Chapter 2 Implications of the proposed changes
2.1
This chapter examines issues raised by inquiry participants about
discontinuing tax deductibility for political contributions and party
membership subscriptions. These are arranged according to their impact on
different interests including the government, individual taxpayers, business
and community participation in political activities.
2.2
The committee’s broad conclusion and recommendation regarding tax
deductibility can be found at the end of the chapter.
Projected savings generated by the proposed changes
2.3
As noted in chapter 1, taxpayers can currently claim a deduction as part
of their annual tax returns for certain contributions and gifts to political
parties, members and candidates.
2.4
Schedule 1 of the Tax Laws Amendment (2008 Measures No. 1) Bill 2008
will remove deductibility for these payments by corporations. In addition,
individual taxpayers will no longer be able to claim contributions and gifts to
political parties, members and independent candidates unless it is incurred in
gaining or producing assessable income.
2.5
The explanatory memorandum to the Bill indicates that the proposed
amendments will save the government $31.4 million over the four years to
2011-12, with savings commencing in 2009-10 (table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Financial
impact – abolition of tax deductibility for contributions and gifts to
political parties, members and independent candidates ($million)
Financial Year
|
2009-10
|
2010-11
|
2011-12
|
|
Savings ($ million)
|
$10.1
|
$10.3
|
$11.0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source Tax Laws Amendment (2008
Measures No. 1) Bill 2008, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 3.
2.6
Most of the expected savings will come from tax deductions claimed for
donations or party memberships by individuals, with donations by business
accounting for about one third of the projected savings. Treasury estimates
that in 2009‑10, savings from individual taxpayers would total
$6.5 million with savings from business totalling $3.6 million. These
savings were expected to rise to $7.2 million and $3.8 million
respectively in 2011-12.[1]
2.7
At the public hearing held in Canberra, representatives of the Treasury
were asked how these savings had been calculated. The Treasury indicated that
there were two elements to Treasury’s costing methodology: the contributions
element, and costing in respect of memberships of political parties.[2]
2.8
Treasury used the records of donations to political parties which are
publicly available on the Australian Electoral Commission’s website for the
contributions element:
… in terms of the contributions … because the $1,500 threshold
had been in place for 2003-04 and 2004-05, we had to make significant
adjustments. There were only a few donations declared below that threshold to
the data, but we could cost accurately in terms of the implications above it.[3]
2.9
Treasury found that exact numbers for ‘membership of parties is
something that is … closely guarded’[4] so it used ‘the most
up-to-date study[5] that we could find that
attempted to estimate membership of political parties’. Treasury told the committee
that it believes the party membership number it used ‘appears to be somewhat
conservative’. [6]
2.10
Treasury agreed with a suggestion by the committee that ‘at best’ the
number used may be a ‘guesstimate’:
… because essentially the thesis in the article [used by Treasury]
is that parties do not give out numbers, because membership may be declining
and they do not want to reveal that. [7]
2.11
The committee also suggested that the Treasury’s estimate might be an overestimate.
Agreeing that it might be, Treasury noted that when it published election
costings it included a warning that:
… it should be noted that actual outcomes may vary from these
estimates if assumptions or behaviour change from our expectation. In
particular, data on political party membership fees received is poor and data
on donations below the [Australian Electoral Commission] disclosure threshold
is also poor. [8]
2.12
Treasury told the committee that in reaching its figures it:
… used the best data available on memberships to get some
idea of what the costing is. … but we have admitted that the idea is imprecise
because of the availability of information. [9]
2.13
Treasury has not done any costings based on the assumption that tax
deductibility was returned to the previous cap of $100. However, it noted that the
average membership subscription to a political party was calculated to be
sixty-two dollars per annum and, therefore:
… the average membership fee is below $100 and, if membership
remained deductible, that is the amount of revenue that would become deductible. [10]
2.14
Treasury was questioned about the apparent discrepancy between its
costings on savings if tax deductibility ceases to exist, and costings by the
Australian Labor Party (ALP) which showed savings of $8.4 million in
2009-10 and $8.7 million in 2010-11. In response, Treasury noted that the ALP
had not included membership fees — the savings costed related only to savings
made by removing tax deductibility from political donations and Treasury
referred the committee to page 3 of its official costing:
The original ALP costing request did not mention the loss in
tax deductibility for membership subscription fees. Confirmation by the ALP led
to this being included. The ALP had assumed that the loss of tax deductibility
for donations under $100 could represent a revenue gain of $3 million per annum
from 2009-10. [11]
2.15
In arriving at their estimates, Treasury did not use the ALP figures regarding
membership. Instead, Treasury used its own estimate of the number of members
of political parties assuming an average donation of $62; and a 90 per cent
claim rate which makes some allowance for those people who do not claim
membership as a tax deduction and those who are not able to claim it as tax
deductible. An average tax rate of 35 per cent for those claiming deductibility
was used. In this way Treasury
arrived at a figure of $4.3 million per annum for membership subscription
costs.[12]
Conclusion
2.16
The committee is satisfied that the savings figures presented by
Treasury represent the best available estimate of the projected savings that
would be generated by the proposed changes. However, it is mindful that the
figures used may be overestimated due to the difficulty encountered in
accessing exact party membership numbers. In this regard the committee noted Professor Orr’s observation that :
… on a seat-of-the-pants assumption, if you are talking about
$10 million per year you are talking about $30 million of donations at, say, a
marginal rate of 30 per cent, which is roughly the corporate rate. Thirty
million dollars is a lot of $1,500 contributions or party memberships. [13]
Impact of changes on individual taxpayers
2.17
Individual taxpayers can currently claim a tax deduction for political
contributions and gifts when they complete their tax returns at the end of a
financial year.
2.18
The committee heard that ‘a key purpose of limited tax deductibility is
to encourage smaller scale donations and hence political participation’. Soliciting
smaller donations is a way for parties to interact with the wider public.[14]
2.19
However, the committee found no clear evidence to prove that tax
deductibility actually does encourage people to become members of political
parties or to make donations to parties. In the 2005 ‘Giving Australia’ study, it was noted that:
Greater taxation incentives are regularly advocated as the
required catalyst to increased giving, but givers regularly report that they
are not motivated by tax incentives and awareness of their very availability
appears to be low.[15]
2.20
The committee heard differing opinions about the equity of tax
deductibility as a policy. A recent academic paper on political finance in Australia suggested that tax deductibility can have regressive effects and hence, undermine
political equality:
The present system of tax relief … favours the wealthy because,
having more disposable income, they are more able to take advantage of the
subsidy. Further, for the same amount of political donation, the wealthy, being
subjected to higher income tax rates, receive a greater amount of public
subsidy.[16]
2.21
The committee noted that more than 2.1 million individual taxpayers
in 2005-06 had a taxable income less than the tax free threshold of $6000
(table 2.2). These taxpayers receive no benefit from tax deductibility for
political contributions and gifts. Currently, taxpayers below the threshold
are unfairly treated compared to the 910,000 taxpayers earning more than
$80,000 — who are able to claim a tax deduction of at least 40 cents for every
dollar contributed to political parties up to the $1500 threshold.
Table 2.2 No. of taxpayers by taxable income and age,
2005-06
Age
|
Below
tax-free threshold ($6000)
|
$6001
to
$30,000
|
$30,001
to $80,000
|
$80,001
to $150,000
|
$150,001+
|
65+
|
447,400
|
186,625
|
282,915
|
49,385
|
23,865
|
45-64
|
542,555
|
1,007,075
|
1,885,345
|
313,745
|
97,615
|
30-44
|
531,150
|
930,670
|
1,846,645
|
307,075
|
67,420
|
18-29
|
421,460
|
1,207,150
|
1,025,080
|
45,685
|
3,050
|
Under 18
|
201,030
|
78,050
|
2,115
|
185
|
60
|
Total taxpayers
|
2,143,595
|
3,409,570
|
5,042,100
|
716,075
|
192,010
|
Source Australian
Taxation Office, Tax Stats, Personal tax table 11, viewed on 5 May 2008 at http://www.ato.gov.au/content/downloads/00117625_2006PER11.pdf.
2.22
With taxpayers facing marginal tax rates of between $0 for taxable
incomes of less than $6,000 and $0.45 for taxable incomes greater than $150,000
there can be a significant difference in the out-of-pocket contributions for
individual taxpayers (table 2.3).
Table 2.3 Income
tax rebates to individual taxpayers based on $1500 donation, by income (2007-08
tax scales)
Taxable income
|
Marginal tax rate
(2007-08)
|
Tax rebate
|
Out of pocket cost
to donor
|
$150,000
|
45%
|
$675
|
$825
|
$100,000
|
40%
|
$600
|
$900
|
$50,000
|
30%
|
$450
|
$1050
|
$25,000
|
15%
|
$225
|
$1275
|
$0
|
0%
|
$0
|
$1500
|
Source Committee
estimates based on a donation of $1500 and the relevant tax rates applying for
the financial year 2007-08 from the Australian Taxation Office website at (http://www.ato.gov.au/individuals/content.asp?doc=/content/12333.htm&pc=001/002/046/002/002&mnu=1045&mfp=001/002&st=&cy=1).
2.23
However, others disagreed that it is regressive to offer a tax deduction
because some people cannot take advantage of it:
We think it unwise to close off avenues encouraging
small-scale grassroots donating. With due respect, it is doctrinaire to say
that tax deductibility is regressive because it is not open to, say, pensioners
who might pay no tax. If that were true, it would be unfair to give charities
tax-deductible status at all.[17]
2.24
Several submissions noted that the current high levels of tax
deductibility have been found to favour wealthy people both because wealthy
people have more disposable income, so they are more able to take advantage of
the subsidy; and because for the same amount of political donation, being
subjected to higher income tax rates, wealthy people receive a larger deduction.[18]
2.25
This was borne out by evidence from a recent study conducted about the
use of tax deductibility for political contributions in Canada:
The almost half of all Canadian tax filers whose income fall
into the lowest bracket comprise only 10 per cent of all [the scheme’s] claimants,
while the 3 percent of tax filers in the highest bracket make 18 percent of all
claims. The pattern is even more skewed when one compares the value of the tax
credit for low and high income earners, as the latter are prone to make large
contributions. Despite its other merits, then, the [scheme] reinforces an
inequitable pattern of giving to parties and candidates.[19]
2.26
Mr Sempill and Dr Tham also observed the inequity of a tax relief scheme
in Quebec:
The data for 1997 indicated that while taxpayers earning C$20,000
or less per annum constituted 54% of all taxpayers, they only constituted 15%
of those who claimed a credit under the Quebec system. Those earning C$50,000
or more, on the other hand, represented 43% of those who claimed the credit
while only constituting 10% of all taxpayers.[20]
2.27
However, The Nationals’ submission put forward an opposing point of
view, noting that ‘it cannot be reasonably argued, nor has it been
demonstrated, that the threshold engenders any level of political influence on
political parties or skews any political influence to the wealthy in society.’[21]
2.28
The Liberal Party of Australia noted its belief that ‘… the tax
deductibility provisions for political donations are operating as intended by
the legislation and, without evidence to the contrary, changes would
disadvantage donors’.[22]
2.29
Several submissions to the inquiry suggested that the best outcome for
individuals would be a reversion to the previous threshold of $100 tax
deduction thereby continuing to encourage small-scale grassroots donating. In Dr Thompson’s opinion ‘totally removing any tax relief for political contributions from
individuals is a short-sighted saving in Australia’s upcoming budgets’.[23]
2.30
On the other hand, some submissions and witnesses favoured removing tax
deductibility completely. For example, the Australian Labor Party noted:
While there are some arguable benefits in increased civic
participation in the political process which are foregone in abolishing
deductibility, there exist many more avenues for that participation to occur,
without facing the risk of distortion in the Australian electoral system.[24]
2.31
The committee was told that inequity is the most likely result of any
provisions granting tax deductibility for party membership and donations and
inequity is exacerbated with the current high threshold of $1500. This high
threshold provides, according to one submission, ‘tax relief for political
donations that is out of reach of ordinary Australians’.[25]
2.32
Only taxpayers who are in a position to pay membership fees or make donations
are advantaged by tax deductibility so by removing tax deductibility for
membership fees and donations it would remove the advantage that only some
taxpayers receive.[26] Among those who are not
advantaged by tax deductibility are ‘job seekers, retirees without income,
full-time parents and students not engaged in paid work’.[27]
Taxpayers who must join parties and/or donate to earn their living
2.33
For some individual taxpayers, membership of a political party and/or
the payment of a party ‘levy’ is an accepted and/or expected part of their
employment.[28] It is also likely, for
tax purposes, that these payments are directly related to earning assessable
income.[29]
2.34
The committee heard from Treasury that members of parliament, staff of
members of parliament and party employees would all still be able to claim
membership fees or compulsory levies as deductions under the proposed
amendments.[30]
2.35
When drafting the Bill, the provisions allowing office holders and
employees to retain their tax deductibility for expenses incurred in the course
of gaining and producing their assessable income were retained because it is ‘the
general tenet of section 8.1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997’.[31]
Treasury noted that there are many professions where expenses are incurred in
gaining and producing the assessable income that a person derives and ‘the
general tenet of taxation policy is that those deductions should be allowable’.[32]
2.36
Some discussion ensued at the public hearing about the tax deduction
available for membership in trade unions. The Australian Taxation Office
confirmed that only membership in those unions which directly relate to a
person’s employment are allowed as a tax deduction.[33]
Where members of trade unions, or other similar organisations, can be said to
receive some advancement of their employment prospects from their involvement
with that association, membership fees are tax deductible when related to gaining
or producing assessable income.
2.37
One submission argued that the exemption in relation to ‘employees’ and
‘office-holders’ can not be justified. Mr Sempill and Dr Tham stated:
Tax relief given to these workers in relation to political
contributions, even if incurred in earning income, shares the same vices as tax
relief for the political contributions of non-workers: it is still inefficient
and inequitable.[34]
Conclusion
2.38
While the retention of tax deductibility for contributions and gifts to
political parties, members and independent candidates is only likely to apply
to a relatively small number of individual taxpayers, the committee considers
that it is important to uphold the principle that individual taxpayers can
deduct expenses related to earning their income. Therefore, the committee
supports the retention of tax deductibility for individual taxpayers as proposed
by the Bill.
2.39
The committee heard a range of arguments for and against tax
deductibility for party membership fees and donations. Most opinions heard by
the committee agreed that a high threshold such as currently exists favours the
wealthy and should be reduced. However, opinions were divided as to whether it
would be better to keep a low threshold for tax deductibility or to abolish tax
deductibility altogether.
2.40
The committee considers that the underlying inequality of tax
deductibility for political contributions and gifts is the most important issue
for individual taxpayers. This inequality will be ‘front and centre’ to the
committee’s overall assessment of the Bill.
Impact of changes for business
2.41
Businesses donate to political parties for a range of reasons including
altruism, management self promotion, corporate social responsibility, to
express political free speech and to maximise profit. However, there is limited
evidence available to test the importance of each of these reasons.[35]
2.42
Self interest is highly likely to be at the forefront of these
decisions.[36] This is particularly so
for public companies where company law requires directors and senior executives
to act in good faith in the interests of the company — implying that there needs
to be an obvious benefit for political contributions (direct or indirect) for
the company’s shareholders.[37]
2.43
Corporations have been able to claim a tax deduction for political donations
since 22 June 2006. Businesses may also have claimed some of these payments
under the general deductibility provisions of the tax law.[38]
2.44
The Democratic Audit told the committee that there are four reasons why
it believes extending tax deductibility of donations to corporations is
controversial:
n Firstly, corporations
are not holders of political rights, but essentially profit-making concerns
which make political contributions for self-interested motivations;
n Secondly, corporate
donations overwhelmingly follow power and therefore only the major parties tend
to benefit from them. This creates a form of inequality with minor parties and
independents which rely on individual donations;
n Thirdly, proprietors
of businesses could effectively have annual tax deductible donations of $3,000
if they donate both individually and via their company; and
n Lastly, corporations
can also claim the purchase of political access as a business deduction, for
example purchasing tickets to/tables at party fundraisers, or sponsoring
session at party conferences.[39]
2.45
The Democratic Audit support the provisions of the Bill designed to
close off ‘business expense’ deductibility for political donations in the form
of buying access/tables at fundraisers. It told the committee that this would
close a loophole on previously uncapped deductions.[40]
2.46
The committee heard that provisions allowing corporations to claim tax
deductions for their political contributions runs contrary to the aim of
reducing the influence of ‘big money’ in politics:
Because corporate money tends to go overwhelmingly to the
major parties, subsidising corporate contributions threatens to deepen the
financial divide between the major and minor parties.[41]
Conclusion
2.47
The committee did not hear, nor did it receive any opinions strongly in
favour of maintaining tax deductibility for business.
2.48
While business can, and will continue to, contribute to political
parties under existing law, the committee considers that it is not necessary to
subsidise business contributions and gifts to political parties through the tax
system — especially when it is likely that most businesses are making these
contributions to support their own interests. The committee therefore supports the
discontinuation of tax deductibility for political donations by business.
Impact of changes on political participation
2.49
The committee heard that political involvement ‘through traditional
vehicles’ is changing in Australia. Most people no longer ‘go out to political
party meetings and public rallies’ as they once did, rather ‘we are moving much
more to a culture based upon online and transactional engagement with
politics.’[42]
2.50
Ms Foskey, MLA, told the committee that:
Making donations tax deductible simply added to the advantage
enjoyed by those people who can afford to make the donation. It has simply
encouraged and legitimised an uneven playing field.[43]
2.51
However, Ms Foskey believes that if a tax deduction of about $100
existed, it would have the effect of ‘inviting tax payers to become active
citizens, and invest in the political parties for whom they will vote.’ This
would in turn encourage a broader political participation and thus more
representative political parties. [44]
2.52
If tax deductibility was removed from party membership and donations it
would not in effect disenfranchise people from participation as people would
still be entitled to make small-scale donations, however, for some people the
incentive to make those donations may have been removed.[45]
2.53
Professor Orr noted that although there is no research to indicate
whether or not party membership would decline sharply as a result of loss of
tax deductibility, the fact that many political party membership forms make no
mention of tax deductibility indicates that most people do not take out
membership based on its availability.[46]
2.54
It is not clear what proportion of party members actually claim a tax
deduction for their party membership fees. A review of political party websites
by the committee confirmed that they do not generally include information about
tax deductibility on their websites or membership forms (table 2.4).
2.55
Overall, the Australian Democrats and the Australian Greens are more
likely to provide information to new members on the tax deductibility of party
membership fees and donations on their websites.
Table 2.4 Information
provided by parties to potential members on tax deductibility for donations
and membership fees
|
NSW
|
Vic
|
Qld
|
SA
|
WA
|
ACT
|
Tas
|
NT
|
Liberal Party of Australia
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Membership
|
X
|
X
|
NA
|
√
|
X
|
X
|
X
|
X
|
Donations
|
X
|
X
|
√
|
X
|
√
|
X
|
√
|
NA
|
The Nationals
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Membership
|
X
|
NA
|
X
|
√
|
X
|
|
|
|
Donations
|
X
|
√
|
√
|
NA
|
X
|
|
|
|
Australian Labor Party
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Membership
|
X
|
X
|
√
|
√
|
X
|
X
|
NA
|
X
|
Donations
|
√
|
X
|
X
|
NA
|
X
|
X
|
NA
|
NA
|
Australian Greens
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Membership
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
X
|
X
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
Donations
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
X
|
√
|
√
|
Australian Democrats
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Membership
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
Donations
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
Family First Party Australia
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Membership
|
X
|
X
|
X
|
X
|
X
|
X
|
X
|
X
|
Donations
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
√
|
One Nation Party
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Membership
|
X
|
NA
|
X
|
X
|
NA
|
|
|
|
Donations
|
X
|
NA
|
X
|
NA
|
NA
|
|
|
|
√
=
Tax
deduction mentioned
X
= Tax
deduction not mentioned
NA
– Not available
Source Committee
review of party websites, 8 April 2008.
Political parties and independent candidates
2.56
The committee heard arguments both for and against using tax
deductibility of membership fees and donations as a way of funding political
parties.
2.57
It was argued that offering tax deductibility for political membership
and donations as a way to adequately fund parties, is not being achieved
because ‘the money provided from the public purse goes to taxpayers rather than
the parties’ and thus, the parties are only being funded in a ‘rather indirect
and limited fashion’.[47] Furthermore:
[the existing] system places an incentive to make
contributions and to take out membership on the taxpayer much more so than on
the parties themselves to solicit contributions and membership. A system of
public subsidy that relies more directly on strengthening incentives faced by
the parties may very well be more effective.[48]
2.58
However, Professor Orr argued that tax deductibility is necessary to
give new and small parties a boost because the current form of direct public
funding after elections shuts out new political parties as well as minor
parties who might not achieve a four per cent threshold.[49]
2.59
The ALP considered that ‘removing tax deductibility remains the best policy
option for promoting integrity in the political system’.[50]
If small contributions and party memberships decline as a result of tax
deductibility being withdrawn:
The challenge [will be] to devise a
system of public funding that is efficient and equitable.[51]
2.60
The Nationals argued that public funding provided to parties and
candidates is not nearly sufficient to cover the escalating costs of modern
political campaigning. The Nationals told the committee that ‘political party
membership fees and particularly political donations have played an ongoing and
increasing role in financing party administration and election campaigns’[52]
and therefore, suggested that the removal of tax deductibility for political
party membership fees will discourage participation in the democratic process. In
defence of tax deductibility, the Nationals told the committee:
The current tax deductibility arrangements of party
membership apply equally to all parties and candidates, whether independent or
party-affiliated, providing no advantage to any party or individual over
another.[53]
2.61
The Nationals noted that one of the funding and disclosure scheme’s
fundamental objectives is that ‘a level playing field should operate between
political parties and independent candidates’. The Nationals told the committee
that in its view, the current arrangements for tax deductibility serves to
achieve that objective, ‘as well as encouraging greater participation in the
democratic process’.[54]
2.62
The Democratic Audit told the committee that its research has found
that:
Australian parties are already considering new approaches to
fund-raising, particularly based on internet marketing to online networks.[55]
Conclusion
2.63
Arguments were presented to the committee both for and against tax
deductibility as a way of funding political parties. Tax deductibility is seen
to be one way to encourage small-scale funding of parties although some argue
that it is inequitable and parties still need to fund-raise in other ways.
2.64
It was argued that while the major parties can and do raise funds in a
variety of ways, new and small parties rely on tax deductibility to use as an
incentive to generate much needed funding, at least until they can achieve the
four per cent threshold to receive public funding.
2.65
Discontinuing tax deductibility for political contributions and gifts
does not disenfranchise citizens and restrict their capacity to make a
contribution to a political party if they wish to do so.
2.66
In the committee’s view, there is no strong evidence to support
assertions that party membership will be adversely affected by the
discontinuation of tax deductibility of party membership fees.
Tax deductibility and its relationship with political party financing
2.67
Inquiry participants held a number of different views on whether the
committee’s consideration of Schedule 1 of the Tax Laws Amendment (2008
Measures No. 1) Bill 2008 should be combined with future broader inquiries into
political financing issues including this committee’s inquiry into the 2007
election and the federal government’s green paper on political finance and
disclosure issues.
2.68
These views were also expressed by members of non-government parties
during debate on the Bill in the House of Representatives and by opposition
members of the committee at the public hearing.[56]
2.69
The Liberal Party of Australia did not support the Parliament
considering tax deductibility at this time, commenting that:
… The Government has indicated its intention to bring forward
a Green Paper later this year considering a range of issues including the
funding of political parties. As tax deductibility of political donations is
only one part of the legislative and policy framework in this area, it would
not be in the interests of good public policy for this matter to be dealt with
in isolation from other matters expected to be canvassed by the Green Paper.
… If tax deductibility is to be reviewed, this should only
occur as part of an overall review of the laws governing political donations.
[The Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters] has the task of doing just
that as part of its review of the 2007 election, and any review of tax
deductibility should only occur as part of that inquiry.[57]
2.70
Similar sentiments were expressed by The Nationals, who also referred to
other parliamentary committee reviews of political party funding in progress in
other jurisdictions:
The Nationals oppose in principle the piecemeal progression
of individual changes to the current rules for campaign finance ahead of, or
independently from, a comprehensive and coordinated examination of campaign
finance generally. The concern regarding the lack of such a comprehensive and
coordinated examination is compounded by the separate inquiry currently being
undertaken by the New South Wales Legislative Council's Select Committee on Electoral
and Political Party Funding.
… The Nationals believe the changes proposed regarding tax
deductibility of political gifts and contributions should be held over and
considered as part of the Electoral Reform Green Paper process, which it is
understood will be initiated with the release of the Green Paper in July 2008.[58]
2.71
The Australian Labor Party, while supporting the discontinuation of tax
deductibility for political contributions and gifts, recognised that the move
would be complemented by recent policy announcements regarding a reduction in
the thresholds for disclosing political contributions and gifts:
By removing the deductibility provisions, rather than
restoring them to their pre-2006 levels, the federal government is bringing the
tax law relating to political parties into line with amendments already
foreshadowed by the Special Minister of State on donation disclosure. These tax
laws will further improve the integrity of the electoral system and will work
in conjunction with the lowering of the disclosure threshold.[59]
2.72
The Democratic Audit recommended retention of a $100 cap on
deductibility for individual taxpayers until the government and/or the
committee settled proposals for any revamping of the broader system of
political finance.[60] Professor Orr told the
committee that:
We may be partly contradicting ourselves, because whilst we
are saying we welcome the lowering of deductibility and taking it away from
corporations—and I guess the government’s intention is to have this in place
for the next financial year—we would not like there to be yet another change
further down the track if the government or [the Joint Standing Committee on
Electoral Matters] decide that you need to have some kind of tax deductibility
measure to encourage small-scale donation. So I think it is premature to
abolish it altogether.
… We are working on the assumption that so far the public
debate on all sides of politics is to move towards a modest system. Our
question would be: where is the money going to come from? We do not want in a
liberal democracy to have a purely statist culture of direct public funding.[61]
2.73
Alternative policies to replace tax deductibility, including the use of
tax credits and a ‘matching’ of private contributions to political parties with
equivalent public funding, were also raised by other participants. Dr Thompson noted that:
Rather than allow a tax deduction on political donations I
believe we should give tax credits for these contributions. This means that
those in a higher tax bracket are not rewarded more than those in the lower
brackets. Tax credits are more equitable than tax deductions.
A tax credit is generally more valuable than a tax deduction
of the same magnitude because a tax credit reduces tax directly, while a
deduction only reduces taxable income. A tax credit reduces the tax paid
dollar-for-dollar. This amount of tax savings is not dependent on the rate the
taxpayer pays.[62]
2.74
Mr Sempill and Dr Tham raised some possible alternatives involving
public funding that could be considered to tax deductibility:
The aims of encouraging small contributions and party
membership while assisting the finances of parties remain sound and modest
public funding should be devoted to them. The challenge is to devise a system
of public funding that is efficient and equitable.
There are two options we wish to flag. First, public funding
can be directly provided to parties registered under the [Commonwealth
Electoral Act] based on the number of their party members (providing there is
integrity of membership rolls). For instance, for each member, a registered
party could receive $5. Second, a system of matching funds could be put in
place to encourage small contributions. For example, for each contribution of
$50 or less received per annum by candidates and registered parties, public
funds could be provided at the amount of 10% of these contributions.
We emphasise that this system of matching funds not only
should be limited to small contributions but also should only involve a modest
public subsidy in total. Both are necessary in order to alleviate the risk of
such a system being biased towards wealthy citizens and parties.[63]
Conclusion
2.75
While links between tax deductibility and other aspects of political
party financing can be drawn, it is not clear to the committee that assessments
about the continuation of tax deductibility need to be made in a broader
context.
2.76
The committee acknowledges that there are likely to be changes made or
considered in a number of areas, including lower disclosure thresholds and
greater accountability for public funding. It does not seem necessary to the
committee that the mix of funding mechanisms should retain an unbalanced and
inequitable system of political contributions through tax deductibility.
Committee recommendation
2.77
The committee considers that the underlying inequity of tax
deductibility for political contributions and gifts, which confers advantages
and disadvantages to taxpayers on the basis of their taxable income, should be
discontinued.
2.78
The committee believes there is no evidence that discontinuing tax
deductibility for political contributions and gifts will necessarily lead to
reduced participation in political activities — members of the community will
still be able to join a political party and individuals and businesses will still
be free to donate to the political parties and candidates. However, the
inequitable aspect of the tax deduction mechanism will be removed and provide a
more equal framework for political participation.
2.79
The committee rejects the view expressed by some inquiry participants
that this measure should be delayed and included in forthcoming reviews of
political party funding.
Recommendation 1
|
2.80
|
The committee supports the removal of tax deductibility for
contributions and gifts made to political parties, members and independent
candidates and recommends that the proposed Bill be passed by the Senate
without amendment.
|
Daryl Melham MP
Chair
26 May 2008