Chapter 5 - Regulation and Integrity

  1. Regulation and Integrity

Overview

5.1Australia’s regulatory and legislative framework needs to keep pace with the changing landscape of international education to ensure sector integrity, improve student experience and be effective in an environment transformed by the experiences of the COVID-19 pandemic.

5.2This chapter begins by setting out the legislative frameworks of relevance to the inquiry. The remainder of the chapter expands on the major concerns and proposals raised in evidence to ensure integrity of the sector, safeguard the welfare of international students studying in Australia, and preserve Australia’s international reputation for quality education.

5.3Over the course of the inquiry, the media broke stories about alleged people trafficking in the Australian international education sector, and of ongoing criminal and government investigations of serious exploitation and abuse of international students, in which education agents and education providers were implicated.[1]Consequently, some hearings and the resulting evidence concerned the relevant and pressing discussions on the issue of exploitation.[2]

5.4Many of the issues raised intersect with ongoing Government work. As referenced elsewhere in this report, the Government’s Migration System for Australia’s Future Review[3] will include a significant overhaul of the student visa system and the Department of Education advised that a rolling Education Services for Overseas Students (ESOS) legislative reform will be undertaken to continue to align to and support visa integrity. Other issues raised in evidence include a return of the capped working hours condition to the student visa have since been implemented by Government.[4]

5.5This chapter discusses:

  • the need for better intergovernmental infrastructure to enable timely and effective data and information sharing across the various agencies that regulate the sector
  • the need for the sector to work together to share information across the sector to inform their own risk management and enhance information sharing with Government to uphold the integrity and reputation of the sector
  • loopholes and serious vulnerabilities in the current system that are allowing the exploitation of students and misuse of the education sector and student visa system
  • challenges in the management of third-party entities in the recruitment of students both on and offshore.

Australia’s regulatory environment

5.6Most international education competitor countries, including United Kingdom (UK), United States of America (USA), Canada and New Zealand do not offer the same degree of tuition protection and legally mandated obligations for education providers specific to international students that Australia offers.[5] Australia’s legislative framework helps safeguard and promote Australia’s international education reputation.[6]

5.7The committee heard from English Australia who surmised that Australia possessed a mature and advanced regulatory approach to international education.[7] English Australia pointed to global recognition such as Singapore's Strategy for Global Schoolhouse: A Review, in which Australia's regulation of international education is applauded as a best practice example, highlighting Australia's strict quality standards, effective regulation, and comprehensive student support services as key factors in attracting international students.[8]

5.8The Department of Education stated that ‘Australia’s world-class legislative framework is another feature that attracts and retains international students.[9] In addition the Department of Education highlighted the following:

To ensure the framework can best support the sector’s recovery, improve student experience and be effective in an environment changed by the experiences of the COVID-19 pandemic, the department will continue to draw on consultations with the sector and regulators to inform an ongoing program of reform including quality and student experience elements.[10]

5.9ASQA informed the committee that there are opportunities to consider further controls to reduce the flow of business to unscrupulous agents and afford the sector greater protection to mitigate risk to students and the sector’s reputation for quality.[11]

The Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (ESOS Act)

5.10All education providers that teach international or ‘overseas’ students (defined as a person holding a Subclass 500 student visa[12]) must in addition to regulations specific to their sector comply with those set out under the Education Services for Overseas Students Act 2000 (ESOS Act) and associated instruments and the relevant regulations under the Migration Act 1958 and associated legislation.

5.11The Australian Government, through the Department of Education, administers theEducation Services for Overseas Students Act 2000(ESOS Act) and its associated instruments.[13] The ESOS Act sets out the legal framework governing delivery of education to international students in Australia on a student visa. The ESOS legislative framework is designed to support visa integrity and the Migration Act 1958 and its associated regulationswhich is the legislative basis governing the regulation of student visas.

5.12One of the ESOS framework’s core objectives is to support visa integrity, the legislation, policy, assessment, and regulation of student visas is the responsibility of the Department of Home Affairs and is in the portfolio of the Minister for Home Affairs. The Department of Home Affairs regulates the conduct of registered migration agents through the Office of the Migration Agents Registration Authority (OMARA).

5.13The ESOS framework governs the registration process and obligations of registered international education providers, the Tuition Protection Service and enforcement and compliance arrangements for education providers.[14] Under the ESOS legislative framework is the Education Services for Overseas Student (ESOS) Regulations 2019 supporting the implementation of the ESOS Act.

5.14The National Code of Practice for Providers of Education and Training to Overseas Students 2018 (National Code) provides nationally consistent standards for the conduct of registered providers and the registration of their courses. The National Code standards set out requirements and procedures to ensure providers of education and training courses to international students can clearly understand and comply with their obligations.

5.15Under the ESOS Act, international students can only enrol and study in Australia on a student visa with education providers registered under the ESOS Act and listed on the Commonwealth Register of Institutions and Courses for Overseas Students (CRICOS).[15]The Education Services for Overseas Students (Registration Charges) Act 1997 imposes provider registration charges in relation to CRICOS.

5.16The ESOS Act allows international students access to an Australian education by operating in conjunction with domestic education frameworks, including: the Australian Qualifications Framework (AQF); the Higher Education Support Act 2003; the National Vocational Education and Training Regulator Act 2011; the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency Act 2011; the Australian Education Act 2013; the Higher Education Standards Framework 2021; and other state and territory school legislation.

5.17In essence, the ESOS framework holds the door open for international students on student visas to enjoy domestic legislative protections.

5.18Additionally, under the ESOS legislative framework are:

  • English Language Intensive Courses (ELICOS) Standards, an enforceable legislative instrument under the ESOS Act. The ELICOS Standards provide a basis on which regulatory authorities can register a provider on the Commonwealth Register of Institutions and Courses for Overseas Students (CRICOS), under the ESOS Act, to deliver an ELICOS course. ELICOS providers wanting to be registered on CRICOS need to meet the Standards.
  • Foundation Program Standards which govern foundation programs and courses that are ‘pathway’ or ‘bridging’ courses for international students to progress to entry into higher education programs in Australia. The Foundation Standards provide a basis on which regulatory authorities can register a provider on the Commonwealth Register of Institutions and Courses for Overseas Students (CRICOS), under the ESOS Act, to deliver a Foundation course. Foundation providers wanting to be registered on CRICOS need to meet the Foundation Standards.
  • Tuition Protection Service (TPS) assists international and domestic students if their education provider closes, stops offering their course, fails to start their course or discontinues units of study they are enrolled in. It is primarily funded by a levy paid by the education providers of the students it is designed to assist.
  • TPS is given effect through theEducation Services for Overseas Students (TPS Levies) Act 2012which contains provisions to require providers to pay fees and levies to fund the TPS, and Education Services for Overseas Students (Calculation of Refund) Specification 2014 which enables the TPS to consider refunds to international students if the provider defaults or the student’s visa application is refused.
    1. International students in Australia are covered by Australian law common to those that protect Australian residents and citizens such as the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, the Fair Work Act2009, and others.

Regulators

Higher Education

5.20Higher education providers are subject to regulatory requirements including those stemming from the Higher Education Support Act 2003 (HESA) and Higher Education Standards Framework (Threshold Standards) and the Australian Qualifications Framework (AQF).[16]

5.21The Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA) is Australia’s independent national quality assurance and regulatory agency for higher education established under the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Act 2011. TEQSA is the ESOS agency for all higher education providers (within the meaning of the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency Act 2011) across Australia.[17]

Vocational Education and Training (VET)

5.22Vocational Education and Training (VET) legislation and associated instruments include the National Vocational Education and Training Regulator Act 2011 (NVETR Act). Standards for Registered Training Organisations (RTOs) 2015, National Vocational Education and Training Regulator (Data Provision Requirements) Instrument 2020.

5.23National standards for VET are agreed by the Australian Government and state and territory governments through the Ministerial Council. Many of these standards are implemented as legislative instruments under the NVETR Act.

5.24The national regulator for VET established under the NVETR Act is the Australian Skills Quality Authority (ASQA). ASQA's regulation of Australia's vocational education and training sector is supported by a framework of legislation and standards. ASQA’s oversight of VET providers who enrol international students is enabled through ASQA’s designated authority under the ESOS Act. ASQA is the ESOS agency for all National VET Regulator (NVR) registered training organisations (within the meaning of the National Vocational Education and Training Regulatory Act 2011) in all states and territories.[18]

English Language Intensive Courses (ELICOS)

5.25ASQA is the ESOS agency for providers of English Language Intensive Courses for Overseas Students (ELICOS) programs in all states and territories except where a provider delivers the program:

  • in the capacity of a school
  • in the capacity of a higher education provider
  • under an Entry Arrangement[19] with at least one higher education provider.
    1. TEQSA is the ESOS agency for:
  • all foundation programs
  • all ELICOS delivered by a higher education provider
  • all providers delivering ELICOS programs under an Entry Arrangement[20] with at least one higher education provider.

Schools

5.27The Secretary of the Department of Education and their designates are the ESOS agency for all schools. The state and territory authorities’ role are to recommend school providers for registration and monitor schools’ compliance under the ESOS Act.

Other entities and agencies

5.28The Department of Home Affairs and the Australian Border Force are key international education regulators as they hold regulatory powers under the Migration Act 1958 and associated legislation which governs student and post graduate work visa conditions and are responsible for visa regulation.[21]

5.29The Department of Home Affairs regulates and registers migration agents through OMARA. Department of Home Affairs detailed that OMARA has a total of nineteen staff who look at professional standards and the investigations team of thirteen full time equivalent staff to regulate almost 5,000 registered migration agents.[22]

5.30The Overseas Students Ombudsman investigates complaints about private education and training institutions in Australia. The Ombudsman’s services are free, independent, and impartial. The Overseas Students Ombudsman (OSO) investigates individual complaints about the actions or decisions of private registered education providers in connection with intending, current or former overseas students; works with private registered education providers to promote best practice handling of overseas students’ complaints and reports on trends and broader issues that arise from complaint investigations.[23]

Issues

Data sharing and communication

5.31A range of agencies and regulators at different levels of government operate in the international education sector. Australian Government agencies have distinct and separate responsibilities cutting across education, immigration, employment, and marketing, with little incentive, or established conduits, to consider the sector on a holistic basis. Decisions made in one policy space may have broader sectoral and economy wide implications.[24]

5.32Currently, the Department of Education’s Provider Registration and International Student Management System (PRISMS) can be accessed by the Department of Home Affairs, and the regulators, TEQSA and ASQA to allow officers to check on student data contained and collected through the system. Providers and their agents have access to PRISMS to add to and access their own PRISMS data holdings.

5.33The Quality Indicators for Learning and Teaching (QILT) survey is a source of valuable information on student experience, including their experience with education agents. University of New South Wales claimed that QILT’s student experience surveys have been ‘an absolute gift to the sector in focusing minds on evidence around the student experience.’[25] The Social Research Centre considered that some of the questions in the surveys could be adapted, especially to gather more nuanced evidence on student interactions with education agents.[26]

5.34Department of Home Affairs spoke of the Education Regulators and Immigration Committee (ERIC) a small existing interagency group set up by the Department of Home Affairs to discuss observed visa risk information within the confines of ERIC with the Department of Education, TEQSA and ASQA.[27]

5.35The Committee heard that the evidence base appears fragmented, with different datasets measuring different aspects of the sector and no obvious platform to support a wholeofgovernment approach to policy development, evaluation or holistic data sharing. Monash University suggested there was an essential need for greater cross-government and jurisdiction coordination to ‘remove regulatory rigidities, overlap and communication variations from all the agencies with a stake in international education to ensure that the various legislative frameworks that apply to international education are in alignment.’[28]

5.36ASQA considered better connectivity across government is needed to enhance sharing intelligence and information.[29] ASQA suggested that such an approach should be based on a firm footing around governance with clear roles and responsibilities on how work is undertaken.[30] The Department of Education considered that information shared earlier would be able to assist regulatory action, whether it is criminal action, or education quality action.[31]

5.37Griffith University informed the committee that if there were more proactive sharing, it would strengthen Australia's student visa settings and integrity. Griffith University was aware of recent calls for the further regulation of recruitment agents and recognised that the management of recruitment agents is a core component of a robust visa regime and support a diverse international student community.[32] Before looking at further regulation and associated compliance obligations, Griffith University recommended that there be greater transparency and sharing of agent data from the Department of Home Affairs to providers to assist them to better assess agent behaviour and performance, not just the institutions but across the sector.[33]

5.38The Department of Education supported joined up engagement between the Department of Education, Department of Home Affairs and the regulators because some of the activity is often through criminal channels, and it is through ABF and other investigative arms of the Department of Home Affairs that information is drawn to the attention of the Department and regulators.[34]

5.39ASQA called for more opportunities to embed and enhance a joined-up connectedness and shared that the agency is focused on leveraging a systemic connectedness across government and law enforcement of data and intelligence pointing to the demonstration of Operation Inglenook, the Australian Border Force (ABF) led multidisciplinary, multi-agency task force.[35]

That is where having that opportunity to have that connectedness, information, intelligence, and data-sharing across government really helps us have a better understanding of where individuals might be located. But it might also be the case that it's not within our powers to deal with those individuals, and we need to rely on and engage with other agencies and other law enforcement to support that work.[36]

5.40Monash University considered that coordination needs to be undertaken at the federal level, including Department of Education, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, Department of Industry Science and Resources, Department of Home Affairs, TEQSA and ASQA. This coordination should then feed into alignment of ESOS legislative framework and the Migration Act.[37]

Student visa applications and recruitment

5.41Despite strong signs of recovery post Covid-19, Navitas, an Australian company who supports international students to transition to a higher learning environment, identified long term impacts for the sector. Within the Australia’s student recruitment and admission infrastructure, Navitas saw a weakness and dilution due to staff retrenchment and cutbacks over the past two years including loss of expertise in the field.[38] This mirrored broader staff retrenchment and cutbacks throughout the education sector. Further loss through lack of access in source countries, and the closure or take-overs of in-country recruitment agencies has meant there has been instabilities introduced all along the student recruitment chain.

5.42Nous Group research found that pursuit of volume (number of international students recruited) had primacy for most providers. Their research identified increasing pressures to diversify the sources of their international students was leading to a choice for education providers to upscale internal recruitment staff or using agents and sub-contractors.[39]

5.43Many witnesses identified the uncapping of allowable work hours for international students applied as a COVID-19 measure, became a driver of fraudulent student visa applications from people seeking to get into Australia on a student visa and work full time, corrupting the student recruitment pipeline. Navitas saw an increasing number of student visa applicants gaining student visas for the purposes of work, with the student visa representing a low cost, de-facto work visa whilst full work rights existed.Navitas believed this undermined the integrity of the student visa in some sectors.[40]

5.44International Education Association of Australia (IEAA) felt that even though the cap had been reinstated, the flow on impact of the uncapped change would continue for some time as the non-genuine students who got in to work full time would be in the education system for some time, and there would be those who are still attempting to get in, and then there is potential continuation of pressure on genuine students to work more and study less, leading to them to be either in breach, to fail or to move to a less onerous course on shore.[41] IEAA found that another effect of uncapping the work hours was that many genuine students have come under mental health pressure from family back home to abandon study to work full time and remit monies back home to support families that were economically hard hit by the pandemic.[42]

5.45IEAA pointed to the jump in Nepalese student applications for the NSW education sector during the uncapped work period, which moved Nepal with a population of twenty-seven million, ahead of India with a population of over a billion people, on the list of total student application numbers.[43]

5.46The Department of Home Affairs conceded that ‘the reality is that we have seen a series of vulnerabilities across the full spectrum of the visa program.’[44] In particular, the Department of Home Affairs commented:

I think the struggle that we have is the demarcation between what we can do onshore and what happens offshore, which we have heard about today as well. In the department, we obviously look at student visas through the lens of students that are here, currently, meeting their visa conditions, plus students that need to arrive into the country from their country of origin.[45]

Simplified Student Visa Framework (SSVF)

5.47The Simplified Student Visa Framework (SSVF) introduced on 1 July 2016 intended to streamline student and temporary visas and make available a single Student Visa (Subclass 500). For international student recruitment, the SSVF moved key evidentiary proofs of a student’s visa application from the Department of Home Affairs to education providers. When issuing a Confirmation of Enrolment (CoE) to a student, providers are required to validate and check applying students’ English language levels, their financial capacity to support themselves and their academic suitability for the courses for which they were applying.

5.48Under the SSVF, students who are able to provide CoEs from education providers with a good immigration compliance record as part of their visa application receive more streamlined visa processing and need to provide less evidence to support their visa application.[46] The Department of Home Affairs stated that the evidence level rating under the Simplified Student Visa Framework (SSVF) dictates the financial and English language evidence level needed to be provided by a student in their visa application.[47] In 2016–17, 85 per cent of total applications where the applicant was outside Australia were processed under streamlined evidentiary requirements.[48]

5.49The SSVF introduced a country and provider risk model to guide evidence requirements for students. Under the SSVF risk matrix, an education provider is responsible for the immigration outcomes of students they recruit offshore, even if the student chooses to change providers onshore (what is termed as a ‘trailing risk’).[49] Some submitters proposed that Australia should adjust the system so the ‘trailing risk’ followed the student when they changed providers, or that it at least be shared. Home Affairs would not provide comment on the potential merits of such proposed changes.

5.50Many education providers pass the SSVF assessment onto education agents to screen students during offshore recruitment interviews. Education agents assess the English language, financial evidence and often this assessment work includes agents conducting background profiling of students to determine their future intentions with regards to post-graduate work and migration opportunities for compliance with Genuine Temporary Entrant (GTE) requirements.[50]

5.51Evidence to the Committee detailed how providers and education agents often drafted GTE letters and evidence for prospective students. Most providers and education agents at minimum offer guides and templates to students to instruct them on how to respond to the GTE requirement.

5.52Under SSVF, providers seeking to access the benefits of lower evidentiary requirements and faster visa processing, have a key role in vetting the students they are seeking to enrol.[51] The due diligence to check a prospective students English language level, their financial capacity to study and live in Australia, and their ability to study the course that they are applying to study in, is carried out by education agents who are paid a commission for every student recruited, and often bonuses if they can recruit bulk numbers of students to providers, and by education providers who receive substantial international student fee revenue.

Student recruitment, study, and work

5.53Predatory practices by international student recruitment agencies (education agents) have been a concern in Australia.[52] These practices can include misleading advertisements, false promises of guaranteed visas or employment, exorbitant fees, and inadequate support for students' welfare. Such practices can exploit vulnerable students, mislead them about educational opportunities and outcomes, and lead to financial and emotional distress.[53]

5.54Evidence described at the recruitment stage, issues of active collusion between non-genuine students, agents, and education providers to subvert the student visa system, including provision of fraudulent documentation on qualifications, English language levels and student finances. Education agents directing genuine students to take up courses that are unsuitable for the student, but profitable for the agent in commissions and the provider in recruitment numbers. ISANA saw a lot of problems with students being given misinformation, resulting in students leaving their primary course and course hopping.[54]

5.55A post graduate student offered the following comment as to how some international students feel they are treated:

I would say some of the people working in the international education sector have the mindset of treating us international students like a product instead of people who are coming here to study. I think that's something fundamentally that affects lots of people's decisions, and also organisations as well.[55]

5.56Navitas alleged that current visa settings protect onshore providers who ‘poach’ students as their ‘provider risk rating’ is not impacted by non-compliance of onshore transferring students. The trailing risk remains with the provider who recruited the student offshore, despite the student no longer being with them onshore.[56] Southern Cross University see some education agents using universities who have attracted students to Australia to access onshore students and divert them to other, cheaper providers. This has a commission incentive attached to those second-tier institutions, but it also leaves universities holding the trailing visa risk.[57]

5.57IEAA highlighted an issue where agents are making money out of double commissions paid by the student. Hon Phil Honeywood provided the following example:

The other danger in all of this is that we are aware, for example, of offshore agents who will have their cousin running the onshore operation. So it becomes a fully vertically integrated business model that the offshore agent gets the student initially and then the student arrives, using public university as a Trojan horse. Often quality private providers are a Trojan horse to get the student visa. When they arrive in Australia, they then have been organised by the cousin here who's the onshore agent to then direct the student to another provider so that the company or the vertically integrated business model picks up two commissions. It picks the commission up from the initial provider that has done the offshore recruitment and then picks up a further commission from redirecting that student to another provider subsequently, usually after about five or six months.[58]

5.58Migration Institute of Australia considered that if registered migration agents, financial advisers all have to disclose commissions, why should education agents be any different.[59] What ITECA have looked at is an arrangement where not only the fees are disclosed but there's a schedule of other necessary arrangements which are made very clear to both the student and the provider and are readily discoverable by Government, such as the health insurance; a copy of the agreement between the student and the agent, whether that be an onshore agent or an offshore agent; and transparency of any third party agreements.[60]

5.59Navitas expressed the opinion that unscrupulous providers and agents sought to exploit policy settings, which in turn is resulting in negative downstream effects for high-quality international education providers, including onshore movement of students. IEAA echoed this concern, pointing to issues in Tasmania where IEAA saw twenty private providers set up in Tasmania to offer vocational diplomas called 'the diploma of leadership'.[61]

5.60Victorian TAFE Association (VTA) argued that ‘most private for-profit training institutions have been able to respond to changing enrolment patterns, with lower cost structures and more flexible work conditions’. VTA emphasised the role that some private for-profit institutions are playing in facilitating exploitation of students, charging low student fees, and turning a blind eye to student non-attendance at classes. This behaviour fuelled by uncapping of work hours for international students.[62]

5.61The Language Academy also noted some problems with are evident with some private for-profit education providers.

…they (non-genuine students) opt to move to schools where attendance is not taken properly, the academic level is not good enough, and you have a student living here for 10 years but they can't even speak English very well and they have no academic goals.[63]

5.62Australian Academy of Vocational Education and Trades (AAVET) shared the following:

We refer to them as 'ghost schools', because there are very few students to be seen. I've walked into a few, looking at hiring premises. You will see teachers at desks, on computers, in empty classrooms.[64]

5.63Mr Kyle Jardue argued that perversely, ‘ghost students’ are a valuable income source for colleges, who receive the fees but do not have to provide the tuition, he related being told the college he worked for did not report ghost students because ‘you get a reputation’, which meant that education agents would not send any students to colleges who reported non-attendance by students.[65]

5.64Professor Dawkins from Jobs and Skills Australia commented that many of the international students studying VET courses are in the management and commerce areas. Professor Dawkins observed that:

Commercial cookery is in there, but things like leadership, management and business are highly prevalent in the VET courses that students do, mostly in private providers. The VET system is very different from higher ed. Higher ed is predominantly in universities; the VET international students are predominantly in private providers, and they're mostly doing those management and leadership-type courses, and it's not clear that they are a particularly strong pathway into areas of skills shortage in Australia.[66]

5.65While most training providers demonstrate the capability and commitment to deliver quality VET outcomes, ASQA is acutely aware of a number of risks associated with international VET and ELICOS delivery including those that can arise from criminal activity in the form of collusion between unscrupulous, non-genuine providers and unethical education agents, motivated by visa fraud.[67]

5.66ASQA noted that this type of criminal activity can inflict significant harm on students, on confidence in an otherwise dedicated and committed sector and damage Australia’s reputation for quality educational outcomes.[68] Vocational Education and Training (VET) students are vulnerable to being taken advantage of by unregulated education agents or their subcontractors offering courses and pathways to permanent residency, which is often a key feature of what people are after.[69]

5.67As of 30 June 2023, ASQA informed the Committee that there were a total of 932 CRICOS registered providers.

5.68ASQA provided the Committee with the number of CRICOS applications received over the last two financial years which showed an upward trend. See table below:

Table 5.1CRICOS applications

Year

1st quarter

2nd quarter

3rd quarter

4th quarter

Total

2021-2022

20

36

39

41

136

2022-2023

45

44

44

55

188

Source: ASQA Question on Notice

5.69Applications for both VET and CRICOS registration initially increased and then fell markedly in 2018-19 as measures were taken to ‘raise the bar’ on market entry. To protect the quality and reputation of the VET and international education sectors, from 1 July 2018, ASQA applied greater scrutiny to all applications to establish new training providers and implemented a two-year initial registration period for new applicants.

5.70This initial registration period allows ASQA to assess the compliance and capability of the new provider against requirements in the Standards for Registered Training Organisations (RTOs) 2015. These measures led to a decrease in initial applications in 2018-19. Since that time, with the exception of a dip in 2021 during the COVID-19 pandemic, initial applications have been trending upwards.[70]

5.71ASQA is responsible for identifying the risk to the quality and international reputation arising through exploitation of the sector for criminal activity. ASQA understands that international students seeking to study VET in Australia can be particularly vulnerable to exploitation by non-genuine providers and education agents.[71] ASQA commented:

This risk arises through collusive activity between non-genuine providers, unethical education agents and students who seek to enter Australia for paid employment, rather than to engage in study.[72]

5.72The Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR) commented that they ‘have a focus to strengthen the integrity of how the international education sector interacts with the migration system and to limit fraudulent activity in international student exploitation.’[73]

5.73Some Committee public hearings held in May, coincided with media coverage of the serious exploitation of international students. An article published in The Age, reported on how registered migration agents were rorting the system without penalty and more than a dozen education providers were found to be corrupt and facilitating sex trafficking.[74]

5.74The Committee was assured that ‘Because of suspected cases of serious exploitation of students occurs drawing students into the ambit of criminal networks, debt bondage, and sex trafficking, the Australian Border Force is leading a multiagency operation to identify threats and coordinate whole-of-government effects to deter and disrupt exploitation of the temporary visa program.’[75]

TAFE

5.75The Victorian TAFE Association (VTA) provided evidence to the Committee that highlighted ‘international education as a critical part of Victoria’s economy, as well as being an important tool to help create global citizens, facilitate diplomacy and encourage partnerships.’[76]

5.76VTA discussed the competitive nature of international VET in Australia and observed that competition from countries such as Germany, Canada and Singapore is increasing rapidly.[77]

5.77The Committee received evidence that the ‘pandemic created major disruption across the sector and there is still uncertainty about the long-term effect of the pandemic …’.[78]

5.78Unlike short-term travel associated with tourism, education for international education operates in a pipeline model, in which commencing students translate into multiple years of future enrolments. The missing cohorts from 2020, 2021 and 2022 will continue to have an ongoing future impact that cannot be filled by subsequent student intakes.[79]

5.79VTA compared the running costs and staff variations between TAFEs and private for-profit providers.

TAFEs have reported significant structural challenges with impacts in terms of volume, and with challenges in adjusting costs to match falls in revenue, with large, full-time and permanent workforces as their major expense. TAFEs are public organisations owned by the states and territories, they are large organisations with, on average, 900 staff. That compares to the average size of private for-profit institution, being 12 training staff.[80]

5.80VTA submitted evidence indicating that international students studying at TAFEs across Australia is only around 5% of the total number of students studying in vocational education and training.[81]

5.81Visa processing times were raised with the Committee as a priority area for further Government consideration. VTA explained that when the Australian borders opened there was a strong demand for visa applications from potential students, resulting in a significant backlog and prompting a blowout in waiting times particularly for vocational education and training applicants.[82]

5.82It was explained to the Committee that some VET students were waiting 12 weeks for a visa in contrast to Higher Education students only waiting 35 days on average for the same reporting period.[83]

5.83VTA explained that TAFEs integrate international students into existing classes with domestic students, ‘whilst in many for-profit registered training organisations (RTOs) international students are the primary source of both students and income.’[84]

5.84VTA recognised that there is a critical juncture for international VET in Australia. VTA called for:

A whole of government approach, which supports and promotes activities, strengthens networks and adopts sensible, inclusive policies is required to support TAFE continue our reputation as a world leader in international education.[85]

5.85VTA called for the Government to prioritise and differentiate vias applications for international students who choose to study at TAFEs.[86]

Work conditions

5.86Students are vulnerable as workers. Mr Shen, an international student shared that many of his peers experience exploitative working conditions and increasing living costs.[87] The NTEU stated that ‘unlike other migrant workers, international student workers have less regulatory requirements on their visas in relation to employment, outside the number of hours that they can officially work during semesters.’ These factors in the view of the NTEU, make international student workers susceptible to exploitation by employers, with underpayment, wage theft, bullying, harassment, and labour trafficking.[88] Employers are abusing the ability of students ability to hold an ABN and too many employers tell students they are contractors when they are in fact employees. The NTEU believed that ‘more focus on shifting penalties to employers and giving international students whistleblower protections so that they could report their underpayment is one approach.’[89]

…international students are also highly susceptible to exploitation, and student visas have been viewed by some as an effective way to traffic labour.[90]

5.87The National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU) considered that one of the easiest ways to traffic labour in Australia is through international student visas. While Government, trade unions, industry and community organisations have attempted to address the exploitation of international student workers, it remains that unscrupulous employers still engage in exploitative employment practices and trafficking.[91]

5.88Evidence from several witnesses described collusion between agents and colleges regarding student visa holders who had no intention of studying, but instead pay course fees as the price for living and working in Australia. Navitas understood that some of the Certificate III courses delivering Registered Training Organisations (RTOs) are supporting a system of non-attendance. These RTOs are fraudulently issuing qualifications, of cases where students completing commercial cookery courses are ‘placed’ in a restaurant which has a direct connection to the RTO and for which students pay an additional, under the counter, fee to be listed as an employee and signed off on their one year’s work experience so they can gain a skills assessment and secure PR.[92]

5.89Sydney University Postgraduate Representative Association (SUPRA) reported that many international students face exploitative working conditions, a situation which worsened during COVID-19.[93] International students are exposed to the threat of their visa being cancelled, because, in part, they have limits on the hours they are allowed to work. Some employers take advantage of this, by locking those students into working for below minimum pay or working additional hours without pay.[94]

5.90The Migrant Justice Institute stated that current immigration settings contribute to exploitation of migrant workers. This includes students and graduates, based on findings from the most comprehensive study to date into wage theft and working conditions among international students, backpackers and other temporary migrants in Australia which draws on responses from 4,322 temporary migrants.[95] Findings confirmed that wage theft is endemic among international students, Working Holiday Makers and other temporary migrants in Australia. Almost a third (30 per cent) of survey participants earned $12/hour or less, approximately half the minimum casual wage. This included 25 per cent of international students. Almost half (46 per cent) earned $15/hour or less, including 43 per cent of international students.[96]

5.91The Migrant Justice Institute claimed that many international students stay silent for fear that if they report exploitation, they will put their visa and stay in Australia at risk or jeopardise a future visa. In International Students and Wage Theft in Australia (2020), 38 per cent of students did not seek information or help for a problem at work because they did not want ‘problems that might affect my visa’.[97]

5.92The NTEU argued that new legislation should be considered to protect international student workers from loss of visa status when reporting workplace exploitation.[98]

5.93The Migrant Justice Institute criticised the existing protections such as those offered through the Assurance Protocol[99] established to encourage international students to approach the Fair Work Ombudsman as ineffective, with only an average of 15 migrant workers using it each year. Only seventy-five workers since 2017 were given protection under the Assurance Protocol.[100]

5.94The NTEU[101] and ISANA[102] both argued for giving international students whistleblower protections so that they could report exploitation. The Migrant Justice Institute proposed two sets of whistleblower reforms that will help bring exploited workers out of the shadows. The first is protection from visa cancellation and the second is a short-term visa with work rights to enable workers to pursue a claim without fear of repercussions for their visas.[103]

Onshore course movement and Concurrent Study

5.95Between 15 December 2021, when Australia’s borders opened to fully vaccinated student visa holders, and 31 May 2023, the Department of Home Affairs received 11,807 Student Primary (subclass 500) (Vocational Education and Training Sector) visa applications where the client’s location at the time of lodgement was in Australia, and the previous visa held was a Student Primary (subclass 500) (Higher Education Sector) visa. Of these:

  • 10,682 were granted and
  • 226 applications refused.[104]
    1. Student (Higher Education sector) visa holders seeking to change providers for study at the same level are not required to apply for a new Student visa. As a result, the Department of Home Affairs reporting does not capture the ‘at level’ movement from a ‘low risk’ (Evidence Level (EL) 1) provider to a ‘higher risk’ (EL2 or EL3) provider.[105]
    2. International students are meant to complete the first six months of their primary course before being allowed to change courses or providers. However the ability to hold concurrent Confirmation of Enrolments has been used in effect as a loophole to enable student visa holders to change courses before even commencing their initial studies or completing the required six months.[106]
    3. The ability to hold concurrent Confirmation of Enrolment documents and/or student visa holders changing courses before commencing their studies or within six months from arrival in Australia is largely permitted under Australia’s migration legislation.[107]
    4. Student visa holders can move between courses and institutions and are subject to a range of controls. These regulatory controls are shared between the Department of Home Affairs through the Migration Act 1958 and Department of Education through the Education Services for Overseas Students (ESOS) Act 2000.[108]
    5. Under Australia’s migration legislation, a mandatory visa condition 8202 (Meet Course Requirement) provides that student visa holders must: be enrolled in a full time, registered course; achieve satisfactory course progress; achieve satisfactory course attendance; and maintain enrolment in a course at the same level or higher Australian Qualification Framework (AQF) level for which they were granted the visa.[109]
    6. Transferring to a lower AQF level course (as the primary course of study) would result in a breach of visa condition 8202, however in most circumstances, students intending to transfer to a lower AQF level course as their primary course of study must mandatorily apply for and be granted another student visa by the Department of Home Affairs appropriate to the level of their intended studies and before commencing studies at the lower-level course.[110]
    7. Victorian TAFE Association commented:

… there's a large amount of scrutiny around recruiting students, making sure they're genuine, and there's a risk rating associated with countries and with providers. There's a large layer of scrutiny that happens before you come onshore. But once you come onshore, there's enough looseness in the system to allow transfers and exploitation of students.[111]

5.103As discussed previously, under the current Simplified Student Visa Framework (SSVF), a student visa applicant who can show a confirmation of enrolment from higher education provider with a low-risk rating (for example in one of the Group of Eight Universities) will be granted a student visa relatively quickly. Assessment is higher for vocational education and training (VET) and the application process is slower as a result.

5.104Lygon Group shared that they have seen students speaking to current students realistically about coming in, for example, 'If we come in through a Group of Eight Universities that guarantees that I would get a visa,' and then coming here and then looking for loopholes where they could swap to a cheaper provider which means that they are looking for the private sector providers.[112]

5.105Victorian TAFE Association related that of the top ten VET commencements, number one by far, was India with 17,109 commencements. But, if a VET provider wanted to recruit a student into VET in India, the student’s chance of getting a visa granted is 4.6 per cent if the student is offshore.[113] Most VET providers do not invest in offshore recruitment as for every hundred students only four will be granted a visa.[114]

5.106Victorian TAFE Association (VTA) continued, however, if you look at the onshore visa grants, 97 per cent of onshore Indian students will get a visa to study VET. Victorian TAFE Association considered that these students are likely getting in on a higher education student visa, and then switching to a VET course. This is because a new onshore student visa required for a student to change from the higher education sector to the VET sector is relatively easy to get and is not subject to the level of scrutiny that the same student would attract if they applied for a student visa for VET studies offshore.[115]

5.107Primary Industry Skills Commission (PISC) detailed that several education/migration agents recognised an opportunity to game the student visa system and provide permanent residency (PR) outcomes through student visas.[116] These agents advise students that the best way to secure PR and work in Australia is to:

… apply for a university course to secure a low bar requirements student visa offshore, which they can then transfer onshore to a VET lower level (Generally Cert III) program, for an occupation which is on the MLTSSL (Occupational Demand List). This is then favoured by the Department of Home Affairs as it meets the requirements of occupations in demand in Australia.[117]

5.108PISC believed this been occurring for some time with these unscrupulous agents having significantly benefitted financially from the practice through both provider commissions and likely kickbacks from business seeking low skilled workers. The practice led to high numbers of applications for Cert III in Commercial Cookery, and several trade courses especially Carpentry, Painting and Automotive Mechanics. The students see these courses as a quick way to gain PR with no intention of working in these occupations upon completion. [118]

5.109PISC regarded this practice as damaging to Australia’s skilled workforce, as there are remains serious skill shortages in all these areas, despite significant numbers of graduates and PR being granted over the past 20 years. PISC summed it up with the following comment:

… this as an abject failure of the current visa model which is encouraging rorting of student visas.[119]

Circumvention of the six-month rule

5.110Under the ESOS Act, international students are generally restricted from transferring for six months after commencing their primary course. The National Code of Practice for Providers of Education and Training to Overseas Students 2018 (Standard 7) requires that providers not knowingly enrol an overseas student seeking to transfer from another registered provider’s course, prior to the overseas student completing six months of their principal course.

5.111Additionally, providers must have an implemented policy and process for assessing transfer requests received from overseas students prior to completion of their first six months.[120] Standard 7 requires that this policy articulate the circumstances under which it would be in the best interests of the student to be released from their primary course before six months.[121]

5.112Student transfers before the six-month limit is reached can be granted if the provider agrees to release them. This usually requires the student to provide evidence of compelling and compassionate circumstances for release to another provider and includes other conditions that must be met under the National Code.[122]

5.113However, the Lygon Group told the Committee how some students they surveyed commented:

Some of them have shared that their agent actually has counsellors and GPs that can provide them with a letter to progress through institution swapping.[123]

Concurrent Study

5.114At the time the Committee was collecting evidence international students were permitted to undertake additional study (a course of education or training) at the same time as the principal course for which they hold a student visa. This is termed ‘concurrent study’ and the student can have two Confirmations of Enrolments in PRISMS one for their primary course and one for a second ‘supplementary course.’ The main purpose of allowing concurrent study is to enable students to supplement their primary study with short courses that can enhance their qualifications and/or employability.

5.115International Education Association (ISANA) highlighted its members’ main concerns were in relation to the effectiveness of the regulation. ISANA members were concerned about loopholes that were being exploited, including course hopping, students enrolling in lower AQF courses without any implications for their student visas, and concurrent enrolments.[124]

5.116The Central Queensland University (CQ University) commented at the time of the inquiry that international students were prohibited from transferring between registered providers before completing six months of their principal course.

Under current regulations, international students are prohibited from transferring between registered providers before completing six months of their principal course. It is the experience of CQUniversity that this practice is not adhered to by the student. Evidence shows that a number of students are utilising provisions within the concurrent COE process to transfer to a lower level or vocational degree which is not inline or comparable with their initial visa approval and we would challenge the notion that these students would have been issued a visa under such arrangements should they have been originally declared.[125]

5.117The Committee heard from several witnesses how students, providers and education agents were utilising concurrent study as a loophole to skip the student to a cheaper, shorter course, or to an unscrupulous provider who has false front courses with the planned intent of the student visa holder to work full time and not study at all. Such loopholes in the current student visa regime are being exploited by some providers and agents, particularly those who deliberately target international students once they are in Australia, incentivising them to leave their primary provider by offering lower tuition fees.[126]

5.118Women Can Australasia raised concerns about the abuse of concurrent study to enable students to move from one provider to another almost immediately after students arrive in Australia, loosely termed as ‘course hopping’.[127]

5.119Southern Cross University has seen some education agents working with private providers to leverage off universities who have attracted students to Australia to divert those students to other, cheaper providers. This has a commission incentive for the agents who are paid to recruit and move onshore students to those second-tier institutions, leaving universities holding the trailing visa risk.

5.120Southern Cross University observed:

We see some of these organisations leveraging universities who have attracted students to Australia and then diverting them to other, cheaper providers. This has a commission incentive attached to those second-tier institutions, but it also leaves universities holding the trailing visa risk. Consumer choice or customer choice is the justification for this: they choose to change institution. But it does leave the universities holding that trailing visa risk, and we would say that it's equivalent to visa rorting.[128]

5.121Navitas considered some onshore student movement to be ‘poaching’ where students move to lower cost providers who typically have reduced face-to-face learning or lesser attendance requirements and spoke about the role some private for-profit institutions are playing in facilitating exploitation of students, charging low student fees, and turning a blind eye to student non-attendance at classes.[129]

5.122The Primary Industry Skills Commission (PISC) stated that the risk driven settings present at the time the Committee was conducting evidence, together with artificial occupational demand listings have actively supported a new migration agency industry focused on permanent residency outcomes for students irrespective of what course of study the student prefers. This, combined with the consequence of concurrent Commencement of Enrolment (CoE) and vocational visa approvals onshore is exacerbating the problem and seriously undermining the integrity of the Study Visa program.[130] PISC suggested that:

Government agencies must accept responsibility and where necessary, work with the education sector to implement solutions that do not support a misuse of the Study visa model. Previous concerns raised by this Skills Council to support genuine study priorities have not been addressed.[131]

5.123Victorian TAFE Association expanded on the issue of students who are disappearing almost immediately after they arrive. We talk to our members about students enrolling in TAFE and then going somewhere else, and they say, 'We've got students flying into Melbourne or Sydney, because they can't fly into Adelaide or Tasmania direct, and they disappear.' They do not get to Adelaide or Tasmania because they swap over to a course as soon as they arrive in the larger city.[132] We have regional members, SuniTAFE in Mildura that have the same issue, where people fly into Melbourne, and they disappear.[133]

5.124The Australian Academy of Vocational Education and Trades (AAVET) gave examples of providers that harvest onshore students from other providers and utilise concurrent study to do so.[134] These providers in AAVET’s view have become adept at gaming the system and are highly competent in licensing requirements.[135]

5.125The Department of Education acknowledged that it is aware that concurrent certificates of enrolment have facilitated inappropriate movements in the sector and that the number of transfers associated with concurrent study has been more than the Department was expecting and growing.[138]

5.126The Department of Education advised that options to refine or remove this provision to provide better management of the requirements under Standard 7 of the ESOS Act were being examined along with other enhancements to regulatory responses.[139] After investigations identified the misuse of concurrent enrolment as an integrity issue, the Australian Government advised on 26 August 2023 that it had closed:

… a loophole which allows education providers to shift international students who have been in Australia for less than six months from genuine study to an arrangement designed to facilitate access to work in Australia.[136]

5.127To further support the integrity of the international education system and the enrolment of genuine students, the Australian Government announced that it will:

  • increase the amount of savings international students will need to get a student visa
  • apply additional scrutiny to high-risk cohorts
  • consider using its powers under Section 97 of the ESOS Act to issue suspension certificates to high-risk education providers.[137]

Overseas comparison for Education Agents

5.128Canada does not have a nation-wide endorsed list of education agents, code of conduct, or consistent model of agent regulation across Canada. However, the province of Manitoba, introduced legislation in 2016 to protect the rights of international students. This legislation outlines the regulations education providers must adhere to when working with agents, to ensure agents adhere to ethical and honest conduct in the best interests of international students.[138]

5.129The education agent is expected to know how to lodge a student visa successfully while staying compliant with Australian migration regulations.[139] Much of the activity of an education agent, or via a sub-agent in the initial recruitment phase of an offshore candidate, occurs offshore.

5.130For Australia, Canada, the US, UK, and New Zealand student recruitment is largely outsourced to for-profit education agents. On the whole, Canada does not have an endorsed list of education agents, code of conduct, or consistent model of agent regulation across Canada. However, the province of Manitoba, introduced legislation in 2016 to protect the rights of international students. This legislation outlines the regulations education providers must adhere to when working with agents, to ensure agents adhere to ethical and honest conduct in the best interests of international students.[140]

5.131Similarly, the UK has limited agent regulation. There is no government legislation that directly regulates agents; however, protections and quality assurance measures are embedded in other legislation. The British Council operates as a certification body for education agents and provides online training for UK education agents. The UK government is currently developing a national code of ethics for agents and is establishing a quality framework, leading to closer alignment with the Australian and New Zealand systems for regulation.[141]

5.132New Zealand publish a by-country list of quality education agencies. Like Australia’s ESOS Act, New Zealand’s Education (Pastoral Care of Domestic Tertiary Students) Interim Code of Practice 2019 regulates providers by holding them responsible for the behaviour of the agents they use. Agent performance data from markets with high volumes of applications is published publicly to promote transparency.

5.133New Zealand encourages agencies to become an Education New Zealand Recognised Agency (ENZRA), which allows agencies access to tools to assist them in quality delivery of services. However, this program is opt-in, and agencies are not required or regulated to register. A review of ENZRA is currently underway.

5.134For the United States, commissioned agent use has only been endorsed by the US government since 2018; there is no federal regulation of agents, however quality standards have been developed by the American International Recruitment Council (AIRC). AIRC, a non-profit of U.S. tertiary institutions and student recruitment agencies, operate as a certification body, providing access to a 5-year certification register for agents for a fee of US$10,000.

Agent aggregators

5.135Australia and its competitor countries have noted an increase in large-scale agent aggregators that host platforms and market to education providers and education agents and sub-agents recruiting international students to Australia.

5.136In Australia, education agents are a key part of the international education sector. International Education Specialists (IDP) conducted research into students that showed most education agents are operating ethically, and the sector has been thriving because of the work that education agents do.[142]

5.137ISEAA echoed the above sentiment:

Education agents promote education and support students on their journey, including student visa related matters. Education agencies operate outside Australia, but there is also a significant number in Australia supporting students throughout their experience onshore beyond their successful enrolment and visa outcome. Agents often provide ‘welcome and arrival services’, job support/placement services, career coaching services, even psychological and mental health support; all for free, as part of their commitment to student support. Students and parents generally go back to the education agent for ongoing

advice or if they have issues with the education provider, and agents act as a mediator for academic, and payment related issues.[143]

5.138The Committee received evidence that Austrade engages with education agents through the partner portal on the Study Australia website. Austrade encourages agents to sign up and only accept sign-ups from agents who are representing Australian CRICOS-registered providers. The partner portal provides information to them to make sure that education agents are aware of any changes to policy; to let them know what is going on in the market; and to remind them of their responsibilities. It is more of a positive, community-building initiative where Austrade try to get them to remain loyal to Australia and to ensure that their students are well-informed and well-prepared for studying and living in Australia. However, Austrade conceded that they do not know when education agents have done the wrong thing.[144]

5.139Griffith University commented that education agents play a valuable role in the journey for many students and their families who are seeking advice and support regarding a significant investment in an overseas education.[145] ISEAA stated that students and parents generally go back to the education agent for ongoing advice or if they have issues with the education provider, and agents will act as a mediator for academic, and payment related issues.[146] ISEAA noted that during the COVID-19 crisis, education agents were sources of valuable information and welfare when students were in distress.[147]

5.140Internationally, the trend to use third parties (like education agents) to recruit students is on the rise, with the USA, a country that was once very reluctant to utilise education agents has seen a marked change. For example, in 2016, only 37 per cent of US universities and colleges were working with commission-based agencies, a 2023 survey found that as many as 62 per cent of institutions collaborate with commission-based agencies.[148]

5.141This percentage is even higher in Australia, the 2021 Quality Indicators for Learning and Teaching (QILT) survey reported 87 per cent of international undergraduate students used an agent when coming to Australia to assist with visa applications or to enrol at an institution.

5.142The Committee received evidence that showed the QILT Survey asked narrow questions of education agents. However, in that narrow band the satisfaction rate was very high at 93 per cent, with students rating the service provided by their agent positively.[149] Social Research Centre considered that there is scope to ask more detailed questions to get better insight into students’ experience with education agents.[150]

5.143International Student Education Agents Association (ISEAA) reports over 21,000 education agent offices are registered in PRISMS.[151] Noting that the registration is of individual education agents (who may sub-contract to other agents) or an agency or businesses (who may have many individual education agents in their employ or who sub-contract). The PRISIMS count does not factor in sub-agent numbers. This means that there are likely many more education agents operating in the Australian international education environment and many of those who would operate offshore.

5.144The growth of education agents within Australia is driven in part by competition for international students within Australia (states and territories) as well as competing internationally with countries such as the UK, Canada, New Zealand and the US, and is in part due to the complexities involved in the 2016 introduction of the Simplified Student Visa Framework (SSVF) and the introduction in 2011 of the Genuine Temporary Entrant (GTE) criteria which sends a very strong message of a complicated visa process for interested international students.[152]

5.145The exponential growth in Australia’s education market and the strong competition to recruit large numbers of students has taxed the ability of providers to vet student enrolments, in some cases education agents’ roles have expanded as providers shift more and more responsibility onto agents.[153]

Current regulation

5.146The London Statement (2012) endorsed by the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland is the closest example of global regulation which lists ethical and best practice standards for education agents’ integrity, transparency, and professionalism.[154]

5.147A challenge for Australia in the regulation of education agents is the Government’s limited jurisdiction with respect to offshore-based agents. In contrast to migration agents that are regulated by a government registration authority (OMARA), thousands of education agents operate offshore outside the direct jurisdiction of the Australian government’s authority, whereas most migration agents and their potential clients are based in Australia.[155]

5.148The Committee heard that issues related to education agent behaviour overseas have been addressed indirectly by setting requirements for education providers within Australia. The Department of Education commented that ‘the behaviour of education agents is the responsibility of the providers for whom they work and by whom they're remunerated.[156]

5.149The Department of Education continued by stating:

Government's position has been to regulate the providers in the sense of their relationship with their agents, and there are requirements in the existing education services for the overseas student framework that require they only work with agents who act in the best interests of the student. Providers are required to cease working with education agents they find have not met those obligations.[157]

5.150This regulatory control is exerted through the National Code of Practice for Providers of Education and Training to Overseas Students (2018) (the National Code). Education providers are responsible for ensuring that their education agents act ethically, honestly and in the best interest of international students and uphold the reputation of Australia’s international education sector. These provider obligations are set out in Standard 4 of the National Code of Practice for Providers of Education and Training to Overseas Students 2018 (the National Code) and standards 1.3.4, 1.3.5, 7.1.1 and 7.1.5 of the Higher Education Standards Framework (Threshold Standards) 2021. Similar guidelines have been produced in the UK and the US, although, unlike in Australia, they are not legally mandated.

5.151The National Code requires providers to enter into formal agreements with education agents who formally represent them and is silent on requirements in situations where providers are approached directly by agents. Where providers have not formalised an arrangement with an agent through a written agreement, providers cannot guarantee the student is receiving accurate information about the institution and providers have little recourse for corrective action.

5.152The University of Melbourne considered that institutions’ ability to engage with reputable agents is stymied by a lack of transparent information on agent performance.[158]

5.153However, as providers only have access to information on the performance outcomes of their own agents in PRISMS, there is an information gap when they are looking to partner with new agents. Even with sufficient data, not all education providers take a proactive approach to monitoring agent behaviour that would require them to terminate the relationship with the agent. While education providers are required to outline their processes for monitoring agent behaviour in their agent agreements, standards vary between providers. ITECA commented:

It needs to be made very clear that the education agent-student-provider relationship is not deficient or malign in every case. Indeed, there is no reliable available data on the extent to which these relationships can be damaging in the context of a sector in which more than 470,000 student visas were lodged prior to the pandemic and around 365,000 in the most recent program year. At the same time, there is ample and reliable evidence from participants across the sector that the current system in which there is no oversight of this relationship, and no oversight of education agent activity is a significant omission that cannot continue.[159]

5.154From Deakin University’s perspective Australia has a robust regulatory framework for the quality assurance and management of education agents. More than 80 per cent of Deakin University international student cohort comes through the education agent channel, one way or another.When we are vetting agents with whom we want to work, we require them to have undertaken that certification program it is not a hands-off distant relationship with our agents. Deakin undertakes a rigorous annual review, and we will let them go where it is not working.[160]

5.155NEAS considered that the onus should be on the providers to manage the quality of their education agent partners, through the national standards.[161] NEAS argued that there is no independent quality assurer for education agents in Australia. There are a lot of certifications and professional development.[162] NEAS has a set of standards that is very much voluntary for education agents at this stage. NEAS developed these standards three years ago and have a number of agents who have gone through that quality assurance process.[163]

5.156In Deakin University’s view, the biggest gap is the lack of data that comes out of the PRISMS system:

Where breaches occur which, we need to respond to, the data of that breach sits in the system for a long time before we see it. If that were able to be made available to us at an early stage—what I am describing from Deakin University's point of view is replicated across the sector—we would be in a position to act more swiftly and get on top of whatever the issues were… I understand that it is a different risk profile for lower ranked universities and for VET providers, where there are cheaper fees.[164]

Agents Market

5.157The current student recruitment market is an ‘agents’ market’ where providers are engaged in intense competition to recruit international students both onshore and offshore. This places providers at a disadvantage in managing agents as educational institutions are driven by recruitment targets. Multiple additional factors hamper the ability of providers to control agent behaviour, including the existence of powerful education agency networks and regular use of subagents.[165]

5.158Navitas highlighted that competition for international students around the world is fierce:

We are in a hyper-competitive period when it comes to international education—possibly the most competitive period that we've ever been in. When we surveyed just over a hundred international education leaders from universities across the UK, Australia, and Canada, pretty much all of them said that competition was going to be higher, if not much higher, than what it was compared to the pre-pandemic period. It will be especially intense around student recruitment.[166]

5.159The Australian Academy of Vocational Education and Trades provided evidence that 98 per cent of students are now going through agents in international VET and there has been subsequently a blowout in agent commissions.[167] Mr Kyle Jardeau held the view that ‘agents hold all the power’:

They (agents) alone provide the colleges with much-needed overseas students. This forces the colleges into a bidding war which has resulted in agent commissions being as high as 30 per cent of what the student pays, for the life of the enrolment.[168]

5.160Central Queensland University stated that vocational education providers are paying up to 40 per cent of tuition fees as commission to agents, leaving them no choice but to operate like visa factories on thin margins.[169] Agents themselves can be squeezed by students, with agents sometimes passing on up to 80 per cent of the agent commission to the student to engage with them.[170]

Education Agent Issues

5.161A serious and unsolved problem is the prevalence of unscrupulous agents and recruiters funnelling unqualified students to universities worldwide. Document fraud has gained momentum due to commission-based agents who have an incentive to ensure that students are ‘packaged’ with impressive credentials as their commissions depend on successful student placement.[171]

5.162Hon Phil Honeywood commented:

We know that the behaviour of certain agents is such that they will find ways and means around any official cap on commissions or transparency around commissions. For example, it's well known in the industry that certain providers have given cash bonuses to individual employees of agents.[172]

5.163The Lygon Group highlighted that education agents are an important source of news for students offshore about Australia and not just about international education; agents are sharing news about Australian politics, policies, life, events happening in Australia:

(Agents are) often the first and the only source of information a lot of students and their families have about Australia. I think this could be concerning in some ways, because we have students who are getting conflicting sources of information from different places. It's very confusing, and agents are playing a role in that information flow, which we find could be a little bit worrisome without other genuine and trustworthy sources of information in the right channels to students.[173]

5.164The issues raised in evidence for this inquiry mirrored those raised in the Report of the inquiry into efficacy of current regulation of Australian migration and education agents encapsulated by the Law Council of Australia (LCA) evidence of education agents engaging in a range of inappropriate conduct, including advising/promising students that certain courses of study have permanent migration pathways but in fact do not. These courses tend to be long in duration and financially lucrative for the education agent; advising applicants to apply for student visas with the sole intention of ‘buying time’ to find a work or family sponsor; advising applicants how to bolster or create stronger Genuine Temporary Entrant (GTE) claims when, in fact, these claims do not exist or are marginal.[174]

Agent transparency and data

5.165The National Code (Standard 4) only requires providers to have written agreements with those agents that formally represent their education services. It is silent on requirements to have written agreements in situations where providers are approached directly by agents, or where informal ‘one off’ negotiations occur which do not have a formal agreement in place. There is a lack of transparency on the use of sub-agents, where agents outsource recruitment. Providers may not be aware that an agent has outsourced some or all their services.

5.166The main issues that concern ISANA members are in relation to the effectiveness of the regulation. There are a number of loopholes that are exploited, including course hopping, students enrolling in lower AQF courses without any implications for their student visas, and concurrent enrolment. ISANA contends that there needs to be greater transparency with education agent practices, including the payment of commissions.

5.167In 2018, Australia’s ESOS Act was amended to allow for greater transparency around education agents’ performance. The Department of Education hosts an Education Agents Dashboard through the Provider Registration and International Student Management System (PRISMS).[175] The Dashboard holds information about students recruited through education agents which providers can use to assess agent recruitment performance. Providers record agents with whom they have formal arrangements and are currently not required to record informal agent arrangements in PRISMS. Education providers can only see reports for its own students recruited through education agents. Providers cannot see information about education agents and students from other providers.

5.168Universities Australia strongly argued for making comparative data about agent performance against other agents and across different universities available in PRISMS.[176]

5.169ISANA made the following observations about the need for greater transparency of agents.

The framework that we've got in place is not working, and I think that's something we really need to focus on. We need to look a little bit more into how we can improve that. We also need greater transparency. The Department of Education made some changes to the ESOS regulations pre COVID to get a lot more transparency around education agents. There's a dashboard on PRISMS. That's about agent performance and agent behaviour, and that doesn't seem to be having the focus that it used to have a few years ago, pre COVID, so it'd be good to see some of that conversation coming back around to how we can be more transparent around agent behaviour…[177]

5.170University of Melbourne recommended improvement of data collection and sharing through PRISMS on education agent performance to assist universities to identify disreputable agents.[178]

5.171ITECA concluded that it is very important that all providers have access to a suite of information on all education agents and that that suite of information should be expanded, not just in relation to agents that they might use. There might be some discomfort for some providers, in relation to that, but ITECA think on balance that is reasonable and justified.[179]

5.172ISEAA commented that there are agents who try to get contracts with universities and others and will often be refused, which is why they sometimes move down the chain to VET providers that might not be of top quality.[180]

5.173Griffith University noted recent calls for the further regulation of education agents and recognise that the management of education agents is a core component of a robust visa regime and support a diverse international student community. Griffith University recommends that before looking at further regulation and associated compliance obligations, that there be greater transparency and sharing of agent data to assist providers to better assess agent behaviour and performance, not just the institutions but across the sector.[181]

5.174A study into agent and third-party provider use in the UK showed that universities that are successfully navigating the agent landscape emphasise developing or procuring expertise on how to select and manage partnerships and invest in incentives and contractual terms to mitigate risk.[182] Research suggested further measures like a comprehensive due diligence of all new education agent engagements, audits and background checks should be carried out, this is reflective of findings from the Joint Standing Committee on Migration (2019) Report of the Inquiry into Efficacy of Current Regulation of Australian Migration and Education Agents.

5.175While Australian education providers are legally mandated to manage the agents they work with, further support through the development of a step-by-step good practice in appointing, training, supporting, and managing education agents could be of value. These steps would add a supportive dimension to the ESOS regulations already in existence and could support the sector towards a unified framework of agent management, which would support other regulatory changes. ISEAA suggested the introduction of an entry level course for education agents based on the ESOS Act and migration regulations associated with the student visa (Subclass 500). ISEAA argued that ensuring that suitable training and continuing professional development taken by education agents in Australia and around the world to deliver best practice service. In ISEAA’s view industry-led and government endorsed certification would be a first step in getting better oversight of education agents.[183]

5.176Universities Australia (UA) stated they do not have any direct role in managing the relationship with agents, they were shocked by the media reports of trafficking and abuse by students. UA observed that this is not new and has been seen before and places a cloud over the reputation that Australia has established.[184]

5.177UA’s view on increasing the enforcement of the current regulatory framework, is that they were mindful that there is a current regulatory framework, but it seems the ‘bad guys’ are paying no attention to it and ‘getting away with murder’.[185] UA considered that the issue is more about better enforcement of the current rules that Australia already has.[186]

5.178IDP Education observed that one matter that might be encouraging poor behaviour are weaknesses in the contracts between a provider and an education agent.[187] IDP Education commented that ‘if you get the contract requirements right, including clear strong contractual obligations it is an effective way to incentivise agents to meet good standards.[188]

A few years ago, I used to work on some of those contracts and a lot of what we see is probably a quite immature contract approach compared to other industries. I think some work could be done there. Perhaps it is training across providers, or having a model contract or something like that might help.[189]

Registration of education agents

5.179Over past years governments have funded several programs and have made changes to monitor, and support the ethical behaviour of, education agents including the introduction of the PRISMS Agent Dashboard, Australian Education Agent Code of Ethics referenced in the national code, Victorian TAFE International Education Agent Best Practice Guide, ISANA's National Code Tutorial and Education Agent Training Program.[190]

5.180ISANA emphasised that regulatory bodies need to have more ability to monitor and regulate to ensure there is best practice, not just minimum standards.[191]ISEAA advocated for a registered education agent system, seeing the need for oversight of agents and accountability of agents, because they consider oversight is severely lacking.[192] ISANA proposed that education agents should be registered like migration agents and required to demonstrate they understand their role and responsibility in ethical marketing and recruiting, as well as the implications for students and the sector more broadly.[193]

5.181Primary Industry Skills Commission (PISC) emphasised that the Government should introduce a comprehensive education agent licensing requirement that bans co-location/investment with RTOs/Universities and in training sites such as restaurants for commercial cookery students, and workshops for building and automotive trades for post study work placements.[194]

5.182IDP Education considered that while there is an existing regulatory framework around providers managing the quality of their education agents, a further step to a direct education agent regulation is a good concept. IDP Education strongly cautioned that there must be consideration of resourcing issues in terms of enforcement and the monitoring and execution of any regulatory framework.

It will need careful consideration, in terms of the potential damaging of the agents' footwork, and operational costs, and potentially discouraging any innovations that agents may have.[195]

5.183ITECA proposed a register of international student agents that CRICOS registered providers must use; the registrant must be a legal entity; the agents on the register will be required to undertake five modules, and these modules will be ethics, as it applies in the context of the national code, the Australian visa framework, the requirements of the ESOS Act, Australian workplace rights, and student wellbeing and accommodation; and the agent must publish their fees and disclose these to students.[196]

5.184ITECA considered the commitment to maintain an understanding of and comply with requirements should be underpinned by a requirement to renew registration every two years. This will require amendments to the ESOS Act; however, the need to preserve the Australia's reputation for excellence warrants such a legislative amendment.[197]

5.185IDP Education are conscious of the extensive offshore network of agents and the hundreds of thousands of sub-agents who work for primary agents who represent the institutions in Australia. IDP education cautioned given the issues of jurisdiction in foreign countries, how would Australia regulate those agents? The challenges of offshore and of sub-agents needs to be considered because a lot of those agents remain unknown.[198]

5.186Independent Higher Education Australia (IHEA) wanted to see education agents registered and regulated. IHEA membership collectively believed there was potential rorting and unethical practices occurring offshore. IHEA are particularly concerned about those unethical education agents operating in the Indian subcontinent.[199]

5.187Independent Tertiary Education Council Australia (ITECA) advise that while there is a natural tendency to regulate the onshore sector, it has a proposed market distortion. It is in that context that ITECA looked at it through a different prism and had several discussions with government and other stakeholders about creating a more transparent framework that works equally well for offshore and onshore agents.[200]

5.188ITECA commented the challenge in regulation is that it creates an opportunity for further loopholes.What ITECA found is even though there are problems with offshore agents there are very good agents who provide a cost effective and good service. While there is an inclination to suggest Australia simply locks overseas agents out of the equation, ITECA advise that would lock good agents out the market.[201]

5.189The Department of Education agreed that regulating agents who operate outside of Australia is a serious constraint that needs to be navigated. The Department of Education advised that there are opportunities and some options that the department is working through that go to improving the accountability of providers. The Department of Education stated that there is more that providers can be asked or required to do to take more responsibility for the behaviours of their agents.[202]

5.190The Department of Education is conscious of legal constraints regarding commercial-in-confidence requirements of both the providers and the agents themselves but consider that there are opportunities to improve transparency across the sector, including for example requirements to make information available about education agent commissions to students potentially in the context of written agreements between providers and students.[203]

Government Register

5.191An existing example of a government-controlled agents registry is the Office of Migration Agents Registration Authority (OMARA) under the Department of Home Affairs. OMARA requires that migration agents be Australian citizens, permanent residents or New Zealand citizens holding special visa status.[204]

5.192Based on the OMARA model a government administered education agents registry or licensing board would require significant investment of resourcing both in the legislative and operational establishment and ongoing resourcing over time. A government register would likely require a levy on providers to offset the cost of education agent regulation assumed by Government. Monitoring and investigative powers would need the ability and resources to have offshore reach and powers to investigate.

5.193Department of Home Affairs cautioned that currently OMARA looks at registered migration agents only, some of whom do provide education advice. The OMARA does not have jurisdiction over investigating that advice in relation to education. The Department of Home Affairs expanded that what this means is that, with any sanction or decision or investigation of a migration agent, who is an education agent, Department of Home Affairs focus is solely on the immigration advice that has been given.

The OMARA doesn't have jurisdiction over actually investigating that advice in relation to education. So what this means is that, with any sanction or decision or investigation of an RMA, who is also an education agent, we can only focus solely on the immigration advice that has been given. In terms of data sharing, it would be useful, but I think the second point is really to ask the question: what power do we still have if we were to find information from an education agent, in relation to education advice, that was untoward? And what role does the department have in that? Currently, as I said, the powers are limited to immigration advice only.[205]

5.194The Department of Home Affairs told the Committee that OMARA has no jurisdiction over unregistered immigration assistance conducted offshore, as Part 3 of the Migration Act 1958 does not have extraterritorial effect. At present, of the approximate 4,850 registered migration agents (RMAs) registered with the OMARA, around two hundred list their primary business address as offshore.

5.195Although they may choose to operate offshore, all RMAs must meet the same requirements and standards to become and remain registered with the OMARA. Should the OMARA receive a complaint in relation to the conduct of an RMA, including an RMA operating offshore, as the regulator of the RMA profession the OMARA may investigate the conduct and take disciplinary action where necessary.[206]

5.196ISEAA pointed out that even with a government registration authority like OMARA, to get rid of a migration agent is an incredibly difficult process, to get the evidence and to take out migration agents.[207] OMARA registers and regulates registered migration agents, but ISEAA hear about dodgy migration agents in the media all the time. What these are most often is unregistered operators, and this is the difficulty. There is no jurisdiction from the OMARA to regulate them. These unregistered migration agents have to be reported to the Australian Border Force (ABF). They are a very low priority because of the under-resourcing of the ABF, and because of the legislation that prevents them from doing things around investigations. For that reason, ISEAA argue the regulation of education agents on a similar basis would not be a practical solution.[208]

Industry led education agent register

5.197ISEAA argued for an industry-led registry and not be ‘government registered’ with all the legal implications of that status. ISEAA proposed a register would be controlled by a joint industry body of agents and providers, be self-funding, and would have training and complaint capacity.[209] ISEAA observed that while many agencies and providers deliver training to staff, but it is by no means consistent or recorded.[210]

5.198ISEAA considered an industry register does not solve all issues but provides a minimum benchmark of training and will useful as providing an initial barrier to agents entering the industry where there are none presently.[211] ISEAA proposed that registered education agents and counsellors would have to undergo training in ESOS legislation, student welfare/mental health first aid, career planning fundamentals, migration relating to student visas. ISEAA further proposed the industry registration could be rolled out over a two-year period and get consensus by providers and peak bodies to require their agents to undergo training.[212]

Combined model: Industry register with government support

5.199The Committee heard from Hon Phil Honeywood that this was not the first time an industry led education agent register has been proposed:

I want committee members to understand that this has been tried before and that perhaps industry-led and industry-run might sound like a nice idea, but getting

everyone to step up to the plate is far more challenging. On that basis, I would argue that government probably needs to embark on a new process by which it makes it very clear—particularly for onshore education agents, where you can regulate them—that there has to be both industry and government involvement.[213]

5.200Evidence suggested an industry led education agents register which is supported through Government legislation could be a solution to address the current state of unregulated education agents. This approach alleviates the regulatory burden of a full government register, enables a stronger ongoing involvement of providers and the sector opportunity to demonstrate self-regulation, but contains the strength of Government legislation to ensure compliance.

Committee Comment

5.201The Committee considers there is a clear need to enhance information and data sharing across agencies to identify loopholes and vulnerabilities in the sector and support joined-up responses to maleficence. The fragmentation of regulatory arrangements and lack of coherent information sharing and analysis hamper the ability of agencies to detect and respond to fraud, criminal activities and misuse of the visa system. In the Committee’s opinion, a more substantial formal platform of information and data holdings should have the capability to identify potential trends and support forward planning in cross-agency risk mitigation. In making this finding and the consequential recommendations the Committee acknowledges that improvements will not be easy or straightforward to devise and implement and that it is likely to be an iterative process over time.

5.202In the Committee’s view such enhancements would enable more holistic and connected mapping and analysis of international education sector which could be utilised in support of Australia’s national objectives for economic and foreign policy. This information enhancement should include state and territory governments, and the sector where appropriate.

5.203The Committee acknowledges that there are sensitivities and limits of information and data gathering, sharing and use which are subject to various legislative frameworks across Government. The Committee considers that efforts should be made to improve sensitive information sharing within current legislative constraints managed through tiering of information sharing platforms to which a need-to-know approach be applied to be legislatively compliant to safeguard exchanges. The Committee cautions that this approach should not be to the extent where it would impede the effectiveness of intelligence, investigation and enforcement strategies and action and that legislative changes may be required to enable a more robust integrity regime.

5.204The Committee believes that such arrangements should be responsive enough to support more effective regulatory action. Building a stronger framework of verifiable information has the potential for a positive impact downstream on visa processing times, supporting visa integrity and unscrupulous third-party activity.

5.205The Committee considers that competition between providers for students is not an adequate reason to prevent information being shared to stop maleficence in agent behaviour and the activities of spurious providers that enable international student exploitation and visa rorting. Recognising that the risk of reputational damage and harm to the integrity of Australia’s international education should outweigh the individual pursuit of student numbers and regulatory regimes need to prioritise the collective good.

5.206Overwhelming evidence is deeply concerning that Australia’s international education sector and student visa system is being abused to the extent that international students in Australia are vulnerable to serious exploitation including being trafficked for sex and enslaved under conditions of debt bondage and forced labour conditions. This is utterly unacceptable, both morally and for the good of the sector.

5.207The Committee acknowledges the challenges of isolation, intimidation, and fear of retribution that an exploited student may face in Australia and the inherent vulnerability that temporary migration status can engender. That this fear is often exacerbated by threats of deportation made by unscrupulous agents, providers and employers who may be operating within a sophisticated chain with links to organised criminal networks.

5.208The Committee is mindful that students are reluctant and fearful to report abuse, and that coming forward may be complicated by a lack of English language skills and lack of easy access to information on their rights, obligations, and protections available to them as students. The Committee considers that the Government must do more to ensure that current protections such as the Assurance Protocol are improved and that further protections should be considered.

5.209At minimum the Government should work with the sector and across agencies to develop a communication strategy with targeted approaches to students, prospective students offshore and to providers and education agents. This strategy would include in language materials, and would target student dominated social media platforms on and offshore. The Committee considers that the Government work across agencies to ensure such messaging reaches employers and industry bodies that are traditionally high employers of international students.

5.210The Committee suggests that there is merit in examining the scale and use of ABNs by international students, especially in circumstances where it is related to their area of study. In this context, it is worth considering whether education institutions should have a role in endorsing or overseeing the ABN requests made by international students for study purposes. Such mechanisms may assist in ensuring that ABNs are not used by employers to exploit students. As heard by the Committee, a significant driver of exploitation appears to be students being forced to work as ‘contractors’ when they are actually employees.

5.211Similarly, there is merit in considering requiring employers to undertake a very light touch registration when they employ international students (or potentially any temporary migrant). This could take the form of a simple website registration, requiring employers to record the name, date of birth and visa number of international students they employ on whatever basis. Such a requirement would enable the Fair Work Ombudsman to undertake more targeted enforcement and to fine businesses found to be employing unregistered workers, rather than punishing the student worker. This proposal is somewhat akin to the reform direction in the recent independent Migration System Review led by Dr Martin Parkinson in relation to allowing portability of skilled migrants who leave their initial employer, proposing a light touch registration system of the worker, role and salary details.

5.212The Committee considers that the international education sector has a significant role to play in this promotion and education, including offering avenues through which students can safely report abuse and secure support.

5.213The Committee heard evidence of organised offshore to onshore operations to channel students into Australia for purposes other than legitimate study, most commonly work scams of various kinds, including simply securing a visa to work not genuinely to study. Practices include falsifying documents to enable non-genuine students to take higher education places to rort the current student visa system and circumvent risk tiering.

5.214The Committee received evidence of providers targeting students onshore with cheaper courses and promises of permanent residency and that such providers often run a low-skilled labour racket through false front schools and courses. That the practice included providers falsifying records of study progression to meet student visa requirements and ESOS legislation to enable students to work full time.

5.215The Committee is of the strong view that these practices are not only damaging to Australia’s international education sector, but they undercut Fair Work regulations. This is morally wrong for the individuals affected, and negatively impacts all Australian workers by distorting the labour market and putting downwards pressure on wages in low-paid sectors for everyone. Such practices contribute to employer abuse of international students who will either fail to gain an Australia education or gain qualifications without any subject competence but are nonetheless charged international student fees to do so.

5.216The Committee strongly welcomes the Government’s announcement on 26August2023 that the concurrent study feature in the PRISMs system has been removed. A working group was established and operated by the Department of Education in 2020 and 2021 which made clear the misuse. Concurrent study has demonstrably been abused to:

  • funnel non-genuine students into ‘ghost schools’ for the purposes of full-time work, and/or into debt labour conditions or into a trafficking situation,
  • be exploited as a loophole by unscrupulous providers and agents to convince genuine higher education students to switch to their cheaper and sub-standard courses within the six-month transfer limit of the student’s primary course,
  • rort the student visa system as a pathway to permanent residency, and
  • as a money-making enterprise by agents and providers in collusion with businesses to extract multiple commissions from providers for a single student who is then confined to being a source of low skilled labour.
    1. The Committee acknowledges that the majority of education agents seek to do the right thing and work to support genuine students to make the important life choice to study in Australia. Strong offshore advocates for the Australian education sector are important and should be valued.
    2. However, loopholes in the visa and education system have contributed to abuse of the Australian migration system and education sectors by unethical education agents, providers, and employers. Some agents and providers are sometimes operating within organised criminal networks to funnel international students into Australia for purposes other than gaining an Australian education. That this activity contributes to worker abuse, and the exploitation of students and is a direct threat to Australia’s international education reputation and the integrity of the migration system. That these practices have long term and damaging implications to Australia’s foreign objectives in the region and internationally and decisive action is required.
    3. Evidence to the Committee is overwhelming that there are persistent and deep-seated issues in the bottom end of the private VET sector. It cannot be denied that some providers in the private VET sector have systematically exploited Australia’s education system and broken migration law to funnel vulnerable international students who are unwilling participants into sophisticated operations that in almost all cases lead to labour exploitation and worse indentured slave labour and sex trafficking.
    4. The Committee considers that determined and focused action is required to weed out disreputable providers and send a strong message that Australia is serious about protecting the integrity of international education. Serious reform will be difficult and long-term requiring additional resources tough decisions. The Committee’s recommendations propose a range of measures including:
  • structural reforms to improve the monitoring and assessment of current providers and increase vetting of new providers including a fit and proper person test to operate a VET provider
  • a pause for at least 12 months by ASQA in processing new provider applications for CRICOS registered VET provider, with limited exceptions for legitimate applications such as industry linked entities, high economic value proposals or those endorsed by state and territory governments
  • requiring new providers seeking CRICOS registration to have operated and delivered to domestic students for at least 12 months
  • automatic suspension of new international student intake for providers under serious regulatory investigation
  • cancellation of a provider’s CRICOS registration if no training is delivered for a period of 12 months or more.
    1. Although a radical step, given the scale of the problems as well as other policy objectives outlined in this report, there is a very strong case for Government to consider suspension of recruitment of international students to CRICOS VET courses identified with persistent quality and integrity issues and/or of limited value to Australia’s critical skills needs such as leadership and management courses.
    2. The Committee considers that major changes to how student learning and quality are assessed should be trialled and introduced. To use an analogy, when a car rolls off a production line, quality and safety of the vehicle is not assessed by checking how many staff worked on it, that the timesheets are filed correctly, that the factory is swept clean and that management can fill out paperwork. The car is checked and tested. In tertiary education however, the education ecosystem is used as a proxy for quality and regulators are very limited in what they can do.
    3. The Committee’s recommendations propose that the Government consider options (provider funded on a cost-recovery basis) including to:
  • develop a framework to assess all CRICOS registered VET providers (excluding public TAFEs) to identify higher risk providers
  • subject higher risk providers to stricter compliance and accreditation requirements which may include:
  • trialling external assessments of a random selection of students from high-risk providers / courses to accurately assess education training quality, identify systemic issues and provide ASQA with better evidence to more rapidly respond with and cancel the registration of non-genuine poor-quality providers,
  • a full re-accreditation process for providers identified as posing the highest integrity and quality risks where providers would have to reapply for their registration with ASQA, and
  • a mechanism to separate the training function from the assessment function in limited circumstances for high-risk providers and / or course, requiring students to be externally assessed by an independent body or by a provider approved (such as TAFEs or a proven high-quality private provider permitted to undertake external assessments).
    1. To support such initiatives, improvements to the capabilities and resourcing of regulators will be necessary over time.
    2. The Committee received evidence from TAFE about the negative impact the pandemic had on the sector, given international education operates in a pipeline model, in which commencing students translate into multiple years of future enrolments. The Committee is very supportive of the excellent work that is undertaken by TAFEs throughout Australia that includes educating and supporting international students. The Committee is aware that TAFEs onshore VET students has dropped to under five per cent of their market share. The Committee encourages the Government to consider what can be done to support Australia’s long standing TAFE system that has a positive record of providing education and support services to all of its students, including international students.
    3. The Committee recommends consideration be given to prioritising visa applications for international students who choose to study at TAFEs. The Committee believes this would be supportive for the Australian TAFE system and would assist the Government in weeding out nefarious education agents who are damaging Australia’s reputation for international students by channelling students into ghost school providers and then onto illegal work practices.
    4. Regarding education agents, the Committee is firmly of the view that an opt in industry-only register would not go far enough. In the Committee’s view the regulation of education agents is essential and long overdue, and a model must be determined and implemented as soon as practicable, understanding this is a complex endeavour. The Government should consider the most effective way of ensuring scrutiny of education agents given their key role in providing temporary migration advice and dealing with often vulnerable consumers. A robust industry-led model backed by legal regulatory requirements to participate would seem to be the minimum response warranted. Consideration could also be given to bringing the regulation of education agents into the sort of framework that governs migration agents.
    5. Whatever model for education agent regulation is ultimately adopted will need to ensure compliance with a single Code of Ethical Practice for Education Agents setting expected standards for all education agents who work with Australian education providers. Consideration will need to be given as to how to ensure the scheme covers scuba-agents and aggregator platforms. Any scheme should be industry funded through cost recovery mechanismsand include penalties for agents and the providers that use unregistered agents. A scheme will require enhanced resources for investigation and enforcement if it is to be effective.
    6. There is little transparency about the transactional relationships between providers and agents. There is a lack of data on the use of sub-agents, where agents outsource recruitment, including those located in other jurisdictions. Providers may not always be aware that an agent has outsourced some or all its services.
    7. As providers are not required to record informal arrangements in the Provider Registration and International Student Management System (PRISMS), there is no Government oversight on these agent and provider relationships, and difficult to identify patterns of unethical behaviour. In addition to their own enquiries, providers rely on advice and information from the Government, peak bodies, and other contacts to manage their agent relationships and assess any new agent.
    8. Even with sufficient data, not all education providers take a proactive approach to monitoring agent behaviour which would require them to terminate the relationship with the agent. While education providers are required to outline their processes for monitoring agent behaviour in their agent agreements, standards vary between providers.
    9. In addition, the Committee has concerns surrounding the student visa system when a student transfers onshore to a new education provider. At this stage the visa risk stays with the initial provider. The Committee sees merit in the Government considering adjustments to the student visa system so that the visa risk follows the student thereby shifting to the receiving provider.
    10. Further consideration is required by Government to determine how best to improve the transparency between providers and education agents with a focus on protecting the international student during their stay in Australia and ensuring that the student receives accurate and informative information from the agent whilst studying in Australia. The Committee considers the case for mandating transparency in agent commissions is overwhelming, whereby providers would be obliged to disclose to students commission paid to their agent.
    11. The Committee welcomes the Government’s announcement that agent commissions and similar payments for all onshore student transfers will be prohibited. This would have major impacts for onshore education agents who facilitate onshore student transfers. A likely response would be for institutions to directly employ marketing and recruitment staff which would ensure they are responsible for their behaviour. Somewhat akin to changes in the travel industry where airlines progressively removed commissions any remaining agent market for onshore student transfers would need to adopt a fee for service model. This change accompanied by an overhaul of regulatory arrangements (outlined earlier) to crack down on the bottom end of the private VET market would go a long way to cleaning up the onshore problems in the sector. In implementing this measure, the new rules will need to be carefully crafted to remove the ability for agents and providers to put in place ‘workarounds’ such as marketing charges and other payments to agents, their families, staff or related entities.
    12. Finally, the Committee acknowledges the professionalism of the Department of Education and the very helpful approach taken to assisting the Committee in its inquiry. Implementation of international education policy is complex as although the Minister for Education is the policy owner, multiple portfolios have responsibilities for implementation critical to achieve government’s broad policy objectives. The Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, reporting to the Minister for Skills and Training, for example, has oversight of the vocational education and training sector. The Committee acknowledges the inherent complexity in the governance arrangements of international education.
    13. The Committee considers that Government must empower the Department of Education as the overarching policy owner so it can properly measure and advise the Minister for Education on whether government’s policy objectives are being achieved in full. This should include assessment as to whether other portfolios are playing their part and achieving their policy outcomes – for example whether quality regulation is adequate or not. The Department should ensure that there are appropriate measures included in its annual performance statement that adequately reflect its responsibilities and the importance of the sector.

Recommendation 12

5.237The Committee recommends the Government significantly improve data sharing between agencies to address serious integrity concerns, including formal information and sharing agreements and platforms between the Department of Home Affairs, the Department of Education, Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA), Australian Skills Quality Authority (ASQA), and where appropriate, the Commonwealth Ombudsman, Austrade and the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations.

Government should form or utilise an existing cross agency expert group to oversee the development of these platforms to ensure:

  • legislative basis and privacy considerations are appropriately addressed without preventing the effective sharing of information
  • platforms are sufficiently resourced to rapidly identify and track high-risk behaviours by education providers, education agents and related third parties and have capacity to map such behaviours to international student movements and student visa data
  • platforms can inform more effective and timely regulatory action to deter and disrupt international student exploitation and safeguard Australian international education and visa integrity.

Recommendation 13

5.238The Committee recommends the Government use whatever means at its disposal to compel education providers to develop information channels across sectors to share credible information and concerns regarding education agents, entities and student movements to inform and support integrity in student recruitment and delivery of international education and to disrupt non-genuine students and other entities seeking to exploit the international education sector, the student visa system, and international students.

Recommendation 14

5.239The Committee recommends the Government take firm action to address persistent and deep-seated integrity issues in the private Vocational Education and Training (VET) sector, understanding this will be a difficult and long-term reform program. Actions may require legislative changes to strengthen regulatory oversight and tough decisions and could include:

  • structural reforms to improve the monitoring and assessment of current providers and increase vetting of new providers including a fit and proper person test to operate a VET provider
  • a pause for at least 12 months by Australian Skills Quality Authority (ASQA) in processing new provider applications for Commonwealth Register of Institutions and Courses for Overseas Students (CRICOS) registered VET providers, with limited exceptions for legitimate applications such as industry linked entities, high economic value proposals or those endorsed by state and territory governments
  • requiring new providers seeking CRICOS registration to have operated and delivered to domestic students for at least 12 months
  • suspension of recruitment of international students to CRICOS VET courses identified with persistent quality and integrity issues and/or of limited value to Australia’s critical skills needs, such as management and leadership courses.
  • automatic suspension of new international student intake for providers under serious regulatory investigation
  • cancellation of a provider’s CRICOS registration if no training is delivered for a period of 12 months or more
  • an ongoing boost to the resources available to ASQA for compliance and enforcement of VET regulatory and quality requirements over time.

Recommendation 15

5.240The Committee recommends the Government implement or at least trial major reforms to how international student learning is assessed, and education quality assured for high-risk Vocational Education and Training (VET) providers and courses by working with the States and Territories to consider the following options:

  • developing a framework to assess all 932 Commonwealth Register of Institutions and Courses for Overseas Students (CRICOS) registered VET providers (excluding public Technical and Further Education providers (TAFEs)) to identify higher risk providers – the framework should be equitable and transparent, informed by both quantitative and qualitative information, though not all data sources and aspects may be public
  • subjecting identified higher risk providers to stricter compliance and accreditation requirements which may include:
  • trialling external assessments of a random selection of students from high-risk providers / courses to accurately assess education training quality, identify systemic issues and provide Australian Skills Quality Authority (ASQA) with better evidence to respond with and cancel the registration of non-genuine poor-quality providers, more rapidly
  • a full re-accreditation process for providers identified as posing the highest integrity and quality risks where providers would have to reapply for their registration with ASQA
  • a mechanism to separate the training function from the assessment function in limited circumstances for high-risk providers and / or course, requiring students to be externally assessed by an independent body or by a provider approved (such as TAFEs or a proven high-quality private provider permitted to undertake external assessments).

All of the above initiatives would be provider funded on a cost-recovery basis.

Recommendation 16

5.241The Committee recommends the Government consider differentiating visa applications for international students who choose to study at Technical and Further Education providers (TAFEs). Further considerations to support TAFEs should include:

  • Disaggregating Vocational Education and Training (VET) immigration data so that TAFE applications are reported separately
  • supporting the Department of Home Affairs to apply a risk regime that recognises TAFEs genuine commitment to providing a quality experience for international students, by providing TAFEs with the same benefits/recognition as universities under the Simplified Student Visa Framework (SSVF).

Recommendation 17

5.242The Committee recommends the Government review international education regulatory bodies to ensure the settings and frameworks empower proactive risk analysis, on-the-ground quality assurance practices and that individual complaints, especially complaints by students, are investigated within an efficient timeframe. The review should consider how:

  • agencies could maintain a list of ‘red flagged’ individuals and entities subject to serious regulatory action or serious integrity concerns, increase the degree and scope of penalties, and regulators could be empowered to be able to investigate provider and education agent or equivalent relationships
  • increase the capacity and resourcing of international regulatory bodies over time to enable the agencies to effectively conduct randomised provider checks including site visits and conduct scaled investigations into high-risk provider behaviour
  • ensure resourcing is sufficient so that agencies are equipped and capably resourced to take full advantage of, and contribute to cross-agency intelligence data gathering, pursue individual student complaints/whistleblowing allegations, and be able to report annual monitoring and investigation KPIs to be set by Government.

Recommendation 18

5.243The Committee recommends the Government amend Quality Indicators for Teaching and Learning (QILT) Surveys to include questions about education agents and equivalents that would provide more detailed information of the agent student interactions.

Recommendation 19

5.244The Committee recommends the Government:

  • review and improve protections for international students to safely report workplace exploitation, including reviewing the Assurance Protocol to ensure that students who report exploitation are protected from visa cancellation
  • examine the scale and use of Australian Business Numbers (ABNs) by international students to ensure this is not being abused as a device by employers to exploit students
  • consider a scheme of endorsement of ABN requests by international students that require oversight by their educational institution
  • consider requiring employers to undertake a very light touch registration when they employ international students (or potentially any temporary migrant), for example a simple website registration, enabling the Fair Work Ombudsman to undertake more targeted enforcement and to fine businesses found to be employing unregistered workers.

Recommendation 20

5.245The Committee recommends cross government agencies and the sector intensify efforts in implementing a targeted communication strategy to educate:

  • international students of their rights and obligations when studying in Australia
  • providers and education agents of their obligations to international students studying in Australia
  • employers and industries that are high employers of international students.

Recommendation 21

5.246The Committee recommends the Government:

  • better enforce the current rules prohibiting transfers within the first six months of commencement of a student’s primary course
  • if resources prohibit this from being enforced in all instances, at least take a risk-based approach and enforce where there is evidence of patterns of transfers linked to certain providers or agents
  • consider adjustments to the student visa system so that visa risk follows the student, shifting to the receiving providers when students transfer onshore to other providers.

Recommendation 22

5.247The Committee recommends the Government amend Education Services and Overseas Students regulations to provide that any medical letter or certification for consideration of early release can only be issued by a medical professional who is approved under the students’ Overseas Student Health Cover.

Recommendation 23

5.248The Committee recommends the Government tighten regulations to:

  • require providers to record the details of all education agents or equivalent that they receive students from into Provider Registration and International Student Management System (PRISMS) Agents Dashboard
  • require providers to have written agreements with all education agents or equivalent
  • require providers to actively monitor agent conduct including annually reviewed key risk indicators
  • enable mandatory requirements to report misconduct involving suspected trafficking to the relevant regulatory authorities.

Recommendation 24

5.249The Committee recommends the Government in consultation with the education sector and agent peak bodies develop model clauses for providers to use in their written agreements with education agents to improve integrity, consumer protection and enable more transparency of payments.

Recommendation 25

5.250The Committee recommends the Government use whatever regulatory levers necessary to mandate certain minimum requirements be included in all written agreements between providers and students to increase transparency and consumer protection including:

  • standard refund conditions
  • mandatory disclosure of agent commissions and all other payments to the agent, their employees or family, and all related entities (to avoid rorts and workaround payments that are not characterised as ‘commissions’) that are charged to the student.

Recommendation 26

5.251The Committee recommends an expansion of the current Education Agents Dashboard on Provider Registration and International Student Management System (PRISMS) to allow provider access to all education agents' information. Such an expansion should enable providers to consider an agent’s performance before entering contractual arrangements and to be able to compare agent performance or integrity concerns about individual agents across the sector.

Recommendation 27

5.252The Committee recommends, in implementing the decision to ban the payment of commissions by providers to education agents, migration agents or equivalent entities for all onshore international student transfers, the Government ensure this captures ‘marketing’ or equivalent payments to related entities and persons however they are characterised.

Recommendation 28

5.253The Committee recommends the Government accept that regulation of education agents is essential and long overdue, and that a model must be determined and implemented.Government should consider the most effective way of ensuring scrutiny of education agents given their key role in providing temporary migration advice and dealing with often vulnerable consumers. Any model will need to ensure compliance with a single Code of Ethical Practice for Education Agents setting expected standards for all education agents who work with Australian education providers. Any scheme should be industry funded through cost recovery mechanisms and have adequate resourcing for compliance and enforcement.

Recommendation 29

5.254The Committee recommends the Department of Education and the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations are each empowered to take a lead approach as policy owners for International Education with respect to their relevant policy portfolios. The Minister for Education and the Minister for Skills and Training, and relevant departments, should ensure the ongoing coordination of policy development and implementation. The Departments should also ensure that appropriate and holistic measures are included in their annual performance statements.

Senator Deborah O'Neill

Chair

Trade Subcommittee

17 October 2023

Hon Shayne Neumann MP

Chair

Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade

17 October 2023

Footnotes

[1]‘Fake schools, fake students: Criminals make mockery of education visas’, The Age, 16 May 2023, www.theage.com.au, viewed 10 August 2023.

[2] ‘Grotesque abuses’: Secret review of migration system scathing of failures’ The Age 14 May 2023, www.theage.com.au, viewed 10 August 2023.

[5]Australian Strategy for International Education 2021-2030, www.Australian Strategy for International Education - Department of Education, Australian Government, viewed 21 August 2023.

[6]Department of Education, Submission 43, p. 14.

[7] English Australia, Submission 50.1, p. 11.

[8] English Australia, Submission 50.1, p. 11.

[9] Department of Education, Submission 43, p. 14.

[10]Department of Education, Submission 43, p. 14.

[11]ASQA Submission 79, p. 8.

[15] Department of Education, Education Services for Overseas Students (ESOS) Framework, viewed 26 June 2023.

[17]www.teqsa.gov.au/, viewed 13 July 2023.

[18]www.asqa.gov.au, viewed 13 July 2023.

[19]Entry Arrangement - means a pathway arrangement under which an overseas student, who completes an ELICOS program with the provider, meets the minimum English proficiency requirements for entry with the higher education provider to study a higher education course or foundation program.

[20]Entry Arrangement - means a pathway arrangement under which an overseas student, who completes an ELICOS program with the provider, meets the minimum English proficiency requirements for entry with the higher education provider to study a higher education course or foundation program.

[21]MIGRATION ACT 1958 (austlii.edu.au), viewed 4 September 2023.

[22]Mr Charlie Shandil Assistant Secretary, Immigration Policy, and Planning Branch Department of Home Affairs, Committee Hansard, Canberra,15 May 2023, p. 24.

[23]Commonwealth Ombudsman, Submission 75, p. 2.

[24]Productivity Commission: International Education Services, www.pc.gov.au/research/completed/international-education, viewed 4 August 2023.

[25]Professor Merlin Crossly, Deputy Vice-Chancellor Academic Quality, University of New South Wales, Committee Hansard, Sydney,2 March 2023, p. 9.

[26]Ms Lisa Bolton Director, QILT Research and Strategy, Social Research Centre, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 8.

[27]Ms Alison Garrod Assistant Secretary, Temporary Visas Program Branch, Department of Home Affairs, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 May 2023, p. 2.

[28]Monash University, Submission 25, p. 2.

[29]Ms Saxon Rice, CEO, ASQA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 May 2023, p. 7.

[30]Ms Saxon Rice, CEO, ASQA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 May 2023, p. 7.

[31]Ms Karen Sandercock, First Assistant Secretary International Division, Department of Education, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 23.

[32]Professor Sarah Todd, Vice President (Global) Griffith University, Committee Hansard, Gold Coast, 17 May 2023, p. 2.

[33]Professor Sarah Todd, Vice President (Global) Griffith University, Committee Hansard, Gold Coast, 17 May 2023, p. 2.

[34]Ms Sandercock, Department of Education, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 23.

[35]Ms Saxon Rice, CEO, ASQA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 May 2023, p. 3.

[36]Ms Saxon Rice, CEO, ASQA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 May 2023, p. 11.

[37]Monash University, Submission 25, p. 2.

[38]Navitas, Submission 38, p. 6.

[40]Navitas Submission 38 p.10

[41]Hon Phillip Honeywood, CEO, International Education Association of Australia, Committee Hansard, Melbourne,18 April 2023,p. 2.

[42]Hon Phillip Honeywood, CEO, International Education Association of Australia, Committee Hansard, Melbourne,18 April 2023,p. 2.

[43]Hon Phillip Honeywood, CEO, International Education Association of Australia, Committee Hansard, Melbourne,18 April 2023,p. 6.

[44]Mr Charlie Shandil, Assistant Secretary, Immigration Policy and Planning Branch, Department of Home Affairs, Committee Hansard, Canberra,15 May 2023, p. 23.

[45]Mr Charlie Shandil, Assistant Secretary, Immigration Policy and Planning Branch, Department of Home Affairs, Committee Hansard, Canberra,15 May 2023, p. 23.

[46]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 77, p. 18.

[47]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 77.1, p. 18.

[49]Mr Kelly Smith, Pro-Vice-Chancellor, International, Murdoch University representing International Group, Innovative Research Universities, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 April 2023, p. 20.

[50]International Student Education Agents Association (ISEAA), Submission 29, p. 3.

[51]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 77.1, p. 18.

[52]National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU), Submission 28, p. 17.

[53]National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU), Submission 28, p. 17.

[54]Ms Sharon Cook, National President, ISANA International Education Association, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 11.

[55]Mr Jiahao Li, National Postgraduate Officer, Council of International Students Australia, Committee Hansard, 15 May 2023, p. 67.

[56]Navitas, Submission 38, p. 10.

[57]Mr Dean Gould, Chief Marketing Officer, Southern Cross University, Committee Hansard, Gold Coast, 17 May 2023, p. 4.

[58]Hon Phillip Honeywood, CEO, International Education Association of Australia, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 April 2023, p. 5.

[59]Ms Bronwyn Markey, Senior Professional Services Manager, Migration Institute of Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 17.

[60]Mr Troy Williams, Chief Executive, Independent Tertiary Education Council Australia, Committee Hansard, Melbourne,18 April 2023, p. 33.

[61]Hon Phillip Honeywood, CEO, International Education Association of Australia, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 April 2023, p. 6.

[62]Victorian TAFE Association, Submission 32, p. 4.

[63]Mr Pablo Carpio, Managing Director and Owner, The Language Academy, Committee Hansard, Gold Coast, 17 May 2023, p. 10.

[64]Mr Menelaos Koumides, Managing Director Australian Academy of Vocational Education and Trades, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 May 2023, p. 6.

[65]Mr Kyle Jardeau, Submission 4, p. 3.

[66]Professor Peter Dawkins, Jobs and Skills Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 36.

[67]ASQA, Submission 79, p. 3.

[68]ASQA, Submission 79, p. 3.

[69]Ms Laura Angus, First Assistant Secretary, Careers and International Skills, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, Committee Hansard Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 27.

[70]ASQA, Submission 79.4, p. 2.

[71]ASQA, Submission 79, p. 5.

[72]ASQA, Submission 79, p. 5.

[73]Ms Laura Angus, First Assistant Secretary, Careers and International Skills, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 27.

[74]‘Grotesque abuses’: Secret review of migration system scathing of failures’, The Age, 14 May 2023, Secret review of Australian migration system is scathing of failures (theage.com.au),viewed 4 September 2023.

[75]Ms Alison Garrod, Assistant Secretary, Temporary Visas Program Branch, Department of Home Affairs, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 May 2023, p. 2.

[76]Victorian TAFE Association, Submission 32, p. 1.

[77]Victorian TAFE Association, Submission 32, p. 1.

[78]Victorian TAFE Association, Submission 32, p. 3.

[79]Victorian TAFE Association, Submission 32, p. 1.

[80]Victorian TAFE Association, Submission 32, p. 4.

[81]Victorian TAFE Association, Submission 32, p. 5.

[82]Victorian TAFE Association, Submission 32, p. 4.

[83]Victorian TAFE Association, Submission 32, p. 5.

[84]Victorian TAFE Association, Submission 32, p. 6.

[85]Victorian TAFE Association, Submission 32, p. 1.

[86]Victorian TAFE Association, Submission 32, p. 6.

[87]Mr Yinfeng (Benny) Shen, Fellow of the Senate, University of Sydney, Committee Hansard, Sydney, 2 March 2023, p. 22.

[88]National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU), Submission 28, p. 3.

[89]Dr Terri MacDonald, Director Public Policy, and Strategic Research, NTEU, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 19 April 2023, p. 8.

[90]Mr Keiran McCarron, Policy and Research Officer, NTEU, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 19 April 2023, p. 1.

[91]NTEU, Submission 28, p. 18.

[92]Primary Industry Skills Commission (PISC), Submission 106,p. 3.

[93]Sydney University Postgraduate Representative Association, Submission 86, p. 5.

[94]Sydney University Postgraduate Representative Association, Submission 86, p. 5.

[95]Migrant Justice Institute, Submission 81, p. 5.

[96]Migrant Justice Institute, Submission 81, p. 5.

[97]Migrant Justice Institute, Submission 81, p. 7.

[98]National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU), Submission 28, p. 4.

[99]Under Assurance Protocol, the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) commits to generally not cancel a worker’s visa for breach of work rights if the worker is assisting the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO) with its inquiries.

[100]Dr Laurie Berg, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Technology Sydney; Co-Executive Director, Migrant Justice Institute, Committee Hansard, Sydney, 2 March 2023, p. 31.

[101]Mr Kieran McCarron Policy and Research Officer, NTEU, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 19 April 2023, p 8.

[102]Ms Sharon Cook, National President, ISANA International Education Association, Committee Hansard, Melbourne,19 April 2023, p. 9.

[103]Dr Laurie Berg, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Technology Sydney; Co-Executive Director, Migrant Justice Institute, Committee Hansard, Sydney, 2 March 2023, p. 33.

[104]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 77.1 QoN No.5, p. 2.

[105]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 77.1 QoN No.5, p. 2.

[106]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 77.1 QoN No.3, p. 2.

[107]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 77.1 QoN No.3, p. 2.

[108]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 77.1 QoN No.1, p. 2.

[109]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 77.1 QoN No.2, p. 2.

[110]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 77.1 QoN No.3, p. 2.

[111]Ms Judith Uren, Director International, Victorian TAFE Association, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 April 2023, p. 43.

[112]Ms Varsha Devi Balakrishnan, Head of Student Insights and Strategy, The Lygon Group, Committee Hansard, 15 May 2013, p. 4.

[113]Ms Judith Uren, Director International, Victorian TAFE Association, Committee Hansard, Melbourne 18 April 2023, p. 43.

[114]Ms Judith Uren, Director International, Victorian TAFE Association, Committee Hansard, Melbourne 18 April 2023, p. 43.

[115]Ms Judith Uren, Director International, Victorian TAFE Association, Committee Hansard, Melbourne 18 April 2023, p. 43.

[116]Primary Industry Skills Commission (PISC), Submission 106, p. 2.

[117]Primary Industry Skills Commission (PISC), Submission 106, p. 2.

[118]Primary Industry Skills Commission (PISC), Submission 106, p. 2.

[119]Primary Industry Skills Commission (PISC), Submission 106, p. 2.

[123]Ms Varsha Devi Balakrishnan, Head of Student Insights and Strategy, The Lygon Group, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2013, p. 4.

[124]Ms Sharon Cook, National President, ISANA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 11.

[125]Central Queensland University, Submission 90, p. 1.

[126]Professor Sarah Todd, Vice President (Global) Griffith University, Committee Hansard, Gold Coast, 17 May 2023, p. 2.

[127]Women Can Australasia (WCA), Submission 55, p. 2.

[128]Mr Gould, Southern Cross University, Committee Hansard, Gold Coast, 17 May 2023, p. 3.

[129]Victorian TAFE Association, Submission 32, p. 4.

[130]Primary Industry Skills Commission (PISC), Submission 106, p. 3.

[131]Primary Industry Skills Commission (PISC), Submission 106, p. 3.

[132]Ms Judith Uren, Director International, Victorian TAFE Association, Committee Hansard, Melbourne 18 April 2023, p. 44.

[133]Ms Judith Uren, Director International, Victorian TAFE Association, Committee Hansard, Melbourne 18 April 2023, p. 44.

[134]Mr Menelaos Koumides, Managing Director Australian Academy of Vocational Education and Trades, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 May 2023, p. 6.

[135]Mr Menelaos Koumides, Managing Director Australian Academy of Vocational Education and Trades, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 May 2023, p. 6.

[138]Ms Alison Cleary, Acting Assistant Secretary, International Quality Branch, Department of Education, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 13.

[139]Ms Alison Cleary, Acting Assistant Secretary, International Quality Branch, Department of Education, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 13.

[136]Ministers of Education, ‘Action to end rorts in international education’, Media Release, 26 August 2023.

[137]Ministers of Education, ‘Action to end rorts in international education’, Media Release, 26 August 2023.

[138]International Student Education Agents Association (ISEAA), Submission 29, p. 4.

[139]International Student Education Agents Association (ISEAA), Submission 29, p. 4.

[142]Ms Jane Li, Area Director, Australasia and Japan, IDP Education, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 17.

[143]International Student Education Agents Association (ISEAA), Submission 29, p. 2.

[144]Ms Melissa Banks, Head of International Education, Austrade, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023 p. 43.

[145]Professor Sarah Todd, Vice President (Global) Griffith University, Committee Hansard, Gold Coast, 17 May 2023, p. 2.

[146]International Student Education Agents Association (ISEAA), Submission 29, p. 3.

[147]International Student Education Agents Association (ISEAA), Submission 29, p. 3.

[148]AIRC and BONARD Research Report: State of international student recruitment and enrolment field, May 2023, State of the Field Survey — AIRC (airc-education.org), viewed 4 September 2023.

[149]Ms Lisa Bolton, Director, QILT Research and Strategy, Social Research Centre, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 8.

[150]Ms Lisa Bolton, Director, QILT Research and Strategy, Social Research Centre, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 8.

[151]International Student Education Agents Association (ISEAA), Submission 29, p. 4.

[152]University of Wollongong, Submission 19,p. 4.

[153]International Student Education Agents Association (ISEAA), Submission 29, p. 3.

[155]International Student Education Agents Association (ISEAA), Submission 29, p. 4.

[156]Ms Alison Cleary, Acting Assistant Secretary, International Quality Branch, Department of Education, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 9.

[157]Ms Alison Cleary, Acting Assistant Secretary, International Quality Branch, Department of Education, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 9.

[158]University of Melbourne, Submission 62, p. 4.

[159]ITECA, Submission 69, p. 7.

[160]Mr John Molony, Vice-President, International, Deakin University, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 42.

[161]Dr Patrick Pheasant, Chief Executive Officer, NEAS Australia, Committee Hansard, Sydney,2 March 2023, p. 17.

[162]Dr Patrick Pheasant, Chief Executive Officer, NEAS Australia, Committee Hansard, Sydney,2 March 2023, p. 17.

[163]Dr Patrick Pheasant, Chief Executive Officer, NEAS Australia, Committee Hansard, Sydney,2 March 2023, p. 17.

[164]Mr John Molony, Vice-President, International, Deakin University, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 42.

[166]Mr Jonathan Chew, Global Head of Insights and Analytics, Navitas, Committee Hansard, Canberra,15 May 2023, p. 41.

[167]Mr Menelaos Koumides, Managing Director, Australian Academy of Vocational Education and Trades, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 May 2023, p. 6.

[168]Mr Kyle Jardeau, Submission 4, p. 3.

[169]Central Queensland University, Submission 90, p. 5.

[170]Central Queensland University, Submission 90, p. 5.

[171]Corruption in Higher Education: Global Challenges and Responses, edited by Elena Denisova-Schmidt, 2020, ParlInfo - Corruption in higher education [electronic resource] : global challenges and responses / edited by Elena Denisova-Schmidt. (aph.gov.au), viewed 4 September 2023.

[172]Hon Phillip Honeywood, IEAA, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 April 2023,p. 5.

[173]Dr Angela Lehmann, Head of Research, The Lygon Group, Committee Hansard , Canberra, 15 May 2023 p.9.

[174]Report of the inquiry into efficacy of current regulation of Australian migration and education agents tabled: 21 February 2019, www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Migration/Migrationagentregulatio/Report, viewed 10 July 2023.

[175]The Dashboard records student information including if the student successfully completed their enrolment; has had their visa application refused or their visa grant cancelled; transfers to another provider; notify early cessation of their studies; have their studies terminated for non-payment of fees or disciplinary reasons; be reported for unsatisfactory course progress or course attendance or deferred or suspended their studies.

[176]Ms Catriona Jackson, Chief Executive Officer, Universities Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 12.

[177]Ms Danielle Hartridge¸ Vice President, Professional Development, ISANA International Education Association, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 19 April 2023, p. 11.

[178]University of Melbourne, Submission 62, p. 3.

[179]Mr Felix Pirie, Deputy Chief Executive, Policy and Research, Independent Tertiary Education Council Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 May 2023, p .17.

[180]Mr Robert Parsonson, Executive Officer, International Student Education Agents Association, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 21.

[181]Professor Sarah Todd, Vice President (Global) Griffith University, Committee Hansard, Gold Coast, 17 May 2023, p. 2.

[183]ISEAA, Submission 29.1, Question on Notice, 18 April 2023, p. 1.

[184]Ms Catriona Jackson, Chief Executive Officer, Universities Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 12.

[185]Ms Catriona Jackson, Chief Executive Officer, Universities Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 12.

[186]Ms Catriona Jackson, Chief Executive Officer, Universities Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 12.

[187]Ms Kim Dienhoff, Head of Government Relations, International Development Program Education, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 22.

[188]Ms Kim Dienhoff, Head of Government Relations, International Development Program Education, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 22.

[189]Ms Kim Dienhoff, Head of Government Relations, International Development Program Education, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 22.

[190]Ms Sharon Cook, National President, ISANA International Education Association, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 11.

[191]Ms Sharon Cook, National President, ISANA International Education Association, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 11.

[192]Mr Robert Parsonson, Executive Officer, International Student Education Agents Association, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 16.

[193]Ms Sharon Cook, National President, ISANA International Education Association, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 11.

[194]Primary Industry Skills Commission (PISC) Submission 106 p.2p.5

[195]Ms Jane Li, Area Director, Australasia and Japan, IDP Education, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 17.

[196]Mr Felix Pirie, Deputy Chief Executive, Policy and Research, Independent Tertiary Education Council Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 May 2023, p .16.

[197]Mr Felix Pirie, Deputy Chief Executive, Policy and Research, Independent Tertiary Education Council Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 16 May 2023, p .16.

[198]Ms Jane Li, Area Director, Australasia and Japan, IDP Education, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 17.

[199]Dr Peter Hendy, CEO, Independent Higher Education Australia, Committee Hansard, Melbourne 18 April 2023, p. 33.

[200]Mr Troy Williams, Chief Executive, Independent Tertiary Education Council Australia, Committee Hansard, Melbourne,18 April 2023, p. 33.

[201]Mr Troy Williams, Chief Executive, Independent Tertiary Education Council Australia, Committee Hansard, Melbourne,18 April 2023, p. 33.

[202]Ms Alison Cleary, Acting Assistant Secretary, International Quality Branch, Department of Education, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 9.

[203]Ms Alison Cleary, Acting Assistant Secretary, International Quality Branch, Department of Education, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 9.

[204]Ms Alison Cleary, Acting Assistant Secretary, International Quality Branch, Department of Education, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 9.

[205]Mr Charlie Shandil, Assistant Secretary, Immigration Policy and Planning Branch, Department of Home Affairs, Committee Hansard, Canberra,15 May 2023, p. 23.

[206]Department of Home Affairs, Submission 77.2 Question on Notice No. 11, p. 10.

[207]Mr Robert Parsonson, Executive Officer, International Student Education Agents Association, Committee Hansard, Melbourne,18 April 2023, p. 60.

[208]Ms Bronwyn Markey, Senior Professional Services Manager, Migration Institute of Australia, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 May 2023, p. 16.

[209]ISEAA, Submission 29.1, p. 4.

[210]ISEAA, Submission 29.1, p. 4.

[211]ISEAA, Submission 29.1, p. 4.

[212]ISEAA, Submission 29.1, p. 4.

[213]Hon Phillip Honeywood, IEAA, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 April 2023,p. 4.