Chapter 2Australia's response to red imported fire ants
2.1This chapter will discuss the broad approach of Australia’s response to RIFA, how RIFA entered Australia and became established, and how the response has been managed in Australia. It will explore the common areas of interest and concern among inquiry participants including governance structures and who is responsible, transparency, accountability, and funding. The sections of this chapter are:
governance arrangements;
funding of Australia’s national response;
industry involvement and the lack of independent oversight;
reporting, oversight, and transparency;
committee view; and
recommendations.
Governance arrangements
2.2As briefly mentioned in chapter 1, Australia’s response to RIFA began on 22February 2001 when they were first identified in Brisbane, Queensland.
2.3According to the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF), the Australian Government leads the response to RIFA through DAFF, while the Queensland Government Department of Agriculture and Fisheries (QLD DAF) administers the NFAEP. The NFAEP’s objective is to contain and control RIFA for eradication by 2032, both in SEQ, and in Australia.
2.4From 2017 until 22 February 2024, the NFAEP reported to a National Steering Committee (NSC) which consisted of representatives from the federal, state and territory governments as the cost-share partners, with an independent chair. Reportedly, the NSC provided guidance and support to the program to best achieve its objectives and monitor progress.
2.5The committee heard that from 22 February 2024, the NFAEP now reports to and is guided by the National Management Group (NMG), following the retirement of the NSC. The NMG is responsible for strategic direction and holding the program accountable for implementation, with technical advice and support provided by a national consultative committee.
2.6The NMG is comprised of members of the National Biosecurity Committee, which includes the state and territory chief biosecurity officers. The Senior Responsible Owner is the Deputy Director-General and Chief Queensland Biosecurity Officer, and the Chair is the Deputy Secretary, Biosecurity and Compliance, DAFF.
2.7In response to a question on notice, the NFAEP confirmed that from February2024, Dr John Robertson (former NSC chair) would be the independent Chair of the RIFA National Biosecurity Management Consultative Committee (NBMCC). The NBMCC comprises ‘appropriate expertise in response management' with ‘relevant technical subject matter expertise’ to assess and advise the NMG on potential risk triggers in the 2023–2027 Response Plan, including if eradication is still possible.
2.8Mr Ashley Bacon, Executive Program Director of the NFAEP also advised the committee that the NFAEP receives input and advice from a Risk Management and Assurance Committee (RMAC), led by independent chair, Mr Alan Mills. The RMAC considers and provides advice to the NMG, NBMCC and Program Board on risks to achieving the vision and independent advice on program assurance. The NFAEP also confirmed in a question on notice there is work underway to onboard additional independent members to the RMAC.
2.9Mr Bacon elaborated by explaining that he is responsible for the Program Board as Chair, which reportedly oversees operations and implementation of the strategy. Figure 2.1 below provides an overview of the reporting and governance structure of the NFAEP, as of 12 March 2024.
Figure 3.1National Fire Ant Eradication Program governance structure
Source: NFAEP, response to questions taken on notice, 4 March 2024 (received 12 March 2024), p. [7].
2.10Despite recommendation 1 from the 2021 Independent Strategic Review calling for expanded expertise and independent oversight of the NFAEP, the NFAEP argued that the change in governance arrangements is aligned with this recommendation:
… [governance] was designed to align with other national biosecurity responses under a National Environmental Biosecurity Response Agreement (NEBRA). In addition, the arrangements are intended to implement Managing Successful Programs (MSP) and best practice governance principles.
2.11Dr Rachel Chay, Deputy Director-General and Chief Biosecurity Officer, Queensland Department of Agriculture and Fisheries also spoke to this, stating that:
… Dr John Robertson, who is making the determination around the technical feasibility of eradication, remains independent. The rationale behind escalating participation in the national management group to the chief biosecurity officers was to hold all cost share partners accountable to their funding governments for the success, or not, of the program.
2.12In its submission, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) informed the committee that the CSIRO also sits on the Science Advisory Committee, the NBMCC and the NMG to provide expert input and oversight of the NFAEP. It noted that CSIRO staff provide science insights and advice regarding protocols, feasibility, and cost benefit analyses.
2.13The Department of Climate Change, Environment, Energy and Water (DCCEEW) also confirmed its involvement in the RIFA response, through DAFF’s Chief Environmental Biosecurity Officer (CEBO).DCCEEW reported that the Threatened Species Commissioner and the CEBO meet regularly and discuss RIFA.
2.14Reflecting on the recent changes to governance arrangements, the South Australian Department of Primary Industries and Regions noted the ‘good progress in recent times’ in ensuring national principles are incorporated in the NFAEP governance arrangements. It also submitted that it will be ‘vitally important to maintain strong national oversight and governance’ and representation of funding partners in the future.
2.15The recent progress was also commented on by industry stakeholders, with DrAnnie Ruttledge, Senior Policy Officer, AgForce Queensland who expressed there has been ‘a very noticeable improvement in a short duration of time’. However, Dr Ruttledge also went on to explain that ‘there still isn't a seat for industry at the governance table’.
2.16Ms Belinda Callanan, Chair, Biosecurity Committee, AgForce Queensland also explained that ‘the governance of this program is not sufficiently nimble’ to adapt quickly, as ‘this super-pest does not recognise bureaucratic timeframes’.
2.17Similar sentiments have been shared by other stakeholders who have called for larger scale reform of the RIFA response and its governance structure.
2.18In its submission, the Invasive Species Council suggested the establishment of an independent body, similar to Plant Health Australia and Animal Health Australia, to undertake oversight and delivery of NEBRA responses, including the response to RIFA. Mr Jack Gough, Advocacy Director, Invasive Species Council, explained to the committee that this type of separate entity would bring the governance in-line with other invasive species approaches and allow a broader approach beyond just agriculture.
2.19Mr John McDonald, Director, Research, Development and Extension and Biosecurity, Greenlife Industry Australia Ltd, also highlighted the benefits a statutory body could provide to the RIFA response, if implemented, noting that the current RIFA response is ‘well-entrenched in government’. He stated that this could be a bold change and new method that could bring flexibility and harness all levels of expertise across a range of stakeholders.
2.20Mr Stephen Ware, AEPMA, noted in his submission that ‘despite the Commonwealth's expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars’, he was told it was the Queensland Government’s responsibility, while providing only 10 per cent of the revenue. Mr Ware argued that the successful Australian Plague Locust Commission (APLC), led by DAFF and the Australian Government, provides a compelling case for the creation of a similar commission for RIFA.
Funding of Australia’s national response
2.21Since 2001, Australia’s RIFA response will cost the federal, state and territory governments a combined $1.28billion, through to 2027. This incorporates the recently agreed $593 million, which equates to approximately 45 per cent of the total funding that will be delivered over four years, with approximately 54 per cent ($690 million) of the total funding already provided over the previous 22 years.
2.22In a response to a question on notice, Dr Helen Scott-Orr informed the committee that former Queensland Chief Veterinary Officer, Dr Ron Glanville argued that the initial investment by jurisdictions in 2001 was withdrawn too early. He reportedly stated that while the investment ‘reduced the infestation to a very low density by 2003’, funding was prematurely removed, leading to a rebound of RIFA infestations which continued to grow in size and expense. DrGlanville characterised the decision to reduce the budget as a ‘poor decision’ in hindsight.
2.23Despite the recent increase in funding for the next four years, there are still concerns among most stakeholders that this is simply still not enough funding to ensure a successful eradication of RIFA. The Invasive Species Council declared that further funding will be required beyond 2027, and potentially sooner.
2.24The 2021 Independent Strategic Review of the NFAEP, released in 2023, found that approximately $200–$300 million per annum for 10 years would be required to eradicate RIFA by 2032. Currently, the allocated funding calculates to approximately $148 million per year, for four years only. Participants to the inquiry highlighted the deficit of approximately $52–$152 million per annum, based on the review findings.
2.25When questioned about this deficit and the calculated figures of $593 million, DAFF highlighted that the 2023–2027 Response Plan funding amounts were calculated based on the recommendation and the actual resources required for this to be delivered:
The $200–$300 million annual budget identified in the 2021 Independent Program Review (Scott-Orr et al 2021) was not a fully costed budget. As the review report states ‘these figures should be viewed as estimates, rather than minimum or maximum…’ The 2023–27 Response Plan (response plan) determined the resources required to deliver the plan, in accordance with the recommendations of the 2021 review, is $592.85 million for the next four years. The plan is focussed to drive efficiencies through new technologies to increase operational windows and lower per area costs and includes some efficiencies of scale. Savings were also identified through the anticipated adoption of new technologies that will improve eradication efficacy…
2.26According to the NFAEP the 2023–2027 Response Plan funding will be released in two tranches. Tranche one will be delivered from 2023–25 and Tranche two between 2025–27. The NFAEP clarified that the release of the Tranche two funds will be subject to a ‘gate review’ process scheduled to be completed during 2024–25 financial year. It stated that the review would be an important step in reassessing if the budget is still appropriate for the remainder of the plan.
2.27As of April 2024, the Commonwealth, Queensland, New South Wales, Northern Territory, Australian Capital Territory, South Australian and Victorian Governments have all confirmed their agreed contribution for the 2023–2027 Response Plan worth $593million, with Western Australia confirming funding for two years.
2.28The Nature Conservation Council submitted that ‘delayed funding from some states and territories’ undermines the effectiveness of the eradication response. It further explained that there is a need for additional leadership and resourcing from the Australian Government.
2.29In its submission, the South Australian Department of Primary Industries and Regions advised that while South Australia remains supportive, the ability to continue to contribute to the national response is not limitless, and future funding cannot be guaranteed, particularly if RIFA spreads.
2.30Dr Scott-Orr further highlighted the difficulties with the funding approach, stating:
The cost-sharing arrangements we've seen in the program to date have been difficult to negotiate. If you're in Western Australia and you're dealing with an expensive problem in South-East Queensland … Even in New South Wales, the New South Wales government was paying the highest contribution of the states into the Queensland program, but all those dollars were being spent in Queensland and it was New South Wales DPI's most expensive biosecurity program and that was hard to sell to the New South Wales Treasury. Those are the structural problems of getting the national program. But it does need to be wider than just agriculture. A high-level approach is needed to drive it for the sake of the country in the longer term.
2.31These concerns, among others, have led inquiry participants to consider whether the funding mechanisms and the contributions made by various jurisdictions are appropriate for the RIFA response.
2.32The Invasive Species Council submitted that funding for the RIFA response is delivered from the budgets of agriculture, environment, and biosecurity. Professor Hestor from the Centre of Excellence for Biosecurity Risk Analysis also described the incursion funding as being ‘an entrenched budgetary item’ due to the length of the response and the amount of time it has required funding.
2.33The Invasive Species Council explained that RIFA response funding is ‘huge’ in comparison to the agriculture budget, and this comparison is directly influencing agreed funding levels. Mr Gough also explained that this comparison may be impacting the capacity and ability to fund other projects in need, such as co-existing biosecurity outbreaks.
2.34The South Australian Department of Primary Industries and Regions reported that ‘the significant national contribution to RIFA contrasts the lack of assistance that South Australia receives’ regarding fruit fly and trade arrangements issues. It further stated that there is a ‘clear inconsistency’ in managing RIFA when compared to other pests that predate NEBRA arrangements.[37]
2.35The Invasive Species Council has suggested that funding levels should account for the society-wide impacts of RIFA, including their effects on human health, worker safety, social amenity, sports and construction, and not just the agricultural sector. Subsequently, it argued that a contingency budget for short‑term surges in funding when future incursions are detected would help support these responses.
Industry involvement and the lack of independent oversight
2.36At the declaration of the 2001 incursion, relevant ministers from all federal, state, and territory governments agreed to contribute to the cost of the response, with a view to create a program led by the Queensland Government to eradicate RIFA in Australia.
2.37In its submission, DAFF confirmed that this was modelled after existing biosecurity agreements in place at the time, however, was established prior to the now commonly used National Environmental Biosecurity Response Agreement (NEBRA). NEBRA is an agreement between the Australian Government and all state and territory governments to reduce the impacts of pests and diseases, under the principle that biosecurity is a shared responsibility.
2.38The NEBRA operates alongside the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA) and the EPPRD, which have recently been used to carry out responses including for foot and mouth disease and the Varroa mite incursion, respectively.
2.39The committee heard how the EPPRD and EADRA allow for private or industry investment and involvement, if there is seen to be a public-private benefit to eradicating an invasive species or disease. However, this is not the case for Australia’s RIFA response, as it solely attracts government funding and input, due to the high level of public-benefit.
2.40Concerns regarding a lack of industry and external stakeholder input have been shared by many witnesses and submitters to this inquiry, across sectors including agriculture and animals, plants and nursery, pest management, and, academia, research and science.
2.41Mr Paul Sloman, Policy Officer, Cotton Australia, explained that the ‘steering group is mostly government’ and it is ‘absolutely essential’ that industry, specifically the agricultural industry, is involved in the steering group or governance.
2.42In its submission, the Queensland Farmers Federation noted that industry consultation was ‘haphazard and sporadic at best’, and that collaboration with representative bodies is imperative.
2.43The South Australian Department of Primary Industries and Regions also made mention of how the current arrangements do not allow for industry contribution, stating that while the governance structures help with national oversight, there is still no agreed means of allowing non-government parties who stand to benefit, to provide financial contributions and input.
2.44When questioned regarding the lack of industry involvement, MsJustineSaunders, Deputy Secretary, Biosecurity and Compliance Group, DAFF informed the committee:
It really comes down to the governance framework within which where we're operating…These arrangements are different because we don't have that direct industry engagement. The primary reason for that is, obviously, the funding arrangements. The committee constructs and the governance support engagement by those that are sharing the cost of the response, which at this stage are the states and territories and the Commonwealth government.
2.45However, some participants to the inquiry have strongly argued that the agriculture, plant, and animal sectors already make significant financial contributions to this response through their levies. Ms Joanna Cave, Chief Executive Officer of Greenlife Industry Australia, stated that ‘we already, obviously, contribute to the management of biosecurity through our levy … we feel we're doing our bit financially’.
2.46Mr McDonald added to this by explaining that the NFAEP is ‘very much focused on itself and its government partners’ despite the number of impacted stakeholders who are willing to contribute. He explained that the current arrangements do not provide flexibility to incorporate external involvement effectively.
2.47Dr Mick Quirk, Senior Manager, Environment and Sustainability, Queensland Cane Growers Organisation, suggested the need for a stakeholder group to be involved in oversight, representing the key sectors. He discussed how the eradication programs and the way they are legislated are ‘very closed-shop activities’ and that there are minimal mechanisms to give any oversight.
2.48Mr Ian Thompson, Chair, Invasive Species Council Conservation and Science Committee, noted that allowing industry involvement would bring active connection, insight, and oversight to the response, external to government.
2.49Mr Ken Cunliffe noted in his submission that inclusion of industry and stakeholders in the response governance would harbour a ‘considerable skill resource’ and could ‘significantly bolster the aspiration of a highly skilled workforce’.
2.50In response to a question on notice, the NFAEP informed the committee that while there are no permanent industry partners on the NMG due to the deed arrangements, the NMG does allow for non-government entities to be approved to attend as a non-voting member.
2.51Dr Chay informed the committee that while the RIFA response is aligned with the NEBRA, which allows only government cost-share partners, ‘it is no excuse’ as to why industry stakeholders are not ‘at the table’.
2.52Dr Chay also acknowledged that recent changes have included increased collaboration with industry and referenced an example where the NFAEP worked with the organics industry to find a solution to maintain their organics credentials and still be part of the eradication program.
2.53In its submission DAFF highlighted that the 2023–2027 Response Plan recognises that industry and community involvement in the program is essential to achieve eradication.
Reporting, oversight, and transparency
2.54In addition to concerns about not being adequately involved and consulted, participants also told the committee how a lack of openness from the program has led to concerns surrounding the transparency, accountability, and reporting of the NFAEP and the RIFA response.
2.55Dr Quirk expressed that industry has been disadvantaged in terms of transparency, due to not being involved. He stated that:
[A] symptom of the way that the grant or the deed arrangements are organised, when they do review reports, is that they're all meant to be kept confidential—all very-in-house. So, for a public interest program, I don't think that's working in our favour because I think we're losing confidence in the investment and we're losing hope—and losing hope's a very bad thing in this sort of situation.
2.56The Invasive Species Council told the committee how ‘stakeholders have often relied upon leaks’ or media pressure to gain access and understanding of documentation relating to the response, such as the 2021 Independent Strategic Review or 2023–2027 Response Plan, as stakeholders are not included in these discussions and the documents had been withheld by the NFAEP.
2.57It further stated that there has been no regular publication of the compliance or enforcement priorities or data, the notification of new outbreaks has sometimes been ad hoc and some annual and quarterly reports have not yet been publicly released.
2.58The Queensland Farmers Federation noted that these issues have been persistent since the commencement of the program, as milestones and their progress have not been clearly identified or communicated, and that transparency is still a source of criticism today.
2.59This was echoed by other submitters who argued there is ‘scepticism about the effectiveness of simply pouring more public money into a program without a clear evaluation of its past performance’. Further, Dr Pam Swepson provided evidence that in 2013, program auditors were also concerned the program did not report against specific and measurable performance indicators.
2.60Mr Richard Shannon, former employee of the NFAEP, remarked that ‘the sooner we can open the program’ to be more transparent ‘the better’ it will be. MrShannon elaborated that this includes sharing all available data and allowing third parties, researchers, and others to access that data and build on it.
2.61Mr Ian Thompson shared these sentiments, stating that:
The 2021 review … those recommendations are now being implemented. That is really important because those recommendations that go to funding, transparency, reporting and accountability I think are key.
2.62Mr Reece Pianta of the Invasive Species Council, expressed the view that the governance body already built into the program should be responsible for leading some of those transparency changes.
2.63In responding to the concerns regarding transparency, Dr John Robertson, former Chair of the NFAEP NSC, stated that:
The steering committee is quite adamant that there is transparency … I think what's been [occurring] over recent times is that there's needed to be a bit of a catch-up with the publication of steering committee meeting minutes but also some of the quarterly reports…Also, the quarterly reports for Q1 and Q2 for 2023–24 are coming out in the next month, for the new governance arrangements. So the steering committee did recognise their issues with transparency or ability to get information out and are certainly trying to rectify that.
2.64Dr Chay also acknowledged the delay in publication of reports and documentation, and that the NFAEP ‘can do better’ regarding timely publication to allow stakeholders and cost-share partners to have confidence in the program. DrChay followed by explaining that recent changes have seen ‘a significant uplift in our communications and in stakeholder engagement capability and an absolute passionate desire to ensure the timely release of reports moving forward’.
2.65As for ongoing reporting and transparency, the NFAEP submitted that evaluations will be conducted at regular intervals, with a financial gate review in 2024–25 to measure the extent to which outcomes have been met and the defined objectives to inform the cost-share partners of performance progress. It further clarified that a program review will take place in 2026–27 to determine whether eradication of RIFA by 2032 remains feasible.
Committee view
2.66The committee has consistently heard throughout the inquiry that the RIFA response is too government heavy, with too many layers of bureaucracy that hinder fast and efficient decision making. While many witnesses called for increased industry involvement and oversight of the response, many others called for entirely new processes and independent agencies to lead the RIFA response.
2.67Similarly, it became clear that industry and impacted or affected stakeholders are very interested and willing to be a part of the RIFA response yet have frequently been dismissed by the responsible governments and the NFAEP. This reluctance to consult and involve industry in the response can only be seen as a disadvantage, given the varied and in-depth on-the-ground knowledge and experience of the agricultural, environment and pest sectors.
2.68The committee would like to acknowledge that during this inquiry process, the NFAEP and its governance structure have been undergoing changes. It is pleasing to hear there is a possibility of including industry representatives and impacted stakeholders in the response through a governance oversight process, and that the NFAEP is open to including more representatives and collaboration. However, the outcomes and implementation of these changes are still yet to be seen, and the committee looks forward to seeing these progress.
2.69Additionally, the changes that have been made to the governance structure and decision-making arrangements to date appear to be minimal, and do not currently increase proper independent oversight or provide a clear avenue for reducing bureaucratic timeframes. Instead, these changes appear to simply create a more-entrenched governmental decision-making framework and simply move the so-called independence from one group to another pre-existing group.
2.70Despite the explanation from program and government officials that these changes do reflect the 2021 Independent Strategic Review recommendation, the committee is concerned these changes directly disregard the review recommendations that called for an expansion in perspectives and an increase in independent oversight.
2.71Witnesses and submitters shared a myriad of situations in which there was a distinct lack of openness from the Australian and Queensland Governments and the NFAEP to share information, reports, reviews, and data. The reluctance to engage in transparent process and active disclosure was of particular concern to the committee, and again while officials have insisted this will be rectified with the new governance process, there are still many outstanding documents that stakeholders have called for that are yet to be published.
2.72The committee urges the involved parties to release the documents that have been called for by stakeholders, in particular, the 2023–2027 Response Plan. It is unacceptable that a plan that is costing the federal and state and territory governments $593 million over four years, that has been agreed to and is currently in action, has not been publicly released.
2.73Additionally, the committee is concerned that the funding amounts allocated in the 2023–2027 Response Plan may be inadequate given the 2021 Independent Strategic Review estimates of $200–$300 million per year for 10 years. While the committee recognises the 2023–2027 funding is a significant increase from previous investment levels and welcomes the additional funding, it is still unclear exactly how this funding will be spent, and whether it is sufficient to meet the eradication goal by 2032.
2.74It was evident to the committee that the slow approach and prematurely reduced funding in the early years of the response contributed significantly to the spread of RIFA and ultimately impacted eradication efforts. The evidence is clear that RIFA are currently contained and managed to a point where they are still considered eradicable. However, the evidence was also clear that current resources and funding are unlikely to meet that eradication goal. If this is the case, this should be rectified promptly, with a commitment from all governments to fund and resource the eventual eradication of this damaging pest.
2.75The committee recommends that the Australian Government in consultation with state and territory governments, work to review the current level of funding for the National Fire Ant Eradication Program and whether this is efficient to eradicate red imported fire ants by 2032, and if not sufficient, investigate the appropriate level of funding required for eradication.
2.76The committee further recommends that:
The Australian Government, and all state and territory governments commit to providing uninterrupted funding required to achieve eradication.
The Australian Government, and all state and territory governments ensure funds are provided as a whole-of-government response to reflect the seriousness of red imported fire ants on all aspects of Australian life, including health, tourism, agriculture, and environmental.
2.77The committee recommends that the Australian Government work with the National Fire Ant Eradication Program to explore options to improve transparency and accountability mechanisms across both the strategic and operational aspects of the red imported fire ant response. In doing so, the committee recommends this includes:
Publication of the full 2023–2027 Response Plan, including funding allocations and priorities.
Timely publication of any outstanding and future key reviews, reports, minutes, and data.
Formal stakeholder and industry involvement within the National Management Group.
Increased independence within the governance arrangements, including the reinstatement of an independent chair for the National Management Group.
2.78The committee recommends that the Australian Government undertake an independent, rapid review of the actions and recommendations from the 2021Independent Strategic Review and what has been completed or is in process to be completed. The committee further recommends that the review should report back to the Commonwealth Minister for Agriculture within three months and that a report of this review should be tabled in both Houses of the Australian Parliament within 14 days of the provision of this report to the Minister.
2.79As part of this review, the committee recommends that the Australian Government, as the primary funder of the red imported fire ant response, investigate alternate models for delivery to reduce bureaucratic process, improve independence and transparency, improve public engagement and improve the delivery of the eradication program. The committee recommends that all models are investigated, including a statutory independent agency and a nationally led commission.