The Suitability of the Australian Army for Peacetime, Peacekeeping and War

Issues paper

Background to the Inquiry

The mission of the Australian Army is to 'to provide a potent, versatile and modern Army to promote the security of Australia and to protect its people and interests.' 1 This requires the Army to be capable of contributing to operations across the spectrum of conflict; from warfighting to military support operations. Although the Australian Army has not been to war since Vietnam it has played a significant role in peacekeeping activities in the region and contributed individuals and force elements to multinational United Nations operations including Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda, Bougainville, Bosnia and the Middle East. In addition, the Army has a long history of contributing to a range of military support operations; from emergency relief activities to support to the 2000 Olympics.

The 1990s have been a period of significant change for the Australian Defence Force, partly in response to the changing strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region, but also as a result of the need to seek efficiencies within the Defence portfolio. Australia's Strategic Policy 1997 and the Defence Reform Program (DRP) have had a marked impact on the focus and structure of the nation's Defence Force. Within this dynamic environment the Australian Army has pursued the Restructuring of the Australian Army (RTA) initiative, aimed at addressing perceived deficiencies identified by the in-house Defence study Army in the 21st Century. More recently, the Australian Army launched its keystone doctrine The Fundamentals of Land Warfare 'which describes the way the Army thinks about, and prepares for, conflict and war [,] explains Army's contribution to national security and military strategy, and highlights the utility of land forces in this context.'2

On 11 March 1999 the Minister for Defence announced that 'the implementation of the DRP is ahead of schedule and is delivering additional resources which will support the equivalent of a second, brigade-sized group, at the same degree of readiness as the Ready Deployment Force at Townsville.' This brigade-sized group includes supporting air and naval units and should be at the required degree of readiness by 30 June 1999. Once this objective has been achieved, the Australian Army will be at its highest state of readiness for two decades. However, Army accepts that increased readiness will impact across the whole Service. In the short term, personnel from elements not required at higher readiness levels will be redirected to higher readiness units.3 This "hollowing-out" of lower readiness units will be rectified as more personnel are recruited and trained and additional equipment is procured.

Over the last decade the Australian Army has undertaken fundamental change, driven by internal initiatives and external requirements. Moreover, the pace of change shows no signs of abating. But has change produced capability dividends and is the Australian Army able to effectively contribute to operations across the spectrum of conflict; from warfighting to military support operations? The Terms of Reference for the inquiry authorise the Committee to review the current status of, and the proposed changes to the Australian Army and to examine the suitability of the Australian Army for peacetime, peacekeeping and war.

Restructuring the Army Initiative

Following a review of the Army in the 21st Century, the position of the Army in 1996 was described in the following terms:

its present structure is not well suited to Australia's defence needs. Some army units are not adequately prepared for combat. In some circumstances the army lacks sufficient combat power to quickly end conflict on terms favourable to us. Some army units suffer from shortages of trained personnel and insufficient equipment. Elements of the force are hollow. While the current structure provides a framework for expansion, it would require substantial warning time and financial expenditure to mobilise for major conflict The present army structure is inadequate to meet the demands of concurrent operations There are also shortcomings in the capability and readiness of much of the Army Reserve. With some exceptions, like the regional force surveillance units, reserve units are understaffed, poorly equipped and have low readiness levels.4

The RTA initiative, which began in late 1996, was aimed at addressing these perceived deficiencies. The restructuring was aimed at developing 'an integrated full-time/part-time Army consisting of modern high-mobility task forces and units, capable of more autonomous operations of a widely dispersed and dynamic nature. It will develop a land force structure suited to Australia's defence needs into the next century and shift from the traditional divisional structure towards flatter, more responsive task-force structures The restructuring is based on graduated and incremental approach using a process of trials and evaluations to confirm force structure and personnel options as development proceeds'.5 RTA places greater reliance on reserve forces.

The Defence Reform Program

Following the release of the Defence Efficiency Review's report in April 1997, the Minister for Defence announced the DRP. The key focus of the DRP is to ensure that Defence is an organisation structured for war and adapted for peace. The DRP is 'to refocus the Defence organisation on its primary task - to maintain and develop combat capability - and to free-up financial resources for reinvestment in combat capabilities - equipment, training, operations and readiness and associated personnel costs'.6 An additional aim was that the reforms under the DRP would act as a catalyst for substantial cultural change within the ADF. The DRP, at maturity, is expected to make up to $1 billion per annum available, as well as some $500 million in one-off gains from asset sales and inventory reductions. All of these funds are earmarked for re-investment in combat capability and operational readiness.7

The DER foreshadowed that some 4700 military positions would be cut from administration and support areas, with about half the military positions to be re-established in combat and combat support areas.8 The Minister for Defence has advised that the proportion of full time personnel in combat and combat-related roles will rise to 65 per cent by early next century. This will mean the ADF will have 32,500 personnel in combat and combat support units out of a total full time force of 50,000. In the context of the DRP, the strength of the Australian Army is to be 50,000 with a regular strength of 23,000 and an effective Reserve strength of 27,000 by 30 June 2002.9 From the regular component, Army's contribution to the combat force will be 15,000.

Australia's Strategic Policy

In December 1997 Australia's Strategic Policy established the future direction for Australian defence planning into the 21st century. The policy identified that the ADF could be required to defeat attacks on Australia; defend our regional interests; and support a global security environment that discourages interstate aggression. The Minister of Defence suggested that while the capability to defeat attacks on Australia is the highest priority the defence of the nation does not begin at Australia's shoreline. 'Indeed, our strategic geography dictates that we should plan on more pro-active operations which focus on defeating attacks in our maritime and air approaches before they reach Australian territory. That doesn't mean a return to "forward defence". Rather, it is about being prepared to contribute actively to our objective of a secure Australia in a secure region.'10

Australia's Strategic Policy 1997 outlined four priority areas for the future development of ADF capabilities:

• the knowledge edge, that is, the effective exploitation of information technologies to allow Australia to use our relatively small forces to maximum effectiveness;
• developing military capabilities to defeat any future threats in our maritime and air approaches;
• maintaining an effective ADF strike capability, that is, the ability to operate pro-actively against hostile forces in the defence of Australia and our interests; and
• developing capabilities to defeat threats on Australian territory.11

The Fundamentals of Land Warfare

In March 1999, the Australian Army launched its keystone doctrine The Fundamentals of Land Warfare which describes the way the Army thinks about, and prepares for, conflict and war. It explains Army's contribution to national security and military strategy, and highlights the utility of land forces within this context.12 Most significantly, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare outlines a new strategy which embraces a maritime concept of defence which ensures that the Army remains relevant to the nation's security needs and aligned with the government's direction of security policy.'13 In addition, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare lays the foundations for the development of the Australian Army to become a concept-led and capability-based fighting force. 1.    Fundamentals of Land Warfare, 1999, p. iii.
2.    Fundamentals of Land Warfare, 1999, p. ii.
3.    Chief of Army's Address to the National Press Club, Wednesday 14 Apr 99
4.    Minister for Defence, Hon I McLachlan, MP, Ministerial Statement, 15 October 1996.
5.    Department of Defence Annual Report 1996-97, p. 13.
6.    Department of Defence Annual Report, 1997-98, p. 13.
7.    Ministerial Statement, Hon J C Moore, MP, 11 March 1999.
8.    Department of Defence Annual Report, 1996-97, p. 12.
9.    Minister for Defence, Hon I McLachlan, MP, in response to Question on Notice No 2889, tabled 22 June 1998.
10.    Minister for Defence, Hon I McLachlan, MP, Statement, MIN 160/97, 2 December 1997.
11.    ibid.
12.    The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, Chief of Army's Introduction, p. ii.
13.    Chief of Army's Address to the National Press Club, Wednesday 14 Apr 99

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