1.1 Government members of
the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee (the Committee)
Inquiry into the Nature and scope of the consultations prior to the making
of the Legal Services Amendment (Solicitor-General Opinions) Direction 2016
(the Inquiry) note that Mr Justin Gleeson SC Solicitor General of the
Commonwealth of Australia (Solicitor-General), tendered his resignation from
the post on Monday October 24, 2016.
1.2 During the course of
the Inquiry, Government members came to the conclusion that the position of the
Solicitor-General had become untenable. The Solicitor-General’s subsequent
decision to resign was, in the view of Government members of the Committee,
commendable and perhaps an unavoidable consequence of the public Inquiry.
1.3 Government members
regret that this Inquiry, set up by the Labor Party to attack Senator the Hon
George Brandis, Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia (the
Attorney-General), has in the end destroyed the career of the Solicitor-General
who was himself appointed by the previous Labor administration.
1.4 Government members of
the Committee are concerned that the majority on the Committee have used the
Senate committee process, and thereby the taxpayers’ indulgence, to pursue a
partisan political agenda.
1.5 Government members of
the Committee find it unfortunate that the Attorney-General was not in the
first instance invited to provide evidence to the Inquiry, which failure
highlights the partisan political nature of the Inquiry.
1.6 Government members were
strongly opposed on the question of calling both the Solicitor-General and the
Attorney-General to give evidence in a public forum. This opposition was based
on their belief that the Inquiry would take an administrative matter and make
it part of the political process, which would in turn diminish the standing of
both positions. Government members warned the Committee about this perilous
course of action and voted against calling the Solicitor-General and the
Attorney-General.
1.7 When the majority of
the Committee decided to proceed with calling the Solicitor-General and the
Attorney-General, Government members sought to have the evidence of both taken in
camera. Government members were again seeking to protect the institution of
these offices but were again overruled by the Labor/Greens majority.
1.8 Government members note
that it is within the discretion of government–and certainly in the interests
of the Australian people–for a broad range of legal advice to be sought on
matters of constitutional importance. Exercising such discretion does not of
itself in any way diminish the standing of the office of the Solicitor-General.
1.9 The independence of the
Solicitor-General has not in any way been endangered by clarifying the
operation of section 12 of the Law Officers Act 1964 (Cth) (Law Officers
Act) through the Legal Services Amendment (Solicitor-General Opinions)
Direction 2016 (the Direction). The terms of section 12 of the Law Officers
Act are not prescriptive regarding the form the advice and opinions furnished
by the Solicitor-General should take.
1.10 At the Inquiry's public
hearing on October 14 the Solicitor-General disclosed onto the public record
information regarding 'recent and urgent advice' requested by the Australian
Government Solicitor (AGS) on the composition of the Senate.[1] The Attorney-General
specified in his evidence to the Inquiry later that day that he did not provide
his consent for this disclosure to occur.[2]
1.11 Further, in his own
written submission to the Inquiry, the Solicitor-General revealed details of
opinions he had provided to government regarding a citizenship amendment,[3] and marriage
equality.[4]
1.12 During his
appearance before the Committee, the Solicitor-General
revealed
that the Prime Minister had, in January, personally sought the Solicitor-General’s advice on a
confidential matter. The Solicitor-General
was
asked why he felt at liberty to disclose that fact. His response was:
The reason I was at liberty
to tell you that...was this, Senator: the Prime Minister in the parliament-I
believe it was on Wednesday of this week-said that he had sought advices from me. So, the fact that the Prime Minister has sought advices from me
is a matter which has been revealed to this parliament by the Prime Minister.[5]
1.13 It
transpired, however, that the Solicitor-General’s
written
submission was published prior to any statement by the Prime Minister in
parliament, and the Solicitor-General had already disclosed the following:
there have been times when
persons, such as a Prime Minister or a Governor-General,
have approached me to provide advice in circumstances where I have been
required to keep their very request for advice, as well as the content of advice given,
confidential.[6]
1.14 There is
nothing to suggest that the Solicitor-General
ever
sought consent to make that revelation. And it was contained in a written
submission that was provided to the Committee before the Prime
Minister's statement to parliament, to which the Solicitor-General referred.
1.15 These disclosures seem to
Government members of the Committee to be at odds with a lawyer’s professional
duty not to disclose any details of advices to, or conversations with, clients.
1.16 The Solicitor-General
subsequently claimed that he made his submission to the Committee, not to the
public, and that it was up to the Committee to determine whether his submission
was published on the public record or not.[7]
As Second Law Officer of
the commonwealth Government
members of the Committee think that the
Solicitor-General is likely to have been familiar with Senate Committee
practice that, in the absence of a request for evidence to be accepted in
camera, it is usual to publish inquiry submissions.
1.17 From any ordinary legal practitioner, whether
a barrister or a solicitor, such behaviour might
well constitute professional misconduct. However the Solicitor-General told the Committee:
'Under the Law Officers Act, I do not practise as a barrister'. Further, when
asked whether he agreed with the assertion by the former Attorney-General, Mark
Dreyfus QC, that the Solicitor-General is 'just a barrister', the Solicitor-General replied: 'No'.[8]
1.18 Under s 13
of the Law Officers Act, the Solicitor-General 'is entitled to all the
rights and privileges of a barrister' in all the courts and tribunals of this
nation. The post nominal letters 'SC' (Senior Counsel) appear after the Solicitor-General’s name in reports of ·cases in which he
appears on behalf of the Commonwealth. And yet it appears that the Solicitor-General did not regard
himself as subject to the ordinary duties of a barrister.
1.19 The
Solicitor-General released Government documents and information to this
Committee without any apparent regard to the wishes of the Government. He
revealed the subject-matter of legal advice that had recently been requested by
the Attorney-General and he did so without the consent or authority of the
Attorney-General.
1.20 According
to his own letter to the Committee, the Solicitor-General engaged in 'voluntary
co operation with the Committee'. In other words, he was not compelled to give
any evidence, nor was he compelled to produce any documents. Despite this, he
appears to have produced documents, answered questions, and neglected to claim
'legal privilege' in respect of certain information without first consulting
the Government.
1.21 The Government members of
the Committee agree that the substance of the Inquiry turns on the construction
of the term 'consultation' under section 17 of the Legislation Act 2003
(Cth) (the Act)[9]
regarding the amendment of the Direction. As the Attorney-General pointed out,
however, the issue of the Direction was 'entirely routine'[10] as it 'did not change the
law in any way'.[11]
1.22 Government Senators are
satisfied that the Attorney-General flagged with relevant colleagues –
including the Solicitor-General and the Secretary of the Attorney-General’s
Department (the Department) – that the operation of the Direction was under
review. Government Senators are equally satisfied that the Attorney-General
conducted consultations in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is
clear to members of the Committee that the Department held the same view when
it provided advice to the Attorney-General that:
Before this instrument was made, the
Attorney‑General considered the general obligation to consult imposed by
section 17 of the Legislative Instruments Act 2003.[12]
1.23 Government Senators note
with interest evidence provided to the Committee that the consultation
conducted under the former Labor government by former Attorney-General Mr Mark
Dreyfus in relation to the Family Law (Superannuation – Provision of
Information: Judges' Pension Scheme) Determination 2013, consisted only of
'email and telephone exchange between two government departments'.[13]
1.24 On 12
November 2015, the Solicitor-General wrote to the Attorney-General. The letter
requested a meeting with the Attorney-General. Its subject heading was: 'Process for seeking and
acting on Solicitor-General advice in significant matters'. In his letter, the
Solicitor-General said that 'insufficient procedures are in place to ensure ...
appropriate coordination within Commonwealth agencies, and between
agencies and my office, in matters of high legal importance'. The
letter stated that the procedures then in place (in particular, the procedures
set out in the pre-existing form of Guidance Note 11) were not 'being followed in a
manner that best facilitates my performance of my statutory functions', those being 'the functions conferred
on [the] office [of SolicitorGeneral] by s12 of the Law
Officers Act 1964 (Cth)'. Again, the Solicitor-General expressed the view that:
the processes
for coordination of my advice function with my responsibilities to appear, and
for coordination of advice across government, are not working adequately.
1.25 The
Direction concerns the process for briefing the Solicitor-General to provide
opinions on questions of law. In other words,
it
deals with one of the very issues raised
by the Solicitor-General in his 12 November letter.
1.26 On 30
November 2015, a meeting took place between the Attorney-General, the
Solicitor-General, other Commonwealth officials, and members of the
Attorney-General's staff. It is apparent from the evidence
that a number of matters
were discussed during that meeting, which appears to have
lasted for around one hour. The meeting was held at the request of the
Solicitor-General, in response to his letter of 12 November. The
Attorney-General provided to the Committee redacted versions of contemporaneous
notes taken by two members of his staff. The notes confirm that among the
matters discussed at the meeting were the very matters raised by the
Solicitor-General in his 12 November letter:
-
the '[p]rocess for seeking... Solicitor-General advice in
significant matters';
-
'procedures ... to ensure ...
appropriate coordination within Commonwealth agencies, and between agencies
and [the Solicitor-General's] office,
in matters of high legal importance';
-
how processes might be 'followed in a manner that best
facilitates [the Solicitor-General's] performance of [his] statutory functions'; and
-
'the processes for coordination of [the Solicitor-General's] advice
function with [his] responsibilities to appear, and for coordination of advice
across government'.
1.27 Those are,
of course, the very matters dealt with by the Direction. And the notes record
the Attorney-General specifically referring to the Legal Services Directions
as being 'at issue'. Indeed, that was the Solicitor-General’s own evidence:
At the
commencement of the meeting the Attorney-General identified that there were
four documents at issue, and one of those documents was the Legal Services Directions.[14]
1.28 The notes
also reveal that the Attorney-General invited the Solicitor-General to 'think
of improvements to Guidance Note 11'. As the Attorney-General submitted, that necessarily raised the
prospect of corresponding amendments to the Legal Services Directions, given
that the instruments are complementary. Indeed, the Direction and Guidance Note
are now, for relevant purposes, identical.
1.29 During his
appearance before the Committee, the Solicitor-General characterised the 30
November meeting as follows:
The meeting that I came to
on 30 November was very much a meeting to say: here are very important matters
where the Solicitor-General either is not being brought into the process or is
being brought into it in an unsatisfactory fashion, and how can we do better
with that issue.[15]
1.30 It seems
from his extensive evidence to the Committee that the Attorney-General would
characterise the meeting somewhat differently. Even accepting the
Solicitor-General’s characterisation, however, it was plainly open to the
Attorney-General to consult the Solicitor-General about the apparently
unsatisfactory process that had been followed in relation to the 'very
important matters' raised by the Solicitor-General, and then form his own view
about how best to solve the problem. It simply cannot be maintained that the
Attorney-General did not consult the Solicitor-General. On the
Solicitor-General’s own evidence, there was consultation at the meeting of 30
November.
1.31 In his
evidence to the Committee, the Solicitor-General complained: 'No-one at the
meeting said: 'The problem we are talking about here needs a new legal services
direction'.[16]
Government Senators note that the Attorney-General's Explanatory Statement did
not suggest that anything like this had been said at the meeting. The Act
does not require a specific statement
of that kind and the
Solicitor-General did not point to anything that would create such a
requirement.
1.32 The Attorney-General
provided evidence to the Committee that at a meeting held on November 30, 2015
considered the 'substance not form' of the Direction.[17] Government Senators note
that this is in-keeping with the consultation provisions of section 17 of the
Act.
1.33 The meeting
of 30 November would alone have been
sufficient to discharge the Attorney-General's consultation duty under the Act.
It would also have been a more-than-sufficient basis for the Explanatory
Statement to assert that such consultation had occurred.
1.34 The
consultation conducted by the Attorney-General in this matter, in accordance
with section 17 of the Act, may not have been to the
Solicitor-General’s liking however that in itself does not mean it was offensive to
the Constitution or to the rule of law.
1.35 On 11 March
2016, some 14 weeks after the 30 November meeting, the Attorney-General was
provided with a draft copy of the Solicitor-General’s written suggestions as to how the processes for briefing him
could be altered. Significantly, Mr Gleeson's proposals included the following:
Before accepting a brief
to advise, the Solicitor-General will notify the Attorney-General of the
request to ensure that the Attorney is content to refer the question of
law for the Solicitor-General's opinion under s 12(b) of the Law
Officers Act. The opinion will also be provided to the Attorney-General. [Emphasis added.][18]
1.36 Plainly,
this proposed procedure is very similar to the one ultimately prescribed by the Direction. As required by the Law
Officers Act, and as is provided for in the Direction, the procedure
proposed by the Solicitor-General envisaged the Attorney-General giving his consent prior to the
Solicitor-General's provision of an opinion on a question of law.
1.37 It is
apparent that in making the Direction, the Attorney-General took into account
not only the concerns expressed in the Solicitor-General’s 12 November letter, and those discussed at the 30 November
meeting, but also the written suggestions that the Solicitor-General provided at the
Attorney-General's invitation.
1.38 The Solicitor-General
provided evidence to the Committee that he understood the conversation at the
November 30 meeting to be about the previous Legal Services Direction as it existed
prior to the Legal Services Amendment (Solicitor-General Opinions) Direction
2016 coming into effect.[19]
Government Senators are of the view that any discussion of the Direction, or
its preceding instrument, satisfies the provisions of section 17 of the Act if
the purpose of such a meeting was to explore the operable benefits of the
instrument.
1.39 The Attorney-General
attempted to secure a further meeting with the Solicitor-General, and noted in
his evidence that
Doubtless, that meeting would have
involved further discussions about the process for referring questions of law
to the second law officer.[20]
The Attorney was informed,
however, that the Solicitor-General was unavailable for a period of six weeks.
1.40 The Solicitor-General
wrote to the Secretary of the Department on May 24, 2016 outlining a detailed
complaint regarding the Direction. The Attorney-General said in evidence that
he did not respond personally to this correspondence due to the caretaker
provisions having been invoked following the prorogation of the parliament.[21] The
Attorney-General instead referred the correspondence to the Secretary of the
Department out of 'an abundance of concern that everything be done properly'.[22]
1.41 Government members note
that the Solicitor-General provided in his evidence to the Committee that he
had accepted a phone call from the Shadow Attorney-General Mr Mark Dreyfus
during the caretaker period in June 2016. The Solicitor-General did not inform
the Attorney-General (Senator Brandis), or the Secretary of the Department,
that this call had occurred. By the Solicitor-General’s own admission he and Mr
Dreyfus discussed the Direction during this phone call.[23] Government members of
the Committee consider this grave error of judgement to have been a clear
breach of the Solicitor-General’s duty to the Attorney-General.
1.42 The Attorney-General
wrote to the Solicitor-General on August 16, 2016, inviting him to provide his
views regarding the Direction. To date the Solicitor-General has not replied to
this correspondence.[24]
In light of this, the Solicitor-General’s evidence to the Committee that “the
Attorney-General has refused to engage with me on this topic” is clearly false
and misleading.
1.43 The Attorney pointed out
during his evidence that, had the Solicitor-General
...sought to engage with me in response
to my invitation, or even made a phone call to me, which he did not, this
issue could have been sorted out in a matter of minutes and at no cost to the
taxpayer.[25]
[Emphasis added]
1.44 Section
17 of the Act establishes a rule-maker's obligation to consult when
making an instrument such as the Direction. Under that provision, the rulemaker
is required to be satisfied, prior to the making of the instrument, that there
has been undertaken any consultation that the rule-maker considers to be
appropriate, and which is reasonably practicable to undertake. Under the
statute, it is for the rule maker to decide the appropriate degree and
form of the consultation. Under section 17(2), the rule-maker is permitted
to have regard to 'any relevant matter' in determining what consultation is
appropriate. Subsection 17(3) explicitly provides that the statute does not in
any way limit the form that consultation may take.
1.45 The Solicitor-General said in his evidence:
‘If one has a duty to
consult over the issue of a legislative instrument, the first thing you have to
do is tell the person affected or the person with expertise that you are
thinking of issuing a legislative instrument. If you do not tell them that they
cannot provide you with meaningful comments on either the legality or the
wisdom of what you are doing...The second thing you have to do is tell them the
substance of what you propose to put in the instrument. Now, if the Attorney
had done both those things, the issues that we now have before us would have
played out in a very different fashion.’[26]
1.46 It is clear
that the statute leaves the form and extent of consultation entirely at the
discretion of the rule-maker. In this case, the rule-maker was the
Attorney-General who, unlike the Solicitor-General, is an elected
representative and a Cabinet Minister.
1.47 Mr Gleeson
is, of course, entitled to his idiosyncratic understanding of what is desirable
when it comes to consultation. What he is not entitled to do is to elevate
that idiosyncratic understanding to the status of a rule of conduct for the
elected government.
1.48 Government
members of the Committee are mindful of the Attorney-General’s evidence to the
effect that it is also important to observe what that Explanatory Statement did not
say. It did not say that the Attorney-General had consulted the
Solicitor-General in some specific fashion. It did not say, for
instance, that he had consulted the Solicitor-General about whether he thought a Direction in some precise form should be issued. It did not
say that the Attorney-General had consulted the Solicitor-General by
providing him with an exposure draft of the instrument. It did not say
that the Attorney-General had secured the agreement of the Solicitor-General to
the form of the Direction. What the Explanatory Statement actually said was:
As the
Direction relates to the process
for referring a question of law to the Solicitor-General, the Attorney-General has consulted the Solicitor-General.[27]
1.49 The Attorney-General's Department was of
the same view. The Ministerial Submission recommending that the
Attorney-General approve the Direction and Guidance Note included the
Explanatory Statement, drafted by the Department. The submission confirmed that
the preconditions for the issuing of the Direction and Guidance Note–including the
requirements of section 17 of the Act–had been satisfied. Specifically, the advice stated:
Section 17 of the Legislative
Instruments Act 2003 [sic] provides that before a rule-maker makes
a legislative instrument the rule-maker must be
satisfied that any consultation that
is considered to be appropriate and is reasonably practicable to undertake, has been undertaken. Due to the nature of
the power exercised by you under s 55ZF of the Judiciary Act 1903 and the subject matter of the instrument, we consider that your consultation with the
Solicitor-General would meet this obligation.
[Emphasis added][28]
The
Attorney-General was entirely correct to accept the advice of his Department.
1.50 The
Attorney-General issued the Direction on 4 May 2016 under section 55ZF of the Judiciary
Act 1903 (Cth). The Direction now constitutes paragraph 10B of the Legal
Services Directions 2005 (Cth). Like the rest of that instrument, the
Direction is legally binding, but enforceable only by the Attorney-General.
1.51 On the same
day that the Direction was issued, the Attorney also released a new version of
what is known as Guidance Note 11 (the Guidance Note), which also concerns
the briefing of the Solicitor-General. Paragraphs 16-24 of the Guidance
Note are relevantly in identical terms to the Direction. The Guidance Note is one of a series
of such Notes maintained by the Office
of Legal Services
Coordination (within the
Attorney-General's Department). Those Notes give effect to the Legal
Services Directions or, in the words of the Office of Legal Services
Coordination, they 'help agencies to comply with their obligations under the directions'.[29]
1.52 Along with the Direction, the Attorney-General authorised an Explanatory Statement
to be issued. That Statement contained the following sentence:
As the Direction relates
to the process for referring a question of law to the Solicitor-General, the Attorney-General
has consulted the Solicitor-General.[30]
1.53 Senator
Reynolds provided the
Solicitor-General with an opportunity to clarify
his evidence to the Inquiry by submitting to the Solicitor-General a series of Questions on Notice. Those questions were
respectful, and they were carefully formulated. They drew upon the
Solicitor-General’s own evidence, including his
revelation that he had a previously undisclosed conversation with the Shadow
Attorney-General, and asked him to expand upon it. The Questions on Notice are
appended to this Report.
1.54 The Solicitor-General refused to respond to the Questions on Notice. He did so
by way of letter dated 24 October 2016. Government Senators were
surprised by the Solicitor-General’s attitude to the Committee. In his letter
the Solicitor-General informed the Committee that he ‘did not accept’ that
there was any deficiency in his evidence, and noted he had ‘already provided
extensive assistance to the Committee’. The Chair
of the Committee subsequently excused the Solicitor-General from answering any
of Senator Reynold’s Questions on notice in a letter to the Solicitor-General
dated October 25, 2016.
1.55 Government members are
concerned that the Chair and the Labor/Greens majority of the Committee decided
to excuse the Solicitor-General from answering any of the Questions on Notice
that were put by Senator Reynolds.
1.56 Government Senators view
the Questions on Notice process as a necessary and tested function of
commonwealth transparency and accountability. Allowing a statutory body or
officer to be excused from answering Questions On Notice places in jeopardy the
ability of all parliamentary committees to forensically pursue matters under
inquiry.
1.57 Such practice would allow
the majority members of a committee to selectively exclude evidence from any
Inquiry, including Senate Estimates, by excusing certain parties from answering
Questions on Notice. This runs counter to community expectations regarding
parliament’s role of ensuring transparency and accountability in all activities
of Government and statutory office holders.
1.58 The terms of reference of
the Inquiry are as follows:
-
the
extent to which any consultation drew on the knowledge or expertise of persons
having expertise in the relevant fields;
-
whether
persons likely to be affected by the proposed instrument had adequate
opportunity to comment on its content;
-
the
form of the consultation, including whether any written submissions were sought;
-
the
timing of when any consultation occurred; and
-
any
related matter.
1.59 In regards to these terms
of reference, Government members of the Committee find that:
-
the
consultation that occurred did in fact draw on the knowledge and expertise of
persons having expertise in the relevant field, to the extent that such
consultation was required within the provisions of section 17 of the Act;
-
persons
likely to be affected by the proposed instrument were given adequate
opportunity to comment on its content to the extent that they were required to
be provided with such opportunity within the provisions of section 17 of the
Act;
-
the
form that the relevant consultations took was in accordance with usual
parliamentary practice and clearly within the provisions of section 17 of the
Act;
-
the
consultation process occurred over a reasonable period of time that allowed for
the consultations prescribed under section 17 the Act to take place; and
-
all
related matters have been satisfactorily addressed.
1.60 All of the evidence
presented to the Committee throughout this Inquiry points to the conclusion
that the parliament was not at any time misled regarding the consultation
process that occurred during the compilation of the Direction.
1.61 The majority report
ignores four fundamental propositions:
- The
Attorney-General clearly consulted the Solicitor-General;
-
The
Attorney-General did not mislead the parliament;
- The
Attorney-General was independently advised by his Department that he had
satisfied the consultation obligations of section 17 of the Act; and
-
There
is no evidence that the Direction has affected, or is affecting, the operation
of the office of the Solicitor-General.
1.62 Government Senators
observe that the majority report pays no attention to the Solicitor-General’s
fractious attitude and incomplete evidence. In doing so the majority has
abandoned any pretence of balance. Once again Labor and the Greens have wasted
the resources of the Senate–resources provided by the taxpayer– on a baseless
and partisan Inquiry intended only to score political points.
Senator the Hon
Ian Macdonald
Deputy Chair
Senator Linda Reynolds
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