Bills Digest No. 97, Bills Digests alphabetical index 2019–20

Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (Competition and Consumer) Bill 2019 and Telecommunications (Regional Broadband Scheme) Charge Bill 2019

Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts

Author

Howard Maclean, Juli Tomaras

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Introductory Info Date introduced: 28 November 2019
House: House of Representatives
Portfolio: Communications, Cyber Safety and the Arts
Commencement: Various dates as set out in the body of this Bills Digest.

The Bills Digest at a glance

Purpose of the Bills

The purpose of the Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (Competition and Consumer) Bill 2019 (TLACC Bill) and the Telecommunications (Regional Broadband Scheme) Charge Bill 2019 (Charge Bill) is to create a:

  • statutory guarantee of internet services to every Australian premise (the Statutory Infrastructure Provider (SIP) regime) and
  • funding vehicle to subsidise meeting that guarantee in non-commercial areas (the Regional Broadband Scheme (RBS)).

The RBS is an industry levy paid into a special account which in turn provides subsidies via grants or contracts to NBN Co.

The TLACC Bill also makes amendments to the superfast network obligation rules in the Telecommunication Act, and requires the NBN to provide mapping data.

Evolution of the Legislation

The Bills are a response to the 2014 Vertigan Panel review into the NBN. Since then, the RBS was the subject of consultation and report by the Bureau of Communications Research (BCR) in 2015-2016, an exposure draft consultation in 2016-2017, was introduced to the 45th Parliament in 2017, before lapsing at the dissolution of the 45th Parliament and being reintroduced with minor changes in November 2019.

Senate Economics Legislation Committee inquires        

The Bills have been the subject of inquiries by the Senate Environment and Communications Legislation Committee—both in 2017 and 2019.

Both Committees recommended the Bills be passed after the adoption of certain amendments (disallowance provision amendments for the 2017 Inquiry and transparency measures for the 2019 Inquiry).

Labor Senators issued additional comments, and the Australian Greens issued dissenting reports to both inquiries.

Position of major interest groups

There is in-principle support for the SIP scheme across major interest groups, although there are some technical concerns with the operation of the scheme.

The RBS is more divisive, with the telecommunications industry split:

    • Telstra and Optus, as operators of the two currently operational 5G mobile networks, support the proposed RBS broadly, and oppose any reform of the RBS to include mobile services
    • much of the rest of the industry, particularly NBN-comparable networks such as TPG and OptiComm (that will be subject to the RBS) oppose the RBS either largely or entirely. In the absence of direct budget funding, some support a broad-based tax which would likely see the RBS extended to mobile services
  • community stakeholders largely avoided a technical discussion of the operation of the Bills, but expressed in-principle support for the policy objectives of the SIP regime and the creation of a long term funding vehicle to provide for it and
  • the Productivity Commission and the ACCC expressed a view that general budget funding would be a more efficient, flexible and less distortionary method of funding the SIP regime than the RBS.

Financial Implications

The RBS is intended to be revenue neutral to the overall budget as a self-funding scheme that raises and spends money internal to it. Administrative costs are intended to be reimbursed to the Budget by way of funds raised through the RBS charge.

Regional Broadband Scheme

The Regional Broadband Scheme is a monthly industry charge paid by owners of fixed-line broadband internet networks on every premise they serve with an internet service that month. On commencement, the charge will be $7.10 per month.

The charge is calculated monthly but collected annually, paid into an RBS Special Account. The Secretary may then issue grants and enter into contracts in relation to funding fixed wireless and satellite services with eligible funding entities (currently only NBN Co), and debit amounts from the special account to fund such contracts and grants.

There following key issues have been identified:

  1. direct budget funding is preferred to the RBS by the Vertigan Review, the Productivity Commission, the ACCC, and some stakeholders
  2. the RBS cost modelling dates from 2015, and is based on a different charge base (services-in-operation) than the current proposed RBS, leading to stakeholder concerns that the modelling is no longer current
  3. the arrival of low earth orbit satellite broadband (LEOSB) may render the assumptions underpinning the RBS and SIP scheme outdated—namely, it may make service to regional and remote areas commercial, and threaten NBN’s Skymuster satellite and fixed wireless services
  4. the RBS excludes mobile network connections from the charge, giving a competitive advantage to mobile providers over fixed-line providers. Given the increasing roll-out of 5G, various stakeholders are concerned that this will both heavily distort the market and lead to a reduced charge base as consumers substitute fixed-line for mobile connections (and avoid paying into the RBS)
  5. the RBS charge and RBS charge cap has not been adjusted for inflation with the reintroduction of the Bills and
  6. various stakeholders and the Senate Inquiry raised concerns about the transparency of funding provided under the scheme.  

Statutory Infrastructure Provider regime

The SIP Scheme is designed to guarantee that every premise in Australia has access to an internet connection of at least 25 megabits per second. A SIP is obligated to provide a fixed-line connection, or if that is not reasonable, a fixed wireless or satellite connection.

NBN Co is intended to be the default SIP for Australia. However, under certain circumstances other carriers must nominate as a SIP for an area, for example if a carrier is contracted to provide connections to a real estate or building development. The Minister may also designate carriers as a SIP by legislative instrument.

The following key issues have been identified with the SIP Regime:

  1. Telstra has expressed concern with potential gaps in the SIP scheme prior to the completion of the NBN
  2. the power of the Minister to designate carriers as SIPs is very broad
  3. SIP bandwidth guarantees may be insufficient to future needs
  4. the definition of ‘fixed wireless’ under the SIP Scheme may impede technological advances
  5. Telstra has expressed concern that a carrier who installs mobile infrastructure in a new real estate development may become legally obligated to provide fixed-line internet network under the current legislation, outside the policy intent of the proposal and
  6. future LEOSB may be excluded from the definition of ‘qualifying satellite carriage service’, potentially preventing such services from being offered to meet SIP obligations.

Amendments to the Superfast Network Rules

The TLACC Bill also repeals Part 7 and makes substantial amendments to Part 8 of the Telecommunications Act. These parts concern regulation of non-NBN fixed-line internet networks in Australia that service residential and small business customers, generally requiring them to be wholesale only (that is, structurally separated).  Broadly, these amendments:

  • remove small business services from the ambit of regulation
  • allow carriers other than NBN or Telstra to functionally separate their retail internet and wholesale internet services subject  to approval from the ACCC
  • allow the ACCC to exempt small providers from obligations
  • impose new non-discrimination requirements and
  • replace an exemption which allows existing networks to extend by up to 1km from their pre-NBN boundaries without engaging regulation under these sections.

There are two key issues identified with the amendment to the Superfast Network Rules:

  1. current legacy network (pre-NBN) carriers oppose the removal of the exemption that allows them to extend their legacy networks up to 1km from their pre-NBN bounds. Other stakeholders support the removal as a way to prevent such networks from ‘cherrypicking’ highly profitable areas in inner metro areas and
  2. the removal of small business networks from superfast network obligations elicited mixed reactions from stakeholders.

NBN Co mapping data

The TLACC Bill will also require NBN to provide mapping data to be published on the National Map website. The mapping data to be provided is about premises connected, or due to be connected, to the NBN based on geographic location and technology type.

Concluding comments

The policy objectives of the Bills have near universal support among stakeholders and other commentators. The methods through which the Bill seeks to achieve those objectives, particularly the RBS, has attracted substantial and varied criticism across stakeholder groups.

History of the Bills

The Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (Competition and Consumer) Bill 2018 (2018 TLACC Bill) and the Telecommunications (Regional Broadband Scheme) Charge Bill 2018 (2018 Charge Bill) were introduced into the House of Representatives on 22 June 2017 and passed the House on 10 May 2018. Government amendments to both Bills were made in the House.[29] Both Bills were introduced into the Senate on 18 June 2018. Further Government amendments, and amendments by the Australian Greens and the Australian Labor Party (Labor), were proposed in the Senate, but the Bills lapsed at the dissolution of the 45th Parliament on 1 July 2019.[30]

The Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (Competition and Consumer) Bill 2019 (TLACC Bill) and the Telecommunications (Regional Broadband Scheme) Charge Bill 2019 (Charge Bill) were introduced into the House of Representatives on 28 November 2019 and passed the House on 13 February 2020.

While the 2019 Bills are mainly the same as the 2018 Bills that passed the House of Representatives (that is, with the Government amendments made in the House), there have been a number of changes to the drafting of both Bills, in particular:

  • the TLACC Bill incorporates the Government amendments to the 2018 Bill moved in the Senate[31] and
  • the Charge Bill reflects amendments suggested by the Government and Opposition to the 2018 Charge Bill in the Senate.[32]

Purpose of the Bills

The Bills have three inter-related purposes:

  • to establish the Rural Broadband Scheme (RBS), imposing an industry levy on all fixed-line internet connections to fund subsidises for satellite and fixed wireless connections in rural and regional Australia. The Charge Bill is a taxation Bill that establishes the RBS charge. Schedule 4 of the TLACC Bill amends the Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Service Standards Act) 1999 (TCPSS Act) to establish the administration of the scheme and govern the payment of subsidies
  • to establish the Statutory Infrastructure Provider (SIP) regime. Statutory Infrastructure Providers would be required to provide a fixed-line service to any premise in the area in which they are the SIP, or if a fixed-line service is not reasonable, fixed wireless or satellite services. NBN Co is envisaged to be the default SIP nationally, but the regime sets out ways in which other carriers must become SIPs and
  • to reform regulation of Non-NBN Carrier Networks in Parts 7 and 8 of the Telecommunications Act 1997. This includes amendments to the exceptions to further network expansion, and provisions for structural separation undertakings by non-NBN carrier networks into wholesaling and retail business units.

Structure of the Bills

The TLACC Bill is divided into five schedules:

  • Schedule 1 repeals Part 7 of the Telecommunications Act (which deals with the regulation of non-NBN carriers offering Layer 2 bitstream services) and makes consequential amendments to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA)
  • Schedule 2 amends Part 8 of the Telecommunications Act (which deals with the regulation of non-NBN carriers offering superfast fixed-line networks) and makes consequential amendments to related legislation
  • Schedule 3 creates the SIP regime
  • Schedule 4 sets out the operational arrangements of the RBS and
  • Schedule 5 requires NBN Co. to provide data on premises connected to the NBN for publication on the National Map website.

The Charge Bill is not subdivided into parts or divisions—it establishes the amount of and imposes liability for the charge.

Commencement

The Charge Bill commences as follows:

  • sections 1 and 2 on Royal Assent
  • sections 3 to 20—at the same time as Schedule 4 of the Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (Competition and Consumer) Act 2019 (that is, Schedule 4 of the TLACC Bill)

The TLACC Bill commences as follows:

  • sections 1 to 4—on Royal Assent
  • Schedule 1—the day after Royal Assent
  • Schedule 2—three months after Royal Assent
  • Schedule 3—Division 1 in Part 1 the day after Royal Assent; Division 2 in Part 1 the earlier of a day fixed by proclamation and 1 July 2020; Part 2, immediately after Division 2 of Part 1 of Schedule 3 commences
  • Schedule 4—the day after Royal Assent and
  • Schedule 5—the day after Royal Assent.

Background

Policy Background to the RBS & SIP

History of providing services to regional and rural Australia—post and telephone service obligations

Providing broadband services to rural and regional Australia is currently very expensive;[33] more expensive than what most customers in this area would be willing to pay if such services were charged at the cost of providing them.[34]

Ensuring equal access to communication services between all Australians regardless of address has been an uncontroversial core policy and expectation of the Commonwealth since Federation. Australia Post’s obligation to deliver services throughout Australia at a single uniform rate of postage is a core social promise and a statutory requirement under section 27 of the Australian Postal Corporation Act 1989.

As technology has evolved, this commitment has varied in its strength and response. The first iteration of the Telecommunications Universal Service Obligation (TUSO) under the Telecommunications Act 1975, obligated Telecom Australia to provide telecommunication services ‘available throughout Australia for all people who reasonably require those services’.[35]

With the deregulation of the telecommunication sector in the 1990s and the privatisation of Telstra between 1996–2007, this original statutory responsibility of Telecom gradually evolved into the current Universal Service Obligation/Telecommunications Industry Levy Scheme (USO/TIL) legislated in 2011–2012.[36] The USO/TIL Scheme is focussed on provision of telephone line infrastructure and standard telephone services. Telstra continues to be the sole universal service provider under this scheme, obligated to provide voice telephony services that are ‘reasonably accessible to all people in Australia on an equitable basis, wherever they reside or carry on business’.[37]

Broadband internet policy in Australia

The Regional Broadband Scheme and Statutory Infrastructure Provider Regime represent the latest development in a long history of government regulation, intervention and subsidisation of broadband internet—together, the regime proposes to extend the obligation of universal and equitable access to communication services to broadband internet.

The SIP Regime obligates the National Broadband Network Company (NBN Co) and other SIPs (as nominated or designated over time) to provide broadband internet services to every premise in Australia.[38] The RBS is a funding mechanism that collects money via an industry charge on every fixed-line broadband connection and then makes payments to eligible funding entities (by default, NBN Co) via grants or contracts, intended to cover losses incurred in meeting their SIP obligations.[39]

The Keating Government first addressed the policy issue of the nascent Internet with the Networking Australia’s Future Report in 1994. From the onset, the challenge of ensuring the accessibility of broadband in regional and rural Australia, as well as the possibility of including broadband internet within a universal service obligation were recognised.[40] The Report noted:

If Broadband services become a basic communications requirement, consideration will need to be given to how to fund the roll-out of these services to areas of low population density. Essentially, the options involve either some form of cross subsidy or direct government funding.[41] [emphasis added]

Government policy since has followed a mix of these two options. From 1997 through to 2007, the Howard Government pursued a series of direct government funding programs, beginning with the Networking the Nation Fund (1997–2004), which distributed $351.13 million directly on a project by project basis across regional Australia.[42]

This was followed by the High Bandwidth Incentive Scheme (HiBIS) in 2003, a subsidy scheme which provided registered internet service providers with incentive payments to supply higher bandwidth services in regional and rural Australia at prices comparable to those available in metropolitan areas.[43] HiBIS was followed by the Broadband Connect package in 2005, and then the Australian Broadband Guarantee (ABG) in 2007.[44] In 2006, the Howard Government announced $958 million in funding for the OPEL Network, an industry proposal to deliver wholesale broadband internet in regional rural Australia (cancelled in 2008).[45]

These packages all focused on providing direct government subsidies to the industry or community organisations to subsidise the cost of providing services in regional and rural Australia.

It is significant that by 2005, there was a discernible and fundamental change in the way in which people were using the internet. The arrival of YouTube was a marker of that change; the video sharing service posted its first video on 23 April 2005.[46] People started to use it as a means for uploading and sharing content they had developed themselves. This expanded into far greater and regular social, commercial and political use with people increasingly posting their own videos on YouTube and digital photos, and then sharing their opinions and stories on blogs and social networking sites like Facebook, Twitter and so forth.

The increased use of the internet has resulted in an increased demand for greater bandwidth. This has generated arguments for timely investment in a sophisticated telecommunications network that is future-proofed, ensuring that people from now until many years into the future can use the internet in the ways we are using it now, and ways not yet contemplated.

The strategy used by the Howard Government shifted with the election of the Rudd Government in November 2007 and the announcement in December 2007 by Senator Stephen Conroy of the newly elected Government's commitment to building a national high-speed broadband Fibre to the Node (FTTN) network.[47]

On 7 April 2009, the Rudd Government announced a large-scale national telecommunications infrastructure project, with concomitant plans to establish a company (NBN Co) to build and operate a National Broadband Network which would deliver superfast broadband services to homes and businesses across Australia. The government would be the majority shareholder of NBN Co, joining with private investors though eventually selling its interest five years after the NBN is operational, ‘consistent with market conditions, and national and identity security considerations’.[48] The aims of this infrastructure project included improving competition in the telecommunications sector, stimulating investment, increasing speed and improving quality in communications technology for businesses and rural Australians in particular. There was also the important goal of elevating Australia’s international standing as measured by telecommunications indicators such as broadband take‐up, accessibility of digital content, and competition in the Internet Service Provider (ISP) sector.[49]

Under the subsequent Gillard Labor Government, it was decided that the NBN proposal would be expanded in its reach, with the goal of providing access to NBN Co’s fibre network (specifically, the FTTP network) to 93 per cent of Australian premises, providing them with accessing speeds of up to 100 Megabits per second (‘Mbps’) (later increased to 1000 Mbit/s), with the remaining seven per cent of premises having accessing speeds of up to 12 Mbps through next generation satellite and wireless technology.[50]

The Abbott Government re-visited some of the decisions made under the Labor Government in relation to the network strategy and its architecture as Labor's NBN was behind schedule and over budget when the government lost office in 2013.[51] The Abbott Government replaced the largely fibre-to-the-premises (FTTP) model initiated by the Labor Government with a Multi Technology Mix (MTM) model. The MTM uses a range of fixed-line architectures and other technologies including copper wires, fibre-to-the-node (FTTN), fibre-to-the-curb (FTTC) and Hybrid Fibre Coaxial (HFC), and satellite. This approach has raised debate about cost-effectiveness and efficacy of the network.[52] Nonetheless, adopting the MTM had the virtue of being cheaper to build, and quicker to roll out. There was also an argument that NBN could be delivered cheaper and sooner, with the earlier arrival of revenue from business and residential customers able to fund subsequent upgrades to the network. There is debate about whether this has been achieved.[53]

With NBN Co being created as a virtual public monopoly over broadband internet connections, protected from competition by legislation,[54] the method used to fund it shifted towards a cross subsidy. The costs of NBN providing services to regional areas by satellite and fixed wireless networks would be covered by higher prices on customers in urban areas.[55]

This cross subsidy arrangement has held throughout the rollout of the NBN, supplemented by direct government programs such as the Mobile Blackspot Program, and the 2019 Stronger Regional Digital Connectivity Package.[56]

Evolution of the Legislation

Origins—the Vertigan Panel

On 12 December 2013, the newly elected Abbott Government issued terms of reference for the Independent Cost-Benefit Analysis of Broadband and Review of Regulation by a NBN Panel of experts chaired by Dr Michael Vertigan AC (the Vertigan Panel).[57]The Vertigan Panel delivered three reports:

Government Response to the Vertigan Panel

The Government released its response to the recommendations of the Vertigan Panel on 11 December 2014 in the Telecommunications Regulatory and Structural Reform government policy paper. In it, the Government, amongst other things:

  • accepted recommendation 3, to repeal Part 7 of the Telecommunications Act
  • accepted recommendation 4, to amend various aspects of Part 8 of the Telecommunications Act
  • accepted recommendation 5, to legislate Infrastructure Provider of Last Resort obligations on NBN Co
  • rejected elements of recommendation 11 (funding of non-commercial services). While the Vertigan Panel at several points had indicated a preference for subsidies to be directly budget funded, they recommended that a single annual broad-based levy similar to the current USO/TIL scheme be adopted that would fund both broadband and voice services.[58] The Government rejected this recommendation, instead proposing an alternative narrow based industry levy (the RBS)). The response also announced that the Government would ask the Bureau of Communications Research (BCR) to inquire into and report on the amount of non-commercial funding required.[59]

The Government’s response to these four recommendations forms the core of the current Bills before Parliament:

  • recommendation 3 (repeals Part 7 of the Telecommunications Act) is set out in Schedule 1 of the TLACC Bill
  • recommendation 4 (amends Part 8 of the Telecommunications Act) is set out as Schedule 2 of TLACC Bill, although it has evolved from its original scope
  • recommendation 5 has evolved into the proposed SIP scheme in Schedule 3 of the TLACC Bill and
  • the Government’s position on recommendation 11 has evolved into the proposed RBS in the Charge Bill and Schedule 4 of the TLACC Bill.

Bureau of Communications Research report

The BCR published the consultation paper NBN non-commercial Services Funding Options on 1 April 2015 and conducted a second consultation, NBN non-commercial services funding options: final consultation paper between 13 October 2015 and 3 November 2015. The BCR published NBN non-commercial services funding options: final report in March 2016—it became the basis of the RBS.

Telecommunication Reform Package Exposure Drafts

In December 2016, the Department of Communication and the Arts (DOCA) released the Telecommunication Legislation Amendment (Competition and Consumer) Bill and the Telecommunications (Regional Broadband Scheme) Bill as exposure drafts.[60] Consultation ran from 12 December 2016 to 3 February 2017, and the Department received 29 submissions.

Productivity Commission inquiry

Simultaneous to the BCR inquiry and the DOCA Exposure Draft consultation process was the Productivity Commission inquiry into the Telecommunications Universal Service Obligation.

The Productivity Commission received Terms of Reference for the inquiry on 28 April 2016, and published an Issues Paper on 7 June 2016. The Final Report was provided to the Government on 28 April 2017 and publicly released on 19 June 2017.[61]

As discussed at numerous points in this Digest, the Productivity Commission inquiry report was broadly critical of the approach that the Government had adopted in designing the RBS and echoed the original Vertigan Panel opinion that the USO and RBS should not be considered independently of each other.

Differences between the 2018 and 2019 Bills

Government amendments to the 2018 Bills were made in the House during the consideration in detail stage and have been incorporated into the Bills.[62] These amendments contained strengthened disallowance procedures in response to recommendations by the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills (Scrutiny of Bills Committee) and the Environment and Communications Legislation Committee (discussed under Committee consideration below).

While the 2019 Bills are mainly the same as the versions of the 2018 Bills that passed the House of Representatives, there have been a number of changes to the drafting in both of the Bills.

The TLACC Bill incorporates Government and Labor amendments to the 2018 Bill moved in the Senate, including the insertion of Schedule 5 of the TLACC Bill that requires NBN Co to provide mapping data on the rollout for publication on the National Map website.[63]

The Charge Bill reflects amendments suggested by the Opposition to the 2018 Charge Bill in the Senate, including:

  • a reduction in the RBS charge cap from $10.00 to $7.10 (clause 17A of the Charge Bill)
  • the addition of a concession that exempts carriers for the first 55,000 ‘recently connected greenfield premises’ on their networks for the first five years of operation of the RBS (clause 20 of the Charge Bill).[64]

Other changes include a new power for the Minister, by legislative instrument, to exempt carriers in nominated areas from the SIP regime.[65]

Committee consideration

Senate Environment and Communications Legislation Committee

Both the 2018 and current Bills were referred to the Senate Environment and Communications Legislation Committee.

2017 Committee Inquiry

The 2018 Bills were referred to the Senate Environment and Communications Legislation Committee on 22 June 2017 for inquiry and report. Details of that inquiry are available at the inquiry homepage. The Committee reported on 6 September 2017.[66]

The Committee recommended that the Bills be passed contingent on an amendment to the disallowance procedure for determinations by the Minister varying the scope of the RBS charge.[67] This recommendation was accepted and forms part of the Bills before Parliament.[68]

Labor Senators issued additional comments and Greens Senators issued a dissenting report—their concerns were primarily regarding the operation of the RBS and the associated charge. Labor Senators noted: ‘the Senate Inquiry process has by no means established that the RBS proposed in the Bill is the most effective and efficient method of achieving the stated policy objectives.’[69]

The Greens Senators expanded on these concerns in their dissenting report; they expressed concern that the RBS was an overly narrow and distortionary tax which did not account for changes in technology and argued: ‘[a] preferable option would be for the non-commercial services to be funded from the general budget.’ The Greens recommended:

Revising the Regional Broadband Scheme, taking into consideration updated costings, the current and emerging state of telecommunications technology and markets, and recommendations from the Productivity Commission regarding the Telecommunications Universal Service Obligation.[70]

2019 Committee Inquiry

The Bills were referred to the Senate Environment and Communications Legislation Committee for inquiry and report by 21 February 2020, with a hearing on 30 January 2020. Details of the inquiry are available at the inquiry homepage. The Committee reported on 14 February 2020.[71]

The Committee recommended that the Bills be passed after consideration by the Government of the ‘implementation of additional transparency measures to provide details of NBN Co’s off-set arrangements and the effective management of these arrangements’.[72] The Committee agreed ‘with the department's conclusion, that the bills represent an appropriate policy response in the long term’.[73]

On the potential for 5G mobile coverage to bypass the NBN (discussed below), the Committee noted:

The department advised that it does not consider fixed line services to be directly substitutable for mobile services. However, in the event of a material change to the NBN uptake rates, the committee agrees that the statutory review could consider expanding the levy base to include mobile services.[74]

The Committee additionally noted support for inclusion of enterprise networks in the RBS charge base, and the use of premise rather than services-in-operation as the charge base definition.

Labor Senators’ additional comments

Labor Senators in their additional comments went further than the Committee view in several respects. Labor Senators noted the submissions of various telecommunications industry members that the RBS charge ‘reduces incentives for the private sector to invest and has an anti-competitive intent’.[75] Labor Senators noted particular concern over RBS funding transparency, stating that contrary to the claims in the Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill:

... there is seemingly no mechanism that requires the surplus revenue from the Government's $800 million annual broadband tax to be spent on regional networks. In practice, there remain legitimate concerns that once the tax revenues flow into NBN Co the company management can effectively direct surplus tax revenue towards anything they wish once it is washed through an offset account, regardless of whether the expenditure relates to a regional outcome or not.[76]

Labor Senators did however indicate support for the TLACC Bill more broadly and the Statutory Infrastructure Provider regime. While raising concerns with the structure of the RBS, they noted ‘their support for a price signal to deter opportunistic cherry picking of the residential NBN fixed-line network’.[77] Labor Senators made three additional recommendations in relation to the Bills:

  • that the Bill be amended to require the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) to redo modelling of RBS costings within 60 days of the Bill receiving assent
  • that the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) exercise forbearance towards carriers who are unable to implement the broadband tax in their systems by the required date, and if necessary, the Government consider delaying the commencement date of the levy and
  • the Government begin work on developing a roadmap for how the USO and RBS can be consolidated and harmonised over time.[78]
Australian Greens’ dissenting report

The Australian Greens issued a dissenting report as they did to the inquiry into the 2018 Bills—this dissenting report was extremely brief. The Greens’ Senators noted in-principle support for the intent of the Bills, supporting ‘technological equity’ and considered ‘the most equitable and sustainable funding model for the RBS is direct Budget funding’.[79]

Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills

Both the current and 2018 Bills have been considered by the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills.[80]

In 2017, the Scrutiny of Bills Committee highlighted concerns with the non-standard disallowance procedures included in the 2018 Bills; amendments were made to the 2018 Bills as recommended by the Senate Environment and Communications Legislation Committee’s 2017 inquiry into the Bills.[81] Those amendments are also incorporated into the current Bills.[82]

While the Scrutiny of Bills Committee’s comments on the current Bills welcomed the modifications to the disallowance procedures, it has noted concern with the extent to which delegated legislation could be used to:

  • alter the tax base—by excluding certain carriage services from the definition of ‘designated broadband service’ and
  • vary the rate of taxation—by changing the size of the charge under subclauses 12(4) and 16(8) of the Charge Bill.

In this respect, the Committee states:

One of the most fundamental functions of the Parliament is to levy taxation. The committee's consistent scrutiny view is that it is for the Parliament, rather than makers of delegated legislation, to set a rate of tax.[83]

The Committee draws its scrutiny concerns to the attention of Senators and leaves to the Senate as a whole to determine the appropriateness of allowing the Minister to alter the rate of a tax via delegated legislation.[84]

Joint Standing Committee on the National Broadband Network

While not considering the Bills directly, the Joint Standing Committee on the National Broadband Network has a current ongoing Inquiry into the Business Case for the NBN and the Experiences of Small Business, which necessarily considers matters related to the Bills.[85]

Policy position of non-government parties/independents

Labor

Labor has indicated support for the TLACC Bill and the Statutory Infrastructure Provider regime; however, in their additional comments to the 2019 Committee Report, Labor Senators expressed concern with aspects of the Bill and have suggested amendments—this is discussed above under the heading ‘Labor Senators’ additional comments’.

The Greens

The Greens do not support the Bills in their current form; their reasons are outlined above under the heading ‘Senate Environment and Communications Legislation Committee’.

Dr Helen Haines

Dr Helen Haines, independent Member for Indi, spoke to the current Bills in the second reading debate. While describing the RBS scheme as an ‘improvement on the current system’, Dr Haines noted concern the charge may result in increased prices for consumers as it is at the discretion of the service providers to decide whether to pass the cost on. Dr Haines clarified her support for the SIP obligations.[86]

Centre Alliance

Centre Alliance does not appear to have made any public statements on the Bills. Some indication of Centre Alliance’s concerns with the Bills is provided by Ms Sharkie's Question in Writing to the Minister on 19 September 2019.[87]The question included queries about the potential for a funding shortfall in ensuring that SIP obligations are met.

Other parties and Independents

At the time of writing, Bob Katter, Andrew Wilkie, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, and the Jacqui Lambie Network do not appear to have expressed a public view on these Bills in either their current or previous form.

Position of major interest groups

Table 1 summarises the position of interest and industry groups that made submissions to either the 2017 or the 2019 Committee Inquiries on the Bills.

Table 1: the position of interest and industry groups that made submissions
Interest Group RBS (Schedule 4) SIP (Schedule 3) Network Rules (Schedules 1 and 2)
Telecommunications Industry
Optus (2017 & 2019) Partially supports (extension to enterprise and government networks undesirable)  Supports Partially Supports (opposes removal of small business networks from Part 8)
Telstra (2017 & 2019) Partially supports (does not support the extension to enterprise networks)[88] Partially Supports (technicalities surrounding NBN Co’s interim SIP obligations) Opposes (unnecessary, elimination of the 1km rule, regards the removal of small businesses from Part 8 as ‘unworkable’)
TPG Telecom Limited (2017 & 2019) Opposes (entirely—considers NBN Co’s shortfall should be funded out of consolidated revenue) No comment Partially Supports (opposes elimination of 1km rule)
Vocus Group Limited (2017 & 2019) Opposes (entirely) Supports Supports
Superloop Limited (2017) Opposes (entirely) No comment Supports (concerns regarding residential definitions)
OptiComm Co Pty Ltd (2017 & 2019) Opposes (entirely) No comment No comment
NBN Co (2017 & 2019) Supports Supports Supports
Vodafone Hutchison Australia (2017 & 2019) Opposes (entirely) Supports Supports
Commpete (2019) Partially supports (too narrow tax base, exclusion of mobile broadband suboptimal) Supports Supports
Other Industry
Cotton Australia (2017) Supports Supports No comment
National Farmers Federation (2017) Supports Supports No comment
NSW Farmers  (2019) Supports Supports No comment
Government
Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (2017 & 2019) No comment Supports No comment
Community
Regional, Rural and Remote Communications Coalition (2017 & 2019) Supports Supports No comment
Australian Communication Consumer Action Network (2017 & 2019) Supports Supports No comment
Australian Isolated Children’s Parents Association (2019) Supports Supports No comment
Internet Australia (2019) Opposes Partially opposes (Merge with USO/PUSP, rigidity of technology options) No comment
Country Women’s Association of Australia (2019) Supports Supports No comment
Individual
Professor Mark Gregory (2017) Opposes (entirely) Opposes (unsatisfactory speeds) Opposes (business/small Business/ residential distinctions impractical, definitional issues)

Position of the telecommunications industry

Regional Broadband Scheme

The telecommunication industry split substantially in its support of the RBS, largely between the current operators of 5G mobile networks (Telstra and Optus) and the rest of the industry, particularly fixed-line NBN competitors (TPG, OptiComm and others).

While no industry member outside NBN Co unequivocally supports the current particulars of the proposed RBS, Optus and Telstra largely limited their concerns to the potential extension of RBS charges to enterprise networks.[89]

Both Telstra and Optus (the two operators of Australia’s existing 5G networks) have stated that they view 5G as a complementary rather than substitutable service to the NBN, and oppose inclusion of non-fixed services in the levy base.[90] However, as discussed below under the heading ‘Key issue: exclusion of non-fixed connections from the charge’, the rollout of 5G technology has reignited the substitutability debate.

Telstra also included substantial concerns with the definition of ‘local access line’ and ‘premise’ in both its 2017 and 2019 submissions for the purposes of the RBS,[91] which the Committee inquiries considered in detail.[92]

Vocus, OptiComm, TPG Telecom, Vodafone Hutchinson Australia conversely all oppose the RBS entirely.[93] Opposition to the RBS is twofold:

  • arguments that the RBS as a ‘narrow-based tax’ is poor policy and that it would be better funded from the budget or consolidated with the USO/TIL scheme and
  • the exclusion of 5G mobile networks and other technologies from the charge will give certain industry players (namely Optus and Telstra) a substantial competitive advantage over NBN Co and other fixed-line network operators. This in turn would lead to falling revenues as consumers shifted away from fixed line connections.

Submissions to the 2019 Committee Inquiry additionally focused on the dated information on which the Bills rely, including the accuracy of the 2015 BCR calculations of RBS costings in the current market,[94] concerns which were a common theme of the Committee’s 30 January 2020 hearing, and raised by Labor Senators in their additional comments.[95]

The above concerns are discussed throughout the digest under the heading are ‘The Regional Broadband Scheme’.

Statutory Infrastructure Provider regime

The telecommunications industry was generally supportive of the principle of the SIP regime, with only Telstra raising any concerns with the scheme in its 2017 and 2019 submissions.

In 2017, Telstra expressed concern that potential gaps in the SIP framework prior to the designated day could lead to Telstra being obligated to service some premises under the USO until that time.[96] Telstra additionally expressed concerns that the Minister’s ability to designate carriers other than the NBN as SIPs was too broad, and that all SIPs should be required to operate through a single wholesale interface.[97]

In 2019, Telstra extended its concerns to include the potential that mobile network infrastructure installation could give rise to nominated SIP requirements, discussed in more detail in ‘Key Issue: nominated service area requirements unclear.[98]

Network Rules amendments

Industry support for the repeal of Part 7 and amendments to Part 8 of the Telecommunications Act were mixed, with key concerns in the 2017 inquiry process including:

  • the removal of the ‘1km exception’ under subsection 156(4) of the Telecommunications Act (Telstra and TPG) and
  • the removal of small business networks from regulation under Part 8, and potential distortionary or definitional issues that may arise (Optus, Vocus, Superloop).[99]

These issues are discussed in further detail under the headings ‘Key issue: removal of the 1km exemption and ‘Key issue: removal of networks servicing small businesses’.

Industry stakeholders tended to focus less on these issues in their 2019 submissions.

Position of the ACCC and PC

The ACCC in the Communications Sector Market Study (2018) took the view that ‘that direct budget funding of regional and remote communications services is preferable’.[100]

The Productivity Commission in the Telecommunications Universal Service Obligation report (2017) also raised concerns with the RBS:

... alternative funding arrangements — such as through general government revenue and/or a broad-based industry levy — should be looked at more closely before implementing a long-term narrow-based funding model in a dynamic industry.[101]

On the RBS the Productivity Commission additionally noted that ‘industry would derive greater certainty if the levy design issues are resolved before implementing the proposed Regional Broadband Scheme’ and that ‘the risk of policy inertia is high once a policy is implemented.’[102]

The Productivity Commission also noted that although the proposed SIP regime ‘would assist in providing greater confidence to the community about nbn’s role’, there was ‘uncertainty and contention’ concerning the role of SIPs in providing voice services. The Productivity Commission recommended that legislation be amended to require SIPs to provide both broadband and voice services.[103]

Position of other groups

The vast majority of other groups were wholly supportive of both the RBS and the SIP scheme. ACCAN argued that ‘the reform package should be passed with the utmost priority’.[104] The National Farmer’s Federation in 2017 highlighted the ‘long term economic benefit to the country - even from agricultural productivity alone’ from investment in otherwise uncommercial telecommunications infrastructure—for example, through the RBS.[105]

Many of these submissions are extremely brief and express more in-principle support for the policy objectives of the SIP scheme in particular, and the RBS as a source of funding in order to sustain it. Unlike industry submissions or the Productivity Commission or ACCC, they do not generally consider the technical aspects of the Bills.

The exception to this include Internet Australia, which seconded telecommunications industry concerns with the administration of the RBS, and recommended that the RBS and SIP schemes should be merged with the existing USO/TIL scheme.[106] Internet Australia also expressed concerns that the restriction of RBS payments to fixed-wireless and satellite connections only could distort the market and protect those technologies from competition with newer connection types.[107]

Professor Mark Gregory of RMIT is the only individual or academic to have made a submission to either inquiry, and was critical of the structure of the RBS as ‘anti-competitive’ while describing the SIP as inadequate to modern bandwidth requirements.[108]

Financial implications

The Regional Broadband Scheme is envisioned to be budget neutral, funded out of the regional broadband scheme charge, which includes an administrative cost component (initially one cent for each chargeable premises, per month) to fund the costs of administering the scheme.[109]

The Charge Bill Financial Impact Statement notes that while there is ‘a small initial impact on the Budget to fund the ACMA and ACCC’s initial set up costs’, this cost will be reimbursed to the Consolidated Revenue Fund and future administrative costs funded out of the scheme.[110]

The Charge Bill Financial Impact Statement also includes 2019–20 Budget figures estimating the impact on underlying cash over the forward estimates (table 2), however, this is dependent on the scheme commencing on 1 July 2020 with collections and payments occurring in 2020–21:

Table 2: 2019–20 Budget figures estimating the impact on underlying cash over the forward estimates
  Impact on underlying cash ($ millions)
  2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23 Total
Expenditure 0.0 -28.002 -29.559 -32.540 -90.101
Revenue 0.0 29.218 29.734 32.540 91.492
Total 0.0 1.216 0.175 0.000 1.391

Source: Explanatory Memorandum, Telecommunications (Regional Broadband Scheme) Charge Bill 2019, p. 5.

The TLACC Bill financial impact statement provides:

The proposals in the Bills will require a small increase in resourcing for the ACMA and the ACCC. Separation and SIP measures are expected to be funded from within those agencies’ existing budgets. Their activities in relation to the Regional Broadband Scheme are funded through the receipts from the Scheme.[111]

More recently some stakeholders have questioned if the RBS will sufficiently cover the costs of the NBN meeting its SIP obligations, such as Rebekha Sharkie in a Question to the Minister of Communications on 19 September 2019.[112] In his answer, the Minister reiterated that SIP obligations were effectively funded by the RBS, and appeared to imply that any costs not covered by the RBS would simply become subject to another cross-subsidy.[113] As the Bills are currently drafted, there does not appear to be a government guarantee to cover any net losses that NBN Co or other providers may incur in meeting their SIP obligations if RBS payments are insufficient, such losses will need to be funded internal to the SIP.

As discussed below under ‘Key issue: exclusion of non-fixed connections from the charge’, there is a possibility that competition from wireless broadband internet connections may reduce the number of chargeable premises, which may in turn, have implications for the tax base of the RBS. Given that the current maximum $7.10 charge is below the amount modelled by the BCR as sufficient to meet the costs of the scheme, there is also the possibility that the RBS scheme will be insufficient even if this does not happen.[114]

Conversely, technological shifts may reduce the cost of meeting the SIP obligations either through reduction of the cost of providing existing services (such as NBN Co’s fixed wireless service), or new technologies such as LEOSB. In this circumstance, the Minister could lower the rate of the RBS charge or refund excess monies to levy paying carriers.[115] However, the ACCC is only currently obligated to review the RBS charge amount every five years.

There is concern about the level of transparency should the RBS result in NBN Co receiving funds surplus to its needs (this is discussed under the heading ‘Key issue: funding transparency concerns’).

Special appropriation

Proposed section 89 of the TCPSS Act (at item 13 of Schedule 4 to TLACC Bill) establishes the RBS Special Account for the purposes of section 80 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act).[116] The special account:

  • will receive credits equal to the amount of RBS charge received by the Government and
  • may be debited for the purposes of making payments to eligible funding recipients for the provision of fixed wireless or satellite service, and to reimburse ACMA and the ACCC for costs incurred in administering the RBS scheme.[117]

The Special Account is discussed in greater detail under the heading ‘the RBS Special Account’.

Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights

As required under Part 3 of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth), the Government has assessed the Bills’ compatibility with the human rights and freedoms recognised or declared in the international instruments listed in section 3 of that Act. The Government considers that the Bills are compatible.[118]

Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights

The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights had no comment on the Bills on the basis that the bills do not engage, or only marginally engage, human rights; promote human rights; and/or permissibly limit human rights.[119]

The Regional Broadband Scheme

Purpose of the RBS

Together, the Charge Bill and Schedule 4 of the TLACC Bill propose to establish the RBS. The RBS charge is a tax on fixed-line broadband which will be used to fund non-commercial fixed wireless and satellite broadband for regional areas. The cost of providing this service is currently met internally by NBN Co using proceeds from its fixed-line networks. This internal cross-subsidy is regarded as unsustainable, such that ‘ongoing funding for essential regional broadband services is at risk’.[121] 

Key issue: is this the best funding model?

Direct budget finding

The Vertigan Panel, Productivity Commission and the ACCC prefer general budget funding over a narrow industry levy for the RBS. The 2014 Vertigan Review stated:

By far the best option for funding any ongoing subsidy would be through consolidated revenue. Among other advantages, that would allow Parliament and the public to assess in an ongoing way the benefits of using taxpayer funds for this purpose rather than others.[122]

In its 2017 Inquiry, the Productivity Commission recommended, as a general principle, that the USO and similar obligations should be funded out of general revenue. In relation to the proposed RBS, it considered:

...that, in line with the principles-based approach to funding outlined in this chapter, the choice of funding model should prioritise minimising distortions in the telecommunications market and be flexible, simple and transparent. In this context, alternative funding arrangements — such as through general government revenue and/or a broad-based industry levy — should be looked at more closely before implementing a long-term narrow-based funding model in a dynamic industry.[123]

In the ACCC’s 2018 Communications Sector Market Study it stated its position: ‘[o]ur view is that direct budget funding of regional and remote communications services is preferable.’[124] The Greens Senators noted in their dissenting report on the 2018 Bills that ‘[a] preferable option would be for the non-commercial services to be funded from the general budget’.[125] The lack of support for the proposed narrowly targeted tax has also been expressed by various industry groups in submissions to both the 2017 and 2019 Committee inquiries into the Bills, including by TPG and Opticomm in the 2017 submissions and Vodafone in its 2019 submissions.[126]

Broad based tax

Failing general budget funding, TPG, OptiComm and other Industry members have recommended a broader, USO/TIL levy over the proposed RBS levy:

TPG submits that, if the objective is to create a “good tax” that effectively funds the non-economic areas of the NBN, this committee needs to find a way to pass a law that more closely aligns with the Vertigan recommendations. A USO type of levy is that way.[127]

TPG additionally noted in its 2017 submission that of the four recent reviews that considered how to fund non-commercial telecommunication services, only the BCR’s 2015 consultation into NBN non-commercial service funding options, recommended a narrowly targeted industry levy—in that case, the terms of reference ‘did not allow it to consider contributions from general tax revenue’.[128]

The Explanatory Memorandum considered both of these options before noting that ‘the 2014 RIS concluded that direct Budget funding was not feasible because of the large negative impact on the budget’.[129] While conceding that the budget option is better able to optimise the use of resources to achieve and properly match consumer demands, it makes arguments that the narrow industry levy is better able to spawn innovation and result in lower production costs.[130]

These arguments are upheld by assumptions that demand for fixed line services are inelastic[131] which is likely to be challenged with increased competition from mobile and fixed wireless services.[132] The Explanatory Memorandum to the Charge Bill advanced more novel arguments against direct budget funding, including that retail service providers would not compete against each other and in doing so, would not pass along lower costs to consumers: ‘...consumers might not benefit because retail service providers could take these lower wholesale prices as extra profit margin’.[133]

Effect on low-income households

The 2019 Roy Morgan Australian Digital Inclusion Index Report noted that ‘[a]ffordability remains a key challenge’ to increasing Australia’s digital inclusion.[134] In 2017, only 67.4 per cent of Australians in the bottom income quintile had internet access at home, compared to a national average of 86.1 per cent.[135]

As the RBS charge is applied to all fixed-line broadband internet connections regardless of the data plan, it will represent a larger percentage of the total cost of providing broadband to those on budget plans (smaller, lower income households) than for those on premium plans.

The exact impact the RBS charge will have on the consumer is unclear. OptiComm did note that while they would absorb some of the costs of the charge, they would need to raise their wholesale prices in response to the charge, which would likely lead to higher consumer prices.[136] OptiComm also noted that as a service provider for new greenfield developments consisting of predominantly first home buyers, these price hikes would likely impact financially stressed households.[137]

It appears from NBN Co’s submission to the ACCC NBN Access Pricing Inquiry that its current internal cross-subsidy is applied uniformly and directly to each individual connection, consistent with the proposed RBS.[138] 

The impact on the affordability of fixed-line broadband and the potential financial stress low-income earners might face has largely not been considered in existing submissions on the Bill or in reports, but was raised by Senators in the second reading debate of the 2018 Bills and in public hearing during the 2019 Senate inquiry.[139]

Key issue: reliance on outdated information

The policy rationale for the RBS is based on research and reviews conducted between 2013 and 2015, primarily the 2014 Vertigan Panel, the 2015 ACCC Superfast Broadband Access Service Declaration inquiry, and the 2015 BCR consultation. The RIS presented with Charge Bill is almost identical to the one introduced with the 2018 Bill, which itself was extremely similar to the RIS published as an exposure draft in December 2016. The only amendments between the previous and current RIS has been the insertion of paragraphs concerning the incorporation of Opposition amendments. In particular, the comparison of various mobile and fixed line broadband plans and accompanying graphs in the RIS are more than three years old and do not appear to reflect current market reality.[140]

Various stakeholders raised this as an issue, for example, Opticomm described the Explanatory Memorandum to the Charge Bill as ‘obsolete and incorrect’.[141] In particular Opticomm expressed concern that the Explanatory Memorandum still relied on 2017 market data, which does not reflect the market developments in mobile broadband that have occurred since:

Given the obvious relevance of this point to the Government’s basis for a narrowly targeted tax and the distortionary effect the tax will have on competition in telecommunications markets, it is extremely concerning that this data was not updated when drafting the 2019 Bill.[142]

Currently technologies and services are emerging which were not contemplated in the 2014 Vertigan Review because they simply did not exist at the time—for example 5G Mobile Networks and Low Earth Orbit Satellite Broadband. Telecommunications is a fast evolving field where advances in technology and changes in consumer behaviour have the potential to rapidly render any prediction of the future state of the industry incorrect.

These limitations of the Vertigan Review and other supporting research that underlines the policy rationale of the Bills will further compound over the projected service life of the RBS.[143] This is discussed below under the heading ‘Key issue: exclusion of non-fixed connections from the charge’.

Key Issue: Emergence of Low Earth Orbit Satellite Broadband (LEOSB)

The RBS exists to subsidise internet service in rural, regional or remote areas of Australia where internet service would otherwise not be commercially viable or affordable for consumers.

Underlying the rationale for this scheme is the assumption that internet service to these areas will remain non-commercial until at least 2040, and that rural and regional Australians will continue to need subsidies in order to access the internet at affordable prices.

Challenging this assumption is the development of LEOSB networks, particularly SpaceX’s Starlink,[144] OneWeb,[145] both of which are currently being deployed. Amazon has made substantial investments in developing its own LEOSB network[146] and Facebook is also reportedly developing a network.[147]

This large degree of private investment is made on the belief that LEOSB networks will be commercial to offer, competing not just for services to remote communities, but also with fixed-line connections in urban and suburban areas.

SpaceX’s Starlink system is expected to be the first operational, with first consumer offerings in high latitudes,[153] expected by August 2020, with global access expected from 2021.[154] SpaceX has begun the process of securing regulatory approval to operate in Australia, being included in the Foreign Space Objects Determination on 24 January 2020,[155] the first step to securing a space apparatus license and other licenses needed to operate the network in Australia.[156]

What this means for the NBN

NBN Co’s Skymuster I & II Satellites are themselves modern conventional systems, being launched in late 2015-2016 and representing a substantial improvement in speeds over earlier satellite connections available.[157] However, Skymuster only has a total bandwidth capacity of 185 gbps[158] split over some 443,154  premises ready for service and 95,480 active premises as of June 2019)[159], with consumer side speeds of around 25 mbps maximum low data caps.[160] It is extremely uncommercial for the NBN to operate the Skymuster satellite service.[161]

This offering is likely to be virtually obsolete as soon as Starlink or any other competing LEOSB becomes available in Australia. It is possible that a large portion of NBN’s 4G based fixed wireless service will also become obsolete, and potentially there could be a high risk of substitution from FTTN to LEOSB connections.[162]

SpaceX’s system has already demonstrated transmission speeds of 610mbps in trials.[163] The exact bandwidth capacity of the Starlink system remains unpublished, although comments by Elon Musk indicate a per satellite capacity of between 20 to 100 gbps per satellite, giving the system a current global capacity in the tens of terabytes per second.[164] Put another way, at the current pace of launches, SpaceX is adding a Skymuster system equivalent amount of bandwidth capacity at least every five days on average, and has been since January 2020.[165]

More importantly, as satellites over regional and rural areas are only serving a very low number of customers (as opposed to when those same satellites are on station above urban centres), this may lead to extremely large amounts of bandwidth becoming available split over very few customers, delivered at very high (1gbps+) speeds.[166]

At what price point these services will be offered remains unclear. However, SpaceX intends to offer at prices comparable to FTTP connections in the United States while offering superior performance, leading some to estimate a $80 USD a month price point in the U.S. market.[167] A comparable Australian price point then would see an unsubsidised Starlink connection costing the consumer a similar amount that each satellite or fixed wireless connection costs the NBN in losses ($110 and $105 AUD per month respectively in 2018[168]).

If this is the case, LEOSB presents obvious problems to the policy rationale of the RBS, as it may allow for commercial services to regional and rural areas, or greatly reduce the necessary subsidy.

Government Response

 A number of reports have drawn the Government’s attention to the potential risks the LEOSB networks present to the policy rationale of the RSB. The BCAR Final Report in 2016 noted that ‘LEO Systems could emerge as a possible, cheaper alternative for providing satellite service compared to nbn’,[169] while the Productivity Commission noted their development in 2017,[170] and the 2018 Regional Telecommunications Review Report noted that ‘Low Earth Orbit satellites have the potential to address some of the issues with the current technology’.[171]

In the 30 January 2020 Senate Inquiry hearing into the Bills, NBN Co confirmed that it was ‘very interested’ in buying capacity on these networks to replace the Skymuster service in around 2025 if they ‘offer better, faster, cheaper service for the bush’.[172]

There may however still be an overlap of some years (potentially up to 2030, when the Skymuster satellites are expected to reach the end of their service life), when technically inferior, highly subsidised commercial services are directly competing with superior, high speed, commercial LEOSB services.

This may create the perverse scenario where Australian fixed-line internet customers would be paying 800 million dollars annually in RBS charges with the practical effect of slowing the transition from NBN to LEOSB services due to RBS subsidies of NBN services. This may be particularly problematic if NBN’s funding under the RBS is a long term, inflexible contract in a similar manner to the TUSOPA contract with Telstra for the provision of standard telephone services under the universal service obligation.[173]

There are also potential issues with the SIP scheme arising from LEOSB providers, see Key Issue: SIP LEOSB issues.

Who is liable to pay the charge?

Each carrier is liable to pay the RBS charge based on the number of ‘chargeable premises associated with a local access line’ they serve on a monthly basis. This definition is ‘central to establishing the charge base of the new tax’[174] as it links the assessment provisions in proposed Division 4 of Part 3 of the TCPSS Act with the relevant charge provisions in the Charge Bill.[175]

What are chargeable premises associated with a local access line?

Premises are chargeable premises associated with a local access line of a person, if, for the month:

  • the person is a carrier
  • the premises are potentially chargeable premises and
  • the premises are not exempt premises.[176]

The terms ‘potentially chargeable premises’ and ‘exempt premises’ are defined under proposed sections 94 and 95 of the TCPSS Act ,at item 13 of Schedule 4 to the TLACC Bill.

If a potentially chargeable premise does not fall within a range of exceptions, then the premise is a ‘chargeable premise associated with a local access line’ and the carrier needs to pay the RBS charge on it for that month.

Potentially chargeable premise

In summary, a ‘potentially chargeable premise’ is one that is:

  • connected by a fixed-line telecommunications network (‘local access line’) that the carrier owns or is the nominated carrier for, which is not an exempt line and
  • being supplied with an active connection by a carriage service provider (who may be the person) for the whole or part of that month which is a designated broadband service–broadly, a connection technically capable of speeds that are normally over 25 megabits per second.[179]

The Minister may, by legislative instrument, exclude classes of carriage services from the definition of ‘designated broadband services’—such premises would not be subject to the charge.[180]

Types of premises exempt from the charge

Small networks: if the carrier operates less than 2,000 premises for whole or part of the month, for example a smaller carrier, then all those premises are exempt premises.[181] As soon as a carrier’s network expands to 2,001 potentially chargeable premises, they become liable to pay the charge for all of them—at current levy rates, an annual charge of $170,485. This has an obvious market distortionary effect by providing incentives for such small network carriers to remain below the exemption limit.

Exempt lines: infrastructure purchased by the NBN from Telstra and Optus under their respective Definitive Agreements are exempt lines for the purpose of the charge.[182] The Minister has the power to, by legislative instrument:

  • specify other agreements the exemption applies to[183] and
  • remove any exemption that Telstra or Optus may be entitled to under an agreement.[184]

Telstra has submitted concerns over the differences in the Optus and Telstra subsections of this section.[185]

Five year concession period

Carriers will be entitled to reduce the number of chargeable premises that are subject to the RBS each month for the first five financial years from the commencement of the scheme; there is a concession for existing premises and one for greenfield premises: 

  • for carriers only serving non-greenfield premises, the first 25,000 residential and small business premises that a carrier supplies are exempt from the RBS and
  • for carriers serving greenfield premises, the first 55,000 ‘recently connected greenfield premises’ are exempt from the RBS—broadly, these are premises connected by a non-NBN provider between 1 January 2011 and 30 June 2019,[186] or premises covered by an adequately served ministerial declaration.[187]

These apply only to ‘potentially concessional premises’, which are chargeable small business or residential premises.[188]

Key issue: non-greenfield concession limited by greenfield concession

Importantly, the non-greenfield premises exemption provided by proposed subsection 20(1) of the Charge Bill is not accessible by carriers that have any recently connected greenfield premises. This may result in some small carriers that operate both greenfield and non-greenfield potentially concessional premises having a substantially higher total charge amount than comparable carriers that operate solely one or the other.

For example If a carrier serves 15,000 non-greenfield residential and small business premises, and 5,000 recently connected greenfield premises, then it can only access an exemption for its 5,000 recently connected greenfield premises, rather than opting for the non-greenfield exemption for its 15,000 other premises.[189]

The Explanatory Memorandum to the Charge Bill appears to indicate that this is intentional, although it does not explain why.[190]

Key issue: difficulty identifying the basis of the charge

In 2017, Telstra submitted detailed concerns over the definition of key terms, particularly the use of the ‘chargeable premises associated with a local access line’ as the basis for calculating the tax because of the administrative burden it would impose. Telstra recommended that Services in Operation (SIOs) would be a suitable alternative basis:

An alternative calculation model, which Telstra considers could be implemented with far greater certainty and accuracy, is one which is based on the carrier’s active superfast broadband Services in Operation (SIOs) delivered to end users over an underlying local access line that is owned or controlled by the carrier. Rather than count premises, the carrier would count network services. The key benefit of this SIO model is that a carrier’s existing network record databases are likely to already identify SIOs and the speed of those services (e.g. for billing purposes).[191]

Telstra’s 2019 Submission echoed the concern over the definition of ‘premise’, although the focus of that submission was instead to remove enterprise premises from the definition, rather than moving to an SIO definition.[192] However, Telstra continues to have ongoing concerns with identifying the kind of premises the RBS will apply to.[193]

Notably, the 2016 BCR report recommended a version of the RBS Levy that used SIOs: ‘[t]he BCR considers an NBN equivalent approach should be calculated according to the number of high-speed fixed-line SIOs.’[194] This issue was addressed by the 2017 Committee Inquiry, where Departmental officials considered interpretational issues could also result from the use of SIOs as the basis of the charge:

In the consultation process on the exposure drafts—the bills—carriers that were servicing the business market raised concerns about how certain the use of services in operation would be, and they identified that for large business customers it can be interpreted in a range of different ways. For example, a large corporate such as the Commonwealth Bank might have lines that service a particular branch, it might have lines that service its ATM network and it might have lines that service different components of its communications services. And there'd be uncertainty about whether all of those lines would be calculated or only some of them. In response to that the department developed the proposal around a premises based charge.[195]

The Department considered that this approach did not entail any material trade-offs.[196] However, as corporate and enterprise entities may exist on a single premise, but have multiple SIOs, but most residential consumers will have a single SIO on a single premise, this change likely did shift a greater portion of the tax burden on residential consumers and networks over enterprise and corporate ones. The Department continues to view the 2016 BCR modelling as appropriate.[197]

The difficulty associated with the Department’s assertion that the use of premises rather than SIOs responds to industry feedback, is that this feedback does not appear to be publically available. It does not appear industry has made submissions in favour of premises over SIOs during the exposure draft consultation process or the 2017 and 2019 Committee inquiries.[198] Industry feedback may have been provided privately to the Department.

The 2017 Inquiry Report concluded that the Committee ‘supports the overall approach taken to drafting the RBS as outlined in the Bills’ and was of the view that ‘the counterpoints made by the department and NBN Co to industry arguments are more compelling’.[199] While concerns about the administrative burden of industry tracking the number of premises, particularly in the enterprise sector, resurfaced in submissions to the 2019 Committee Inquiry, the Committee considered the ‘current bills, like the 2017 bills, reflect industry feedback’.[200]

Key issue: exclusion of non-fixed connections from the charge

The Bills as currently drafted do not impose the RBS charge on non-fixed connections, such as mobile broadband, fixed wireless or satellite broadband connections. Only fixed line connections technically capable of download speeds above 25 mbps are subject to the charge.[201] This appears to be based on a view that:

  • non-fixed line services are not and will not in the short to medium term become a substitutable service to fixed-line broadband and
  • a narrow charge incentivises NBN to control its wireless and satellite broadband costs because those services would be funded mostly by the RBS applied to NBN Co fixed-lines.[202]

Key stakeholder concerns include the market distortionary effect which gives a competitive advantage to mobile and fixed wireless networks and the potential for consumers to transition to those technologies in the medium to long term—this would undermine the basis of the RBS.[203] In 2017, the Department noted that fixed-wireless NBN competitors had been excluded from the RBS as they make up a small portion of the market—one to two per cent.[204]

Is wireless substitutable for fixed-line broadband?

The Government has consistently stated the view that non-fixed line services are not substitutable for fixed-line services.[205] While this may have been the view when consultation on this issue began in 2014, this is not necessarily the view today—in 2018, the ACCC highlighted how this view has evolved:

When we originally commented on this proposal, we accepted the BCR’s view that only imposing the charge on NBN equivalent services (as opposed to introducing a broader industry levy) would better encourage NBN Co to contain costs to efficient levels because it would continue to bear most of the funding responsibility for the non-commercial services in question. Our comments were directed mainly at addressing the merits of the funding principles and proposals put forward as alternatives by the BCR, rather than articulating our own.

We accept that increased substitution towards fixed wireless and mobile broadband services raises questions about the funding base of this scheme. Attendees at the market study stakeholder forum in July 2017 also suggested the scheme could distort market outcomes in favour of service providers (such as those using fixed wireless and mobile networks) that the charge did not apply to. NBN Co’s CEO has even suggested that NBN Co may need further protection from wireless competitors to sustain its financial viability.

In its final consultation paper on NBN non-commercial services, the BCR acknowledged that the introduction of 5G technology may see an increase in the level of substitution. It therefore indicated that future consideration will be required on how funding arrangements adjust over time.

As the substitutability of wireless and mobile broadband services increases, the fact that the RBS is not applied to these services may indeed further help to underpin this substitution and distort market outcomes.[206]

The ACCC affirmed its view that direct budget funding for wireless and satellite services was the ‘least distortionary alternative’ as it would ‘not serve as a means of protecting the NBN from network competition’.[207] It is on this basis that the ACCC recommended that the RBS should not be extended to wireless services—the ACCC was not necessarily considering the merits of the RBS itself.[208]

Since the Bills were first released as exposure drafts in 2016, the underlying justification for excluding wireless services has remained part of the accompanying explanatory materials.[209] Notably, the RIS continues to rely on the view of the ACCC as it was in 2016.[210] According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Charge Bill, the Government considers this issue could be considered under one of the charge review mechanisms: ‘[i]n the event that mobile broadband services become substitutable for fixed-line services, the Government would consider changing the funding base’.[211] Subsequent studies and current market conditions do not appear to have been addressed in the rationale for the decision to exclude non-fixed connections from the RBS, including, for example, the 2017 Productivity Commission Report.[212]

The view that NBN Co should bear most costs of the levy itself

The Government considers that a narrow tax will ensure that NBN Co has strong incentives to control costs for the operation of its fixed wireless and satellite services because a high percentage of the RBS would come from NBN Co fixed-lines. The RIS for the Charge Bill states:

While the precise difference in net benefits between [the RBS, a narrow industry levy on fixed line networks] and the others are not able to be measured, both the BCAR and the ACCC noted that NBN Co would face greater incentives for cost efficiency if the costs for providing its fixed wireless and satellite networks were borne mainly by NBN Co itself. The BCAR also recommended a charge on fixed-line broadband providers on the basis that the benefits in productive and dynamic efficiency from ensuring that costs were mainly borne by NBN Co itself outweighed the lower allocative efficiency from a narrower charge.[213] [citations omitted and emphasis added]

This is based on the assumption that wireless is not substitutable for fixed-line broadband, and therefore NBN will retain a significant market share of overall broadband services—this view is contentious, particularly given the fact that the RBS is meant to be in place through to 2040.[214] In 2017, the Productivity Commission raised concerns with the distortionary effect of a narrow tax:

The Government has proposed that the Regional Broadband Scheme (at least initially) include only a narrow levy base... Both the BCR and the ACCC have argued for a narrow levy base as they considered that it would maintain incentives for nbn to contain costs and improves productive and dynamic efficiency. However, the Commission considers that, in line with the principles-based approach to funding outlined in this chapter, the choice of funding model should prioritise minimising distortions in the telecommunications market and be flexible, simple and transparent.[215] [citations omitted and emphasis added]

Industry position

The Telecommunication Industry has consistently been divided on the exclusion of non-fixed broadband connections from the RBS, between the operators of mobile phone networks (particularly the two 5G network operators Optus and Telstra) and the rest of the industry.

Both Optus and Telstra have maintained that their 5G offerings are not a threat to the NBN. For example Telstra submitted to the 2019 inquiry that ‘we have always stated that we do not believe that NBN or broadband and 5G substitute but that they naturally complement each other’, with Optus also affirming that ‘we also see the two networks as complementary’.[216] However, it was reported in 2019 that Optus CEO Allen Yew had proposed 5G as a ‘viable alternative’ to the NBN, and has reportedly described 5G as a cheaper and faster alternative to fixed-line NBN offerings.[217] This could, in part, be explained by the non-disparagement clauses in Optus’ and Telstra’s Definitive Agreements,[218] which require, in at least some areas, that they market their 5G services as non-substitutable with the NBN.[219]

Operators of NBN-comparable fixed-line networks but not mobile networks, who may be exposed to 5G competition, are generally critical of this position. TPG has consistently taken the opposing view to Telstra and Optus. In its submission to the 2019 Inquiry, TPG stated ‘[i]t is plain that these products compete with the NBN’.[220] Commpete, OptiComm Co, and Vocus Group all submitted similar concerns and advocated a technologically neutral tax base—for example, OptiComm stated ‘NBN bypass services that are already in existence will increase with the current rollout of 5G mobile networks’.[221]

NBN Co’s 2019 submission indicates broad support for the Bills but does not consider this issue.[222] However, in NBN Co’s 2016 submission on the exposure draft version of the bills, it expressed strong opposition to the exclusion of fixed wireless networks from the RBS charge base: ‘nbn strongly believes that fixed wireless network operators should be included in the levy. New entrants are building their business models around the assumption that fixed wireless networks do, and will, compete with nbn going forward’.[223] NBN Co additionally noted concern over 5G and recommended that legislative review mechanisms be introduced.[224]

The challenge of 5G mobile to NBN’s FTTN business model

There appears to be a substantial risk of substitution from NBN FTTN connections to 5G mobile connections in the medium term, which will in turn have a considerable impact on the funding base of the RBS as such wireless connections are not included in the charge base.

5G networks are a massive improvement on 4G mobile networks in terms of speed, capacity, and cost of data per gb. 5G Networks are technically capable of speeds of up to 20 gbps or 20,000 mbps,[225] two hundred times faster than the upper limit of 4G and of the NBN FTTN offering, a factor noted as a cause for likely shift in substitutability by the ACCC in 2018.[226] Telstra achieved three gbps in trials in 2018.[227]

Both Optus and Telstra are currently rolling out 5G mobile networks in Australia. Optus is currently offering a 5G home broadband plan for $70 AUD per month, offering unlimited data and a guarantee of 50mbps during evening peak loads, although Optus also claimed in November 2019 that this service was averaging evening peak speeds of 164mbps and top speeds of over 400mbps.[228] These speeds may increase further as the network matures towards the protocol’s maximum speed of 10gbps. By comparison, the current median retail price of a NBN 50mbps peak period connection in 2018-2019 was $89 per month.[229]

Although 5G was available to only around 140,000 residential premises in November 2019,[230] this figure is expected to rapidly increase as the network is rolled out. Sky News has described it as an ‘NBN Killer’;[231] WhistleOut has noted that the Optus 5G home broadband offering ‘seems directly pitched as an NBN alternative’; [232] and the Australian Financial Review described it as ‘a seriously competitive proposition’.[233] Ry Crozier noted in January 2019 that:

The advertised characteristics of the Optus service are likely to be a concern for NBN Co as well as for regulators and the government, who have consistently dismissed mobile broadband as being substitutable for fixed line services.[234]

If a consumer has access to a 5G mobile broadband offering comparable to Optus’s, then it is arguable that there are not many clear circumstances in which a NBN fixed-line connection is preferable, other than in the case of FTTP.

NBN has a mixed ability to respond to 5G wireless competition, and crucially may have no options to upgrade FTTN speeds and capacity without an overhaul of the physical infrastructure. FTTP connections are already technically capable of speeds of 10gbps, and gigabit connections have been offered internationally over FTTP connections,[235] but FTTP only makes up 21.5% of NBN’s connections.[236] While NBN Co has been developing other technology such as ‘g.fast’ to increase speeds over connections, which rely, in part, on copper (FTTC & FTTB), this technology only offers substantial improvement over short copper loops, and the average copper loop length for NBN FTTN connections is 450 metres.[237] Around 42.5 of NBN’s services are FTTN connections, or 2.8 million homes.[238]

On this basis, it would appear that there is a real risk of substitution resulting in NBN FTTN customers switching to 5G connections as those networks roll-out across suburban Australia—the exclusion of such services from the RBS will mean less revenue to subsidise regional broadband.  These are the risks which the BCR identified when it recommended future re-examination of the legislation when 5G network services started in Australia.[239]  The ACCC further explored this risk in 2017 when it modelled four scenarios of 5G adoption.[240] The second, ‘wireless growth’[241] identified a risk of ‘significant technological substitution’ as ‘[c]ustomers move from the fixed line NBN networks to private sector wireless networks that are able to offer better value propositions’ and ‘5G fixed wireless slowly becomes the favoured option of broadband retailers to reduce their costs of delivering broadband to the home.’[242] Of the four options, this one was modelled as resulting in the lowest customer experience with the NBN.[243]

The concern of 5G substitutionally reducing the charge base of the RBS was raised in the Committee inquiry into the 2019 Bills. Departmental officials reiterated the position of the Government was that non-fixed line services were not substitutable with fixed line, but if this assumption changes ’it may raise this question about whether the levy base should be expanded to include mobile services’, and that the Department’s preference would be to expand the levy base rather than raise the charge amount.[244]

How much is the charge?

Clause 6 of the Charge Bill imposes the RBS charge on a carrier’s annual chargeable premises amount—this has two components:

  • an annual base amount ($7.09 per premises per month) and
  • an annual administrative cost amount ($0.01 per premises per month).[245]

How are the annual base amounts calculated?

The annual amounts are simply the sum of the number of chargeable premises associated with a local access line a carrier has, multiplied by the base component of $7.09 per premises and the administrative component of $0.01 per premises per month. These amounts are indexed to CPI and may be varied by the Minister by way of legislative instrument.[246]

Base component

Subclause 12(1) of the Charge Bill establishes the initial base component amount as:

  • $7.09 per month or
  • an amount determined by the Minister by legislative instrument under subclause 12(4).

The base component amount will be indexed annually to the Consumer Price Index (CPI).[247] However, the Minister may determine another amount as the base component from the second financial year onwards.[248]

The Minister must not make a determination on the base component unless the ACCC has given advice to the Minister under clause 13 of the Bill; in making such a determination the Minister must have regard to the most recent ACCC advice, along with any other matters the Minister considers relevant—see ‘Box 1: ACCC advice about the base and administrative cost components’.[249]

The Minister’s determination must not be ‘inconsistent with’ the combined base and administrative component cap of $7.10 per month—this cap is indexed to CPI.[250] The Explanatory Memorandum states the aim of a cap is to support ‘wholesale market competition by providing regulatory certainty for investors that the level of taxation under the new Act cannot exceed the specified amount’.[251]

Administrative cost component

Subclauses 16(1)-(5) of the Charge Bill set out the administrative cost component for each month in the first five financial years of the scheme—the amounts are as follows unless varied by the Minister by way of legislative instrument:

  • first financial year: $0.01
  • second financial year: $0.00172
  • third financial year: $0.00
  • fourth financial year: $0.0027 and
  • fifth financial year: $0.00.[252]

For the sixth and subsequent financial year, the administrative cost component for a month is:

  • the cost component for a month in the previous financial year indexed to CPI or
  • an amount determined by the Minister.[253]

The following explanation is provided in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Charge Bill as to the varying administrative cost component for each year:

The administrative cost component reflects the amount of funding necessary for the ACCC and ACMA to administer the Scheme. This is why the amount is highest in the first and second years, when the ACCC and ACMA are setting up their systems and operationalising their processes. There is an amount in the fourth year, when the ACCC is expected to review the base and administrative cost components. A nil amount occurs in the third and fifth year because the ACCC and ACMA do not expect to have any new additional direct costs in those years.[254]

In varying the administrative cost component the Minister must have regard to the most recent advice provided by the ACCC under clause 17 and any other matters considered relevant by the Minister—see ‘Box 1: ACCC advice about the base and administrative cost components’.[255] A determination varying the administrative cost component must not be ‘inconsistent with’ the combined component cap under subclause 17A.[256]

Parliamentary disallowance of Minister’s determination

The Minister’s determination of a monthly base component or administrative cost component is subject to Parliamentary disallowance. A copy of the determination must be tabled in each House of Parliament within six sitting days of being registered.[261] A notice of motion to disallow may then be brought within 15 sitting days of the date of its tabling. The instrument will then be disallowed if either:

  • within 15 sitting days of the notice, either House passes a resolution disallowing the instrument or
  • at the end of 15 sitting days after the giving of the notice, the motion has not been withdrawn or otherwise dealt with.[262]

Key issue: charge cap insufficient to fund RBS

The initial charge calculated in 2016 has not been updated for inflation through to 2020, and the adoption of Opposition amendments caps it at $7.10, which will be insufficient to meet BCR projected costs. The 2016 BCR Final Report calculated the amount of charge needed:

The BCR has calculated that each high-speed fixed-line SIO would contribute around $6.80 per month in FY2015 real terms. This is equivalent to around $7.30 per month in nominal terms in FY2018 (the first full financial year for which new funding arrangements could be calculated), and $8.00 per month nominal by FY2022, when the NBN is expected to be completed and operating in a relatively steady state of operations.[263]

The 2018 Bills had a combined component cap of $10 (indexed to CPI).[264] Adjusted for inflation, the $7.10 per month component cap is below the $6.80 FY2015 in real terms, that the BCR calculated as necessary to fund the scheme. In 2020 dollars, $6.80 in 2015 would be around $7.27 in 2019.[265] The BCAR expected the RBS to raise $825 million in 2021-22,[266] although this was on an expected charge of $7.82 monthly in 2021-2022 nominal terms. A charge of $7.82 monthly in 2021-2022 is no longer possible under the current legislative scheme, due to the combined component cap of $7.10 (adjusted for CPI) imposed by clause 17A of the Charge Bill.

The likely cap of the charge in 2021-2022 then is likely to be around $7.25 (assuming a CPI of two per cent). On the same estimate of the charge base (8.791 million SIOs/premises[267]), this yields an expected annual total amount of approximately $765 million as opposed to $825 million.  However, as the BCAR modelling did not include the impact of the transitional concessions contained in clause 20 of the Charge Bill (for greenfield and other premises) or the move to premises rather than SIOs as the charge base, the total collected may be lower still.

When considered with the possible reduction in the size of the tax base due to potential competition from mobile services and/or the development of low earth orbit satellite broadband, this may have impacts on the financial adequacy of the RBS (these issues are discussed above under the heading ‘Key issue: exclusion of non-fixed connections from the charge’.)

How is the charge assessed and collected?

Division 7 in proposed Part 3 of the TCPSS Act (at item 13 of Schedule 4 to the TLACC Bill) deals with the assessment, collection and recovery of the charge. This is a complex and technical section—a diagram of the expected administrative timeline of the assessment of the charge is contained in the RIS. In summary, the process is as follows:

  1. a carrier reports its chargeable premises for the previous financial year to ACMA before 31 October
  2. ACMA makes a written assessment which includes the amount of charge payable by the carrier by 30 November
  3. the assessment is provided to the carrier as soon as practicable after it is made and
  4. the charge is payable by the carrier by 31 December.[268]

Carrier reporting obligations

Carriers must report, in a form approved by ACMA, on the number of potentially chargeable premises for each month of the financial year to the ACMA annually—reports may be subject to verification by statutory declaration. It is a criminal offence with a maximum penalty of four years imprisonment to intentionally making a false statement in a statutory declaration.[269]

The report on the previous financial year is due by 31 October.[270]

It is an offence to omit to do an act which breaches a requirement under proposed subsection 100(1) of TCPSS Act, this would include failing to lodge a report.[271] This is a strict liability offence with a maximum penalty of 50 penalty units (currently $10,500).[272]  A person who contravenes proposed subsection 100(1) commits a separate offence each day that the omission continues.[273] That is, a person will commit a separate offence on each day until the required report is lodged with the ACMA.

Assessment

Subdivision B of Division 7 of proposed Part 3 of the TCPSS Act concerns the ACMA’s obligations and powers in making assessments of a carrier’s RBS charge liability for the year.

ACMA must make a written assessment, setting out, among other things, the charge payable by the carrier.[274] ACMA must make this assessment by 30 November or a later date set by determination and provide the assessment to the carrier and the Secretary as soon as practicable after it is made.[275]

ACMA may make an assessment notwithstanding that the carrier has failed to lodge a report.[276]

Collection and recovery of charge

Subdivision C of Division 7 of proposed Part 3 of the TCPSS Act concerns the collection of the charge. The charge becomes payable to the ACMA on 31 December following the financial year, or a later day if allowed by ACMA which must be before 28 February.[277] The charge is debt due to ACMA on behalf of the Commonwealth.[278]

Separate collection arrangements apply to eligible funding recipients (currently only NBN Co) in order for the charge offset mechanism to operate effectively (discussed below).[279]

Publishing the charge collected

ACMA must publish online the total amount of charge paid and offset by carriers each financial year.[280] According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill: ‘[s]ince the ACMA would only publish the aggregate amount of charge paid and offset each year, the information should not reveal carriers’ sensitive commercial information.’[281]

Penalties and anti-avoidance

Penalties

Subdivision D of Division 7 of proposed Part 3 of the TCPSS Act provides for a pecuniary penalty for late payment of the charge. A carrier is liable to pay a penalty on the unpaid amount of the charge each day it remains unpaid.[282] The penalty rate is 20 per cent per year or a lower rate as ACMA determines by way of legislative instrument.[283] ACMA may remit the whole or part of the penalty.[284]

The ACMA may cancel carrier licenses for failing to pay the charge.[285]

Anti-avoidance measures

Division 5 of proposed Part 3 of the TCPSS Act prohibits carriers form entering into schemes for the sole or dominant purpose of attempting to avoid the charge or to dishonestly obtain a benefit under the five year concessional arrangements. It is also proposed that a person must not:

  • aid, abet, counsel or procure
  • induce, whether by threats or promises or otherwise
  • be in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to
  • conspire with others

to effect a contravention of the above prohibition.[286]

This division provides both civil penalty and criminal offence versions of the prohibitions on carriers.[287] The ancillary contravention is not a criminal offence.

The maximum penalty for contravention of the civil penalty provisions for a body corporate is $10 million for each contravention and 10,000 penalty units ($2.1 million) for a person other than a body corporate.[288] The maximum penalty for contravention of the criminal offences is 10,000 penalty units ($2.1 million) for an individual and $10.5 million for a body corporate.[289]

How are eligible funding recipients funded?

Division 2 of proposed Part 3 of the TCPSS Act would enable the Secretary to enter into a contract with, or make a grant to, eligible funding recipients on behalf of the Commonwealth to provide financial assistance for fixed wireless or satellite broadband services. These provisions are extremely similar to the contract and grant provisions used for the Universal Service Obligation in Division 3 of Part 2 of the TCPSS Act.

Proposed subsection 80(1) of the TCPSS Act enables the Secretary to enter into contracts with, or make grants of financial assistance to, eligible funding entities in relation to:

  • the connection of premises to fixed wireless or satellite networks
  • the supply of fixed wireless or satellite broadband services
  • facilities that are, or proposed to be used to supply fixed wireless or satellite broadband services and
  • a matter incidental or ancillary to these matters. 

The Secretary is to pay any amount payable by the Commonwealth under a section 80 contract or grant.[290]

Terms and conditions of grants

The Secretary’s power to enter into contracts and make grants under section 80 is qualified by a variety of restrictions, namely:

  • terms and conditions: terms and conditions of grants must be set out in a written agreement between the Commonwealth and the grant recipient that the Secretary enters into on behalf of the Commonwealth
  • Ministerial determinations: the Minister may, by legislative instrument, set standards, rules and minimum benchmarks that contractors or grant recipients must comply with in relation to section 80 grants and contracts. This determination prevails over inconsistent contracts or grant terms and conditions, subject to a limited number of exceptions:
    • a determination cannot override a term or condition that gives a contractor or grant recipient a right to adjust payment for a change in services, facilities or customer equipment under a contract or a grant agreement
    • a determination cannot change the price, or method of ascertaining the price, for any services, facilities or customer equipment to be supplied by the contractor or grant recipient in accordance with the contract, or grant agreement
  • rules binding the Secretary: the Minister may, by legislative instrument, make rules that the Secretary must comply with when exercising any of their functions under Division 2.[291]

Performance monitoring

The Secretary must monitor the performance of contractors and grant recipients, and report to the Minister on the adequacy of their compliance with the terms of the grant or contract, any notice of breaches received, any remedial action taken by the Secretary in response to such a breach, and the outcome of that action.[292]

Contracts and grants register

The Secretary must maintain registers, published on the Department’s website, of contracts and grants issued under section 80. The registers must include certain information, including for example—name, duration, a summary of service and the amount to be paid or payable by the Commonwealth (or in the case of grants, the total amount of the grant).[293]

Charge offset mechanism

Proposed section 86 inserts a ‘nominal funding entitlement’ scheme—it broadly requires the Secretary to issue a certificate (a ‘nominal funding entitlement certificate’) certifying the funding entitlement of each eligible funding entity receiving funds under a contract or grant for that year (currently only NBN Co) and:

  • if the carrier holds a charge offset certificate—pay the nominal funding entitlement to the carrier, reduced by the amount specified in the charge offset certificate or
  • if the carrier does not hold a charge offset certificate for the previous financial year—pay the nominal funding entitlement to the carrier.[294]

Division 6 in proposed Part 3 of the TCPSS Act enables eligible funding entities to reduce their charge liability by the amount that they would be entitled to receive under their funding entitlements. This is intended to minimise the burden of administering the scheme for NBN Co, any future eligible funding entities and the Department. Proposed sections 98 and 99 detail how an eligible funding entity obtains a charge offset certificate and when the charge is refunded—this is summarised in ‘Box 2: charge offset certificates’.

Key issue: funding transparency concerns

Proposed section 80 of the TCPSS Act reflects to some extent the provisions of the existing section 14 of the TCPSS Act that forms the basis for grants and contracts to carriers under the USO. Section 14 was the provision under which the Department negotiated the TUSOPA with Telstra. The TUSOPA has received broad criticism for being opaque and having minimal methods of ascertaining if payments are being used for the purposes of the contract, for example, by the Productivity Commission and the ANAO, with the later stating:

Neither the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) nor the Department undertakes processes to verify the accuracy of the underlying performance data provided by Telstra, which is used to determine compliance with the standard telephone customer service guarantee and payphone benchmarks.[302]

Under the agreement, Telstra receives $257 million dollars annually through the TUSOPA.[303] This funding is nominally provided in order to allow Telstra to meet its universal service obligations as the primary service provider, but Telstra is not required to demonstrate that the funding it receives actually goes towards this purpose, or report on the scale of its non-commercial losses. Instead, the primary indicator of Telstra’s performance under the TUSOPA is simply if Telstra is meeting their USO obligations, which it is.[304]

Proposed section 80 does not appear to impose safeguards which would prevent the same issues arising as have arisen as a result of the TUSOPA with Telstra. In particular Division 2 of proposed Part 3 of the TCPSS Act does not:

  • require eligible funding entities to report exactly what funds are used for
  • require accounting separation of non-commercial services or
  • place a statutory obligation on a contractor to use RBS funds towards RBS purposes.

Similar to section 14 of the TCCPS Act, proposed section 80 merely obliges the Secretary to enter into contracts or grant agreements with eligible funding entities ‘in relation to’ fixed wireless or satellite broadband covered by proposed subsection 80(1).

It is possible that NBN Co’s performance under the contract or grant will be assessed on how successfully it meets its SIP obligations (discussed below). Proposed section 85 (which mirrors existing section 20) only requires the monitoring of performance related to the terms of the contract rather than any minimum reporting requirements on losses, or expenditure.

These risks could be mitigated by the Department ensuring that contracts and grant agreements issued under section 80 contain relevant safeguards or the Minister utilises the determination power under proposed section 82.

During the Committee Inquiry into the 2019 Bills, Senator Urquhart raised concerns about what would occur in the event of NBN Co receiving more money under a contract or grant arrangement then it would need to cover fixed wireless and satellite losses for that year. The Department confirmed that such a surplus would need to be used for the delivery of fixed wireless and satellite services.[305] It is not clear where this obligation is found (although it may be intended to set it out in contract and grant agreement terms). Labor Senators’ additional comments to the Committee report on the 2019 Bills noted:

...[t]here is seemingly no mechanism that requires the surplus revenue from the Government's $800 million annual broadband tax to be spent on regional networks... there remain legitimate concerns that once the tax revenues flow into NBN Co the company management can effectively direct surplus tax revenue towards anything they wish once it is washed through an offset account, regardless of whether the expenditure relates to a regional outcome or not.[306] [emphasis added]

The majority committee view was more constrained in its language, but was ‘of the view that additional transparency measures, with respect to the management of the RBS levy, should be implemented’ to ‘easily determine that the off-set arrangements are being managed effectively’ and recommended that such measures be implemented.[307] The Committee did not explicitly state that these ‘additional transparency measures’ should be legislated as amendments to the Bill.

Key issue: funding can only be applied to fixed-wireless & satellite connections

RBS payments can only be provided for fixed wireless and satellite internet connections, even if alternative technologies are superior.[308] This explicitly excludes carriage services delivered over a public mobile telecommunications service, which means services delivered over the Telstra, Optus, and Vodafone 4G and 5G networks cannot receive RBS subsidies.[309] However, it must be noted that those mobile networks will not subject to the RBS—this is discussed above under the heading ‘Exclusion of non-fixed connections’.

In effect, NBN Co will continue to receive subsidies for the delivery of fixed wireless and satellite broadband services, even if, in future, mobile networks are able to offer superior and/or cheaper broadband in those areas. Internet Australia raised this as a concern:

The TCC Bill specifically only allows the use of funds to build fixed wireless or satellite infrastructure, and cannot be used to provide any other form of superior technology. The TCC Bill and regime appears to assume that fixed wireless and satellite networks are, and always will be, the lowest cost and optimal method of servicing regional and remote areas. This is at odds with the principal of technology neutrality, and removes any incentive for NBN Co or another funding recipient to install any better technology, even if it would be more cost-effective and provide superior services in those local conditions.[310]

Internet Australia went on to warn of ‘a perverse incentive for NBN Co to maximise the footprint of its fixed-wireless and satellite areas, even into areas where it would be more economic in the long term to install a superior fixed-line technology’.[311]

The RBS Special Account

Proposed section 89 of the TCPSS Act, at item 13 of Schedule 4 to the TLACC Bill, establishes the RBS Special Account for the purposes of section 80 of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act). A Special Account is a limited special appropriation that notionally sets aside an amount that can be expended for listed purposes.[312] In this case, the Special Account may be debited to:

  • pay amounts payable by the Commonwealth under an eligible funding entity contract (under proposed section 80)
  • make grants to eligible funding entities
  • make distributions of the balance of the account back to carriers and
  • make refunds of the charge in the event of overpayment of the charge, including when a person becomes the holder of a charge offset certificate.[313]

The Special Account must be credited with those amounts paid to the Commonwealth for the RBS charge, under an eligible funding recipient contract (including compensation or damages for breach of that contract) and repayment of an eligible funding recipient grant.[314]

The Secretary may distribute the whole or part of the balance of the account to carriers who have paid into the account. This can only be done if a legislative instrument made by the Minister regulating the process exists, which the Secretary must comply with.[315]

Reimbursement of ACCC & ACMA expenses

Proposed section 92A enables the Secretary to direct, by notifiable instrument, that funds may be debited from the Special Account to reimburse the ACCC and ACMA for the costs of running the RBS scheme. The funds do not actually flow directly to the ACCC and ACMA, but rather are transferred to the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF) out of which the Government can fund those entities in the usual manner.

The amount which can be transferred by the Secretary must be the lesser of:

  • the total of the relevant Budget amounts listed in proposed subsection 92A(3) and
  • the annual administrative cost component of the charge collected for the year.

Information gathering & legislative review

ACMA and ACCC powers

Division 8 in proposed Part 3 of the TCPSS Act (at item 13 of Schedule 4 of the TLACC Bill) provides powers to ACMA and the ACCC to:

  • require carriers and carriage service providers to disclose information or documents to ACMA
  • require eligible funding recipients to disclose information or documents to the ACCC
  • enable ACMA and the ACCC to share information among various Commonwealth bodies including with each other, the Department and declared (by way of notifiable instrument) Commonwealth, state and territory bodies.[316]

One-off carrier reporting obligation

Carriers are required to submit a report to the ACCC on their current number of chargeable premises, potentially chargeable premises, exempt premises, exempt lines, and potentially concessional premises. This is scheduled to occur within three months after Schedule 4 to the Bill commences.[317] According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill: ‘[t]he ACCC may decide to use this information to give the Government advice about the base charge and administrative cost components ... of the Charge Bill.’[318]

A strict liability offence with a maximum penalty of 50 penalty units is imposed for failing to  comply with the requirements to lodge or failing to disclose specified information in the report—each day the contravention continues constitutes a separate offence.[319] A statutory declaration may be required to accompany the report—it is a criminal offence with a maximum penalty of four years imprisonment for intentionally making a false statement in a statutory declaration.[320]

Legislative Review of the RBS

Proposed section 102ZFA requires the Minister to cause a review of the RBS and associated legislative framework. This Review must occur within, or as soon as practicable after, four years of the commencement of the RBS and include public consultation.[321] The Minister may give a written direction to the ACMA or ACCC requiring them to make available specified information to the review.[322] The report tabled within 25 sitting days of each House after the completion of the Report.[323]

Key Issue: ‘set and forget concerns’

The statutory requirements to review the RBS as well as the administrative and base component of the charge (see above: ‘Box 1: ACCC advice about the base and administrative cost components’) is perceived by some stakeholders as being too far into the future. In this respect, stakeholders have expressed concern that the RBS charge is inflexible and risks becoming an entrenched tax—Vodafone noted in its 2017 submission:

It is concerning for example that the RBS does not have a sunset clause or automatic requirements for fundamental reviews in certain circumstances, such as privatisation of the NBN. [Vodafone] understands the RBS is intended to be in place until at least 2040.[324]

In its 2017 submission, TPG states that the RBS should be ‘reviewed every 18 months after implementation to gauge the effect on competition and the ongoing sustainability for the funding of the nbn’s non-economic services’.[325] Internet Australia recommends the ACCC’s review of the base component of the charge occur every year and indexation be removed.[326] These concerns were raised by the Australian Greens in their Dissenting Report to the 2017 inquiry, and formed a key line of questioning in the 2019 inquiry.[327]  The Productivity Commission stressed the importance of regular reviews:

It reduces the risk that the Government takes a ‘set and forget’ approach to what could become an easy way for the Government to move NBN costs off its ledgers, without regard to the distortions that a poorly designed levy could create.[328]

The Commission also noted that ‘the risk of policy inertia is high once a policy is implemented, given a demonstrated preference among policymakers for default policy settings.’[329]

Charge and policy reviews not synchronised

Additionally these two review processes are not synchronised and will be conducted by different entities on different reporting timelines—the policy review is required to be commenced before the ACCC is required to review the costings of the RBS and the amount of the charge (by a year).[330] There is then a distinct possibility that the policy review will be conducted, and public consultation to that review carried out, with the ACCC RBS costing modelling underway and forthcoming, but not complete, or even engaged in parallel consultation processes.

Consequential changes

Amendments to the CCA

Items 1A and 1B of Schedule 4 to the TLACC Bill insert reference to the RBS into the telecommunications industry record keeping rules detailed in Division 6 of Part XIB of the CCA. The amendments create new requirements to retain records related to the operation of proposed Part 3 of the TCPSS Act on telecommunication carriers (item 1A), and provide that the ACCC may publicly disclose, or direct a carrier or carriage service provider to publicly disclose, reports received or retained under the record keeping rules, if satisfied that such a disclosure would facilitate the operation of proposed Part 3 of the TCPSS Act or the Telecommunications (Regional Broadband Scheme) Charge Act (items 1B-1D).

Amendments to the Telecommunications Act

Item 5 of Schedule 4 inserts the power for ACMA to cancel carrier licenses for failure to pay the RBS charge. Item 3 creates a process for determining when an individual is disqualified for failure to pay the RBS charge. Items 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7 make related amendments to the disciplinary and penalty provisions under Telecommunications Act.

Statutory Infrastructure Provider scheme

What is the SIP scheme?

Division 2 in Part 1 of Schedule 3 to the TLACC Bill inserts a new Part 19 into the Telecommunications Act and makes consequential amendments to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA). The purpose of new Part 19 is to ensure that all end-users can request that their premises be connected and supplied with superfast broadband services­—Part 19 achieves this by, broadly:

  • defining who the responsible statutory infrastructure provider (SIP) is for various ‘service areas’ (Division 2 of Part 19) and
  • imposing obligations on the SIP to supply the necessary infrastructure so that the premises can be connected and supplied with superfast broadband (Division 3 of Part 19).

The proposed SIP scheme has two forms: the scheme as it exists before ‘the designated day’ and the scheme as it exists after that day.[331] The designated day is the date, in the Minister’s opinion, the NBN is deemed to be built and fully operational as provided for under the National Broadband Network Companies Act 2011. This declaration must occur by 31 December 2020 but may be continually extended by ministerial declaration in 12 month intervals.[332]

What are the service areas and who is the SIP?

Proposed Division 2 of Part 19 of the Telecommunications Act sets out the various kinds of SIP service areas, how they come about, and who is the SIP for those areas. As noted above, the SIP scheme has two variants: as it exists before and as it exists after the NBN is declared completed (known as the designated day).  There are four SIP service areas, the existence of which depends on the designated day:

  • interim NBN service areas—only exists before the designated day
  • the general service area—only exists after the designated day
  • nominated service areas—exists both before and after the designated day, and
  • designated service areas—exists both before and after the designated day.

NBN Co is responsible for the interim service areas and general service area while other carriers are responsible for the nominated service areas—for example, where other carriers have rolled out their own fibre networks. The Minister may designate a carrier as the SIP for designated service areas.[333]

Interim service areas

Where: interim service areas only exist before the designated day—they are the areas NBN Co declares or has declared are ready for service that are not nominated or designated service areas.[334]

The Minister may make rules, by way of legislative instrument, regulating NBN Co. declarations that an area is ready for service.[335]

Who is the SIP: NBN Co.[336]

Variable/revocable? A declaration that an area is ready for service cannot be revoked.[337]

NBN Co cannot vary a declaration that an area is ready for service except in the case of ‘clerical error or obvious mistake’.[338] The Minister may vary a declaration in writing but must conduct a consultation process of not less than 10 business days, and consider any submissions received, before making a variation.[339] This variation is not a legislative instrument.[340]

Key issue: Telstra’s obligations prior to the completion of the NBN

It was initially expected that the pre-designated day SIP scheme would be in operation for at least two years. However, given the time that has passed since the Bills were originally introduced into the 45th Parliament, the operation of the interim provisions may be brief. While the designated day is currently set as 1 December 2020, it is possible this could be indefinitely extended until the NBN is declared complete.[341] Prior to the designated day, the NBN is responsible for ‘interim NBN service areas’ declared under proposed subsections 360D(2) and (3) of the Telecommunications Act. Telstra, as the body with ongoing USO obligations to connect all of Australia to telephone services expressed concern that this would lead to gaps in the SIP scheme that Telstra would have to fill:

This will lead to a ‘Swiss cheese’ effect where large areas within a region are serviced by nbn co, but neighbouring pockets (or even a single neighbouring premises) have no SIP in the lead up to the designated day and are reliant on Telstra supplying services under the USO. As USO provider, Telstra still has to meet service requests, and in the absence of NBN infrastructure, provide its own fixed or wireless infrastructure in order to supply services for a potentially indeterminate period prior to the designated day (after which nbn co will be the SIP and required to connect the premises and supply wholesale services).[342]

However, the brief likely operation of the interim provisions mitigates many of these concerns.

The general service area

Where: the general service area only exists after the designated day—it is the whole of Australia other than a nominated or designated service area.[343]

Who is the SIP: NBN Co.[344]

The general service area reflects the default assumption that NBN co will be the SIP for all of Australia except where specific circumstances arise.[345]

Nominated service areas

Where: an area where a non-NBN carrier must nominate as the SIP because if it meets conditions specified by the Minister and is contracted (or has previously been contracted) to install telecommunications infrastructure in:

  • a real estate development or
  • a building redevelopment, and
  • the area is not a designated service area.[346]

A carrier has the option, but is not required to nominate as the SIP, if the carrier:

  • is contracted to install infrastructure that will enable the supply of eligible services to all of the premises in a given area (excluding a real estate or building redevelopment project) and
  • that contract requires or did require the carrier to connect premises to a qualifying telecommunications network on request of a carriage service provider so that eligible services can be provided to the end-user at the premises.[347]

The Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill identifies shopping centres and business districts as possible examples of the use of this third, non-compulsory avenue of nominating and provides the following justification:

It is compulsory for a carrier to declare a provisional nominated service area when it installs infrastructure under a contract for a real estate development project or a building redevelopment project. This is because generally there will only be a single carrier servicing these areas. By contrast, it is at a carrier’s discretion whether it declares a provisional nominated service area when it enters into a contract to install infrastructure that is not a contract for a real estate development project or a building redevelopment project. This is because the carrier may not be the only network provider to the premises in question... if a carrier becomes the only network provider to the premises in question, it would be open for the carrier to declare a provisional nominated service area. If the carrier did not, the Minister could designate the area as a designated service area, and declare the carrier to be the SIP for the service area.[348]

Real estate development project

‘Real estate development project’ is defined as either:

  • any project that involves the subdivision of land in Australia, and then the sale or lease of those lots or building units (practically, residential accommodation) on those lots—this includes greenfield development, the gazetting and development of new suburbs or
  • any project that involves the construction and sale of new building units on areas of land. This would include the construction of new apartment blocks and the sale of units within those apartment blocks

which meets any conditions specified by the Minister.[349]

Building redevelopment project

A ‘building redevelopment projects’ is defined as any project that involves ‘the significant refurbishment or repurposing of one or more buildings so as to bring into existence one or more building units’ and the sale or lease of those units. The project must also meet any conditions specified by the Minister.[350]

How: the process for declaring a real estate development or building redevelopment as a nominated service areas is as follows:

  1. If a non-NBN carrier enters into a contract that would give rise to nominated SIP requirements (real estate developments and building redevelopments), then they must give the ACMA written notice of the contract.[351]

    The notice must specify the project area, describe the telecommunication network infrastructure to be installed, and estimate the completion date of the installation.

    This notice must be given within 10 business days of entering into the contract.[352] If the contract had been entered into before commencement and the installation has not yet been completed, the carrier must give the ACMA notice within 90 days of commencement, or within a longer period that the ACMA allows.[353]

    The ACMA must maintain a register of the notices of contracts provided by carriers.[354]

  2. After completion of the installation of the infrastructure, the carrier must by written instrument declare the project area is a provisional nominated service area within 10 days of completion.[355]
  3. The carrier is then the service infrastructure provider for the area, provided that it is not a designated service area or covered by a subsequent nominated service area declaration.[356]

Box 3: provides an example of how a carrier becomes the SIP for a nominated service area for contracts entered into after commencement.

Who is the SIP: the carrier required to declare itself as SIP for a given area, or else a carrier specified in a legislative instrument.[357]

Proposed section 360J also lists three carrier license condition declarations (held by OptiComm, Pivit, and NT Technology Services Pty Ltd), prescribing that the areas served under these carrier licenses are automatically nominated services areas. These areas are already subject to SIP-like obligations under these declarations—proposed section 360J translates these obligations into the SIP scheme.

Exceptions: the Minister may, by legislative instrument:

  • exempt a specified real estate or building redevelopment project from nominated service area requirements[360]
  • substitute a different carrier than the one that is nominated as the SIP for a nominated service area[361] and
  • specify additional conditions that must be satisfied in order for projects to qualify for nomination requirements.[362]

Variable/revocable? A carrier declaration cannot be revoked.[363] The Minister may vary a declaration of a provisional nominated service area by a carrier. The Minister must conduct a consultation process of not less than 10 business days, and consider any submissions received before making a variation. This variation is not a legislative instrument.[364]

Key Issue: nominated service area requirements unclear

Telstra raised a concern in its submission to the 2019 Senate Inquiry that the drafting of the nominated service area requirements in proposed section 360H(2) may inadvertently require some mobile carriers to nominate as a SIP for the area upon the installation of telecommunications infrastructure:

Under the draft SIP legislation, a carrier is required to nominate as the SIP where it installs network infrastructure to enable the supply of ‘eligible services’ to premises in the whole of a real estate development project or building redevelopment project, and the installation was carried out under a contract. Eligible services include a ‘listed carriage service’ which includes ‘a carriage service between a point in Australia and one or more other points in Australia’. Accordingly, the installation of almost any telecommunications network infrastructure could trigger the requirement to nominate as the SIP.[365]

And that further:

In effect, there is a legislative mis-match between the (broader) kinds of telecommunications network infrastructure that can trigger the requirement to nominate as the SIP, and the (narrower) kinds of telecommunications network infrastructure to which a SIP is required to connect premises.[366]

This concern could be practically mitigated by the Minister issuing an exemption under 360H, 360P or 360Q to relevantly impacted carriers on an individual case by case basis.

Designated service areas

Where: anywhere that the Minister specifies by legislative instrument. Designated service areas are automatically ‘carved out’ of both the general service area and any overlapping nominated service area.[367]

Who is the SIP: any carrier that the Minister, by legislative instrument, designates as the SIP for the area.[368]

Variable/revocable? Yes.

Key issue: power is extremely broad

The Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill describes this provision as a ‘reserve power’, stating that the powers were ‘deliberately cast broadly as there could be specific circumstances that need to be taken into account on an area by area basis.’[369] Telstra raised issues with the scope of this power in its 2017 submission:

This power is so broadly framed that it could be exercised in future to unreasonably shift responsibility for infrastructure deployment from nbn co to another carrier: in effect, to substantially reverse the policy that nbn co should be the primary provider of national broadband infrastructure.[370]

Telstra proposed a series of limitations on this power to prevent abuse, none of which has been adopted.  Telstra reiterated these concerns in its 2019 submission.[371]

The following justification for the ministerial power is provided in the Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill:

The power under proposed subsection 360L(1) is a reserve power for the Minister. For example, it could be used to designate real estate development projects that were installed before the commencement of proposed Part 19, and are serviced by a single superfast fixedline network provider (other than NBN Co). In such cases, it may be appropriate for the network provider to be the SIP for the area and so the Minister would be able to determine this. The Minister’s powers under the section are deliberately cast broadly as there could be specific circumstances that need to be taken into account on an area-by-area basis. However, as any Ministerial determination would be a legislative instrument, it would be subject to the consultation, disallowance and sunsetting requirements under the Legislation Act.[372]

What are the obligations of a SIP?

Proposed Division 3 of new Part 19 of the Telecommunications Act imposes an obligation on SIPs to connect and supply premises with qualifying services within their relevant service area, at the reasonable request of a carriage service provider.[373]

Obligation to connect premises

The obligation to connect is provided by proposed subsection 360P(1)—the SIP must on the ‘reasonable request’ of a carriage service provider, connect the premise to:

  • a fixed-line telecommunications network to supply fixed-line carriage services, or
  • if it is not reasonable to connect the premises to a fixed-line—connect the premises to a telecommunications network to supply wireless or satellite carriage services.

The obligation to connect premises upon ‘reasonable request’ is different to the obligation to connect it to a ‘fixed-line’ network where it is ‘reasonable’ to do so—this is outlined in Box 4 below.

Requirements: the Minister may set requirements of SIPs in connecting premises by legislative instrument.[374]

Exceptions: the Minister may, by legislative instrument, specify circumstances in which the obligation to connect does not apply.[375]

Terms and conditions: the SIP must publish a set of terms and conditions on its website on which it offers to connect premises. The SIP must connect premises on these terms if a carriage service provider requests.[376]

Response to requests: upon receiving a request to connect a premise by a carriage service provider, a SIP must either notify that it will connect the premise or refuse the request within 10 business days of receipt (or a longer period as set by legislative instrument).[377] If the SIP refuses the request to connect, it must provide written notice to the carriage service provider within five business days of the refusal, who in turn must provide a copy of the notice to the end user within five days of receiving the notice.[378]

Obligation to supply eligible services

The obligation to supply eligible services is provided by proposed subsections 360Q(1) and (1A)—The SIP for a service area must, on the ‘reasonable request’ of a carriage service provider:

  • supply an eligible service to the carriage service provider so they can supply qualifying carriage services to end-users at the premises and
  • the carriage services must be capable of making and receiving voice calls, except where the premise is serviced by satellite.[382]

An eligible service is, broadly, any telecommunications service where at least one point is in Australia.[383] A qualifying carriage service is a:

  • qualifying fixed-line carriage service
  • qualifying fixed wireless carriage service or
  • qualifying satellite carriage service.[384]

These are, broadly, broadband services provided over fixed-line, wireless or satellite, with peak download transmission speeds of at least 25 megabits per second, and peak upload speeds of 5 megabits per second.[385] This implicitly excludes legacy copper fixed networks, such as ADSL2+ from being capable of being ‘qualifying carriage service’ as ADSL2+ is only capable of 24 mbps per second at best.[386]

The peak download and upload transmission speeds are speeds which the Government expects the SIP to be able to support should the carriage service provider utilise the full capacity of the network, but they are not the actual speeds the end-user can expect from their carriage service provider.[387] The end-user speed will be determined by a range of factors, including, for example, the broadband package the customer has purchased and the capacity and congestion of the network units purchased by the carriage service provider from the SIP.[388]

Both wireless and satellite carriage services do not include public mobile telecommunication services—this excludes mobile networks, for example: Telstra, Optus and Vodafone, from being used to satisfy SIP obligations.[389] Further, the Minister may, in the case of the meaning of wireless carriage services, determine conditions that must be satisfied.[390]

Requirements: the Minister may set requirements of SIPs in supplying premises by legislative instrument.[392]

Exceptions: there are two exceptions to the obligations to supply eligible services:

  • if the SIP is already subject to a standard access obligation, then they are exempt from the SIP obligation to supply[393] and
  • the Minister may, legislative instrument, specify circumstances in which the obligation to supply does not apply by.[394]

The SIP is only obligated to supply an eligible service on the ‘reasonable request’ of the carriage service provider—this obligation is explained above in ‘Box 4’ in relation to the SIP’s obligation to connect a premise. Similarly, in this case, the Minister may, by legislative instrument, specify circumstances in which the obligation to supply does not apply, and in doing so, determine when a request is not reasonable—the Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill provides the following example: ‘a SIP could refuse to supply if it cannot obtain required approvals from a land owner or a local council’.[395]

Terms and conditions: the SIP must publish a set of terms and conditions on its website on which it offers to supply premises under its obligations. The SIP must supply premises with an eligible service on these terms on the request of a carriage service provider.[396]

Key issue: peak bandwidth SIP obligations may be inadequate

Professor Mark Gregory, senior telecommunications and network engineering academic at RMIT University, was of the view that the obligation of the SIP to provide infrastructure to service 25mbps download and 5mbps upload peak speeds, was inadequate to modern and ongoing user needs: ‘[t]o vote for this Bill is to become an active supporter of the second rate NBN and this is not something that opposition and cross bench Senators should willingly agree to – history will not be kind’.[397]

The 2017 Senate Inquiry considered these concerns and received evidence from the Department that the 25/5mbps obligation ‘reflect anticipated consumer need for speed in the foreseeable future.’[398] The Department offered the following additional evidence:

In 2014, as part of the Vertigan cost-benefit analysis of the NBN, Communications Chambers was contracted to construct a bottom-up model of the 'technical' bandwidth required for the applications utilised by various types of household, and used this to estimate future demand. Its report estimated that by 2023 the median Australian household will have 'technical' demand (that is, generated by actual application usage) for download bandwidth of 15 Mbps. Therefore, a 25 Mbps download service is considered to be a service that will actually support most applications that people will need for the foreseeable future. This conclusion is consistent with current usage on the NBN with 29 per cent of services being 12/1 Mbps and 55 percent being 25/5 Mbps.[399]

As covered in this Digest in relation to the RBS under the headings ‘Key issue: reliance on outdated information’ and ‘Key issue: exclusion of non-fixed connections from the charge’, consumer demand for data has rapidly increased since these underlying assumptions were made.[400]Advances in telecommunication technology are frequent, and speed capabilities and consumer requirements increase rapidly. In June 2010 for instance, just over 60 per cent of Australian broadband connections had speeds under 8mbps—a SIP guarantee of 25mbps may quickly become inadequate to consumer expectations and business requirements.[401]

As the speed minimums are currently defined in proposed sections 360A and 360AA of the Telecommunications Act, updating the SIP minimum speed guarantees to reflect evolving markets and consumer expectations will require a legislative amendment.

Key issue: limitations of fixed-wireless definition

The definition of a qualifying fixed wireless carriage service requires, among other things, that the carriage service is supplied using a ‘fixed wireless technology platform’—the phrase is defined as having the ‘meaning generally accepted within the telecommunications industry’.[402] The Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill states that fixed wireless technology involves wireless transmission to an ‘antenna installed at the premise’ as distinct from mobile technology which allows a user to move around.[403] This would seemingly exclude some other technologies that have been described as ‘fixed wireless’, such as mobile home broadband that has an antenna built into the modem and requires no installation—such technologies would not appear to be sufficiently ‘fixed’.[404] While the exclusion of public mobile networks is consistent with the Government’s policy, this may introduce perverse outcomes—for example requiring a SIP such as NBN Co to install fixed antennas at premises, even when they may be able to roll-out cheaper and less labour intensive desktop modem solutions. 

Key issue: SIP Issues with Low Earth Orbit Satellite Broadband.

A qualifying satellite carriage service is among other things, a carriage service that is ‘supplied using a satellite’, but does not include a public mobile telecommunications service’.[405] Low earth orbit satellite broadband (LEOSB) networks are an emerging satellite broadband technology which may be a public mobile telecommunication network (LEOSB networks are discussed in further detail above in relation to the RBS under Key issue: emergence of Low Earth Orbit Satellite Broadband).

The NBN Sky Muster satellites and other traditional satellite carriage services located in geostationary orbit are not public mobile telecommunications services, principally because such services are not designed or largely capable of being used while moving, and do not appear to involve  ‘intercell handover functions’—both requirements of the definition of ‘public mobile telecommunications service’.[406] LEOSB networks will likely be different to geostationary because they will be capable of being accessed while the consumer is roaming and require intercell handover functions.[407]

There is existing ambiguity around whether or not LEOSB networks are a public mobile telecommunications service.[408] In any event, if LEOSB networks are classified as such, then NBN Co (or any other SIP) would not be able to utilise them to satisfy their SIP obligations. As detailed above under Key issue: emergence of low earth orbit satellite broadband, in evidence to the Senate Inquiry into the 2019 Bills, NBN Co indicated that it was examining the possibility of either owning or purchasing capacity on an LEOSB network to replace its existing Sky Muster satellite service.[409]

Additionally, the current SIP framework does not allow for there to be multiple SIPs responsible for different technology types over a single area, on the assumption that the SIP in regional areas would be NBN Co which provides all three qualifying service types (fixed-line, fixed wireless, broadband).

This may pose difficulties if the government seeks to designate a LEOSB carrier (that is not the NBN) as SIP for regional areas under proposed section 360L of the Telecommunications Act (at item 7 of Schedule 3 to the TLACC Bill). As the SIP, the LEOSB provider would be required to connect premises to a qualifying fixed-line network at first instance unless unreasonable.[410] A LEOSB carrier such as SpaceX will likely not operate a fixed-line network. The Minister may be able to mitigate this risk via their ability to define ‘reasonable’. [411]

What if a SIP can’t meet its obligations?

SIPs must lodge periodic compliance reports to the ACMA on terms that the Minister determines by legislative instrument.[412] If the SIP for a nominated or designated area (that is, a non-NBN Co SIP) becomes aware that it will be unable to meet its SIP obligations, it must notify the Department and the ACMA as soon as practicable.[413] If the SIP becomes aware that another carrier is willing to become the SIP for that area they must also notify the Department and the ACMA.[414] The Minister may also delegate most of the Minister’s powers in this new Part the ACMA.[415]

Standards, benchmarks and rules

The Minister may, by legislative instrument set standards and performance benchmarks which bind SIPs on a broad range of matters.[416] This mostly concerns the particulars of the supply, service delivery, performance, complaint resolution and wait times for connection and fault rectification.

The Minister may, by legislative instrument, make rules which a SIP must comply with, which may cover:

  • processes for resolving complaints about eligible service supplied by a SIP to CSPs
  • any other matter concerning the supply of such an eligible service to a CSP
  • processes for resolving complaints about the connection of premises in the service area to a qualifying telecommunications network and
  • any other matter concerning the connection of premises in a service area to a qualifying telecommunications network.[417]

Amendments to the CCA provide that these standards and rules prevail over various other instruments including access determinations, rules of conduct and access agreements entered into after commencement,[418] and special access undertakings entered into at any time, in the event of inconsistency.[419] There do not appear to be any specific offences for breaches of these standards and rules.

NBN Co targets

NBN Co ‘must have regard’ to both a speed and coverage target in relation to fixed-line services when fulfilling its obligations as a SIP.[420]

Speed target of fixed-line connections

Under the current NBN Co statement of expectations, NBN Co should ensure that 90 per cent of fixed-line connections within NBN service are capable of enabling carriage service providers to provide 50 mbps peak download speeds to end-users.[421] This expectation is being codified into a statutory target under proposed subsection 360S(1).

Fixed-line connections coverage target

Proposed subsection 360S(2) requires NBN Co to take all reasonable steps to ensure that NBN Co’s fixed-line service is capable of being connected to at least 92 per cent of premises in Australia. According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill, this is intended to complement and reinforce the proposed subsection 360S(1) target by ensuring that the speed target is in effect as widely as possible.[422]

NBN Co service maps

Schedule 5 to the Bill amends the National Broadband Network Companies Act 2011 to require:

  • NBN Co to provide mapping data to the Secretary, and
  • the Secretary to make that mapping data available on the National Map website.

The data must be made available on the National Map website no later than 60 days after the commencement of Schedule 5 (the day after Royal Assent).[423] The mapping data required to be provided is about premises connected, or due to be connected, to the NBN based on geographic location and technology type.[424]

While proposed subsection 98B of the National Broadband Network Companies Act imposes a one-off obligation, proposed subsection 98B(2) allows for the Secretary to direct NBN Co to provide subsequent mapping data. However, the amendments do not require the Secretary to do this regularly or at all. According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill:

NBN Co has progressively increased the level of transparency in the information it has provided to consumers over time. The company’s ongoing development of its online website rollout maps already allows consumers and stakeholders to see the information sought through this amendment. NBN Co’s website is regularly updated to provide the viewer with the most current information available on rollout progress and technology for each premises. In the interest of further enhancing transparency, the proposed measure in Schedule 5 would result in mapping data about the NBN being uploaded to the National Map to facilitate comparison with other publicly available datasets on the map.[425]

Amendments to the ‘superfast network rules’

Schedules 1 and 2 of the TLACC Bill amend the legislative framework which applies to superfast fixed-line networks by:

  • repealing Part 7 of the Telecommunications Act 1997, which deals with the regulation of non-NBN carriers offering Layer 2 bitstream services, and making consequential amendments to the CCA (Schedule 1) and
  • amending Part 8 of the Telecommunications Act, which deals with the regulation of non-NBN carriers offering superfast fixed-line networks (Schedule 2).

Background

The Telecommunications Act, together with associated provisions of the CCA, provides the regulatory framework for the telecommunications industry—as stated in the Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill:

The superfast network rules in Parts 7 and 8 of the [Telecommunications Act] were introduced in 2011 and apply to superfast fixed-line networks servicing residential and small business customers (other than the NBN). Part 7 requires operators of such networks to supply a Layer 2 bitstream service to access seekers. Part 8 requires the networks to be wholesale-only (that is, structurally separated).[426]

Part 7: supply of layer 2 bitstream services to access seekers

Currently, under the Telecommunications Act, a Layer 2 bitstream service is an ethernet service (‘cable’) supplied for transporting data from one point to another. Or, a Layer 2 bitstream service has the meaning as specified in a legislative instrument made by the ACMA.[427] This enables retail service providers (access seekers) to supply broadband services to end-users (homes, small business customers) without needing to build a direct physical connection to them.[428]

Part 7 of the Telecommunications Act (and associated provisions of the CCA) concern the regulation of non-NBN carriers supplying Layer 2 bitstream services. Part 7 requires the owners of private superfast broadband networks built or extended after 2011 to make a Layer 2 bitstream service available to access seekers on an open-access (which means that it must not unreasonably refuse access) and equivalent access basis (which means it must offer substantially the same terms to all businesses, including any subsidiaries that it has).[429]

The regime to regulate the provision of Layer 2 bitstream services includes a mandatory requirement for the ACCC to declare a Layer 2 bitstream service, and this declaration remains in force indefinitely so as to provide ‘certainty in relation to the enduring nature of this requirement.’[430]

The so-called superfast network rules in Parts 7 and 8 of the Telecommunications Act have been in place since 1 January 2011. They apply to local access lines (other than NBN) that are:

  • part of a fixed line local access network built after 1 January 2011 and used to supply superfast carriage services wholly or principally to residential and small business customers or
  • part of a fixed-line local access network that was built, upgraded, altered or extended after 1 January 2011, so that it became capable of being used to supply superfast[431] carriage services to residential or small business.[432]

The operational effect of the ACCC declaring a Layer 2 bitstream service is that carriers and carriage service providers who supply a declared service are required to comply with the ‘Category A standard access obligations’ in relation to that service (section 152AR of the CCA).[433]

Exemptions from standard access obligations

The ACCC may make a ‘class exemption’ from Class A standard access obligations where it is satisfied that this will promote the long term interests of end-users (section 152ASA of the CCA). Individual carriers and carriage service providers may also seek an ‘anticipatory individual exemption’ from any or all standard access obligations (section 152ATA of the CCA). This exemption may be granted on a conditional or unconditional basis and may specify time limits. The ACCC must be satisfied that the giving of the exemption would promote the long term interests of end-users.[434]

Part 8: structural separation of retail and wholesale networks  

Part 8 of the Telecommunications Act seeks to deal with discrimination in the market and requires that high speed broadband networks built after 1 January 2011 be wholesale-only (structurally separated in terms of wholesale and retail business). The aim of these separation rules is to provide a level playing field as the basis for enabling opportunities for fair competition for the operation of new superfast broadband networks.[435] This level playing field is also intended to encourage and provide greater investment certainty for network builders with the goal of providing enhanced consumer choice and value for money in terms of quality of services.

Part 8 does not apply to extensions of pre-2011 networks of less than 1 kilometre from any point on the infrastructure of the network (as it stood immediately before 1 January 2011).[436]

The key aim of the proposed changes to Part 8 is to make the obligations target:

[a]ny single local access line that forms part of a network (other than the NBN) that is wholly or principally supplying services to residential customers and is used to supply a superfast carriage service to residential customers in Australia.[437]

Repeal of Part 7

Item 24 in Part 1 of Schedule 1 repeals Part 7 of the Telecommunications Act which deals with access to Layer 2 bitstream services. The Vertigan Review recommended the repeal of Part 7, arguing that it acted as an unnecessary fetter on competition.[438] The Vertigan Review also recommended that Part 8 should be amended to enhance its operation by providing a baseline of structural separation of superfast broadband networks, while also creating:

a process under which the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) could authorise providers operating on a functionally separate, rather than structurally separate, basis where this promotes the long-term interests of end-users.[439]

The amendments to Parts 7 and 8 are broadly in line with recommendations made by the Vertigan panel.[440] The repeal of Part 7 is being done on the basis that Part XIC of the CCA is sufficient to properly regulate any access to Layer 2 bitstream services.[441] The Explanatory Memorandum states:

The ACCC has declared the ‘Superfast Broadband Access Service’ (SBAS) under Part XIC of the CCA. As a result, the SBAS is required to be supplied to access seekers on a range of superfast networks.[442]

The consequence of this repeal is that ‘access to specific wholesale services on superfast broadband networks would only be mandated if the services are declared by the ACCC under Part XIC of the CCA.’[443] There are a few networks declared under Part XIC, which are not currently captured by Part 7 of the Telecommunications Act. Also, because of the proposed amendments to Part 8, ‘superfast networks would operate on either a functionally or structurally separated basis. They would therefore supply eligible services on a wholesale basis.’[444]

Transitional provisions

The Minister may grant exemptions under section 141A or section 144(1) of the Telecommunications Act. Subsection 141A confers power on the Minister for Communications to exempt:

  • a specified network
  • a specified local access line or
  • a specified owner

from the Layer 2 bitstream obligations under of section 141.[445]

Subsection 144(1) of the Telecommunications Act confers similar powers on the Minister to exempt specified networks from the wholesale-only requirements of section 143 of the Telecommunications Act (Part 8). As a general rule section 143 of the Telecommunications Act (Part 8) requires that supply of superfast broadband services be provided on a wholesale only basis. Networks that existed before 1 January 2011 are exempt from this requirement.

Item 27 in Part 2 of Schedule 1 covers transitional provisions for the repeal of Part 7, namely the continued validity of various instruments made under section 141A of the Act. Also, while the Minister cannot grant any further exemptions under subsections 144(1)-(3) after commencement, the Minister is able to vary any exemption.[446]

Amended definition of layer 2 bitstream services

Items 23A and 23B in Part 1 of Schedule 1 amend the definition of ‘Layer 2 Bitstream service’ as defined in section 7 of the Telecommunications Act to give it the ordinary meaning of that expression (rather than the technical definition currently in place). This amendment reflects the technical reality that Layer 2 Bitstream services can be supplied in a number of forms.[447] The Explanatory Memorandum states that ‘for the purposes of determining the ordinary meaning of the expression... the reader is to assume that Layer 2 has the same meaning as in the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference model for data exchange’.[448] The consequence of this amendment is that it will not be necessary for the ACMA to have the power to specify a Layer 2 Bitstream service for the purpose of the new and functionally inclusive definition.

Amendments to Part 8

Removal of regulation for networks servicing small business customers

Item 34 of Schedule 2 inserts proposed section 142C into Part 8 of the Telecommunications Act, which will replace section 143 for local access lines created or upgraded after the designated commencement date (three months after Royal Assent). Section 143 will continue to operate for access lines that came into existence between 1 January 2011 and the designated commencement date. These sections mandate that the supply of superfast broadband is to be on a wholesale basis. Items 35-41 mirror the structural amendments to section 142C into 143 including:

  • a new subsection 143(3) creating an exception if a functional separation undertaking is given
  • reworked contravention provisions in proposed subsection 143(5) and
  • removal of small businesses from section 143.

Item 42 inserts a new Division 2A – Exemptions, a revised scheme of statutory exemptions from the general wholesale only requirement under sections 142C and 143. These include:

  • proposed section 143A: class exceptions for small providers (up to 2,000 premises and possibly up to 12,000 premises if the regulations permit) as determined by the ACCC. Detailed discussion of this section can be found on pages 93-95 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill
  • proposed section 143E: creates exemptions for certain real estate developments that were underway before 1 January 2011. The Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill states that ‘a number of real estate development projects that were under way before 1 January 2011 continue to be developed. It is therefore necessary to preserve the existing rules’[449]
  • proposed section 143F: details the new ‘close proximity’ exemption replacing the existing 1km rule under subsection 156(4) as amended by item 64 of Schedule 2
  • proposed section 143G: carries forward four existing exemptions for certain networks, specifying those networks in the section and
  • proposed section 143H: introduces a new exemption for networks marketed exclusively as business networks.

Item 43 amends section 144 to limit the ability of the Minister to issue new exemptions by written instrument after the commencement date.

Key issue: removal of the 1km exemption

Section 143 of the Telecommunications Act creates a general rule that the supply of superfast broadband services must be provided on a wholesale only basis. Networks that existed before 1 January 2011 are exempt from this requirement. Section 156(4) creates an additional exemption allowing pre-existing networks to extend up to 1km from their 1 January 2011 limits without engaging the wholesale only requirement in section 143. 

Item 64 of Schedule 2 removes this exemption and replaces it with the ‘close proximity’ exemption under proposed section 143F—it would allow for new access lines to be exempt only if, among other things, ‘the premises are in close proximity to a line that forms part of the infrastructure of the network as the network stood immediately before the designated commencement date.’ It is the proposed that Minister has, by way of legislative instrument, the ability to define ‘close proximity’ under proposed section 162 (at item 77 of Schedule 2 to the TLACC Bill). This power is delegable to the ACCC.[450] The Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill provides:

It is envisaged the close proximity would facilitate the connection of existing network infrastructure in the street to premises, but not the extension of that network infrastructure to allow connection in a new location where the network is not already ‘in close proximity’.[451]

Various telecommunication providers, including TPG and Telstra have used this exemption to extend their legacy fibre networks to new customers.[452] It was also reported in 2016 that NBN was at a competitive disadvantage to other FTTB providers, such as TPG, which has been utilising the 1km exception to roll-out FTTB and are not structurally separated.[453]  In support of the removal of the exemption, the Department has cited the Vertigan Review recommendation to remove the exemption on the basis that it:

...advantaged carriers with pre-2011 network over those who build networks after 2011, especially those with larger network footprints, and enabled carriers with pre-existing networks to roll out large extensions which were not subject to wholesale-only requirements, designed to protect residential consumers.[454]

Telstra and TPG, as operators of legacy networks able to expand under the 1km exception, argued against the amendment in their submissions to the 2017 Senate Inquiry.[455] The 2017 Senate Committee Inquiry ultimately considered that it had ‘not been convinced of the need for amendments’ to the Bill.[456] The 1km rule was not again raised in submissions to the 2019 Inquiry.

Key issue: removal of networks servicing small businesses

Section 143 of the Telecommunication Act requires that networks ‘...used, or proposed to be used, to supply a superfast carriage service wholly or principally to residential or small business customers’, must be provided on a wholesale only basis—it is an offence to contravene this requirement. The Bill proposes that small business customers are removed from the scope of Part 8, leaving it to apply to networks servicing residential customers.[457] As noted above, proposed section 143H sets out an exemption (from the general wholesale only requirement) for networks marketed by the carrier exclusively as a business network, where any incidental residential use is minor.

The effect of this change is that ‘lines which supply superfast carriage services to small business will not be subject to the structural or functional separation requirements’.[458] The intention of this is to enhance flexibility in the supply of superfast carriage services to small businesses, however it is unclear whether this will also result in an improved cost-effective service.[459] The RIS attributes this reform to the Government Policy Statement of 2014, but the statement makes no mention of such a reform.[460] The RIS also states that ‘existing networks, subject to the current rules, will have more scope to service small business customers and operate retail businesses as well as networks.’[461]

Industry and other stakeholders have mixed positions on this issue; Optus in 2017 opposed the change stating that the ‘amendment is inconsistent with the principle that superfast broadband network infrastructure should operate on the basis of a level playing field’.[462] Telstra in 2017 supported the change in general but considered the drafting of the exemption unworkable: ‘[t]his exemption does not reflect the commercial reality that almost every network will have mixed uses’.[463] Telstra recommended that the ‘marketed exclusively’ requirement in the exemption be replaced with the lower bar of ‘wholly or principally’.[464] Vocus, Superloop, and others supported the Bill’s proposal more strongly.[465]

The Department recommended that amendments adopting Telstra’s proposal ‘would not be consistent with the policy objectives of the legislation’ and that such a change would enable carriers to ‘roll out substantial integrated local access networks where only a bare majority of customers (50 per cent plus one, for example) need to be business customers’.[466]

Professor Mark Gregory of RMIT strongly opposed this proposal, describing the Government’s justification of flexibility for network operators as ‘simply nonsense’ and suggesting it would only benefit larger telecommunication companies.[467]

Functional separation undertaking provisions

Item 51 of Schedule 2 inserts a new Division 2B—Standard Functional Separation Undertakings into Part 8 of the Telecommunications Act, which underlines the new functional separation provisions and a new Division 2C–Non-discrimination Rules, which outlines the wholesale rules for such functionally separated entities.

These provisions are uncontentious, with no stakeholders raising issues with functional separation undertakings in the Senate Inquiry process.

Division 2B: standard functional separation undertakings

Proposed section 151A of the Telecommunications Act outlines the basic features of a functional separation undertaking, including:

  • a requirement that the person making the undertaking must maintain an arm’s length functional separation between that person’s wholesale business unit and retail business (proposed paragraphs 151A(2)(a) and (b))
  • various safeguards to ensure that this is effective concerning for example, communication systems and accounts (proposed paragraph 151A(2)(e))
  • publication requirements for wholesale prices and terms of conditions (proposed paragraph 151A(2)(f)) and
  • requirements in relation to the form of the undertaking, expiry, compliance reporting and so on.[468]

Proposed sections 151B and 151C mirror section 151A provisions for non-standard functional separation undertakings. Proposed 151B concerns ‘deemed’ undertakings, where the ACCC has made a determination of variant rules for a specified class of corporation, and the corporation agrees to be bound by those rules. Proposed 151C concerns joint undertaking between multiple persons.

Proposed sections 151F-151J outline the ACCC’s responsibility to either accept or reject proposed undertakings and the process of acceptance or rejection,[469] consultation requirements,[470] and criteria for acceptance.[471] The key criteria for acceptance is ‘whether the undertaking promotes the long-term interests of end-users of carriage services or of services supplied by means of carriage services’.[472]

Proposed sections 151K-151V concern the variation, renewal, replacement, and expiry of undertakings, and consultation and other requirements imposed on the ACCC.

Proposed sections 151W-151Z concerns the revocation of functional separation undertaking. Revocations may be issued if the person has ‘breached a fundamental provision of the undertaking’ (151W(1)(b)(i)) or breached the non-discrimination rules in Division 2C. Proposed 151X imposes consultation requirements on the ACCC before issuing a revocation notice. Proposed section 151Y requires the ACCC to notify a person if that person’s compliance with the undertaking is unsatisfactory.

Proposed sections 151ZA-151ZC concern reporting requirements of entities generally, including the requirement to notify ACCC of changes in control and that the ACCC maintain a register of functional separation undertakings.

Proposed section 151ZD-151ZE concern compliance and enforcement provisions, and provide for civil penalties for contravention. Proposed 151ZE empowers the Federal Court to hear applications concerning potential breaches of functional separation undertakings, and provides for a wide range of remedies and penalties.

Division 2C: non-discrimination rules

Proposed section 151ZF sets out the general principle that structurally separated entities must provide wholesale services on a non-discriminatory basis, without any favour to itself, and provides for civil penalties for contravention. Proposed section 151ZG extends this principle to related activities.

Proposed section 151ZH imposes publication requirements for terms and conditions to wholesale customers, and proposed section 151ZHA provides for judicial enforcement by way of application to the Federal Court.

Other amendments

Item 52 inserts provisions into Division 3 of Part 8 of the Telecommunications Act, including anti-avoidance provisions and related civil penalty provisions,[473] provisions concerning self-incrimination,[474] and delegation of ACCC powers to SES employees of the ACCC.[475]

Proposed sections 151ZL-151ZN concern the role of the Australian Competition Tribunal in reviewing ACCC decisions made under these divisions.

Concluding comments

There is consensus across politics, industry, civil society, and other stakeholder groups that ensuring universal access to broadband is a worthy social goal. The principle of the use of public funding to provide subsidies to non-commercial services in regional areas in support of this goal is also uncontroversial. No submissions by any stakeholders expressed in-principle opposition to the policy objectives of these Bills or their predecessors.

The challenges these Bills face instead arise from widespread concern about their suitability as a method to achieve these uncontroversial policy objectives. Nearly every stakeholder that considered the RBS at a technical level expressed concerns with at least one aspect of its operation. The Vertigan Panel, the Productivity Commission, and the ACCC have all either recommended against an RBS style levy, or expressed concerns with the RBS’s operation. All three regarded an RBS style levy as needlessly distortionary, while also being neither technologically nor competitively neutral. All three recommended direct budget funding as the preferred method of providing subsidies, a position shared by various industry and community groups. 

Broader stakeholder concerns stretched from other macro-scale issues, such the exclusion of wireless technologies from the RBS levy base, through to micro-scale issues such as perceived drafting issues.

2020 is a year of extremely rapid shifts in the telecommunication industry, with the 5G network rollout accelerating, the first LEOSB constellations expected to come online for consumers globally and the NBN network expected to reach completion. These shifts have the potential to upend the market, and present inherent challenges to any attempt at a long term funding arrangement, particularly one developed nearly half a decade ago.

A key concern of stakeholders and the Senate Environment and Communications Legislation Committee is the lack of transparency on how RBS funds are actually spent, reflected in the 2019 Senate Inquiry’s majority recommendation that further measures be developed. 

A running theme of these Bills’ long history has been a repeated emphasis on the role of future legislative reviews of the RBS to address the variety of issues raised during its development. The Productivity Commission’s view that ‘industry would derive greater certainty if the levy design issues are resolved before implementing the proposed Regional Broadband Scheme’[476] is particularly relevant. There is merit in getting it right the first time.