Performance statement
3.1
The Portfolio Budget Statements (PBS) 2019-20 set out the following outcome and corresponding program for the Australian Commission on Law Enforcement and Integrity (ACLEI):
Outcome 1: Independent assurance to the Australian Government that Commonwealth law enforcement agencies and their staff act with integrity by detecting, investigating and preventing corruption.
Program 1.1: Detect, investigate and prevent corruption in prescribed law enforcement agencies; assist law enforcement agencies to maintain and improve the integrity of staff members.
3.2
In the year 2019-20, ACLEI assessed its performance against:
five performance criteria and 16 corresponding targets associated with the outcome and program specified above;
ACLEI’s Corporate Plan 2019-23; and
the related reporting requirements under the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (LEIC Act) and Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Regulations 2017 (LEIC Regulations).
3.3
ACLEI reported it ‘performed well against its performance measures in
2019-20’ and met 15 of its 16 performance measures (see Table 3.1 below). However, it noted there is room for improvement regarding the timeliness of the assessment process and resource management.
Table 3.1: Overall performance
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Criterion 1:
The corruption notification and referral system is effective
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1.1 Law enforcement agencies notify ACLEI of corruption issues and related information in a timely way.
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Met
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1.2 Other agencies or individuals provide information about corruption issues, risks and vulnerabilities to ACLEI.
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Met
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1.3 Partner agencies indicate confidence in sharing information or intelligence with ACLEI.
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Met
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1.4 ACLEI prioritises credible information about serious and systemic corruption.
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Not met
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1.5 ACLEI supports awareness-raising activities in agencies within the Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction, including by participating in joint initiatives.
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Met
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Criterion 2: ACLEI’s investigations are conducted professionally and efficiently, and add value to the law enforcement integrity system.
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2.1 Each investigation considers corruption risk and the broader impact on law enforcement outcomes.
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Met
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2.2 Operational resources are actively managed and targeted for maximum effect.
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Met
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2.3 Risks relating to the operating context of law enforcement agencies are taken into account and, in appropriate circumstances, mitigation strategies are agreed with the agency concerned.
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Met
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Criterion 3: ACLEI monitors corruption investigations conducted by law enforcement agencies.
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3.1 All agency corruption investigation reports provided to ACLEI for review are assessed for intelligence value and completeness.
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Met
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3.2 ACLEI liaises regularly with the agencies’ professional standards units about the progress of agency investigations.
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Met
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Criterion 4: ACLEI insights contribute to accountability and anti-corruption policy development.
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4.1 When warranted, the Integrity Commissioner makes recommendations for improvement in corruption prevention or detection measures.
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Met
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4.2 Submissions that relate to corruption prevention or enhancing integrity arrangements are made to government or in other relevant forums.
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Met
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4.3 Targeted presentations about integrity are made to diverse audiences.
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Met
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4.4 The Integrity Commissioner’s annual report or other publications contain analysis of patterns and trends in law enforcement corruption.
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Met
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Criterion 5: ACLEI’s governance and risk management controls are effective and take account of its operations.
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5.1 Systems are in place to ensure ACLEI officers act ethically, comply with legislative requirements and adhere to standards set by the Integrity Commissioner.
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Met
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5.2 Regular reviews and audits indicate effective governance, risk management and integrity.
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Met
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Source: ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2019-20, pp. 23–24.
3.4
ACLEI's Annual Performance Statement 2019-20 presents ACLEI's results against each of the five PBS performance criteria. These are discussed individually below.
Performance criterion one: The corruption notification and referral system is effective
3.5
Criterion one relates to the effectiveness of ACLEI's corruption notification and referral system and is measured against the following:
law enforcement agencies notify ACLEI of corruption issues and related information in a timely way;
other agencies or individuals provide information about corruption issues, risks and vulnerabilities to ACLEI;
partner agencies indicate confidence in sharing information or intelligence with ACLEI;
ACLEI prioritises credible information about serious or systemic corruption; and
ACLEI supports awareness-raising activities in agencies within the Integrity Commissioner's jurisdiction, including by participating in joint initiatives.
3.6
ACLEI reported it met four out of five performance measures under performance criterion one in 2019-20.
Notifications from LEIC Act agencies
3.7
The heads of agencies within ACLEI's jurisdiction must notify the Integrity Commissioner of potential corruption issues in their agencies under section 19 of the LEIC Act.
3.8
ACLEI received 172 notifications from agency heads, an increase on the previous three reporting periods, as shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Notifications from LEIC Act agencies
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AFP
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52
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43
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66
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66
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63
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Home Affairs
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128
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84
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57
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36
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100
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DAWE
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1
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5
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2
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10
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5
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ACIC
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3
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1
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3
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4
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4
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AUSTRAC
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1
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2
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0
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0
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0
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Total
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185
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135
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128
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116
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172
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Source: ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2019-20, p. 25.
3.9
ACLEI reported that of the 172 notifications it received:
Six per cent (11) commenced as ACLEI investigations, including joint investigations.
Forty-nine per cent (85) were referred back to the agency for investigation or to another agency.
Forty-one per cent (71) had no action taken as the Integrity Commissioner determined an investigation was not warranted, or a law enforcement agency would investigate, or was investigating, the matter.
Three per cent (5) were still under assessment at the end of the reporting period.
3.10
Of the 172 notifications, ACLEI assessed 124 as relating to 'abuse of office' (up by 35 from the previous year), 46 relating to 'corruption of any other kind' (up by 22 from the previous year) and two relating to 'pervert the course of justice' (a decrease from two from the previous year).
3.11
Notifications from agency heads remained relatively stable for the Australian Federal Police (AFP), the Department of Agriculture, Water and Environment (DAWE), the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) and the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC). However, there was a significant increase in notifications from the Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs) (increasing from 34 in 2018-19 to 100 in 2019-20, a year-to-year increase of 64). ACLEI advised that three factors may have contributed to this increase, including:
greater awareness of the need to identify and notify of potential corruption issues as a result of ACLEI workshops which covered the role of ACLEI, the notification and assessment process, and awareness-raising of potential corruption in visa processing by the Visa Integrity Taskforce;
an increase in the number of staff members included in ACLEI’s jurisdiction since changes in December 2017; and
the identification of past corruption issues that had not previously been reported.
3.12
ACLEI considered the increase in notifications from Home Affairs to reflect the growing development of its integrity arrangements.
Referrals from other sources
3.13
In 2019-20, ACLEI received 38 referrals about potential corruption issues from other agencies or individuals, the same number as the previous reporting period. ACLEI noted that the number of referrals 'fluctuates from year to year depending, in part, on the operational priorities of those partner agencies'. Refer to Table 3.3 for more detail.
Table 3.3: Referrals from other sources
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AFP
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17
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2
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6
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8
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19
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Home Affairs
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24
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13
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19
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18
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16
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DAWE
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7
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5
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4
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10
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1
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ACIC
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2
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2
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4
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2
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2
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AUSTRAC
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0
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0
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0
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0
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0
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Total referrals (all sources)
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50
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22
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33
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38
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38
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Source: ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2019-20, p. 27.
3.14
ACLEI stated that out of the 38 referrals it received:
thirty-nine per cent (15) resulted in ACLEI commencing an investigation, including joint investigations;
eleven per cent (4) were referred to another agency for investigation;
ACLEI deemed that no investigation was warranted for 26 per cent (10) of referrals; and
twenty-four per cent (4) were still under investigation at the end of the reporting period.
3.15
Of the 38 referrals, most (30) were assessed by ACLEI as relating to 'abuse of office' (down by two from the previous year), and the remaining eight were equally shared between 'prevent the course of justice' (up by one from the previous year) and 'corruption of any other kind' (a decrease from 5 from the previous year).
Assessment of notifications
3.16
As discussed in Chapter 2, ACLEI advised it completed 212 assessments in 2019-20, with 75 per cent (160 assessments) completed in 30 days of receipt. ACLEI stated that it did not meet its new assessment target—90 per cent to be completed in 30 days—due to the substantial increase in notifications and referrals received by the agency. Previously, ACLEI’s assessment target was 75 per cent of assessments completed in 90 days, which ACLEI achieved in the previous two reporting periods. Further details are in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Assessment statistics
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Total assessments completed
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190
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193
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167
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141
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212
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Number that met the benchmark
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120
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172
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167
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141
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160
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% that met the benchmark
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63%
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89%
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100%
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100%
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75%
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Number active during the period
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265
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206
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200
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195
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261
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Source: ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2019-20, p. 28.
3.17
ACLEI stated that despite the increase in the number of assessments, it still exceeded the agency's previous target, as 98 per cent were completed in 90 days. For context, ACLEI further explained that the two per cent of assessments that extended beyond 90 days consisted of four matters. One matter was 'delayed while further information was sought to support the assessment', and the other three matters were historic referrals from members from the public, which were reassessed as part of ACLEI's process to ensure all referrals were dealt with in the same way as notifications.
3.18
At the end of the reporting period, a combined total of 49 notifications and referrals were still under assessment by ACLEI. This is the most assessments carried forward into a reporting year to date.
3.19
As mentioned in Chapter 2, in 2019-20 the Integrity Commissioner established an internal 'Assessments Board', to support the effective management of ACLEI’s workload and performance regarding corruption matters.
The Assessments Board comprises of the Executive Director of Operations, the Director of Operations, the Director of Corruption Prevention and the Director of Operational Capability and Systems. It will consider all notifications and referrals and make recommendations to the Integrity Commissioner on how the corruption matters should be managed. ACLEI expects that the Assessment Board will assist the agency to meet its target of 90 per cent of assessments completed within 30 days.
Own-initiative investigations
3.20
Under the LEIC Act, the Integrity Commissioner has the power to commence investigations without notification or referral. In 2019-20, ACLEI commenced six such investigations, an increase of three from the previous year.
3.21
Of the six investigations:
three related to Home Affairs—ACLEI investigated one of those matters, and the other two were referred to Home Affairs;
two investigations related to the AFP, and ACLEI investigated both; and
one matter related to DAWE, and was referred to that department for investigation.
3.22
Four of the investigations related to 'abuse of office' and two related to 'corruption of any other kind'.
Awareness-raising activities and sharing information with ACLEI
3.23
ACLEI stated that partner agencies 'continue to indicate confidence in sharing information and intelligence with ACLEI' as demonstrated through their willingness to participate in joint investigations. ACLEI advised that it also receives intelligence reports and other information from agencies outside its jurisdiction.
3.24
In 2019-20, ACLEI delivered 20 presentations to LEIC Act agencies and the broader public service to raise awareness about corruption prevention. For example, ACLEI's Corruption Prevention and Intelligence Assessments team delivered workshops on the notifications process to the integrity areas of
LEIC Act agencies.
Committee comment
3.25
The committee notes that ACLEI received the highest number of notifications and referrals of corruption in several years. The committee understands that an increase in notifications and referrals expands ACLEI's assessment workload and, subsequently, its investigation workload, putting further pressure on limited resources. However, the committee considers that the growth in notifications and referrals suggests that LEIC Act agencies and others are aware of ACLEI's role, and in this sense indicates that the system is effective.
3.26
The committee is pleased by ACLEI's efforts to reduce its assessment time of notifications and referrals. The committee notes that 75 per cent of assessments were completed within 30 days of receipt. Although ACLEI did not meet its target (90 per cent of assessments to be completed within 30 days), on the whole, the result still demonstrates ACLEI's commitment to completing assessments in a timely manner. However, the committee reiterates its comments from Chapter 2 and encourages ACLEI to monitor the appropriateness of the target's metrics and ensure that there is a narrative around the performance that puts the target in perspective.
3.27
The committee thanks ACLEI for addressing the committee's two recommendations outlined in its examination report published in February 2020. The committee notes that ACLEI has included the total number of assessments active during the year in its assessment statistics. In addition, the committee acknowledges the benefit of engaging a data analyst to assist with the annual report statistics and the automation of reporting for future periods.
Performance criterion two: ACLEI's investigations are conducted professionally and efficiently, and add value to the law enforcement integrity system
3.28
Criterion two relates to the professional and efficient conduct of ACLEI's investigations and the value that ACLEI adds to the law enforcement integrity system and requires that:
each investigation considers corruption risk and the broader impact on law enforcement outcomes;
operational resources are actively managed and targeted for maximum effect; and
risks relating to the operating context of law enforcement agencies are taken into account and, in appropriate circumstances, mitigation strategies are agreed with the agency concerned.
Positive operational results
3.29
During 2019-20, ACLEI achieved a more manageable investigation workload. At the end of the reporting year, ACLEI had 75 corruption issues open (compared to 136 in 2018-19 and 230 in 2017-18), which the Integrity Commissioner, Ms Jaala Hinchcliffe, stated 'represents a much more sustainable and realistic operational tempo for ACLEI and means that we are better placed to focus on the most serious allegations and complete our investigation in a timely way'.
3.30
ACLEI reported positive investigation results as demonstrated by the following achievements:
ACLEI concluded 93 investigations, by finalising investigations or determining that further investigation was not required.
ACLEI commenced 36 investigations (either alone or jointly).
Five prosecutions arising from ACLEI investigations concluded. Three out of the five individuals prosecuted were employed by the Australian Border Force.
Eleven prosecutions were before the courts at the end of the reporting period.
The Visa Integrity Taskforce concluded at the end of 2019 and helped to strengthen integrity in visa-processing.
3.31
Three final investigation reports were provided to the Attorney-General under section 54 of the LEIC Act. These included:
Operation Valadon—a corruption investigation relating to the former Commissioner of the Australian Border Force.
Operation Maven—an investigation into the potential involvement of staff members of the [former] Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS) in the importation of prohibited imports.
Operation Balaton—an investigation into the misuse of an official credit card by an AFP appointee.
3.32
The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) assessed seven of ACLEI’s evidence briefs and all were accepted for prosecution. This exceeded ACLEI’s target of 90 per cent of briefs to be accepted by the CDPP.
Data error
3.33
As briefly noted in Chapter 1, ACLEI advised the committee that it identified a data error in its reporting on the number of investigations commenced in 2019-20. It advised that it commenced investigating 36 corruption issues, not 34.
3.34
The Integrity Commissioner told the committee that ACLEI had recruited a data analyst to improve the agency's data collecting and reporting. In the next reporting year, ACLEI plans to undertake a 'soft close' of its statistics in April and then a 'hard close' before the end of the financial year to identify any data errors.
Decrease in investigations
3.35
In 2019-20, ACLEI had 168 corruption issues under investigation (either alone or jointly), the lowest number of investigations since 2016-17. ACLEI reported that the decrease reflects the agency's consistent effort to 'better manage and prioritise its investigation workload'. Further details are in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, below.
3.36
As reported in the previous annual report examination by this committee, ACLEI's workload had been trending upwards since 2015-16, when its jurisdiction expanded to include the former Department of Immigration and Border Protection (now Home Affairs). The expansion led to an increase in the number of investigations commenced by ACLEI and the number of investigations carried forward. In 2018-19, ACLEI implemented a review and prioritisation program and the agency managed to significantly reduce its backlog of investigations. It stated that the program, combined with the 90-day review process, helped ACLEI to close a substantial number of investigations during the year.
Table 3.5: Corruption issues investigated by ACLEI (including joint investigations)
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Number commenced during the year
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76
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107
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55
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28
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36
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Total active in the year
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144
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242
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282
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252
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168
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Number concluded
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6
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14
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52
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116
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93
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Number open at the end of the reporting period
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138
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228
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230
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136
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75
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Source: ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2019-20, p. 31.
3.37
ACLEI concluded 93 investigations during the reporting year; however, 89 were discontinued after reconsideration under section 42 of the LEIC Act. At the end of the reporting period, 75 investigations remained opened which is an improvement on previous reporting periods.
Table 3.6: Corruption issues investigated by ACLEI (including joint investigations) by agency
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AFP
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54
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93
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98
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85
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34
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Home Affairs
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61
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115
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147
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130
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105
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DAWE
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11
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17
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19
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17
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10
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ACIC
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16
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15
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18
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19
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18
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AUSTRAC
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2
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2
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0
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1
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1
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Total
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144
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242
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282
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252
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168
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Source: ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2019-20, p. 31.
3.38
Corruption issues within Home Affairs concerned most of the matters under investigation by ACLEI, a decrease from 130 in 2018-19 to 105 in the reporting year. ACLEI concluded 61 matters, with 58 discontinued under section 42 of the LEIC Act.
3.39
From a total of 168 under investigation in 2019-20, 34 related to the AFP. This was the lowest number of AFP corruption issues under investigation by ACLEI (including jointly) in the last five years.
3.40
ACLEI advised that the Visa Integrity Taskforce (taskforce) formally concluded in December 2019. The purpose of the taskforce was to 'assure the integrity of Australia's visa system by investigating allegations and intelligence about visa fraud involving law enforcement officers'. ACLEI, Home Affairs and the AFP investigated 31 corruption issues relating to onshore and offshore visa processing. ACLEI stated that the taskforce identified a range of vulnerabilities, particularly involving locally engaged staff. It raised awareness about corrupt behaviour and informed staff employed overseas about how to report such behaviour. Although the taskforce had dissolved, ACLEI advised it had still 15 investigations underway but expected these would be finalised at the end of 2020.
3.41
ACLEI noted that the Corruption Prevention and Intelligence Assessment team 'continues to work closely with the operational teams to identify vulnerabilities [during] investigations, disseminate information to agencies and provide insight into current and emerging integrity risks'.
Committee comment
3.42
The committee commends ACLEI for finalising 93 investigations during the reporting year. The committee notes this is the second-highest number of investigations concluded by ACLEI in a financial year. Moreover, the committee acknowledges ACLEI's positive investigative results, including five prosecutions resulting in convictions and the conclusion of the Visa Integrity Taskforce. These results highlight how ACLEI's partnerships with other law enforcement agencies can combat corrupt conduct.
3.43
The committee notes that ACLEI commenced 36 investigations during the year, which is slightly more than last financial year; it is, however, considerably less than other reporting years. The committee further notes that ACLEI had 75 corruption issues on hand at the end of the reporting period, which is a significant reduction compared to the figures in the last four reporting years.
3.44
It is clear that ACLEI is focused on investigating serious and systemic corruption while less serious matters are referred to LEIC Act agencies for investigation. The committee is satisfied that ACLEI's resources are being appropriately managed and targeted for maximum impact.
3.45
The committee thanks ACLEI for promptly advising the committee of a data error discovered while preparing for the public hearing. The committee notes ACLEI has engaged a data analyst to help reduce instances of post-reporting amendments and ensure the data reported in its annual reports is accurate. This is a welcome development.
Performance criterion three: ACLEI monitors corruption investigations conducted by law enforcement agencies
3.46
Criterion three considers ACLEI's support to LEIC Act agencies undertaking internal investigations, specifically that:
all agency corruption investigation reports provided to ACLEI for review are assessed for intelligence value and completeness; and
ACLEI liaises regularly with the agencies' professional standards units about the progress of agency investigations.
3.47
During the reporting year, LEIC Act agencies investigated 332 corruption issues. ACLEI advised that this was around two-thirds of all the corruption issues under investigation at some stage during 2019-20. ACLEI advised that although there was a substantial increase in the number of corruption issues under investigation by LEIC Act agencies, this was offset by a large increase in the investigations concluded during the year. By the end of the reporting period, 216 LEIC Act agency investigations remained open, consistent with the previous two reporting periods. Refer to Table 3.7 for further detail.
Table 3.7: Corruption issues investigated by LEIC Act agencies
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Number commenced during the year
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54
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54
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88
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79
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129
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Number active in the year
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136
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183
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232
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278
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332
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Number concluded in the year
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21
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70
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30
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66
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117
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Number open at the end of the year
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117
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110
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206
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212
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216
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Source: ACLEI, Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2019-20, p. 34.
3.48
ACLEI advised 117 corruption issues investigated by LEIC Act agencies were concluded in 2019-20. Of the 117 concluded, 28 investigations were discontinued (under section 42 of the LEIC Act), and 89 resulted in final investigation reports to the Integrity Commissioner for review (compared to 65 in 2018-19). The Integrity Commissioner raised concerns with two final investigation reports and made recommendations for further investigation.
3.49
ACLEI advised that during the reporting year it conducted a review to improve its processes for monitoring investigations led by LEIC Act agencies, as well as managing section 66 reports to the Integrity Commissioner. ACLEI stated that its new processes ensure regular contact with the agencies regarding their investigations to discuss progress and key issues. The changes to the process have enabled ACLEI to promptly review section 66 reports and determine if they contain broader issues relevant to its corruption prevention work.
Committee comment
3.50
The committee notes the significant growth in LEIC Act agency investigations during the reporting year. It acknowledges ACLEI's efforts to work closely with agencies to support their investigations and prevent corruption.
3.51
The committee is pleased that ACLEI's review relating to section 66 reports improved how it monitors the progress of LEIC Act agency investigations and increased the intelligence value obtained from reports.
3.52
The committee's previous examination report published in September 2020 recommended ACLEI consider how it can collect data on investigations that are discontinued under section 42 of the LEIC Act and report at a high level the reasons why investigations have been discontinued in its annual reports going forward. ACLEI advised although it did not collect this information in 2019-20, it has implemented processes to collect the information and it will report on it in future annual reports. The committee looks forward to seeing how this information is captured in the 2020-21 annual report.
Performance criterion four: ACLEI insights contribute to accountability and anti-corruption policy development
3.53
Criterion four addresses ACLEI's accountability and anti-corruption and anti-corruption policy development, by ensuring that:
the Integrity Commissioner makes recommendations for improvement in corruption prevention or detection measures;
submissions that relate to corruption prevention or enhancing integrity arrangements are made to government or in other relevant forums;
targeted presentations about integrity are made to diverse audiences; and
the Integrity Commissioner's Annual Reports or other publications contain analysis of patterns and trends in law enforcement corruption.
Promote anti-corruption and corruption detection measures
3.54
ACLEI reported that the Integrity Commissioner engaged with LEIC Act agency heads to provide information on corruption vulnerabilities observed in operations and how they may be addressed. ACLEI provided two classified briefs on corruption vulnerabilities to relevant LEIC Act agency heads.
3.55
ACLEI reported that it made a number of submissions to parliamentary committees in the reporting period, including:
two submissions to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security—one to the Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (International Production Orders) Bill 2020 inquiry, and another supplementary submission to the Review of the mandatory data retention regime;
a submission to the ACT Legislative Assembly’s Standing Committee on Justice and Community Safety inquiry into the evaluation of current ACT Policing arrangements; and
a submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity inquiry into the integrity of Australia’s border arrangements.
3.56
Together, the Integrity Commissioner and ACLEI staff delivered 28 presentations to LEIC Act agencies, other government agencies, and domestic and international audiences. Presentation topics included integrity risks within organisations, vulnerabilities within systems and processes, and corruption prevention and early intervention.
3.57
ACLEI participated in four Community of Practice for Corruption Prevention meetings, and held various discussions with international law enforcement and accountability and integrity bodies from Hong Kong, the Philippines, Nigeria and the United States.
3.58
Between November 2019 and March 2020, ACLEI published eight corruption prevention concepts factsheets on its website, relating to:
Frontline Management Capability
Unauthorised disclosure of information
3.59
ACLEI noted that its factsheets raise awareness of the corruption vulnerabilities it observes in its investigations. ACLEI stated that the factsheets consider 'vulnerability through an analysis of higher-risk areas which may increase susceptibility to corrupt compromise' and provide 'practical advice aimed at strengthening and protecting integrity'.
3.60
ACLEI also published a short video titled 'Personal/private nexus' on its website, which discusses how decisions made outside of work can compromise law enforcement agency officials.
Patterns and trends in corruption
3.61
ACLEI's investigations and operations provide insights into patterns and trends in law enforcement corruption. ACLEI shares these insights with LEIC Act agencies to educate them about corruption methods and motivations and how agencies can respond to corruption threats. ACLEI's Annual Report 2019-20 provides an unclassified overview of two corruption vulnerabilities it has observed:
In-groups and social connections—ACLEI stated that ‘in-group’ loyalty could overshadow organisational values and integrity frameworks creating corruption and integrity risks. Members of ‘in-groups’ may try to advance the group’s status through corrupt conduct or protect group members engaging in illicit activities. Individuals may also feel pressured to act corruptly from social connections, for example, by members of a criminal syndicate. ACLEI advised that it is important that agencies and managers:
identify and breakdown 'in-groups' within workplaces;
seek to understand a range of social pressures employees may experience and remain aware of changes in behaviour or personal circumstances;
build an awareness of the integrity framework and report process; and
conduct pre-employment screening measures to identify personal associations which could increase an individual's risk of compromise.
Paying lip-service or convenient compliance—ACLEI stated it ‘often considers circumstances where staff have exploited loopholes in agency policy or systemically broken rules for personal benefit.’ For example, this type of corrupt behaviour is often associated with credit card fraud cases, defrauding payment systems, manipulating recruitment and promotion processes, compromised procurement processes and leave entitlement exploitation. The danger of this type of corruption is that it can become systemic and normalised within workplace cultures. ACLEI advised that early detection and intervention are essential to address this problematic behaviour and avoid workplace cultures where corrupt conduct is ignored or even accepted.
Committee comment
3.62
The committee commends ACLEI for its work to draw insights from investigations to inform corruption prevention material and provide advice to LEIC Act agencies, the broader public service and other interested stakeholders. Although ACLEI is a small agency, its targeted anti-corruption presentations and published materials add considerable value to addressing corrupt conduct within Commonwealth law enforcement agencies.
Performance criterion five: ACLEI's governance and risk management controls are effective and take account of its operational role
3.63
Criterion five considers ACLEI’s internal risk management processes to ensure:
systems are in place to ensure ACLEI officers act ethically, comply with legislative requirements and adhere to standards set by the Integrity Commissioner; and
regular reviews and audits indicate effective governance, risk management and integrity.
3.64
ACLEI advised that it 'continues to require high standards of integrity' from its employees and stated that they are required to comply with the ACLEI integrity reporting scheme and maintain an appropriate security clearance through the Australian Government Security Vetting Agency. Potential ACLEI employees undergo several integrity checks such as criminal background checks, psychological assessments and a security questionnaire.
3.65
ACLEI reported that one investigation into an ACLEI corruption issue was finalised in 2019-20. The then Integrity Commissioner, Mr Michael Griffin, notified the Attorney-General of an allegation that an 'ACLEI employee misused their position to facilitate official travel involving a second ACLEI employee in order to advance a personal relationship with the second employee'. However, a Special Investigator authorised to investigate the matter by the Attorney-General, found that 'no corrupt conduct had occurred'.
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In 2019-20, ACLEI’s Internal Governance Board, Assessments Board and Audit Committee met frequently to provide advice and support to the Integrity Commissioner and ACLEI's senior executives on issues relating to ACLEI’s management.
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ACLEI reported that it conducted several reviews of its guidelines and standard operating procedures relating to ACLEI's assessments, investigations and other operational activities, which will progressively be updated throughout 2020-21.
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Looking ahead, ACLEI plans to strengthen its internal governance arrangements by implementing an Operations Board. The board will meet monthly and assist the Integrity Commissioner with operational matters such as resourcing investigations and identifying corruption vulnerabilities.
Committee comment
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The committee is satisfied that ACLEI has several effective governance arrangements in place to support its operations. The committee looks forward to learning more about the Operations Board once established.
Commonwealth Ombudsman inspections
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Part 218 of the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (the LEIC Act) requires the Commonwealth Ombudsman (the Ombudsman) to provide a briefing at least once a year to the committee about ACLEI's involvement in controlled operations under Part 1AB of the Crimes Act 1914 over the preceding 12 months. The LEIC Act also requires the committee to receive the briefing in private.
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At the annual private briefing on controlled operations, the Ombudsman generally also provides a briefing on the involvement of ACLEI in the use of other covert powers over which the Ombudsman has oversight, including powers under the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 and the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979.
Controlled operations
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The Ombudsman's Report on the Commonwealth Ombudsman's activities in monitoring controlled operations—for the period 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020 reported that the Ombudsman did not inspect ACLEI's controlled operations records in the period from 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020. The Ombudsman explained that ACLEI did not have any relevant authorities for the records period between 1 July and 31 December 2019. It could not inspect in May 2020 as planned due to the COVID-19 pandemic travel and social distancing restrictions. The Ombudsman advised that it has plans to inspect a sample of records from the 2019-20 period during its next inspections.
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The Ombudsman's Report on the Commonwealth Ombudsman's activities in monitoring controlled operations—for the period 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019 was published in October 2020. As it was not reported on in the committee's examination of the Annual Report 2018-19 due to its late availability, it is discussed below for the sake of completeness.
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In May 2019, the Ombudsman inspected the records of two controlled operations authorities that expired or were cancelled between 1 January and 31 December 2018 and did not identify any non-compliance issues. The Ombudsman reported it was satisfied ACLEI included all required information in its controlled operations reports for the periods 1 January to 30 June 2018 and 1 July to 31 December 2018, except in two instances where information was incorrectly recorded in its 1 January to 30 June 2018 report. ACLEI rectified the administration errors where required.
Surveillance devices
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The Ombudsman's Report to the Minister for Home Affairs on agencies' compliance with the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth)—for the period 1 January to 30 June 2020, reported that the Ombudsman did not conduct an inspection during the period 1 January to 30 June 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the Ombudsman plans to include a sample of records from this period in its next inspection.
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The Report to the Minister for Home Affairs on agencies' compliance with Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth)—for the period 1 July to 31 December 2019, advised that in September 2019, the Ombudsman inspected ACLEI's surveillance device warrants for the period 1 January to 30 June 2019 and did not identify any compliance or administrative issues. In addition, the report noted that during the inspection, the Ombudsman verified that ACLEI had addressed several issues previously identified regarding reporting inaccuracies and incomplete record-keeping and reporting requirements.
Telecommunications interception records and stored communication records
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The Ombudsman's report titled Monitoring agency access to stored communications and telecommunications data under Chapters 3 and 4 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979—for the period 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019 advised that the Ombudsman did not inspect ACLEI's compliance with persevering and accessing stored communications (chapter 3 of the act) or accessing telecommunications data (chapter 4 of the act) for the 2018-19 period as a result of a risk-based approach it applied to inspections. The Ombudsman advised that it did not inspect 'those agencies with strong mechanisms in place to achieve compliance or very low use of the powers' during this period.
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As the Ombudsman did not inspect ACLEI during 2018-19, samples of relevant records from 2017-18 were inspected in 2019-20. Results will be reported in the Ombudsman's 2019-20 report on stored communications and telecommunications data, which is yet to be published.
Committee conclusion
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The committee is satisfied that ACLEI performed well against its performance criteria for the 2019-20 reporting year. ACLEI's Annual Report 2019-20 highlighted many positive operational outcomes it achieved during the year, despite facing several challenges—including, of course, the COVID-19 pandemic.
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In summary, ACLEI has achieved positive operational results for the year, and the committee notes in particular:
93 investigations were concluded.
Five individuals were convicted of offences and 11 more matters are before the courts.
Three final investigation reports were provided to the Attorney-General.
117 LEIC Act agency investigations were completed.
The successful completion of the Visa Integrity Taskforce.
ACLEI's persistence to reduce the time taken to complete assessments, completing 75 per cent of all assessments within 30 days of receipt.
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The committee also acknowledges:
ACLEI's efforts to maintain a sustainable workload;
its commitment to supporting LEIC Act agencies;
its focus on building productive relationships with its law enforcement counterparts; and
its use of resources to educate others of corruption vulnerabilities and corruption prevention methods.
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The committee commends ACLEI for continually improving its processes and developing efficient and effective mechanisms to support its key activities, including conducting assessments and investigations, partnering with other agencies, and supporting the development of a robust integrity culture within Commonwealth law enforcement agencies.
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The committee anticipates that the expansion of ACLEI's jurisdiction in January 2021 will create significant work for ACLEI going forward. The committee will be looking to ensure ACLEI continues to effectively prioritise corruption matters, manage its workload and direct resources to the most serious and systemic corruption matters. In addition, the committee looks forward to learning more about ACLEI's renewed performance framework for the 2020-21 year.
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The committee congratulates the Integrity Commissioner, Ms Hinchcliffe, and the staff of ACLEI for their dedication and hard work to tackle corrupt conduct within Australia's Commonwealth law enforcement agencies and for another comprehensive annual report.
Senator Paul Scarr
Chair