4.1
The Committee commenced this inquiry to test the appetite within the House of Representatives for potential change to the standing order provisions related to disorder.
4.2
The question of whether the standing orders needed clarifying, expanding or supplementing was tested against other similar Westminster-style parliaments and with Members directly.
4.3
Whilst there are common themes amongst similar jurisdictions when it comes to the more serious sanction of ‘naming’ a Member, the most divergence occurs around the less serious ‘withdrawal’ provisions. This differentiation relates to whether those jurisdictions have such a provision, the length of withdrawal and any related restrictions (expulsion from precincts, voting rights etc).
4.4
The current two-tiered sanction system within the House of Representatives provides the Speaker with flexibility to respond to disorder in the House depending on the severity of the offence. Standing order 94(a) allows the Speaker to remove a distracting and disorderly Member quickly and without further disruption. For more serious offences, standing order 94(b) provides the Speaker with the option of ‘naming’ a Member and, with the support of the House, removing the Member from the Chamber for 24 hours on the first occasion, and for three days or seven days on subsequent occasions.
4.5
The reducing incidence of namings since the introduction of standing order 94(a) (as evidenced in Table 2.1) suggests that its use has either aided in removing the disorder that would have led to a naming in the past, or that Speakers in those parliaments have potentially controlled disorderly behaviour in a more efficient manner.
4.6
Such commentary has to be tempered with acknowledgement of the reality that different parliaments have differing levels of order in their proceedings, and these will be managed by Speakers (or occupants of the Chair) in different ways. The statistics can only highlight behaviour of Members to a certain degree. Further, the makeup of the House in the 43rd Parliament and in the current Parliament should be considered when looking at the figures (with numbers between government and non-government being so close, the Chair may be less willing to name a Member).
4.7
Ultimately, as outlined in Chapter 3, there are a variety of ways in which Westminster-style parliaments manage disorder. Their common genesis in the UK House of Commons has diverged into multiple forms of tiered sanctions, but still with the common ‘naming’ for more serious offences.
4.8
The withdrawal sanctions that may exist in those other parliaments and the ancillary effects of a naming (such as exclusion from parliamentary precincts) are a reflection of the evolution of those legislatures and the way in which they decide to govern themselves; as all of these parliaments set their own rules in their standing orders.
4.9
Similarly, the Australian House of Representatives sets its own rules, and the current two-tiered sanction structure is a result of that evolution. Having been twenty-three years since the introduction of the current standing order 94(a) provision, the Committee saw it as a fitting time to do a ‘temperature test’ of the Members for their support of potential change, but in the end, this support was found to be lukewarm at best. The Committee therefore suggests that the current provisions remain unchanged.