House of Representatives Committees

Dissenting Report 2 — Senator Andrew Murray , Australian Democrats

Major parties’ resistance to change
Diluting pluralist democracy
Democrats’ funding and disclosure principles
The role of the media
Uncontrolled campaign funding
Donation splitting
Hidden funds
Overseas donations
Conflicts of interest
The Government’s proposed changes
Attachment A

 

Major parties’ resistance to change

 

The Australian Democrats have a long history of activism for greater accountability, transparency and disclosure in political finances.1 We have raised funding and disclosure issues at length in our Minority Reports on the JSCEM reports into the 1996, 1998, 2001 and 2004 federal elections.

Despite this consistent effort, however, progress in achieving greater accountability in political funding and disclosure has been slow. In many ways, the major political parties have thwarted meaningful change and today, under Coalition control, Senate scrutiny has become less effective.

The few funding and disclosure amendments that have gone through since the disclosure scheme was first introduced in 1984, under the Hawke Labor Government, have not closed the loopholes.

In light of this strong resistance to change, we make no apology for repeating our concerns with the current funding and disclosure scheme.

 

Diluting pluralist democracy

 

Two major trends mark the last ten years:

These developments do not add to the strength and stability of our pluralist democracy. Indeed, the aims of a comprehensive disclosure regime should be to:

In some quarters, resistance to funding reforms is still argued on privacy grounds; that the privacy and commercial confidentiality of donors must be respected.

For those of us who cherish democratic ideals, it is difficult to accept that secrecy is valued more than openness; that political donations are valued over grassroots political involvement; that political equality is a furphy; and that incumbency and influence is what really matters.

This reveals a wide gulf between a central tenet of pluralist theory and its practice. This is the notion that of the multiplicity of groups in society, no one interest group dominates; that political power is somehow fluid and can be accessed by all groups.

However, every time electoral commissions release the annual returns of political parties, the real picture emerges: that of the close nexus between big corporate unions, big corporate business and big corporate politics; of those with independent or corporate wealth purchasing political capital and media political support.

The domination of the rich has become so blatant that although some politicians feel quite uncomfortable about it, no federal, state or territory government or opposition seeks to end it.

 

Democrats’ funding and disclosure principles

 

Disclosure proposals can be seen from two perspectives – improving present principles, or establishing new principles. The first should in theory be easiest, but in practice it is not so. For instance, while it is a present principle that the source of donations should be known, there remains great resistance to ensuring that donations from clubs, trusts, foundations, fund-raisers and overseas are publicly sourced.

The Democrats’ principal recommendations for reform either build on those already in place or introduce new principles.

Those Democrat recommendations that build on those disclosure principles already in place are:

Those Democrat recommendations that introduce new principles of disclosure into electoral law are:

If everaccepted, these proposals would establish a comprehensive disclosure scheme. They also need to be accompanied by significant improvements in political governance and accountability.2

The rest of this dissenting report details these proposals for change.

 

The role of the media

 

The value of funding disclosure rests on the premise of the availability of and accessibility to documentation for public scrutiny. This is the role of the media as governmental scrutineer.

Comprehensive public scrutiny can only be achieved if issues such as political donations are covered by the mass media, and if the media campaign for greater integrity.

To this end, Joo-Cheong Tham and Graeme Orr submitted that:

…funding disclosure schemes still serve to put the public, assuming a virile media, on notice of the risk of corruption and undue influence. If armed with such information, independent journalists (and indeed in a truly competitive electoral system, rival parties) will vigorously ‘shine a bright light and poke around with a long stick’, then there will be a useful antidote against corruption and undue influence. In the context of lazy journalism and lax political morality, however, the information disclosed by the disclosure scheme will by and large be meaningless.3

However, this interrelationship between disclosure by the media to the public is potentially undermined according to a 2004 report by the Democratic Audit of Australia.4 The Audit report notes that the symbiotic relationship the media maintains with government may lead in some cases to reluctance to fully cover political donations for fear of a backlash in government access. They say the result could be reduced public pressure on the government due to lack of scrutiny by the media regarding funding sources and consequentially, reduced transparency.

There have been suggestions by a member of the House of Representatives that members of the media should be required to declare all conflicts of interest that may reflect on their reporting of political matters.

These fears become more important if media concentration accelerates as a result of changed government policies. It is vital that any potential perception of political influence over the media, or vice versa, is avoided.

For this reason, the Democrats’ first recommendation is that:

 

Recommendation 1

No media company or related entity or individual acting in the interests of a media company may donate in cash or kind to the electoral or campaign funding of a political party.

 

Uncontrolled campaign funding

 

We believe that democracy is best served by keeping the cost of political party management and campaigns at reasonable and affordable levels. Although in any democracy some political parties and candidates will always have more money than others, money and the exercise of influence should not be inevitably connected.

One step forward in setting a limit on expenditure is to set a limit on donations – to apply a cap, or ceiling. Indeed, such limitations do apply in other democratic systems around the world. The cost of campaigning in Australia, however, is growing exponentially and constitutes a barrier to entry.

Numerous submissions to the Committee’s inquiries into funding and disclosure and its inquiries into federal elections have called for the imposition of restraints.5 There appears to be significant cross-party support for such reform with commentators including Liberal Members Mr Malcolm Turnbull MP and Mr  Christopher Pyne MP, the Greens Bob Brown MP and academics Dr Young, Professor Williams and Mr Mercurio, and Mr Tham and Dr Orr. The ALP’s supplementary report also alluded to concerns about the level and control of campaign funding.

In their submission to the JSCEM inquiry on the 2004 federal election, Tham and Orr stressed the importance of combining improved disclosure laws with donation caps and expenditure limits, since ‘disclosure on its own is a weak

regulatory mechanism, and probably merely ‘normalises’ corporate donations.’6 Tham and Orr suggest improving disclosure laws to include:

payments from fundraisers, party conferences and similar events be classified as gifts and that all parties be required to submit gift reports which include the status of all donors; and

removing delays in the timing of disclosure, by potentially requiring quarterly disclosure statements and even weekly statements during an election period.

For these improvements to be effective, donation caps that limit actual or perceived undue influence by individuals or corporations would also need to be implemented.

Limiting the level of funding for election campaigns is also an issue raised by Professor Williams and Mr Mercurio, to the extent that increased costs of campaigning heavily favours major parties.7 As Williams and Mercurio state, unrestricted campaign expenditure which is heavily concentrated on advertising has the effect of crowding out minor party voices and is further evidence of a lack of equity in the current system.

In their 'Political Donations' Issue sheet for the 2004 federal election, the Democrats recommended that a cap or ceiling of $100,000 be imposed on any donation made to political parties, independents or candidates. While this is higher than the caps recommended by others, the Democrats took the view that the new principle of a cap, to even be considered, would need to be at a high level.

Despite the support for placing limitations on funding from both international models and from domestic commentary, there is no recommendation forthcoming from the JSCEM to this end. In contrast, the Democrats do propose a legislated amendment that places an indexed cap on electoral and campaign funding, with the amount to be set and controlled by the AEC:

 

Recommendation 2

All electoral and campaign funding is subject to a financial cap, indexed to inflation and controlled by the AEC. Section 294 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 should be amended to this end.

 

Recommendation 3

No entity or individual may donate more than $100,000 per annum (in cash or kind) to political parties, independents or candidates, or to any person or entity on the understanding that it will be passed on to political parties, independents or candidates.

 

Ultimately, minimising or limiting the public perception of corruptibility associated with political donations requires a good donations policy that should forbid a political party from receiving inordinately large donations. Of concern is the Government’s intention to increase threshold values before disclosure requirements apply. The Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Electoral Integrity and Other Measures) Bill 2005 currently before Parliament will increase the threshold from $1,500 to $10,000. The current threshold for disclosure of donations is a generous individual sum.

 

Donation splitting

 

A further problem is the allegation that significant sums have and can be donated without disclosure. For instance, nine separate cheques for $1,499 can be made to the separate federal, state and territory divisions of the same political party, totalling $13,491.8 Under the Government’s proposed disclosure scheme, the same principle could be used to write nine separate cheques for $9,999 for the separate federal, state and territory divisions of the same political party, totalling $89,991.

In its 1998 Funding and Disclosure Report, the AEC elaborated on the practice of donation splitting:

The AEC continues to witness instances of apparent cases of donation splitting to avoid disclosure … The donations can be split between family members and a family business and also across the various State and Territory branches of a party, each of which is treated as a separate party for disclosure purposes.

The Act already demands that related companies be treated as a single entity for disclosure purposes. The AEC does not believe that any such deeming provision is possible to overcome the scenarios outlined above. The only practical deterrent to donation splitting is to maintain a low disclosure threshold.9

The Democrats agree that raising the disclosure level from $1,500 to $10,000 will exacerbate the problem of donation splitting and recommend instead that:

 

Recommendation 4

The donations loophole be closed, that allows nine separate cheques to be written at a value just below the disclosure level, made out to the separate federal, state and territory divisions of the same political party .

 

Hidden funds

 

It is essential that Australia has a comprehensive regulatory system that legally requires the publication of explicit details of the true sources of donations to political parties, and the destinations of their expenditure. The objectives of such a regime are to prevent, or at least discourage, corrupt, illegal or improper conduct in electing representatives, in the formulation or execution of public policy, and helping protect politicians from the undue influence of donors.

Some political parties, in seeking to preserve the secrecy surrounding some of their funding, claim that confidentiality is essential for donors who do not wish to be publicly identified with a particular party. But the privacy considerations for donors, although in some cases perhaps understandable, must be made subordinate to the wider public interest of an open and accountable system of government. Further, if donors have no intention of influencing policy directions of political parties, they would not be dissuaded by such a transparent scheme. As Tham and Orr state, ‘transparency is viewed as a method of deterring corruption and undue influence directly, or, indirectly, by discouraging large amounts of private funding.’10

Submissions referred to the timeliness of reporting as a key factor in facilitating this level of transparency.11 In Tham and Orr ’s words, ‘there needs to be timely disclosure so that citizens are equipped with the relevant information prior to casting their vote.’12 Agreeing with this, Dr Young submitted that there was a need for ‘rolling updates of who is donating rather than having to wait 12 to 18 months after donations are made.’13

The Democrats agree with these submissions about the need for both frequent and timely reporting, particularly with regard to those donations which might feasibly have the greater influence, that is, large donations.

One concern has recently arisen as a result of very large individual donations for the 2004 election campaign, including the $1 million from Lord Ashcroft of the United Kingdom to the Liberal Party, and those around the time of the campaign, including ones of $200,000 and $120,000 from ACT clubs to the Labor Party.

If a large donation or gift in kind affected a constituency or general election result improperly, you would never know in time for any challenge to the Court of Disputed Returns because donations are only disclosed after the end of the following financial year end. People wanting to challenge an election result because it was allegedly improperly influenced by a donation have only 45 days after polling to get their action started in the Court of Disputed Returns.

 

Recommendation 5

In addition to the existing disclosure requirements applying to Political Parties, Independents and Candidates, any donation of over $10 000 to a political party should be disclosed within a short period (at least quarterly) to the Electoral Commission who should publish it on their website so that it can be made public straight away, rather than leaving it until an annual return.

 

As noted by various submissions to the inquiries, three main sources of funds have essentially been hidden from the disclosure regime currently in operation, namely those derived from fundraising, those from trusts and foundations, and those from clubs.14

Mr Andren, MP illustrates the mechanism by which fundraising can be excluded from the disclosure regime:

…where a person attends an event, at a ticket-price above $1500, and gains access to senior government ministers, that person may feel this access benefits their business, and is therefore a purchase of services rather than a donation, and therefore no return needs to be lodged.15

For this reason, the AEC noted in evidence to the Committee that:

…the concept of ‘donor returns’ should become ‘payment made returns’. If people are expecting to see [fundraising tickets, for example] declared in returns, wipe out the idea of whether people have to think about whether they have got their money’s worth. All they have to think about is whether they paid money and therefore whether they have to put in a return. It makes it a much simpler concept to deal with.16

In other words, the AEC recommends ‘that all payments at fundraising events be deemed by the Electoral Act to be donations or be required to be disclosed anyway.’17 The Democrats support this recommendation:

 

Recommendation 6

Additional disclosure requirements should apply to Political Parties, Independents and Candidates so that professional fundraising is subject to the same disclosure rules that apply in the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 to donations.

  One of the key screening devices for hiding the true source of donations is the use of Trusts. As a consequence, the Democrats continue to recommend strong disclosure provisions for trusts that provide electoral donations. The AEC has dealt with some of these matters in Recommendations 6-8 of its 1998 Funding and Disclosure report concerning associated entities. The Labor Party has given in - principle support to some of the AEC’s recommendations,18 which the Democrats welcome. More recently, the Labor Party has also suggested increasing powers to audit disclosure returns of political parties.19 This is a sensible and practical solution to a troubling problem and has the support of the Democrats.
 

Recommendation 7

Additional disclosure requirements to apply to political parties that receive donations from trusts or foundations. They should be obliged to return the money unless the following is fully disclosed:

 

Another key screening device for hiding the true source of donations are certain ‘clubs’. Such clubs are simply devices for aggregating large donations, so that the true identity of big donors is not disclosed to the public.

 

Recommendation 8

Political parties that receive donations from clubs (greater than those standard low amounts generally permitted as not needing disclosure) should be obliged to return these funds unless full disclosure of the true donor’s identities are made.

 

Overseas donations

 

The AEC comprehensively canvassed the issue of overseas donations in its 1996 Funding and Disclosure Report. Since then, it has consistently repeated its recommendation:

that donations received from outside Australia be either prohibited, or forfeited to the Commonwealth where the true original source of that donation is not disclosed through the lodgement of disclosure returns by those foreign persons and/or organisations.

While the AEC asserted that an outright ban ‘would have negligible impact upon the donation receipts of political parties or candidates’, it submitted that the option of making overseas donations conditional upon full disclosure, including by the overseas entity or entities, ‘would place an obligation upon overseas donors to comply with Australian disclosure laws … without resolving the problem of trying to track and prosecute donors who are overseas.’20

In 2004-05 there was the massive and alarming $1 million donation the Liberal Party received from British billionaire, Lord Michael Ashcroft. As the largest single donation from an individual in Australian political history, we are right to ask just what did this donation actually buy – friendship and gratitude, or access and influence? Not even very rich people part with a million dollars easily. In fact, this donation would have been illegal in Britain because of that country’s ban on foreign donations.

In the last seven years, foreign donations totalling $2 million have come in from the Channel Islands, New Zealand, Sweden the Philippines, Great Britain, Lichtenstein, Germany, China, Hong Kong, the USA, Japan, India, Fiji and Taiwan.

Table 1 also indicates that the distribution of overseas donations to Australian political parties is skewed towards the major parties and the Liberal Party in particular (see also Attachment A for a detailed list of party funds from overseas).

Table 1. Funds from overseas sources, 1998-99 to 2004-05 (party totals)

Party

Amount ($)

 

 

Liberal Party

1 557 804

Australian Labor Party

229 779

The Greens

170 564

Citizens Electoral Council

7 110

Australian Democrats

2 200

Total

1 967 457

Source Donors or associated entity returns, and party returns, on AEC website, 1998/99 to 2004/05

 

It is not acceptable to allow any foreign influence in our domestic politics.

We have no problems with donations from Australian individuals living offshore, and they should be permitted to continue.

There is some precedent for banning overseas donations. Canada, New Zealand, the USA and the United Kingdom all ban foreign donations to domestic political parties.

Yet despite the AEC’s concerns and the precedent set in other countries, the JSCEM has not attended to the contentious issue regarding the question of political parties receiving large amounts of money from foreign sources – both entities and individuals.21

In fact, in 2004, the major parties rejected the Democrat-sponsored amendment to the Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Representation in the House of Representatives) Bill 2004 intended to prohibit foreign donations, but allow those made by Australians living abroad.

The fundamental principle of Australian electoral funding law is that the AEC must be able to verify the nature and source of significant political donations. Offshore based foundations, trusts or clubs or individuals funded from tax havens making political donations to Australian political parties are a real danger, because those who are behind those entities are often hidden and beyond the reach of Australian law. Although foreign entities with shareholders or members are more transparent, none of these entities are capable of being audited by the AEC. By banning donations from overseas entities and closing the loophole, this problem is significantly mitigated.

 

Recommendation 9

Donations from overseas entities must be banned outright. Donations from Australian individuals living offshore should be permitted.

 

Conflicts of interest

 

In most cases, donors appear to make donations to political parties for broadly altruistic purposes, in that the donor supports the party and its policies, and is willing to donate to ensure the party’s candidates and policies are represented in Parliament. Nevertheless, there is a perception (and probably a reality), that some donors specifically tie large donations to the pursuit of specific policies they want achieved in their self-interest. This is corruption.

The Democrats have therefore consistently argued against donations with ‘strings attached’. In considering this proposal, the AEC submitted that while certain enforcement difficulties could arise:

…there may still be value in having a broad anti-avoidance clause if it deters donations with ‘strings attached’. Obviously the definition of that concept – eg access, favours – should be clear in any legislation.22

 

Recommendation 10

The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 should specifically prohibit donations that have ‘strings attached.’

 

The practice of companies making political donations without shareholder approval and without disclosing donations in annual reports must end.23 So must the practice of unions making political donations without member approval. It is neither democratic nor is it ethical. Shareholders of companies and members of registered organisations (or any other organisational body such as mutuals) should be given the right either to approve a political donations policy, to be carried out by the board or management body, or the right to approve political donations proposals at the annual general meeting. This will require amendments to the relevant acts rather than to the Electoral Act.

 

Recommendation 11

The Corporations and Workplace laws be amended so that either:

  1. Shareholders of companies and members of registered organisations (or any other organisational body such as mutuals) must approve a political donations policy at least once every three years; or in the alternative
  2. Shareholders of companies and members of registered organisations (or any other organisational body such as mutuals) must approve political donations proposals at the annual general meeting.
 

Under the Registered Organisations schedule of the Workplace Relations Act, elections are conducted under the auspices of the AEC. It would seem self evident, in the public interest and for the same reasons, that the same provisions governing disclosure of donations for political organisations should apply to industrial or other organisations for whom the AEC conducts elections.

Controversy sometimes attends union elections. Trade unions are an important institution in Australian society and union elections have become far more expensive to campaign in today than ever before. Many people and organisations contribute to union election campaigns. As for political elections the public and members of those unions in particular should have the right to know the source of any campaign donations above a minimal amount.

 

Recommendation 12

Where the AEC conducts elections for registered and other organisations, the same provisions governing disclosure of donations for political organisations should apply.

 

The Government’s proposed changes

 

On 8 December 2005, the Coalition Government introduced the Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Electoral Integrity and Other Measures) Bill 2005. The Democrats consider the changes proposed in this Bill to be in the wrong direction. The Coalition Government’s intention to raise the threshold for disclosure from $1,500 to $10,000 can only lead to even more secrecy and hidden influence.

Moreover, the Coalition’s plans to increase the tax-deductibility of individual donations to an indexed $1,500 is offensive, as the Government is proposing to give political parties a better tax deductibility deal than it gives to community organisations.

The quest to attract more and more money just keeps growing. Even though the public funding of elections was introduced to address problems of corruption and unfair competition, large private donations continue to grease the wheels. That is why donation caps must be applied to limit the escalating cost of modern democracy.

The ever-escalating costs associated with running US-style election campaigns, as well as the organisational facets of political life, means more and more finance is required, in ways that can threaten the integrity of our democracy.

As long as this powerful mix of business, unions, money and politics remains loosely regulated, Australian democracy will continue to be undermined. Corruption is already a problem. It must not become systemic.

Back in 1989, on his retirement, the then Commonwealth Electoral Commissioner, Dr Colin Hughes, remarked that the integrity of the electoral system was ‘teetering on a knife edge in a climate of political corruption.’

Sadly, it has got worse. The controversy over political finance continues. Corruption exists, the moneyed buying access or policy favours, or rewarding policy stances; or even in local government apparently, rewarding politicians who approve development applications.

We must continue to hope that vital funding accountability measures will be introduced. That can only happen with sustained public pressure.

Politicians and political parties must be protected from the undue influence and patronage of donors. Without that the integrity of our democracy is at risk.

 

Senator Andrew Murray

 

Attachment A

 

Table 1 Party funds from overseas sources

Year

From

To

Amount ($)

 

 

 

 

1998/99

W.S Cairns
Guernsey , UK

Liberal Party, WA Division

5 000

1998/99

Michael Esdaile
West Auckland , NZ

Citizens Electoral Council of Australia

5 250

1998/99

Todizo Pty Ltd
(no address, but a major shareholder in a NZ company)

Liberal Party, NSW Division

2 000

1999/00

Green Forum Foundation Stockholm , Sweden

Australian Greens

19 438

1999/00

B. Salizar
Manila , Philippines

ALP, NSW Branch

25 000

1999/00

UK Conservative Party
32 Smith Square, London, UK

Liberal Party, National Secretariat

5 950

2000/01

Fondation du Sauve
Vaduz , Liechtenstein

Australian Greens, National

9 780

2000/01

Heinrich Boll Foundation
Berlin , Germany

Green Institute, Tasmania

99 622

2000/01

International Democrat Union
32 Smith Square, Westminster, UK (same address as UK Conservatives)

Liberal Party, National Secretariat

3 301

2000/01

NZ National Party
Wellington , NZ

Parakeelia Pty Ltd
(same address as Liberal Party’s National Secretariat)

166 975

2000/01

Swedish Green Forum Foundation
Harnosand , Sweden

Australian Greens, National

20 413

2001/02

David Argyle
Sichuan Province , China

Liberal Party, Qld Division

2 000

2001/02

Chen Kang
Hong Kong

ALP, Qld Branch

9 586

2001/02

Flextronics
San Jose , California , USA

Liberal Party, Qld Division

2 000

2001/02

Lucent Technology
Hong Kong

Australian Democrats, National

2 200

2001/02

J. Mackay Gill
New York , NY , USA

Liberal Party, Vic Division

1 948

2001/02

Green Forum Foundation Harnosand , Sweden

Australian Greens, National

18 453

2001/02

Alastair Walton
Hong Kong

ALP, SA Branch

10 000

2001/02

Zhang Ziaojing
Hong Kong
(same address as Chen Kang , above)

ALP, Qld Branch

9 769

2002/03

Michael Esdaile
West Auckland , NZ

Citizens Electoral Council, National (8 donations)

1 860

2002/03

Hatco Corporation
New Jersey , USA

ALP, NSW

17 674

2002/03

Icon Productions LLC
Santa Monica , USA

Liberal Party, NSW

8 359

2002/03

Dr Kazumasa Ikoma
Hyogo , Japan

Liberal Party, Vic

14 000

2002/03

NZ National Party
Wellington , NZ

Parakeelia Pty Ltd
(same address as Liberal Party’s National Secretariat)

43 742

2002/03

Shimao Holdings Co Ltd
Hong Kong

ALP, NSW Branch

100 000

2002/03

United States Greens
Washington , DC , USA

Australian Greens, National

2 858

2003/04

Paul Anderson ,
Charlotte , NC , USA

500 Club
(same address as Liberal Party, Vic )

1 650

2003/04

Beijing Austchina Technology,
Beijing , China

ALP, NSW

5000

2003/04

Government of India Tourism Office, Sydney

Liberal Party, Qld

2 000

2003/04

Richard Hains ,
London , UK

Liberal, NSW

25 000

2003/04

Leader of the Opposition,
Wellington , NZ

Parakeelia Pty Ltd

39 324

2003/04

NZ National Party,
Wellington , NZ

Parakeelia Pty Ltd

43 333

2003/04

Vomo Island Resort ,
Fiji

ALP, NSW

5 000

2004/05

Lord Michael Ashcroft , KCMG
House of Lords, London

Liberal Party, National

1 000 000

2004/05

Beijing Austchina Technology,
Beijing , China

ALP, NSW

8 750

2004/05

Betfair-Tse (International) Ltd,
London , UK

ALP, NSW

ALP, Victoria

Liberal Party, National

Liberal Party, NSW

5 000

5 000

5 000

5 000

2004/05

Christmas Island Club,
Christmas Island

ALP, NT

10 000

2004/05

Mr Timothy Dattels ,
Walnut Street, San Francisco, USA

Liberal Party, NSW

7 059

2004/05

Mr Timothy Dattels ,
Sacramento Street, San Francisco, USA

Liberal Party, NSW

7 104

2004/05

Kingson Investment Ltd,
Guangzhou , China

Liberal Party, NSW

49 981

2004/05

Kingson Investment Ltd,
E. Kowloon , China

Liberal Party, NSW

19 981

2004/05

Leader of the Opposition,
Wellington , NZ

Parakeelia Pty Ltd

36 666

2004/05

NZ National Party,
Wellington , NZ

Parakeelia Pty Ltd

39 999

2004/05

Skycity Darwin ,
Auckland , NZ

NT CLP

10 000

2004/05

Mr G Stevens ,
California , USA

Liberal Party, NSW

2 682

2004/05

TSE International Ltd,
London , UK
(miskeyed in returns as TSA)

ALP, National

Liberal Party, SA

Liberal Party, NSW

5 000

5 000

2 750

2004/05

Yu-Hueu, Dr Chang ,
Taipei , Taiwan

ALP, Qld

12 000

2004/05

D & M Yun Klein ,
Hong Kong

ALP, WA

2 000

 

 

 

 

Source Australian Electoral Commission, Funding and Disclosure Records, On-line records for 1998-99 to 2002-03



Footnotes

1 A useful reference to our views is ‘the dangerous art of giving’, Australian Quarterly, June-July 2000 Senator Andrew Murray and Marilyn Rock . Back
2 See Senator Andrew Murray , Supplementary Remarks to the JSCEM Report of the Inquiry into the Conduct of the 2004 Federal Election and Matters related Thereto, September 2005, pp. 387-394. Back
3 Mr J-C. Tham and Dr Graeme Wood (Submission No. 5 to Funding and Disclosure Inquiry, 40 th Parliament), p. 22. Back
4 Tennant-Wood, R. 2004, ‘The role of the media in the public disclosure of electoral funding’, Democratic Audit of Australia, December 2004. Back
5 See Mr J-C. Tham and Dr Orr (Submission No. 5 to Funding and Disclosure Inquiry, 40 th Parliament); Mr P. Andren, MP (Submission No. 9 to Funding and Disclosure Inquiry, 40 th Parliament); Professor G. Williams and Mr B. Mercurio (Submission No. 48 to 2004 Federal Election Inquiry); Senator B Brown (Submission No. 39 to 2004 Federal Election Inquiry); Mr E. Jones (Submission No. 89 to 2004 Federal Election Inquiry); Democratic Audit of Australia (Submission No. 97 to 2004 Federal Election Inquiry); Australian Labor Party (Submissions Nos. 136 and 201 to 2004 Federal Election Inquiry); Dr S. Young (Submission No. 145 to 2004 Federal Election Inquiry); Mr J-C. Tham and Dr Orr (Submission Nos 160 and 199 to 2004 Federal Election Inquiry); Mr M. Turnball , MP (Submission No. 196 to 2004 Federal Election Inquiry).Back
6 Mr J-C. Tham and Dr G. Orr (Submission Nos 160 and 199 to 2004 Federal Election Inquiry). Back
7 Professor G. Williams and Mr B. Mercurio (Submission No. 48 to 2004 Federal Election Inquiry). Back
8 The Australian Electoral Commission’s (AEC) 2004 Funding and Disclosure Report noted a number of issues raised in the media following the federal election, including ‘the alleged shortcomings of the disclosure scheme (e.g. … the scheme allows donations to be split between party branches etc)’, AEC, 2004, Funding and Disclosure Report Federal Election 2004, p. 14. See also Mr P. Andren , MP (Submission No. 9 to Funding and Disclosure Inquiry, 40 th Parliament). Back
9 AEC, 1998, Funding and Disclosure Report Following the Federal Election held on 3 October 1998 , p. 14. Back
10 Mr J-C Tham and Dr G Orr (Submission Nos 160 and 199 to 2004 Federal Election Inquiry). Back
11 See in particular, Mr J-C Tham and Dr G Orr (Submission No. 5 to Funding and Disclosure Inquiry, 40 th Parliament); Dr S. Young (Submission No. 145 to 2004 Federal Election Inquiry); and Democratic Audit of Australia (Submission No. 97 to 2004 Federal Election Inquiry). Back
12 Mr J-C Tham and Dr G Orr (Submission No. 5 to Funding and Disclosure Inquiry, 40 th Parliament), p. 17. Back
13 Dr S. Young (Submission No. 145 to 2004 Federal Election Inquiry), p. 5. Back
14 See Dr S. Young (Submission No. 145 to 2004 Federal Election Inquiry); Australian Labor Party (Submission No. 136 to 2004 Federal Election Inquiry, and Submission No. 8 to Funding and Disclosure Inquiry, 40 th Parliament); Mr P. Andren , MP (Submission No. 9 to Funding and Disclosure Inquiry, 40 th Parliament). Back
15 Mr P. Andren, MP (Submission No. 9 to Funding and Disclosure Inquiry, 40 th Parliament). See also AEC (Submission No. 11 to the Funding and Disclosure Inquiry, 40 th Parliament), pp. 8-9. Back
16 Ms Kathy Mitchell (AEC), Transcript of Evidence, 11 May 2004 , p. EM21. Back
17 AEC (Submission Nos 7 and 15 to the Funding and Disclosure Inquiry, 39 th Parliament). It is noteworthy that the AEC later prioritised this recommendation highly following questions from the Committee in May 2004. Mr Joo-Cheong Tham and Dr Graeme Orr note in their submission that a drawback of this scheme is that it would leave the onus of disclosure on the ‘contributor’ (that is, the donor) rather than the fund raiser (that is, the party); see Submission No. 5 to Funding and Disclosure Inquiry, 40 th Parliament, p. 13. Back
18 ‘Electoral Report Vindicates ALP Greenfields Concerns’, Media Release, 2 June 2000; See also Australian Labor Party (Submission No. 8 to Funding and Disclosure Inquiry, 40 th Parliament), p. 2. Back
19 Australian Labor Party (Submission No. 8 to Funding and Disclosure Inquiry, 40 th Parliament), p. 2. Back
20 AEC (Submission No. 11 to Funding and Disclosure Inquiry, 40 th Parliament), p. 27. Back
21 The Australian Labor Party recently stated its opposition to overseas donations, see Submissions Nos 136 and 201 to the 2004 Federal Election Inquiry. Back
22 AEC (Submission No. 199 to the 2004 Federal Election Inquiry), p. 8. Back
23

See Mr M. Doyle (Submission No. 6 to Funding and Disclosure Inquiry, 40 th Parliament), p. 2. Back


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