Bills Digest No. , Bills Digests alphabetical index 2022–23

High Speed Rail Authority Bill 2022

Author

Go to a section

Bills Digest No. 14, 2022–23

PDF version [630KB]

Philip Hamilton
Politics and Public Administration Section

Rodney Bogaards
Economic Policy Section

Tim Brennan
Science, Technology, Environment and Resources Section
20 September 2022

Key points

  • The Bill establishes a statutory authority with the objective of leading the development of a high speed rail line along the east coast of Australia.
  • The establishment of the High Speed Rail Authority (HSRA) as a statutory, Budget-funded, corporate Commonwealth entity (CCE) for the purposes of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) is consistent with principles outlined in Department of Finance guidance in relation to the appropriateness and applicability of entity structures.
  • The HSRA will managed by a part-time Board appointed by the Minister, and a CEO appointed by the Board, in consultation with the Minister.
  • The functions of the HSRA include policy development and planning, and liaison with state and territory governments. The existing non-statutory National Faster Rail Agency (NFRA) will be abolished and its functions absorbed into the HSRA and the portfolio department.
  • Since the 1980s, high speed rail proposals have been considered by Australian governments several times. No proposal has ever been implemented because governments have baulked at the significant costs, as well as risks and uncertainties, associated with such a long-term project.
  • Aviation is a growing source of greenhouse gas emissions and there are limited technological options for significantly reducing the emissions from flying in the medium term. High speed rail could provide a low emissions alternative for intercity travel. The construction of a high speed rail line will, however, increase emissions and it may be several decades before the line will begin reducing emissions.

Contents

Purpose of the Bill
Structure of the Bill
Background
Committee consideration
Policy position of non-government parties/independents
Position of major interest groups
Financial implications
Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights
Key issues and provisions
Appendix A

 

Date introduced:  8 September 2022
House:  House of Representatives
Portfolio: Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts
Commencement: On the earlier of proclamation or 6 months after Royal Assent.

Links: The links to the Bill, its Explanatory Memorandum and second reading speech can be found on the Bill’s home page, or through the Australian Parliament website.

When Bills have been passed and have received Royal Assent, they become Acts, which can be found at the Federal Register of Legislation website.

All hyperlinks in this Bills Digest are correct as at September 2022.

Purpose of the Bill

The purpose of the High Speed Rail Authority Bill 2022 (the Bill) is to establish the High Speed Rail Authority (the HSRA) as a statutory corporate Commonwealth entity for the purposes of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act).

As defined by the Bill, the high speed rail network (HSR) will connect Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Canberra, and some regional centres on the east coast of Australia or in New South Wales, Victoria or Queensland. In relation to the HSR, ‘faster rail’ measures initiated under the Coalition Government (which may link to the HSR), and associated corridors, the HSRA’s functions include:

  • leading and coordinating policy development and planning
  • consulting, liaising and negotiating with states and territories and other relevant parties
  • providing advice and recommendations to the Minister and other relevant parties
  • undertaking evaluations and research and gathering information
  • constructing or extending railways for the HSR or a faster rail network (if the Commonwealth has obtained a state’s consent or a territory’s consent).

The Bill also provides for the appointment of a Board and a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and allows the Minister to give written directions to the HSRA about the performance of its functions.

Structure of the Bill

This Bill comprises five parts:

  • Part 1 provides a simplified outline of the High Speed Rail Authority Bill 2022 and sets out the definitions of key terms
  • Part 2 establishes the HSRA, including setting out its functions, and makes provision for the Minister to give written directions to the HSRA about the performance of its functions
  • Part 3 sets out the terms and conditions of the Board of the HSRA, including an outline of the Board’s functions
  • Part 4 sets out the terms and conditions of the appointment of the CEO of the HSRA, including an outline of the CEO’s functions. It provides that staff must be employed under the Public Service Act 1999 and enables the CEO to engage consultants to assist the HSRA
  • Part 5 outlines requirements for the HSRA’s corporate plan and a cycle of ten-year reviews of the Act and rules, and the making of rules by the Minister.

Background

What is High-Speed Rail

High-Speed Rail (HSR) is usually defined as train services capable of travelling in excess of 250 kilometres per hour. This is how it defined in this Bill. As the Phase 2 report of the Rudd Government’s High Speed Rail Study highlights this typically cannot be achieved simply by using faster trains but requires the construction of purpose-built tracks (p. 46). Due to its speed, HSR often competes with aviation in intercity markets.

Globally, many countries operate HSR networks. In the Geography of Transport Systems, Rodrigue summarises the history of HSR, beginning with its introduction in Japan in 1964 in time for the Tokyo Olympics. Since then, Japan’s network of Shinkansen (often referred to in English as ‘bullet trains’ but translating to ‘new trunk line’) has expanded to connect most major Japanese cities. From the 1980s, HSR rail networks began to be constructed in Europe and are now operating in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. In Asia, Kao and Lin describe how Japanese corporations were engaged to construct Taiwan’s HSR, which opened in 2007. The most significant growth of HSR has, however, been in China. Operation of the first Chinese HSR line only began in 2008 but, as CNN reports, it now has the world’s largest HSR network, with 37,900 kilometres of lines in operation, and plans to almost double that size by 2035.

High-Speed Rail in Australia: a brief history

HSR along the Australian east coast has been an aspirational goal of various private sector interests, political parties and governments since the 1980s. However, no proposal has ever been implemented because governments have baulked at the significant public sector funding contribution and/or other financial concessions required to make the proposal commercially viable for private sector proponents given the risks and uncertainties associated with such a long‑term project.

The first serious iteration of the concept was the Very Fast Train (VFT) proposal for a HSR line between Sydney, Canberra and Melbourne (with a possible extension to Brisbane). The project was backed by corporate heavyweights BHP, Elders IXL, TNT and Japanese construction company Kumagai Gumi. Following several government inquiries, however, the project folded in August 1991, after failing to garner Australian Government support for the significant tax concessions its corporate supporters had proposed.

Following the collapse of the VFT project, in the mid-1990s a HSR line known as the Very High Speed Train (VHST) was proposed to provide a service between Sydney and Canberra (for more information on the VFT and VHST, see Parliamentary Library Background Paper Australian Very Fast Trains–A Chronology). However, the tender process with the Speedrail consortium—the consortium that had come closest to meeting the tender requirements—was terminated by the Minister for Transport and Regional Services in December 2000 (see media release) because its bid did not meet the ‘no net cost to government’ criterion.

2010 High Speed Rail feasibility study

In August 2010 then Minister for Infrastructure and Transport Anthony Albanese announced a $20 million High Speed Rail feasibility study (HSR study). The study was undertaken in two phases:

  • Phase 1, published in July 2011, identified a short list of corridors and station options and estimated preliminary costs and demand for HSR on the east coast of Australia.
  • Phase 2, published in April 2013, built on Phase 1 but was considerably broader and deeper in objective and scope, and so refined many of the Phase 1 estimates, particularly the demand and cost estimates.

The HSR Phase 2 study (hereafter, Phase 2 study) forecast a travel time between Sydney and Brisbane of 2 hours 37 minutes, between Sydney and Melbourne of 2 hours 44 minutes and between Sydney and Canberra of 64 minutes (p. viii). The entire line was forecast to be completed by 2058 (45 years after the release of the report), with the Sydney to Melbourne section scheduled for completion by 2040 (p. x).

Project costing

The project was estimated to cost $114 billion (in 2012 terms, approximately $135 billion in 2021 terms), comprised of $64 billion ($76 billion in 2021) for Brisbane to Sydney and $50 billion ($59 billion in 2021) for Melbourne to Sydney (p. viii). Significantly, the study anticipated that governments would be expected to fund 86% of the upfront capital cost (p. xi). However, once completed, the HSR system was expected to generate sufficient operating income to cover operational and maintenance costs (p. xi).

The Phase 2 study noted that forecasts of costs and of passenger numbers, decades in the future, were inherently uncertain. The study added, however, that it is ‘most likely that demographic trends will support a steadily improving case for HSR on the east coast rather than otherwise’ (p. xiv).

The economic assessment in the Phase 2 study concluded that a future HSR program could deliver positive net economic benefits—with most of the benefits accruing to long-distance business travellers travelling between Sydney, Canberra, Melbourne, and Brisbane—rather than regional communities (p. xii).

Economic costs and benefits

When calculated using a discount rate[1] of 4% the economic benefit cost ratio was 2.5 for Sydney‑Melbourne and 2.3 for the whole network (p. xii). However, when calculated using a more conventional 7% discount rate, which represents a higher hurdle for judging economic performance, the economic benefit cost ratio was only 1.1 for the whole network (that is, the benefits are only slightly larger than costs) (p. xii). Moreover, with a 4% discount rate the community net benefit of the HSR project was $101.3 billion, whereas with a 7% discount rate the community net benefit is $4.9 billion (pp. 365–366). This indicates the economic evaluation of HSR in this study was highly sensitive to the discount rate chosen. The recent media statement by the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, that HSR ‘would return over $2 for every $1 of investment’ is evidently based on the lower discount rate.

Choice of discount rate

A discount rate of 4% is at the lower bound of discount rates for major project evaluation. Lower discount rates place relatively high values on the benefits that occur in the future (compared to higher discount rates). It is important to note that the majority of HSR costs are upfront capital costs and therefore are less affected by the discount rate chosen because they occur at the start of the project.

Infrastructure Australia (IA), in its Guide to Economic Appraisal (p. 23), recommends that three discount rates can be used for economic appraisals of infrastructure projects: 4%, 7%, and 10%. IA states that (p. 23):

To increase transparency, our project evaluations present the economic appraisal results using all three discount rates to show the range of analysis.

Although IA recommends that all three discount rates be used, it recommends that 7% be used for the ‘central case’. IA further states that these three rates (with 7% as the central case) should be used as (p. 23):

This aligns with the majority of current national, state and territory guidelines on [cost-benefit analysis] in Australia. In cases where a different real discount rate is used in an appraisal, the basis for doing so should be specified.

The Phase 2 study uses two discount rates, 4% and 7%, but the 4% rate is the primary rate used in the headline results. The Phase 2 study explained that (p. 364):

A four per cent discount rate has been assessed as suitable for large scale and long-life infrastructure projects such as HSR. This is consistent with international experience and the Australian Transport Council (ATC) guidelines and has therefore been adopted as the discount rate for the primary evaluation of HSR.

The 7% discount rate is typically the primary rate used in presenting the costs and benefits of large infrastructure projects. For example, the Western Sydney Airport business case (p. 14), and IA business case evaluations of the Melbourne Metro (p. 1) and Sydney’s M4 (p. 1) and M12 (p. 1) Motorways (p. 1). However, 4% discount rates are also used in some cases, for example, the Brisbane Airport New Parallel Runway (p. A2‑90), the Inland Rail (p. 12), and the Melbourne Suburban Rail Link (p. 39).

In its May 2020 report, Fast Train Fever, the Grattan Institute argued that HSR in Australia is not feasible due to the nation’s small and dispersed population (p. 3). Grattan was also critical of the low discount rate, suggesting it artificially inflated the Phase 2 study’s benefit estimates. Grattan also noted that it was likely that a much lower economic benefit-cost ratio would be generated if a study was conducted today following the decision to build a second Sydney airport because it would affect passenger demand. Moreover, Grattan suggested that if a further study was undertaken it would need to be more explicit about how to fund the large upfront and ongoing costs of HSR over the life of the project (p. 12).

Recommended delivery model

The Phase 2 study outlined the potential steps that would be required prior to the construction of the HSR. The preparation work would begin with protection of the HSR corridor and reaching agreement between the Australian, ACT and state governments on objectives, timelines, and dispute resolution mechanisms. The Phase 2 study proposed that this should begin with a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the governments to formalise the responsibilities of the parties. The MoU would enable governments to commit money towards corridor protection and early planning work (pp. 40-41). The Phase 2 study also suggested that the HSR authority be established following the MoU and that it should be co-owned by the Australian, ACT and state governments (p. 40).

The Phase 2 study’s preferred model for delivering the HSR envisaged significant roles for both the public and private sector. The preferred model involved governments contracting work packages through competitive tenders but retaining responsibility for integrating the completed works. Once completed, the model envisaged the operation of train services being contracted to the private sector with governments retaining an oversight role to ensure that agreed price and service quality metrics were achieved. This model was compared to the Japanese HSR system where a state‑owned entity is responsible for the development and strategic management of the network but train operations are contracted to private companies which pay a fee for use of lines (p. 39). Although this level of detail is not explicitly discussed, the Bill appears to allow for a governance structure resembling the Phase 2 study’s preferred model.

2013 High Speed Rail Advisory Group

In April 2013, at the release of the HSR Phase 2 study, the High Speed Rail Advisory Group was announced. The advisory group was to advise on key industry and community issues arising out of the HSR Phase 2 study.

In August 2013, the advisory group published its report, On Track: Implementing High Speed Rail in Australia. The advisory group made recommendations to:

  • formally commit to high speed rail and settle arrangements with state and territory governments
  • protect the corridor (initially through national legislation)
  • refer high speed rail to Infrastructure Australia for initial assessment
  • establish a High Speed Rail Authority.

In a media release on 8 November 2013 the new Coalition Government announced that the advisory group was abolished.

High Speed Rail Planning Authority Bill introduced to Parliament multiple times

A private member’s Bill known as the High Speed Rail Planning Authority Bill (HSRPA Bill), was introduced to the Parliament on five separate occasions between 2013 and 2018:

The HSRPA Bill proposed to establish a planning authority to advise on, plan and develop high speed rail on the east coast of Australia and ensure the rail corridor is reserved. According to Anthony Albanese’s Second Reading Speech on the 2018 HSRPA Bill:

The idea is that this authority's immediate priorities would be to finalise the track alignment and to work with Infrastructure Australia on the finalisation of a detailed business case, and it would then be able to go out to the private sector. We know that so many companies who've been successful in high-speed rail, construction and operation in Japan, China and Europe would be willing to participate. We know this because they've told us that that is the case.

According to the Parliamentary Library’s Flagpost High Speed Rail for Australia – A Fast Track or Just the Same Old Pipe Dream?, the Authority’s major functions were to involve land use planning for the HSR corridor and directing the HSR’s development and construction. The Authority was to also consider specific measures related to environmental impacts; ensure that the HSR system provides a safe, regular, efficient and cost-effective rail transport system; and consult with interested bodies and the public on matters related to the HSR system generally.

2016 Corridor preservation for east coast High Speed Rail

The preservation of a corridor for an east coast HSR line was added to Infrastructure Australia’s Infrastructure Priority List in 2016 and, as of February 2022, remained on the list. Modelling by Infrastructure Australia in 2017 estimates the net cost of protecting and acquiring the corridor at $2.8 billion (2016 prices) using a 7% real discount rate.

2019 A change of t(r)ack: from ‘high speed rail’ to slower ‘faster rail’

In March 2019, the Australian Government released the Faster Rail Plan, which focused on improving the speed of rail in key travel corridors (not necessarily through HSR). The Plan noted that some Australian rail lines are currently extremely slow, for example, rail travel between Sydney and Wollongong averages less than 60km per hour. The plan announced that a National Faster Rail Agency (NFRA) would be established and business cases undertaken to assess the viability of upgrading key rail corridors.

The NFRA website reports that the former Australian Government committed $79 million to develop faster rail business cases. Business cases have been completed for the following rail corridors:

  • from Sydney to: Newcastle; Wollongong/Bomaderry; and Parkes
  • from Melbourne to Greater Shepparton
  • from Brisbane to: the Gold Coast (part 1); and the Sunshine Coast.

Business cases have also commenced for the following rail corridors:

  • Melbourne to Warrnambool, Ballarat, Bendigo, Shepparton, Albury-Wodonga and Traralgon (due for completion by mid-2022)
  • Brisbane to Gold Coast (part 2 – due for completion mid-2022)
  • Melbourne to Geelong (due for completion end of 2022)
  • Perth to Bunbury (due for completion in 2024).

According to the NFRA website, the former Government also committed funding for construction of the following projects:

  • Brisbane to the Gold Coast: In the 2021-22 Budget the Government committed $178.1 million, which was matched by the Queensland Government, for the Kuraby to Beenleigh section of this line. In the 2022-23 Budget the Government committed a further $1.12 billion to this project
  • Brisbane to Sunshine Coast: In the 2022-23 Budget the Government committed $1.6 billion for a 37-kilometre line between Beerwah and Maroochydore
  • Sydney to Newcastle: In the 2022-23 Budget the Government committed $1.0 billion to the Tuggerah to Wyong section of this line
  • Melbourne to Geelong: the Australian and Victorian Governments have each committed $2 billion to Stage 1 of this project which will reduce travel time between the two cities by 10–15 minutes. Pre-construction is expected to commence in 2023.

2020 Financing faster rail inquiry

In December 2020, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure, Transport and Cities released the Fairer funding and Financing of Faster Rail report of its inquiry into financing faster rail. The report recommended that the Commonwealth, in consultation with state, territory, and local governments, develop mechanisms to fund rail infrastructure using a ‘value capture’ model. According to Infrastructure Australia’s Capturing Value report, value capture is the act of collecting a portion of the benefits from public infrastructure investments that flow to the value of land (for example, through betterment levies, developer charges, leveraging government land, taxes on property transactions and taxes on land value). The Committee also made recommendations relating to how these mechanisms should be developed.

2021 Labor commits to establishing a High Speed Rail Authority

In a media release on 15 November 2021 then Opposition leader Anthony Albanese indicated that a Labor Government would ‘kickstart high speed rail by establishing the High Speed Rail Authority and updating the business case for this nation-building project’.

2022 and further down the track

On 8 September 2022 the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government announced that the Government would be introducing legislation to establish the High Speed Rail Authority.

The Authority will build on previous work including the comprehensive study, commissioned under former Infrastructure Minister and now Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, that found high speed rail was not only viable, but would return over $2 for every $1 of investment …

The first priority of the Authority will be planning and corridor works for the Sydney to Newcastle section of the high-speed rail network, backed by a $500 million commitment from the Australian Government.

This commitment will see corridor planning and early works progress in this fast-growing region of the east coast.

While the Authority works closely with the New South Wales Government on this section, it will continue to advance plans for other sections of the high-speed rail network, which will eventually connect Brisbane to Melbourne, with stops in Canberra, Sydney and regional centres.

Potential route

As yet, the route of an east coast high speed rail line is not finalised, and this is likely to be one of the HSRA’s priorities. Previous plans have often focussed on a Melbourne-Sydney-Brisbane route, which would necessitate the involvement of the Governments of Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland in the project’s development. The route may also include Canberra, which would require the involvement of the Australian Capital Territory Government.

The Phase 2 study presented perhaps the most detailed consideration of an east coast HSR route to date. The Phase 2 study’s approach to selecting the route included consideration of user benefits (such as travel times), accessibility to existing transport infrastructure, environmental and social impacts, comparative cost estimates, and construction risk (pp. 138–139).

The Phase 2 study’s recommended route followed a ‘coastal alignment between Brisbane and Sydney, followed by an inland alignment from Sydney to Melbourne, with spur lines to the Gold Coast and Canberra’ (p. 4) The route includes four capital city stations (each in the CBD), an additional four city-periphery stations (one each in Melbourne and Brisbane and two in Sydney), and 12 regional stations (p. viii). See Appendix A for a map of the route proposed in the Phase 2 study.

Environmental impacts

In the period since the last major study of HSR in Australia there has been increasing international agreement that there is a need for the world to move towards net zero greenhouse gas emissions. Globally, this is encapsulated in the Paris Agreement, which includes a commitment to carbon neutrality by mid‑century. In Australia, the Government has committed, in the Climate Change Act 2022, to a 43% emission reduction by 2030 and net-zero emissions by 2050 (see p. 27 of the Parliamentary Library’s Bills Digest).

Displacing aviation emissions

Long-distance travel, currently mainly served by aviation, is one of the more challenging sectors to decarbonise. Although currently a relatively small component of overall emissions, as other sectors decarbonise, aviation’s growing share of carbon budgets is likely to be the focus of increasing attention. As an alternative long-distance transport option HSR could, potentially, divert passengers from aviation and reduce transport emissions.

According to Australia’s National Greenhouse Accounts, in 2019[3] air and space transport (which is predominantly domestic aviation)[4] accounted for 8.5 million tonnes of CO2-equivalent (Mt CO2e) greenhouse gas emissions. Unlike the economy as a whole, air and space emissions have been gradually rising and, although it represents just 1.64% of Australia’s total emissions, this is a 4-fold increase on its proportion of emissions in 1990 (0.41%).[5] In 2016, the Department of the Environment and Energy estimated that domestic aviation emissions will increase at an average of 2.2% per year to 2034–35 despite improving aircraft technology and increasing uptake of alternative fuels (p. 2).

Additionally, the emission of high-altitude non‑C02 emissions is believed to have significantly greater global warming potential. Carbon Brief reports that the IPCC has previously estimated that the total global warming impact of aviation is likely to be 2 to 4 times higher than the CO2e emissions would suggest, but that it is proving challenging to improve the accuracy of this figure.

The outlook for reducing emissions in the aviation sector is challenging. Whitehead and Kane report that small electric aircraft already exist and could play a role in short-haul (less than 500km) transport in coming decades. For longer journeys, sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) made from renewable feedstocks are likely to be a key technology. Virgin Australia is currently trialling blending SAF with jet fuel in flights leaving from Brisbane. SAFs have the advantage that they can be used with existing planes and infrastructure. However, they still produce some emissions and (at least currently) are only being used in small proportions blended with jet fuel. An article by Harris estimates that for a global 25% jet fuel market share, a USD$1.3 trillion investment in SAFs would be required.

Given the driving distances between Australia’s major cities and the challenges in decarbonising the aviation sector, there is a need for a low-emissions fast transport option. It would appear that HSR might be able to fill this role, although the potential climate impacts of a HSR line are the subject of competing views.

Emissions from construction and operation of HSR

The International Energy Agency and International Union of Railways estimate that the energy usage of HSR is about 90% lower than aviation per passenger kilometre (p. 93). Additionally, it is likely that the electricity used to power HSR will become increasingly emissions free as more renewable is deployed into the grid.

An analysis by Robertson found that a HSR network would reduce emissions on travel between Sydney and Melbourne by an average of 56% to 69% per year over the project life cycle. Although Robertson’s study included operation and construction emissions, it did not include the effect of high‑altitude non-CO2 emissions (which would likely increase the benefits of HSR) or the effect of additional travel due to induced demand[6] (which would likely lessen the benefits of HSR).

Although it appears likely that the construction of a HSR would, over a long-time period, result in a significant reduction in transport emissions. The difficulty lies in the fact that it will be many years before these emission reductions are realised. The Grattan Institute found that, for a period of between 24 and 36 years, during the construction of the project, emissions would increase (p. 22). Additionally, from the time of committing to building the HSR, it ‘would not be until somewhere between year 39 and year 51 that the bullet train would lead to lower emissions than if the train had not been built’ (p. 23). There may be some capacity to lower construction emissions due to developments in green steel and other technologies, but, nevertheless, construction will inevitably result in a period of increased emissions.

Other environmental impacts

A HSR rail line can be expected to have local environmental impacts in the areas that it passes through. Depending on the nature of these impacts they may initiate approval processes such as those outlined in the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999.

Additionally, a HSR line would have noise impacts (see pages 131–133 in Phase 2 study). In the regional and rural areas that the HSR will pass through this is likely to result in increased noise. In some urban areas, however, the potential diversion of passengers from flights to HSR could result in decreased noise.

Appropriateness of the entity model chosen for the HSRA

Following commitments to faster rail in the 2019–20 Budget, in July 2019 the National Faster Rail Agency (NFRA) was established as an Executive Agency within the then Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications portfolio, with a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) appointed in December 2019. This administrative measure did not require legislation.[7] The Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill states that, with the establishment of the HSRA, the NFRA will be abolished and its functions absorbed into the HSRA and the Department.

When deciding on the appropriate means by which to deliver a service or execute a function, a significant source of information and guidance is the PGPA Act, the key legislation with regard to governance and administration of the public sector.[8]

Within the context of PGPA Act requirements, the Department of Finance (Finance) classifies Commonwealth entities into 13 categories.[9] Table 1, compiled by the Parliamentary Library from several Finance sources, outlines the 13 categories with selected examples, including the current and proposed categorisations of the HSRA.[10]

Table 1: Department of Finance classification of Commonwealth entities into thirteen categories

1. PRIMARY (or Principal) bodies

are part of the Commonwealth,

or have a separate legal status

2. SECONDARY bodies
are established within a Primary body

3. OTHER bodies

are established by
Commonwealth involvement
through membership or investment

Secondary statutory structures
are established by legislation

1.1 Non-corporate Commonwealth Entities (NCEs)

NCEs are legally and financially part of the Commonwealth, and include:

  • departments of state

2.1 Statutory advisory structures

Majority of members are likely to be external to the Australian Government.

  • Aged Care Quality and Safety Advisory Council

3.1 Ministerial Councils and related bodies

Ministerial Councils provide a forum for Commonwealth, State and Territory Ministers to discuss national policy issues.

  • parliamentary departments
  • Australian Bureau of Statistics
  • listed entities prescribed by rules made under the PGPA Act, or another Act

Examples of listed entities currently prescribed by Schedule 1 of the PGPA Rule include:

  • Geoscience Australia (DISER portfolio)
  • IP Australia (DISER portfolio)

2.2 Statutory office holders, offices and committees

Do not usually incur expenditure on their own account nor prepare separate accounts. Instead, where expenditure is incurred, it is accounted for through the accounts of a parent body.

  • Gene Technology Regulator

3.2 National law bodies

These bodies are established under consistent laws enacted in every State and Territory, usually the result of some form of intergovernmental agreement. They may be incorporated.

  • Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency

Secondary non-statutory structures
are established without legislation

  • National Heavy Vehicle Regulator

1.2 Corporate Commonwealth Entities (CCEs)

A CCE is a body corporate that has a separate legal personality from the Commonwealth, and can act in its own right exercising certain legal rights such as entering into contracts and owning property. Most CCEs are financially separate from the Commonwealth.

  • CSIRO
  • National Gallery of Australia
  • Reserve Bank of Australia

The Bill would establish the HSRA as a Corporate Commonwealth Entity (CCE).

2.3 Non-statutory advisory structures

Majority of members are likely to be external to the Australian Government.

  • Foreign Investment Review Board

3.3 Interjurisdictional and international bodies

Bodies established by the Australian Government as a result of treaty obligations or negotiated agreements with individual or a number of governments (State, Territory or international).

  • Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee
  • Northern Territory Fisheries Joint Authority

1.3 Commonwealth companies

A company established under the Corporations Act 2001 that the Commonwealth controls. A Commonwealth company is legally and financially separate from the Commonwealth. Some are Government Business Enterprises (GBEs).

  • Aboriginal Hostels Ltd
  • Bundanon Trust
  • NBN Co Ltd (a GBE)
  • RAAF Welfare Recreational Company

2.4 Non-statutory functions with separate branding

Often responsible for the delivery of services to the public and/or to government.

  • Centrelink
  • Comcare
  • Comcover
  • Medicare
  • NFRA (established as an Executive Agency in July 2019)

3.4 Structures linked to the Australian Government through statutory contracts, agreements and delegations

These bodies are owned and operated by the private sector, but have been recognised in legislation or a legislative instrument, or are party to a statutory contract/funding agreement to deliver services on the Government’s behalf.

  • Australian Housing & Urban Research Institute (AHURI)

3.5 Joint ventures, partnerships and interests in other companies

  • Law Courts Ltd (jointly with NSW Govt)

3.6 Subsidiaries of CCEs and Commonwealth companies

  • Star Track Pty Ltd (subsidiary of AusPost)

Source: This table has been compiled by the Parliamentary Library using information from the following sources: Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Rule 2014; Department of Finance (DoF), Australian Government Organisations Register - Types of Bodies, (Canberra: DoF, 20 July 2018); ‘Types of Australian Government Bodies’, DoF, 11 February 2021; ‘PGPA glossary’, DoF.

The establishment of the HSRA as a statutory, Budget-funded, corporate Commonwealth entity (CCE) for the purposes of the PGPA Act is consistent with the following principles outlined by Finance guidance in relation to the appropriateness and applicability of entity structures:

Commonwealth Governance Structures Policy (Governance policy): Governance structures created through enabling legislation (e.g. a primary or a secondary statutory body) have clearly defined purposes authorised by Parliament.

Types of Australian Government Bodies’: A corporate Commonwealth entity is a body corporate that has a separate legal personality from the Commonwealth. A corporate Commonwealth entity can enter into contracts and own property separate from the Commonwealth.

Corporate Commonwealth entities are still part of the Australian Government. … Creating a corporate Commonwealth entity may be suitable if:

  •     the body will operate commercially or entrepreneurially
  •     a multi-member accountable authority will provide optimal governance for the body
  •     there is a clear rationale for the assets of the body not to be owned or controlled by the Australian Government
  •     the body requires a degree of independence from the policies and direction of the Australian Government.

Governance assessment template – creating a new body: A governing board or multi-member accountable authority is usually established for a Commonwealth entity or company when collective decision-making and diverse expertise (beyond what can be expected from one individual) are required to govern the body. Boards are usually given autonomy to determine an entity’s corporate strategy and direction (subject to statutory constraints) and therefore can operate with a managerial freedom.

Types of Australian Government Bodies’: The PGPA Act does not give ministers a general power to direct the activities of a corporate Commonwealth entity. It does give broad powers to require the entity to provide information about its activities.

Corporate Commonwealth entities are generally not required to comply with policies of the Australian Government except where there is:

  •     a direction from the responsible Minister under the enabling legislation
  •     a government policy order.

The Finance guidance compares CCEs with Commonwealth companies. A company structure does not appear to be a good match for the proposed form and functions of the HSRA.

Types of Australian Government Bodies’: Creating a Commonwealth company may be suitable if:

  •     the body will primarily conduct commercial or entrepreneurial activities and will generate profits for distribution to its members
  •     the body will operate in a commercial or competitive environment (at arm’s length from government)
  •     the Australian Government is going the sell the body in the short to medium term.

The Finance guidance notes that ‘issues’ can arise when using a company structure.

Types of Australian Government Bodies’: Lack of scrutiny

  •     there is no formal opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny before a company is established
  •     the objects of a company may be amended by its members without parliamentary scrutiny
  •     a company can borrow and invest money without government approval.

Budget funding

  •     Commonwealth companies may not be able to enter into multi-year agreements if they rely on annual funding from the government. Lack of funding certainty may affect their ability to pay debts when they fall due.

Public perception

  •     there may be an assumption, or a public perception, that there is a government guarantee for the operations of a Commonwealth company in the event of its failure.

Taxes

  •     a company is generally liable to pay Commonwealth, state and territory taxes and charges, whereas enabling legislation may exempt a statutory body from these taxes and charges.

Committee consideration

At the time of writing the Bill has not been referred to Committee.

Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills

At the time of writing, the Bill has not been considered by the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills (Scrutiny of Bills Committee). However, the Bill includes a provision of a type that has previously attracted the attention of the Scrutiny of Bills Committee.

Under clause 11, the Minister may, by legislative instrument, give written directions of a general nature to the HSRA about the performance of its functions. Under subclause 11(3), the HSRA must comply. Such legislative instruments will not be subject to disallowance by the Parliament, as directions by a Minister to a person or body are exempt from this process (Legislation Act 2003, paragraph 44(2)(b) and Legislation (Exemptions and Other Matters) Regulation 2015, section 9, table item 2).

In its Scrutiny Digest 2 of March 2022, the Scrutiny of Bills Committee raised concerns about Ministerial directions not being subject to parliamentary disallowance in relation to the Australian Radioactive Waste Agency Bill 2022 (the ARWA Bill). The Scrutiny of Bills Committee noted its expectation that such exemptions be fully justified in a Bill’s Explanatory Memorandum, and that ‘the fact that a certain matter has previously been within executive control or continues or is consistent with current arrangements does not, of itself, provide an adequate justification’ (p. 25).’ The Scrutiny of Bills Committee sought the Minister’s advice as to:

… why it is considered necessary and appropriate to provide that directions given [to the agency and the CEO] are not subject to disallowance; and

whether the [ARWA] bill could be amended to provide that these directions are subject to disallowance to ensure that they are subject to appropriate parliamentary oversight (pp. 26-27).

Policy position of non-government parties/independents

Coalition

The Coalition, when recently in Government, had been investigating faster rail options, not specifically HSR. Then Deputy Prime Minister Michael McCormack was quoted in the rail industry publication Rail Express saying that he would like to see HSR in his lifetime, but Australia’s geographic size and small population makes HSR difficult and ‘there are other priorities at hand’.

Australian Greens

In 2020, the Greens’ Invest to Recover plan committed to a ‘fully publicly owned high speed rail connection from Melbourne to Brisbane’. Prior to the 2019 election, the Australian Greens in their policy document, World Class Public Transport, pledged to establish a High Speed Rail Authority and provide $1.6 billion in funding ‘to cover the first four years of expenses’.

Earlier, in 2012 the Greens released the report, High Speed Rail: Benefits That Add Up outlining the direct and indirect benefits from HSR, including the time saved by consumers, congestion savings, accident reductions and pollution reduction.

Position of major interest groups

Australasian Railway Association

The Australasian Railway Association (ARA) has not commented on the introduction of the HSRA Bill. However, in its publication Faster Rail In Australia, it proposes a three-step approach to achieving HSR in the longer term:

  • act now to deliver faster rail by achieving top speeds on the network from 160km/h to 200km/h so rail travel times compete with road
  • establish new fast rail lines in the next 5 to 10 years by building new tracks, improving the existing network and purchasing new trains to achieve speeds from 200km/h to 250km/h
  • prepare for high speed rail in the longer term with trains travelling faster than 250km/h by securing rail corridors now to minimise project costs in the future.

MacroBusiness blog

This business and investment blog opposed the announcement of the HSRA Bill for three main reasons related to the HSR network which underpins the establishment of HSRA:

1. The exorbitant cost associated with building and operating the rail line

2. Lack of population density to support the project

3. Lack of competitiveness against air travel unless there are massive ongoing operational subsidies from taxpayers.

The blog’s author Leith van Onselen suggested the biggest barrier to the ‘HSR boondoggle’ is building the track from the outskirts of Sydney, Melbourne or Brisbane into their respective CBDs.

These trains are not compatible with suburban commuter trains unless they slow to the same slow speeds due to alignment and congestion, in which case they are no longer HSR. Further, the current commuter train systems in Sydney and Melbourne are already at capacity and cannot cope with existing demands, let alone imposing a HSR network.

This means HSR would need to be separated from the existing commuter network via new train lines and stations. And since our major cities are already build-out, this would necessarily require acquiring some of the most expensive capital city real estate in the world or tunnelling under it, either of which would cost a fortune.

Urban Development Institute of Australia

In response to the release of the HSRA Bill the Urban Development Institute of Australia (UDIA) commented in the Australian Financial Review that ‘Plans have to be carefully tuned to ensure we link future cities [and] have well-thought-out, strategic plans well ahead of any transport rollout’.

State and Territory Governments

State and territory governments will be critical to any development of a high speed rail network in Australia. They do not appear to have made specific comments on the Bill and commitments to the concept of an east coast HSR have also been limited. For example, HSR is not mentioned in the Victorian Infrastructure Plan 2021, the Queensland Government’s State Infrastructure Strategy: June 2022, or the New South Wales Government’s Staying Ahead: State Infrastructure Strategy 2022­–2042. The Australian Capital Territory Government’s website states that it has ‘commenced corridor preservation for a high-speed rail service into the ACT and will reflect this in its future planning’.

Financial implications

The Explanatory Memorandum states that ‘this Bill will have no financial impact as any impacts will be offset’ (p. 2).

Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights

As required under Part 3 of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth), the Government has assessed the Bill’s compatibility with the human rights and freedoms recognised or declared in the international instruments listed in section 3 of that Act. The Government considers that the Bill is compatible. The Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights can be found at page 3 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill.

Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights

At the time of writing the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights has not considered the Bill.

Key issues and provisions

Definitions

Clause 4 comprises definitions, half of which simply clarify the meaning of ‘Authority’, ‘Board’, ‘Board member’, ‘CEO’, and ‘Chair’. The definition of ‘paid work’ supports provisions relating to the Chair and Board members (clauses 22 and 24) and the CEO (clause 41). Other definitions relate to faster rail and high speed rail.

‘Faster rail network’ means a network of railways in Australia that are not capable of supporting high speed trains.

‘High speed rail corridor’ means the area through which the high speed rail network will run.

‘High speed rail network’ means a network of railways that:

        (a)   are capable, in whole or in part, of supporting high speed trains; and

        (b)  connect:

         (i) Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Canberra; and

         (ii) some regional centres on the east coast of Australia or in New South Wales, Victoria or Queensland.

‘High speed train’ means a vehicle that:

        (a)   is designed to transport passengers or goods and operates on a railway (including a vehicle that does not have wheels); and

        (b)  is capable of travelling at speeds exceeding 250 km/hr.

The definition of ‘rules’ supports clause 50, which provides that the Minister may, by legislative instrument, make rules required, permitted, necessary or convenient for giving effect to the Act. Clause 50 is discussed below.

Establishment of the HSRA

Clause 7 establishes the HSRA and specifies that the HSRA is a body corporate, and a corporate Commonwealth entity for the purposes of the PGPA Act.

Functions of the HSRA

Functions listed in the Bill

Clause 8 lists the functions of the HSRA. The Explanatory Memorandum states that:

All of the Authority’s functions as related in Clause 8 are in relation to work associated with both high speed rail and faster rail. All the functions related to faster rail cover the scope and objectives of the National Faster Rail Agency (p. 5).

As noted by the Explanatory Memorandum, the functions listed in clause 8 aim to enable ‘strategic planning of the high speed rail network across jurisdictions’ (p. 5). The HSRA will:

  • lead and coordinate policy development and planning (subparagraph 8(1)(a)(i))
  • consult, liaise and negotiate with states and territories and other relevant parties (subparagraph 8(1)(a)(ii))
  • provide advice and recommendations to the Minister and other relevant parties, including advice and recommendations on environmental matters and interconnectedness (subparagraph 8(1)(a)(iii))
  • undertake evaluations and research and gather information (subparagraph 8(1)(a)(iv))
  • if the Commonwealth obtains a state’s consent (paragraph 8(1)(b)) or a territory’s consent (paragraph 8(1)(c)), construct or extend that jurisdiction’s railway for the high speed or faster rail network (consent from a state must be in accordance with paragraph 51(xxxiv) of the Constitution)
  • perform any other functions conferred on the Authority (paragraphs 8(1)(d) and (e)) and do anything incidental to, or conducive to, the performance of the above functions (paragraph 8(1)(f)).

Foreshadowed additional functions

The Explanatory Memorandum observes that ‘there is also capacity for the Minister to add functions over time’ (p. 6). The addition of functions would be effected under paragraph 8(1)(e), which provides that other functions can be prescribed by rules (in relation to rules, see the discussion of clause 50 below). A similar mechanism has been used in, for example, the Australian Renewable Energy Agency Act 2011, in which paragraph 8(a) provides that the functions of the Australian Renewable Energy Agency include ‘any other functions that are prescribed by the regulations’.

Subclause 8(2) provides that rules prescribing other functions ‘must specify the legislative power or powers of the Parliament in respect of each function of the Authority that is prescribed’.

The Minister’s second reading speech and the Explanatory Memorandum both foreshadow the addition of functions not listed in the Bill. In her second reading speech the Minister stated ‘this government is absolutely committed to establishing this authority to oversee the construction and operation of a high-speed rail network along Australia's eastern seaboard’ [emphasis added]. Similarly, the Explanatory Memorandum states the role of the HSRA will be to ‘lead, plan, develop, coordinate, oversee and monitor the construction and operation of a high speed rail network in Australia’ [emphasis added](p. 1).

Establishment of the Board

The proposed provisions in relation to the Board are similar to and consistent with provisions at other statutory authorities.

Establishment and appointment

Clause 13 establishes the Board of the HSRA, and clause 14 establishes the functions of the Board, which are:

(a)  to decide, within the scope of any directions given to the Authority under [clause 11], the strategies and policies to be followed by the Authority; and

(b) to ensure the proper, efficient and effective performance of the Authority’s functions; and

(c)  any other functions conferred on the Board by this Act.

In addition, subclause 14(2) provides that the Board has power to do ‘all things necessary or convenient to be done for or in connection with the performance of its functions’.

Clause 15 establishes that the Board comprises a Chair and four other members. Under clauses 16 and 17, Board members will be appointed by the Minister by written instrument for a period not exceeding three years, although they may be reappointed. Board members are appointed on a part time basis, although the Chair may be appointed on a full-time basis.

Under clause 18, the Minister may, in some circumstances (for example, vacancy, or when a Board member is absent from Australia), appoint a Board member to act as the Chair, or appoint a person to act as a Board member other than the Chair.

Qualifications, knowledge, skills or experience

Subclause 16(4) provides that a person is not eligible for appointment as a Board member unless the Minister is satisfied that the person has ‘appropriate qualifications, knowledge, skills or experience’. The Bill does not provide criteria or guidance about the qualifications, knowledge, skills or experience that would be appropriate for appointees to possess, leaving this for the Minister to decide. Although it is not unusual for enabling legislation to be silent on the selection of board appointees, there are examples where legislation has included criteria or other guidance.

For example, in the National Housing Finance and Investment Corporation Act 2018, section 18 specifies six areas of qualifications, skills or experience, and also requires that ‘in appointing Board members, the Minister must ensure that … the Board members collectively have an appropriate balance of qualifications, skills or experience in the fields mentioned’.

Remuneration, and leave of absence

Clause 20 provides that Board members’ remuneration is determined by the Remuneration Tribunal. If no determination is in operation, the Board members’ remuneration is prescribed by rules (made by the Minister under clause 50). Allowances will be prescribed by the rules.

Under subclause 21(3) the Chair may grant leave of absence to any Board members on the terms and conditions that the Chair determines. Under subclause 21(2) if the Chair is appointed on a part time basis, the Minister may grant leave of absence to the Chair on the terms and conditions that the Minister determines. Under subclause 21(1) if the Chair is appointed on a full time basis the Chair has the recreation leave entitlements that are determined by the Remuneration Tribunal, and the Minister may grant the Chair leave of absence, other than recreation leave, on the terms and conditions as to remuneration or otherwise that the Minister determines.

Establishment of the CEO

The proposed provisions in relation to the CEO are similar to and consistent with provisions applicable to comparable CEO positions at statutory authorities.

Clause 34 establishes that the CEO is responsible for the day-to-day administration of the HSRA, in accordance with policies and strategies determined by the Board. Clause 35 provides that the CEO must act in accordance with directions of Board, except to the extent that a direction relates to the CEO’s performance of functions or exercise of powers under the Public Service Act 1999 in relation to the Authority.

Clause 36 provides that the CEO is to be appointed by the Board on a full-time basis by written instrument, after consultation with the Minister. The CEO must not be a Board member. The CEO holds office for a period not exceeding 5 years, though may be re-appointed. Under clause 38 terms and conditions are determined by the Board. Clauses 39 and 40 provide that the CEO’s remuneration and recreation leave entitlements are determined by the Remuneration Tribunal. If no determination is in operation, the CEO’s remuneration is prescribed by rules (made by the Minister under clause 50).

Clause 41 specifies that the CEO must not engage in paid work outside the duties of the CEO’s office without the Chair’s approval. Clause 42 requires the CEO to comply with section 29 of the PGPA Act, which deals with the duty to disclose interests, and this includes compliance with rules made under section 29.

Under clause 43 the CEO may resign by giving the Board a written resignation. Clause 37 provides that the Board may, by written instrument and after consultation with the Minister, appoint a person (other than a Board member) to act as the CEO.

Clause 44 provides that the Board may terminate the CEO’s appointment for misbehaviour, or physical or mental incapacity, or if specific circumstances arise relating to bankruptcy, absence from duty without approved leave, and potential conflicts of interest.

Staff

The proposed provisions in relation to staff are similar to and consistent with provisions applicable to comparable entities. Clause 45 provides that staff of the HSRA must be persons engaged under the Public Service Act. The Explanatory Memorandum notes that:

The Authority will have the power to second staff from other agencies under the Public Service Act 1999 to ensure there are appropriately skilled personnel to undertake the Authority’s functions and objectives (p. 11).

Clause 46 provides that the HSRA may engage consultants to assist in the performance of its functions.

Corporate plan, and review every 10 years

Clause 48 provides that, in preparing or varying a corporate plan under section 35 of the PGPA Act, the Board must consult with the Minister, and such of the following as it considers appropriate: government, commercial, industrial, consumer and other relevant bodies and organisations, and investors in infrastructure and owners of infrastructure

Clause 49 provides that, at least once every 10 years, the Minister must cause a review of the operation of the Act and the rules to be undertaken. The Minister must cause a copy of the report of the review to be tabled in each House of the Parliament within 15 sitting days of that House after the report is given to the Minister.

Minister’s powers to give directions and make rules

Minister may give directions to the HSRA

Under clause 11, the Minister may, by legislative instrument, give written directions to the HSRA about the performance of its functions. Under subclause 11(3), the HSRA must comply with such directions. Such legislative instruments will not be subject to disallowance by the Parliament, as directions by a Minister to a person or body are exempt from this process (Legislation Act 2003, paragraph 44(2)(b) and Legislation (Exemptions and Other Matters) Regulation 2015, section 9, table item 2). The Scrutiny of Bills Committee has raised concerns regarding this type of exemption, as discussed above under ‘Committee consideration’.

Consequent to clause 11, clause 35 provides that ‘the Board may give written directions to the CEO, not inconsistent with any direction given to the Authority under [clause 11], about the performance of the CEO’s duties’.[11] The CEO must comply with such a direction, but the direction is not a legislative instrument.

Minister may make rules

Clause 50 provides that the Minister may, by legislative instrument, make rules required, permitted, necessary or convenient for giving effect to the Act. The Explanatory Memorandum explains why the subordinate instruments are rules rather than regulations.

[T]he Office of Parliamentary Counsel's Drafting Direction No. 3.8 – Subordinate legislation … states that matters such as compliance and enforcement, the imposition of taxes, setting amounts to be appropriated, and amendments to the text of an Act, should be included in regulations unless there is a strong justification otherwise. The Bill does not enable rules to provide for any of these matters. This is clarified by the subclause [50(2)] that specifically prevents rules from including these types of matters (p. 12).

As explained by the Explanatory Memorandum, clause 50 also clarifies that the rules are a legislative instrument for the purposes of the Legislation Act 2003. Consequently, the rules must be tabled in Parliament and ‘a motion to disallow the rules may be moved in either House of the Parliament within 15 sitting days of the date the rules are tabled’ (p. 13).

Possible subject matter of rules

The Bill, the Minister’s second reading speech, and the Explanatory Memorandum foreshadow that the Minister may make rules including, but not limited to, two matters.

Clauses 20 and 39 provide that remuneration for Board members and the CEO is determined by the Remuneration Tribunal, and ‘if no determination of that remuneration by the Tribunal is in operation, the Board member [or CEO] is to be paid the remuneration that is prescribed by the rules’.

Paragraph 8(1)(e) provides that additional functions for the HSRA can be prescribed by rules. Both the Minister’s second reading speech and the Explanatory Memorandum foreshadow that the HSRA may oversee the operation of a high-speed rail network, a function not specifically listed in clause 8.

A similar mechanism has been used in, for example, the Australian Renewable Energy Agency Act 2011, in which paragraph 8(f) provides that the functions of the Australian Renewable Energy Agency include ‘any other functions that are prescribed by the regulations’.

Subclause 8(2) provides that rules prescribing additional functions for the HSRA ‘must specify the legislative power or powers of the Parliament in respect of each function of the Authority that is prescribed’.

Appendix A

Figure 1:    Map of proposed high speed rail line in the High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Phase 2 Study (p. 7)

Appendix A


[1].       The discount rate ‘translates future costs and benefits to a common time unit, to compare costs and benefits that accrue at different times.’ Discounting also ‘allows the appropriate comparison of costs and benefits over different timescales between different options and projects.’ Source: Guide to Economic Appraisal: Technical Guide of the Assessment Framework, (Canberra: Infrastructure Australia, July 2021), p. 23.

[2].       Under Standing Order 42 the Clerk of the House of Representatives removes from the Notice Paper any item of private member’s business which has not been called on for eight consecutive sitting Mondays: House of Representatives Standing Orders, (Canberra: Department of the House of Representatives, 2 August 2022), Chapter 6, p. 33.

[3].       There are figures available for 2020 and 2021, however, the public health measures undertaken in response to the COVID‑19 pandemic (such as lockdowns and state border closures) significantly impacted travel. As such, transport statistics from 2020 and 2021 are unlikely to be representative.

[4].       International aviation does not count towards individual nation’s greenhouse gas accounts. Space industries will have contributed some of these emissions, but this is likely to be a much smaller share than domestic aviation.

[5].       In 2019, air and space transport emitted 8.47Mt CO2e of the nation’s total 516.39Mt CO2e. In 1990, air and space transport emissions were 2.62 Mt CO2e of Australia’s 640.64 Mt CO2e. Source: Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources, Australia’s National Greenhouse Accounts, Activity Tables, National Inventory by Economic Sector 2020 – Data Tables (Excel), Sheet: Data Table 1: National Direct Emissions by Economic Sector, 1990 to 2020.

[6].       When new transport infrastructure is built it often reduces the overall cost of travel (including time costs) for potential passengers. Because of this reduced cost, some people will choose to make trips they would not otherwise have taken. This can have benefits such as increasing the range of services that are accessible for a person but also costs such as environmental impacts and increased congestion. Induced demand for a new HSR line could include people using HSR who may not have otherwise make a trip but also (due to the shift of passengers from air to HSR) spare capacity becoming available on scheduled air services which might be (at least partially) filled by new passengers who otherwise may not have undertaken a trip. This issue is discussed by Robertson and, in more detail, by Jiang and colleagues.

[7].       Other current entities designated as Executive Agencies include the Bureau of Meteorology, the National Archives of Australia, and Services Australia.

[8].       Department of Finance (Finance) webpages accessible from Structure of the Australian Government Public Sector provide information about the types of entities, and guidance in relation to proposals to create new entities.

[9].       The Australian Government Organisations Register (AGOR), a database of entities operated by Finance, acknowledges some challenges with the categories: ‘Australian Government bodies are diverse, which means classification is not always straightforward. The following table provides guidance on the main types of Australian Government bodies. Bodies may possess some but not all of the features listed. Where a government body could be classified under more than one body type, the most relevant classification has been chosen.’ Notwithstanding this caveat, the classification system is a useful guide to the options available when establishing a new agency. Note that AGOR uses 12 categories, whereas recent Finance webpages use 13 categories.

[10].     Information about specific entities is available from the AGOR, and the PGPA Act Flipchart and List (Primary/Principal bodies only).

[11].     However, subclause 35(3) does not apply to the extent that the direction relates to the CEO’s performance of functions or exercise of powers under the Public Service Act 1999.

 

For copyright reasons some linked items are only available to members of Parliament.


© Commonwealth of Australia

Creative commons logo

Creative Commons

With the exception of the Commonwealth Coat of Arms, and to the extent that copyright subsists in a third party, this publication, its logo and front page design are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Australia licence.

In essence, you are free to copy and communicate this work in its current form for all non-commercial purposes, as long as you attribute the work to the author and abide by the other licence terms. The work cannot be adapted or modified in any way. Content from this publication should be attributed in the following way: Author(s), Title of publication, Series Name and No, Publisher, Date.

To the extent that copyright subsists in third party quotes it remains with the original owner and permission may be required to reuse the material.

Inquiries regarding the licence and any use of the publication are welcome to webmanager@aph.gov.au.

Disclaimer: Bills Digests are prepared to support the work of the Australian Parliament. They are produced under time and resource constraints and aim to be available in time for debate in the Chambers. The views expressed in Bills Digests do not reflect an official position of the Australian Parliamentary Library, nor do they constitute professional legal opinion. Bills Digests reflect the relevant legislation as introduced and do not canvass subsequent amendments or developments. Other sources should be consulted to determine the official status of the Bill.

Any concerns or complaints should be directed to the Parliamentary Librarian. Parliamentary Library staff are available to discuss the contents of publications with Senators and Members and their staff. To access this service, clients may contact the author or the Library‘s Central Enquiry Point for referral.