can be a significant issue.
Australia has provided significant assistance to countries in the region to address infectious diseases, having provided more than $60 million in bilateral assistance to PNG to prevent and treat TB, …and committing in 2019 to providing $19 million to address key health issues in the Pacific, including $13 million to address TB.
4.77
RESULTS also emphasised the critical response still needed, irrespective of COVID-19, saying:
The Stop TB Partnerships modelling analysis of the potential impact of COVID‑19 on TB services in the high burden countries shows that unless we act now, 5-7 years of progress in the global fight against TB will be lost. PNG is one of the 30 highest TB burden countries in the world with a high TB infection rate 432 per 100 000 population. …RESULTS recommends that more investment is made for TB and health system strengthening in the Pacific to not only reverse the damage done by COVID-19 but to help our Pacific neighbours prepare for existing and future pandemics.
4.78
RESULTS recommended:
‘That Australia build on the bilateral support it has provided to combat tuberculosis (TB) in Papua New Guinea and funding for TB research and services in the region announced in 2019’.
That the Australian Government improve access to vaccinations for children in the Pacific region ‘especially in countries which have experienced recent outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases.’
4.79
Health security is a category targeted by the Partnerships for recovery plan, with the Australian Government stating in the Australian Development Budget Summary 2020‑21 that apart from COVID-19 specific measures the aim of funding is to ‘manage future disease outbreaks’ and ‘broader health system strengthening’.
4.80
Caritas Australia recommended, as a priority:
Scale up Australia’s assistance to Pacific nations to strengthen the resilience of their economies and healthcare systems to respond to the primary and secondary impacts of COVID-19 on incomes, livelihoods and health. This will hinge on new and additional funding for COVID-19 initiatives to ensure that existing development programs that are critical to building community stability and resilience are not diminished.
Leverage and support established local networks, including church networks, to quickly activate and scale up timely local responses to COVID-19.
4.81
Her Excellency Hon. Dame Annette King, New Zealand High Commissioner, pointed out the difficulty in dealing with not only the COVID-19 vaccine, but other vaccines requiring very cold storage: ‘many of these new vaccines need cold storage and cold storage is not easy in the Pacific’.
4.82
Finally, at a hearing in Canberra, Mr Jonathan Pryke considered Australia’s potential ability to benevolently use its buying power (due to scale) to assist Pacific island countries with high value purchases like pharmaceuticals:
The other area that I know the government is working on but could probably work harder on is: how do we use our scale and our buying power to help the Pacific with, for example, drug procurement and educational supplies procurement? We do a lot in the meteorological space in the Pacific, but we could be doing more with these niche services and in bulk-buying areas where we can leverage our size and our capabilities to support the Pacific.
4.83
Mr Chris Gardiner proposed in his submission that two significant health and humanitarian initiatives should be established:
The ‘Australian Virtual Hospitals Program’; and
A ‘Humanitarian and Disaster Response Command/Centre’—equipped with a multi-role vessel serving as a supply and medical hospital ship.
4.84
Mr Gardiner said ‘it is unrealistic to expect that many Pacific States will be able to build or, if built, sustain, modern tertiary hospitals to service their populations’. This appeared to be echoed in a suggestion made by Mr Sakias Tameo, Deputy High Commissioner, Papua New Guinea (PNG), who, at the Pacific roundtable when asked by the Chair of the full Committee about the potential use of a large multi-function vessel, requested access to a ‘hospital ship’:
With respect to the vessel that you talked about, I'm aware that [Youth with a Mission (YWAM)] does a good job in PNG. It goes to the western and gulf provinces. They really provide a lot of valuable services, because obviously our people need help out there in terms of health. Many of the PNG provinces have coastal areas and highlands. That would really help a lot because we need a lot of health facilities and health workers out there. I'm sure that would also be beneficial in other Pacific island countries. Imagine bringing a hospital next to a community that would never have an opportunity to access facilities and doctors. That's a very good initiative…
4.85
Mr Gardiner contends that:
Australia has unequalled medical expertise and infrastructure that can be connected into medical facilities in the Pacific via cable, satellite, digital platforms, virtual theatres and robotics. This is a clear example where smart aid expenditure would benefit partner states and involve further strengthening of Australian expertise, infrastructure and comparative advantage.
By funding the establishment and operation of a virtual hospitals or virtual theatres program, Australia would be offering the people of the Pacific, and the medical teams serving them locally, access to its world-class specialists and medical capabilities. There are Australian service providers (eg, Aspen) who could establish such a health connection and the necessary training programs, in partnership with Australia’s leading hospitals.
Regional ‘deep integration’ and compact proposals
4.86
Migration pathways to Australia from the Pacific islands was not a topic of discussion at the Committee’s roundtable with Pacific diplomatic heads of mission and officials in September 2020; nor was the subject canvassed in the Whitlam Institute’s report which included in-situ Pacific island interview research undertaken by Peacifica in late 2019. However, the topic was repeatedly raised by Australian based academics, support organisations and peak think-tanks.
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Professor Stephen Howes, ANU Development Policy Centre, expressed the view that longer-term migration pathways were needed:
So far, we’ve opened these temporary migration windows. But we really need to be looking at the New Zealand practice of having a Pacific window in the permanent migration policy area.
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Professor Howes stated that there are three aspects of regional ‘economic integration’:
One is free trade, and the Pacific's had duty-free access to Australia for decades. …The second one is biosecurity—to get ginger or kava from Fiji. It is not just biosecurity but related to health issues. …The one you could really change is labour mobility. That is the practical way to promote economic integration …so it needs to go to permanent migration. As I said, there are two ways to do it. One is through the compact approach…—it’s like a security treaty. The other is a more unilateral offer. Maybe it's not unlimited access but more of a Pacific access category. But it's an offer on the table. There's no formal requirement in return; it’s an informal way to deepen the relationship.
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Mr Nic Maclellan outlined the key objective of a ‘compact of free association’ proposal (or similar):
In response, a number of Australian politicians and security analysts have proposed that Australia should offer a Compact of Free Association to smaller South Pacific countries such as Kiribati, Tuvalu, Nauru and Tonga, allowing for shared governance. The key objective of such proposals is to maintain Australia’s long-standing policy of strategic denial in the Pacific islands, directed especially at China.
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The integration model proposed by Professor John Blaxland for a ‘grand compact of free association’ between environmentally vulnerable Pacific island countries and Australia, created the most comment.
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Professor Blaxland clarified the shared value of a ‘grand compact’:
We need to be thinking intergenerational. We need to be thinking about what the effect will be in 20, in 40 and in 50 years. When you do the sums on that, you see that this is potentially of enormous benefit to all of us—a shared benefit.
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At a hearing in Canberra, Professor Blaxland explained the responsibilities which would come with forming such a compact of association:
There would be a considerable impost on Australia in buying in on this space and in assisting in governance in their exclusive economic zone with fisheries, with policing and with defence issues—akin to the arrangement that the United States has with the northern Pacific islands as well. This is part of the point. When I talk about great power contestation, we're talking about asserting Australia's interests in this space and ensuring that the peace, security and prosperity of this space is one that is well disposed to Australia and one that is consistent with Australia's interests …and yet we have to be acutely attuned to the sensitivities and the felt needs of the Pacific Islanders.
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A suggested inclusion in Professor Blaxland’s ‘grand compact’ is that a component of an offer of permanent migration to Pacific islanders could include a requirement to undertake a form of public service:
…we could have, for example, a national scheme for national and community service where you do your two years and you get automatic citizenship. I know that there are many in the Pacific who are very interested in doing this. …But we're not thinking the Army; we've got enormous needs outside of the Army—the [State Emergency Service], the Rural Fire Service, the paramedics, the National Parks and Wildlife services. These are bodies that are screaming out for help, that need additional resources, and there are people who'd happily do it.
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Professor Blaxland’s submission recognised that:
In order for the grand compact to become a reality will require deft diplomacy. It will require a doubling down on relationship-building and on working collaboratively with the powers that be in these nations to explore a workable proposition that is tailored to their individual felt and perceived needs. This can't be dictated. This has to be something that the Pacific Island states buy in on, and it has to be sufficiently compelling. It has to be attractive.
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Mr Jonathan Pryke, Lowy Institute discussed Professor Blaxland’s proposal with the Committee, he commented:
We need to have these conversations because we do need to think about what is the long-term trajectory for our relationship in these countries, but it's not the way to have constructive dialogue with them. We need to actually go and start with a blank piece of paper: 'What do you want?' We're not going to get an answer straightaway …We could start through our missions. It could be done independently. It could be commissioned in the space to learn from the examples of the North Pacific and the realm states.
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However, Mr Pryke also noted that components of these concepts could be pursued now:
Permanent migration, these small niche services and bulk purchasing are all areas we could pursue right now without needing to go into a large, broad compact of association or where they would need to give up their security. 'We control your security and police your EEZs, and you can get free access to Australia’, is very far down the road.
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Due to the diversity and historic relationships within the region, the Lowy Institute stated the key to the development of an integrated model lies in tailored and patient consultation with each country:
These consultations would be iterative, protracted, and would need to go beyond just the political elite of each country. It would require bipartisan support in Australia, and a genuine commitment to developing integration solutions in partnership with each Pacific nation. Only through such a consultative process would Australia get buy-in from Pacific governments and peoples to avoid the sovereignty pitfalls that so often derail conversations around enhanced integration. Only through a long, broad and consultative process will Australia be able to overcome the scepticism entrenched in many parts of the Pacific that ‘integration’ is just a modern word for ‘colonialism’.
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Lowy Institute further suggested that:
Australia should commission studies into the positive and negative experiences of other compact arrangements in the North Pacific and Realm states to inform these consultations.
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The Lowy Institute commented that the Seasonal Worker Programme and the Pacific Labour Scheme ‘should be a central feature of economic integration between Australia and the Pacific’, and Mr Pryke further stated:
Much has been written about the benefits of seasonal labour for Australian employers and Pacific communities, including in a recent Kaldor Centre Policy Brief co-authored by myself and Jane McAdam. In the brief we argue that, in addition to the profound economic benefits, permanent migration pathways can act as a critical climate change adaptation policy for the Pacific.
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Similarly, Mr Graeme Dobell said Australia should seek to better integrate Pacific island countries into the Australian economy:
The basis of the step-up is the reality that integrating Pacific countries into the Australian and New Zealand economies and our security institutions is important—essential, I’d argue—to the long-term stability and economic prospects of the Pacific.
The New Zealand model—a special category visa pathway
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The Committee is aware of views regarding alternatives to a compact, including establishing a separate visa category, which may assist with labour mobility issues. Inquiry participants suggested that such a visa might provide a less formal means of mobility, with fewer limitations than might be needed for a formal agreement, for example around security issues.
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The Griffith Asia Institute stated that ‘Australian policy makers should look to build on the successes of labour mobility by providing new pathways for temporary mobility, and permanent migration, for Pacific Island workers’. The ANU Development Policy Centre referred to a need for Australia to move beyond a focus on temporary migration for Pacific Islanders to build better pathways to permanent residency, recommending ‘a permanent lottery scheme, as per the New Zealand model. The [Pacific Labour Scheme] could also be reformed to include a permanent pathway.’
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According to the New Zealand Immigration website, residents of Kiribati, Tuvalu, Tonga and Fiji aged between 18 and 45 can register for a ballot. Should they be selected, they are invited to apply a Pacific Access Category Resident Visa. The visa permits the winner to work, live and study in New Zealand indefinitely. According to the website, these visas will be available to 75 Kiribati citizens, 75 Tuvaluan citizens, 250 Tongan citizens and 250 Fijian citizens.
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The Committee notes Professor Stephen Howes’ description of the ballot as being ‘like the green card’ lottery in the United States:
…the demand is about six times the amount of supply. So people put in their bid. The lucky ones are chosen and then they’ve got six months to get a job. I think a strong aspect of the scheme is that you can’t just rock up and get the unemployment benefits; you’ve got six months to get a job. So they use the diaspora, and the New Zealand government also has a small team that kind of helps you find a job.
…The Pacific Access Category is like a permanent residency. You don’t get that unless you have a job.
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The Committee recommends the Australian Government considers creating a dedicated Pacific component within Australia’s permanent migration intake, similar to the New Zealand model.
Sovereignty
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Dr Tess Newton Cain from Griffith Asia Institute explained how Pacific island states value their sovereignty as independent countries, despite still desiring a deep level of integration with Australia and New Zealand regarding labour mobility:
I think one of the things that came out of our research very strongly was that Pacific island people felt that their agency, whether as political leaders or in communities, was not sufficiently acknowledged, embraced and welcomed. I suggest to you that closing the borders and not allowing people to enter your country so that they can't bring in a deadly disease that will overwhelm your health system is about as good an indication of agency and sovereignty as needed to make it very clear that these countries do take these issues of sovereignty and agency extremely seriously.
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Mr Jonathan Pryke, Lowy Institute, reiterated the importance of sovereignty in the Pacific islands: ‘For Tuvalu and Kiribati, it's their largest bargaining chip on the international stage’.
Committee comment
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The Committee acknowledges the sensitivities around proposals of regional integration, in particular compacts of free association which may impact (usually hard won) state sovereignty, resource ownership and intangible values including identity and culture.
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However, the imminent increasing climate change impacts and disaster threats may alone necessitate some Pacific populations to consider migrating, perhaps firstly within the island region to less vulnerable environments.
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A ‘compact of free association’ or similar deep integration proposal between Australia and Pacific island areas would require ownership by Pacific island nations and be based on considerable research, logistical and legal analysis. Sensitive and careful consultation between Pacific islanders and Australian communities would be essential before any roadmap could be developed for more concrete consideration.
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There is considerable groundwork required in researching the costs and benefits of such models and in carefully considering the needs of each country in the region. The Committee sees value in the Australian Government and Pacific governments undertaking studies into the experiences of other countries, like those in the North Pacific compact and the realms of New Zealand, to learn from those experiences.
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The Committee believes such a compact or compacts would offer significant benefits to both non-associated Pacific island countries, particularly those most vulnerable to population displacement risks, and Australia.
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Deeper integration models in the Pacific region should be explored with more rigour as this may be a necessary consideration to future-proofing the lives of those most vulnerable within the Blue Pacific.
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The Committee recommends the Australian Government:
start dialogue with Pacific island countries about compacts of association considerations; and
evaluate bold ideas for longer term Pacific region ‘deep integration’ including the creation of a significant compact of free association with countries in the Pacific island region—in particular microstates most vulnerable to climate change instability.