Key issue
Australia’s security environment is anticipated to remain complex, challenging and changing. Espionage, foreign interference, sabotage of infrastructure and terrorism continue to pose threats to the Australian community. There will continue to be statutory reviews and law reforms necessary to protect Australia’s national security from those threats.
Key threats and outlook
Espionage and foreign interference
According to the head of
the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation’s (ASIO) 2022 Annual Threat Assessment, espionage and foreign interference has supplanted
terrorism as ASIO’s principal security concern. ASIO has warned that foreign intelligence services and their proxies have been seeking
to penetrate government, defence, academia and business to steal classified
information, military capabilities, policy plans and sensitive research. Social media and messaging platforms have been denounced as breeding grounds for these covert
activities.
Although the impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic has made the operating environment more difficult for Australia’s adversaries, it has also increased the risk of cyber espionage by
these adversaries, which is highly deniable and can be remotely executed. According
to ASIO, cyber espionage remains the most pervasive approach adopted by Australia’s adversaries and represents the
most significant threat (p. 2) to the Australian higher education and
research sector.
Beyond espionage, ASIO has
also warned of foreign interference potentially targeting almost all sectors in Australia ‘to build and leverage community and
business relationships to covertly shape decision-making to Australia’s
detriment’ (p. 20). In recent years, ASIO has publicly cited examples of foreign
powers or foreign intelligence services’ attempts to cultivate candidates for an election in Australia, co-opt Australian politicians and recruit Australian
Government security clearance holders.
Diaspora communities and the higher education and research sector have been identified as particularly vulnerable to
threats from foreign interference.
Sabotage of critical infrastructure
ASIO has anticipated that an
act of sabotage in Australia by a foreign power becomes more likely when geopolitical
tensions increase (p. 20). Foreign involvement or investment in Australia’s critical
infrastructure, or concentrations of foreign ownership in key sectors, may increase a foreign power’s ability (p. 10,095) to access and control Australia’s
critical infrastructure. This could adversely impact Australia’s economy,
security and sovereignty. ASIO has also flagged the potential for Australia’s
adversaries to pre-position malicious code in critical infrastructure, particularly in areas
such as telecommunications and energy, to damage critical networks in the
future (p. 20).
Terrorism
Australia’s national
terrorism threat level has remained at ‘probable’.
This means credible intelligence, assessed by our security agencies, indicates that
individuals or groups have the intent and capability to conduct a terrorist
attack. Any future attacks will likely be committed by lone-actors and involve readily available weapons and simple tactics (p. 2).
Since September 2014 when the ‘probable’ threat level was raised, there have been at least 9
terrorist attacks and 21 major counter-terrorism disruption operations in
response to potential or imminent attack-planning in Australia. All of these
attacks and most of these disruption operations have related to Sunni Islamic terrorism (p. 2), the threat of which in Australia continues to
be shaped by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and, to a lesser
extent, al-Qa’ida. Meanwhile, ASIO has observed that the threat from right-wing extremism has grown, with the 2019
Christchurch attack remaining a source of inspiration for right-wing extremists
in Australia and internationally (p. 3). See the article, 'Right-wing
extremism in Australia', elsewhere in this Briefing book for further detail.
Despite the threat level, ASIO’s
overall terrorism caseload has decreased amid the COVID-19 pandemic. This trend is
common among Western countries and may be attributed to restrictions on movement
and cross-border travel according to the Institute for Economics and Peace (p. 8), which has categorised Australia as a country with a ‘very
low’ terrorism impact in 2022 (p. 14). Nevertheless, ASIO has stressed that the
pandemic ‘has not substantially diminished the threat from
terrorism’ (p. 2).
For the Australian Federal
Police (AFP), its operational tempo for terrorism has remained high, even during the COVID-19 pandemic
(p. 49). With individuals spending more time online (p. 49), the pandemic has provided extremists with
opportunities to exploit individuals’ isolation, financial stress and resentment
over government vaccination mandates and lockdown restrictions. This has led to
an increase in radicalisation and specific-issue grievances, turning to violent extremism in some cases.
Further, ASIO is concerned
about an increase in the radicalisation of young Australians. Australians as young as 13 who are vulnerable to terrorist propaganda designed
to radicalise have been involved in onshore terrorism (p. 2)- in both extremist Islamic and right-wing
circles. In 2021, minors represented nearly 15% of ASIO’s new counter-terrorism investigations and over 50%
of ASIO’s priority counter-terrorism investigations each week.
In Australia’s counter-terrorism strategy 2022, the Department of Home Affairs notes the growing
threat posed by convicted terrorist offenders after their release from custody,
citing recent examples of attacks in New Zealand and the UK. According to both ASIO (p. 2) and
the AFP (p. 9),
the enduring power of extremist ideologies means that convicted terrorists are
less likely to be rehabilitated. As at March 2022, fourteen convicted terrorists in Australia have finished serving their
sentence since 2019 and a further 54 convicted terrorists are due for release
in the next 2 decades, with 19 of them to be released between 2022 and 2027 (p.
12).
Key measures in the 46th
Parliament
Combating espionage, foreign
interference and sabotage of critical infrastructure
Major legislative amendments passed during the 46th
Parliament included the:
The Morrison Government also established a University
Foreign Interference Taskforce (UFIT), a partnership between government and
the university sector, to provide better protection for universities against
foreign interference. In November 2021, the UFIT updated its ‘Guidelines
to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector’, which
aim to support universities in strengthening their resilience to foreign
interference risks.
Counter-terrorism
Major legislative amendments passed during the 46th
Parliament included the:
The Morrison Government listed
for the first time 10 organisations as terrorist organisations under the Criminal
Code Act 1995 (Criminal Code), bringing the total number of listed
terrorist organisations to 29 as at April 2022. The new organisations included:
- Islamic State Somalia
- Islamic State West Africa Province
- Hizballah (in its entirety)
- Neo-Jama’at Mujahideen Bangladesh
- Sonnenkrieg Division
- The Base
- Hamas (in its entirety)
- Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham
- Hurras al-Din
- National Socialist Order
Recent developments and lapsed/ongoing reviews
As part of its inquiry
into extremist movements and radicalism in Australia, the Parliamentary
Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) tabled a 3-page
interim report in March 2022. It did not complete the inquiry during the
46th Parliament, with its former chair, Senator James Paterson, citing ‘other
pressing demands’ of the PJCIS and recommending that the 47th Parliament
complete the inquiry. Given the change of government following the 2022 federal
election, it is relevant to note that in December 2020 Labor originally called
for an inquiry specifically focused
on ‘right-wing extremism’ before the Morrison Government opted to recommend
a more expansive inquiry into various forms of extremism ‘including, but
not limited to … far right-wing extremist groups’. The PJCIS then adopted
in full the terms of reference as recommended by the Morrison Government,
with Labor MP Anne Aly reportedly stating that Labor reached
a compromise with the Morrison Government to help launch the inquiry.
Whilst in opposition, Labor regularly singled out ‘the
terrorist threat of right-wing extremism’ as an issue that the Australian
Government must take seriously and respond to appropriately. The Shadow Home
Affairs Minister, Kristina Keneally, called
on the Morrison Government to refer to the PJCIS a review into whether
Australia’s terrorist
organisation listing criteria were fit-for-purpose in relation to
right-wing extremism. Having
indicated that ‘Labor would support measures to proscribe extreme
right-wing organisations’, in August 2021 Senator
Keneally criticised the Morrison Government for not having proscribed groups
such as the National Socialist Network, The Proud Boys, Combat 18, and Blood
and Honour (none of which have
been proscribed under the Criminal Code to date).
Other PJCIS reviews
that have lapsed until its new membership is appointed include its
reviews of the Counter-Terrorism (Temporary Exclusion Orders) Act
2019, the Foreign
Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018, and the listing and re-listing of 8 organisations as terrorist
organisations under the Criminal Code.
The incoming PJCIS membership is also expected to resume the 2020–21 review
of the administration, expenditure and financial statements of the 6 intelligence
agencies that comprise the National Intelligence Community.
In March 2022, the Senate Legal and Constitutional
Affairs References Committee tabled a
report on its inquiry into the
adequacy and efficacy of Australia’s anti-money laundering and
counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF) regime. The report recommends, among
other things, that the Australian Government accelerates its consultation with
stakeholders on extending AML/CTF reporting obligations to designated
non-financial businesses and professions, such as lawyers, accountants and real
estate agents, in line with the Financial
Action Task Force recommendations.
In December 2021, the Senate
Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media tabled its first interim report on its inquiry into the risk posed to Australia’s democracy by foreign
interference through social media. The interim report recommended to the
Australian Government various initiatives to combat the threats of cyber-enabled
foreign interference, disinformation and misinformation- both generally and during
elections. In its April 2022 progress report, the committee recommended that the Senate consider whether to
re-establish the committee in the 47th Parliament, with provision to access the
documents and evidence of the now-dissolved committee, to enable the inquiry to
be completed.
In the 2022–23 Budget, the Morrison Government allocated
$19.8 million to establish a new national convicted terrorist offender register,
to be designed in consultation with states and territories and to be administered
by the AFP, to manage the risk posed by post-sentence terrorist offenders. In
justifying the need for such a register, the AFP cited
an example where it had to deploy about 300 police officers for 2 weeks
with the state police ‘at a serious cost to the Australian taxpayer of about
$3.8 million over one year’ to monitor a recently released terrorist offender
(p. 9).
The Independent National Security Legislation
Monitor (INSLM) is undertaking a review
into Division 105A of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth), which establishes
a scheme for the continuing detention of terrorist offenders whom a court is
satisfied pose an unacceptable risk of committing a serious terrorism offence
if released into the community post-sentence.
The 2020 Comprehensive
review of the legal framework of the National Intelligence Community
found that Australia’s existing electronic surveillance framework was no
longer fit-for-purpose. In response, the Morrison Government committed to reforming
the current patchwork of laws into a
single, streamlined and technology-neutral Act (p. 3). This proposed reform
aimed to better protect individuals’ information and data, ensure law
enforcement and security agencies have the powers they need to investigate
serious crimes and threats to security, and clearly identify which agencies can
seek access to specific information. The Department
of Home Affairs released a discussion paper in December 2021 and is
scheduled to release exposure draft legislation for public comment in 2022,
with a view to finalising the Bill in 2023.
On 8 June 2022, in the case of Alexander v
Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 19, the High Court of Australia,
by majority, invalidated the Home Affairs Minister’s power under section 36B of
the Australian
Citizenship Act 2007 to determine that a dual national ceases to
be an Australian citizen, if the minister is satisfied, among other matters,
that the person engaged in certain proscribed conduct demonstrating that the
person had repudiated their allegiance to Australia. The High Court made the
ruling on the basis that section 36B, which was introduced by the Australian
Citizenship Amendment (Citizenship Cessation) Act 2020, reposed in the minister
the exclusively judicial function of adjudging and punishing criminal guilt. The
Albanese
Government has stated that it ‘will examine the judgment and its
implications in detail’.
Following the 2022 federal election, on 1 June
2022, Prime Minister Albanese announced Machinery
of Government changes that would take effect on 1 July 2022. The
Attorney-General’s portfolio would gain responsibility for criminal law
enforcement and policy, including the AFP, which was part of the Home Affairs
portfolio in the Morrison Government. The Australian Federal Police Association
welcomed this move and commented in a media
release on 2 June 2022:
… we believe that [the AFP as] the
Commonwealth’s law enforcement agency should be closely aligned with the
portfolio that makes the laws in Australia. This will also provide independence
for the AFP. The AFP was buried within the Home Affairs portfolio. The
Attorney-General sits a little to the side of government, and we welcome such
an environment for the AFP …
It was also announced that the Home Affairs
portfolio would gain
responsibility for natural disaster response and mitigation, including the
National Recovery and Resilience Agency, which was previously part of the Prime
Minister and Cabinet portfolio.