Chapter 1 - Introduction and background

Chapter 1Introduction and background

Referral of the inquiry

1.1On 30 March 2023, the following matters were referred to the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committees (the committee) for inquiry and report by 1 September 2023:

The adequacy of Australia’s preparedness to host the 2026 Commonwealth Games in Victoria and the 2032 Olympic and Paralympic Games in Brisbane, and to leave a legacy of sporting infrastructure to encourage more Australians to participate in elite and community sports and live active lifestyles, with particular reference to:

(a)the adequacy of existing sporting infrastructure to host Games events;

(b)investments in the provision of new or upgraded sporting infrastructure to host Games events, which will have legacy applications for elite and community sports;

(c)consultation by responsible state and Australian government agencies with peak national and state sporting representative organisations to ensure any new investments in Games sporting infrastructure meet the needs of elite and community sports now and into the future;

(d)the adequacy of oversight and accountability processes for investments in new or upgraded sporting infrastructure to host Games events;

(e)investments into the provision of transport infrastructure to facilitate the involvement of more Australians in the Games;

(f)the adequacy and accessibility of, and planning for, accommodation to host athletes, organisers, support staff and Games attendees and future use;

(g)the adequacy of planning for visa requirements for athletes, support staff, officials and visitors seeking to participate in the Games;

(h)the costs and benefits to the Australian community of investments in infrastructure to support the Games, including any impacts on local government, communities and business in host locations;

(i)claimed economic and tourism benefits of the Games;

(j)impacts on housing affordability in areas where proposed Games venues will be located and surrounds;

(k)the potential for regions to benefit in the short and long term from Games investments;

(l)consideration of solutions; and

(m)any other related matters.

1.2On 13 June 2023, the Senate granted an extension of time to report to 1December2023.

Conduct of the inquiry to date

1.3The committee advertised the inquiry on its website and invited submissions from relevant stakeholders, including National Sporting Organisations (NSOs) and National Sporting Organisations for People with Disability; the 2026 Commonwealth Games and 2032 Olympic and Paralympic Games (Games) organising bodies; Australian and state government departments and agencies; local governments; businesses and economic development associations; universities and institutes; and community organisations. Details regarding the inquiry are available on the committee’s website.

1.4Submissions originally closed on 29 May 2023. On 25 July 2023, following the Victorian Government’s decision to withdraw as host of the 2026 Commonwealth Games, the committee agreed to reopen submissions until 18 August 2023.

1.5To date the committee has held the following hearings:

22 August 2023, Brisbane, Queensland—this hearing focused on the 2032 Olympic and Paralympic Games, with the Australian Olympic Committee, Paralympics Australia, NSOs, community and housing groups, local governments;

28 August 2023, Melbourne, Victoria—this hearing focused on the cancellation of the 2026 Commonwealth Games, with Commonwealth Games Australia, Ernst and Young, local governments, VicSport, a former Victorian Minister for Tourism, Sport and Major Events; and

29 August 2023, Bendigo, Victoria—this hearing also focused on the cancellation, with NSOs, sporting associations, local government and city associations, and two registered Indigenous corporations.

Structure of the interim report

1.6This interim report addresses the immediate priorities of the committee which reflect community concern around the cancellation of the 2026 Commonwealth Games on 18 July 2023, and, for the 2032 Olympic and Paralympic Games, the proposed redevelopment of the Brisbane Cricket Ground (the Gabba) and the proposed construction of the Redland Whitewater Centre. The inquiry’s final report will address other matters relevant to the terms of reference.

1.7The interim report is structured in four chapters:

Chapter 1—an introduction to the inquiry and its conduct; the structure of this interim report; discussion of matters relating to the Senate’s powers and jurisdiction; and background on:

the awarding of both Games;

the cancellation of the 2026 Commonwealth Games; and

the Gabba redevelopment and proposed construction of the Redland RWC.

Chapter 2—the timeline, decisions, processes and implications of the Victorian Government’s cancellation of the Commonwealth Games on 18July 2023;

Chapter 3—the impact of the cancellation on rural and regional communities in Victoria and on sport, and on Australia’s reputation more broadly; and

Chapter 4—concerns about the proposed plan for the redevelopment of the Gabba and the construction of the Redland Whitewater Centre.

2026 Victoria Commonwealth Games

1.8The Commonwealth Games is an international elite sporting event, held every four years since 1930 except during the Second World War.[1] Almost all Commonwealth Games participants are former colonies and territories of the British Empire, or countries of the United Kingdom, although participants include countries that have recently joined the Commonwealth such as Rwanda.[2]

1.9Australia has hosted the Commonwealth Games (previously known as the British Empire Games) on five occasions: in Sydney (1938); Perth (1962); Brisbane (1982); Melbourne (2006); and the Gold Coast (2018).

1.10A regional Victoria hosting model for the Commonwealth Games was proposed in April 2017 by the City of Greater Shepparton and other regional cities, although this was for the 2030 Commonwealth Games.[3]

1.11In February 2022, the Victorian Government announced it had entered into exclusive negotiations with the Commonwealth Games organising bodies for 2026 hosting rights, and said that if successful Victoria would use a multi-location model.[4] Victoria’s successful multi-city bid was subsequently confirmed in April 2022.[5]

1.12In May 2022, the Victorian Government allocated $2.6 billion in funding for the Commonwealth Games in its 2022–23 Budget, providing a ‘massive economic boost’ to the regions, including through improvements to infrastructure and housing.[6] In June and August 2022 it announced the appointment of the Chief Executive Officer and Board of the Organising Committee for the Games.[7]

1.13On 18 July 2023, the Victorian Government announced it would no longer proceed with the 2026 Commonwealth Games, asserting there was an increase in costs to $6 billion. It said it would seek to resolve contractual matters with the Commonwealth Games Federation (CGF) and Commonwealth Games Australia (CGA) and provide a $2 billion funding package for regional Victoria as an alternative.[8]

1.14On 19 August 2023, a joint statement from the Victorian Government, Commonwealth Games Federation Partnerships, the CGF and CGA announced that $380 million would be paid by the Victorian Government to the other parties, as part of an otherwise confidential settlement resolving matters related to the cancellation.[9]

1.15Analysis of the decision will be provided in Chapter 2, and evidence on the impact of the cancellation on regional and rural communities and sport will be detailed in Chapter 3.

2032 Brisbane Olympic and Paralympic Games

1.16The Olympics, also a quadrennial international elite sporting event, dates back to Ancient Greece.[10] The modern Olympic Games commenced in 1896, with cancellations and delays during both world wars and the COVID-19 pandemic. The Summer and Winter Olympic Games have been held every two years since 1994.[11] The Paralympic Games traces its modern history to the 1948 Olympic Games.[12] Australia has hosted the Summer Olympics in 1956 (Melbourne) and 2000 (Sydney).

1.17Brisbane’s successful bid originated in 2015, when the Southeast Queensland Council of Mayors agreed to investigate the feasibility of a bid and commissioned prefeasibility and feasibility studies to this effect.[13] The Premier of Queensland announced it would explore a bid in July 2019, and the Australian Government supported Queensland’s bid, providing $10 million towards it.[14] Following the successful bid, the Australian Government provided $3.4 billion over 10 years from 2023–24 in the 2023–24 Budget for venue infrastructure, as part of a 50–50 cost-sharing arrangement with Queensland.[15]

1.18The International Olympic Committee (IOC) undertook a new approach for the 2032 bidding process following concerns that economic costs and local opposition to bids were causing host cities to scrap bids.[16] For 2032, the IOC identified Brisbane as its preferred host following work by its Future Host Commission, in contrast to previous competitive bidding processes by multiple cities.[17] The decision was ratified by a vote of IOC members, with 72 in favour to 5 against.[18]

1.19This interim report will focus on two issues relevant to the Brisbane Olympic Games—the redevelopment of the Gabba and the proposed construction of a new RWC. Both were identified in the questionnaire response to the IOC’s Future Host Commission in May 2021, which outlined that a successful bid would involve a ‘major upgrade’ for the Gabba, and described the RWC as a ‘much needed facility’ that would ‘provide year-round swift water training for emergency services personnel’.[19] Some have suggested the Gabba redevelopment is ‘effectively a new build’ given the scope of the work required to convert it into a 50000 seat stadium.[20]

1.20Since the bid, the Queensland Government has characterised the Gabba redevelopment as a ‘significant legacy outcome for Brisbane and Queensland’, and has reiterated the RWC’s benefits for emergency services personnel in addition to athletes.[21] Both projects have attracted opposition from local community members and groups—in the case of the former, because of the impacts it will have on Raymond Park and East Brisbane State School, and in the case of the latter, on the natural environment around the Redlands Coast. These issues will be detailed further in Chapter 3.

The Senate’s power and jurisdiction

1.21Upon the announcement of the cancellation of the 2026 Victoria Commonwealth Games, the committee considered its ongoing role and the appropriateness of continuing its inquiry into matters surrounding the Victorian Games.

1.22The Senate’s power to conduct inquiries derives from section 49 of the Australian Constitution. Section 51, ‘Legislative powers of the Parliament’, outlines areas in which the Commonwealth Parliament may makes laws. The inquiry power could be confined to inquiring into subjects in respect of which the Commonwealth Parliament has the power to legislate.[22] Among these areas is external affairs (xxix).

1.23The decision to cancel the Games was a state government decision, and the committee respects the Victorian Government’s sovereign right to make that decision. However, the committee believed that potential impacts on Australia’s international reputation, along with impacts of the decision on rural and regional communities, meant its inquiry remained essential.

1.24As the Senate standing committee responsible for infrastructure and regional development from a national perspective, the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee has an ongoing responsibility to consider infrastructure spending and infrastructure projects around Australia. Significant sporting events like the Games generally attract Commonwealth funding and require support from the Commonwealth, both financially and administratively.

1.25In line with its responsibilities, the committee was determined to interrogate the processes leading to the decision to cancel the Victorian Commonwealth Games; to look at the impacts of the cancellation, especially for rural and regional communities and sport; and to explore what lessons can be learned. Nevertheless, the committee faced challenges gathering the information it required.

1.26The committee thanks the Queensland Government for its participation in the inquiry and its willingness to engage in earnest. This stands in stark contrast to the Victorian Government, which chose not to participate.

The power to call for persons and documents

1.27Committees have the power to call for persons and documents. This power, like the inquiry power, derives from section 49 of the Australian Constitution. In practice, this means that, if a person is invited to attend a public hearing and give evidence as part of an inquiry, and that person declines to participate, a committee may insist upon their attendance. Committees may also ask that certain documents be provided, and insist upon this if documents are refused.

1.28While Senate committees have these powers, they are generally accepted to be limited—there is ‘an implicit limitation on the power of the Houses to summon witnesses in relation to members of the other House or of a house of a state or territory legislature’:[23]

The procedures of the Senate acknowledge that special considerations apply to two categories of office-holders: senators and members and officers of other houses.[24]

1.29Senate committees can, and have, invited members of state and territory legislatures and officers of state and territory governments to appear as witnesses on a voluntary basis, and many have chosen to attend.

1.30Throughout the inquiry the committee had cause to consider the report of the Senate Select Committee on the Victorian Casino Inquiry (Victorian Casino Committee) tabled in 1996. As part of their inquiry, the Victorian Casino Committee received advice regarding limitations on the powers of the Senate:

There are two grounds on which the powers of the Senate may be limited because of the federal nature of the Australian Constitution. The first of these is that the power of the Commonwealth may be restricted to inquiring into matters which fall within the legislative competence of the Commonwealth. The second is that the use of the Commonwealth's powers must not be inimical to the integrity of the states.[25]

1.31Despite these limitations, the Victorian Casino Committee also reported ‘that there appears to be no limit on the subject into which the Commonwealth may inquire, or into the questions which may be asked’, only that the Senate’s power to ‘compel answers and production of documents is limited to inquiries into subjects in respect of which the Commonwealth parliament has the power to legislate’.[26]

Witnesses to this inquiry

1.32The committee invited former and current members and officers of the Victorian Parliament to appear as witnesses at its August hearings, including the Premier of Victoria and several Victorian ministers. These invitations were declined.

1.33The committee also wrote to the Premier of Queensland and invited officers of the Queensland Government to attend the 22 August 2023 hearing as witnesses. These invitations were accepted, and important evidence was received.

1.34In response to the committee’s invitations, the Premier of Victoria wrote that neither he, nor the State Government, would participate in the committee’s inquiry.[27]

1.35In a subsequent letter, the Premier of Victoria pre-emptively claimed ‘public interest immunity or intergovernmental immunity’ in relation to certain categories of information that the committee may seek, and wrote to a number of persons that the committee had invited or summoned, to advise them of the Victorian Government’s view that the committee had ‘no power to compel the disclosure of information’.[28] Furthermore, the Secretary of the Victorian Department of Premier and Cabinet wrote to a number of non-government witnesses scheduled to attend hearings instructing these witnesses to give consideration to the Victorian Government’s claims of public interest immunity or intergovernmental immunity with respect to certain classes of information. These classes were:

information the disclosure of which would directly or indirectly reveal the deliberations of the Victorian Cabinet;

information the disclosure of which would reveal high level confidential deliberative processes of the Victorian Government, including legal advice forming part of these processes;

information the disclosure of which would materially damage the State's commercial interests, including because it would reveal the State's confidential negotiating position and/or would undermine the commercial settlement of the State of Victoria and the Commonwealth Games Federation, Commonwealth Games Australia Limited and CGF Partnerships Ltd;

information the disclosure of which would prejudice intergovernmental, including international, relations.[29]

1.36While the committee was unable to compel evidence from the Victorian Government, it was able to invite a number of private individuals and organisations that were involved in the Games. A former member of the Victorian Parliament, the Hon Martin Pakula, former Minister for Tourism, Sport and Major Events, was invited to the 28 August 2023 hearing, and attended as a witness. Whilst respecting the confidentiality of cabinet deliberations and the comity between the state and federal governments, the committee was able to ask, and Mr Pakula was able to answer, many questions that the committee had. The committee thanks Mr Pakula for the courteous and respectful way in which he engaged with and sought to assist the committee.

1.37A contractor who had delivered services to the Victorian Government was also invited to and did attend a hearing. A number of witnesses made claims that they were unable to provide certain information to the committee because of the immunity claimed by the Victorian Government.

1.38Ernst and Young (EY), for example, claimed that it could not provide information requested by the committee due to confidentiality obligations that form part of the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants.[30] EY was not only unable to assist the committee with specific questions around their consultancy work to the Victorian Government for the Commonwealth Games, but also in relation to more general questions. In addition, EY also attempted to advance an argument that they were unable to provide information as it formed the basis of cabinet deliberations. This claim was made in reference to all information requested that was not already in the public domain.

1.39Given the frustrations faced in public session, the committee determined to hear from EY in camera. Despite being afforded the opportunity to speak with the committee confidentially, EY remained unhelpful in their engagement with the committee on these matters.

Committee view

1.40The committee recognises that the Senate and its committees cannot compel current and former state and territory government ministers and officials to answer questions relating to their duties in these capacities.

1.41Despite this, the committee notes that state and territory governments are free to cooperate voluntarily with inquiries, including by providing documents and by making officials available as witnesses at hearings. Likewise, senators are free to ask a wide range of questions so that they may properly inquire into matters before the committee. With respect to this, the different approaches taken by the Queensland and Victorian Governments are illustrative. Regardless of the views that the Queensland Government may hold on the necessity of this inquiry, or its different views on the advocacy of some witnesses against some Olympics and Paralympics projects, the Queensland Government chose to participate, to make a submission, and to make its officials available. The committee appreciates this constructive engagement by the Queensland Government.

1.42In contrast, the Victorian Government not only did not engage in the inquiry, but, in the committee’s view, actively worked to hinder the engagement of other witnesses by expressing its broad position on protected evidence about a wide range of witnesses in its letter of 25 August 2023. The committee does not accept that either this or a lack of confirmed funding from the Australian Government constitutes ‘no involvement’ from the Australian Government, and that accordingly no scrutiny from the Australian Senate is warranted—noting the Victorian Government’s own documents make clear that it was expecting and seeking funding. Contrary to this, the decision not to cooperate was entirely the choice of the Victorian Government, and the committee considers it inconsistent with maintaining productive intergovernmental relations and assuring Australian Government support for future major event hosting bids.

1.43The committee was also dissatisfied by the engagement of EY in the course of the inquiry. EY partners were insufficiently forthcoming in answering the committee’s questions during their appearance at the 28 August 2023 hearing. Scrutiny of professional services firms—in receipt of billions of dollars of public funding from multiple levels of government—has never been higher than it is presently, including by Senate committees. Serious errors of judgement and criminal investigations have put professional services firms on notice that they have placed in jeopardy their commercial reputations and social licence to operate. EY should reflect very carefully whether its participation, in both the public and in camera sessions, met the high and rising standards expected of a recipient of public funding, in particular robust accountability for the use of this funding.

1.44In relation to EY’s evidence, the committee reiterates that the Senate has never accepted simple claims of legal professional privilege or commercial-in-confidence as grounds for a refusal to provide information. Simply stating these as reasons on their own is not sufficient. Witnesses must clearly articulate the harm that would result if certain information were disclosed to the committee, and/or made public. Despite multiple requests to do so on notice, EY had not provided this information to the committee at the time of writing.

1.45As outlined above, the power of parliamentary committees to conduct inquiries is enshrined in Australia’s constitution. Parliamentary inquiries provide critical information that Parliamentarians need to make decisions; they also provide opportunities for citizens to engage with, and provide input into, legislative and administrative decision-making.

1.46It is incumbent upon individuals and organisations to respect the Senate, and the role played by its committees, and to engage in good faith. The committee will consider further its response to the lack of cooperation of EY in subsequent reports.

Acknowledgments

1.47The committee thanks all contributors to the inquiry to this point, including those individuals and organisations who submitted to the inquiry and gave evidence at the public hearings. The committee acknowledges the willingness of some of the Victorian submitters and witnesses to continue participating in the inquiry after the cancellation of the 2026 Commonwealth Games.

1.48The committee also acknowledges and is grateful for the participation of the Queensland Government and its officers in the inquiry.

Footnotes

[1]Commonwealth Sport, Commonwealth Games – 1930 – 2022(accessed 29 August 2023).

[2]The Commonwealth, Our history(accessed 29 August 2023).

[3]Melissa Davey, ‘Regional Victoria launches bid to host 2030 Commonwealth Games’, The Guardian, 13 April 2017 (accessed 29 August 2023).

[4]The Hon Daniel Andrews MP, Premier of Victoria, ‘A Regional Led Bid For The 2026 Commonwealth Games’, Media Release, 16 February 2022.

[5]The Hon Daniel Andrews MP, Premier of Victoria, ‘Regional Victoria Hosting 2026 Commonwealth Games’, Media Release, 12 April 2022.

[6]State of Victoria, 2022-23 Treasurer’s Speech, May 2022, p. 8.

[7]The Hon Martin Pakula MP, Minister for Industry Support and Recovery, Minister for Trade, Minister for Business Precincts, Minister for Tourism, Sport and Major Events, Minister for Racing, Weimar to Lead Victoria 2026 Organising Committee, Media Release, 23 June 2022; The Hon Jacinta Allan MP, Deputy Premier of Victoria, Minister for Transport Infrastructure, Minister for Suburban Rail Loop, Minister for Commonwealth Games Delivery, Chair and Board To Deliver a Regional Games, Media Release, 20 August 2022.

[8]The Hon Daniel Andrews MP, Premier of Victoria, ‘Commonwealth Games Costs Too High At Over $6 Billion’, Media Release, 18 July 2023.

[9]State Government of Victoria, Commonwealth Games Federation, Commonwealth Games Federation Partnerships and Commonwealth Games Australia, ‘Joint Statement on Victoria 2026 Commonwealth Games’, Media Release, 19 August 2023.

[10]International Olympic Committee, Olympic History: from the home of Zeus in Olympia to the modern Games(accessed 29 August 2023).

[11]IOC, Olympic Games Overview(accessed 29 August 2023).

[12]International Paralympic Committee, Paralympics History (accessed 29 August 2023).

[13]Southeast Queensland Council of Mayors, 2032 Games(accessed 29 August 2023).

[14]The Hon Annastacia Palaszszuk MP, Premier of Queensland and Minister for Trade, ‘On your marks’, Media Statement, 23 July 2019; Commonwealth of Australia, Federal Financial Relations: Budget Paper No. 3 2021–22, p. 36.

[15]Commonwealth of Australia, Budget Measures: Budget Paper No. 2 2023–24, p. 171.

[16]IOC, Future Host Election (accessed 29 August 2023). See for instance Karolos Grohmann, ‘IOC overhauls bidding process for Games to stop dropouts’, Reuters, 26 June 2019 (accessed 29 August 2023).

[18]IOC, ‘IOC elects Brisbane 2032 as Olympic and Paralympic host’, Press Release, 21 July 2021.

[19]IOC, IOC Future Host Commission Questionnaire Response, May 2021 (accessed 29 August 2023).

[20]See for instance Mark Ludlow, ‘Commonwealth and Queensland split $7b Olympics funding’, Australian Financial Review, 17 February 2023 (accessed 29 August 2023).

[21]Queensland Government, Upgraded venues, 3 May 2022 (accessed 29 August 2023); Queensland Government, New venues, 23 March 2023 (accessed 29 August 2023).

[22]Odgers Australian Senate Practice, 14th Edition, 2016, p. 79.

[23]Odgers Australian Senate Practice, 14th Edition, 2016, p. 79. & 561.

[24]Odgers Australian Senate Practice, 14th Edition, 2016, p. 561.

[25]Senate Select Committee on the Victorian Casino Inquiry, Report on compelling evidence, December 1996, p.7, HPP042016001692.pdf;fileType=application/pdf (aph.gov.au) (accessed 31 August 2023).

[26]Senate Select Committee on the Victorian Casino Inquiry, Report on compelling evidence, December 1996, p.8, HPP042016001692.pdf;fileType=application/pdf (aph.gov.au) (accessed 31 August 2023).

[27]Correspondence from the Premier of Victoria, the Hon. Daniel Andrews MP to the committee (received 21 August 2023).

[28]Correspondence from the Premier of Victoria, the Hon. Daniel Andrews MP to the committee (received 21 August 2023); and Correspondence from the Premier of Victoria, the Hon. Daniel Andrews MP to the committee regarding a public hearing on 28 August 2023 (received 25 August 2023).

[29]Correspondence from the Premier of Victoria, the Hon. Daniel Andrews MP to the committee regarding a public hearing on 28 August 2023 (received 25 August 2023).

[30]Mr Dean Yates, Partner, Ernst and Young, Proof Committee Hansard, 28 August 2023, p. 16.