Introductory Info
Date introduced: 28 November 2019
House: House of Representatives
Portfolio: Communications, Cyber Safety and the Arts
Commencement: Various dates as set out in the body of this Bills Digest.
The
Bills Digest at a glance
Purpose of the Bills
The purpose
of the Telecommunications
Legislation Amendment (Competition and Consumer) Bill 2019 (TLACC Bill) and
the Telecommunications
(Regional Broadband Scheme) Charge Bill 2019 (Charge Bill) is to create a:
- statutory guarantee of internet services to every Australian premise
(the Statutory Infrastructure Provider (SIP) regime) and
- funding vehicle to subsidise meeting that guarantee in
non-commercial areas (the Regional Broadband Scheme (RBS)).
The RBS is an
industry levy paid into a special account which in turn provides subsidies via
grants or contracts to NBN Co.
The TLACC
Bill also makes amendments to the superfast network obligation rules in the Telecommunication
Act, and requires the NBN to provide mapping data.
Evolution of the Legislation
The Bills are
a response to the 2014 Vertigan Panel review into the NBN. Since then, the RBS
was the subject of consultation and report by the Bureau of Communications
Research (BCR) in 2015-2016, an exposure draft consultation in 2016-2017, was
introduced to the 45th Parliament in 2017, before lapsing at the dissolution of
the 45th Parliament and being reintroduced with minor changes in November 2019.
Senate Economics Legislation
Committee inquires
The Bills
have been the subject of inquiries by the Senate Environment and Communications
Legislation Committee—both in 2017 and 2019.
Both
Committees recommended the Bills be passed after the adoption of certain
amendments (disallowance provision amendments for the 2017 Inquiry and
transparency measures for the 2019 Inquiry).
Labor
Senators issued additional comments, and the Australian Greens issued
dissenting reports to both inquiries.
Position of major interest groups
There is in-principle
support for the SIP scheme across major interest groups, although there are
some technical concerns with the operation of the scheme.
The RBS is
more divisive, with the telecommunications industry split:
- Telstra
and Optus, as operators of the two currently operational 5G mobile networks,
support the proposed RBS broadly, and oppose any reform of the RBS to include
mobile services
- much
of the rest of the industry, particularly NBN-comparable networks such as TPG
and OptiComm (that will be subject to the RBS) oppose the RBS either largely or
entirely. In the absence of direct budget funding, some support a broad-based
tax which would likely see the RBS extended to mobile services
- community stakeholders largely avoided a technical discussion of
the operation of the Bills, but expressed in-principle support for the policy
objectives of the SIP regime and the creation of a long term funding vehicle to
provide for it and
-
the Productivity Commission and the ACCC expressed a view that
general budget funding would be a more efficient, flexible and less
distortionary method of funding the SIP regime than the RBS.
Financial Implications
The RBS is
intended to be revenue neutral to the overall budget as a self-funding scheme
that raises and spends money internal to it. Administrative costs are intended
to be reimbursed to the Budget by way of funds raised through the RBS charge.
Regional Broadband Scheme
The Regional
Broadband Scheme is a monthly industry charge paid by owners of fixed-line
broadband internet networks on every premise they serve with an internet
service that month. On commencement, the charge will be $7.10 per month.
The charge is
calculated monthly but collected annually, paid into an RBS Special Account.
The Secretary may then issue grants and enter into contracts in relation to funding
fixed wireless and satellite services with eligible funding entities (currently
only NBN Co), and debit amounts from the special account to fund such contracts
and grants.
There
following key issues have been identified:
- direct
budget funding is preferred to the RBS by the Vertigan Review, the Productivity
Commission, the ACCC, and some stakeholders
- the
RBS cost modelling dates from 2015, and is based on a different charge base
(services-in-operation) than the current proposed RBS, leading to stakeholder
concerns that the modelling is no longer current
- the
arrival of low earth orbit satellite broadband (LEOSB) may render the
assumptions underpinning the RBS and SIP scheme outdated—namely, it may make
service to regional and remote areas commercial, and threaten NBN’s Skymuster
satellite and fixed wireless services
- the
RBS excludes mobile network connections from the charge, giving a competitive
advantage to mobile providers over fixed-line providers. Given the increasing
roll-out of 5G, various stakeholders are concerned that this will both heavily
distort the market and lead to a reduced charge base as consumers substitute
fixed-line for mobile connections (and avoid paying into the RBS)
- the
RBS charge and RBS charge cap has not been adjusted for inflation with the
reintroduction of the Bills and
- various
stakeholders and the Senate Inquiry raised concerns about the transparency of
funding provided under the scheme.
Statutory Infrastructure Provider
regime
The SIP Scheme is designed to guarantee that every premise
in Australia has access to an internet connection of at least 25 megabits per
second. A SIP is obligated to provide a fixed-line connection, or if that is
not reasonable, a fixed wireless or satellite connection.
NBN Co is intended to be the default SIP for Australia.
However, under certain circumstances other carriers must nominate as a SIP for
an area, for example if a carrier is contracted to provide connections to a
real estate or building development. The Minister may also designate carriers
as a SIP by legislative instrument.
The following
key issues have been identified with the SIP Regime:
- Telstra has
expressed concern with potential gaps in the SIP scheme prior to the
completion of the NBN
- the power
of the Minister to designate carriers as SIPs is very broad
- SIP
bandwidth guarantees may be insufficient to future needs
- the
definition of ‘fixed wireless’ under the SIP Scheme may impede
technological advances
- Telstra has
expressed concern that a carrier who installs mobile infrastructure in a
new real estate development may become legally obligated to provide
fixed-line internet network under the current legislation, outside the
policy intent of the proposal and
- future LEOSB may be excluded from the definition of
‘qualifying satellite carriage service’, potentially preventing such
services from being offered to meet SIP obligations.
Amendments to the Superfast
Network Rules
The TLACC
Bill also repeals Part 7 and makes substantial amendments to Part 8 of the Telecommunications
Act. These parts concern regulation of non-NBN fixed-line internet networks
in Australia that service residential and small business customers, generally
requiring them to be wholesale only (that is, structurally separated).
Broadly, these amendments:
- remove small business services from the ambit of regulation
- allow carriers other than NBN or Telstra to functionally separate
their retail internet and wholesale internet services subject to approval from
the ACCC
- allow the ACCC to exempt small providers from obligations
-
impose new non-discrimination requirements and
- replace an exemption which allows existing networks to extend by
up to 1km from their pre-NBN boundaries without engaging regulation under these
sections.
There are two
key issues identified with the amendment to the Superfast Network Rules:
- current legacy network (pre-NBN) carriers oppose the removal of the
exemption that allows them to extend their legacy networks up to 1km from their
pre-NBN bounds. Other stakeholders support the removal as a way to prevent such
networks from ‘cherrypicking’ highly profitable areas in inner metro areas and
-
the removal of small business networks from superfast network obligations
elicited mixed reactions from stakeholders.
NBN Co mapping data
The TLACC
Bill will also require NBN to provide mapping data to be published on the National Map website. The mapping data
to be provided is about premises connected, or due to be connected, to the NBN
based on geographic location and technology type.
Concluding comments
The policy
objectives of the Bills have near universal support among stakeholders and
other commentators. The methods through which the Bill seeks to achieve those
objectives, particularly the RBS, has attracted substantial and varied
criticism across stakeholder groups.
History
of the Bills
The Telecommunications
Legislation Amendment (Competition and Consumer) Bill 2018 (2018 TLACC
Bill) and the Telecommunications
(Regional Broadband Scheme) Charge Bill 2018 (2018 Charge Bill) were introduced
into the House of Representatives on 22 June 2017 and passed the House on
10 May 2018. Government amendments to both Bills were made in the
House.[29]
Both Bills were introduced into the Senate on 18 June 2018. Further Government
amendments, and amendments by the Australian Greens and the Australian Labor
Party (Labor), were proposed in the Senate, but the Bills lapsed at the dissolution
of the 45th Parliament on 1 July 2019.[30]
The Telecommunications
Legislation Amendment (Competition and Consumer) Bill 2019 (TLACC Bill) and
the Telecommunications
(Regional Broadband Scheme) Charge Bill 2019 (Charge Bill) were introduced
into the House of Representatives on 28 November 2019 and passed the House on
13 February 2020.
While the 2019 Bills are mainly the same as the 2018 Bills
that passed the House of Representatives (that is, with the Government
amendments made in the House), there have been a number of changes to the
drafting of both Bills, in particular:
- the
TLACC Bill incorporates the Government amendments to the 2018 Bill moved in the
Senate[31]
and
- the
Charge Bill reflects amendments suggested by the Government and Opposition to
the 2018 Charge Bill in the Senate.[32]
Purpose of the Bills
The Bills have three inter-related purposes:
- to
establish the Rural Broadband Scheme (RBS), imposing an industry levy on
all fixed-line internet connections to fund subsidises for satellite and fixed
wireless connections in rural and regional Australia. The Charge Bill is a
taxation Bill that establishes the RBS charge. Schedule 4 of the TLACC Bill
amends the Telecommunications
(Consumer Protection and Service Standards Act) 1999 (TCPSS Act)
to establish the administration of the scheme and govern the payment of
subsidies
- to
establish the Statutory Infrastructure Provider (SIP) regime. Statutory
Infrastructure Providers would be required to provide a fixed-line service to
any premise in the area in which they are the SIP, or if a fixed-line service
is not reasonable, fixed wireless or satellite services. NBN Co is envisaged to
be the default SIP nationally, but the regime sets out ways in which other
carriers must become SIPs and
- to
reform regulation of Non-NBN Carrier Networks in Parts 7 and 8 of the Telecommunications
Act 1997. This includes amendments to the exceptions to further network
expansion, and provisions for structural separation undertakings by non-NBN
carrier networks into wholesaling and retail business units.
Structure of the Bills
The TLACC Bill is divided into five schedules:
- Schedule
1 repeals Part 7 of the Telecommunications Act (which deals with the
regulation of non-NBN carriers offering Layer 2 bitstream services) and makes
consequential amendments to the Competition and
Consumer Act 2010 (CCA)
- Schedule
2 amends Part 8 of the Telecommunications Act (which deals with the
regulation of non-NBN carriers offering superfast fixed-line networks) and
makes consequential amendments to related legislation
- Schedule
3 creates the SIP regime
- Schedule
4 sets out the operational arrangements of the RBS and
- Schedule
5 requires NBN Co. to provide data on premises connected to the NBN for
publication on the National Map website.
The Charge Bill is not subdivided into parts or
divisions—it establishes the amount of and imposes liability for the charge.
Commencement
The Charge Bill commences as follows:
- sections
1 and 2 on Royal Assent
- sections
3 to 20—at the same time as Schedule 4 of the Telecommunications Legislation
Amendment (Competition and Consumer) Act 2019 (that is, Schedule 4 of the
TLACC Bill)
The TLACC Bill commences as follows:
- sections
1 to 4—on Royal Assent
- Schedule
1—the day after Royal Assent
- Schedule
2—three months after Royal Assent
- Schedule
3—Division 1 in Part 1 the day after Royal Assent; Division 2 in Part 1 the
earlier of a day fixed by proclamation and 1 July 2020; Part 2, immediately
after Division 2 of Part 1 of Schedule 3 commences
- Schedule
4—the day after Royal Assent and
- Schedule
5—the day after Royal Assent.
Background
Policy Background to the RBS
& SIP
History of providing services to regional and rural
Australia—post and telephone service obligations
Providing broadband services to rural and regional
Australia is currently very expensive;[33]
more expensive than what most customers in this area would be willing to pay if
such services were charged at the cost of providing them.[34]
Ensuring equal access to communication services between
all Australians regardless of address has been an uncontroversial core policy
and expectation of the Commonwealth since Federation. Australia Post’s
obligation to deliver services throughout Australia at a single uniform rate of
postage is a core social promise and a statutory requirement under section 27
of the Australian
Postal Corporation Act 1989.
As technology has evolved, this commitment has varied in
its strength and response. The first iteration of the Telecommunications
Universal Service Obligation (TUSO) under the Telecommunications
Act 1975, obligated Telecom Australia to provide
telecommunication services ‘available throughout Australia for all people who
reasonably require those services’.[35]
With the deregulation of the telecommunication sector in
the 1990s and the privatisation of Telstra between 1996–2007, this original
statutory responsibility of Telecom gradually evolved into the current
Universal Service Obligation/Telecommunications Industry Levy Scheme (USO/TIL)
legislated in 2011–2012.[36]
The USO/TIL Scheme is focussed on provision of telephone line infrastructure
and standard telephone services. Telstra continues to be the sole universal
service provider under this scheme, obligated to provide voice telephony
services that are ‘reasonably accessible to all people in Australia on an
equitable basis, wherever they reside or carry on business’.[37]
Broadband internet policy in Australia
The Regional Broadband Scheme and Statutory Infrastructure
Provider Regime represent the latest development in a long history of
government regulation, intervention and subsidisation of broadband
internet—together, the regime proposes to extend the obligation of universal
and equitable access to communication services to broadband internet.
The SIP Regime obligates the National Broadband Network
Company (NBN Co) and other SIPs (as nominated or designated over time) to
provide broadband internet services to every premise in Australia.[38]
The RBS is a funding mechanism that collects money via an industry charge on
every fixed-line broadband connection and then makes payments to eligible
funding entities (by default, NBN Co) via grants or contracts, intended to
cover losses incurred in meeting their SIP obligations.[39]
The Keating Government first addressed the policy issue of
the nascent Internet with the Networking
Australia’s Future Report in 1994. From the onset, the challenge
of ensuring the accessibility of broadband in regional and rural Australia, as
well as the possibility of including broadband internet within a universal
service obligation were recognised.[40]
The Report noted:
If Broadband services become a basic communications
requirement, consideration will need to be given to how to fund the roll-out of
these services to areas of low population density. Essentially, the options
involve either some form of cross subsidy or direct government
funding.[41]
[emphasis added]
Government policy since has followed a mix of these two
options. From 1997 through to 2007, the Howard Government pursued a series of
direct government funding programs, beginning with the Networking the Nation
Fund (1997–2004), which distributed $351.13 million directly on a project by
project basis across regional Australia.[42]
This was followed by the High Bandwidth Incentive Scheme
(HiBIS) in 2003, a subsidy scheme which provided registered internet service
providers with incentive payments to supply higher bandwidth services in
regional and rural Australia at prices comparable to those available in
metropolitan areas.[43]
HiBIS was followed by the Broadband Connect package in 2005, and then the
Australian Broadband Guarantee (ABG) in 2007.[44]
In 2006, the Howard Government announced $958 million in funding for the
OPEL Network, an industry proposal to deliver wholesale broadband internet in
regional rural Australia (cancelled in 2008).[45]
These packages all focused on providing direct government
subsidies to the industry or community organisations to subsidise the cost
of providing services in regional and rural Australia.
It is significant that by 2005, there was a discernible
and fundamental change in the way in which people were using the internet. The
arrival of YouTube was a marker of that change; the video sharing service
posted its first video on 23 April 2005.[46]
People started to use it as a means for uploading and sharing content they had
developed themselves. This expanded into far greater and regular social, commercial
and political use with people increasingly posting their own videos on YouTube
and digital photos, and then sharing their opinions and stories on blogs and
social networking sites like Facebook, Twitter and so forth.
The increased use of the internet has resulted in an increased
demand for greater bandwidth. This has generated arguments for timely
investment in a sophisticated telecommunications network that is
future-proofed, ensuring that people from now until many years into the future
can use the internet in the ways we are using it now, and ways not yet
contemplated.
The strategy used by the Howard Government shifted with
the election of the Rudd Government in November 2007 and the announcement in
December 2007 by Senator Stephen Conroy of the newly elected Government's
commitment to building a national high-speed broadband Fibre to the Node (FTTN)
network.[47]
On 7 April 2009, the Rudd Government announced a
large-scale national telecommunications infrastructure project, with
concomitant plans to establish a company (NBN Co) to build and operate a
National Broadband Network which would deliver superfast broadband services to
homes and businesses across Australia. The government would be the majority
shareholder of NBN Co, joining with private investors though eventually selling
its interest five years after the NBN is operational, ‘consistent with market
conditions, and national and identity security considerations’.[48]
The aims of this infrastructure project included improving competition in the
telecommunications sector, stimulating investment, increasing speed and
improving quality in communications technology for businesses and rural
Australians in particular. There was also the important goal of elevating Australia’s
international standing as measured by telecommunications indicators such as
broadband take‐up, accessibility of digital content, and competition in
the Internet Service Provider (ISP) sector.[49]
Under the subsequent Gillard Labor Government, it was decided
that the NBN proposal would be expanded in its reach, with the goal of
providing access to NBN Co’s fibre network (specifically, the FTTP network) to
93 per cent of Australian premises, providing them with accessing speeds of up
to 100 Megabits per second (‘Mbps’) (later increased to 1000 Mbit/s), with the
remaining seven per cent of premises having accessing speeds of up to 12 Mbps
through next generation satellite and wireless technology.[50]
The Abbott Government re-visited some of the decisions
made under the Labor Government in relation to the network strategy and its
architecture as Labor's NBN was behind schedule and over budget when the
government lost office in 2013.[51]
The Abbott Government replaced the largely fibre-to-the-premises (FTTP) model
initiated by the Labor Government with a Multi Technology Mix (MTM) model. The
MTM uses a range of fixed-line architectures and other technologies including copper
wires, fibre-to-the-node (FTTN), fibre-to-the-curb (FTTC) and Hybrid Fibre
Coaxial (HFC), and satellite. This approach has raised debate about
cost-effectiveness and efficacy of the network.[52]
Nonetheless, adopting the MTM had the virtue of being cheaper to build, and quicker
to roll out. There was also an argument that NBN could be delivered cheaper and
sooner, with the earlier arrival of revenue from business and residential
customers able to fund subsequent upgrades to the network. There is debate
about whether this has been achieved.[53]
With NBN Co being created as a virtual public monopoly
over broadband internet connections, protected from competition by legislation,[54]
the method used to fund it shifted towards a cross subsidy. The costs of NBN
providing services to regional areas by satellite and fixed wireless networks
would be covered by higher prices on customers in urban areas.[55]
This cross subsidy arrangement has held throughout the
rollout of the NBN, supplemented by direct government programs such as the Mobile
Blackspot Program, and the 2019
Stronger Regional Digital Connectivity Package.[56]
Evolution of the Legislation
Origins—the Vertigan Panel
On 12 December 2013, the newly elected Abbott Government
issued terms
of reference for the Independent Cost-Benefit Analysis of Broadband and
Review of Regulation by a NBN Panel of experts chaired by Dr Michael Vertigan
AC (the Vertigan Panel).[57]The
Vertigan Panel delivered three reports:
Government Response to the Vertigan Panel
The Government released its response to the
recommendations of the Vertigan Panel on 11 December 2014 in the Telecommunications
Regulatory and Structural Reform government policy paper. In it, the
Government, amongst other things:
- accepted
recommendation 3, to repeal Part 7 of the Telecommunications Act
- accepted
recommendation 4, to amend various aspects of Part 8 of the Telecommunications
Act
- accepted
recommendation 5, to legislate Infrastructure Provider of Last Resort
obligations on NBN Co
- rejected
elements of recommendation 11 (funding of non-commercial services). While the
Vertigan Panel at several points had indicated a preference for subsidies to be
directly budget funded, they recommended that a single annual broad-based levy
similar to the current USO/TIL scheme be adopted that would fund both broadband
and voice services.[58]
The Government rejected this recommendation, instead proposing an alternative
narrow based industry levy (the RBS)). The response also announced that the
Government would ask the Bureau of Communications Research (BCR) to inquire
into and report on the amount of non-commercial funding required.[59]
The Government’s response to these four recommendations
forms the core of the current Bills before Parliament:
- recommendation
3 (repeals Part 7 of the Telecommunications Act) is set out in Schedule 1
of the TLACC Bill
- recommendation
4 (amends Part 8 of the Telecommunications Act) is set out as Schedule 2
of TLACC Bill, although it has evolved from its original scope
- recommendation
5 has evolved into the proposed SIP scheme in Schedule 3 of the TLACC Bill and
- the
Government’s position on recommendation 11 has evolved into the proposed RBS in
the Charge Bill and Schedule 4 of the TLACC Bill.
Bureau of Communications Research report
The BCR published the consultation paper NBN
non-commercial Services Funding Options on 1 April 2015 and conducted
a second consultation, NBN
non-commercial services funding options: final consultation paper
between 13 October 2015 and 3 November 2015. The BCR published NBN
non-commercial services funding options: final report in March 2016—it
became the basis of the RBS.
Telecommunication
Reform Package Exposure Drafts
In December 2016, the Department of Communication and the
Arts (DOCA) released the Telecommunication Legislation Amendment (Competition
and Consumer) Bill and the Telecommunications (Regional Broadband Scheme) Bill
as exposure
drafts.[60]
Consultation ran from 12 December 2016 to 3 February 2017, and the Department
received 29 submissions.
Productivity
Commission inquiry
Simultaneous to the BCR inquiry and the DOCA Exposure
Draft consultation process was the Productivity Commission inquiry into the
Telecommunications Universal Service Obligation.
The Productivity Commission received Terms of Reference
for the inquiry on 28 April 2016, and published an Issues Paper
on 7 June 2016. The Final Report
was provided to the Government on 28 April 2017 and publicly released on
19 June 2017.[61]
As discussed at numerous points in this Digest, the
Productivity Commission inquiry report was broadly critical of the approach
that the Government had adopted in designing the RBS and echoed the original
Vertigan Panel opinion that the USO and RBS should not be considered
independently of each other.
Differences between the 2018 and 2019 Bills
Government amendments to the 2018 Bills were made in the
House during the consideration in detail stage and have been incorporated into
the Bills.[62]
These amendments contained strengthened disallowance procedures in response to
recommendations by the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills (Scrutiny
of Bills Committee) and the Environment and Communications Legislation
Committee (discussed under Committee consideration below).
While the 2019 Bills are mainly the same as the versions
of the 2018 Bills that passed the House of Representatives, there have been a
number of changes to the drafting in both of the Bills.
The TLACC Bill incorporates Government and Labor
amendments to the 2018 Bill moved in the Senate, including the insertion of Schedule
5 of the TLACC Bill that requires NBN Co to provide mapping data on the
rollout for publication on the National Map website.[63]
The Charge Bill reflects amendments suggested by the
Opposition to the 2018 Charge Bill in the Senate, including:
- a
reduction in the RBS charge cap from $10.00 to $7.10 (clause 17A of the
Charge Bill)
- the
addition of a concession that exempts carriers for the first 55,000 ‘recently
connected greenfield premises’ on their networks for the first five years of
operation of the RBS (clause 20 of the Charge Bill).[64]
Other changes include a new power for the Minister, by
legislative instrument, to exempt carriers in nominated areas from the SIP
regime.[65]
Committee consideration
Senate Environment and Communications Legislation Committee
Both the 2018 and current Bills were referred to the
Senate Environment and Communications Legislation Committee.
2017 Committee Inquiry
The 2018 Bills were referred to the Senate Environment and
Communications Legislation Committee on 22 June 2017 for inquiry and report.
Details of that inquiry are available at the inquiry
homepage. The Committee reported on 6 September 2017.[66]
The Committee recommended that the Bills be passed
contingent on an amendment to the disallowance procedure for determinations by
the Minister varying the scope of the RBS charge.[67]
This recommendation was accepted and forms part of the Bills before Parliament.[68]
Labor Senators issued additional comments and Greens
Senators issued a dissenting report—their concerns were primarily regarding the
operation of the RBS and the associated charge. Labor Senators noted: ‘the
Senate Inquiry process has by no means established that the RBS proposed in the
Bill is the most effective and efficient method of achieving the stated policy
objectives.’[69]
The Greens Senators expanded on these concerns in their
dissenting report; they expressed concern that the RBS was an overly narrow and
distortionary tax which did not account for changes in technology and argued:
‘[a] preferable option would be for the non-commercial services to be funded
from the general budget.’ The Greens recommended:
Revising the Regional Broadband Scheme, taking into
consideration updated costings, the current and emerging state of
telecommunications technology and markets, and recommendations from the
Productivity Commission regarding the Telecommunications Universal Service
Obligation.[70]
2019
Committee Inquiry
The Bills were referred to the Senate Environment and
Communications Legislation Committee for inquiry and report by 21 February
2020, with a hearing on 30
January 2020. Details of the inquiry are available at the inquiry
homepage. The Committee reported on 14 February 2020.[71]
The Committee recommended that the Bills be passed after
consideration by the Government of the ‘implementation of additional
transparency measures to provide details of NBN Co’s off-set arrangements and
the effective management of these arrangements’.[72]
The Committee agreed ‘with the department's conclusion, that the bills
represent an appropriate policy response in the long term’.[73]
On the potential for 5G mobile coverage to bypass the NBN
(discussed below), the Committee noted:
The department advised that it does not consider fixed line
services to be directly substitutable for mobile services. However, in the
event of a material change to the NBN uptake rates, the committee agrees that
the statutory review could consider expanding the levy base to include mobile
services.[74]
The Committee additionally noted support for inclusion of
enterprise networks in the RBS charge base, and the use of premise rather than
services-in-operation as the charge base definition.
Labor Senators’ additional comments
Labor Senators in their additional comments went further
than the Committee view in several respects. Labor Senators noted the
submissions of various telecommunications industry members that the RBS charge
‘reduces incentives for the private sector to invest and has an
anti-competitive intent’.[75]
Labor Senators noted particular concern over RBS funding transparency, stating
that contrary to the claims in the Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill:
... there is seemingly no mechanism that requires the surplus
revenue from the Government's $800 million annual broadband tax to be spent on
regional networks. In practice, there remain legitimate concerns that once the
tax revenues flow into NBN Co the company management can effectively direct
surplus tax revenue towards anything they wish once it is washed through an
offset account, regardless of whether the expenditure relates to a regional
outcome or not.[76]
Labor Senators did however indicate support for the TLACC
Bill more broadly and the Statutory Infrastructure Provider regime. While
raising concerns with the structure of the RBS, they noted ‘their support for a
price signal to deter opportunistic cherry picking of the residential NBN
fixed-line network’.[77]
Labor Senators made three additional recommendations in relation to the Bills:
- that
the Bill be amended to require the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission (ACCC) to redo modelling of RBS costings within 60 days of the Bill
receiving assent
- that
the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) exercise forbearance
towards carriers who are unable to implement the broadband tax in their systems
by the required date, and if necessary, the Government consider delaying the
commencement date of the levy and
- the
Government begin work on developing a roadmap for how the USO and RBS can be
consolidated and harmonised over time.[78]
Australian Greens’ dissenting report
The Australian Greens issued a dissenting report as they
did to the inquiry into the 2018 Bills—this dissenting report was extremely
brief. The Greens’ Senators noted in-principle support for the intent of the
Bills, supporting ‘technological equity’ and considered ‘the most equitable and
sustainable funding model for the RBS is direct Budget funding’.[79]
Senate
Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills
Both the current and 2018 Bills have been considered by
the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills.[80]
In 2017, the Scrutiny of Bills Committee highlighted
concerns with the non-standard disallowance procedures included in the 2018
Bills; amendments were made to the 2018 Bills as recommended by the Senate
Environment and Communications Legislation Committee’s 2017 inquiry into the
Bills.[81]
Those amendments are also incorporated into the current Bills.[82]
While the Scrutiny of Bills Committee’s comments on the
current Bills welcomed the modifications to the disallowance procedures, it has
noted concern with the extent to which delegated legislation could be used to:
- alter
the tax base—by excluding certain carriage services from the definition of
‘designated broadband service’ and
- vary
the rate of taxation—by changing the size of the charge under subclauses
12(4) and 16(8) of the Charge Bill.
In this respect, the Committee states:
One of the most fundamental functions of the Parliament is to
levy taxation. The committee's consistent scrutiny view is that it is for the
Parliament, rather than makers of delegated legislation, to set a rate of tax.[83]
The Committee draws its scrutiny concerns to the attention
of Senators and leaves to the Senate as a whole to determine the
appropriateness of allowing the Minister to alter the rate of a tax via
delegated legislation.[84]
Joint Standing Committee on the National Broadband Network
While not considering the Bills directly, the Joint
Standing Committee on the National Broadband Network has a current ongoing Inquiry
into the Business Case for the NBN and the Experiences of Small Business,
which necessarily considers matters related to the Bills.[85]
Policy position of non-government parties/independents
Labor
Labor has indicated support for the TLACC Bill and the
Statutory Infrastructure Provider regime; however, in their additional comments
to the 2019 Committee Report, Labor Senators expressed concern with aspects of
the Bill and have suggested amendments—this is discussed above under the
heading ‘Labor Senators’ additional comments’.
The
Greens
The Greens do not support the Bills in their current form;
their reasons are outlined above under the heading ‘Senate Environment
and Communications Legislation Committee’.
Dr
Helen Haines
Dr Helen Haines, independent Member for Indi, spoke to the
current Bills in the second reading debate. While describing the RBS scheme as
an ‘improvement on the current system’, Dr Haines noted concern the charge may
result in increased prices for consumers as it is at the discretion of the
service providers to decide whether to pass the cost on. Dr Haines clarified
her support for the SIP obligations.[86]
Centre
Alliance
Centre Alliance does not appear to have made any public
statements on the Bills. Some indication of Centre Alliance’s concerns with the
Bills is provided by Ms Sharkie's Question in Writing to
the Minister on 19 September 2019.[87]The
question included queries about the potential for a funding shortfall in
ensuring that SIP obligations are met.
Other
parties and Independents
At the time of writing, Bob Katter, Andrew Wilkie, Pauline
Hanson’s One Nation, and the Jacqui Lambie Network do not appear to have
expressed a public view on these Bills in either their current or previous
form.
Position of major interest groups
Table 1 summarises the position of interest and industry
groups that made submissions to either the 2017 or the 2019 Committee Inquiries
on the Bills.
Table 1: the position of interest and industry groups
that made submissions
Interest Group |
RBS (Schedule 4) |
SIP (Schedule 3) |
Network Rules (Schedules 1 and 2) |
Telecommunications Industry |
Optus (2017
& 2019) |
Partially supports (extension to enterprise and government
networks undesirable) |
Supports |
Partially Supports (opposes removal of small business
networks from Part 8) |
Telstra (2017
& 2019) |
Partially supports (does not support the extension to
enterprise networks)[88] |
Partially Supports (technicalities surrounding NBN Co’s
interim SIP obligations) |
Opposes (unnecessary, elimination of the 1km rule, regards
the removal of small businesses from Part 8 as ‘unworkable’) |
TPG Telecom Limited (2017
& 2019) |
Opposes (entirely—considers NBN Co’s shortfall should be
funded out of consolidated revenue) |
No comment |
Partially Supports (opposes elimination of 1km rule) |
Vocus Group Limited (2017
& 2019) |
Opposes (entirely) |
Supports |
Supports |
Superloop Limited (2017) |
Opposes (entirely) |
No comment |
Supports (concerns regarding residential definitions) |
OptiComm Co Pty Ltd (2017
& 2019) |
Opposes (entirely) |
No comment |
No comment |
NBN Co (2017
& 2019) |
Supports |
Supports |
Supports |
Vodafone Hutchison Australia (2017
& 2019) |
Opposes (entirely) |
Supports |
Supports |
Commpete (2019) |
Partially supports (too narrow tax base, exclusion of
mobile broadband suboptimal) |
Supports |
Supports |
Other Industry |
Cotton Australia (2017) |
Supports |
Supports |
No comment |
National Farmers Federation (2017) |
Supports |
Supports |
No comment |
NSW Farmers (2019) |
Supports |
Supports |
No comment |
Government |
Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (2017
& 2019) |
No comment |
Supports |
No comment |
Community |
Regional, Rural and Remote Communications Coalition (2017
& 2019) |
Supports |
Supports |
No comment |
Australian Communication Consumer Action Network (2017
& 2019) |
Supports |
Supports |
No comment |
Australian Isolated Children’s Parents Association (2019) |
Supports |
Supports |
No comment |
Internet Australia (2019) |
Opposes |
Partially opposes (Merge with USO/PUSP, rigidity of
technology options) |
No comment |
Country Women’s Association of Australia (2019) |
Supports |
Supports |
No comment |
Individual |
Professor Mark Gregory (2017) |
Opposes (entirely) |
Opposes (unsatisfactory speeds) |
Opposes (business/small Business/ residential distinctions
impractical, definitional issues) |
Position of the telecommunications industry
Regional Broadband Scheme
The telecommunication industry split substantially in its
support of the RBS, largely between the current operators of 5G mobile networks
(Telstra and Optus) and the rest of the industry, particularly fixed-line NBN
competitors (TPG, OptiComm and others).
While no industry member outside NBN Co unequivocally
supports the current particulars of the proposed RBS, Optus and Telstra largely
limited their concerns to the potential extension of RBS charges to enterprise
networks.[89]
Both Telstra and Optus (the two operators of Australia’s
existing 5G networks) have stated that they view 5G as a complementary rather
than substitutable service to the NBN, and oppose inclusion of non-fixed
services in the levy base.[90]
However, as discussed below under the heading ‘Key issue: exclusion of
non-fixed connections from the charge’, the rollout of 5G technology
has reignited the substitutability debate.
Telstra also included substantial concerns with the
definition of ‘local access line’ and ‘premise’ in both its 2017 and 2019
submissions for the purposes of the RBS,[91]
which the Committee inquiries considered in detail.[92]
Vocus, OptiComm, TPG Telecom, Vodafone Hutchinson
Australia conversely all oppose the RBS entirely.[93]
Opposition to the RBS is twofold:
- arguments
that the RBS as a ‘narrow-based tax’ is poor policy and that it would be better
funded from the budget or consolidated with the USO/TIL scheme and
- the
exclusion of 5G mobile networks and other technologies from the charge will
give certain industry players (namely Optus and Telstra) a substantial
competitive advantage over NBN Co and other fixed-line network operators. This
in turn would lead to falling revenues as consumers shifted away from fixed
line connections.
Submissions to the 2019 Committee Inquiry additionally
focused on the dated information on which the Bills rely, including the
accuracy of the 2015 BCR calculations of RBS costings in the current market,[94]
concerns which were a common theme of the Committee’s 30 January 2020 hearing,
and raised by Labor Senators in their additional comments.[95]
The above concerns are discussed throughout the digest
under the heading are ‘The Regional Broadband Scheme’.
Statutory
Infrastructure Provider regime
The telecommunications industry was generally supportive
of the principle of the SIP regime, with only Telstra raising any concerns with
the scheme in its 2017 and 2019 submissions.
In 2017, Telstra expressed concern that potential gaps in
the SIP framework prior to the designated day could lead to Telstra being
obligated to service some premises under the USO until that time.[96]
Telstra additionally expressed concerns that the Minister’s ability to designate
carriers other than the NBN as SIPs was too broad, and that all SIPs should be
required to operate through a single wholesale interface.[97]
In 2019, Telstra extended its concerns to include the
potential that mobile network infrastructure installation could give rise to
nominated SIP requirements, discussed in more detail in ‘Key Issue:
nominated service area requirements unclear’.[98]
Network Rules amendments
Industry support for the repeal of Part 7 and amendments
to Part 8 of the Telecommunications Act were mixed, with key concerns in
the 2017 inquiry process including:
- the
removal of the ‘1km exception’ under subsection 156(4) of the Telecommunications
Act (Telstra and TPG) and
- the
removal of small business networks from regulation under Part 8, and potential
distortionary or definitional issues that may arise (Optus, Vocus, Superloop).[99]
These issues are discussed in further detail under the
headings ‘Key issue: removal of the 1km exemption’ and
‘Key issue: removal of networks servicing small businesses’.
Industry stakeholders tended to focus less on these issues
in their 2019 submissions.
Position of the ACCC and PC
The ACCC in the Communications
Sector Market Study (2018) took the view that ‘that direct budget
funding of regional and remote communications services is preferable’.[100]
The Productivity Commission in the Telecommunications
Universal Service Obligation report (2017) also raised concerns with
the RBS:
... alternative funding arrangements — such as through general
government revenue and/or a broad-based industry levy — should be looked at
more closely before implementing a long-term narrow-based funding model in a
dynamic industry.[101]
On the RBS the Productivity Commission additionally noted
that ‘industry would derive greater certainty if the levy design issues are
resolved before implementing the proposed Regional Broadband Scheme’ and
that ‘the risk of policy inertia is high once a policy is implemented.’[102]
The Productivity Commission also noted that although the
proposed SIP regime ‘would assist in providing greater confidence to the
community about nbn’s role’, there was ‘uncertainty and contention’ concerning
the role of SIPs in providing voice services. The Productivity Commission
recommended that legislation be amended to require SIPs to provide both
broadband and voice services.[103]
Position of other groups
The vast majority of other groups were wholly supportive
of both the RBS and the SIP scheme. ACCAN argued that ‘the reform package
should be passed with the utmost priority’.[104]
The National Farmer’s Federation in 2017 highlighted the ‘long term economic
benefit to the country - even from agricultural productivity alone’ from
investment in otherwise uncommercial telecommunications infrastructure—for
example, through the RBS.[105]
Many of these submissions are extremely brief and express
more in-principle support for the policy objectives of the SIP scheme in
particular, and the RBS as a source of funding in order to sustain it. Unlike
industry submissions or the Productivity Commission or ACCC, they do not
generally consider the technical aspects of the Bills.
The exception to this include Internet Australia, which
seconded telecommunications industry concerns with the administration of the
RBS, and recommended that the RBS and SIP schemes should be merged with the
existing USO/TIL scheme.[106]
Internet Australia also expressed concerns that the restriction of RBS payments
to fixed-wireless and satellite connections only could distort the market and
protect those technologies from competition with newer connection types.[107]
Professor Mark Gregory of RMIT is the only individual or
academic to have made a submission to either inquiry, and was critical of the
structure of the RBS as ‘anti-competitive’ while describing the SIP as
inadequate to modern bandwidth requirements.[108]
Financial implications
The Regional Broadband Scheme is envisioned to be budget
neutral, funded out of the regional broadband scheme charge, which includes an
administrative cost component (initially one cent for each chargeable premises,
per month) to fund the costs of administering the scheme.[109]
The Charge Bill Financial Impact Statement notes that
while there is ‘a small initial impact on the Budget to fund the ACMA and
ACCC’s initial set up costs’, this cost will be reimbursed to the Consolidated
Revenue Fund and future administrative costs funded out of the scheme.[110]
The Charge Bill Financial Impact Statement also includes
2019–20 Budget figures estimating the impact on underlying cash over the
forward estimates (table 2), however, this is dependent on the scheme
commencing on 1 July 2020 with collections and payments occurring in 2020–21:
Table 2: 2019–20 Budget figures estimating the impact on
underlying cash over the forward estimates
|
Impact on underlying cash ($ millions)
|
|
2019-20
|
2020-21
|
2021-22
|
2022-23
|
Total
|
Expenditure
|
0.0
|
-28.002
|
-29.559
|
-32.540
|
-90.101
|
Revenue
|
0.0
|
29.218
|
29.734
|
32.540
|
91.492
|
Total
|
0.0
|
1.216
|
0.175
|
0.000
|
1.391
|
Source: Explanatory Memorandum, Telecommunications (Regional Broadband Scheme) Charge Bill 2019, p. 5.
The TLACC Bill financial impact statement provides:
The proposals in the Bills will require a small increase in
resourcing for the ACMA and the ACCC. Separation and SIP measures are expected
to be funded from within those agencies’ existing budgets. Their activities in
relation to the Regional Broadband Scheme are funded through the receipts from
the Scheme.[111]
More recently some stakeholders have questioned if the RBS
will sufficiently cover the costs of the NBN meeting its SIP obligations, such
as Rebekha Sharkie in a Question to the Minister of Communications on 19
September 2019.[112]
In his answer, the Minister reiterated that SIP obligations were effectively
funded by the RBS, and appeared to imply that any costs not covered by the RBS
would simply become subject to another cross-subsidy.[113]
As the Bills are currently drafted, there does not appear to be a government
guarantee to cover any net losses that NBN Co or other providers may incur in
meeting their SIP obligations if RBS payments are insufficient, such losses
will need to be funded internal to the SIP.
As discussed below under ‘Key issue: exclusion of
non-fixed connections from the charge’, there is a
possibility that competition from wireless broadband internet connections may
reduce the number of chargeable premises, which may in turn, have implications
for the tax base of the RBS. Given that the current maximum $7.10 charge is
below the amount modelled by the BCR as sufficient to meet the costs of the
scheme, there is also the possibility that the RBS scheme will be insufficient
even if this does not happen.[114]
Conversely, technological shifts may reduce the cost of
meeting the SIP obligations either through reduction of the cost of providing
existing services (such as NBN Co’s fixed wireless service), or new
technologies such as LEOSB. In this circumstance, the Minister could lower the
rate of the RBS charge or refund excess monies to levy paying carriers.[115]
However, the ACCC is only currently obligated to review the RBS charge amount
every five years.
There is concern about the level of transparency should
the RBS result in NBN Co receiving funds surplus to its needs (this is
discussed under the heading ‘Key issue: funding transparency concerns’).
Special
appropriation
Proposed section 89 of the TCPSS Act (at item
13 of Schedule 4 to TLACC Bill) establishes the RBS Special Account for
the purposes of section 80 of the Public Governance,
Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act).[116]
The special account:
- will
receive credits equal to the amount of RBS charge received by the Government
and
- may
be debited for the purposes of making payments to eligible funding recipients
for the provision of fixed wireless or satellite service, and to reimburse ACMA
and the ACCC for costs incurred in administering the RBS scheme.[117]
The Special Account is discussed in greater detail under
the heading ‘the RBS Special Account’.
Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights
As required under Part 3 of the Human Rights
(Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth), the Government has assessed the
Bills’ compatibility with the human rights and freedoms recognised or declared
in the international instruments listed in section 3 of that Act. The
Government considers that the Bills are compatible.[118]
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights had no
comment on the Bills on the basis that the bills do not engage, or only
marginally engage, human rights; promote human rights; and/or permissibly limit
human rights.[119]
The Regional Broadband
Scheme
Purpose of the RBS
Together, the Charge Bill and Schedule 4 of the TLACC Bill
propose to establish the RBS. The RBS charge is a tax on fixed-line broadband which
will be used to fund non-commercial fixed wireless and satellite broadband for
regional areas. The cost of providing this service is currently met internally
by NBN Co using proceeds from its fixed-line networks. This internal
cross-subsidy is regarded as unsustainable, such that ‘ongoing funding for
essential regional broadband services is at risk’.[121]
Key issue: is this the best
funding model?
Direct budget finding
The Vertigan Panel, Productivity Commission and the ACCC prefer
general budget funding over a narrow industry levy for the RBS. The 2014
Vertigan Review stated:
By far the best option for funding any ongoing subsidy would
be through consolidated revenue. Among other advantages, that would allow
Parliament and the public to assess in an ongoing way the benefits of using
taxpayer funds for this purpose rather than others.[122]
In its 2017 Inquiry, the Productivity Commission
recommended, as a general principle, that the USO and similar obligations
should be funded out of general revenue. In relation to the proposed RBS, it
considered:
...that, in line with the principles-based approach to funding
outlined in this chapter, the choice of funding model should prioritise
minimising distortions in the telecommunications market and be flexible, simple
and transparent. In this context, alternative funding arrangements — such as
through general government revenue and/or a broad-based industry levy — should
be looked at more closely before implementing a long-term narrow-based funding
model in a dynamic industry.[123]
In the ACCC’s 2018 Communications Sector Market Study it
stated its position: ‘[o]ur view is that direct budget funding of regional and
remote communications services is preferable.’[124]
The Greens Senators noted in their dissenting report on the 2018 Bills that
‘[a] preferable option would be for the non-commercial services to be funded
from the general budget’.[125]
The lack of support for the proposed narrowly targeted tax has also been
expressed by various industry groups in submissions to both the 2017 and 2019
Committee inquiries into the Bills, including by TPG and Opticomm in the 2017
submissions and Vodafone in its 2019 submissions.[126]
Broad based tax
Failing general budget funding, TPG, OptiComm and other
Industry members have recommended a broader, USO/TIL levy over the proposed RBS
levy:
TPG submits that, if the objective is to create a “good tax”
that effectively funds the non-economic areas of the NBN, this committee needs
to find a way to pass a law that more closely aligns with the Vertigan
recommendations. A USO type of levy is that way.[127]
TPG additionally noted in its 2017 submission that of the four
recent reviews that considered how to fund non-commercial telecommunication
services, only the BCR’s 2015 consultation into NBN non-commercial service
funding options, recommended a narrowly targeted industry levy—in that case,
the terms of reference ‘did not allow it to consider contributions from general
tax revenue’.[128]
The Explanatory Memorandum considered both of these
options before noting that ‘the 2014 RIS concluded that direct Budget funding
was not feasible because of the large negative impact on the budget’.[129]
While conceding that the budget option is better able to optimise the use of
resources to achieve and properly match consumer demands, it makes arguments
that the narrow industry levy is better able to spawn innovation and result in lower
production costs.[130]
These arguments are upheld by assumptions that demand for
fixed line services are inelastic[131]
which is likely to be challenged with increased competition from mobile and fixed
wireless services.[132]
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Charge Bill advanced more novel arguments
against direct budget funding, including that retail service providers would
not compete against each other and in doing so, would not pass along lower
costs to consumers: ‘...consumers might not benefit because retail service providers
could take these lower wholesale prices as extra profit margin’.[133]
Effect on low-income
households
The 2019 Roy Morgan Australian Digital Inclusion Index
Report noted that ‘[a]ffordability remains a key challenge’ to increasing
Australia’s digital inclusion.[134]
In 2017, only 67.4 per cent of Australians in the bottom income quintile had
internet access at home, compared to a national average of 86.1 per cent.[135]
As the RBS charge is applied to all fixed-line broadband
internet connections regardless of the data plan, it will represent a larger
percentage of the total cost of providing broadband to those on budget plans
(smaller, lower income households) than for those on premium plans.
The exact impact the RBS charge will have on the consumer
is unclear. OptiComm did note that while they would absorb some of the costs of
the charge, they would need to raise their wholesale prices in response to the
charge, which would likely lead to higher consumer prices.[136]
OptiComm also noted that as a service provider for new greenfield developments
consisting of predominantly first home buyers, these price hikes would likely
impact financially stressed households.[137]
It appears from NBN Co’s submission to the ACCC NBN Access
Pricing Inquiry that its current internal cross-subsidy is applied uniformly
and directly to each individual connection, consistent with the proposed RBS.[138]
The impact on the affordability of fixed-line broadband
and the potential financial stress low-income earners might face has largely
not been considered in existing submissions on the Bill or in reports, but was
raised by Senators in the second reading debate of the 2018 Bills and in public
hearing during the 2019 Senate inquiry.[139]
Key issue: reliance on
outdated information
The policy rationale for the RBS is based on research and
reviews conducted between 2013 and 2015, primarily the 2014 Vertigan Panel, the
2015 ACCC Superfast Broadband Access Service Declaration inquiry, and the 2015
BCR consultation. The RIS presented with Charge Bill is almost identical to the
one introduced with the 2018 Bill, which itself was extremely similar to the
RIS published as an exposure draft in December 2016. The only amendments
between the previous and current RIS has been the insertion of paragraphs
concerning the incorporation of Opposition amendments. In particular, the
comparison of various mobile and fixed line broadband plans and accompanying
graphs in the RIS are more than three years old and do not appear to reflect
current market reality.[140]
Various stakeholders raised this as an issue, for example,
Opticomm described the Explanatory Memorandum to the Charge Bill as ‘obsolete
and incorrect’.[141]
In particular Opticomm expressed concern that the Explanatory Memorandum still
relied on 2017 market data, which does not reflect the market developments in
mobile broadband that have occurred since:
Given the obvious relevance of this point to the Government’s
basis for a narrowly targeted tax and the distortionary effect the tax will
have on competition in telecommunications markets, it is extremely concerning
that this data was not updated when drafting the 2019 Bill.[142]
Currently technologies and services are emerging which
were not contemplated in the 2014 Vertigan Review because they simply did not
exist at the time—for example 5G Mobile Networks and Low Earth Orbit Satellite
Broadband. Telecommunications is a fast evolving field where advances in
technology and changes in consumer behaviour have the potential to rapidly
render any prediction of the future state of the industry incorrect.
These limitations of the Vertigan Review and other
supporting research that underlines the policy rationale of the Bills will
further compound over the projected service life of the RBS.[143]
This is discussed below under the heading ‘Key issue: exclusion of
non-fixed connections from the charge’.
Key Issue:
Emergence of Low Earth Orbit Satellite Broadband (LEOSB)
The RBS exists to subsidise internet service in rural,
regional or remote areas of Australia where internet service would otherwise
not be commercially viable or affordable for consumers.
Underlying the rationale for this scheme is the assumption
that internet service to these areas will remain non-commercial until at least
2040, and that rural and regional Australians will continue to need subsidies
in order to access the internet at affordable prices.
Challenging this assumption is the development of LEOSB
networks, particularly SpaceX’s Starlink,[144]
OneWeb,[145]
both of which are currently being deployed. Amazon has made substantial
investments in developing its own LEOSB network[146]
and Facebook is also reportedly developing a network.[147]
This large degree of private investment is made on the
belief that LEOSB networks will be commercial to offer, competing not just for
services to remote communities, but also with fixed-line connections in urban
and suburban areas.
SpaceX’s Starlink system is expected to be the first
operational, with first consumer offerings in high latitudes,[153]
expected by August 2020, with global access expected from 2021.[154]
SpaceX has begun the process of securing regulatory approval to operate in Australia,
being included in the Foreign Space Objects Determination on 24 January 2020,[155]
the first step to securing a space apparatus license and other licenses needed
to operate the network in Australia.[156]
What this
means for the NBN
NBN Co’s Skymuster I & II Satellites are themselves
modern conventional systems, being launched in late 2015-2016 and representing
a substantial improvement in speeds over earlier satellite connections
available.[157]
However, Skymuster only has a total bandwidth capacity of 185 gbps[158] split
over some 443,154 premises ready for service and 95,480 active premises as of
June 2019)[159],
with consumer side speeds of around 25 mbps maximum low data caps.[160]
It is extremely uncommercial for the NBN to operate the Skymuster satellite
service.[161]
This offering is likely to be virtually obsolete as soon
as Starlink or any other competing LEOSB becomes available in Australia. It is
possible that a large portion of NBN’s 4G based fixed wireless service will also
become obsolete, and potentially there could be a high risk of substitution
from FTTN to LEOSB connections.[162]
SpaceX’s system has already demonstrated transmission
speeds of 610mbps in trials.[163]
The exact bandwidth capacity of the Starlink system remains unpublished,
although comments by Elon Musk indicate a per satellite capacity of between 20
to 100 gbps per satellite, giving the system a current global capacity in the
tens of terabytes per second.[164]
Put another way, at the current pace of launches, SpaceX is adding a Skymuster
system equivalent amount of bandwidth capacity at least every five days on
average, and has been since January 2020.[165]
More importantly, as satellites over regional and rural areas
are only serving a very low number of customers (as opposed to when those same
satellites are on station above urban centres), this may lead to extremely
large amounts of bandwidth becoming available split over very few customers,
delivered at very high (1gbps+) speeds.[166]
At what price point these services will be offered remains
unclear. However, SpaceX intends to offer at prices comparable to FTTP
connections in the United States while offering superior performance, leading
some to estimate a $80 USD a month price point in the U.S. market.[167]
A comparable Australian price point then would see an unsubsidised Starlink
connection costing the consumer a similar amount that each satellite or fixed
wireless connection costs the NBN in losses ($110 and $105 AUD per month
respectively in 2018[168]).
If this is the case, LEOSB presents obvious problems to
the policy rationale of the RBS, as it may allow for commercial services to
regional and rural areas, or greatly reduce the necessary subsidy.
Government Response
A number of reports have drawn the Government’s attention
to the potential risks the LEOSB networks present to the policy rationale of
the RSB. The BCAR Final Report in 2016 noted that ‘LEO Systems could emerge as a
possible, cheaper alternative for providing satellite service compared to nbn’,[169]
while the Productivity Commission noted their development in 2017,[170]
and the 2018 Regional Telecommunications Review Report noted that ‘Low Earth
Orbit satellites have the potential to address some of the issues with the
current technology’.[171]
In the 30 January 2020 Senate Inquiry hearing into the Bills,
NBN Co confirmed that it was ‘very interested’ in buying capacity on these
networks to replace the Skymuster service in around 2025 if they ‘offer better,
faster, cheaper service for the bush’.[172]
There may however still be an overlap of some years
(potentially up to 2030, when the Skymuster satellites are expected to reach
the end of their service life), when technically inferior, highly subsidised
commercial services are directly competing with superior, high speed,
commercial LEOSB services.
This may create the perverse scenario where Australian
fixed-line internet customers would be paying 800 million dollars annually in
RBS charges with the practical effect of slowing the transition from NBN to
LEOSB services due to RBS subsidies of NBN services. This may be particularly
problematic if NBN’s funding under the RBS is a long term, inflexible contract
in a similar manner to the TUSOPA contract with Telstra for the provision of
standard telephone services under the universal service obligation.[173]
There are also potential issues with the SIP scheme arising
from LEOSB providers, see Key Issue: SIP LEOSB issues.
Who is liable to pay the
charge?
Each carrier is liable to pay the RBS charge based on the
number of ‘chargeable premises associated with a local access line’
they serve on a monthly basis. This definition is ‘central to establishing the
charge base of the new tax’[174]
as it links the assessment provisions in proposed Division 4 of Part
3 of the TCPSS Act with the relevant charge provisions in the Charge
Bill.[175]
What are chargeable premises
associated with a local access line?
Premises are chargeable premises associated with a local
access line of a person, if, for the month:
- the
person is a carrier
- the
premises are potentially chargeable premises and
- the
premises are not exempt premises.[176]
The terms ‘potentially chargeable premises’ and ‘exempt
premises’ are defined under proposed sections 94 and 95 of the TCPSS
Act ,at item 13 of Schedule 4 to the TLACC Bill.
If a potentially chargeable premise does not fall
within a range of exceptions, then the premise is a ‘chargeable premise
associated with a local access line’ and the carrier needs to pay the RBS
charge on it for that month.
Potentially chargeable
premise
In summary, a ‘potentially chargeable premise’ is one that
is:
- connected
by a fixed-line telecommunications network (‘local access line’) that the
carrier owns or is the nominated carrier for, which is not an exempt line and
- being
supplied with an active connection by a carriage service provider (who may be
the person) for the whole or part of that month which is a designated
broadband service–broadly, a connection technically capable of speeds
that are normally over 25 megabits per second.[179]
The Minister may, by legislative instrument, exclude classes
of carriage services from the definition of ‘designated broadband
services’—such premises would not be subject to the charge.[180]
Types of premises exempt
from the charge
Small networks: if the carrier operates less than
2,000 premises for whole or part of the month, for example a smaller carrier, then
all those premises are exempt premises.[181]
As soon as a carrier’s network expands to 2,001 potentially chargeable
premises, they become liable to pay the charge for all of them—at current levy
rates, an annual charge of $170,485. This has an obvious market distortionary
effect by providing incentives for such small network carriers to remain below
the exemption limit.
Exempt lines: infrastructure purchased by the NBN
from Telstra and Optus under their respective Definitive Agreements are exempt
lines for the purpose of the charge.[182]
The Minister has the power to, by legislative instrument:
- specify
other agreements the exemption applies to[183]
and
- remove
any exemption that Telstra or Optus may be entitled to under an agreement.[184]
Telstra has submitted concerns over the differences in the
Optus and Telstra subsections of this section.[185]
Five year concession period
Carriers will be entitled to reduce the number of chargeable
premises that are subject to the RBS each month for the first five financial
years from the commencement of the scheme; there is a concession for existing
premises and one for greenfield premises:
- for
carriers only serving non-greenfield premises, the first 25,000
residential and small business premises that a carrier supplies are exempt from
the RBS and
- for
carriers serving greenfield premises, the first 55,000 ‘recently
connected greenfield premises’ are exempt from the RBS—broadly, these are
premises connected by a non-NBN provider between 1 January 2011 and 30 June
2019,[186]
or premises covered by an adequately served ministerial declaration.[187]
These apply only to ‘potentially concessional premises’,
which are chargeable small business or residential premises.[188]
Key issue: non-greenfield
concession limited by greenfield concession
Importantly, the non-greenfield premises exemption
provided by proposed subsection 20(1) of the Charge Bill is not
accessible by carriers that have any recently connected greenfield
premises. This may result in some small carriers that operate both greenfield
and non-greenfield potentially concessional premises having a substantially
higher total charge amount than comparable carriers that operate solely one or
the other.
For example If a carrier serves 15,000 non-greenfield
residential and small business premises, and 5,000 recently connected greenfield
premises, then it can only access an exemption for its 5,000 recently connected
greenfield premises, rather than opting for the non-greenfield exemption for
its 15,000 other premises.[189]
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Charge Bill appears to
indicate that this is intentional, although it does not explain why.[190]
Key issue: difficulty
identifying the basis of the charge
In 2017, Telstra submitted detailed concerns over the
definition of key terms, particularly the use of the ‘chargeable premises
associated with a local access line’ as the basis for calculating the tax
because of the administrative burden it would impose. Telstra recommended that Services
in Operation (SIOs) would be a suitable alternative basis:
An alternative calculation model, which Telstra considers
could be implemented with far greater certainty and accuracy, is one which is
based on the carrier’s active superfast broadband Services in Operation (SIOs)
delivered to end users over an underlying local access line that is owned or
controlled by the carrier. Rather than count premises, the carrier would count
network services. The key benefit of this SIO model is that a carrier’s
existing network record databases are likely to already identify SIOs and the
speed of those services (e.g. for billing purposes).[191]
Telstra’s 2019 Submission echoed the concern over the
definition of ‘premise’, although the focus of that submission was instead to
remove enterprise premises from the definition, rather than moving to an SIO
definition.[192]
However, Telstra continues to have ongoing concerns with identifying the kind of
premises the RBS will apply to.[193]
Notably, the 2016 BCR report recommended a version of the
RBS Levy that used SIOs: ‘[t]he BCR considers an NBN equivalent approach should
be calculated according to the number of high-speed fixed-line SIOs.’[194]
This issue was addressed by the 2017 Committee Inquiry, where Departmental
officials considered interpretational issues could also result from the use of
SIOs as the basis of the charge:
In the consultation process on the exposure drafts—the
bills—carriers that were servicing the business market raised concerns about
how certain the use of services in operation would be, and they identified that
for large business customers it can be interpreted in a range of different
ways. For example, a large corporate such as the Commonwealth Bank might have
lines that service a particular branch, it might have lines that service its
ATM network and it might have lines that service different components of its
communications services. And there'd be uncertainty about whether all of those
lines would be calculated or only some of them. In response to that the
department developed the proposal around a premises based charge.[195]
The Department considered that this approach did not
entail any material trade-offs.[196]
However, as corporate and enterprise entities may exist on a single premise,
but have multiple SIOs, but most residential consumers will have a single SIO
on a single premise, this change likely did shift a greater portion of the tax
burden on residential consumers and networks over enterprise and corporate
ones. The Department continues to view the 2016 BCR modelling as appropriate.[197]
The difficulty associated with the Department’s assertion
that the use of premises rather than SIOs responds to industry feedback, is
that this feedback does not appear to be publically available. It does not
appear industry has made submissions in favour of premises over SIOs during the
exposure draft consultation process or the 2017 and 2019 Committee inquiries.[198]
Industry feedback may have been provided privately to the Department.
The 2017 Inquiry Report concluded that the Committee
‘supports the overall approach taken to drafting the RBS as outlined in the
Bills’ and was of the view that ‘the counterpoints made by the department and
NBN Co to industry arguments are more compelling’.[199]
While concerns about the administrative burden of industry tracking the number
of premises, particularly in the enterprise sector, resurfaced in submissions
to the 2019 Committee Inquiry, the Committee considered the ‘current bills,
like the 2017 bills, reflect industry feedback’.[200]
Key issue: exclusion of
non-fixed connections from the charge
The Bills as currently drafted do not impose the RBS
charge on non-fixed connections, such as mobile broadband, fixed wireless or
satellite broadband connections. Only fixed line connections technically
capable of download speeds above 25 mbps are subject to the charge.[201]
This appears to be based on a view that:
- non-fixed
line services are not and will not in the short to medium term become a
substitutable service to fixed-line broadband and
- a
narrow charge incentivises NBN to control its wireless and satellite broadband
costs because those services would be funded mostly by the RBS applied to NBN
Co fixed-lines.[202]
Key stakeholder concerns include the market distortionary
effect which gives a competitive advantage to mobile and fixed wireless
networks and the potential for consumers to transition to those technologies in
the medium to long term—this would undermine the basis of the RBS.[203]
In 2017, the Department noted that fixed-wireless NBN competitors had been
excluded from the RBS as they make up a small portion of the market—one to two
per cent.[204]
Is wireless substitutable
for fixed-line broadband?
The Government has consistently stated the view that
non-fixed line services are not substitutable for fixed-line services.[205]
While this may have been the view when consultation on this issue began in
2014, this is not necessarily the view today—in 2018, the ACCC highlighted how
this view has evolved:
When we originally commented on this proposal, we accepted
the BCR’s view that only imposing the charge on NBN equivalent services (as
opposed to introducing a broader industry levy) would better encourage
NBN Co to contain costs to efficient levels because it would continue to
bear most of the funding responsibility for the non-commercial services in
question. Our comments were directed mainly at addressing the merits of the
funding principles and proposals put forward as alternatives by the BCR, rather
than articulating our own.
We accept that increased substitution towards fixed wireless
and mobile broadband services raises questions about the funding base of this
scheme. Attendees at the market study stakeholder forum in July 2017 also suggested
the scheme could distort market outcomes in favour of service providers (such
as those using fixed wireless and mobile networks) that the charge did not
apply to. NBN Co’s CEO has even suggested that NBN Co may need
further protection from wireless competitors to sustain its financial
viability.
In its final consultation paper on NBN non-commercial
services, the BCR acknowledged that the introduction of 5G technology may see
an increase in the level of substitution. It therefore indicated that future
consideration will be required on how funding arrangements adjust over time.
As the substitutability of wireless and mobile broadband
services increases, the fact that the RBS is not applied to these services may
indeed further help to underpin this substitution and distort market outcomes.[206]
The ACCC affirmed its view that direct budget funding for
wireless and satellite services was the ‘least distortionary alternative’ as it
would ‘not serve as a means of protecting the NBN from network competition’.[207]
It is on this basis that the ACCC recommended that the RBS should not be
extended to wireless services—the ACCC was not necessarily considering the merits
of the RBS itself.[208]
Since the Bills were first released as exposure drafts in
2016, the underlying justification for excluding wireless services has remained
part of the accompanying explanatory materials.[209]
Notably, the RIS continues to rely on the view of the ACCC as it was in 2016.[210]
According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Charge Bill, the Government considers
this issue could be considered under one of the charge review mechanisms: ‘[i]n
the event that mobile broadband services become substitutable for fixed-line
services, the Government would consider changing the funding base’.[211]
Subsequent studies and current market conditions do not appear to have been
addressed in the rationale for the decision to exclude non-fixed connections
from the RBS, including, for example, the 2017 Productivity Commission Report.[212]
The view that NBN Co should
bear most costs of the levy itself
The Government considers that a narrow tax will ensure
that NBN Co has strong incentives to control costs for the operation of its
fixed wireless and satellite services because a high percentage of the RBS
would come from NBN Co fixed-lines. The RIS for the Charge Bill states:
While the precise difference in net benefits between [the
RBS, a narrow industry levy on fixed line networks] and the others are not able
to be measured, both the BCAR and the ACCC noted that NBN Co would face
greater incentives for cost efficiency if the costs for providing its fixed
wireless and satellite networks were borne mainly by NBN Co itself. The
BCAR also recommended a charge on fixed-line broadband providers on the basis
that the benefits in productive and dynamic efficiency from ensuring that costs
were mainly borne by NBN Co itself outweighed the lower allocative efficiency
from a narrower charge.[213]
[citations omitted and emphasis added]
This is based on the assumption that wireless is not substitutable
for fixed-line broadband, and therefore NBN will retain a significant market
share of overall broadband services—this view is contentious, particularly given
the fact that the RBS is meant to be in place through to 2040.[214]
In 2017, the Productivity Commission raised concerns with the distortionary
effect of a narrow tax:
The Government has proposed that the Regional Broadband
Scheme (at least initially) include only a narrow levy base... Both the BCR and
the ACCC have argued for a narrow levy base as they considered that it would
maintain incentives for nbn to contain costs and improves productive and
dynamic efficiency. However, the Commission considers that, in line with the
principles-based approach to funding outlined in this chapter, the choice of
funding model should prioritise minimising distortions in the
telecommunications market and be flexible, simple and transparent.[215]
[citations omitted and emphasis added]
Industry position
The Telecommunication Industry has consistently been
divided on the exclusion of non-fixed broadband connections from the RBS, between
the operators of mobile phone networks (particularly the two 5G network
operators Optus and Telstra) and the rest of the industry.
Both Optus and Telstra have maintained that their 5G
offerings are not a threat to the NBN. For example Telstra submitted to the
2019 inquiry that ‘we have always stated that we do not believe that NBN or
broadband and 5G substitute but that they naturally complement each other’,
with Optus also affirming that ‘we also see the two networks as complementary’.[216]
However, it was reported in 2019 that Optus CEO Allen Yew had proposed 5G as a
‘viable alternative’ to the NBN, and has reportedly described 5G as a cheaper
and faster alternative to fixed-line NBN offerings.[217]
This could, in part, be explained by the non-disparagement clauses in Optus’
and Telstra’s Definitive Agreements,[218]
which require, in at least some areas, that they market their 5G
services as non-substitutable with the NBN.[219]
Operators of NBN-comparable fixed-line networks but not
mobile networks, who may be exposed to 5G competition, are generally critical
of this position. TPG has consistently taken the opposing view to Telstra and
Optus. In its submission to the 2019 Inquiry, TPG stated ‘[i]t is plain that
these products compete with the NBN’.[220]
Commpete, OptiComm Co, and Vocus Group all submitted similar concerns and
advocated a technologically neutral tax base—for example, OptiComm stated ‘NBN
bypass services that are already in existence will increase with the current
rollout of 5G mobile networks’.[221]
NBN Co’s 2019 submission indicates broad support for the
Bills but does not consider this issue.[222]
However, in NBN Co’s 2016 submission on the exposure draft version of the bills,
it expressed strong opposition to the exclusion of fixed wireless networks from
the RBS charge base: ‘nbn strongly believes that fixed wireless
network operators should be included in the levy. New entrants are building
their business models around the assumption that fixed wireless networks do,
and will, compete with nbn going forward’.[223]
NBN Co additionally noted concern over 5G and recommended that legislative
review mechanisms be introduced.[224]
The challenge of 5G mobile
to NBN’s FTTN business model
There appears to be a substantial risk of substitution from
NBN FTTN connections to 5G mobile connections in the medium term, which will in
turn have a considerable impact on the funding base of the RBS as such wireless
connections are not included in the charge base.
5G networks are a massive improvement on 4G mobile
networks in terms of speed, capacity, and cost of data per gb. 5G Networks are
technically capable of speeds of up to 20 gbps or 20,000 mbps,[225]
two hundred times faster than the upper limit of 4G and of the NBN FTTN
offering, a factor noted as a cause for likely shift in substitutability by the
ACCC in 2018.[226]
Telstra achieved three gbps in trials in 2018.[227]
Both Optus and Telstra are currently rolling out 5G mobile
networks in Australia. Optus is currently offering a 5G
home broadband plan for $70 AUD per month, offering unlimited data and a
guarantee of 50mbps during evening peak loads,
although Optus also claimed in November 2019 that this service was
averaging evening peak speeds of 164mbps and top speeds of over 400mbps.[228]
These speeds may increase further as the network matures towards the protocol’s
maximum speed of 10gbps. By comparison, the current median retail price of a
NBN 50mbps peak period connection in 2018-2019 was $89 per month.[229]
Although 5G was available to only around 140,000
residential premises in November 2019,[230]
this figure is expected to rapidly increase as the network is rolled out. Sky
News has described it as an ‘NBN Killer’;[231]
WhistleOut has noted that the Optus 5G home broadband offering ‘seems directly
pitched as an NBN alternative’; [232]
and the Australian Financial Review described it as ‘a seriously
competitive proposition’.[233]
Ry Crozier noted in January 2019 that:
The advertised characteristics of the Optus service are
likely to be a concern for NBN Co as well as for regulators and the government,
who have consistently dismissed mobile broadband as being substitutable for
fixed line services.[234]
If a consumer has access to a 5G mobile broadband offering
comparable to Optus’s, then it is arguable that there are not many clear circumstances
in which a NBN fixed-line connection is preferable, other than in the case of
FTTP.
NBN has a mixed ability to respond to 5G wireless
competition, and crucially may have no options to upgrade FTTN speeds and
capacity without an overhaul of the physical infrastructure. FTTP connections
are already technically capable of speeds of 10gbps, and gigabit connections
have been offered internationally over FTTP connections,[235]
but FTTP only makes up 21.5% of NBN’s connections.[236]
While NBN Co has been developing other technology such as ‘g.fast’ to increase
speeds over connections, which rely, in part, on copper (FTTC & FTTB), this
technology only offers substantial improvement over short copper loops, and the
average copper loop length for NBN FTTN connections is 450 metres.[237]
Around 42.5 of NBN’s services are FTTN connections, or 2.8 million homes.[238]
On this basis, it would appear that there is a real risk
of substitution resulting in NBN FTTN customers switching to 5G connections as
those networks roll-out across suburban Australia—the exclusion of such
services from the RBS will mean less revenue to subsidise regional broadband. These
are the risks which the BCR identified when it recommended future
re-examination of the legislation when 5G network services started in
Australia.[239]
The ACCC further explored this risk in 2017 when it modelled four scenarios of
5G adoption.[240]
The second, ‘wireless growth’[241]
identified a risk of ‘significant technological substitution’ as ‘[c]ustomers
move from the fixed line NBN networks to private sector wireless networks that
are able to offer better value propositions’ and ‘5G fixed wireless slowly
becomes the favoured option of broadband retailers to reduce their costs of
delivering broadband to the home.’[242]
Of the four options, this one was modelled as resulting in the lowest customer
experience with the NBN.[243]
The concern of 5G substitutionally reducing the charge
base of the RBS was raised in the Committee inquiry into the 2019 Bills.
Departmental officials reiterated the position of the Government was that
non-fixed line services were not substitutable with fixed line, but if this
assumption changes ’it may raise this question about whether the levy base
should be expanded to include mobile services’, and that the Department’s
preference would be to expand the levy base rather than raise the charge
amount.[244]
How much is the charge?
Clause 6 of the Charge Bill imposes the RBS charge
on a carrier’s annual chargeable premises amount—this has two
components:
- an annual base amount ($7.09 per premises per month)
and
- an annual administrative cost amount ($0.01 per
premises per month).[245]
How are the annual base
amounts calculated?
The annual amounts are simply the sum of the number of
chargeable premises associated with a local access line a carrier has,
multiplied by the base component of $7.09 per premises and the administrative
component of $0.01 per premises per month. These amounts are
indexed to CPI and may be varied by the Minister by way of legislative
instrument.[246]
Base component
Subclause 12(1) of the Charge Bill establishes the
initial base component amount as:
- $7.09
per month or
- an
amount determined by the Minister by legislative instrument under subclause
12(4).
The base component amount will be indexed annually to the
Consumer Price Index (CPI).[247]
However, the Minister may determine another amount as the base component from
the second financial year onwards.[248]
The Minister must not make a determination on the base
component unless the ACCC has given advice to the Minister under clause 13
of the Bill; in making such a determination the Minister must have regard to
the most recent ACCC advice, along with any other matters the Minister
considers relevant—see ‘Box 1: ACCC advice about the base and administrative
cost components’.[249]
The Minister’s determination must not be ‘inconsistent
with’ the combined base and administrative component cap of $7.10 per month—this
cap is indexed to CPI.[250]
The Explanatory Memorandum states the aim of a cap is to support ‘wholesale
market competition by providing regulatory certainty for investors that the
level of taxation under the new Act cannot exceed the specified amount’.[251]
Administrative cost
component
Subclauses 16(1)-(5) of the Charge Bill set out the
administrative cost component for each month in the first five financial years
of the scheme—the amounts are as follows unless varied by the Minister by way
of legislative instrument:
- first
financial year: $0.01
- second
financial year: $0.00172
- third
financial year: $0.00
- fourth
financial year: $0.0027 and
- fifth
financial year: $0.00.[252]
For the sixth and subsequent financial year, the
administrative cost component for a month is:
- the
cost component for a month in the previous financial year indexed to CPI or
- an
amount determined by the Minister.[253]
The following explanation is provided in the Explanatory
Memorandum to the Charge Bill as to the varying administrative cost component
for each year:
The administrative cost component reflects the amount of
funding necessary for the ACCC and ACMA to administer the Scheme. This is why
the amount is highest in the first and second years, when the ACCC and ACMA are
setting up their systems and operationalising their processes. There is an amount in the fourth year, when
the ACCC is expected to review the base and administrative cost components. A
nil amount occurs in the third and fifth year because the ACCC and ACMA do not
expect to have any new additional direct costs in those years.[254]
In varying the administrative cost component the Minister
must have regard to the most recent advice provided by the ACCC under clause
17 and any other matters considered relevant by the Minister—see ‘Box 1:
ACCC advice about the base and administrative cost components’.[255]
A determination varying the administrative cost component must not be ‘inconsistent
with’ the combined component cap under subclause 17A.[256]
Parliamentary disallowance
of Minister’s determination
The Minister’s determination of a monthly base component
or administrative cost component is subject to Parliamentary disallowance. A
copy of the determination must be tabled in each House of Parliament within six
sitting days of being registered.[261]
A notice of motion to disallow may then be brought within 15 sitting days of
the date of its tabling. The instrument will then be disallowed if either:
- within
15 sitting days of the notice, either House passes a resolution disallowing the
instrument or
- at
the end of 15 sitting days after the giving of the notice, the motion has not
been withdrawn or otherwise dealt with.[262]
Key issue: charge cap insufficient
to fund RBS
The initial charge calculated in 2016 has not been updated
for inflation through to 2020, and the adoption of Opposition amendments caps
it at $7.10, which will be insufficient to meet BCR projected costs. The 2016
BCR Final Report calculated the amount of charge needed:
The BCR has calculated that each high-speed fixed-line SIO
would contribute around $6.80 per month in FY2015 real terms. This is
equivalent to around $7.30 per month in nominal terms in FY2018 (the first full
financial year for which new funding arrangements could be calculated), and
$8.00 per month nominal by FY2022, when the NBN is expected to be completed and
operating in a relatively steady state of operations.[263]
The 2018 Bills had a combined component cap of $10 (indexed
to CPI).[264]
Adjusted for inflation, the $7.10 per month component cap is below the $6.80
FY2015 in real terms, that the BCR calculated as necessary to fund the scheme.
In 2020 dollars, $6.80 in 2015 would be around $7.27 in 2019.[265]
The BCAR expected the RBS to raise $825 million in 2021-22,[266]
although this was on an expected charge of $7.82 monthly in 2021-2022 nominal
terms. A charge of $7.82 monthly in 2021-2022 is no longer possible under the
current legislative scheme, due to the combined component cap of $7.10 (adjusted
for CPI) imposed by clause 17A of the Charge Bill.
The likely cap of the charge in 2021-2022 then is likely
to be around $7.25 (assuming a CPI of two per cent). On the same estimate of
the charge base (8.791 million SIOs/premises[267]),
this yields an expected annual total amount of approximately $765 million as
opposed to $825 million. However, as the BCAR modelling did not include the
impact of the transitional concessions contained in clause 20 of the
Charge Bill (for greenfield and other premises) or the move to premises rather
than SIOs as the charge base, the total collected may be lower still.
When considered with the possible reduction in the size of
the tax base due to potential competition from mobile services and/or the development
of low earth orbit satellite broadband, this may have impacts on
the financial adequacy of the RBS (these issues are discussed above under the
heading ‘Key issue: exclusion of non-fixed connections from the charge’.)
How is the charge assessed
and collected?
Division 7 in proposed Part 3 of the TCPSS
Act (at item 13 of Schedule 4 to the TLACC Bill) deals with
the assessment, collection and recovery of the charge. This is a complex and
technical section—a diagram of the expected administrative timeline of the
assessment of the charge is contained in the RIS. In summary, the process is as
follows:
- a carrier reports its chargeable premises for the previous financial
year to ACMA before 31 October
- ACMA makes a written assessment which includes the amount of charge
payable by the carrier by 30 November
- the assessment is provided to the carrier as soon as practicable after it
is made and
-
the charge is payable by the carrier by 31 December.[268]
Carrier reporting obligations
Carriers must report, in a form approved by ACMA, on the
number of potentially chargeable premises for each month of the financial year
to the ACMA annually—reports may be subject to verification by statutory
declaration. It is a criminal offence with a maximum penalty of four years
imprisonment to intentionally making a false statement in a statutory
declaration.[269]
The report on the previous financial year is due by 31 October.[270]
It is an offence to omit to do an act which breaches a
requirement under proposed subsection 100(1) of TCPSS Act,
this would include failing to lodge a report.[271]
This is a strict liability offence with a maximum penalty of 50 penalty units (currently
$10,500).[272]
A person who contravenes proposed subsection 100(1) commits a separate
offence each day that the omission continues.[273]
That is, a person will commit a separate offence on each day until the required
report is lodged with the ACMA.
Assessment
Subdivision B of Division 7 of proposed
Part 3 of the TCPSS Act concerns the ACMA’s obligations and
powers in making assessments of a carrier’s RBS charge liability for the year.
ACMA must make a written assessment, setting out, among
other things, the charge payable by the carrier.[274]
ACMA must make this assessment by 30 November or a later date set by determination
and provide the assessment to the carrier and the Secretary as soon as
practicable after it is made.[275]
ACMA may make an assessment notwithstanding that the
carrier has failed to lodge a report.[276]
Collection and recovery of
charge
Subdivision C of Division 7 of proposed
Part 3 of the TCPSS Act concerns the collection of the
charge. The charge becomes payable to the ACMA on 31 December following the
financial year, or a later day if allowed by ACMA which must be before 28
February.[277]
The charge is debt due to ACMA on behalf of the Commonwealth.[278]
Separate collection arrangements apply to eligible funding
recipients (currently only NBN Co) in order for the charge offset mechanism to
operate effectively (discussed below).[279]
Publishing the charge collected
ACMA must publish online the total amount of charge paid and
offset by carriers each financial year.[280]
According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill: ‘[s]ince the ACMA
would only publish the aggregate amount of charge paid and offset each year,
the information should not reveal carriers’ sensitive commercial information.’[281]
Penalties and anti-avoidance
Penalties
Subdivision D of Division 7 of proposed
Part 3 of the TCPSS Act provides for a pecuniary penalty for
late payment of the charge. A carrier is liable to pay a penalty on the unpaid
amount of the charge each day it remains unpaid.[282]
The penalty rate is 20 per cent per year or a lower rate as ACMA determines by
way of legislative instrument.[283]
ACMA may remit the whole or part of the penalty.[284]
The ACMA may cancel carrier licenses for failing to pay the
charge.[285]
Anti-avoidance measures
Division 5 of proposed Part 3 of the TCPSS
Act prohibits carriers form entering into schemes for the sole or
dominant purpose of attempting to avoid the charge or to dishonestly obtain a benefit
under the five year concessional arrangements. It is also proposed that a
person must not:
- aid,
abet, counsel or procure
- induce,
whether by threats or promises or otherwise
- be
in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to
- conspire
with others
to effect a contravention of the above prohibition.[286]
This division provides both civil penalty and criminal
offence versions of the prohibitions on carriers.[287]
The ancillary contravention is not a criminal offence.
The maximum penalty for contravention of the civil penalty
provisions for a body corporate is $10 million for each contravention and
10,000 penalty units ($2.1 million) for a person other than a body corporate.[288]
The maximum penalty for contravention of the criminal offences is
10,000 penalty units ($2.1 million) for an individual and $10.5 million
for a body corporate.[289]
How are eligible funding
recipients funded?
Division 2 of proposed Part 3 of the TCPSS
Act would enable the Secretary to enter into a contract with, or make a
grant to, eligible funding recipients on behalf of the Commonwealth to provide
financial assistance for fixed wireless or satellite broadband services. These
provisions are extremely similar to the contract and grant provisions used for
the Universal Service Obligation in Division 3 of Part 2 of the TCPSS Act.
Proposed subsection 80(1) of the TCPSS Act enables
the Secretary to enter into contracts with, or make grants of financial
assistance to, eligible funding entities in relation to:
- the
connection of premises to fixed wireless or satellite networks
- the
supply of fixed wireless or satellite broadband services
- facilities
that are, or proposed to be used to supply fixed wireless or satellite
broadband services and
- a
matter incidental or ancillary to these matters.
The Secretary is to pay any amount payable by the
Commonwealth under a section 80 contract or grant.[290]
Terms and conditions of
grants
The Secretary’s power to enter into contracts and make
grants under section 80 is qualified by a variety of restrictions, namely:
- terms
and conditions: terms and conditions of grants must be set out in a written
agreement between the Commonwealth and the grant recipient that the Secretary
enters into on behalf of the Commonwealth
- Ministerial
determinations: the Minister may, by legislative instrument, set
standards, rules and minimum benchmarks that contractors or grant recipients
must comply with in relation to section 80 grants and contracts. This
determination prevails over inconsistent contracts or grant terms and
conditions, subject to a limited number of exceptions:
- a
determination cannot override a term or condition that gives a contractor or
grant recipient a right to adjust payment for a change in services, facilities
or customer equipment under a contract or a grant agreement
- a
determination cannot change the price, or method of ascertaining the price, for
any services, facilities or customer equipment to be supplied by the contractor
or grant recipient in accordance with the contract, or grant agreement
- rules
binding the Secretary: the Minister may, by legislative instrument, make
rules that the Secretary must comply with when exercising any of their
functions under Division 2.[291]
Performance monitoring
The Secretary must monitor the performance of contractors
and grant recipients, and report to the Minister on the adequacy of their
compliance with the terms of the grant or contract, any notice of breaches
received, any remedial action taken by the Secretary in response to such a
breach, and the outcome of that action.[292]
Contracts and grants
register
The Secretary must maintain registers, published on the
Department’s website, of contracts and grants issued under section 80. The
registers must include certain information, including for example—name, duration,
a summary of service and the amount to be paid or payable by the Commonwealth
(or in the case of grants, the total amount of the grant).[293]
Charge offset mechanism
Proposed section 86 inserts a ‘nominal funding
entitlement’ scheme—it broadly requires the Secretary to issue a certificate (a
‘nominal funding entitlement certificate’) certifying the funding entitlement
of each eligible funding entity receiving funds under a contract or grant for
that year (currently only NBN Co) and:
- if
the carrier holds a charge offset certificate—pay the nominal funding
entitlement to the carrier, reduced by the amount specified in the charge
offset certificate or
- if
the carrier does not hold a charge offset certificate for the previous
financial year—pay the nominal funding entitlement to the carrier.[294]
Division 6 in proposed Part 3 of the TCPSS
Act enables eligible funding entities to reduce their charge liability by
the amount that they would be entitled to receive under their funding
entitlements. This is intended to minimise the burden of administering the
scheme for NBN Co, any future eligible funding entities and the Department. Proposed
sections 98 and 99 detail how an eligible funding entity obtains a
charge offset certificate and when the charge is refunded—this is summarised in
‘Box 2: charge offset certificates’.
Key issue: funding
transparency concerns
Proposed section 80 of the TCPSS Act reflects
to some extent the provisions of the existing section 14 of the TCPSS
Act that forms the basis for grants and contracts to carriers under the
USO. Section 14 was the provision under which the Department negotiated the TUSOPA
with Telstra. The TUSOPA has received broad criticism for being opaque and
having minimal methods of ascertaining if payments are being used for the
purposes of the contract, for example, by the Productivity Commission and the
ANAO, with the later stating:
Neither the Australian Communications and Media Authority
(ACMA) nor the Department undertakes processes to verify the accuracy of the
underlying performance data provided by Telstra, which is used to determine
compliance with the standard telephone customer service guarantee and payphone
benchmarks.[302]
Under the agreement, Telstra receives $257 million dollars
annually through the TUSOPA.[303]
This funding is nominally provided in order to allow Telstra to meet its
universal service obligations as the primary service provider, but Telstra is
not required to demonstrate that the funding it receives actually goes towards
this purpose, or report on the scale of its non-commercial losses. Instead, the
primary indicator of Telstra’s performance under the TUSOPA is simply if
Telstra is meeting their USO obligations, which it is.[304]
Proposed section 80 does not appear to impose
safeguards which would prevent the same issues arising as have arisen as a
result of the TUSOPA with Telstra. In particular Division 2 of proposed
Part 3 of the TCPSS Act does not:
- require
eligible funding entities to report exactly what funds are used for
- require
accounting separation of non-commercial services or
- place
a statutory obligation on a contractor to use RBS funds towards RBS purposes.
Similar to section 14 of the TCCPS Act, proposed
section 80 merely obliges the Secretary to enter into contracts or
grant agreements with eligible funding entities ‘in relation to’ fixed wireless
or satellite broadband covered by proposed subsection 80(1).
It is possible that NBN Co’s performance under the
contract or grant will be assessed on how successfully it meets its SIP
obligations (discussed below). Proposed section 85 (which mirrors
existing section 20) only requires the monitoring of performance related to the
terms of the contract rather than any minimum reporting
requirements on losses, or expenditure.
These risks could be mitigated by the Department ensuring
that contracts and grant agreements issued under section 80 contain relevant
safeguards or the Minister utilises the determination power under proposed
section 82.
During the Committee Inquiry into the 2019 Bills, Senator
Urquhart raised concerns about what would occur in the event of NBN Co
receiving more money under a contract or grant arrangement then it would need
to cover fixed wireless and satellite losses for that year. The Department confirmed
that such a surplus would need to be used for the delivery of fixed wireless
and satellite services.[305]
It is not clear where this obligation is found (although it may be intended to set
it out in contract and grant agreement terms). Labor Senators’ additional
comments to the Committee report on the 2019 Bills noted:
...[t]here is seemingly no mechanism that requires the surplus
revenue from the Government's $800 million annual broadband tax to be spent on
regional networks... there remain
legitimate concerns that once the tax revenues flow into NBN Co the company
management can effectively direct surplus tax revenue towards anything they
wish once it is washed through an offset account, regardless of whether the
expenditure relates to a regional outcome or not.[306]
[emphasis added]
The majority committee view was more constrained in its language,
but was ‘of the view that additional transparency measures, with respect to the
management of the RBS levy, should be implemented’ to ‘easily determine that
the off-set arrangements are being managed effectively’ and recommended that
such measures be implemented.[307]
The Committee did not explicitly state that these ‘additional transparency
measures’ should be legislated as amendments to the Bill.
Key issue: funding can only
be applied to fixed-wireless & satellite connections
RBS payments can only be provided for fixed wireless and
satellite internet connections, even if alternative technologies are superior.[308]
This explicitly excludes carriage services delivered over a public mobile
telecommunications service, which means services delivered over the Telstra,
Optus, and Vodafone 4G and 5G networks cannot receive RBS subsidies.[309]
However, it must be noted that those mobile networks will not subject to the
RBS—this is discussed above under the heading ‘Exclusion of non-fixed
connections’.
In effect, NBN Co will continue to receive subsidies for
the delivery of fixed wireless and satellite broadband services, even if, in
future, mobile networks are able to offer superior and/or cheaper broadband in
those areas. Internet Australia raised this as a concern:
The TCC Bill specifically only allows the use of funds to
build fixed wireless or satellite infrastructure, and cannot be used to provide
any other form of superior technology. The TCC Bill and regime appears to
assume that fixed wireless and satellite networks are, and always will be, the
lowest cost and optimal method of servicing regional and remote areas. This is
at odds with the principal of technology neutrality, and removes any incentive
for NBN Co or another funding recipient to install any better technology, even
if it would be more cost-effective and provide superior services in those local
conditions.[310]
Internet Australia went on to warn of ‘a perverse
incentive for NBN Co to maximise the footprint of its fixed-wireless and
satellite areas, even into areas where it would be more economic in the long
term to install a superior fixed-line technology’.[311]
The RBS Special Account
Proposed section 89 of the TCPSS Act, at item
13 of Schedule 4 to the TLACC Bill, establishes the RBS Special
Account for the purposes of section 80 of the Public Governance,
Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act). A Special
Account is a limited special appropriation that notionally sets aside an amount
that can be expended for listed purposes.[312]
In this case, the Special Account may be debited to:
- pay
amounts payable by the Commonwealth under an eligible funding entity contract (under proposed section 80)
- make
grants to eligible funding entities
- make
distributions of the balance of the account back to carriers and
- make
refunds of the charge in the event of overpayment of the charge, including when
a person becomes the holder of a charge offset certificate.[313]
The Special Account must be credited with those amounts
paid to the Commonwealth for the RBS charge, under an eligible funding
recipient contract (including compensation or damages for breach of that
contract) and repayment of an eligible funding recipient grant.[314]
The Secretary may distribute the whole or part of the
balance of the account to carriers who have paid into the account. This can
only be done if a legislative instrument made by the Minister regulating the
process exists, which the Secretary must comply with.[315]
Reimbursement of ACCC &
ACMA expenses
Proposed section 92A enables the Secretary to
direct, by notifiable instrument, that funds may be debited from the Special
Account to reimburse the ACCC and ACMA for the costs of running the RBS scheme.
The funds do not actually flow directly to the ACCC and ACMA, but rather are
transferred to the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF) out of which the Government
can fund those entities in the usual manner.
The amount which can be transferred by the Secretary must
be the lesser of:
- the
total of the relevant Budget amounts listed in proposed subsection 92A(3)
and
- the
annual administrative cost component of the charge collected for the year.
Information gathering &
legislative review
ACMA and ACCC powers
Division 8 in proposed Part 3 of the TCPSS
Act (at item 13 of Schedule 4 of the TLACC Bill) provides
powers to ACMA and the ACCC to:
- require
carriers and carriage service providers to disclose information or documents to
ACMA
- require
eligible funding recipients to disclose information or documents to the ACCC
- enable
ACMA and the ACCC to share information among various Commonwealth bodies
including with each other, the Department and declared (by way of notifiable
instrument) Commonwealth, state and territory bodies.[316]
One-off carrier reporting obligation
Carriers are required to submit a report to the ACCC on
their current number of chargeable premises, potentially chargeable premises,
exempt premises, exempt lines, and potentially concessional premises. This is
scheduled to occur within three months after Schedule 4 to the Bill commences.[317]
According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill: ‘[t]he ACCC may
decide to use this information to give the Government advice about the base
charge and administrative cost components ... of the Charge Bill.’[318]
A strict liability offence with a maximum penalty of 50
penalty units is imposed for failing to comply with the requirements to lodge
or failing to disclose specified information in the report—each day the contravention
continues constitutes a separate offence.[319]
A statutory declaration may be required to accompany the report—it is a
criminal offence with a maximum penalty of four years imprisonment for
intentionally making a false statement in a statutory declaration.[320]
Legislative Review of the
RBS
Proposed section 102ZFA requires the Minister to cause
a review of the RBS and associated legislative framework. This Review must
occur within, or as soon as practicable after, four years of the commencement
of the RBS and include public consultation.[321]
The Minister may give a written direction to the ACMA or ACCC requiring them to
make available specified information to the review.[322]
The report tabled within 25 sitting days of each House after the completion of
the Report.[323]
Key Issue: ‘set and forget concerns’
The statutory requirements to review the RBS as well as the
administrative and base component of the charge (see above: ‘Box 1: ACCC advice
about the base and administrative cost components’) is perceived by some
stakeholders as being too far into the future. In this respect, stakeholders
have expressed concern that the RBS charge is inflexible and risks becoming an
entrenched tax—Vodafone noted in its 2017 submission:
It is concerning for example that the RBS does not have a
sunset clause or automatic requirements for fundamental reviews in certain
circumstances, such as privatisation of the NBN. [Vodafone] understands the RBS
is intended to be in place until at least 2040.[324]
In its 2017 submission, TPG states that the RBS should be
‘reviewed every 18 months after implementation to gauge the effect on
competition and the ongoing sustainability for the funding of the nbn’s
non-economic services’.[325]
Internet Australia recommends the ACCC’s review of the base component of the
charge occur every year and indexation be removed.[326]
These concerns were raised by the Australian Greens in their Dissenting Report
to the 2017 inquiry, and formed a key line of questioning in the 2019 inquiry.[327]
The Productivity Commission stressed the importance of regular reviews:
It reduces the risk that the Government takes a ‘set and
forget’ approach to what could become an easy way for the Government to move
NBN costs off its ledgers, without regard to the distortions that a poorly
designed levy could create.[328]
The Commission also noted that ‘the risk of policy inertia
is high once a policy is implemented, given a demonstrated preference among
policymakers for default policy settings.’[329]
Charge and policy reviews
not synchronised
Additionally these two review processes are not synchronised
and will be conducted by different entities on different reporting timelines—the
policy review is required to be commenced before the ACCC is required to
review the costings of the RBS and the amount of the charge (by a year).[330]
There is then a distinct possibility that the policy review will be conducted,
and public consultation to that review carried out, with the ACCC RBS costing
modelling underway and forthcoming, but not complete, or even engaged in
parallel consultation processes.
Consequential changes
Amendments to the CCA
Items 1A and 1B of Schedule 4 to the TLACC
Bill insert reference to the RBS into the telecommunications industry record
keeping rules detailed in Division 6 of Part XIB of the CCA. The
amendments create new requirements to retain records related to the operation
of proposed Part 3 of the TCPSS Act on telecommunication
carriers (item 1A), and provide that the ACCC may publicly disclose, or
direct a carrier or carriage service provider to publicly disclose, reports
received or retained under the record keeping rules, if satisfied that such a
disclosure would facilitate the operation of proposed Part 3 of the TCPSS
Act or the Telecommunications (Regional Broadband Scheme) Charge Act
(items 1B-1D).
Amendments to the Telecommunications
Act
Item 5 of Schedule 4 inserts the power for ACMA to
cancel carrier licenses for failure to pay the RBS charge. Item 3 creates
a process for determining when an individual is disqualified for failure to pay
the RBS charge. Items 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7 make related amendments to
the disciplinary and penalty provisions under Telecommunications Act.
Statutory Infrastructure Provider scheme
What is the SIP scheme?
Division 2 in Part 1 of Schedule 3 to the TLACC Bill
inserts a new Part 19 into the Telecommunications Act and makes
consequential amendments to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA).
The purpose of new Part 19 is to ensure that all end-users can request
that their premises be connected and supplied with superfast broadband services—Part
19 achieves this by, broadly:
- defining
who the responsible statutory infrastructure provider (SIP) is for various
‘service areas’ (Division 2 of Part 19) and
- imposing
obligations on the SIP to supply the necessary infrastructure so that the
premises can be connected and supplied with superfast broadband (Division 3 of
Part 19).
The proposed SIP scheme has two forms: the scheme as it
exists before ‘the designated day’ and the scheme as it exists after that day.[331]
The designated day is the date, in the Minister’s opinion, the NBN is deemed to
be built and fully operational as provided for under the National Broadband
Network Companies Act 2011. This declaration must occur by 31 December
2020 but may be continually extended by ministerial declaration in 12 month
intervals.[332]
What are the service areas and who is the SIP?
Proposed Division 2 of Part 19 of the Telecommunications
Act sets out the various kinds of SIP service areas, how they come about,
and who is the SIP for those areas. As noted above, the SIP scheme has two
variants: as it exists before and as it exists after the NBN is declared
completed (known as the designated day). There are four SIP service areas, the
existence of which depends on the designated day:
- interim
NBN service areas—only exists before the designated day
- the
general service area—only exists after the designated day
- nominated
service areas—exists both before and after the designated day, and
- designated
service areas—exists both before and after the designated day.
NBN Co is responsible for the interim service areas and
general service area while other carriers are responsible for the nominated
service areas—for example, where other carriers have rolled out their own fibre
networks. The Minister may designate a carrier as the SIP for designated
service areas.[333]
Interim service areas
Where: interim service areas only exist before the
designated day—they are the areas NBN Co declares or has declared are ready for
service that are not nominated or designated service areas.[334]
The Minister may make rules, by way of legislative
instrument, regulating NBN Co. declarations that an area is ready for service.[335]
Who is the SIP: NBN Co.[336]
Variable/revocable? A declaration that an area is
ready for service cannot be revoked.[337]
NBN Co cannot vary a declaration that an area is ready for
service except in the case of ‘clerical error or obvious mistake’.[338]
The Minister may vary a declaration in writing but must conduct a consultation
process of not less than 10 business days, and consider any submissions
received, before making a variation.[339]
This variation is not a legislative instrument.[340]
Key issue: Telstra’s obligations prior to the completion of
the NBN
It was initially expected that the pre-designated day SIP
scheme would be in operation for at least two years. However, given the time
that has passed since the Bills were originally introduced into the 45th
Parliament, the operation of the interim provisions may be brief. While the
designated day is currently set as 1 December 2020, it is possible this could
be indefinitely extended until the NBN is declared complete.[341]
Prior to the designated day, the NBN is responsible for ‘interim NBN service
areas’ declared under proposed subsections 360D(2) and (3) of the
Telecommunications Act. Telstra, as the body with ongoing USO
obligations to connect all of Australia to telephone services expressed concern
that this would lead to gaps in the SIP scheme that Telstra would have to fill:
This will lead to a ‘Swiss cheese’ effect where large areas
within a region are serviced by nbn co, but neighbouring pockets (or even a
single neighbouring premises) have no SIP in the lead up to the designated day
and are reliant on Telstra supplying services under the USO. As USO provider,
Telstra still has to meet service requests, and in the absence of NBN
infrastructure, provide its own fixed or wireless infrastructure in order to
supply services for a potentially indeterminate period prior to the designated
day (after which nbn co will be the SIP and required to connect the premises
and supply wholesale services).[342]
However, the brief likely operation of the interim
provisions mitigates many of these concerns.
The general service area
Where: the general service area only exists after
the designated day—it is the whole of Australia other than a nominated or
designated service area.[343]
Who is the SIP: NBN Co.[344]
The general service area reflects the default assumption
that NBN co will be the SIP for all of Australia except where specific
circumstances arise.[345]
Nominated service areas
Where: an area where a non-NBN carrier must
nominate as the SIP because if it meets conditions specified by the Minister
and is contracted (or has previously been contracted) to install
telecommunications infrastructure in:
- a
real estate development or
- a
building redevelopment, and
- the
area is not a designated service area.[346]
A carrier has the option, but is not required to nominate
as the SIP, if the carrier:
- is
contracted to install infrastructure that will enable the supply of eligible
services to all of the premises in a given area (excluding a real estate or
building redevelopment project) and
- that
contract requires or did require the carrier to connect premises to a
qualifying telecommunications network on request of a carriage service provider
so that eligible services can be provided to the end-user at the premises.[347]
The Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill identifies shopping
centres and business districts as possible examples of the use of this third,
non-compulsory avenue of nominating and provides the following justification:
It is compulsory for a carrier to declare a provisional
nominated service area when it installs infrastructure under a contract for a
real estate development project or a building redevelopment project. This is
because generally there will only be a single carrier servicing these areas. By
contrast, it is at a carrier’s discretion whether it declares a provisional
nominated service area when it enters into a contract to install infrastructure
that is not a contract for a real estate development project or a building
redevelopment project. This is because the carrier may not be the only network
provider to the premises in question... if a carrier becomes the only network
provider to the premises in question, it would be open for the carrier to
declare a provisional nominated service area. If the carrier did not, the
Minister could designate the area as a designated service area, and declare the
carrier to be the SIP for the service area.[348]
Real estate development project
‘Real estate development project’ is defined as either:
- any
project that involves the subdivision of land in Australia, and then the sale
or lease of those lots or building units (practically, residential
accommodation) on those lots—this includes greenfield development, the
gazetting and development of new suburbs or
- any
project that involves the construction and sale of new building units on areas
of land. This would include the construction of new apartment blocks and the
sale of units within those apartment blocks
which meets any conditions specified by the Minister.[349]
Building redevelopment project
A ‘building redevelopment projects’ is defined as any
project that involves ‘the significant refurbishment or repurposing of one or
more buildings so as to bring into existence one or more building units’ and
the sale or lease of those units. The project must also meet any conditions
specified by the Minister.[350]
How: the process for declaring a real estate
development or building redevelopment as a nominated service areas is as
follows:
-
If a non-NBN carrier enters into a contract that would give rise to
nominated SIP requirements (real estate developments and building
redevelopments), then they must give the ACMA written notice of the contract.[351]
The notice must specify the
project area, describe the telecommunication network infrastructure to be
installed, and estimate the completion date of the installation.
This notice must be given
within 10 business days of entering into the contract.[352]
If the contract had been entered into before commencement and the installation
has not yet been completed, the carrier must give the ACMA notice within 90
days of commencement, or within a longer period that the ACMA allows.[353]
The ACMA must maintain a
register of the notices of contracts provided by carriers.[354]
- After completion of the installation of the infrastructure, the carrier
must by written instrument declare the project area is a provisional
nominated service area within 10 days of completion.[355]
- The carrier is then the service infrastructure provider for the area,
provided that it is not a designated service area or covered by a subsequent
nominated service area declaration.[356]
Box 3: provides an example of how a carrier becomes the SIP
for a nominated service area for contracts entered into after commencement.
Who is the SIP: the carrier required to declare
itself as SIP for a given area, or else a carrier specified in a legislative
instrument.[357]
Proposed section 360J also lists three carrier
license condition declarations (held by OptiComm, Pivit, and NT Technology
Services Pty Ltd), prescribing that the areas served under these carrier
licenses are automatically nominated services areas. These areas are already
subject to SIP-like obligations under these declarations—proposed section 360J
translates these obligations into the SIP scheme.
Exceptions: the Minister may, by legislative
instrument:
- exempt
a specified real estate or building redevelopment project from nominated
service area requirements[360]
- substitute
a different carrier than the one that is nominated as the SIP for a nominated
service area[361]
and
- specify
additional conditions that must be satisfied in order for projects to qualify
for nomination requirements.[362]
Variable/revocable? A carrier declaration cannot be
revoked.[363]
The Minister may vary a declaration of a provisional nominated service area
by a carrier. The Minister must conduct a consultation process of not less than
10 business days, and consider any submissions received before making a
variation. This variation is not a legislative instrument.[364]
Key Issue: nominated service area requirements unclear
Telstra raised a concern in its submission to the 2019
Senate Inquiry that the drafting of the nominated service area requirements in
proposed section 360H(2) may inadvertently require some mobile carriers to
nominate as a SIP for the area upon the installation of telecommunications
infrastructure:
Under the draft SIP legislation, a carrier is required to
nominate as the SIP where it installs network infrastructure to enable the
supply of ‘eligible services’ to premises in the whole of a real estate
development project or building redevelopment project, and the installation was
carried out under a contract. Eligible services include a ‘listed
carriage service’ which includes ‘a carriage service between a point in
Australia and one or more other points in Australia’. Accordingly, the
installation of almost any telecommunications network infrastructure could
trigger the requirement to nominate as the SIP.[365]
And that further:
In effect, there is a legislative mis-match between the
(broader) kinds of telecommunications network infrastructure that can trigger
the requirement to nominate as the SIP, and the (narrower) kinds of
telecommunications network infrastructure to which a SIP is required to connect
premises.[366]
This concern could be practically mitigated by the
Minister issuing an exemption under 360H, 360P or 360Q to relevantly impacted
carriers on an individual case by case basis.
Designated service areas
Where: anywhere that the Minister specifies by legislative
instrument. Designated service areas are automatically ‘carved out’ of both the
general service area and any overlapping nominated service area.[367]
Who is the SIP: any carrier that the Minister, by
legislative instrument, designates as the SIP for the area.[368]
Variable/revocable? Yes.
Key issue: power is extremely broad
The Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill describes
this provision as a ‘reserve power’, stating that the powers were ‘deliberately
cast broadly as there could be specific circumstances that need to be taken
into account on an area by area basis.’[369]
Telstra raised issues with the scope of this power in its 2017 submission:
This power is so broadly framed that it could be exercised in
future to unreasonably shift responsibility for infrastructure deployment from
nbn co to another carrier: in effect, to substantially reverse the policy that
nbn co should be the primary provider of national broadband infrastructure.[370]
Telstra proposed a series of limitations on this power to
prevent abuse, none of which has been adopted. Telstra reiterated these
concerns in its 2019 submission.[371]
The following justification for the ministerial power is
provided in the Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill:
The power under proposed subsection 360L(1) is a reserve
power for the Minister. For example, it could be used to designate real estate
development projects that were installed before the commencement of proposed
Part 19, and are serviced by a single superfast fixedline network provider
(other than NBN Co). In such cases, it may be appropriate for the network
provider to be the SIP for the area and so the Minister would be able to
determine this. The Minister’s powers under the section are deliberately cast
broadly as there could be specific circumstances that need to be taken into
account on an area-by-area basis. However, as any Ministerial determination would
be a legislative instrument, it would be subject to the consultation,
disallowance and sunsetting requirements under the Legislation Act.[372]
What are the obligations of a SIP?
Proposed Division 3 of new Part 19 of
the Telecommunications Act imposes an obligation on SIPs to connect and supply
premises with qualifying services within their relevant service area, at the reasonable
request of a carriage service provider.[373]
Obligation to connect premises
The obligation to connect is provided by proposed subsection
360P(1)—the SIP must on the ‘reasonable request’ of a carriage service
provider, connect the premise to:
- a
fixed-line telecommunications network to supply fixed-line carriage
services, or
- if
it is not reasonable to connect the premises to a fixed-line—connect the
premises to a telecommunications network to supply wireless or satellite
carriage services.
The obligation to connect premises upon ‘reasonable
request’ is different to the obligation to connect it to a ‘fixed-line’ network
where it is ‘reasonable’ to do so—this is outlined in Box 4 below.
Requirements: the Minister may set requirements of
SIPs in connecting premises by legislative instrument.[374]
Exceptions: the Minister may, by legislative
instrument, specify circumstances in which the obligation to connect does not
apply.[375]
Terms and conditions: the SIP must publish a set of
terms and conditions on its website on which it offers to connect premises. The
SIP must connect premises on these terms if a carriage service provider
requests.[376]
Response to requests: upon receiving a request to
connect a premise by a carriage service provider, a SIP must either notify that
it will connect the premise or refuse the request within 10 business days of
receipt (or a longer period as set by legislative instrument).[377]
If the SIP refuses the request to connect, it must provide written notice to
the carriage service provider within five business days of the refusal, who in
turn must provide a copy of the notice to the end user within five days of
receiving the notice.[378]
Obligation to supply eligible services
The obligation to supply eligible services is provided by proposed
subsections 360Q(1) and (1A)—The SIP for a service area must, on the
‘reasonable request’ of a carriage service provider:
- supply
an eligible service to the carriage service provider so they can
supply qualifying carriage services to end-users at
the premises and
- the
carriage services must be capable of making and receiving voice calls, except
where the premise is serviced by satellite.[382]
An eligible service is, broadly, any telecommunications
service where at least one point is in Australia.[383]
A qualifying carriage service is a:
- qualifying
fixed-line carriage service
- qualifying
fixed wireless carriage service or
- qualifying
satellite carriage service.[384]
These are, broadly, broadband services provided over
fixed-line, wireless or satellite, with peak download transmission speeds of at
least 25 megabits per second, and peak upload speeds of 5 megabits
per second.[385]
This implicitly excludes legacy copper fixed networks, such as ADSL2+ from
being capable of being ‘qualifying carriage service’ as ADSL2+ is only capable
of 24 mbps per second at best.[386]
The peak download and upload transmission speeds are
speeds which the Government expects the SIP to be able to support should the
carriage service provider utilise the full capacity of the network, but they
are not the actual speeds the end-user can expect from their carriage service
provider.[387]
The end-user speed will be determined by a range of factors, including, for
example, the broadband package the customer has purchased and the capacity and
congestion of the network units purchased by the carriage service provider from
the SIP.[388]
Both wireless and satellite carriage services do not
include public mobile telecommunication services—this excludes mobile
networks, for example: Telstra, Optus and Vodafone, from being used to satisfy
SIP obligations.[389]
Further, the Minister may, in the case of the meaning of wireless carriage
services, determine conditions that must be satisfied.[390]
Requirements: the Minister may set requirements of
SIPs in supplying premises by legislative instrument.[392]
Exceptions: there are two exceptions to the
obligations to supply eligible services:
- if
the SIP is already subject to a standard access obligation, then they are
exempt from the SIP obligation to supply[393]
and
- the
Minister may, legislative instrument, specify circumstances in which the
obligation to supply does not apply by.[394]
The SIP is only obligated to supply an eligible service on
the ‘reasonable request’ of the carriage service provider—this obligation is
explained above in ‘Box 4’ in relation to the SIP’s obligation to connect a
premise. Similarly, in this case, the Minister may, by legislative instrument, specify
circumstances in which the obligation to supply does not apply, and in doing
so, determine when a request is not reasonable—the Explanatory Memorandum to
the TLACC Bill provides the following example: ‘a SIP could refuse to supply if
it cannot obtain required approvals from a land owner or a local council’.[395]
Terms and conditions: the SIP must publish a set of
terms and conditions on its website on which it offers to supply premises under
its obligations. The SIP must supply premises with an eligible service on these
terms on the request of a carriage service provider.[396]
Key issue: peak bandwidth SIP
obligations may be inadequate
Professor Mark Gregory, senior telecommunications and
network engineering academic at RMIT University, was of the view that the
obligation of the SIP to provide infrastructure to service 25mbps download and
5mbps upload peak speeds, was inadequate to modern and ongoing user needs: ‘[t]o
vote for this Bill is to become an active supporter of the second rate
NBN and this is not something that opposition and cross bench Senators should
willingly agree to – history will not be kind’.[397]
The 2017 Senate Inquiry considered these concerns and
received evidence from the Department that the 25/5mbps obligation ‘reflect
anticipated consumer need for speed in the foreseeable future.’[398]
The Department offered the following additional evidence:
In 2014, as part of the Vertigan cost-benefit analysis of the
NBN, Communications Chambers was contracted to construct a bottom-up model of
the 'technical' bandwidth required for the applications utilised by various
types of household, and used this to estimate future demand. Its report
estimated that by 2023 the median Australian household will have 'technical'
demand (that is, generated by actual application usage) for download bandwidth
of 15 Mbps. Therefore, a 25 Mbps download service is considered to be a service
that will actually support most applications that people will need for the
foreseeable future. This conclusion is consistent with current usage on the NBN
with 29 per cent of services being 12/1 Mbps and 55 percent being 25/5
Mbps.[399]
As covered in this Digest in relation to the RBS under the
headings ‘Key issue: reliance on outdated information’ and ‘Key
issue: exclusion of non-fixed connections from the charge’, consumer
demand for data has rapidly increased since these underlying assumptions were
made.[400]Advances
in telecommunication technology are frequent, and speed capabilities and
consumer requirements increase rapidly. In June 2010 for instance, just over 60
per cent of Australian broadband connections had speeds under 8mbps—a SIP
guarantee of 25mbps may quickly become inadequate to consumer expectations and
business requirements.[401]
As the speed minimums are currently defined in proposed
sections 360A and 360AA of the Telecommunications Act,
updating the SIP minimum speed guarantees to reflect evolving markets and
consumer expectations will require a legislative amendment.
Key issue: limitations of fixed-wireless definition
The definition of a qualifying fixed wireless carriage
service requires, among other things, that the carriage service is supplied
using a ‘fixed wireless technology platform’—the phrase is defined as having
the ‘meaning generally accepted within the telecommunications industry’.[402]
The Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill states that fixed wireless
technology involves wireless transmission to an ‘antenna installed at the
premise’ as distinct from mobile technology which allows a user to move around.[403]
This would seemingly exclude some other technologies that have been described
as ‘fixed wireless’, such as mobile home broadband that has an antenna built
into the modem and requires no installation—such technologies would not appear
to be sufficiently ‘fixed’.[404]
While the exclusion of public mobile networks is consistent with the
Government’s policy, this may introduce perverse outcomes—for example requiring
a SIP such as NBN Co to install fixed antennas at premises, even when they may
be able to roll-out cheaper and less labour intensive desktop modem solutions.
Key issue: SIP Issues with Low Earth Orbit Satellite
Broadband.
A qualifying satellite carriage service is among other
things, a carriage service that is ‘supplied using a satellite’, but does not
include a public mobile telecommunications service’.[405]
Low earth orbit satellite broadband (LEOSB) networks are an emerging satellite
broadband technology which may be a public mobile telecommunication network
(LEOSB networks are discussed in further detail above in relation to the RBS
under Key issue: emergence of Low Earth Orbit Satellite Broadband).
The NBN Sky Muster satellites and other traditional
satellite carriage services located in geostationary orbit are not public
mobile telecommunications services, principally because such services are not
designed or largely capable of being used while moving, and do not appear to
involve ‘intercell handover functions’—both requirements of the definition of
‘public mobile telecommunications service’.[406]
LEOSB networks will likely be different to geostationary because they will be
capable of being accessed while the consumer is roaming and require intercell
handover functions.[407]
There is existing ambiguity around whether or not LEOSB
networks are a public mobile telecommunications service.[408]
In any event, if LEOSB networks are classified as such, then NBN Co (or any
other SIP) would not be able to utilise them to satisfy their SIP obligations.
As detailed above under Key issue: emergence of low earth orbit satellite
broadband, in evidence to the Senate Inquiry into the 2019 Bills, NBN
Co indicated that it was examining the possibility of either owning or
purchasing capacity on an LEOSB network to replace its existing Sky Muster
satellite service.[409]
Additionally, the current SIP framework does not allow for
there to be multiple SIPs responsible for different technology types over a
single area, on the assumption that the SIP in regional areas would be NBN Co
which provides all three qualifying service types (fixed-line, fixed wireless,
broadband).
This may pose difficulties if the government seeks to
designate a LEOSB carrier (that is not the NBN) as SIP for regional areas under
proposed section 360L of the Telecommunications Act (at item 7
of Schedule 3 to the TLACC Bill). As the SIP, the LEOSB provider would
be required to connect premises to a qualifying fixed-line network at
first instance unless unreasonable.[410]
A LEOSB carrier such as SpaceX will likely not operate a fixed-line network.
The Minister may be able to mitigate this risk via their ability to define
‘reasonable’. [411]
What if a SIP can’t meet its obligations?
SIPs must lodge periodic compliance reports to the ACMA on
terms that the Minister determines by legislative instrument.[412]
If the SIP for a nominated or designated area (that is, a non-NBN Co SIP)
becomes aware that it will be unable to meet its SIP obligations, it must
notify the Department and the ACMA as soon as practicable.[413]
If the SIP becomes aware that another carrier is willing to become the SIP for
that area they must also notify the Department and the ACMA.[414]
The Minister may also delegate most of the Minister’s powers in this new Part
the ACMA.[415]
Standards, benchmarks and rules
The Minister may, by legislative instrument set standards
and performance benchmarks which bind SIPs on a broad range of matters.[416]
This mostly concerns the particulars of the supply, service delivery,
performance, complaint resolution and wait times for connection and fault
rectification.
The Minister may, by legislative instrument, make rules
which a SIP must comply with, which may cover:
- processes
for resolving complaints about eligible service supplied by a SIP to CSPs
- any
other matter concerning the supply of such an eligible service to a CSP
- processes
for resolving complaints about the connection of premises in the service area
to a qualifying telecommunications network and
- any
other matter concerning the connection of premises in a service area to a
qualifying telecommunications network.[417]
Amendments to the CCA provide that these standards
and rules prevail over various other instruments including access
determinations, rules of conduct and access agreements entered into after
commencement,[418]
and special access undertakings entered into at any time, in the event of
inconsistency.[419]
There do not appear to be any specific offences for breaches of these standards
and rules.
NBN Co targets
NBN Co ‘must have regard’ to both a speed and coverage target
in relation to fixed-line services when fulfilling its obligations as a SIP.[420]
Speed target of fixed-line connections
Under the current NBN Co statement of expectations, NBN Co
should ensure that 90 per cent of fixed-line connections within NBN
service are capable of enabling carriage service providers to provide 50 mbps
peak download speeds to end-users.[421]
This expectation is being codified into a statutory target under proposed subsection
360S(1).
Fixed-line connections coverage target
Proposed subsection 360S(2) requires NBN Co to take
all reasonable steps to ensure that NBN Co’s fixed-line service is capable of
being connected to at least 92 per cent of premises in Australia. According to
the Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill, this is intended to complement
and reinforce the proposed subsection 360S(1) target by ensuring that
the speed target is in effect as widely as possible.[422]
NBN Co service maps
Schedule 5 to the Bill amends the National Broadband
Network Companies Act 2011 to require:
- NBN
Co to provide mapping data to the Secretary, and
- the
Secretary to make that mapping data available on the National Map website.
The data must be made available on the National Map
website no later than 60 days after the commencement of Schedule 5 (the day
after Royal Assent).[423]
The mapping data required to be provided is about premises connected, or due to
be connected, to the NBN based on geographic location and technology type.[424]
While proposed subsection 98B of the National
Broadband Network Companies Act imposes a one-off obligation, proposed
subsection 98B(2) allows for the Secretary to direct NBN Co to provide
subsequent mapping data. However, the amendments do not require the Secretary
to do this regularly or at all. According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the
TLACC Bill:
NBN Co has progressively increased the level of transparency
in the information it has provided to consumers over time. The company’s
ongoing development of its online website rollout maps already allows consumers
and stakeholders to see the information sought through this amendment. NBN Co’s
website is regularly updated to provide the viewer with the most current
information available on rollout progress and technology for each premises. In
the interest of further enhancing transparency, the proposed measure in
Schedule 5 would result in mapping data about the NBN being uploaded to the
National Map to facilitate comparison with other publicly available datasets on
the map.[425]
Amendments to the ‘superfast network rules’
Schedules 1
and 2 of the TLACC Bill amend the legislative framework which applies to
superfast fixed-line networks by:
- repealing
Part 7 of the Telecommunications
Act 1997, which deals with the regulation of non-NBN carriers offering
Layer 2 bitstream services, and making consequential amendments to the CCA (Schedule
1) and
- amending
Part 8 of the Telecommunications Act, which deals with the
regulation of non-NBN carriers offering superfast fixed-line networks (Schedule
2).
Background
The Telecommunications
Act, together with associated provisions of the CCA, provides the
regulatory framework for the telecommunications industry—as stated in the
Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill:
The superfast network rules
in Parts 7 and 8 of the [Telecommunications Act] were introduced in 2011
and apply to superfast fixed-line networks servicing residential and small
business customers (other than the NBN). Part 7 requires operators of such
networks to supply a Layer 2 bitstream service to access seekers. Part 8 requires
the networks to be wholesale-only (that is, structurally separated).[426]
Part 7: supply of layer 2
bitstream services to access seekers
Currently,
under the Telecommunications Act, a Layer 2 bitstream service is an
ethernet service (‘cable’) supplied for transporting data from one point to
another. Or, a Layer 2 bitstream service has the meaning as specified in a
legislative instrument made by the ACMA.[427]
This enables retail service providers (access seekers) to supply broadband
services to end-users (homes, small business customers) without needing to
build a direct physical connection to them.[428]
Part 7 of the
Telecommunications Act (and associated provisions of the CCA)
concern the regulation of non-NBN carriers supplying Layer 2 bitstream
services. Part 7 requires the owners of private superfast broadband networks
built or extended after 2011 to make a Layer 2 bitstream service
available to access seekers on an open-access (which means that it must not
unreasonably refuse access) and equivalent access basis (which means it must
offer substantially the same terms to all businesses, including any
subsidiaries that it has).[429]
The regime to
regulate the provision of Layer 2 bitstream services includes a mandatory
requirement for the ACCC to declare a Layer 2 bitstream service, and this
declaration remains in force indefinitely so as to provide ‘certainty in
relation to the enduring nature of this requirement.’[430]
The so-called
superfast network rules in Parts 7 and 8 of the Telecommunications Act have
been in place since 1 January 2011. They apply to local access lines (other
than NBN) that are:
- part
of a fixed line local access network built after 1 January 2011 and used to
supply superfast carriage services wholly or principally to residential and
small business customers or
- part
of a fixed-line local access network that was built, upgraded, altered or
extended after 1 January 2011, so that it became capable of being
used to supply superfast[431]
carriage services to residential or small business.[432]
The
operational effect of the ACCC declaring a Layer 2 bitstream service is that
carriers and carriage service providers who supply a declared service are
required to comply with the ‘Category A standard access obligations’ in
relation to that service (section 152AR of the CCA).[433]
Exemptions from standard
access obligations
The ACCC may
make a ‘class exemption’ from Class A standard access obligations where it is
satisfied that this will promote the long term interests of end-users (section
152ASA of the CCA). Individual carriers and carriage service providers
may also seek an ‘anticipatory individual exemption’ from any or all standard
access obligations (section 152ATA of the CCA). This exemption may be
granted on a conditional or unconditional basis and may specify time limits.
The ACCC must be satisfied that the giving of the exemption would promote the
long term interests of end-users.[434]
Part 8: structural
separation of retail and wholesale networks
Part 8 of the
Telecommunications Act seeks to deal with discrimination in the market
and requires that high speed broadband networks built after 1 January 2011 be
wholesale-only (structurally separated in terms of wholesale and retail
business). The aim of these separation rules is to provide a level playing field
as the basis for enabling opportunities for fair competition for the operation
of new superfast broadband networks.[435]
This level playing field is also intended to encourage and provide greater
investment certainty for network builders with the goal of providing enhanced
consumer choice and value for money in terms of quality of services.
Part 8 does not apply to extensions of pre-2011 networks of
less than 1 kilometre from any point on the infrastructure of the network (as
it stood immediately before 1 January 2011).[436]
The key aim of the proposed changes to Part 8 is to make the
obligations target:
[a]ny single local access
line that forms part of a network (other than the NBN) that is wholly or
principally supplying services to residential customers and is used to supply a
superfast carriage service to residential customers in Australia.[437]
Repeal of Part 7
Item 24
in Part 1 of Schedule 1 repeals Part 7 of the Telecommunications
Act which deals with access to Layer 2 bitstream services. The
Vertigan Review recommended the repeal of Part 7, arguing that it acted as an
unnecessary fetter on competition.[438]
The Vertigan Review also recommended that Part 8 should be amended to enhance
its operation by providing a baseline of structural separation of superfast
broadband networks, while also creating:
a process under which the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) could authorise providers
operating on a functionally separate, rather than structurally separate, basis
where this promotes the long-term interests of end-users.[439]
The
amendments to Parts 7 and 8 are broadly in line with recommendations made by
the Vertigan panel.[440]
The repeal of Part 7 is being done on the basis that Part XIC of the CCA
is sufficient to properly regulate any access to Layer 2 bitstream services.[441] The
Explanatory Memorandum states:
The ACCC has declared the
‘Superfast Broadband Access Service’ (SBAS) under Part XIC of the CCA. As a
result, the SBAS is required to be supplied to access seekers on a range of
superfast networks.[442]
The
consequence of this repeal is that ‘access to specific wholesale services on
superfast broadband networks would only be mandated if the services are
declared by the ACCC under Part XIC of the CCA.’[443] There are a few networks
declared under Part XIC, which are not currently captured by Part 7 of the Telecommunications
Act. Also, because of the proposed amendments to Part 8, ‘superfast
networks would operate on either a functionally or structurally separated
basis. They would therefore supply eligible services on a wholesale basis.’[444]
Transitional provisions
The Minister
may grant exemptions under section 141A or section 144(1) of the
Telecommunications Act. Subsection 141A confers power on the Minister for
Communications to exempt:
- a
specified network
- a
specified local access line or
- a
specified owner
from the Layer 2 bitstream obligations under of section 141.[445]
Subsection
144(1) of the Telecommunications Act confers similar powers on the
Minister to exempt specified networks from the wholesale-only requirements of
section 143 of the Telecommunications Act (Part 8). As a general rule
section 143 of the Telecommunications Act (Part 8) requires that supply
of superfast broadband services be provided on a wholesale only basis. Networks
that existed before 1 January 2011 are exempt from this requirement.
Item 27 in
Part 2 of Schedule 1 covers transitional provisions for the repeal
of Part 7, namely the continued validity of various instruments made under
section 141A of the Act. Also, while the Minister cannot grant any further
exemptions under subsections 144(1)-(3) after commencement, the Minister is
able to vary any exemption.[446]
Amended definition of layer
2 bitstream services
Items 23A and
23B in Part 1 of Schedule 1 amend the definition of ‘Layer 2
Bitstream service’ as defined in section 7 of the Telecommunications Act to
give it the ordinary meaning of that expression (rather than the technical
definition currently in place). This amendment reflects the technical reality
that Layer 2 Bitstream services can be supplied in a number of forms.[447] The
Explanatory Memorandum states that ‘for the purposes of determining the
ordinary meaning of the expression... the reader is to assume that Layer 2 has
the same meaning as in the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference model
for data exchange’.[448]
The consequence of this amendment is that it will not be necessary for the ACMA
to have the power to specify a Layer 2 Bitstream service for the purpose of the
new and functionally inclusive definition.
Amendments to Part 8
Removal of regulation for
networks servicing small business customers
Item 34 of
Schedule 2 inserts proposed section 142C into Part 8 of
the Telecommunications Act, which will replace section 143 for local
access lines created or upgraded after the designated commencement date (three
months after Royal Assent). Section 143 will continue to operate for access
lines that came into existence between 1 January 2011 and the designated
commencement date. These sections mandate that the supply of superfast
broadband is to be on a wholesale basis. Items 35-41 mirror the
structural amendments to section 142C into 143 including:
- a new subsection 143(3) creating an exception if a
functional separation undertaking is given
- reworked
contravention provisions in proposed subsection 143(5) and
- removal
of small businesses from section 143.
Item 42 inserts
a new Division 2A – Exemptions, a revised scheme of statutory exemptions
from the general wholesale only requirement under sections 142C and
143. These include:
- proposed
section 143A: class exceptions for small providers (up to 2,000 premises
and possibly up to 12,000 premises if the regulations permit) as determined by
the ACCC. Detailed discussion of this section can be found on pages 93-95 of
the Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill
- proposed
section 143E: creates exemptions for certain real estate developments that
were underway before 1 January 2011. The Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC
Bill states that ‘a number of real estate development projects that were under
way before 1 January 2011 continue to be developed. It is therefore necessary
to preserve the existing rules’[449]
- proposed
section 143F: details the new ‘close proximity’ exemption replacing the
existing 1km rule under subsection 156(4) as amended by item 64 of
Schedule 2
- proposed
section 143G: carries forward four existing exemptions for certain
networks, specifying those networks in the section and
- proposed
section 143H: introduces a new exemption for networks marketed exclusively
as business networks.
Item 43 amends
section 144 to limit the ability of the Minister to issue new exemptions
by written instrument after the commencement date.
Key issue: removal of the
1km exemption
Section 143
of the Telecommunications Act creates a general rule that the supply of
superfast broadband services must be provided on a wholesale only basis.
Networks that existed before 1 January 2011 are exempt from this
requirement. Section 156(4) creates an additional exemption allowing
pre-existing networks to extend up to 1km from their 1 January 2011 limits
without engaging the wholesale only requirement in section 143.
Item 64
of Schedule 2 removes this exemption and replaces it with the ‘close proximity’
exemption under proposed section 143F—it would allow for new access
lines to be exempt only if, among other things, ‘the premises are in close
proximity to a line that forms part of the infrastructure of the network as the
network stood immediately before the designated commencement date.’ It is the
proposed that Minister has, by way of legislative instrument, the ability to
define ‘close proximity’ under proposed section 162 (at item 77
of Schedule 2 to the TLACC Bill). This power is delegable to the ACCC.[450] The
Explanatory Memorandum to the TLACC Bill provides:
It is envisaged the close
proximity would facilitate the connection of existing network infrastructure in
the street to premises, but not the extension of that network infrastructure to
allow connection in a new location where the network is not already ‘in close
proximity’.[451]
Various telecommunication
providers, including TPG and Telstra have used this exemption to extend their
legacy fibre networks to new customers.[452]
It was also reported in 2016 that NBN was at a competitive disadvantage to
other FTTB providers, such as TPG, which has been utilising the 1km exception
to roll-out FTTB and are not structurally separated.[453] In support of the removal
of the exemption, the Department has cited the Vertigan Review recommendation
to remove the exemption on the basis that it:
...advantaged carriers with
pre-2011 network over those who build networks after 2011, especially those with
larger network footprints, and enabled carriers with pre-existing networks to
roll out large extensions which were not subject to wholesale-only
requirements, designed to protect residential consumers.[454]
Telstra and
TPG, as operators of legacy networks able to expand under the 1km exception,
argued against the amendment in their submissions to the 2017 Senate Inquiry.[455] The
2017 Senate Committee Inquiry ultimately considered that it had ‘not been
convinced of the need for amendments’ to the Bill.[456] The 1km rule was not again
raised in submissions to the 2019 Inquiry.
Key issue: removal of
networks servicing small businesses
Section 143
of the Telecommunication Act requires that networks ‘...used, or proposed
to be used, to supply a superfast carriage service wholly or principally
to residential or small business customers’, must be provided on a
wholesale only basis—it is an offence to contravene this requirement. The Bill proposes
that small business customers are removed from the scope of Part 8, leaving it to
apply to networks servicing residential customers.[457] As noted above, proposed
section 143H sets out an exemption (from the general wholesale only
requirement) for networks marketed by the carrier exclusively as a business
network, where any incidental residential use is minor.
The effect of
this change is that ‘lines which supply superfast carriage services to small
business will not be subject to the structural or functional separation
requirements’.[458]
The intention of this is to enhance flexibility in the supply of superfast
carriage services to small businesses, however it is unclear whether this will
also result in an improved cost-effective service.[459] The RIS attributes this
reform to the Government Policy Statement of 2014, but the statement makes no mention
of such a reform.[460]
The RIS also states that ‘existing networks, subject to the current rules, will
have more scope to service small business customers and operate retail
businesses as well as networks.’[461]
Industry and
other stakeholders have mixed positions on this issue; Optus in 2017 opposed
the change stating that the ‘amendment is inconsistent with the principle that
superfast broadband network infrastructure should operate on the basis of a
level playing field’.[462]
Telstra in 2017 supported the change in general but considered the drafting of
the exemption unworkable: ‘[t]his exemption does not reflect the commercial
reality that almost every network will have mixed uses’.[463] Telstra recommended that
the ‘marketed exclusively’ requirement in the exemption be replaced with the
lower bar of ‘wholly or principally’.[464]
Vocus, Superloop, and others supported the Bill’s proposal more strongly.[465]
The
Department recommended that amendments adopting Telstra’s proposal ‘would not
be consistent with the policy objectives of the legislation’ and that such a
change would enable carriers to ‘roll out substantial integrated local access
networks where only a bare majority of customers (50 per cent plus one, for
example) need to be business customers’.[466]
Professor
Mark Gregory of RMIT strongly opposed this proposal, describing the
Government’s justification of flexibility for network operators as ‘simply
nonsense’ and suggesting it would only benefit larger telecommunication
companies.[467]
Functional separation
undertaking provisions
Item 51 of
Schedule 2 inserts a new Division 2B—Standard Functional
Separation Undertakings into Part 8 of the Telecommunications Act,
which underlines the new functional separation provisions and a new Division
2C–Non-discrimination Rules, which outlines the wholesale rules for such
functionally separated entities.
These
provisions are uncontentious, with no stakeholders raising issues with
functional separation undertakings in the Senate Inquiry process.
Division 2B: standard
functional separation undertakings
Proposed section
151A of the Telecommunications Act outlines the basic
features of a functional separation undertaking, including:
- a
requirement that the person making the undertaking must maintain an arm’s
length functional separation between that person’s wholesale business unit and
retail business (proposed paragraphs 151A(2)(a) and (b))
- various
safeguards to ensure that this is effective concerning for example,
communication systems and accounts (proposed paragraph 151A(2)(e))
- publication
requirements for wholesale prices and terms of conditions (proposed
paragraph 151A(2)(f)) and
- requirements
in relation to the form of the undertaking, expiry, compliance reporting and so
on.[468]
Proposed
sections 151B and 151C mirror section 151A provisions for
non-standard functional separation undertakings. Proposed 151B concerns
‘deemed’ undertakings, where the ACCC has made a determination of variant rules
for a specified class of corporation, and the corporation agrees to be bound by
those rules. Proposed 151C concerns joint undertaking between
multiple persons.
Proposed
sections 151F-151J outline the ACCC’s responsibility to either accept or
reject proposed undertakings and the process of acceptance or rejection,[469]
consultation requirements,[470]
and criteria for acceptance.[471]
The key criteria for acceptance is ‘whether the undertaking promotes the
long-term interests of end-users of carriage services or of services supplied
by means of carriage services’.[472]
Proposed
sections 151K-151V concern the variation, renewal, replacement, and expiry
of undertakings, and consultation and other requirements imposed on the ACCC.
Proposed
sections 151W-151Z concerns the revocation of functional separation
undertaking. Revocations may be issued if the person has ‘breached a
fundamental provision of the undertaking’ (151W(1)(b)(i)) or breached
the non-discrimination rules in Division 2C. Proposed 151X
imposes consultation requirements on the ACCC before issuing a revocation
notice. Proposed section 151Y requires the ACCC to notify a
person if that person’s compliance with the undertaking is unsatisfactory.
Proposed
sections 151ZA-151ZC concern reporting requirements of entities generally,
including the requirement to notify ACCC of changes in control and that the ACCC
maintain a register of functional separation undertakings.
Proposed
section 151ZD-151ZE concern compliance and enforcement provisions, and
provide for civil penalties for contravention. Proposed 151ZE empowers
the Federal Court to hear applications concerning potential breaches of
functional separation undertakings, and provides for a wide range of remedies
and penalties.
Division 2C:
non-discrimination rules
Proposed
section 151ZF sets out the general principle that structurally separated
entities must provide wholesale services on a non-discriminatory basis, without
any favour to itself, and provides for civil penalties for contravention. Proposed
section 151ZG extends this principle to related activities.
Proposed
section 151ZH imposes publication requirements for terms and
conditions to wholesale customers, and proposed section 151ZHA provides
for judicial enforcement by way of application to the Federal Court.
Other
amendments
Item 52 inserts
provisions into Division 3 of Part 8 of the Telecommunications Act,
including anti-avoidance provisions and related civil penalty provisions,[473]
provisions concerning self-incrimination,[474]
and delegation of ACCC powers to SES employees of the ACCC.[475]
Proposed
sections 151ZL-151ZN concern the role of the Australian Competition
Tribunal in reviewing ACCC decisions made under these divisions.
Concluding comments
There is consensus across politics, industry, civil
society, and other stakeholder groups that ensuring universal access to
broadband is a worthy social goal. The principle of the use of public funding
to provide subsidies to non-commercial services in regional areas in support of
this goal is also uncontroversial. No submissions by any stakeholders expressed
in-principle opposition to the policy objectives of these Bills or their
predecessors.
The challenges these Bills face instead arise from
widespread concern about their suitability as a method to achieve these
uncontroversial policy objectives. Nearly every stakeholder that considered the
RBS at a technical level expressed concerns with at least one aspect of its
operation. The Vertigan Panel, the Productivity Commission, and the ACCC have
all either recommended against an RBS style levy, or expressed concerns with
the RBS’s operation. All three regarded an RBS style levy as needlessly
distortionary, while also being neither technologically nor competitively
neutral. All three recommended direct budget funding as the preferred method of
providing subsidies, a position shared by various industry and community
groups.
Broader stakeholder concerns stretched from other
macro-scale issues, such the exclusion of wireless technologies from the RBS
levy base, through to micro-scale issues such as perceived drafting issues.
2020 is a year of extremely rapid shifts in the
telecommunication industry, with the 5G network rollout accelerating, the first
LEOSB constellations expected to come online for consumers globally and the NBN
network expected to reach completion. These shifts have the potential to upend
the market, and present inherent challenges to any attempt at a long term
funding arrangement, particularly one developed nearly half a decade ago.
A key concern of stakeholders and the Senate Environment
and Communications Legislation Committee is the lack of transparency on how RBS
funds are actually spent, reflected in the 2019 Senate Inquiry’s majority
recommendation that further measures be developed.
A running theme of these Bills’ long history has been a
repeated emphasis on the role of future legislative reviews of the RBS to
address the variety of issues raised during its development. The Productivity
Commission’s view that ‘industry would derive greater certainty if the levy
design issues are resolved before implementing the proposed Regional
Broadband Scheme’[476]
is particularly relevant. There is merit in getting it right the first time.