Audit Report No. 42 2007-2008
Chapter 5 Management of Customer Debt – Follow-up Audit
Background
5.1
Centrelink is the Commonwealth’s primary payment agency responsible for
the distribution of social security benefits. When an incorrect payment is made
by Centrelink, which results in a customer receiving a greater benefit than
entitled, the customer may incur a debt to the Commonwealth. It is Centrelink’s
responsibility to recover these debts in an efficient and timely manner.
5.2
Customer debt primarily arises due to customers failing to notify
Centrelink of changes in circumstances or providing inaccurate or incorrect
information to Centrelink. When debt arises as a result of an error on the part
of Centrelink, and the customer could not reasonably be expected to know they
were being overpaid, the debt can be waived.[1]
5.3
As the social security system is reliant on customers accurately
reporting changes to their details in a timely manner a level of customer debt
will always exist. The value of the debt base has been steadily increasing from
$967 million in 2003 to approximately $1.3 billion at 30 June 2007, with the debt base numbering approximately 650,000 customers.
5.4
In August 2004, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) finalised
Audit Report No. 4 2004-05 Management of Customer Debt, a performance
audit examining Centrelink’s administration of its customer debt base. The
audit noted that while Centrelink had improved the effectiveness of its debt
management processes, the debt base continued to grow rapidly. Further, many
inconsistencies across the debt management processes were found, particularly
in relation to prevention and recovery.
5.5
The ANAO made nine recommendations, which were all agreed to by
Centrelink and its purchaser departments. Following the audit, the Joint
Committee of Public Accounts and Audit conducted an inquiry and made a further
six recommendations. Centrelink responded to the Committee’s inquiry in August
2006 noting they had implemented or were in the process of implementing all six
recommendations with the exception of Recommendation No. 22, which related to
the value of the automatic debt waiver. Centrelink indicated that it was the
responsibility of its purchaser departments to determine the value of the
automatic debt waiver.
The Audit
Audit objectives
n The objective of the
follow-up audit was to examine Centrelink’s process in implementing the
recommendations of the 2004-05 audit and the subsequent JCPAA inquiry. The
audit took into account the changes made to the Commonwealth’s welfare program
structure since the previous audit, and examined Centrelink’s debt management
arrangements with its main purchaser departments: the Department of Families,
Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaCSIA), the Department of
Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR), and the Department of Education,
Science and Training (DEST).
Audit conclusion
5.6
The audit report made the following conclusion:
The ANAO found that Centrelink and its purchaser departments
had either fully or partially implemented all of the recommendations of the
previous audit and JCPAA inquiry, with the exception of JCPAA Recommendation
No. 22, which recommended that the debt waiver amount be raised from $50 to
$100.
In implementing the recommendations of the previous audit and
JCPAA inquiry, Centrelink had undertaken a significant ongoing restructure of
its debt management operations that had improved consistency, efficiency and
performance measurement. This had allowed Centrelink to meet the performance
requirements of its purchaser departments. However, the ANAO still found
notable inconsistencies across the Centrelink network, particularly in its
allocation of resources to debt prevention; its application of debt waivers;
and its approach to recovering debts.
Despite the identified improvements to debt management
administration, the ANAO also found that the value of the debt base and its
associated characteristics (including the number of debtors and the age profile
of the debt base), had continued to increase. The ANAO notes that this is
occurring at a time when the level of consumer debt in Australia is rising. Between 1 July 2003 and 31 December 2007, nominal household debt levels within Australia increased from 126.4 per cent to 160.4 per cent of
disposable income.[2]
In these circumstances it is particularly important that
Centrelink and its purchaser departments focus on gaining a better
understanding of the factors driving the changes in the debt base. Undertaking
an analysis of the debt base would usefully inform the framing of a nationally
integrated program based approach to debt management. Such a framework would
allow the implementation of more effective measures to prevent the
circumstances that result in a customer incurring a debt and, in the longer
term, slow the growth in the value of the debt base.
ANAO recommendations
5.7
The ANAO made the following recommendations:
Table 1.1 ANAO recommendations, Audit Report no. 42,
2007-2008
1.
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The ANAO recommends that Centrelink and its purchaser
departments undertake an analysis to determine the underlying drivers of the
value and profile of the debt base with specific reference to the continuing:
·
increase the value of the debt base;
·
increase in the number of customers experiencing debt; and
·
ageing of the debt base.
Centrelink’s response: Agreed.
Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and
Indigenous Affairs’ response: Agreed.
Department of Education, Employment and Workplace
Relations’ response: Agreed.
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2.
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The ANAO recommends that Centrelink review the existing
governance arrangements and operation of the Early Intervention Activity
Database (EIAD) to identify and implement improvements to the integrity and
usefulness of the data produced and relied upon to support debt prevention
strategy decision making.
Centrelink’s response: Agreed.
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The Committee’s review
5.8
The Committee held a public hearing on Wednesday 12 November 2008, with the following witnesses:
n Australian National
Audit Office (ANAO);
n Centrelink;
n Department of
Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR); and
n Department of
Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA).
5.9
The Committee took evidence on the following issues:
n actions taken since
the initial audit;
n the debt base;
§
the size of the debt base;
§
the age of the debt base;
§
debt write offs and waivers;
n cost effectiveness of
debt recovery; and
n debt prevention;
§
aged pension debts.
Actions taken since the initial audit
5.10
As the audit conducted by the ANAO was a follow up on an audit
previously tabled in August 2004, Centrelink updated the Committee on actions
taken since the initial audit and subsequent committee inquiry.
5.11
The Committee was informed that Centrelink had established a business
integrity network with more than 3,000 staff working under the same hierarchy,
rather than the previous system in which debt recovery work was undertaken in
15 different areas under 15 different management structures.[3]
5.12
The Committee noted that inconsistencies had been visible across the
Centrelink network, particularly with relation to resource allocation, the
application of debt waivers, and approaches to recovering debts in the past.
Centrelink replied that consistency was a constant challenge due to the size of
its network, but that a national training package had been developed alongside
the new management structure to further drive consistency.[4]
5.13
Centrelink noted:
Specifically in response to the audit recommendations, we ran
several of what we call value creation workshops, where we get groups of
customers together and ask them about their experience in relation to
particular areas of our business. We ran a series of value creation workshops
in relation to debt and used that information to inform the processes,
communications with customers…[5]
5.14
Centrelink was asked if processes or practice had changed as a result of
these workshops, and replied that they had changed some communications
material, increased access to staff who were experts on debt, and that they had
developed a dedicated telephone number to call to talk about debt.[6]
5.15
The Committee asked whether it was possible for Centrelink to identify
regions where efforts to recover debt were more or less successful. Centrelink
noted there were two reasons for the accumulation of debt – instances where the
customer makes a mistake, and instances where Centrelink is in error.
Centrelink noted they were able to address regional performance in instances
where Centrelink was in error.[7]
5.16
In addressing whether Centrelink was able to identify areas of best
practice, they replied that they were always looking for “pockets of best
practice”.[8]
5.17
The Committee is encouraged that Centrelink is looking for best
practice, but is of the opinion that more work needs to be done to identify
instances of best practice and to implement best practice across its entire network.
Recommendation 10 |
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That Centrelink obtain a regional breakdown of debt recovery
successes and identify ways to improve debt recovery by examining methods
used by the most successful regions. Further, that Centrelink identify
regions with low customer debt and identify the ways in which these regions
minimise customer debt.
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The debt base
The size of the debt base
5.18
The Committee expressed its concern at the increasing size of debt, and
the widening of the customer debt base, and asked for the total quantum of debt
that Centrelink was trying to recover. Centrelink replied that the debt as of 30 September 2008 was $2.2 billion.[9]
The age of the debt base
5.19
The Committee then examined the age of customer debt, expressing concern
that almost a quarter of debt was over four years old. Centrelink noted that
while that was the case, that the majority of debt was under recovery
arrangements with current customers, and that debts were being deducted from
benefits at a small rate to avoid putting customers into additional financial
hardship.[10]
5.20
The audit report noted that Centrelink was unable to provide the ANAO
with reasons for the ageing of its debt base[11] with the Committee
asking the agency to explain why this was the case. Centrelink replied that
they had accepted the ANAO’s recommendations and had begun to analyse the debt
base, but that the relaxed debt recovery regime put into place by Centrelink
was one of the reasons for the ageing and expansion of the debt base.[12]
5.21
Noting the ageing of the customer debt base, and the slow rate of
recovery, the Committee asked Centrelink for an estimate of how much of the
debt would eventually have to be written off. Centrelink replied that it was
difficult to say, but that 70 per cent of the total value of debt base was
under active recovery arrangements.[13]
5.22
While the Committee is glad the majority of customer debt is under
active recovery arrangements, it remains concerned that the debt base continues
to age, and that Centrelink is unaware of concrete reasons why this seems to be
the case. It is imperative that Centrelink identify why the debt base continues
to age to slow or prevent debt base ageing altogether.
Recommendation 11 |
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That Centrelink conduct a review to determine the cause of
its ageing debt base, and that it reports its findings back to the Committee
within six months of the tabling date of the Committee’s report.
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Debt write offs and waivers
5.23
The Committee asked about the value of debt waived in a yearly period,
and was informed that in the 2007-08 financial year, $574 million worth of
debts were waived, written off or reduced.[14]
5.24
The Committee observed that Centrelink had identified that legislation
impeded its ability to write off debt. Centrelink noted that it was
legislatively obliged to pursue customer debts for six years (unless the debt
met certain conditions) before they could write it off as a bad debt.[15]
5.25
The Committee asked for a breakdown of waiver reasons. The vast majority
of waivers (866,899 of a total of 915,455 waivers, or over 95% for the 2007-08
financial year) were because the debt was less than fifty dollars, and was
deemed not cost effective to recover. The other major reasons waivers were
provided were due to clerical error (32,368 instances), and extreme and unusual
circumstances (2,946 instances).[16]
Cost effectiveness of debt recovery
5.26
The Committee noted that of the recommendations it had made in the first
hearing into the issue, all recommendations had been adopted with the exception
of Recommendation 22, which dealt with raising the debt waiver amount from $50
to not more than $100. The reason for this was that Centrelink believed it was
the responsibility of its purchaser departments to determine the debt waiver
amounts. During the public hearing, Centrelink restated its position.[17]
5.27
The Committee noted that DEEWR had analysed its debt waiver in 2006 and
had found it was cost effective to collect sums below $50. DEEWR replied they
had done some indicative work and that they had found enough evidence that:
…it showed, on the information that was available, $38 or so
was a point and that we might be able to bring that down to 20-something
dollars. On that work we are continuing to talk with Centrelink and FaHCSIA so
it is a major part of going forward.[18]
5.28
The Committee members suggested that the agencies and ANAO should be
working together to develop a recommendation about what the debt waiver level
should be in terms of cost-effectiveness. DEEWR replied that they wanted to
work further with Centerlink and FaHCSIA to ensure a comprehensive empirical
analysis to determine the most cost effective level of debt waiver.
5.29
The Committee is disappointed that there is still no clear debt waiver
figure, and recommends:
Recommendation 12 |
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That Centrelink, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace
Relations and the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous
Affairs conduct an empirical analysis to determine a cost-effective debt
waiver, and that this figure be reported to the Committee within six months
of the tabling of the Committee’s report.
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Debt prevention
5.30
Centerlink noted the importance of debt prevention, and noted that while
the majority of its resources were spent on finding debts once they had
occurred, that the focus was now going to move to one of balancing between debt
detection and debt prevention.[19]
5.31
The Committee noted its major concern was that there was no evidence of
major concentration on, or clear strategies towards, preventing customer debts
arising in the first instance.
5.32
Centrelink noted that the primary reason debts were incurred was because
customers did not inform it of changes in their personal circumstances.[20]
5.33
The Committee examined one of the areas where debt was the largest,
youth payments, and asked for examples of innovations used to prevent youth
payment recipients from incurring debts. DEEWR noted that non-declaration or
incorrect declaration of earnings was a primary driver of debt for Newstart
recipients, along with failing to declare a change in marital status. To
address this issue, DEEWR and Centrelink put into place improved processes for
verification of earnings, and improved data matching, obtaining data from
employment service providers to match with Centrelink’s records.[21]
5.34
Centerlink noted that students were failing to inform it of changes in
their study load, often resulting in overpayment. As a result, Centerlink had
initiated the rollout of data exchange with academic institutions, which had
led to a reduction in customer debts at participating institutions by more than
70 per cent.[22]
5.35
The Committee expresses its support for these initiatives, and
encourages agencies to continue in the same vein to address other drivers of
customer debt.
5.36
The audit report found that the existing arrangements and operations for
Centrelink’s early intervention activity database were insufficient. The
Committee asked what changes had been made, with Centrelink replying that the
ANAO recommendations had been implemented, and the database had been made more
robust and reliable. Further, they were currently working with policy
departments and the Department of Human Services to agree on how to measure
prevention and identify the tools needed to do so.[23]
5.37
The Committee is pleased to see that data matching has been such a
success in preventing the accrual of customer debt across some sectors and
encourages agencies to continue to roll out data matching programs to prevent
customer debt.
Aged pension debts
5.38
The Committee discussed debts incurred by aged pensioners, with FaHCSIA
noting that while the aged pension occupied a large proportion of the debt
base, that the average size of debts was smaller, and that the primary problem
was the declaration of income and earnings, especially amongst part-rate
pensioners.[24]
5.39
Centrelink added that the sale of assets, particularly real estate was
another driver of aged pension debt, and advised the Committee that they now
obtained data from the Australian Valuations Office and some financial
institutions such as the Commonwealth Bank to prevent aged pensioners incurring
debt.[25]
5.40
The Committee noted that 46.5 per cent of aged pension debt was
classified as ‘very large debt’, over $20,000, expressing concern about how
such large amounts of debt were incurred by aged pensioners. FaHCSIA replied
that large debts occurred as aged pensioners did not have to have regular
contact with Centrelink, and that their marital status may have changed, or
that their financial circumstances may have changed due to the sale of assets,
primarily real estate.[26]
5.41
The Committee moved on to examine the rate of recovery of aged pension
debts, noting the success rate for recovery of aged pension debt was 52.6 per
cent. It asked whether success in debt recovery was measured in the terms of
the amount of successful claims, or by the amount of money recovered. The ANAO
replied that the audit found success was measured by the amount of money recovered.[27]
5.42
Centrelink reiterated the importance of rolling out its prevention
mechanisms, such as real estate valuations and financial institution data
exchange to prevent the accrual of aged pension debt in the first place,
acknowledging they needed to improve at addressing risks, rather than acting
after a debt has occurred.[28]
Conclusion
5.43
It is clear to the Committee that there has been some excellent progress
made in management of customer debt. It is pleased to see that the agencies
have implemented all of the ANAO recommendations of the two reports on the
issue, and the majority of the Committee recommendations stemming from its
first examination of the issue.
5.44
Notwithstanding this, there are still some areas that require
improvement. While the centralised management structure for debt recovery is
encouraging, Centrelink should do more to determine which regions are
performing well, and which regions are performing poorly to ensure an even
level of regional performance in debt recovery.
5.45
Further, the Committee is disappointed that Centrelink remains unsure
why the debt base continues to age. There may be simple or more complex reasons
for this, but determining why this is the case is of importance for the sake of
risk management.
5.46
Finally, the Committee is unhappy there has been no more progress made
on developing a comprehensive debt waiver threshold and urges the relevant
agencies to determine one as soon as possible.
5.47
The Committee notes the importance of Centrelink being involved in
policy implementation and urges more cross-agency collaboration between
Centrelink, DEEWR and FaHCSIA.
5.48
The Committee is glad to see progress made in the management of customer
debt, and is firmly of the belief that the full implementation of its
recommendations would continue to improve performance and further reduce the
cost of customer debt to the taxpayer.