Coalition Senators' Dissenting Report

Background

1.1The Bill partially implements the recommendations of the RBA Review. It replaces the existing Reserve Bank Board with a Monetary Policy Board and Governance Board. It also removes the Government’s power to override monetary policy decisions of the Reserve Bank Board under section 11 of the Reserve Bank Act 1959 (the Act).

1.2Coalition Senators support the independence of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) in its monetary policy decision making. It was the Howard Government in August 1996 that formalised the RBA’s independence through a joint Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy:

The Government recognises the independence of the Bank and its responsibility for monetary policy matters and intends to respect the Bank's independence as provided by statute.[1]

1.3Coalition Senators also support the flexible inflation targeting framework of the RBA of 2 to 3 percent, contributing to a relatively stable inflationary environment in Australia over the past 30 years, which was recognised by the RBA Reviewers.[2]

1.4The recent review of the Reserve Bank of Australia, the first of its kind in 30 years, could have been an opportunity to genuinely assess the short-comings in the RBA’s current structure, whilst identifying future opportunities and risks that the bank could face in the future.

1.5The Government’s review ignored the major disruptive factors facing the economy arising from digital and payments. Therefore the review was left to focus on a random set of governance and internal matters.

1.6Given the RBA’s large regulatory remit in payments policy, it is baffling that this was not given greater focus. Recent innovation in payments systems presents numerous opportunities for the Australian economy, but also serious risks. The Reserve Bank’s ability to manage these risks without diminishing economic disruption and competition should have been examined properly by the Review.

1.7When the Review of the RBA was released in April 2023, Treasurer Chalmers adopted all 51 recommendations immediately, and seemingly without much scrutiny. There was no formal government response to the Review, and this inquiry was the first opportunity for members of the public to provide feedback on the Review’s proposals.

1.8Coalition Senators have serious concerns and reservations about some of the Review’s recommendations adopted by the Government, which are partially implemented by the legislation before this Committee.

1.9A credible, capable, stable and independent central bank has proven to be one of the most powerful institutions underpinning a strong, low inflation economy.

1.10While our Reserve Bank hasn’t always got it right, we can’t afford any actual or perceived shift away from stability and independence in these uncertain economic times.

1.11Australia still faces stubbornly high inflation, more than 1.6 per cent above the midpoint of the target band – which under Treasurer Chalmers’ new statement of Conduct of Monetary Policy the bank is required to target.

1.12Non-tradable inflation remains even higher, while non-discretionary and services inflation remain well above band.

1.13With a highly uncertain geopolitical outlook including continued pressure in the Red Sea, sustained conflict in the Middle East and Ukraine, and a structural deficit that Labor’s two budgets have only made worse, this leaves Australia’s inflation trajectory highly exposed to further shocks.

1.14At the same time, Australia is seeing considerable pressure on unit labour costs as labour productivity has collapsed in a manner not seen in peer countries.

Continuity of Board Members

1.15Coalition Senators are concerned that the Government is not intending to retain continuity of board members between the existing Reserve Bank Board and the proposed Monetary Policy Board. There is a concern that the Treasurer intends to essentially spill the Board and appoint a suite of new members.

1.16Shadow Treasurer Angus Taylor raised this concern with the Government during his consultation with them on the legislative changes, noting that stability on the board is essential during a time of persistent inflation.[3] The Shadow Treasurer raised this concern with the Treasurer in October 2023, but the list of concerns was not taken on board by the Government.

1.17The Shadow Treasurer, writing in the Australian Financial Review, outlined that process:

In responding to the Reserve Bank review, the Coalition made it clear that continuity of board appointments would be a critical condition of bipartisan support. This was an express red line issue when consulted on the draft legislation in September and October last year…The legislation, as drafted, doesn’t just give operational flexibility to the Treasurer of the day. It explicitly abolishes the Board as it currently exists.[4]

1.18The Shadow Treasurer went on to note that the Review does not make the case that the current Board are well suited to governance, noting that “The RBA Review found that the existing board meetings are almost entirely focused on monetary policy, with corporate governance matters appearing only occasionally” and that “[t]he review also noted that “past and current Reserve Bank Board members found that most members viewed the board as a monetary policy-making body, with corporate governance largely falling outside their remit.”[5]

1.19The RBA, in their submission to the Committee, also argued that continuity is essential, submitting that:

… we believe that it is essential that any near-term reconsideration of the composition of the Board recognises the value of continuity of membership and recent monetary policy experience. This is particularly important at the current juncture, where the Board is navigating a challenging policy environment and significant changes in processes for determining monetary policy. For these reasons, the Bank believes that having a high degree of continuity of membership will be important during 2024 and 2025.[6]

1.20The RBA Governor, Ms Michelle Bullock, further explained to the Committee at the public hearing why continuity would be important for monetary policy decision making:

Monetary policy setting is not simply something that you just set at a meeting and then start with a blank sheet of paper at the next meeting. It is a continuous decision and a continual discussion. I think in those circumstances it is really important that, if we go into this new world, that we have continuity of membership to provide that.[7]

1.21Under the proposed legislation as it stands, transitional arrangements for existing board members are not automatic, and for current members of the RBA board “there would need to be a formal appointment by the Treasurer” if they were to transition to the new proposed Monetary Policy Board.[8]

1.22Accordingly, there’s nothing in the legislation which guarantees the current board members will be reappointed, despite the Treasurer’s assurances:

Senator DEAN SMITH: Right. But there's a risk for current board members that they may not be reappointed? Does this—

Ms Bullock: In theory, there is.[9]

1.23At the public hearing, the Treasury confirmed that the Bill provides for Government to decide on who transitions:

It is, in the same way that, for all government appointments, it's the government that has the final say as to who does or does not transition.[10]

1.24Coalition Senators are of the view that if the Treasurer is sincere about maintaining board continuity, which is essential to maintaining effective management of monetary policy by the bank, there should be a provision in the legislation that guarantees this continuity.

1.25That the bill be amended so that the existing Reserve Bank Board members become the Monetary Policy Board, ensuring continuity of membership and monetary policy decision making in an inflation crisis.

Section 11 of the Reserve Bank Act 1959

1.26Section 11 of the Act sets out the mechanism under which differences of opinion with the Government on questions of policy are resolved.[11] It gives the Government the ability to override the Reserve Bank with respect to policy matters, be it monetary and banking policy or payments system policy. The section 11 powers have never been used by any government since they were introduced.

1.27Section 11 was considered by the Committee of Inquiry into the Australian Financial System, chaired by Sir J. K. Campbell, in its final report in 1981. However, the Committee did not recommend removing the override powers. In its recommendations, the Committee stated it “sees no need for change in the present provisions for resolution of differences of opinion between the Reserve Bank Board and the Treasurer (Section 11).”[12]

1.28The Campbell Report noted at the time that proposals to remove the powers were underpinned by concerns that “governments may at times be reluctant to pursue appropriately tight monetary policies, because of political constraints.”[13]However, the Committee disagreed, stating that:

...proposals to make the Bank fully independent of government would, in the Committee’s view, amount to the substitution of bureaucratic for political discretion which would be inconsistent with the processes of democratic government.[14]

1.29The Committee took this view on the basis that the Reserve Bank must be accountable to the Parliament, explaining that:

In short, the Committee is firmly of the view that ultimate determination of and responsibility for overall economic policy - including monetary policy - cannot be effectively divorced from government and Parliament. It is also important that the monetary authorities be effectively accountable to the public and the Parliament.[15]

1.30In 1996, the Howard Government’s joint statement with the RBA on the conduct of monetary policy noted the continuing relevance of section 11, reiterating its importance as a necessary safeguard:

Section 11 of the Reserve Bank Act prescribes procedures for the resolution of policy differences between the Bank and the Government. The procedures, in effect, allow the Government to determine policy in the event of a material difference; but the procedures are politically demanding and their nature reinforces the Bank's independence. Safeguards like this ensure that monetary policy is subject to the checks and balances inherent and necessary in a democratic system.[16]

1.31Notwithstanding the Campbell Committee’s recommendation, the RBA Review Panel in its final report decided to recommend “the repeal of s11 (2)-(7) of the RBA Act” on the basis that “no Australian Government has used these override powers”, and its continuing presence in legislation “creates the risk that the Government wields, or threatens to wield, power in a way that undermines the independent operation of monetary policy.”[17]

1.32The premise in the Review Panel’s argument seems to be that the very presence of section 11 is a threat to the independence of the RBA, and its removal would “enhance” its monetary policy independence. The Reviewers have not attempted to refute the arguments against repeal made by the Campbell Committee in 1981.

1.33Schedule 1, Part 1 of the Bill implements this recommendation of the RBA Review Panel, by removing the Government’s ability to override the RBA on monetary policy under section 11 of the Act, including the mechanism through which differences of opinion on monetary policy between the Government and the Board could be resolved.

1.34Justifying the removal in the explanatory memorandum, the Government has said that that RBA Review “cited evidence that the independence of monetary policy and the application of inflation targeting frameworks have coincided with an increase in the credibility of central banks’ commitment to price stability and lower inflation outcomes.”[18]

1.35Essentially, the argument here is that by removing section 11, the RBA’s ability to tackle inflation is improved. This is a very broad economic argument that lacks any specific justification relevant to section 11’s existence.

1.36Whilst Coalition Senators agree that the independence of the RBA with respect to monetary policy decision making is key to its effectiveness in managing price stability and inflation targeting, the argument that section 11 is an impediment to this has not been effectively made.

1.37None of the submitters to this Committee’s inquiry supported the Government’s removal of the section 11 override.

1.38Economist Dr Steven Hamilton, appearing before this Committee at a public hearing, emphasised his support for RBA independence, but questioned the need for removing section 11 on the basis that Parliament should have ultimate control under the law:

So, independent central banking—good; and removing inflation from the political constraints they were under before—good. The question is: what does independence mean? I'm not sure that removing section 11 is necessary to achieve functional independence in a policy sense. Moreover, I think it removes what I think is a really democratic function, which is, at the end of the day, no government agency can be fully independent. Ultimately, we elect a parliament, we have a democracy, and that parliament ought to have an executive government that is formed from that parliament or to have some ultimate control over that process. So I would be more comfortable leaving it as it is…[19]

1.39Furthermore, he questioned what alternative check and balance mechanism on the RBA’s policy decisions would be available to the Parliament in the absence of section 11:

Frankly, I had the same question, when I've read the amendment. I thought to myself: what is the check and balance there? There was a reason that was put in the act in the first place. It has never been executed, but that doesn't mean it doesn't play a role, and, of course, it will behave in a certain way given the legislation as it is. I suppose the Prime Minister would have to ask the Governor-General to sack the governor. But, ultimately, the governor and the board that they lead would still be in control of the cash rate in that circumstance, which seems very odd to me. I would argue that there are circumstances you can conceive of—for example, situations of national crisis or situations of serious disagreement with the board—where that could be necessary. Again, it has worked for the last more than half century. I'm not quite sure why we would want to fully remove it.[20]

1.40When asked, Dr Hamilton agreed that the RBA currently already has “functional independence”, and that the existing override mechanism under section 11 is well designed and already fairly onerous for government:

Looking at the provisions of section 11 as they are right now, it is a fairly long process. It requires a lot of steps to be taken by the government. They need to publicly disclose and there are exchanges of letters. It doesn't allow the government to just decide to set interest rates differently on a whim. In a sense, I think it is actually pretty well designed for a kind of break-glass scenario in which the government might need to take control of monetary policy.[21]

1.41Mr Ian Macfarlane AC, RBA Governor from 1996 to 2006, told the Committee that repealing section 11 would “be a big mistake as it does play a useful role in the long-term relationship between the Reserve Bank and the government.”[22]

1.42He stated that the nuanced provision was a useful one in his experience:

It's one of those things that at first sight it doesn't appear to be very useful, but after decades of reflection I and a number of my colleagues have come to the conclusion that section 11 would be valuable in resolving a once or twice-a-century situation where there was a major irreconcilable difference between the bank and the government.[23]

1.43Mr Macfarlane, in his appearance at the public hearing, endeavoured to refute the various arguments put forward in favour of repeal. Firstly, he explains the reality of RBA independence in practice:

On [the] first point, we have to recognise that central banking independence, as good a thing as it is—and no one has promoted it as much as I have—is not God given. It was delegated to the central banks by elected governments because they concluded it would lead to better decision-making.[24]

1.44Secondly, he explains why section 11 has never been used:

Section 11 imposes a very politically demanding process that governments would only be willing to use in the most extreme and rare circumstances. After the failure to reach agreement, the government would have to publish its decision, and both the government and the bank would have to lay before both houses of parliament the detailed reasons behind their positions. Little wonder that it's not been used. But, if there had been a conflict, a really big conflict—like the one in the early thirties—it would have been a great help in resolving the issue.[25]

1.45Mr Macfarlane therefore explains why section 11 is important and useful in both a practical and principle-based sense:

In short, I think section 11 protects central bank independence in that it prevents short-term government meddling in decisions but preserves the authority of the elected government in those rare and unforeseen major events.[26]

1.46One of the arguments put forward in favour of repeal by the RBA Review panel was that section 11 involves “primarily a decision of the executive government over the decision around monetary policymaking” and that “it's actually better that parliament has that power, rather than the executive.”[27]

1.47However, Mr Macfarlane told the Committee that by removing the mechanism in section 11, we run the risk of having to implement an inferior form of intervention in the RBA through the Parliament in the event of a crisis:

But the problem I foresee is that they would do something in a rush during an emergency or a crisis, and so we’d probably end up with some hastily put together legislation to try to change the Reserve Bank or have new legislation introduced for some other purpose. It’s so much better when we actually have a procedure in place which both parties know they have to adhere to; that’s the great virtue of section 11…Something else would fall in its place—some informal thing would take its place, something which would be inferior.[28]

1.48Mr Peter Costello AC, Federal Treasurer under the Howard Government from 1996 to 2007, told the Committee that he had considered section 11 during his time in Government and concluded there was no reason to get rid of it:

… this idea has been around a long time, by the way. This is not a new idea. Certainly, when I became Treasurer 30 years ago, people were advocating getting rid of section 11. I didn’t, obviously. I don’t think that has in any way impaired the operation of the bank or impaired its independence. I don’t think you’d be improving things if you got rid of it.[29]

1.49In his evidence, Mr Costello argued that section 11 was important as a matter of Parliamentary sovereignty:

I really think it’s a matter for parliament. Does parliament want to maintain some sovereignty in this area or not? I don’t think it’s really a matter for central banking, to be frank; it’s a matter for parliament. I would say to you: you’ll always find economists who will say parliament should give up its power, because they’re economists; they believe that they should have the power. But I can only think that parliament would give up its power if it didn’t trust itself, and I don’t think that’s a very good principle. So I don’t think we’ll improve things by getting rid of section 11…[30]

1.50Mr Costello further contended that:

The only reason you would get rid of section 11 would be if you didn’t trust the parliament, if you thought that the parliament might wrongly intervened. It’s a funny thing, I think, for the parliament so say, ‘We don’t trust ourselves.’[31]

1.51It may be that a lack of trust in the parliament factored into the decision by the RBA review panel to recommend the removal of section 11, as during their appearance before their Committee they argued that the Bank had to be “protected” from “populist politics”.[32]

1.52Mr Costello agreed with evidence given by former RBA Governor Mr Macfarlane, that we risk having to implement an inferior provision in the future if we repeal section 11:

I suppose if you got rid of it and some major event happens, the parliament could always go in and legislate it back again. But what you legislated back again may not have all of the restrictions that the current provision has. I think the restrictions about tabling the positions in parliament are good restrictions, so I can’t see that you’re going to improve things by getting rid of section 11.

You’d be back to square one and you’d be legislating all over again. It is such a difficult power to exercise that a government could only exercise it in extreme circumstances, which is why it’s never been done and which is why, in my view, it’s not a problem.[33]

1.53RBA Governor, Ms Michelle Bullock, told the Committee she was not sure how a disagreement with the Government would be resolved without section 11, and “what the legal status is if we couldn’t agree”.[34] The RBA’s General Counsel agreed with other witnesses such as Mr Costello and Mr Macfarlane, that:

it would be a question for the government to determine whether it felt the matter was so serious that it wanted to legislate either to impose a particular outcome or to remove or somehow amend the bank’s powers or to legislate a provision for resolving differences.[35]

1.54At the public hearing, one of the RBA Review panellists said that one reason they recommended removing section 11 was that “it’s not generally a feature of best-practice central banking” from an international perspective.[36]

1.55However, based on his experience as Treasurer over 11 years, Mr Costello said that the issue of section 11 had never come up internationally with respect to the Bank’s independence:

I don’t think there’s anybody in the world who says, ‘The RBA is not independent because of section 11 of the act.’ I’ve sat in IMF meetings, BIS meetings and G20 meetings, and nobody ever said to me, ‘Because of section 11 of the RBA Act you don’t have an independent central bank.’ It’s just not an issue. It would never come up. The times when the independence was queried it had nothing to do with section 11.[37]

1.56The RBA Review panellists, Dr Gordon de Brouwer and Professor Renee Fry-McKibbin, when appearing before the Committee, said that one reason they recommended repealing the override mechanism in Section 11 was “that power has never been used”.[38]

1.57But Ian Macfarlane disputed this argument, noting it was an important and transparent component of the Bank’s relationship with the government and the Parliament:

I think, if you were a newcomer and you looked at the Reserve Bank Act, you might say: ‘Oh, there’s something there. We want to get rid of things that aren’t needed. Let’s get rid of that one because it hasn’t been used.’ I don’t think there’s been deep thinking behind the review of the Reserve Bank at all. And I don’t think there’s any deep thinking behind the decision to get rid of section 11.[39]

1.58On section 11’s continuing relevance, in his experience, Mr Macfarlane noted that:

… it was important. We talked about it a lot. If you were at the senior levels of the Reserve Bank—or, I daresay, in the Treasury—you were very conscious of the existence of section 11 … there was certainly a great awareness of its existence. The fact it hadn’t been used didn’t mean it was irrelevant. It was definitely on people’s minds. And that’s why you can’t dismiss it simply on the grounds that it hasn’t been used.[40]

1.59When asked, the RBA Review panellists could not adequately explain to the Committee what alternative dispute resolution process would be there if section 11 was repealed:

The elected government could take that through a bill through the parliament, if you really thought that was the issue. … what’s there hasn’t been used and what’s there is potentially an undermining of the independence of the central bank.[41]

1.60However, when giving evidence, the panellists conceded that the RBA is already independent:

Prof. Fry-McKibbin: The RBA is operationally independent. It’s independent because you guys allow them to be independent; that’s a political decision. But they’re independent because they have to make difficult decisions and they need to be protected from the short-run political process of populist politics. The RBA having to make hard decisions is hard sometimes, and they need to be protected as well.

Senator BRAGG: So it is independent, even though section 11 exists today?

Dr de Brouwer: Yes.[42]

1.61When asked about section 11, the current RBA Governor, Ms Michelle Bullock, said she was “agnostic about it”. Furthermore, the Governor insisted that the Bank was already independent under the Act:

Senator BRAGG: Do you regard the RBA as independent as it stands?

Ms Bullock: Yes, I do.[43]

1.62Even the Treasury agreed, telling the Committee that “we all accept that the RBA is currently operating very effectively and independently. That should not come into question.”[44]

1.63Coalition Senators are of the view that removing Section 11 has not been properly justified.

1.64The outstanding questions regarding the method of resolving disputes between the Boards, and the lack of clarity on how the Governance Board would operate with a Chair who is not the Governor, strengthen the case for retaining Section 11 as a safeguard against potential conflicts between the Boards.

1.65The Coalition have raised the importance of having clear lines of accountability between the Executive, the Parliament, and the Governor with the government. These concerns have not been addressed in the legislation. One way of dealing with this would be for the Governor to chair both boards.

1.66Given the Government has not adopted this as a structural element of the legislation, but instead a discretionary choice of the government of the day – the Coalition believes this significantly diminishes the case to remove section 11 from the Act.

1.67Accordingly, the Coalition believe it is important to preserve section 11 as a ‘stop-gap’ for potential unforeseen conflicts or circumstances.

1.68The argument that it practically reduces the RBA’s independence in a consequential way has not been convincingly made. In fact, the Committee has received evidence that removing the section 11 powers could diminish the RBA’s independence.

1.69The Howard Government’s 1996 Statement of the Conduct of Monetary Policy with the RBA stated that the procedures in section 11 “reinforces the Bank’s independence” because they are politically demanding.[45]Former Treasurer Peter Costello, who formed that agreement with the RBA in 1996, said that with respect to section 11:

I certainly don’t think it compromises the independence of the bank.[46]

1.70Former Governor Ian Macfarlane agreed, stating that:

I think it actually provides independence … against governments trying to influence the monthly decisions of board meetings and things like that. It provides protection against that.[47]

1.71Coalition Senators are of the view that the position taken by the Campbell Committee in 1981 still stands as correct, that although the Bank has functional independence in monetary policy, and this has been crucial to Australia’s management of inflation in the last 30 year, its independence cannot be absolute:

…the Bank cannot rise above the source of its powers - government and Parliament - and must be responsive to the direction which governments may deem fit to give.[48]

1.72Ultimately the Parliament must always maintain sovereignty over institutions with delegated authority in a liberal democracy like Australia. Section 11 is a well-established and understood safeguard.

1.73That the Bill be amended to maintain Section 11 of the Reserve Bank Act 1959.

Senator Andrew BraggSenator Dean Smith

Deputy ChairMember

Liberal Senator for NSWLiberal Senator for WA

Footnotes

[1]The Treasurer and the Governor (designate) of the Reserve Bank, ‘Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy’, 14 August 1996, https://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/framework/stmt-conduct-mp-1-14081996.html (accessed 21 March 2024).

[2]Review of the Reserve Bank of Australia, An RBA fit for the future, March 2023, p. 2.

[3]Michael Read, ‘Chalmers’ RBA overhaul in jeopardy’, Australian Financial Review, 11 March 2024, https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/rba-overhaul-in-doubt-after-chalmers-rejects-coalition-key-demand-20240311-p5fbdb?btis (accessed 21 March 2024).

[4]Angus Taylor, ‘Why an RBA board spill is a red line on independence’, Australian Financial Review, 20 March 2024, https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/why-an-rba-board-spill-is-a-red-line-on-independence-20240318-p5fd5m (accessed 21 March 2024).

[5]Angus Taylor, ‘Why an RBA board spill is a red line on independence’, Australian Financial Review, 20 March 2024, https://www.afr.com/policy/economy/why-an-rba-board-spill-is-a-red-line-on-independence-20240318-p5fd5m (accessed 21 March 2024).

[6]Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), Submission 1, pp. 3–4.

[7]Ms Michelle Bullock, Governor, RBA, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p.26.

[8]Ms Catherine Parr, General Counsel, RBA, Committee Hansard, 22February2024, p. 28.

[9]Ms Bullock, RBA, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p.28.

[10]Mr Luke Yeaman, Deputy Secretary, Macroeconomic Group, Department of the Treasury, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 35.

[11]Reserve Bank Act 1959, s11.

[12]Australian Financial System Inquiry (1981), Final Report, AGPS, Canberra, p. 21.

[13]Australian Financial System Inquiry (1981), Final Report, AGPS, Canberra, p. 19.

[14]Australian Financial System Inquiry (1981), Final Report, AGPS, Canberra, p. 19.

[15]Australian Financial System Inquiry (1981), Final Report, AGPS, Canberra, p. 20.

[16]The Treasurer and the Governor (designate) of the Reserve Bank, ‘Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy’, 14 August 1996, https://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/framework/stmt-conduct-mp-1-14081996.html (accessed 21 March 2024).

[17]Review of the Reserve Bank of Australia, An RBA fit for the future, March 2023, p. 82.

[18]EM, pp. 7–8.

[19]Dr Steven Hamilton, Private Capacity, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 2.

[20]Dr Hamilton, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 3.

[21]Dr Hamilton, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 3.

[22]Mr Ian Macfarlane AC, Private Capacity, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 11.

[23]Mr Macfarlane AC, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 11.

[24]Mr Macfarlane AC, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 11.

[25]Mr Macfarlane AC, Private Capacity, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 11.

[26]Mr Macfarlane AC, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 12.

[27]Dr Gordon de Brouwer, Panel member, Review of the Reserve Bank of Australia, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 22.

[28]Mr Macfarlane AC, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 12.

[29]Mr Peter Costello AC, Private Capacity, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 14.

[30]Mr Costello AC, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 14.

[31]Mr Costello AC, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 15.

[32]Professor Renee Fry-McKibbon, Panel member, Review of the Reserve Bank of Australia, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 23.

[33]Mr Costello AC, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 15.

[34]Ms Bullock, RBA, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p.27.

[35]Ms Parr, RBA, Committee Hansard, 22February2024, p. 27.

[36]Dr de Brouwer, Review of the Reserve Bank of Australia, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p.22.

[37]Mr Costello AC, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 15.

[38]Dr de Brouwer, Review of the Reserve Bank of Australia, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p.22.

[39]Mr Macfarlane AC, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 12.

[40]Mr Macfarlane AC, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 12.

[41]Dr de Brouwer, Review of the Reserve Bank of Australia, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p.22.

[42]Professor Fry-McKibbon & Dr de Brouwer, Review of the Reserve Bank of Australia, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 23.

[43]Ms Bullock, RBA, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p.26.

[44]Mr Yeaman, Department of the Treasury, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 32.

[45]The Treasurer and the Governor (designate) of the Reserve Bank, ‘Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy’, 14 August 1996, https://www.rba.gov.au/monetary-policy/framework/stmt-conduct-mp-1-14081996.html (accessed 21 March 2024).

[46]Mr Costello AC, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 16.

[47]Mr Macfarlane AC, Committee Hansard, 22 February 2024, p. 12.

[48]Australian Financial System Inquiry (1981), Final Report, AGPS, Canberra, p. 21.