Chapter 4Committee view
4.1The impetus for this inquiry was the government's recent decision to refuse to increase flight capacity for Qatar Airways, the impacts on cost of airfares and choice of services as a result, and the failure of the relevant minister to explain the reasons for the decision, which warranted close scrutiny. In just the short period set by the Senate for this inquiry, the committee received substantial evidence focussing on that decision as well as broader challenges for Australia's aviation industry, especially in relation to the affordability and reliability of air services in Australia.
4.2This evidence reflects the many questions raised by the government's recent decision, as well as the need for immediate action and reform to Australia's aviation industry in general.
4.3It is important to emphasise the significance of these matters. Our aviation sector connects Australians with each other and the world. It contributes to tourism and trade, facilitates investment and jobs, and is relied upon by countless regional communities.
4.4The committee considers that many of the reforms needed in Australia's aviation sector cannot wait until the Government's White Paper is published and recommendations adopted. The department's website says the White Paper is to be published in mid-2024 but the committee is concerned that release of the White Paper, like the recent Green Paper, may be delayed and reforms arising from the process may not be implemented until after the next election. While continuing to pursue those processes, the government should take swift action on key matters examined in this report.
4.5This chapter provides the committee's comments and recommendations on key issues raised in this inquiry as follows:
Australia's approach to negotiating air service agreements.
the recent Qatar decision.
the government's decision making process on the Qatar decision.
Australia's aviation industry more broadly, comprising:
Competition in the aviation industry.
Frequent flyers.
Consumer protections.
Management of airport slots at Sydney Airport.
Current staffing issues for air traffic controllers.
Air cabotage arrangements.
Security screening at regional airports.
The need for an extended inquiry to hear from key witnesses to uncover specific and critical details pertaining to the Qatar Airways decision.
Australia's approach to negotiating air service agreements
4.6A range of inquiry participants emphasised that Australia should ensure our bilateral air service agreements provide capacity ahead of demand and should seek to liberalise its air service agreements, including open skies agreements where appropriate. This approach would support affordable and reliable services where there is demand for them. It would encourage competition and choice of destination, help to place downward pressure on airfares, and support the industry to make long term plans with confidence.
4.7The recent Aviation Green Paper, Towards 2050, seems broadly consistent with this approach; it says the Australian Government 'proposes to continue the current "Capacity ahead of Demand" approach, and negotiate "Open Skies" style agreements where it is in the national interest and can be bilaterally agreed'. However, in apparent tension with calls for a more liberal approach, the Green Paper also says the 'current approach to bilateral air services negotiations appears well adapted to continue to seek benefits in the national interest…'
4.8The committee is of the view that Australia should have regard to the interests of the Australian public, economy and security when negotiating bilateral air service agreements, rather than place too much emphasis on reciprocity from the other country in the negotiation.
4.9The committee understands that Australia has just seven open skies agreements. It is concerned that Australia is falling behind other states such as Canada, which has 23 such agreements, Singapore with over 60, and the United States with 130.
4.10The committee supports efforts to provide more open skies agreements and, at a minimum, ensure that Australia's air service agreements provide capacity well in advance of demand, so that the aviation industry can confidently prepare to deliver services in alignment with demand.
The recent Qatar decision
4.11The Aviation White Paper of 2009 includes the following statement of government policy:
The Government will continue to pursue liberalisation of the international aviation market, including 'open skies' style agreements, where these are assessed to be in the national interest.
In all cases the Australian Government will seek to ensure capacity available under our bilateral agreements remains ahead of demand so that airlines are free to make commercial decisions about the frequency and types of services they operate. Such an approach provides airlines with the regulatory certainty to enable them to commit to long-term growth plans in the Australian market.
4.12In addition, consistent with successive government policy, in the recent Green Paper the Australian Government 'proposes to continue the current “Capacity ahead of Demand” approach, and negotiate “Open Skies” style agreements where it is in the national interest and can be bilaterally agreed'.
4.13In this light, the recent Qatar decision is perplexing and seemingly inconsistent with the direction canvassed in the Green Paper.
4.14Given the lack of clarity from the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government as to the reasons for declining Qatar's request, as well as directions from the minister's office to departmental officials not to answer key questions during the committee's hearing on 28September2023, it is unclear whether the policy aim of capacity ahead of demand was considered at all.
4.15The committee heard that all available routes under Australia's agreement with Qatar are being used to capacity, but Qatar Airways is prepared to provide additional services if the agreement were amended. It seems that demand is exceeding capacity, exacerbating the price of airfares, and urgent action should be taken to remedy this air service agreement. Qatar Airways advised the committee that it planned to commence the extra flights from 1 April 2023, but was forced to reallocate aircraft to other routes when no advice was provided by Australian Government officials regarding progress of their application.
4.16The committee welcomes increased competition in the aviation industry to create a more affordable aviation sector for travellers, and agrees with the views of witnesses that allowing more Qatar Airways flights into Australia would have placed downward pressure on airfares.
4.17In the committee's view, the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government has not provided a persuasive reason for the government's decision.
4.18The minister has said the decision was based on the national interest. But to the committee's knowledge, the minister has not clearly articulated the factors that informed her assessment of the national interest, nor set out how they were applied in this case. Moreover, a wide range of witnesses, including key stakeholders in Australian aviation, submitted that they did not fully understand the basis for the decision. Witnesses also conveyed the benefits that would apply if stakeholders were better informed about the decision, including the ability to make informed representations to government.
4.19Officials confirmed that the brief provided in January 2023 to the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government concerned a 'negotiating mandate' for consultations with Qatar. It has not been confirmed what the department specifically recommended in that brief, because the minister has made a claim of public interest immunity. However, the weight of evidence in this inquiry suggests to the committee that this brief recommended entering further negotiations with Qatari authorities on their application. This includes evidence from the CEO of Virgin Australia indicating that in January 2023 she understood that an increase in capacity was likely.
4.20Nonetheless, the minister decided in July 2023 not to conduct any further negotiations. The committee is of the view that given the minister ultimately refused to enter into negotiations, it appears she rejected her department's advice.
4.21The weight of evidence before the committee indicates the national interest would have been well served by agreeing to Qatar's request. The committee heard estimates that the decision resulted in a loss to the Australian economy of up to $1 billion. The decision was also a missed opportunity to support activity in tourism and to support trade, particularly agricultural exports that use passenger planes for high value freight. The committee was particularly concerned by evidence from farming organisations about the challenges industry faces exporting chilled meat without enough passenger flights to provide reliable, efficient and competitive freight opportunities to key markets. In addition, agreeing to Qatar's request could have provided welcome relief for Australians facing high airfares—especially in the context of cost of living pressures.
4.22Importantly, no evidence was provided that national security considerations were points of concern or factors in the minister's decision. It was revealed in evidence to the committee that the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts did not consult any other Australian Government agency on the Qatar Airways application, only Qantas and Virgin airlines.
4.23The committee expresses its deep concern at the appalling and unacceptable incident that occurred at Hamad International Airport in October 2020. The committee heard evidence that Qatari officials prosecuted those responsible and the Qatari Government has apologised. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials advised 'we have not put forward any recommendations in our travel advice in relation to Hamad International Airport' regarding ongoing concerns or warnings. Further, the department advised:
…we've tasked our officials, including our ambassador to Doha, to continue to engage with the Qatari authorities in support of the requests made by the women; that has been done on numerous occasions. The government of Qatar has given assurances to all travellers that such an incident will not occur. As the minister said, the Australian government is aware that some complainants have initiated legal proceedings following that appalling incident; it wouldn't be appropriate for us to go into that. The Qatari government put together a task force, and that task force has put together recommendations. They also put on trial the police captain involved in that terrible incident, and he was convicted and sentenced. My understanding is remedial actions were taken by the Qatari government and they have apologised, including at the prime ministerial level. They've repeatedly assured us that this is something that was an appalling and horrific incident, and that it won't happen again.
4.24The committee commends Qatar Airways for the service it provided to Australia during the COVID-19 pandemic in repatriating stranded Australians, freighting medical supplies and shipping Australian export product abroad. It also acknowledges the support of Qatar Airways in facilitating transportation during the political and humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan in 2021.
4.25The committee appreciates that bilateral air service agreements should be considered on a case-by-case basis, and requests for more liberal arrangements should be assessed for their benefits to the Australian economy and public, not be granted automatically. However, the committee considers that the Qatar Airways decision lacks merit and agrees with inquiry participants who urged the government to review it immediately. It has been confirmed by the department that a review of the decision by government is allowed for at any time.
4.26Qatar Airways expressed its desire for the minister's decision to be reviewed and approval for additional flights to be granted, which would enable the airline 'to operate before Christmas. We hope that we manage to do that.' When asked if it was still possible to deliver additional services to Australia if a review was undertaken and a quick decision was made, Qatar Airways stated: 'Yes, we hope so.'
4.27The committee recommends that the Australian Government immediately review its decision not to increase capacity under Australia's bilateral air services agreement with Qatar.
The decision making process
4.28Inquiry participants highlighted a range of relevant considerations that could apply to decisions about air service agreements. Foremost among these are economic costs and benefits, as well as how the agreement will affect competition in the aviation industry, tourism, trade industries, foreign policy, and Australia's regions.
4.29The committee is disappointed that the government has not clearly articulated how these factors were weighed in its decision.
4.30As outlined in chapter 2, the Senate ordered several ministers to produce documents that could have helped explain the reasoning for the government's decision. In response, the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government and the Minister for Foreign Affairs made claims of public interest immunity.
4.31The committee does not accept the reasoning in these claims and considers the government is obstructing much needed transparency about its decision making. It remains unclear to the committee the extent to which the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government consulted any ministerial colleagues—except for some level of discussion with the Minister for Foreign Affairs in January 2023—prior to making her decision on the Qatari request.
4.32The withholding of the ordered documents diminished the committee's ability to scrutinise the government's decision making process and reasoning on Qatar's request. It also meant that officials appearing at the committee's hearing declined to answer questions relating to the documents, which included a departmental brief provided to the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government on 9 January 2023 about Australia's approach to upcoming air service agreement negotiations, including with Qatar.
4.33The committee also holds serious concerns about the government's refusal to provide the contents of Qantas' submission to DITRDCA about Qatar's request. While the committee received a redacted version of this submission, it was provided by Qantas in confidence, not the government publicly.
4.34In addition, the committee notes the late submission of responses to questions taken on notice at the committee's hearing from all the departments which attended. These were the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts; the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet; the Treasury; and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. This has adversely affected the ability of the committee to consider their evidence when producing this report within the short timeframe set by the Senate for this inquiry.
4.35The committee sees merit in a proposal from the Productivity Commission that the government use transparent cost–benefit analysis for decisions relating to air service agreements. These analyses would be published and articulate how the government has assessed the range of interests that apply to the decision. The committee considers that this approach would support rigour in decision making and improve stakeholders' confidence in the process. In addition, given the critical importance of competition in the aviation sector, the committee sees a greater role for the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) to provide advice to government on decisions about air service agreements.
4.36Regarding consultation, the committee is concerned that the process followed by the government appears inadequate. The department consulted a group of 57 stakeholders to inform priorities on the government's negotiating program, but when it came to the specific request from Qatar, only Qantas and Virgin were consulted. Considering the economic implications of the government's approach to those negotiations with Qatar, the committee considers that the government should have consulted more widely.
4.37The committee agrees that consideration of bilateral air services agreement applications should involve consultation with key stakeholders including the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Treasury and the ACCC. Considering the evidence of economic benefits provided by a wide range of industry stakeholders, the committee is of the view this consultation should have occurred for the Qatar Airways' request.
4.38More generally, the committee is of the view that major decisions – such as those relating to bilateral air service agreements – should be publicly explained. This would be in the interests of transparency and enable key stakeholders to understand decisions and be better informed in their long term planning.
4.39The following recommendations are important for negotiations on all air service agreements, including processes that are currently underway with Vietnam and Türkiye.
4.40The committee recommends that when making decisions relating to bilateral air service agreements, the Australian Government have regard to a cost benefit analysis, consult widely with key stakeholders including the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, and publish a statement of reasons for decisions taken.
Australia's aviation industry
4.41The government published its Aviation Green Paper, Towards 2050, on 7September2023. Throughout the committee's hearings, various witnesses indicated they would provide submissions to that process to inform a subsequent White Paper. The committee is pleased that this process is underway and looks forward to meaningful reforms in the future.
4.42However, this inquiry has highlighted a range of pressing issues that should be dealt with sooner than the Green and White Paper process can facilitate. These issues are not limited to bilateral air service agreements and relate to the aviation industry more broadly. The committee presents its views on key matters below and urges the government to respond to these concerns with the urgency that they merit.
Competition in the aviation industry
4.43The weight of evidence in this inquiry indicated that there is not enough competition in Australia's domestic aviation industry, and this diminishes outcomes for Australians. As the ACCC said in its recent report on airline competition in Australia:
The duopoly market structure of the domestic airline industry has made it one of the most highly concentrated industries in Australia, other than natural monopolies. The lack of effective competition over the last decade has resulted in underwhelming outcomes for consumers in terms of airfares, reliability of services and customer service.
4.44The implications of the present duopoly are numerous. To take one example, the committee was concerned by evidence about the rate of cancellations by Qantas on certain routes, which it seems cannot be explained by poor weather or air traffic control issues. Rather, it seems these cancellations are possible because there is inadequate competition to drive more reliable services. These cancellations can cause major disruption for travellers who are already paying high prices for airfares—which is another symptom of the limited competition in aviation.
4.45The committee recognises that the effective duopoly in Australia's domestic aviation market requires close consideration and careful reform. Some of the recommendations made in this report will assist, including in relation to air service agreements and airport slot management. However, the committee is of the view that further action is also necessary.
4.46The government recently established a Competition Taskforce in Treasury to review competition laws, policies and institutions. Professor Rod Sims AO, who is part of an expert panel informing the taskforce, confirmed that the taskforce will provide information into the upcoming White Paper on aviation.
4.47In the committee's view, measures that would improve competition in the domestic aviation market should be a key focus of the Competition Taskforce, and inform any recommendations to the Treasurer and government from that process, in addition to feeding into the White Paper process. The Competition Taskforce is a valuable opportunity to enact meaningful reform to the status quo. Particular consideration should be given to divestiture powers as a remedy for any misuse of market power. Evidence to the committee about concentration in the Australian aviation market, including the fact that Qantas and Jetstar share the same ownership structure, raise concerns that should be addressed.
4.48The committee recommends that the Australian Government review reform options to strengthen competition in the domestic aviation industry, including potential divestiture powers to remedy any misuse of market power.
4.49As an immediate step, the committee is firmly of the view that the ACCC should continue monitoring airline competition in Australia and publishing regular reports, as it has done for the past three years. The committee is concerned that the reports were allowed to conclude. These reports provide valuable information for aviation stakeholders, which can be used to inform potential changes. The reports also provide timely insights and policy proposals to government on the state of competition in the aviation sector, which the committee considers to be of high importance amidst present cost of living pressures.
4.50On 12 September 2023 Senators Dean Smith and Bridget McKenzie introduced a bill that would largely replicate the previous direction and require the ACCC to report on its monitoring at least once every quarter. The committee supports this bill and recommends its urgent passage to ensure that the state of competition continues to be monitored.
4.51The committee recommends that in order to reinstate monitoring of the airline industry by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, the Senate urgently pass the Competition and Consumer Amendment (Continuing ACCC Monitoring of Domestic Airline Competition) Bill 2023.
4.52As well as this broad monitoring of competition in aviation, the committee would support a specific investigation by the ACCC into Qantas' actions in the aviation market. The committee is concerned by evidence suggesting Qantas may be especially aggressive when seeking to maintain its market share. This muscular approach towards competitors and new entrants can compound the problems that are already caused by a lack of competition.
4.53The committee agrees that the Qantas group have significant steps to take to repair trust with Australian consumers. The committee expects tangible improvements regarding their behaviour toward their customers.
4.54The committee recommends that the Australian Government direct the Australian Competition and Consumer Committee to conduct an inquiry into potential anti-competitive behaviour in the domestic aviation market.
Frequent flyers
4.55The committee heard serious concerns about the state of consumer protections in aviation. This includes over 100 individuals who raised concerns about their experience with the Qantas frequent flyer program, especially the (lack of) value of their points. Other issues have also been well-publicised, such as trouble for consumers accessing flight credits or recent court action initiated by the ACCC against Qantas for allegedly advertising flights that it had already cancelled.
4.56The committee recognises that airline flight credits do not always provide value for money and can lead to additional out of pocket expenses from consumers at the time of redemption.
4.57As a result of the committee raising the issue, Qantas expressed a willingness to engage with submitters who expressed concerns about their experience with Qantas' frequent flyer program, and work to resolve their concerns. In order to protect those submitters' privacy, the committee did not provide their contact information to Qantas. Instead, the committee sought appropriate contact details from Qantas and provided them to the submitters so that they may contact Qantas if they wish. The committee considers it incumbent on Qantas to work constructively with these submitters to arrive at a satisfactory outcome. Further, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ought to monitor these processes carefully to ensure consumer rights are protected.
Consumer protections
4.58Regarding consumer protections more broadly, an industry based‑scheme, the Aviation Consumer Advocate, is already in place. However, on the evidence before it, the committee agrees with the ACCC's assessment that the Aviation Consumer Advocate is 'generally ineffective'.
4.59Australians expect an aviation industry that is reliable, safe and affordable. Consumers should be able to rely on their flight to take off and land on time, their bag to arrive at their destination with them and to feel safe when travelling.
4.60Australians count on reliable air services to see friends and family, conduct business, travel, and attend medical appointments. It is vitally important that effective protections are available to them when things go wrong.
4.61Of course, it would be preferable if these protections did not need to be called upon. However, evidence in this inquiry highlights genuine and current concerns for consumers. Indeed, some inquiry participants suggested that making improvements elsewhere—such as in domestic competition and slot management at Sydney airport—could improve outcomes for consumers. The committee is also optimistic about this, but considers that improved consumer protections have a key role to play.
4.62The committee is drawn to schemes that exist in North America and Europe which provide compensation for consumers whose flights are significantly delayed or cancelled. Not only would this provide some remedy for consumers, it would also more strongly incentivise airlines to avoid such problems in the first place. The proposal seems particularly apt for Australia's domestic market, where competition is lower compared to the international market.
4.63The committee also sees potential in a new independent ombudsman to provide support for consumers, investigate complaints, and be empowered to make binding decisions similar to ombudsmen in other industries.
4.64In the committee's view, the ACCC should be closely engaged in progressing consumer protection reforms. Its Chair, Ms Gina Cass-Gottlieb, highlighted several areas for potential reform, including consumer guarantees, unfair trading practices, and an external independent ombudsman. These matters should be pursued with urgency to ensure that the benefits are enjoyed by consumers as soon as reasonably practicable. This process should not be delayed by the White Paper process.
4.65The committee recommends that the Australian Government develop and implement consumer protection reforms as soon as reasonably practicable to address significant delays, cancellations, lost baggage and devaluation of loyalty programs.
Management of airport slots
4.66The committee is concerned by evidence regarding airport slot management, including allegations of slot hoarding, especially at Sydney Airport.
4.67A small number of airlines are taking up most of the slots at Sydney Airport, which comes at the expense of other competitors and new entrants. This drives down competition, which in turn has a negative effect for the consumer and ultimately the economy. Considering the vital role of Sydney Airport in Australia's aviation networks, it is imperative that a diverse range of airlines can access slots in a fair and appropriate way.
4.68The committee is not satisfied that current arrangements for airport slot management are working well. Existing processes do not align with the Worldwide Airport Slot Guidelines. There also appear to be inefficiencies in current arrangements, such as the way in which the cap on flights per hour is applied.
4.69The committee was repeatedly advised by inquiry participants that valuable work on airport slot management was completed in the 2021 Review of the Sydney Airport Demand Management Scheme by Mr Peter Harris AO. As discussed in Chapter 3, considerable work was undertaken by the department over the period between handing down of Mr Harris' recommendations in February2021 and February 2022, including 25technical working group meetings involving a wide range of Sydney Airport stakeholders, including airlines, the slot manager, government agencies, community and local government representatives, to provide advice on specific proposals to give effect to the recommendations of the review of the Sydney Airport Demand Management Scheme. Regarding that review, the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government said on 7September2023:
The Government is considering the recommendations from the Review of the Sydney Airport Demand Management Scheme, an independent review prepared by Mr. Peter Harris AO. We have recently concluded targeted consultation regarding potential changes to the Scheme, with a particular eye to modernising the slot allocation framework and strengthening compliance measures to ensure that slots are not being misused by airlines. I will have more announcements to make about these reforms in due course.
4.70The committee considers that action to implement the Harris Review recommendations is urgently needed and certainly cannot wait for the conclusion of the Green Paper and White Paper processes. Improving airport slot management at Sydney Airport is a key part of improving competition in Australia's aviation industry, which will in turn have benefits for consumers and the economy more broadly. Given the urgency of the matter, the committee is concerned about the minister's inaction on the review's recommendations.
4.71The committee recommends that the Australian Government urgently respond to the Review of the Sydney Airport Demand Management Scheme including the Mr Peter Harris AO recommendations to improve airport slot management and strengthen the 'use it or lose it' rule.
4.72The committee also heard concerns regarding a proposal to legislate a demand management scheme for Brisbane Airport, including imposition of a curfew and cap aircraft movements to 45 per hour.
4.73Evidence presented to the committee indicated that such arrangements could disadvantage regional airports and access to aviation services across regional Queensland as a capacity constrained Brisbane Airport would provide preference to larger international and capital city flights. The committee shares these concerns and would not support legislation to implement a demand management scheme for Brisbane Airport.
Current staffing issues for air traffic controllers
4.74The committee is aware that the current shortage of air traffic controllers has contributed, among other factors, to cancellations and delays at airports in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Perth. It is positive that in order to address this, Airservices Australia has opened its training pipeline and will have an additional 72 air traffic controllers in the system by the end of the year. The committee remains concerned about the effects being experienced by the travelling public.
Air cabotage arrangements
4.75The committee notes that the ACCC flagged in its final report on airline competition in Australia that removing cabotage restrictions could potentially promote competition. The committee agrees with the suggestion put forward by Professor Rod Sims that changes could be considered on either a case by case or route by route basis, subject to commercial considerations by the airlines.
4.76The committee recommends that the Australian Government consider introducing limited cabotage for foreign airlines to regional airports.
Security screening at regional airports
4.77The committee appreciates the importance of regional airports to Australia's aviation networks. Without these airports and their associated services, the many benefits of aviation would not extend to regional Australia.
4.78It is therefore critical to ensure that these airports are appropriately supported. The committee was concerned by evidence suggesting that regional airports can struggle to meet the financial and personnel burden imposed by enhanced security requirements. This is largely because they lack the economies of scale that benefit larger airports. Recognising that the security requirements are important, the committee considers that the government should consider further support for regional airports.
Extended inquiry to hear from key witnesses
4.79The Senate set less than five weeks for the committee to conduct this inquiry. In that time the committee received a wealth of evidence and made the above recommendations to improve air service agreements and aviation in this country. However, that short timeframe did not allow the committee to gather all the evidence it was seeking.
4.80It transpired that during the short window of the inquiry, key witnesses were overseas and unavailable to provide evidence. This includes the former Chief Executive Officer of Qantas, Mr Alan Joyce AC, who led Qantas at the time of Qatar's request and the government's decision to refuse it. A key matter for the committee has been to examine the extent of any influence exerted by Qantas and/or Mr Joyce over the government's decisions in aviation policy, including the decision to decline the Qatari request and the decision to end ACCC monitoring of domestic airlines. The committee has also been examining broader issues in Australia's aviation industry, and MrJoyce played a key role in that industry over recent years. Despite lengthy questioning of the Qantas Chair and new Chief Executive Officer, there were questions unable to be satisfactorily answered for which the evidence suggests Mr Joyce will likely hold the answers. In addition, Qantas officials were unable to answer questions regarding the extent and content of lobbying of ministers, ministerial offices and departments by its government affairs staff.
4.81In addition, Qantas officials present were unable to answer questions regarding the extent and content of lobbying of ministers, ministerial offices and departments by its government affairs staff. Qantas chose to appear before the inquiry without any member of their extensive government affairs division available to answer the committee's questions. As a result, Qantas representatives took specific questions about the company's lobbying activities on notice and responded to specific questions with generalities. If the committee is to understand the role that lobbying and private discussions played in the Government's decision it will be necessary to hear from these government affairs representatives of Qantas.
4.82The committee considers that its deliberations would benefit greatly from evidence that certain key witnesses could provide.
4.83For procedural reasons that apply in this particular circumstance, it is not practicable for the committee's inquiry to be extended.
4.84In order to allow an opportunity for the committee to receive evidence from key witnesses, the committee is of the view that the Senate should re-establish the select committee to receive that evidence. The committee could then provide the Senate with any updated conclusions by way of a final report.
4.85The committee recommends that the Senate adopt the following resolution:
That—
(a) the Select Committee on Commonwealth Bilateral Air Service Agreements, appointed by resolution of the Senate on 5 September 2023, as amended on 7 September 2023, be reappointed on the same terms, except as otherwise provided by this resolution, so that the committee may:
(i) receive evidence at a public hearing from:
(1) witnesses who were unavailable prior to the committee's original reporting date, including MrAlanJoyce AC;
(2) government affairs representatives from Qantas, noting that Qantas' answers to questions on notice from senators were unsatisfactory,
(ii) report on any matters arising relevant to the committee's terms of reference; and
(b) the committee or any subcommittee have the power to consider and make use of the evidence and records of the select committee appointed on 5September2023;
(c) senators who were members or participating members of the previous select committee are appointed to the new committee; and
(d) the committee report by 29 November 2023.
4.86In addition, the committee sought clarity from the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts on engagements and discussions the minister had held between January 2023 and July 2023 that may have influenced her decision on the Qatar Airways application. This included a meeting between the minister and Mr Alan Joyce on or around 23 January 2023. Having sought advice from the minister's office, department officials advised that 'any requests in relation to outcomes that the minister had will need to be directed to the minister directly'.Under further questioning on the nature of that response, department officials read a text message received during the hearing after seeking advice from the minister's office:
The text message I received is: 'MO view is it is not for the department to answer re the minister's diary. The question should be directed to the minister.'
4.87In consideration of this evidence, on 28 September 2023 the committee invited the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, theHonCatherineKingMP, to give evidence to the committee at a public hearing. Given the ambiguity about the reasons for the Government's decision to decline Qatar's request, the committee considers it vital that it receive evidence from her directly.
4.88At the time of drafting this report, the committee is yet to receive a response from the minister to the invitation. This is despite media reporting that the minister has said she will not attend. On 3 October 2023 it was reported that the minister said '[i]t is long-standing practice that House of Representatives members do not appear before Senate committees.'
4.89It was also reported that the Prime Minister, the Hon Anthony Albanese MP, said on 3 October 2023 that 'no House of Representatives member has ever appeared before a senate inquiry'. He also reportedly said that '[m]inisters do not appear. No ministers in the former government did. Everyone knows that who follows the [S]enate'.
4.90However, there is precedent for a minister from the House of Representatives to give evidence at a public hearing of a Senate committee. On 31 January 2014, theHon Scott Morrison MP, then Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, voluntarily gave evidence at a public hearing of the Legal and Constitutional References Committee for its inquiry into a claim of public interest immunity raised over documents. The Hon Ross Free MP, then Ministerfor Science and Technology in the Keating Government also attended a Senate committee hearing in 1992.
4.91To facilitate the attendance of the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government at a public hearing of a re‑established committee (as recommended above), the committee makes the following recommendation.
4.92The committee recommends that the Senate request the House of Representatives to require the attendance of the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, theHonCatherineKingMP, before the re-established Select Committee on Commonwealth Bilateral Air Service Agreements to provide public evidence.
Senator the Hon Bridget McKenzie
Chair