Chapter 4Government: Current practice
4.1In order to identify gaps in countermeasures that governments can take towards foreign interference through social media, it is vital to accurately map the steps currently being taken.
4.2This chapter outlines current legislation and taskforce initiatives of the Australian Government to attempt to combat the impact of foreign interference and disinformation on social media.
Current legislative settings
4.3As noted in the interim report of the Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media established during the 46th Parliament (2019 select committee), while several pieces of legislation apply to social media and the online environment—such as those that seek to protect user privacy and prevent criminal activity online—none specifically address the problem of foreign interference through social media.
Criminal Code Act 1995
4.4The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Criminal Code) contains provisions that criminalise foreign interference (section 92.3).
4.5These provisions were used to charge MrDi‑SanhDuong ‘with the offence of preparing for a foreign interference offence, contrary to section 92.4 of the Criminal Code’. This matter is still before the courts.
4.6On 14 April 2023, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) charged MrAlexanderCsergo with the offence of reckless foreign interference, contrary to section 92.3 of the Criminal Code. This matter is still before the courts.
4.7These provisions were also used in the June 2020 investigation of MrJohnZhisen Zhang, a part-time staffer of New South Wales (NSW) LaborMP MrShaoquett Moselmane. The AFP alleged that MrZhang and unnamed others used a WeChat group to advance the interests and policy goals of China by providing support and encouragement to MrMoselmane for the advocacy of 'Chinese state interests' within the NSW Labor Party and to voters.
4.8It was later revealed that the AFP-Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Foreign Interference Taskforce had also taken action in relation to sixChinese citizens suspected to be part of a group of foreign agents who encouraged and helped Mr Moselmane to champion Chinese Government interests, including two academics who had their visas cancelled and four Chinese journalists who departed Australia after raids on their media outlets.
National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018
4.9The Australian Government updated the offences in the Criminal Code via the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018 (Espionage Act) to introduce new offences relating to foreign interference with Australia's political, governmental or democratic processes. These new foreign interference offences could be applied to persons who 'weaponise' fake news in certain circumstances.
4.10The offences contained in the Espionage Act now extend to persons who, on behalf of a foreign government, engage in the deceptive or covert conduct intended to 'influence a political or governmental process of the Commonwealth or a State or Territory or influence the exercise (whether or not in Australia) of an Australian democratic or political right or duty'.
4.11At time of writing, two separate people have been charged under the Espionage Act, for actions not relating to social media. In the first case, Dr Sunny Duong is alleged to have sought to cultivate a relationship with former Coalition Minister Alan Tudge from March to June in 2020 and use that relationship to advance the interests of the Chinese Communist Party.
4.12The second case is that of Australian businessman Alexander Csergo, who was charged with reckless foreign interference in April 2023. Mr Csergo lived in China for decades and is alleged to have been recruited by suspected agents for China's Ministry of State Security, 'Ken' and 'Evelyn', to obtain and provide information on intelligence priorities. It is alleged they first made contact with Mr Csergo via professional networking platform, LinkedIn.
4.13Both cases are still before the courts. The effectiveness of this legislation is discussed in the following Chapter 5 which discusses ideas for further government measures.
Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018
4.14The Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 (Transparency scheme) is managed by the Attorney-General's Department. The scheme's stated goal is to 'provide the public with visibility of the nature, level and extent of foreign influence on Australia's government and politics', which is done via requiring individuals and entitles to register certain activities under the scheme if they are taken on behalf of a foreign principal.
4.15Under the Transparency scheme, a foreign principal includes a foreign government, a foreign political organisation, a foreign government related entity and a foreign government related individual. Registerable activities include parliamentary lobbying, general political lobbying, communications activities and disbursement activities (the payment of money or things of value).
4.16ASIO has stated the two recent changes—the Espionage Act and Transparency scheme—have assisted in the fight to counter foreign interference in Australia:
The passage of espionage and foreign interference (EFI) legislation has proven a valuable tool to ASIO and partners in preventing threats posed by foreign intelligence services (FIS) and their proxies. The legislation, coupled with operational work, caused some intelligence services to reassess the risks associated with conducting clandestine foreign intelligence operations in or against Australia, and—in some cases—they ceased activities.
We assess that the legislation also contributed to some FIS more openly declaring their intelligence presence and activities in Australia. This informed our assessments, and improved our understanding of the EFI threat in Australia, enabling us to direct our efforts towards mitigating highest harm activities.
4.17The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security is currently undertaking a review into the operation, effectiveness and implications of the Transparency scheme which commenced on 6 February 2021.
Online Safety Act 2021
4.18On 23 July 2021, the Online Safety Bill 2021 and Online Safety (TransitionalProvisions and Consequential Amendments) Bill 2021 were enacted. They retained and replicated certain provisions in the EnhancingOnlineSafety Act 2015 and made consequential amendments to 'protect more Australians from harm, or risk of harm', including through schemes regulating the non-consensual sharing of intimate images, online complaints, complaints-based removal notices and compliance requirements, and including app distribution services and internet search engine services into the remit of the new online content scheme.
4.19Significantly, the amendments also gave the eSafety Commissioner (outlined in greater detail below) powers to request or require internet service providers to disable access to material depicting, promoting, inciting or instructing in abhorrent violent conduct for time-limited periods in crisis situations.
Privacy Act 1998
4.20The Privacy Act 1988 (Privacy Act) is the principal piece of Australian legislation protecting the handling of personal information about individuals, including the collection, use, storage and disclosure of personal information in the federal public sector and in the private sector. The Attorney-General’s Department is conducting a review into the Privacy Act, which is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
Government counter-interference entities
4.21The following visualisation of the Australian Government's network for countering foreign interference maps the responsibilities and connections between departments and agencies. Further information about the participants and specific initiatives is on following pages.
Counter Foreign Interference Strategy
4.22Developed by the Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs), the aim of the Counter Foreign Interference Strategy (CFI strategy)is to protect Australia's sovereignty, values and national interests from foreign interference. The CFI strategy includes five pillars aimed at enhancing capability, engaging with at‑risk sectors, deterring perpetrators, defending against acts of foreign interference, and enforcing counter foreign interference laws.A summary of the CFI strategy is published on the Home Affairs website, but further details are not publicly available.
Figure 4.1Counter foreign interference network
Home Affairs
4.23As well as participating in taskforces and other initiatives described below, Home Affairs advised the committee of broader activities it undertakes in relation to foreign interference.
4.24Home Affairs submitted that it engages ‘with a range of international partners through a variety of bilateral and multilateral forums to share information and exchange policy best practice approaches to counter foreign interference and malign information activities’. Home Affairs further submitted that this engagement ‘informs Australia’s domestic policies and legislative frameworks to protect Australian interests from hostile state actor activities’. However, no specific information was given on which international fora it participates in, nor which specific policies were adopted from overseas best practice.
4.25Home Affairs noted that it uses an integrated model to counter misinformation and disinformation online, particularly promoting Australian values and Australia’s inclusive national identity, but gain, did not provide anything specific as to whether it follows similar counter-tactics as outlined in Chapter 3 on international approaches, such as using the DISARM or other agreed frameworks.
National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator
4.26The inaugural National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator (NCFIC), MrChris Teal, was appointed in 2018 to work across government and non‑government sectors to strengthen arrangements to counter foreign interference. The NCFIC administers the CFI strategy and is supported by the Counter Foreign Interference Coordination Centre (CFICC).
Counter Foreign Interference Coordination Centre
4.27The Home Affairs CFICC coordinates all Australian Government responses to foreign interference, including through the CFI strategy, outreach efforts and advice, engagement with culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) communities, and engagement with international and regional partners.
4.28CFICC Partnership teams located in all states and territories also work closely with communities, state/territory governments, police and national security agencies to build community awareness of, and resilience to, the threat of foreign interference.
Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce
4.29Established in 2020 and lead by ASIO, the CFI Taskforce, discovers, disrupts and investigates foreign interference activity, including through investigations and enforcement activity. Membership includes ASIO, Home Affairs and the AFP. ASIO noted that the taskforce is ‘designed to mitigate harm and disrupt the threat of espionage and foreign interference by leveraging the unique capabilities of our intelligence and law enforcement agencies and it uses a range of mechanisms such as ‘intelligence operations, law enforcement activity and prosecutions under the Espionage and Foreign Interference Legislation and the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme, visa cancellations, and financial disruptions’.
4.30The CFICC confirmed with the committee that it is not a member of the CFITaskforce because ‘structure is an operational activity, and Home Affairs does not undertake the operational investigative aspects’ however it was noted that the CFICC has ‘responsibility for the oversight board for the taskforce and engage[s] with them to inform policy and to work with them on policy aspects of investigations’.
Australian Cyber Security Centre
4.31The Australian Cyber Security Centre leads the Australian Government's efforts to improve cyber security by providing advice, alerts and information about cyber threats and monitoring threats globally and developing solutions, including in relation to foreign interference and disinformation. The Australian Government has committed to 10 years of investment in the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD)—known as REDSPICE—to improve cyber defences from 2022–23.
Cyber and Infrastructure Security Centre
4.32The Cyber and Infrastructure Security Centre of Home Affairs actively assists Australian critical infrastructure owners and operators to understand the risk environment and meet their cyber-related regulatory requirements, in addition to its own regulatory requirements. It works in partnership with government, industry and community.
Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme
4.33The Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme commenced on 10December2018. The purpose of the scheme is to provide the public with visibility of the nature, level and extent of foreign influence (rather than interference) on Australia's government and politics, including through registration of individuals and entities, foreign principals, and registerable activities, with additional obligations during voting periods.
4.34Under the scheme, communications activities such as those conducted on social media need to be registered if they are undertaken in Australia on behalf of a foreign principal for the purpose of political or government influence.TheAttorney-General's Department advised that all scheme registrants met their obligations under the act in relation to the 2022 federal election.
Community Liaison Officer network
4.35The Home Affairs network of Regional Directors and Community Liaison Officers engage with a wide range of cultural, religious and ethnic community stakeholders around Australia, to 'support the communication of official information to CALD communities, and provides a mechanism for community members to share information about their priorities, concerns, and the impact of government policies and programs on their communities'.
National Security Hotline
4.36The National Security Hotline, administered by the National Emergency Management Agency, takes reports of suspicious behaviour in relation to terrorism and foreign interference, including where people are 'being intimidated or harassed by someone linked to a foreign government' or 'coerced to return to their home country'.
University Foreign Interference Taskforce
4.37The University Foreign Interference Taskforce (UFIT) was established in 2019, to support and build resilience against foreign interference in universities. The UFIT Steering Group 'primary conduit for all university and Government counter foreign interference related activities'. In 2019, UFIT released the Guidelines to Counter Foreign Interference in the Australian University Sector, with an update released in November 2021.
4.38Evidence received during the Inquiry into national security risks affecting the Australian higher education and research sector suggested that the taskforce is unique amongst Five Eyes Plus nations, and that it has been a highly successful collaborative approach which has been mirrored in other jurisdictions.
Strengthening Democracy Taskforce
4.39Announced on 8 December 2022, the Strengthening Democracy Taskforce, housed within Home Affairs, aims to bolster Australia's democratic resilience and enhance trust among citizens, and between citizens and governments. Thetaskforce will work in partnership with Australian civil society organisations to deliver a practical agenda for sustaining and strengthening our democratic resilience. The taskforce will work closely with the newly established National Resilience Taskforce 'noting Australia's democratic resilience underpins our national resilience'.
Election Integrity Taskforce
4.40The Election Integrity Taskforce is comprised of a range of AustralianGovernment agencies who provide specialist support to the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) to support election integrity including cyber security and disinformation. The taskforce supports various electoral events, including federal by-elections and State and territory elections. The AEC submitted that ‘Taskforce agencies did not identify any foreign interference, or any other interference, that compromised the delivery of the 2022 federal election’.
4.41However, David Robinson of Internet 2.0 expressed scepticism on this. Hepointed to a study of social media commentary after the 2021 coup in Myanmar, where the Pentagon’s social media accounts were hit with 700 000 posts related to the coup. Social media companies and providers tracked the authenticity of the debate and found that it was authentic behaviour. However, when Internet 2.0 studied the data from a mathematical analysis perspective, they were easily able to identify an inauthentic campaign. In relation to the safety of Australian elections from CIB, Mr Robinson stated that until someone had done similar analysis ‘I don't think you can say either way’.
Code of practice on misinformation and disinformation
4.42In December 2019, the Australian Government requested that major digital platforms in Australia develop a voluntary code of practice to address online disinformation and news quality concerns.
4.43In February 2021, Digital Industry Group Inc (DIGI) published the AustralianCode of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation (DIGI code) with 8signatories: Adobe, Apple, Google, Meta, Microsoft, Redbubble, TikTok and Twitter. The DIGI code aimed to provide safeguards against harms from the spread of mis and disinformation on digital platforms. The DIGI code was then updated in October 2022 with changes to the code's governance.
4.44The objectives of the DIGI code are:
(a)Provide safeguards against harms that arise from mis and disinformation.
(b)Disrupt advertising and monetisation incentives for mis and disinformation.
(c)Work to ensure the integrity and security of services and products delivered by digital platforms.
(d)Empower consumers to make better informed choices of digital content.
(e)Improve public awareness of the source of political advertising carried on digital platforms.
(f)Strengthen public understanding of mis and disinformation through support of strategic research.
(g)Signatories publicise measures they take to combat mis and disinformation.
Australian Communications and Media Authority
4.45The Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) is the independent statutory authority responsible for the regulation of broadcasting, radiocommunications and telecommunications in Australia. The ACMA's remit also includes aspects of online content regulation; relevantly, the ACMA monitors digital platforms' activities under the DIGI code, including in response to coordinated campaigns by foreign actors.
4.46In June 2021, the ACMA finalised A report to government on the adequacy of digital platforms' disinformation and news quality measures. The ACMA found the scope of the DIGI code is limited by the threshold where both 'serious' and 'imminent' harm must be reached before action is required. 'The effect of this is that signatories could comply with the code without having to take any action on the type of information which can, over time, contribute to a range of chronic harms, such as reductions in community cohesion and a lessening of trust in public institutions.' The DIGI code was subsequently updated by signatories, to change the definition of harm to a threshold of ‘serious and credible’ threat of harm.
4.47The ACMA found challenges in obtaining relevant data on platform actions in Australia and recommended:
That the ACMA be vested with formal information-gathering powers (including powers to make record-keeping rules) to incentivise greater platform transparency and improve access to data on the effectiveness of measures to address mis and disinformation in Australia.
The ACMA be vested with reserve regulatory powers in relation to digital platforms – such as code registration powers and the ability to set standards.
A misinformation and disinformation Action Group be established to support collaboration and information-sharing between digital platforms, government agencies, researchers and non-government organisations on issues relating to mis and disinformation.
4.48The Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) also noted that although platforms are publishing transparency reports under the DIGI code, and the code itself was updated in December 2022, ‘none of these existing measures are specifically focused on the question of foreign interference through social media, or the particular strategic risks posed to Australia through these activities’.
4.49On 21 March 2022 the Australian Government announced it would consult on proposals to introduce legislation in the second half of 2022 to combat harmful online mis and disinformation. These new powers for the ACMA have been proposed via an exposure draft of new legislation, which is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
eSafety Commissioner
4.50The eSafety Commissioner is Australia's independent regulator for online safety with a role to help safeguard Australians at risk from online harms and to promote safer, more positive online experiences. While foreign interference is not a matter which falls directly within the remit of the eSafety Commissioner, this activity intersects with two of its functions, namely its role in promoting ‘Safety by Design’ principles and compliance with the government’s ‘BasicOnline Safety Expectations’.
DP-REG
4.51The Digital Platform Regulators Forum (DP-REG) was established in early 2022 to facilitate better coordination across government on digital platform regulation. It includes the ACMA, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, the Office of the eSafety Commissioner, and the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner.
4.52DP-REG’s strategic priorities for 2022—23 include a focus on the impact of algorithms, efforts to improve transparency of digital platforms’ activities and how they are protecting users from potential harm—including from mis and disinformation—and increased collaboration and capacity building between members.
Recent policy responses and initiatives
Budget 2023–24
4.53On 9 May 2023, the Australian Government announced a range of measures to improve privacy, digital safety, cybersecurity and development of critical technology industries. There were a number of key budget which are likely to directly impact on matters relating to foreign interference through social media, including:
funding to progress the government's response to the Privacy Act review ($0.9million over two years);
funding to help combat scams and mis and disinformation, including:
funding for the ACMA to resource the Office of the eSafety Commissioner—$134.1 million over four years ($33.7 million per year ongoing, in addition to the existing base funding of $10.3 million per annum ongoing). This will be partly met by existing departmental resourcing and be used for a variety of programs including 'enhanced educational, outreach and investigatory activities';
funding for the ACMA for the implementation of ‘new powers to hold digital platforms to account and improve efforts to combat harmful misinformation and disinformation in Australia'—$7.9 million over four years;
establishment of the Coordinator for Cyber Security within Home Affairs—$46.6 million over four years, then $11.8 million per year ongoing. Noting this appears to be funding redirected from ASD rather than new funding; and
support for local news and media and promotion of media literacy, including $2.5 million over two years 'to build media literacy in culturally and linguistically diverse communities. This funding will be used by the government to:
… partner with the Federation of Ethnic Communities’ Council of Australia (FECCA) to support media literacy in culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) communities. This partnership aims to empower multicultural communities to combat harms associated with the proliferation of deceptive information including mis and disinformation, and support improved economic and civic participation.
Privacy Actamendments and review
4.54The first interim report of the 46th Parliament inquiry into foreign interference discussed potential amendments to the Privacy Act, including the 'introduction of a binding online privacy code for social media and certain other online platforms'. However, ultimately the Privacy Legislation Amendment (Enforcement and Other Measures) Bill 2022 passed into law on 12December2022 without introducing such a requirement. Rather, the bill increased penalties for serious or repeated interferences with privacy, enhanced enforcement powers for the Australian Information Commissioner, and provided the commissioner and the ACMA with greater information sharing powers.
4.55In 2020, following the initial Australian Competition and Consumer Commission digital platforms inquiry of 2019, the Attorney-General commenced a review of the Privacy Act, releasing a review report in February2023.
4.56Reforms proposed by the report include stronger protections for personal information, greater transparency and control for individuals over their information, and more enforcement and redress mechanisms. TheAttorney‑General's Department informed the committee that ‘the general theme around the review itself was to conduct an uplift in terms of individuals' control over their personal data and how it's used, and also generally awareness raising and transparency initiatives’.
4.57The report included discussion about the scope for political disinformation in relation to political targeting and microtargeting, including the 'involvement of foreign interests in political communication' and the possibility of negative impacts on democracy. Many submitters to the review referenced the Cambridge Analytica matter and 'expressed concern about whether the political exemption may allow such an incident in Australia'.
4.58Discussion also considered the security of personal information held by political parties and the potential for this information to be targeted by foreign interference in elections, with the proposal that political entities be required to take 'reasonable steps to protect personal information'.
4.59Disinformation was also considered in the report the context of direct and targeted marketing and serious negative impacts which this can cause, 'for example by contributing to disinformation campaigns or by discriminating against certain groups' and 'risks undermining other public interests, including the integrity of the democratic electoral process'.
4.60The review report also examined international data flows, specifically mentioning concerns raised in relation to social media platform TikTok. Thereport considered options for regulating privacy for foreign organisations or small business operations which have an 'Australian link' and allowing for the flow of information overseas while ensuring privacy is protected including the Cross‑Border Privacy Rules or a domestic certification scheme. However, the report noted that some 'submissions noted that personal information transferred overseas could potentially be accessed by overseas governments, and that it could be more difficult for individuals to enforce privacy rights and access justice for overseas privacy infringements'.
4.61The Attorney-General’s Department sought feedback by 31 March 2023 to its review report, noting that feedback would ‘inform the Australian Government’s response to this report to ensure that any reforms the Australian Government implements are balanced and effective’. There is no information available on any timeline for proposed changes to the Privacy Act.
4.62However, the United States Federal Communications Commissioner, MrBrendan Carr, expressed some doubt that privacy protections would be wholly effective. Commissioner Carr noted that Europe has ‘gold standard’ privacy protections, but is still finding it necessary to ban apps such as TikTok:
If privacy protections were enough to address TikTok then we wouldn't see these concerns existing today in Europe. So privacy is important, but, when we're dealing with a company with a history of misrepresentations, because of their conduct, we do not have a baseline level of trust. Privacy protection isn't tailored to address those national security threats.
AEC activities
4.63As noted above, the AEC is a member of the Election Integrity Taskforce and has undertaken a number of activities designed to protect election-related activity in Australia. However, the AEC noted that while the Electoral Act 1918 does ‘require electoral matter to be properly authorised to inform voters of the source of communication’ it ‘does not regulate truth in electoral communication’. In other words, a person or organisation can provide false information, but they must put their name to it.
4.64The AEC noted that as part of its integrity work, it has launched a ‘purpose-built Command Centre for rapid and coordinated incident response, including a dedicated media hub to quickly respond to electoral disinformation’ as well as a ‘Disinformation Register to list and debunk electoral process disinformation’. The AEC further noted it has developed effective working relationships with social media organisations, including a signed public agreement with Meta, Twitter, Google, Microsoft and TikTok. However, CyberCX expressed doubt that any department or agency ‘has the capability or authority to lead in relation to a social media disinformation campaign related to political parties, candidates or policies’.
4.65Dr Andrew Dowse of RAND Australia noted that an unintended consequence of election blackout periods for mainstream media, was that it drove people to social media where there was less chance of appropriately moderated information, and this should be considered.
Stop and consider campaign
4.66The AEC managed the Stop and Consider campaign during the 2022 federal election to help voters to cut through disinformation and spin messages they may receive.
4.67Information was distributed to voters primarily via social media feeds and through digital displays with translated material distributed through CALDaudiences. The AEC also operated a disinformation register listing prominent pieces of disinformation regarding the election process.
4.68Chapter 7 contains more in-depth discussion around these education and digital literacy campaigns run by the AEC and other entities.
Voice referendum
4.69The AEC has also noted work being done on the proposed referendum to be held later in 2023, to help prevent the spread of disinformation. The AEC noted that due to the long time since the last referendum in 1999, there are approximately 7.4 million people who will never have voted in a referendum before and this lack of experience ‘coupled with the ever-increasing digital consumption of information, means social media platforms will undoubtedly play a key role for electors seeking information’.
Home Affairs review of foreign interference through social media
4.70Home Affairs was tasked by the Home Affairs Minister in September 2022, with undertaking a review into Foreign Interference through Social Media Applications. The review was asked to consider all options to address data security risks, as well as disinformation concerns as they relate to social media platforms and was delivered to the Minister for Home Affairs on 16March2023 and is not expected to be publicly released.
4.71CyberCX noted that this review was expected to look at data harvesting by TikTok and other social media platforms, but noted it is unclear whether platforms’ content moderation and algorithm practices were also reviewed.
TikTok on Australian Government devices
4.72Following the delivery of the Home Affairs review outlined above, on 4April2023. TikTok was banned from on devices issued by AustralianGovernment departments and agencies. The ban is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.
Community outreach
4.73On 14 February 2023, the Minister for Home Affairs announced a new community outreach program to be coordinated by Home Affairs and ASIO. The program will identify individuals within the Australian community who might be targets of foreign interference and design and deliver a program to proactively help them understand what foreign interference is, how they can respond, and what the government can do to protect them.
4.74Home Affairs advised the committee on 12 July 2023, that this program has begun and is ‘looking to identify communities that we think are at risk and to then proactively engage with them and seek opportunities to provide them information and make sure that we're engaging in understanding their concerns’. Home Affairs advised it had not been allocated any new resources for this program, which it had already been undertaking, simply not at this scale.
4.75On 27 February 2023, the AFP announced the launch of an education campaign to help CALD communities understand what foreign interference is, how it manifests itself and where victims can report instances and seek assistance. Itwill include meetings between AFP community liaison teams, CALD groups and religious leaders, and a factsheet translated into more than 30 languages.
National Office for Cyber Security
4.76On 27 February 2023, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Home Affairs jointly announced the creation of a new National Office for Cyber Security, to help mitigate the impact of major cyber incidents. The office will help establish a strategic and structured approach to cyber security across government, and help to manage cyber incidents in a seamless and strategic way across government. TheAustralian Government is also proposing a discussion paper to improve the function of relevant laws and policies.
Data Security Action Plan
4.77Under current development, Australia's first Data Security Action Plan is a key initiative under the Cyber Security Strategy 2023-2030, that will seek to strengthen data security policy settings across government and the broader economy, including consideration of storage settings of domestic and international data and whether they adequately promote privacy, security and transparency.
4.78From 6 April to 24 June 2022, Home Affairs undertook consultation and received 81 submissions on the plan. As of 10 July 2023, Home Affairs is currently developing the final plan.