Key points
- The Bill amends Commonwealth statutes relating to national security and intelligence matters.
- Most of the proposed changes are linked to recommendations from the 2019 Review of the Legal Framework of the National Intelligence Community (the Richardson Review).
- Other proposed amendments in the Bill:
- increase the membership of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) from 11 to 13
- clarify the level of detail required in a Ministerial direction to the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) under the Intelligence Services Act 2001.
Introductory Info
Date introduced: 29 March 2023
House: House of Representatives
Portfolio: Attorney-General
Commencement: The day after Royal Assent
Purpose of
the Bill
The purpose of the National
Security Legislation Amendment (Comprehensive Review and Other Measures Bill
2023 (the Bill) is to amend Commonwealth legislation relating to national
security and intelligence. Specifically, the Bill seeks to:
Structure
of the Bill
The Bill has nine Parts, which are summarised in the table
below. Parts 1 to 2 and 4 to 8 seek to implement recommendations from the
Richardson Review. Parts 3 and 9 make further changes to national security
legislation.
Table 1: Structure of the Bill
Part |
Amends |
Summary of change/s |
1—Powers and functions of the Attorney-General |
Acts
Interpretation Act 1901 Australian
Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act) Law
Officers Act 1964 Telecommunications
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act) |
Removes the ability of the Attorney-General to delegate
powers under the ASIO Act (except financial assistance powers). Limits
the ability of the Executive to confer the Attorney-General’s powers with
respect to ASIO on another Minister. |
2—Defences for certain national infrastructure related
offences |
Criminal
Code Act 1995 (Criminal Code) |
Provides new defences for ASIO relating to interference
with facilities, unauthorised modification of data and impairment of
electronic communication. |
3—Membership of the PJCIS |
Intelligence Services Act |
Increases the membership of PJCIS from 11 to 13 and
specifies the composition of Senate and House members. |
4—Spent convictions |
Crimes
Act 1914 |
Allows ASIO to use, record and disclose spent conviction
information. |
5—Reporting by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and
Security (IGIS) |
Inspector-General
of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (IGIS Act) Public
Interest Disclosure Act 2013
|
Requires the Inspector-General of Intelligence and
Security (IGIS) to report annually on public interest disclosures and
complaints made to IGIS. |
6—Investigations by the Ombudsman |
Ombudsman
Act 1976 |
Removes the ability for the Ombudsman to investigate
complaints concerning ASIS, the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence
Organisation (AGO), the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), the Office of
National Intelligence (ONI) and the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO). |
7—Exemptions from Freedom of Information (FOI) law |
Freedom
of Information Act 1982 (FOI Act) |
Removes freedom of information (FOI) exemptions for the
AGO for documents related to the Australian Hydrographic Office (AHO). |
8—Review under the archives law |
Administrative
Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (AAT Act) Archives
Act 1983 FOI Act
|
Requires Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) proceedings
in relation to security records to be heard in the Security Division of the
AAT. Narrows the circumstances in which IGIS is required to provide evidence
to the AAT. |
9—Other amendments |
Intelligence Services Act |
Clarifies the level of detail required in a Ministerial
direction to the ASIS. |
Background
Broader Context
of Reforms
National security and intelligence in Australia is
currently administered by several different agencies under a range of
Commonwealth legislation. Collectively, these agencies form part of the National
Intelligence Community (NIC). NIC agencies collect,
produce and analyse information in support of common missions that address
priority requirements of the Australian Government.
This Bill is the second in a set of legislative measures which
responds to the Richardson Review (see below). The first measures were
introduced by the previous Government through the National Security
Legislation Amendment (Comprehensive Review and Other Measures No. 1) Act 2021
(the First Measures Act).[1]
Prior to the Richardson Review, there had been several
independent reviews of the NIC, including:
The 2019 Richardson Review represented the first
‘wholesale review of the legislative framework’ underpinning NIC work.[3]
The
Richardson Review
The Richardson Review’s focus on national intelligence legislation
responded to a recommendation from the 2017 Independent Intelligence Review
undertaken by Michael L’Estrange and Stephen Merchant.[4]
Specifically, Recommendation 15 from the L’Estrange/Merchant Review proposed:
A comprehensive review of the Acts governing Australia’s
intelligence community be undertaken to ensure agencies operate under a
legislative framework which is clear, coherent and contains consistent
protections for Australians. This review should be carried out by an eminent
and suitably qualified individual or number of individuals, supported by a
small team of security and intelligence law experts with operational knowledge
of the workings of the intelligence community.[5]
The Richardson Review – delivered in late 2020 – contained
a total of 203 recommendations reportedly
to be implemented over several years. The goal of balancing individual
rights against the need for national security was highlighted throughout the
Review. Indeed, as the final report
made clear:
The intelligence services and the agencies with intelligence
functions that comprise the NIC occupy a special place in a democratic society.
They operate, sometimes in secrecy, for the purpose of protecting Australia and
its people, and to promote our national interests. The laws that govern these
agencies, and their activities, must be based on sound and firm principles that
balance privacy and individual liberties, and broader collective interests.[6]
The Terms of Reference for the Richardson Review focused
on making improvements to Commonwealth legislation, in order to, amongst other
things:
- facilitate
the general co-ordination and appropriate control and direction of each agency
comprising the NIC in relation to the exercise of intelligence powers and
functions, and of the NIC as a whole
- support
the effective co-operation, liaison and sharing of information between NIC
agencies, and between NIC agencies and Commonwealth, state, territory, foreign
government and other partners, for intelligence purposes
- support
the intelligence purposes, functions, administration and staffing (including
recruiting) of each agency comprising the NIC
- provide
for accountability and oversight that is transparent and as consistent across
the NIC agencies as is practicably feasible.[7]
Progress on
Implementation
At the time of writing, 30 of the 203 recommendations from
the Richardson Review have been implemented, 53 did not require implementation
and 120 (including the 10 in this Bill) remain ‘in progress’.[8]
The previous Government’s
response to the Richardson Review agreed (or agreed in principle or in part)
to all but four of the Review’s unclassified recommendations. The Bill
specifically seeks to implement Recommendations 18, 19, 66, 136, 145, 167, 186,
188, 191 and 192 of the Richardson Review. These are discussed in greater
detail in the 'Key Issues and Provisions' section of this Digest.
Committee
consideration of the Bill
Parliamentary
Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS)
The Bill has been referred to the PJCIS for inquiry and
report. The Attorney-General requested that the Committee report by the end of
April 2023, but at the time of writing, the report had not yet been published.
Details of the inquiry is available at the
homepage for the inquiry. A public hearing was conducted by the Committee
on 11 April 2023 in Canberra. The transcript of the hearing has been
published online.
Senate
Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills
The Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills
has not yet considered the Bill.
Position of
major interest groups
Extension of
defences and enhanced access to spent conviction information for ‘ASIO affiliates’
Dr Walker-Munro, appearing in a private capacity before
the PJCIS, raised concerns with the scope of the proposed definition of ASIO
officer in the Bill, which the Bill defines as meaning the ‘Director-General
of Security’, an ‘ASIO
employee’ or ‘ASIO
affiliate’. All of these terms carry the same meaning as provided in the
definitions for those terms under the ASIO Act.[9]
Under the ASIO Act, ‘ASIO
affiliate’ is defined as ‘a person performing functions or services for
[ASIO] in accordance with a contract, agreement or other arrangement …’.
The Bill would give ASIO officers (and, by
extension, ASIO affiliates) greater access to spent conviction information as
well as protection via new defences in the Criminal Code.
Dr Walker-Munro stated in his oral evidence before the Committee:
The [concern I have] is in relation to the extension to an
ASIO affiliate, which is defined under the act to include, essentially,
secondees and contractors that may have arrangements with ASIO. The Richardson
review, as far as I'm aware, didn't warrant the extension of immunities from
ASIO employees, who are the staff members of the agency, to anybody else. It is
a very specific immunisation against a very wide range of potential civil and
criminal immunities to which ASIO would have access.[10]
Similarly, in its submission to the PJCIS, the Office of
the IGIS noted that the definition of ASIO officer was potentially
quite broad, although in oral evidence before the Committee, Inspector-General,
Dr Christopher Jessup, stopped short of saying it was a ‘matter of concern’.[11]
In a similar vein, the written submission to the PJCIS by
the Law Council of Australia expressed its view that the definition of ASIO
officer goes beyond the scope of the Richardson Review. In its
submission to the PJCIS inquiry, the Law Council stated that it:
remains concerned that there is the potential for ‘ASIO
Affiliate’ [within the definition of ASIO officer] to allow other
officers of law enforcement agencies, such as the AFP, or other intelligence
agencies with an offshore intelligence focus, such as ASIS, to rely on the
defence. This is undesirable. It would carry the risk of undermining the
differentiated warrant and issuing safeguards—for example, the issuing
safeguards regulating access to telecommunications data and interceptions under
the TIA Act. The Law Council’s long-standing position is that the vital
distinction between foreign and security intelligence should be maintained.[12]
The Director-General of Security at ASIO, Mike Burgess,
responded to these concerns at the public hearing convened by the PJCIS explaining
that the application of the word ‘affiliate’ within the definition of ASIO
officer was intended to be limited:
Obviously, ASIO is made up of our employees and individuals
that are contracted by us or seconded inside our organisation. They are
labelled 'ASIO affiliates', and therefore these defences would apply to them in
the performance of ASIO's function. I would stress that—noting some papers
submitted to the committee and other comments made—this would not allow someone
who is seconded into our organisation to call upon these defences in the
purpose of their own home organisation's function. They can only use them when
they're authorised to do so inside of ASIO for ASIO's purpose.[13]
In reply to further questioning from the Committee, the
Director-General gave the following response:
… officers from another organisation, say ASD or ASIS or the
Australian Defence Force, would have to be seconded inside ASIO working for
ASIO's purpose. They couldn't take that defence with them in the performance of
their functions for ASD, ASIS or ADF. They would have to rely on their own
defences and law that governs what they do in that capacity. When they're an
affiliate of ASIO, they are working for ASIO and can only call upon these
defences when they're doing our functions that are authorised internally.[14]
Furthermore, during the Committee hearing on the Bill, Dr
Walker-Munro expressed additional concerns about ASIO’s proposed access to
spent conviction information:
I think that ASIO should have access to that information for
the purposes of discharging their functions under the act. The potential issue
then becomes whether or not there is a flow-on effect that permits the sharing
of that information with agencies that would not otherwise be permitted to
access it, so other NIC agencies that would not necessarily be able to access
that information gaining access to it essentially through an information share
with ASIO. My concern on that side is that you've essentially got a way to
circumvent the law in a way that perhaps the law didn't intend.[15]
On the same issue, the Director-General of Security at
ASIO suggested ASIO’s access would not be unfettered:
If the concern was that an affiliate could then take it and
use it back in his or her home agency, that wouldn't be allowed because they
can only use it inside ASIO and there'd be restrictions on them under their
home agency under the spent convictions law, so, no, I don't believe that's
valid.[16]
In its submission to the Committee, ASIO argued that spent
conviction information has the potential to ‘help inform ASIO’s understanding
of security threats, including in relation to people who might also be the
subject of a law enforcement investigation.’[17]
The Attorney-General’s Department agreed, suggesting in its submission to the
PJCIS that allowing ASIO to access spent conviction information will help ASIO
to ‘better perform its security functions’.[18]
Removal of oversight
by the Commonwealth Ombudsman
The Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman supports the
proposed changes to the Ombudsman Act 1976
(Richardson Review Recommendation 167). The changes in the Bill remove the
ability for the Commonwealth Ombudsman to oversee the activities of ASIO, ASIS,
AGO, ASD, ONI and DIO. During the PJCIS inquiry, Iain Anderson, Commonwealth Ombudsman
stated:
What we've said in our submission is that we really don't do
anything with respect to these six agencies. ASIO has been carved out under our
regulations for a very long time. For the other five, if we do receive
complaints about those agencies, we either pass them on to the IGIS or tell the
complainants that they need to themselves go to the IGIS. So we don't exercise
functions with respect to these six AIC agencies. We welcome the fact that the
bill takes the position that we and the IGIS have arrived at and makes it very
clear in the face of the legislation.[19]
The Law Council of Australia also supported the proposed amendments
to the Ombudsman Act.[20]
Financial
implications
According to the Explanatory
Memorandum, the Bill has nil financial impacts.[21]
Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights
As required under Part 3 of the Human Rights
(Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011, the Government has assessed the
Bill’s compatibility with the human rights and freedoms recognised or declared
in the international instruments listed in section 3 of that Act. The
Government considers that the Bill is compatible.[22]
Parliamentary
Joint Committee on Human Rights
At the time of writing, the Parliamentary
Joint Committee on Human Rights had not commented on the Bill.
Key issues
and provisions
Implementation
of the Richardson Review
The Bill seeks to implement ten recommendations from the
Richardson Review. Each recommendation is dealt with in turn below.
Recommendation
18
Recommendation 18 of the Review was that the Law
Officers Act should be amended to remove the ability for the
Attorney-General to delegate their power to issue warrants under the ASIO Act
to the Solicitor General, the Secretary of the Attorney-General’s Department or
any other Commonwealth officer. Recommendation 18 also argued that the warrant
prohibitions under the TIA Act should remain unchanged.[23]
The Richardson Review considered that in light of the
principles of ‘ministerial responsibility and accountability and the powers
contained in the ASIO Act’, there are ‘no circumstances in which the
Attorney-General should be allowed to delegate [their] responsibilities for
issuing ASIO warrants to an unelected official’.[24]
Currently, the Attorney-General has the power to issue
ASIO with various types of warrants, such as search
warrants, computer
access warrants and surveillance
device warrants, under the ASIO Act. In general terms, section
17 of the Law Officers Act allows the Attorney-General to delegate
‘any or all’ of their powers and functions under Commonwealth laws to the
Solicitor-General or the Secretary of the Attorney-General’s Department, except
for the powers and functions conferred on the Attorney-General under the TIA
Act.
Item 3 in Part 1 of the Bill amends the Law
Officers Act by repealing and replacing subsection
17(6) to prevent the Attorney-General from delegating their powers under both
the ASIO Act and the TIA Act.
Recommendation
19
Recommendation 19 of the Review was to the effect that the
Attorney-General’s powers in respect of ASIO should only be conferrable on
another minister through legislative amendment and not by way of Executive
action, other than in circumstances where the Prime Minister is satisfied that
exceptional circumstances exist.
The Richardson Review considered that because ‘the
Attorney-General has a special role in respect of ASIO warrants’ the conferral of
that role ‘should not be so readily achievable’.[25]
Items 2 and 4 in Part 1 of the Bill seek to
implement Recommendation 19 in relation to substituted reference orders by
inserting proposed section 5B into the ASIO Act and proposed section
6V into the TIA Act respectively.
Under section
19B of the Acts
Interpretation Act 1901 (the AIA), the Governor-General may, in
certain circumstances, make a substituted reference order. A substituted
reference order is an order under which a reference in an Act to one authority (such
as a Minister) is taken to be a reference to a different authority (such as a
different Minister). See, for example, the Acts Interpretation
Amendment Substituted Reference Order 2022.
The proposed amendments to the ASIO Act and the TIA
Act provide that, unless the Prime Minister is satisfied that
‘exceptional circumstances’ exist, the Governor-General must not make a
substituted reference order in relation to the provisions concerning the
Attorney-General within the ASIO Act and the TIA Act,
respectively. Item 1 in Part 1 of the Bill inserts a note to subsection
19B(2) of the AIA that highlights the restrictions imposed on the making
of substituted reference orders by the provisions inserted into the ASIO Act
and the TIA Act by items 2 and 4.
Recommendation
66
Subsection 474.6(7) of the Criminal Code
provides that a person is not criminally responsible for an offence under subsection
474.6(5) (use/operation of an apparatus/device that hinders a carriage service)
where the person is a law enforcement, intelligence or security officer acting
in good faith in the course of their duties and the conduct is reasonable in
all the circumstances for the purpose of that duty.
Recommendation 66 of the Review proposed that the defence
in subsection 474.6(7) of the Criminal Code
should be extended to ASIO so that it applies to all offences in section 474.6.
The defence should only be available where ASIO officers are acting in the
course of their duties and where their conduct is reasonable in the
circumstances for the purpose of performing those duties.[26]
The Richardson Review notes that the current method
employed by ASIO to identify the location of cellular transmitters is used, despite
being ‘inefficient’, due to concerns that using other methods would risk
liability for offences in Part 10.6 and Part 10.7 of the Criminal Code.[27]
Items 6, 8 and 9 in Part
2 of the Bill insert proposed subsections 474.6(4A), 477.2(2) and 477.3(2)
into the Criminal Code to provide that ASIO officers acting in good
faith in the course of their duties who have behaved reasonably in all the
circumstances would not be criminally responsible for the following offences:[28]
- subsection
474.6(1) (tampering with a carrier facility)
- subsection
474.6(3) (tampering with a carrier facility that hinders a carriage service)
- subsection
477.2(1) (modifying computer data without authorisation)
- subsection
477.3(1) (impairing computer-based electronic communication without
authorisation).
The provisions inserted by items 6, 8 and 9 are
framed as defences to the above offences. This means that a defendant in a
trial of these offences bears an evidential burden and would be required to
adduce or point to evidence suggesting a reasonable possibility that their
conduct was undertaken in good faith in the course of their duties as an ASIO
officer and was reasonable in the circumstances. The prosecution would then be
required to discharge its legal burden to negate the existence of the defence
beyond reasonable doubt.[29]
Items 5 and 7 in Part 2 of the Bill insert the definition
of ASIO officer into section 473.1 and subsection 476.1(1) of the
Criminal Code. As discussed previously, the Bill defines ASIO
officer as meaning the ‘Director-General
of Security’, an ‘ASIO
employee’ or ‘ASIO
affiliate’. This definition will apply to all references to ASIO officers
in Parts 10.6 (telecommunications services) and Part 10.7 (computer offences)
of the Criminal Code. A supplementary
submission by ASIO to the PJCIS inquiry into the Bill clarified that ‘[i]n
practice, this [the term ‘ASIO affiliate’] could include persons such as
secondees, contractors, consultants or human sources’.
Although the Richardson Review refers to ASIO
officers it does not appear that the Review defined this term
explicitly. Therefore, it is not clear whether the scope of coverage of the
proposed defences exceeds that which was recommended by the Richardson Review,
especially through the inclusion of the term ‘ASIO affiliates’ in the
definition, which is, according to a submission
to the PJCIS by the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security,
‘potentially quite broad’.
The proposed extension of these defences to ASIO and its ‘affiliates’
was discussed during the PJCIS hearing (see the discussion under the heading
‘Position of major interest groups’ above).
Recommendation
136
Recommendation 136 of the Richardson Review proposed that Part VIIC
of the Crimes
Act 1914 be amended to allow ASIO to use, record and disclose spent
conviction information for the performance of its functions.[30]
Spent
convictions are those criminal convictions which may no longer be disclosed
on a person’s record because a period of time has elapsed (for example, 10
years) where no further reoffending has occurred.[31]
There are some exceptions to the ‘automatic spending of convictions’. For
example, some sexual assault offences may never be spent and are thus always disclosable.
Each state and territory (as well as the
Commonwealth) has its own spent convictions legislation (or ‘scheme’) that
defines a spent conviction and sets out the exemptions that apply.
Division
3 of Part VIIC of that Crimes Act provides that a person who has a
spent conviction under a Commonwealth law is not required to disclose charges
or a conviction in relation to that matter. A number of exclusions to this
general position are provided in Division
6 of Part VIIC of the Crimes Act.
To give effect to Recommendation 136, item 14 in Part
4 of the Bill inserts proposed section 85ZZJA into Division 6 of
Part VIIC of the Crimes Act to provide that Division 3 of Part VIIC of
that Act does not apply to ASIO or an ASIO officer in relation to disclosure,
recording, filing or use of information for the purpose of the performance
ASIO’s functions or the exercise of ASIO’s powers. Proposed subsection 85ZZJA(2)
replicates the definition of ASIO officer that would be inserted
into the Criminal Code under Part 2 of the Bill. Some concerns have
been raised in relation to the level of access to spent conviction information that
may be available to ASIO affiliates as a result of the proposed change,[32]
although the Information Commissioner supported the changes.[33]
Recommendation
145
Recommendation 145 of the Richardson Review proposed that the
IGIS should be required to report annually on public interest disclosures
received by, and complaints about similar conduct made to, the IGIS.[34]
To give effect to the recommendation, item 15 in Part
5 of the Bill inserts proposed subsections 35(2AB) and 35(2AC) into the IGIS
Act requiring the IGIS to include information in its annual report about
complaints made under Division
2 of Part 2 of the IGIS Act and disclosures of information under the
Public Interest
Disclosure Act 2013 (the PID Act). Furthermore, the Bill inserts
proposed subsection 35(2AD) into the IGIS Act to provide
that the head of an intelligence agency must give the IGIS information and
assistance as reasonably required in relation to responses to complaints under
the IGIS Act and disclosures under the PID Act.
Recommendation
167
Recommendation 167 of the Richardson Review states that ASIS,
AGO, ASD, ONI and DIO should be excluded from the Commonwealth Ombudsman’s
jurisdiction.[35]
The Commonwealth Ombudsman was established by the Ombudsman
Act, to, amongst other things, undertake complaint investigations into
Commonwealth agencies.[36]
Its jurisdiction currently extends to all NIC agencies (except ASIO).[37]
By convention, however, it has not exercised jurisdiction over NIC agencies
other than Home Affairs, the AFP, AUSTRAC and the ACIC.[38]
The proposed change is to formalise this approach by
excluding ASIS, AGO, ASD, ONI and DIO from the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction. Item
19 in Part 6 of the Bill inserts proposed paragraph 5(2)(e) into the
Ombudsman Act to specifically prohibit the Commonwealth Ombudsman from
investigating the actions of ASIO, ASIS, AGO, ASD, DIO and ONI.
The Commonwealth Ombudsman was supportive of the changes
(see the discussion under the heading ‘Position of major interest groups’ above).
IGIS will retain responsibility for overseeing and reviewing the activities of
intelligence agencies, including
for legality and propriety and for consistency with human rights.
Recommendation
186
Recommendation 186 of the Richardson Review recommended the
FOI Act should be amended to remove the AGO exemption in respect of its non-intelligence
function.[39]
The AGO currently enjoys an exemption from the FOI Act
under existing subparagraph 7(2A)(a)(v). According to the Richardson Review:
… following the transfer of the functions of the Australian Hydrographic Office from the
Royal Australian Navy to AGO, concerns were raised during parliamentary debate
about the fact that non-intelligence hydrographic documents would be exempt
from release under the FOI Act.[40]
Item 20 in Part 7 of the Bill repeals and replaces subparagraph
7(2A)(a)(v) of the FOI Act to allow FOI requests for documents originating
with, or received from, the AHO.[41]
Recommendation
188
Recommendation 188 of the Richardson Review recommended
that consistent protections should be afforded to Suspicious Matter Reports and
Suspicious Transaction Reports to AUSTRAC under the FOI Act.[42]
Section
7 of the FOI Act provides that certain persons and bodies are exempt
from the operation of that Act, either in full or in relation to the kinds of
documents specified. Entities that are entirely exempt from the FOI Act
are set out in Part I of Schedule 2 to the Act. AUSTRAC is not listed in that
Part. Entities that are exempt from the FOI Act in relation to
particular documents are listed in Part II of Schedule 2 to the Act. That Part
currently provides that AUSTRAC is exempt from the FOI Act in relation
to documents concerning:
In addition, section 38 of the FOI Act provides
that a document is exempt from disclosure if its disclosure is prohibited under
a provision that is specified in Schedule 3 to the Act. No provisions in the Financial
Transaction Reports Act or the AML-CTF Act are so specified.
Accordingly, AUSTRAC
documents are afforded variable levels of protection under the FOI Act.
For example, there are currently exemptions for Suspicious Matter Reports which
are submitted by entities if they suspect a customer or transaction is linked
to a crime.[43]
This does not necessarily extend to those documents under the control of
another entity. During the Richardson Review:
AUSTRAC submitted that there are inconsistencies in the
exemptions available to it in the FOI Act. It noted that the FOI Act does not
protect Suspicious Matter Reports, Suspicious Transaction Reports and any
document concerning these reports when they are held by agencies other than
AUSTRAC. It also noted that the FOI Act (section 38) does not consistently
exempt documents from release, even where they are prohibited from release
under other legislation.[44]
Item 22 in Part 7 of the Bill inserts proposed
subsection 7(2G) into the FOI Act to provide a specific exemption
for certain documents (for example, Suspicious Matter Reports) that have
originated with, or have been received from, AUSTRAC.
Recommendation
191
Recommendation 191 of the Richardson Review submitted that
all security matters arising under the Archives Act
should be heard in the Security Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal
(AAT).[45]
According to the Richardson Review:
The AAT’s treatment of national security information differs
depending on whether the record under consideration is a record of ASIO or
another agency (even where the record contains the same information and is
sourced from the same agency). When the AAT is reviewing a decision made under
the Archives Act, in respect of access to a record, records identified as ASIO
records are considered by the Security Division of the AAT whereas records from
other intelligence agencies are considered by the General Division of the AAT.[46]
Recommendation 191 addresses that inconsistency.
Item 25 in Part 8 of the Bill inserts a definition
of exempt security record into subsection
3(1) of the AAT
Act. The definition refers to a record of ASIO or a record that
is claimed to be an exempt record under the Archives Act for the reason
that it contains information or a matter referred to in paragraph
33(1)(a) or (b) of that Act—that is, information or matter that could
reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security, defence or international
relations of the Commonwealth or that was communicated in confidence by or on
behalf of a foreign government or international organisation and remains
confidential.
Item 26 in Part 8 amends paragraph
17B(2)(b) of the AAT Act to require all proceedings in relation to
an exempt security record be heard in the Security Division of
the AAT. The amendment ensures that proceedings concerning exempt records of
the Archives Act are heard in the Security Division of the AAT which
also includes records which did not originate with NIC agencies.[47]
Recommendation
192
Recommendation 192 of the Richardson Review proposed that
the FOI Act and the Archives Act should be amended so that IGIS
is only required to provide evidence that addresses the damage that would, or
could reasonably be expected to, arise from the release of material where the
matter involves one or more of the agencies that the IGIS oversees.[48]
During the Review, the IGIS raised concerns with mandatory
requirements for the IGIS to personally provide evidence or advice in Information
Commission external reviews of FOI decisions, AAT proceedings concerning FOI
decisions, and AAT proceedings concerning decisions under the Archives Act.[49]
Item 32 repeals and replaces subsection
50A(1) of the Archives Act. The amendment limits the circumstances
in which the IGIS is required to appear and give evidence before the AAT to instances
where:
- the
National Archives has made a decision under review by the AAT in respect to
access to a record, and
- the
record is claimed to be an ‘exempt record’ pursuant to paragraphs
33(1)(a) or (b), and
- the
record relates directly or indirectly to the functions, duties or powers of an
NIC agency, and
- the
record is not a record of the IGIS.
The amendment is intended to reduce the administrative
burden on the IGIS by narrowing the circumstances in which they are required to
appear before the AAT.[50]
Items 33 and 34 in Part 8 of the Bill also address
Recommendation 192. They amend the FOI Act by repealing and replacing section
55ZA and subsection
60A(1) respectively in an effort to reduce the administrative burden on the
IGIS by narrowing the circumstances in which they are required to appear before
the AAT and the Information Commissioner, so that this is only required when
the matter involves a record claimed to be exempt on national security grounds
that relates to the functions, duties or powers of an NIC agency.
Changes to
the PJCIS
One of the other proposed changes in the Bill – unrelated
to the Richardson Review – are the proposed amendments to the composition of
the PJCIS under the Intelligence
Services Act. In oral evidence to the PJCIS from the Attorney-General’s
Department (AGD) it was stated:
[These amendments] came about as a recommendation from
government, via [the Attorney-General ’s] office, as a measure to enhance the
flexibility [of the PJCIS], to reduce the constraints on its composition but
also to allow an additional two people, which might assist when covering leave
or other absences.[51]
AGD confirmed that ‘flexibility was the main intent’ of
the proposed PJCIS changes, and that the inclusion of two additional members
provided the Committee with greater resourcing.[52]
The PJCIS is established by section
28 of the Intelligence Services Act. It is intended to provide a
level of Parliamentary oversight of the NIC. The precursors to the PJCIS
were the Parliamentary
Joint Committee on ASIO (1988–2001) and the Parliamentary
Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD (2002–2005).
According to subsection
28(1) of the Intelligence Services Act, the PJCIS is established
after commencement of the first session of each Parliament. Its functions are
set out in section
29 of that Act and include, amongst other things, to review the
administration and expenditure of NIC agencies, although it cannot, by law,
review the intelligence gathering priorities of ASIO, ASIS, AGO, DIO, ASD or
ONI.[53]
The PJCIS currently comprises eleven members in total, five
of whom must be Senators and six of whom must be members of the House of
Representatives.[54]
The majority of the Committee’s members must be Government members.[55]
Part 3 of the Bill proposes to amend the composition of
the PJCIS, including increasing the number of members from eleven to thirteen.[56]
Table 2 below shows the change in composition of the PJCIS and its predecessors
from 1988 to today.
Table 2: Composition
of PJCIS and its predecessors from 1988 to today
Ministerial
Directions to ASIS under the Intelligence Services Act 2001
In addition to the implementation of ten recommendations
from the Richardson Review, and the change in composition of the PJCIS, the
Bill seeks to amend the Intelligence Services Act to clarify the level
of detail required in a Ministerial Direction to ASIS.
Under paragraph
6(1)(e) of the Intelligence Services Act, one of the functions of
ASIS is to ‘undertake such other activities as the responsible Minister directs
relating to the capabilities, intentions or activities of people or
organisations outside Australia.’
Item 36 in Part 9 of the Bill repeals and replaces
paragraph 6(1)(e) in an effort to provide ‘certainty regarding the level of
detail required to describe the directed activities in a Ministerial Direction’.[58]
It provides that activities directed by the Minister may be of a general or
specific nature and may include classes of activities. Item 37 inserts proposed
subsections 6(1A) and 6(1B) into the Intelligence Services Act to
allow the Minister to specify a purpose or purposes for which activities (or
classes of activities) of ASIS may be carried out.
Conclusion
The Bill makes what appear to be relatively minor and
technical amendments to the Commonwealth’s legislative framework for gathering
and utilising information related to national security. It is the second in a
suite of measures seeking to respond to the Richardson Review of 2019. The
previous Government agreed to all ten of the recommendations which this Bill
seeks to implement. In the hearing before the PJCIS on this Bill, relatively
few concerns were raised about the changes, although there was discussion about
the new defences afforded to ASIO and its ‘affiliates’ as well as an ASIO
officer’s ability to access and control spent convictions information.