In December 2022, the Chinese state-owned newspaper China Daily carried an op-ed entitled ‘Hail the pioneering spirit of relations between China and NZ’ which lauded New Zealand’s relationship with China. Six months later, during a visit to China by NZ Prime Minister Chris Hipkins, Xi Jinping was reported to have told him that ‘China-New Zealand relations have long been a “pacesetter” in China’s relations with developed countries’. This repeated a maxim Xi had used with former Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern during her visit to Beijing in April 2019.
New Zealand has also keenly promoted its relations with China over the last few years. In 2018, NZ was the only Five Eyes country to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative, an agreement which auto-renewed in March 2022. NZ prime ministers, present and past, have continued to travel to Beijing, where they reportedly receive ‘a very, very special experience’. Trade promotion has assumed policy precedence with the Upgrade to the New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement entering into force in April 2022. Links between NZ and China’s People’s Liberation Army and Ministry of Public Security Bureau have been maintained and developed, while the NZ publisher of the People’s Daily overseas edition has supported the relationship through political party donations. And a New Zealand minister once urged Australia to follow NZ and show China ‘respect’.
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But, of late, the relationship seems to have cooled somewhat. During her June 2023 visit to Beijing, NZ Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta was reportedly harangued by the former Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang. Then in late July, China’s ambassador to NZ underlined that there is ‘no room for complacency in the relationship’ and that nothing can be ‘taken for granted’. Meanwhile, the China Daily published an op-ed headlined ‘New Zealand bent on perilous shift in defense policy’ and the Chinese embassy in Wellington objected strongly to a recent assessment by the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service.
This change in the NZ-China relationship has a broader regional, and indeed global, context. Growing concerns by Australia, the US and other NZ partners over China’s military build-up, expanded regional influence and perceived global aspirations have induced diplomatic and military responses. These have included the QUAD, AUKUS, military force expansion, trade diversification and extended support for Pacific Island states under a burgeoning and increasingly integrated Indo-Pacific partnership.
Despite being a formal ally of Australia and a signatory of the 1951 ANZUS Treaty (which, however, no longer obliges the US to help defend New Zealand), New Zealand’s close relationship with China had made it somewhat of an outlier in this rapidly-changing environment. Its membership of the Five Eyes intelligence sharing arrangement was also questioned and a reluctance by the NZ Foreign Minister to join a uniform Five Eyes response to China in 2021 led to further concerns.
It was within this environment that NZ PM Chris Hipkins gave a key foreign policy speech on 7 July this year. In this, he noted of the China relationship:
New Zealand’s national interests require continued engagement with China, and cooperation where our interests converge. Certainly, our economic interests are significant. But there are other ways in which China challenges our national interests and in these areas we will disagree.
The PM also presaged the issue of ‘an interrelated set of strategic policy documents and assessments, spanning across New Zealand’s national security, defence, and foreign policy – including New Zealand’s first National Security Strategy’. These 4 documents were published in July and August:
The publication of these reports in rapid succession was clearly intended to collectively reflect – to both domestic and global audiences – a shift in NZ’s strategic and defence orientation and policies. More specifically, they appear to be signalling that like its security partners, New Zealand now also sees China as a major threat to the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific as well as to domestic security.
The Strategic Foreign Policy Assessment states (p. 20):
The Chinese Government has more assertively pursued diplomatic, trade, security, and development initiatives aimed at enhancing China’s influence, shaping international approaches, challenging existing international rules and norms, and promoting China’s vision in these areas.
The National Security Strategy notes (p. 5) that ‘China’s rise is a major driver of geopolitical change’ and:
China’s development cooperation has become a key lever to achieve its long-term ambitions in the Pacific. Its efforts to develop ports and airports in the region bring the possibility that these could become dual-use facilities (serving both civilian and military purposes) or fully fledged military bases in the future …
The Defence paper stresses: ‘An increasingly powerful China is using all its instruments of national power in ways that can pose challenges to existing international rules and norms’ (p. 14). It also foreshadows stepped-up defence funding. And the NZSIS report depicts China as a disruptive element within New Zealand society: ‘Most notable is the continued targeting of New Zealand’s diverse ethnic Chinese communities. We see these activities carried out by groups and individuals linked to the intelligence arm of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’ (p. 27).
The spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in NZ issued 2 statements in response to these reports, taking issue with the newly-expressed NZ sentiments. The response to the NZSIS report ‘strongly deplored and firmly rejected’ the report and claimed the Chinese Government was conducting ‘normal’ exchanges with overseas Chinese citizens in accordance with international law. The challenging of such activities has the potential to undercut key avenues of influence for China globally.
New Zealand’s new foreign and domestic orientation on China has likely been encouraged and supported by its security partners, with US Secretary of State Blinken visiting NZ in July; an Australian parliamentary committee delegation (including the heads of the Office of National Intelligence and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service) travelling to NZ in August to meet with government and opposition figures; and the Indian Navy planning port visits in NZ. The enhanced NZ links with NATO, an agreement with Japan to pursue a ‘free and open’ Pacific; the pursuit of trade diversification; discussions about potential participation in some aspects of AUKUS; and the purchase of new Poseidon aircraft by NZ also align NZ in a similar direction to its partners.
In short, the 4 policy statements noted above are guiding New Zealand along a new path. While Prime Minister Hipkins was careful in his 7 July speech to include a few caveats, stressing ‘our greatest foreign policy touchstones are our independence and our nuclear free position’ and that ‘New Zealand’s national interests require continued engagement with China’, it is clear that, like its partners, New Zealand has recognised that it is facing a changing and more uncertain world.