Chapter 7 Pay as you go and common standards of practice
Pay as you go – introduction
7.1
The previous Government introduced the pay as you go system (PAYG) in
2000 as part of the ‘A New Tax System’ reforms. It introduced two main
approaches to tax payments, PAYG withholding (generally employees) and PAYG
instalments (generally recipients of business and investment income). PAYG
replaced nine other payment systems. Treasury explained the benefits of PAYG
over previous arrangements:
These former collection systems duplicated obligations or
were inefficient and outdated in their own right. In particular, the former
PAYE [pay as you earn] system relied on outmoded ideas to define obligations
and had not kept pace with labour market trends. Instead, the PAYG withholding
system specifies the types of payments from which amounts are required to be
withheld. It also caters more effectively for new work practices through the
introduction of new rules to cover payments under labour hire arrangements
(which can be extended to new work arrangements as they emerge)…[1]
7.2
PAYE was introduced for the 1944-45 income year.[2]
By requiring taxpayers to contribute to their tax obligations as they earn the
relevant income, both PAYG and PAYE decreased the risk of taxpayers defaulting
on these debts. In its submission, Treasury gave an overview of the advantages
of PAYG:
The PAYG system ensures that most taxpayers pay income tax …
‘as they go’ during the income year. Although the amounts are paid before an
annual assessment is made, they are paid after the related income has been
derived. The PAYG system provides a more even stream of revenue to the
Government to fund services throughout the year, as well as smoothing business
cash flow. It also avoids taxpayers accruing large tax liabilities on
assessment which they may have difficulty paying as a lump sum.[3]
7.3
PAYG and its predecessors have had other benefits. For example, requiring
employers to pay tax on behalf of their employees is more efficient than
requiring each employee to do this themselves.[4]
7.4
Submissions that discussed the PAYG system generally focussed on the
over collection of tax. This is the amount of tax collected under PAYG but
returned to taxpayers after the reconciliation process that occurs when
taxpayers lodge their returns. Although fundamental reform is possible in the
long term, this chapter concludes that over collection is a necessary aspect of
the tax system as it currently stands.
Legal framework
Pay as you go withholding
7.5
The Taxation Administration Act 1953 gives the legal framework
for PAYG. Section 12-35 requires an entity (employer) to withhold an amount
from salaries, wages and similar payments paid to an employee. Sections 12-80
to 12-90 make the same requirement in relation to superannuation and unused
leave paid to an individual.[5]
7.6
There are three main legal questions in this requirement. The first is
the definition of an ‘employee.’ The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has
addressed this in Taxation Ruling TR 2005/16. The Ruling discusses the
difference between an employee and a contractor. Relevant factors include:
n the way in which the
entity exercises control over the individual’s work
n the extent to which
payment depends on results
n the extent of the
individual’s power to delegate
n the amount of risk
borne by the individual
n to what extent the
individual provides their own tools and equipment and pays business expenses.[6]
7.7
The second issue is the type of payments from which an employer must
withhold tax. The Act has a number of exemptions. These include exempt income
and both cash and non-cash fringe benefits.
7.8
The third question is how much tax employers should withhold. Sections
15-10 and 15-25 in Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953
give the Commissioner the power to draw up withholding schedules. Section 15-30
requires the Commissioner to have regard to the legislated tax rates and family
tax benefit in drafting the schedules. In practice, the ATO sends the schedules
to employers, who apply them. The ATO builds a ‘very small’ amount of over
withholding into the schedules.[7]
7.9
Section 16-25 states that if an employer does not withhold an amount as
the Act requires, or does not pass on this amount to the ATO, they are liable
to a penalty of 10 penalty units ($1,100).[8] Large employers must pay
withholding amounts on Mondays and Thursdays, generally within a week and a
half of the payment to the employee. Small employers pay the least often. They
are liable for a single amount quarterly.[9]
7.10
Employees can vary the rate at which their employer withholds tax. Section
15-15 allows the Commissioner to vary the withholding rate for an employee or
class of employees. The ATO has created an application form for this process.
Employees can vary their withholding rates upwards or downwards. The ATO
reported that common reasons for variation are:
n high levels of
deductible expenditure to be claimed against an allowance which would normally
be taxed
n losses from rental properties
or other ventures…
n preference for [an] end
of year refund.[10]
7.11
The ATO has systems to manage the risk that taxpayers may set low
withholding levels as a means of avoiding or postponing tax. It does so by
placing a number of requirements where applicants request a downward variation.
In addition to providing all necessary information, applicants must:
n not have any
outstanding tax returns
n not have had a debit
assessment on their last tax return, if that return involved a PAYG withholding
variation
n not have any
outstanding tax debts to the Government or any other debt under an Act
administered by the Commissioner.[11]
7.12
Where taxpayers’ circumstances change following a variation, the ATO
requires them to make a new application where they are likely to have a debit
assessment of more than $500.[12]
Pay as you go instalments
7.13
Section 45-15 in Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953
states that taxpayers are liable to pay an instalment amount once they have
received an instalment rate from the Commissioner. Further, once they receive
this rate, section 45-20 requires them to report their income to the
Commissioner. If taxpayers do not report their income, or under report their
income, they are liable for a failure to lodge penalty (see chapter five).[13]
7.14
There are two key issues with PAYG instalments. The first is how many
instalments the taxpayer is liable for. Section 45-50 implies that instalment
taxpayers pay quarterly. This is the base position.
7.15
There are two variations to this base position. Section 45-140 allows
taxpayers to instead pay annually if they meet a number of conditions. The main
ones are that the taxpayer must not be registered for GST or need to register
for GST, and must have a notional tax (tax on instalment income) of more than
$8,000. Section 45-134 gives the second variation. Quarterly payers are allowed
to pay twice a year if they are either farmers or ‘special professionals,’
namely sportspersons, authors, entertainers and inventors.
7.16
Section 45-80 states that late payments are subject to the general
interest charge (GIC). Failure to lodge penalties also apply.
7.17
In 2006-07, there were 2.3 million PAYG instalment payers, of which 86%
paid quarterly. The ATO issued 71,963 failure to lodge penalties to 48,803
taxpayers with a PAYG instalment obligation. Therefore, 2% of PAYG instalment
payers incurred a failure to lodge penalty. The ATO applies a seven day period
of grace to taxpayers so they do not incur the penalty if they are a few days
late in lodging.[14]
7.18
The second main issue with PAYG instalments is the amount taxpayers pay
at each instalment. The Act has several options. The first is to pay an amount
based on last year’s tax, adjusted for changes in GDP. This is the base
position for the following quarterly payers:
n individuals
n companies and
superannuation funds with less than $2 million income in the previous year
n entities that meet
the criteria to be annual payers but have chosen not to do so.[15]
7.19
The legislation requires all other quarterly payers to calculate their
payment on their income for the current period multiplied by an instalment rate
that the Commissioner determines (the instalment income method). The instalment
rate is an approximation of the taxpayer’s income tax rate. Quarterly payers
who meet the criteria to pay on the basis of a GDP adjusted amount can also
request to use the instalment income method.[16]
7.20
Annual payers have two initial choices in determining their payment
amounts. They may use the instalment income method or they may elect to base
the amount on last year’s tax, without adjusting for GDP.[17]
7.21
Similar to PAYG withholding, instalment taxpayers may vary their
instalment amounts as long as they notify the Commissioner of this variation.
However, taxpayers must exercise care in this because they are subject to GIC
for any understatement of income each quarter greater than 85% of their actual
income. Broadly, the GIC applies to the difference between the tax calculated
on the 85% figure and the tax calculated on their predicted income. There is a
‘fair and reasonable’ test for remitting this GIC.[18]
7.22
By way of observation, the Committee received evidence from the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia that the PAYG legislation was substantially
amended shortly after it came into effect. The Institute stated this made it ‘extraordinarily
complex legislation to read.’[19] The Committee concurs
with this assessment. This piece of legislation lacks clarity and is difficult
to read.
Over collection of revenue
The amounts involved
7.23
The Inspector-General of Taxation and CPA Australia expressed concern to
the Committee about the level of tax that the ATO collects through PAYG but
then later refunds to taxpayers.[20] For example, in 2006-07,
the ATO collected $133.6 billion from all individuals and repaid $19.3 billion
in refunds. The refund rate, as a percentage of tax initially paid, is 14.5%.
The refund rate over the past few years has increased slightly. In 1995-96 it
was 12.4%. In 2000-01 it was 12.5%.[21]
7.24
During the inquiry, the ATO provided a breakdown of these refunds for the
Committee. It analysed individuals’ tax returns lodged in 2004-05 for the
2003-04 tax year. This comprised 8.4 million tax returns. Refunds totalled
$13.7 billion. In order, the main causes of refunds were:
n deductions and prior
year losses of $5.2 billion
n withholding
mismatches of $3.8 billion
n refundable tax
offsets and credits of $2.7 billion (for example, the dividend imputation
credit)
n Family Tax Benefit of
$1.1 billion
n tax offsets of $0.8
billion (for example, the termination payment rebate).[22]
7.25
The ATO made a distinction between two types of refunds. The first, or
‘true’ refunds, involved returning an amount that a taxpayer has already paid.
The main types under this category included PAYG withholding and PAYG
instalments. It totalled $9.9 billion for the period in the ATO’s analysis.[23]
7.26
The remainder, or $3.8 billion, comprise Family Tax Benefit and tax
offsets and credits. Taxpayers do not pay an initial amount to qualify for
these, so they are not strictly refunds, although they are included in the
definition.[24]
7.27
The ATO broke down these tax returns into three groups, according to taxpayers’
level of withholding and instalments, calculated on gross income, and how this
compared with their tax liability. The Committee has summarised the results of
this research in table 7.1.
Table 7.1 Characteristics of tax refunds by level of
withholding and instalments, 2003-04
PAYG against actual gross income
|
Average gross and taxable incomes
|
Higher proportion of taxpayers
|
Main cause of refunds
|
Total refunds
|
Total tax-payers
|
Per capita refund
|
No PAYG
|
$14,398 $6,949
|
Seniors and investors
|
Refundable tax offsets
|
$0.747 b
|
0.77 m
|
$970
|
Under paid
|
$56,034 $42,637
|
Business and investors
|
Deductions and losses
|
$5.593 b
|
3.02 m
|
$1,850
|
Over paid
|
$31,533 $30,138
|
Employees and youth
|
Withholding mismatches
|
$7.332 b
|
4.56 m
|
$1,610
|
Source ATO,
sub 50.3, pp 19, 106-07.
7.28
The group that does not withhold at all tends to have a higher
representation of seniors and investors. In per capita terms, they have the
lowest refunds. On average, they have the lowest income of the three groups.
Even though they did not put any funds into PAYG, they received enough through
refundable tax offsets and Family Tax Benefit to receive a tax refund.
7.29
The second group is those individual taxpayers whose level of
withholding and instalments was less than that suggested by their gross income.
They tended to be higher income earners and have a higher representation of
business people. They mainly used deductions and prior year losses to reduce
their taxable income so that, at the end of the financial year, they received a
refund. Even though they under paid under the PAYG system, their significant
levels of deductions meant that this group received the highest per capita refund
of the three categories.
7.30
The final group is individual taxpayers whose level of withholding and
instalments was higher than that indicated by their gross income. They tended
to be middle income earners and had a higher representation of employees and
young people. The ATO has advised the Committee that the PAYG withholding
schedules have a small amount of over-withholding built into them, which would
appear to explain why this group is mainly made up of employees. The main cause
of refunds for this group is withholding mismatches that the withholding
schedules do not cater for. For example, employees may only work for part of
the year, they may have a second job taxed at the highest marginal rate, and
some people receive promotions part of the way through the year.[25]
Is over collection appropriate?
7.31
The Committee believes that, for the foreseeable future, a ‘squaring up’
tax process at the end of each financial year will be necessary to manage
deductions and withholding mismatches.
7.32
In determining whether some over collection is appropriate, the
Committee considered the example of Family Tax Benefits (FTB). The previous Government
introduced the benefits on 1 July 2000 and the payment amount depends on the
recipient’s estimated income. As with all estimates, recipients occasionally
make errors, which has led to a squaring up process (or reconciliation) at the
end of the financial year for recipients who choose to receive it fortnightly.
The Government obtains final income figures for these recipients through tax
returns, which leads to a debt or credit. The ATO factors this debit or credit
into taxpayers’ final tax position.
7.33
This squaring up process had significant financial implications for the previous
Government. For 2000-01, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) reported that
34% of recipients who received FTB fortnightly incurred a reconciliation debt.
Out of total fortnightly FTB payments of $10.1 billion, the value of these
debts was $584 million (5.8%). In July 2001, the then Government announced a
one-off waiver of all debts less than $1,000 per recipient. This reduced the
reconciliation debt to $225 million.[26]
7.34
The squaring up process also had significant implications for families.
Those that underestimated their income had significant debts that they found
difficult to repay.[27]
7.35
The previous Government responded by introducing supplements for the FTB.
In 2003-04, it introduced the FTB Part A supplement of $600 per child. In
2004-05, it introduced the FTB Part B supplement of $300 per family. The ANAO
found that reconciliation debt for FTB became considerably less, largely due to
the supplements:
The ANAO found that the incidence of reconciliation debt had
reduced from approximately 33%of the FTB population during the first two years
of the program to under 10% of the FTB population in the most recent two years.
The ANAO also found that the introduction of the FTB part A supplement in
2003-04 and the FTB Part B supplement in 2004-05 significantly reduced the
number of FTB customers who incurred a reconciliation debt. Without the Part A
supplement, 27% of customers would have incurred a reconciliation debt in
2003-04. However, with the supplement only 10% actually incurred a
reconciliation debt for that FTB year. In 2004-05, 15% would have incurred a
reconciliation debt but for the Part A and B supplements – only 5% actually
incurred a reconciliation debt for that year.[28]
7.36
This example bears many similarities to PAYG. Taxpayers have an income
estimate that the Government uses to determine their eligibility for a credit
or debit. The Government uses the tax refund as a form of insurance for
taxpayers. If their circumstances change and their tax liability increases,
then the refund is some extra money that the taxpayer can draw on to either
meet the liability of decrease the debt.
7.37
If the Government eliminates over collection in aggregate, there will be
less taxpayers in credit and more taxpayers with a tax debt. The Committee’s
concern is that they will have similar difficulties in paying this debt as the
recipients of FTB did in paying their reconciliation debt. To expect taxpayers
to focus on their tax position throughout the year and adjust their spending in
response is not realistic.
7.38
Rather, people tend to make decisions intuitively and, recognising this,
then make other arrangements to compensate. As one commentator has stated:
…people tend to favour immediate benefits over more distant,
less certain costs.
This means humans often make choices they come to regret.
They have a problem with self-control, which ranges from spoiling your appetite
by eating too many nuts before dinner to …being unable to save…
Because they recognise their self control problem, people
commonly resort to what behavioural economists call ‘commitment devices’
intended to constrain their future behaviour in desirable ways.
Conventional economists would regard most of these devices as
irrational – for instance, failing to claim certain tax concessions through the
year so they are returned as a higher annual tax refund, which is more likely
to be saved.
Given people’s desire to overcome their own frailties,
however, to label these efforts irrational merely demonstrates the labeller’s
incomprehension.[29]
7.39
In hearings, the Committee received evidence consistent with this. The
ATO stated that taxpayers enjoy receiving a refund at the end of the financial
year:
The other thing that may be of interest to you there is those
comments in relation to preference for a refund, because …you can adjust and
finetune what is being withheld from your pay. But we did some research a few
years ago—and it did surprise us—around whether, if it was very small amounts,
people would prefer not to be lodging tax returns. The answer came back that,
even if it was only a $10 refund, they would prefer to have a refund, in
general, but if it was a $10 debt it would be okay not to lodge a tax return…[30]
7.40
The ATO’s research showed that taxpayers believed that the refund was ‘their
one chance to recoup “their” money from the system.’[31]
7.41
Academic research confirms taxpayers’ preference for lodging a return
and receiving a refund. Atax at the University of New South Wales conducted a
survey of people under the age of 24. They concluded:
Although the participants were superficially attracted to the
concept of not needing to lodge a return, virtually everyone decided that they
would prefer to stay with the current system after thinking about the concept
further. Many participants independently used the word ‘control’ in relation to
that decision…[32]
7.42
This evidence and the example of FTB suggests to the Committee that not
only is a measure of over collection in PAYG prudent for both the Government
and taxpayers, but that taxpayers prefer it as well. Therefore, the Committee
believes that the ATO should maintain a modest level of over collection in
PAYG.
Interest on over collections
7.43
Generally, the ATO pays interest on tax related amounts where the
taxpayer has lodged a document and crystallised a tax amount. Interest is not
paid under PAYG or where a taxpayer receives a tax credit. The interest rate is
the base rate discussed in chapter six, namely the Reserve Bank’s monthly
average yield of 90-day Bank Accepted Bills. During 2006, the base rate was
approximately 5.5% and it is now approximately 7.7%.[33]
7.44
The ATO is required to pay overpayment interest in the following
circumstances:
n a taxpayer pays the
tax required in their assessment, and the ATO then amends the assessment,
reducing the tax liability
n the ATO takes more
than 30 days to pay an income tax refund after a taxpayer lodges their return
n the ATO takes more
than 14 days to refund a running balance account following the lodgement of a
correct business activity statement (BAS).[34]
7.45
Following an income tax assessment, taxpayers receive early payment
interest where they pay the amount more than 14 days before the due date.[35]
The Committee understands that the ATO usually gives taxpayers at least
21 days to pay an amount under an assessment.[36]
7.46
CPA Australia[37] and the
Inspector-General of Taxation raised concerns that the ATO withholds large
amounts of funds that are eventually repaid to taxpayers ($19.3 million in
2006-07[38]), which do not attract
any interest. The Inspector-General argued this constituted an anomaly in
relation to PAYG. If a taxpayer does not meet their PAYG obligations or make a
sufficiently large error in calculating their PAYG amounts, they are subject to
GIC. However, the Government does not pay interest on PAYG refunds and only pays
interest in the circumstances listed above. The Inspector-General also noted
that:
n Even if the end of
year position shows that the taxpayer did not need to provide for a liability,
the compounded GIC charged on unpaid instalments remains compounding on the
taxpayers PAYG account. Effectively, this is interest on monies that were never
needed to be paid. Taxpayers can apply for remission; even if they get it, this
can involve cost and delay…
n Paying tax
instalments by withdrawing investment capital results in loss of income for
taxpayers. Accountants say that PAYG is fleecing small business of its capital.[39]
7.47
The Committee considered whether the ATO should pay interest on tax paid
that is ultimately refunded to taxpayers. However, the Committee decided against
this approach for a number of reasons. For example, the relationship between
taxpayer and the ATO is not the same as that between a bank and a client. In
the context of debt recovery, the ANAO summarised the taxpayer/ATO relationship
as follows:
Taxpayers’ relationship to the ATO is different to the
relationship between a private sector firm and those to whom that firm extends
credit. Taxpayers’ relationship to the ATO is not a market-based relationship. People
are required by law to pay tax and the ATO is in no position to withhold supply
as a means of collecting debt, as are other creditors.[40]
7.48
Banks paying interest on deposits is based on the economic principles of
trade and exchange. Banks lend on the basis of their deposits and earn revenues
and profits on this lending. This dynamic does not apply to tax, where
taxpayers have a legal obligation to pay.
7.49
Another reason why the Committee does not support the ATO paying
interest on over collections of tax is that the Government will have to
increase taxes to pay for it. For example, in 2006-07, the ATO refunded $19.3
billion to taxpayers. Using the ATO’s 2004-05 data above, 61.3% of total
refunds involve refunds on money paid by taxpayers. Applying this figure to $19.3
billion gives a total of $11.8 billion subject to interest. Assuming the ATO
holds these funds for an average of 12 months[41] and pays 7.7% interest,
the Government and Parliament will need to increase the ATO’s budget by $909
million. The Committee is not convinced that it should impose an additional
revenue burden on the community of almost a billion dollars so the ATO can pay
interest on PAYG refunds.
7.50
Another reason why the Committee does not support the ATO paying
interest on PAYG refunds is that many taxpayers enjoy receiving a refund in the
first place. If taxpayers are happy to receive the refund as a form of enforced
saving (see above), then the Committee does not see why the ATO needs to
provide an additional benefit to taxpayers in the form of interest.
7.51
The final reason why the Committee does not support interest on refunds
is that the system gives taxpayers a way of changing their PAYG amounts. As
noted earlier in the chapter, this applies for both PAYG withholding and
instalments.
7.52
The Committee notes that PAYG instalment taxpayers face significant
risks in changing their PAYG amounts. If their instalment amounts are less than
85% of their final tax, they are subject to GIC. The National Institute of
Accountants stated:
The tax agents know that they could vary an instalment but
often they do not because of the risk of penalties. If you vary the instalment
and, for instance, the end result of the year is that your tax is not within 85
per cent of the varied amount you are going to pay then you are up for
penalties. Members that I speak to do not recommend a variation instalment,
unless it is to nil—where they know that someone has gone into a loss
situation. The issue is around this 85 per cent threshold and the risks that
threshold creates.[42]
7.53
The problem for many taxpayers appears to be planning and managing their
cash flow and tax liabilities. For example, in both its debt collection report
in 1999 and its micro-business debt report in 2007, the ANAO stated that cash
flow was a major contributor to tax debt.[43]
7.54
In other words, it appears that many PAYG instalment taxpayers prefer
not to reduce their overpayments due to the challenges in predicting and
managing their cash flow. Businesses that are better at planning and monitoring
their cash will enjoy a competitive advantage because less of their resources
will be held by the ATO.
Common standards of practice
Compliance issues
7.55
Parties to the inquiry interpreted this term of reference in one of two
ways. Some believed this topic referred to the ATO’s compliance activities
(such as audits and remitting penalties and interest). Others looked more
widely at the ATO’s operations overall, including its advice role.
7.56
Where submissions expressed concern about common standards of practice,
they focussed on the consistency of the ATO’s compliance activities.[44]
This report examines compliance activities such as audits in chapter five. In
chapter six, it examines the ATO’s approach to remitting penalties and
interest. The remainder of its operations appeared to be of less concern due to
it rationalising its operations.[45]
Rationalisation of ATO operations
7.57
Over the last 10 years, the ATO has moved from a regional structure
(duplicating the same expertise in each state) to a national structure where a
certain expertise may only exist in one or a few states. In its submission, CPA
Australia gave an overview of this process:
[Consistency] may have been a problem to a greater extent in
the past when the ATO operated via semi-autonomous state offices in which
various ATO services (eg issue of rulings) were effectively duplicated in each
office. One upshot of this administrative arrangement appeared to be a lack of
co-ordination in the issue of rulings such that different rulings could be
issued in some cases by different state offices on the same or similar topics.
Problems of this kind in the private binding rulings area may
have contributed to some of the problems with mass marketed schemes in the
mid-1990s. However, as part of the clean up of those issues, the ATO moved to a
new administrative framework whereby rulings and other ATO services are now
provided on a single national basis notwithstanding that such services are
still being provided on an operational basis via state offices.
Insofar as we are currently aware, the ATO generally appears
to adopt uniform administrative practices across the whole of Australia, although we note that individual cases are sometimes brought to our attention
where matters may have ‘slipped through the cracks.’[46]
7.58
This rationalisation and increased consistency has come at a cost. At
the Launceston hearings, one accountant stated that reducing the breadth of ATO
expertise in Tasmania made it more difficult to build links with it:
In 1985, there was a fully functioning tax office in Hobart, and it had complex audit, high-level advice areas, individual advice areas and
so forth. All tax agents in this state knew exactly who was in what area, and
they could resolve their issues. Our firm even got the tax officers to come
along to our training days to train us on things, to work out issues and so forth.
Here we are 21 years later, with exceptionally complex tax legislation, and we
do not know anybody in our tax office with whom we can speak to resolve an
issue. That cannot be productive…[47]
7.59
At a Senate Estimates hearing in 2007, the ATO noted there are
management efficiencies in moving away from a regional structure. The ATO discussed
the example of closing down a four-person debt legal team in Hobart:
… when you do not have a critical mass and you have people
who go on leave and you have four covering a small group of people, it is hard
to manage that effectively. There is an issue of having specialisations in
areas where you can have more of a critical mass in Melbourne. On the other
hand, we are trying to build Hobart as a centre for a lot of our superannuation
work, and you will have to find people in Melbourne who will have to put up
with people from Tasmania going there on some of their superannuation
processes. When you run a large organisation across the country and you have a
system that is nationally based and not regionally based, you have a whole
range of those issues. What you have to do is try to make sure that you have a
number of bases covered. One base is of course the level of service you can
provide, and that has to be satisfactory. Secondly, you also have to make sure
that you have a critical mass to go forward. You have to have some sort of
succession planning and some level of specialisation. And the smaller the group
the harder it is to provide that, even in terms of their own training and
development.[48]
7.60
In summary, the shift away from a regional structure has had benefits in
producing efficiencies for the ATO and ensuring that its advice and
administrative practice are more consistent. However, it has made tax agents
less efficient through reduced local links with the ATO. On balance, the
Committee is of the view that the ATO has taken the right decision, mainly
because greater consistency is fairer on taxpayers.
Conclusion
7.61
The ATO faces a particular challenge in collecting tax debt. It cannot
withhold supply from taxpayers and so does not have many options apart from
traditional debt collection activities. Therefore, the PAYG system has taken a
preventive approach by encouraging overpayments that are returned to taxpayers
after they lodge their return. The Committee notes that many individuals are
comfortable with this sort of commitment device. Further, PAYG instalment
taxpayers have the option of conducting their own ‘squaring up’ when they lodge
their final BAS for each financial year. Therefore, the Committee believes that
the current framework strikes a reasonable balance between the interests of
taxpayers and government.
Sharon
Grierson MP
Committee
Chair