Foreword

Foreign interference is now Australia's principal national security threat which risks significantly undermining our values, freedoms and way of life. Australia has been a world leader in combatting foreign interference, however, authoritarian regimes continue to pose an unacceptable risk to democratic societies through targeted online disinformation campaigns that leverage social media platforms to skew public debate, undermine trust in our democratic institutions, and establish narratives that favour the interests of authoritarian states. The proliferation of emerging technologies like artificial intelligence has made their job easier, and demonstrates the need for urgent action to ensure Australia stays ahead of the threat.

Foreign interference is clandestine activity carried out by, or on behalf of, a foreign regime to corrupt our decision-making, political discourse and societal norms. The scale, speed and ease at which these activities can be conducted online means social media is increasingly being weaponised to spread disinformation to deliberately mislead or obscure the truth for malicious or deceptive purposes. Authoritarian regimes like China and Russia are deploying new methods for cyber-enabled disinformation activities as part of a broader, integrated strategic campaign to advance their own national interests at Australia's expense.

Whether we like it or not, social media platforms are today not just the dominant communications channels in modern economies, they constitute the public square for democracies. They are the place where news is first reported, contentious issues are debated, consensus is formed and public policy decisions are shaped. The health of these forums directly affects the health of our democracies.

Foreign authoritarian states know this. They do not permit open and free debates on their own social media platforms. They use ours as a vector for their information operations to shape our decision-making in their national interest—contrary to ours.

Effectively countering foreign interference through social media is therefore one of Australia's most pressing security challenges. That is why on 24November2022 the Senate resolved to establish the Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media to investigate the risk posed to Australia's democracy from foreign interference through social media, to expand on the work of the 46th Parliament which investigated cyber-enabled foreign interference.

As the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) rightly assessed, social media itself is not the threat but is a vector for foreign interference.Notall social media platforms are the same, and therefore the ability for an authoritarian regime to leverage a platform varies greatly for platforms based in authoritarian countries and those that are based in liberal democracies.

The committee was particularly concerned with the unique national security risks posed by social media companies like TikTok and WeChat, whose parent companies ByteDance and Tencent respectively, are irrefutably headquartered in and run from authoritarian countries like China. China's 2017 NationalIntelligence Law means the Chinese Government can require these social media companies to secretly cooperate with Chinese intelligence agencies. In the case of TikTok, the committee heard that its China-based employees can and have accessed Australian user data, and can manipulate content algorithms—but TikTok cannot tell us how often this data is accessed despite initially suggesting that this information was logged. Nor was TikTok able to provide the legal basis upon which its employees can refuse to comply with Chinese law—the short answer is, it can't.

Throughout the inquiry, the committee found social media companies based in authoritarian countries demonstrated their reluctance to cooperate with Australian parliamentary processes. TikTok was reluctant to provide witnesses sought by the committee, and evasive in their answers when they finally did agree to appear. WeChat showed its contempt for the Parliament by failing to appear before the committee at all, and through its disingenuous answers to questions in writing. This stood in contrast to the more constructive engagement of platforms based in Western countries who at least recognised the fundamental importance of the checks and balances inherent in democratic systems.

The committee was also concerned with the equally serious risk of Western social media companies being weaponised by authoritarian regimes to pump disinformation into our democracy to influence and undermine our political systems. For example, between 2017 and 2022, Facebook's parent company, Meta, disabled more than 200 covert influence operations originating from more than 60 countries that targeted the public domestic debate of another country.In the first quarter of 2023, YouTube terminated more than 900 channels linked to Russia and more than 18 000 linked to China.

In the case of both authoritarian and Western-based social media companies, the committee explored concerns that social media platforms are being used to 'pull' and 'push' information in four ways: to gather intelligence on individuals that will enable them to be targeted; to gather behavioural data by population or cohort to refine interference campaigns; to harass and intimidate Australia's diaspora communities; and to undermine societal trust, spread social disunity and influence decision-making through disinformation campaigns.

Countering this insidious activity becomes more complex as authoritarian regimes continue to adapt and evolve their methods. Emerging new technology and tactics such as the rise of artificial intelligence and the commercialisation of disinformation services, where state actors engage companies to orchestrate disinformation campaigns, threatens to exponentially increase the risk of foreign interference on social media, necessitating an urgent response.

Looking to the future, developing a real-time understanding of and response to foreign interference through social media is critical to protecting our values, freedoms and way of life from interference by foreign regimes. The committee believes that strengthening transparency requirements on social media companies is critical to ensuring they operate with integrity while also preserving the right of Australians to freely communicate and participate in public debate online.

The committee is gravely concerned that the information Australians receive on these platforms is being influenced by directions from foreign authoritarian governments. That's why we have recommended a range of enforceable transparency standards, so that users can both evaluate the content they see on these platforms, and the conduct of the platforms themselves. For example, we believe state-affiliated media entities should be proactively labelled on all platforms. We recommend that any content censored at the direction of a government be disclosed to users. Platforms should be open to independent external researchers who can identify, investigate and attribute coordinated inauthentic behaviour. The access to user data facilitated by these platforms, especially to employees based in authoritarian countries, must be disclosed.

WeChat was found to have comprehensively failed the transparency test by refusing to participate in public hearings on the basis that, despite its significant digital presence, it does not have a physical presence in Australia. The committee therefore recommends that, as part of a suite of transparency requirements, social media companies that operate in Australia be required to establish a physical presence within Australia's legal jurisdiction so that they can be held accountable to our laws.

The committee found that TikTok engaged in a determined effort to obfuscate and avoid answering the most basic questions about the platform, its parent company ByteDance and its relationship to the Chinese Communist Party. That's one reason why the committee has also recommended that social media companies that repeatedly fail to meet the minimum transparency requirements should be subject to fines and, as a last resort, may be banned by the MinisterforHome Affairs with appropriate oversight mechanisms in place.

Should the United States Government take action to force ByteDance to divest ownership of TikTok to another company that is not beholden to the Chinese Communist Party, the committee finds that Australia should consider similar requirements in Australia.

The serious espionage and data security risks posed by TikTok, which necessitated the April 2023 ban on government users downloading the app to their devices, must also be confronted by government contractors and critical infrastructure providers. Government must also put in place measures to anticipate, assess and mitigate the next TikTok before it is widely deployed on government devices.

Deterring this malign online behaviour must be a priority for government. Amended Magnitsky sanctions, bolstered enforcement of espionage and foreign interference offences and support for diaspora communities targeted by transnational repression all need to be part of a package of reforms to raise the costs of this activity.

Of course, social media companies do not need to wait for the government to introduce legislation to strengthen transparency on their platforms. They can proactively undertake this important task on their accord, as some of them are already doing.

Foreign interference through social media is a real, pervasive and growing threat. Despite Australia's world-leading efforts to counter foreign interference including through our Espionage and Foreign Interference statutory framework and the establishment of a Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme, it is evident that there is more work to be done to make Australia an even harder target for the sophisticated disinformation campaigns of authoritarian regimes.

It's not too late to arrest the threat. With a concerted joint effort by government, the private sector and civil society, we can ensure Australia's way of life prevails.