Chapter 3 The implications and community impacts of proscription
3.1
This chapter discusses the impact of proscription on religious and
ethnic communities within Australia. It was clear from the evidence that there
continues to be a degree of concern in some sectors about the application and longer
terms effects of the new terrorism laws.
The claim of anti-Muslim bias
3.2
There were no objections to the listing of entities such as Al Qai’da but several witnesses argued that the proscription power is exercised inconsistently
and is vulnerable to political manipulation.[1] Australian Muslim Civil Rights
Advocacy Network (AMCRAN) remains opposed to proscription on the grounds that
the terrorist organisation offences do not require any specific intent by the
individual to engage in acts of terrorism.[2]
3.3
The preponderance of self-declared Islamic groups on the Australian list
was significant to many witnesses, who argued that the Australian list reflects
an anti-Muslim bias as compared to how proscription operates in like-minded
countries.[3] In particular, AMCRAN
and Islamic Information and Support Centre of Australia (IISCA) said that
because all but one of the organisations is ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’, many Muslim
Australians feel that they have been ‘targeted’ by the new terrorism laws.[4]
AMCRAN claimed that one of the consequences is that Muslim Australians are
likely to be subject to higher levels of surveillance and investigation than
the rest of the community.[5] AMCRAN expressed the
view that this situation:
… does not help in creating a cooperative environment for
addressing and fighting the modern challenges of terrorism, not to mention the
adverse impact it is having on the sense of security and safety of the Muslim
community.[6]
3.4
Although no organisation has yet been proscribed on the basis of
‘advocacy’ the power to do so was criticised as infringing freedom of
expression, especially of Australian Muslims who are more likely to express
unpopular opinions about the Iraq War, the Israel/Palestinian conflict or
conflicts in other places such as Afghanistan or Chechnya.[7]
3.5
There was also anecdotal evidence that proscription results in a degree
of self-censorship within the Muslim communities.[8]
For example, participation in social activities, lawful protest and dissent,
financial contributions to charitable organisations and through mosques, were
some of the areas of normal civic participation that were said to be affected.[9]
IISCA said that:
Law-abiding organisations have seen funding reduced to a
trickle, in part due to the confusion created by the new laws, and, in part,
due to the media hype surrounding the groups sharing similar names i.e.
anything with Islam or Muslim terminology in the name.[10]
The impact on other ethnic communities
3.6
Similar concerns were raised by the Australian Tamil Rights Advocacy
Council (ATRAC) who submitted that if the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
were to be listed under the Criminal Code, this would cause many Australian
Tamils to withdraw from legitimate activities that have non-violent goals. It
was argued that connections, through travel, education, family and humanitarian
and development work, means that engagement with the LTTE is inevitable.[11]
ATRAC said that because of these deep and ongoing connections, listing the LTTE
under the Criminal Code was likely to have a significant and adverse impact on
normal social, economic and political activities.[12]
In particular, ATRAC said that the suppression of the community’s deeply held
political convictions was inconsistent with pluralist democracy.[13]
The implications for refugees and asylum seekers
3.7
The Committee also received evidence from the Refugee Council of
Australia (RCOA) about its concerns that due to real or alleged association
with a listed organisation, refugees and asylum seekers may be exposed to
prosecution for a terrorist organisation offence for the same reasons they were
granted refugee status. [14] RCOA said that, in
complex internal conflicts, it is almost impossible for a person not to have
some type of connection with a ‘terrorist organisation’.[15]
Associate Professor Hogg argued that Australia has granted refugee status to
people persecuted because of alleged membership and support of organisations,
such as the PKK.[16] RCOA explained that
because concepts such as ‘membership’ and ‘association’ are broad and
undefined, listing an organisation means that these offences have the potential
to affect large numbers of people.[17] It was said that many
refugees may support an organisation’s goals (for example, an independence
struggle) but not their method of achieving it.[18]
3.8
The RCOA and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) submitted that
proscription may also increase the risk of exclusion or expulsion under the
Migration Act 1958.[19] RCOA stated that the
power to proscribe organisations could:
… expand the grounds for exclusion of refugees and asylum
seekers imputed to be members or to support a listed terrorist organisation
through:
n adverse security
assessments;
n exclusion under
Article 1F of the Refugee Convention 1951; and
n visa cancellation
under s501(6) of the Migration Act 1958.[20]
3.9
RCOA said that, having consulted with other organisations, there
appeared to be an increasing reliance on security assessment that was causing
delays. RCOA also questioned the reliability of intelligence about a refugee or
asylum seekers involvement in a listed organisation.[21]
UNHCR stated that because an adverse security assessment is not disclosable to
a non-national, a presumption arising from a connection to a listed entity
cannot be rebutted by a person otherwise found to be in need of protection.[22]
3.10
The Committee asked the Government to clarify the situation. The Department
of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) confirmed that there is no automatic
exclusion based on an association with a ‘terrorist organisation’ and each case
is dealt with individually. Whether or not a person is excluded depends upon
the existence of an adverse security assessment by ASIO.[23]
The Deputy-Director of ASIO stated that:
Obviously it is case by case, you understand, because you are
dealing with individuals; you are not dealing with groups. … Whether the group
is proscribed here or not, it is still a matter of the individual and the
extent to which that person might have engaged in, or is likely to engage in,
in Australia, activities prejudicial to security. It is not automatic.[24]
3.11
This appears to be consistent with the position advocated by the UNCHR,
which submitted that:
In view of the seriousness of the issues and the consequences
of an incorrect decision, the application of any exclusion clause should
continue to be individually assessed, based on available evidence, and conform
to basic standards of fairness and justice.[25]
3.12
ASIO publishes information in its annual report on the number of visa
security assessments processed in each twelve month period. Thus, for example,
in the financial year 2005-06 ASIO conducted 53,147 visa security assessments,
resulting in 12 individuals, from a range of nationalities being refused entry
due to links to politically motivated violence, terrorism or foreign
intelligence services.[26]
The adequacy of community information
3.13
It appears to be a commonly held view that informing the community about
proscription and the scope of terrorist organisation offences remains a
challenge.[27] The Community Relations
Commission did not comment on the effectiveness of proscription but made the
observation that:
..it is an offence to fund a terrorist organisation both
within and outside Australia, the Commission would suggest that a communication
strategy be put in place to ensure that the Australian community is informed of
those organisations that are listed, the law, and the possible consequences of
breaching that law.[28]
3.14
The Committee sought up to date information from AGD about the
Department’s efforts to promote public understanding of the implications of
proscription. AGD reiterated that it publishes information about listings on
its website and this includes the Statement of Reasons.[29]
The Attorney-General also releases a press statement at the time of the listing
but the extent to which the various ethnic news outlets are covering such
matters has not been monitored and is therefore unknown.[30]
As a consequence, the Committee has no way of assessing the effectiveness of
these routine steps in informing the wider community.
3.15
AGD has also adopted a number of other measures. For example, during
the hearing AGD advised that a set of pamphlets produced in 2005 are to be
revised to include information about proscribed organisations.[31]
The Committee was also informed that these pamphlets have been distributed
through some migrant organisations.[32] AGD has also responded
positively to invitations to speak at public forums and have made presentations
at several such events during the past year.[33]
Committee View
3.16
In a liberal democracy the ‘banning’ of a political association is
inherently controversial. However, proscription of organisations that engage
in extreme acts of political violence, while still regarded an exceptional measures,
is not entirely new. Few witnesses claimed that proscription per se is
unjustified as a means to combat terrorism. Provided there is probative
material that the entity has adopted terrorism as a strategy to pursue its
goals, listing that organisation, regardless of the ideological, political or
religious cause it seeks to advance, is a legitimate response by a democratic
society.
3.17
The Committee does not accept that the preponderance of militant
Islamist groups on the current list is a form of discrimination. The selection
of entities is not concerned with the religious faith of any group and is not
geared toward selecting Islamic organisations. Nor is the proscription power
exercisable purely in relation to organisations that promote some form of
religious fundamentalism. There have been numerous efforts to make the
distinction between Islam the religion and the violent extremism of some
militant Islamist groups, whose indiscriminate violence threatens public safety
and/or the existing structures of government.
3.18
That said, the Committee recognises that there remains a tendency in
much of the public debate to conflate Islam the religion with the distorted
political theology of groups that use terrorist tactics, and this has fed
prejudicial attitudes. A general rise in the level of prejudice experienced by
Muslim Australians has been recorded, with Muslim women being particularly
vulnerable.[34]
3.19
HREOC briefed the Committee on its ongoing work with the DIAC to
alleviate the situation. The Committee was especially interested to learn of
the Unlocking the Doors Project designed to facilitate dialogue between
Muslim communities and police in NSW and Victoria, and improve police responses
to complaints of racist violence.[35] It is important that
such work continues and that everything is done to promote a wider appreciation
across the whole community that freedom of speech is not a license to
deliberately inflame hostile sentiment against any other group.[36]
3.20
The Committee regard the issue of increased levels of investigation as
essentially a question about the operation of police and intelligence powers, a
matter that was not examined in detail during this inquiry. We therefore limit
our comment to the observation that building cross community partnerships at
the operational and community level is important in supporting the efforts of
the police and intelligence agencies.[37]
3.21
The Committee does not agree that proscription on the basis of
‘advocacy’ of terrorist acts is an unjustified infringement of freedom of
expression. While we understand that many of the fears expressed about this
aspect of the law are genuine, in light of the fact that no organisation has
yet been proscribed on the basis of advocacy, some of the claims appear to
overstate the position. The application of the proscription power based on the
grounds of ‘advocacy’ of terrorism is discussed in Chapter 4.
3.22
The Committee recognises that, traditionally, Diaspora communities have
considered their ongoing support and connections with overseas organisations as
perfectly legitimate. However, Australia has obligations not to provide safe
haven or allow its territory to be used for activities that facilitate
terrorist violence against foreign states. The Committee has also recognised
that assessing the impacts of proscription on ethnic and religious communities
is a relevant factor to be taken into account during its review of listings.
3.23
Concerns were raised about the potential for proscription to impact on
the determination of refugee status but exclusion is not automatic under
Australian law. The Inspector General of Security and Intelligence (IGIS)
plays an important role in providing ongoing oversight of the intelligence
agencies, and is the appropriate body to deal with individual complaints about
delays in assessments in migration related matters.[38]
The question of the procedural rights of non-nationals is outside the terms of
reference of this inquiry.
3.24
There is an important distinction between activities prior to arrival in
Australia and conduct in Australia that breaches Australian criminal law,
which clearly does raise the possibility of prosecution. It is therefore of
the utmost importance that effective communication strategies are in place to
ensure that vulnerable communities are aware of what is and what is not
permissible. The Committee has stated the importance of community information
on several occasions during its review of listings and it is disappointing that
the efforts to-date appear to be quite limited rather than part of a more
comprehensive and proactive strategy.
Recommendation 1 |
3.25
|
The Committee recommends that:
n the
Attorney-General’s Department develop a communication strategy that is
responsive to the specific information needs of ethnic and religious communities;
n there
be direct consultation on the management of visa security assessments between
the Australian Intelligence Security Organisation, the Inspector General of
Intelligence and Security and the UN High Commission for Refugees.
|