- Space Command and capability
Overview
3.1Space is increasingly becoming a contested domain and Defence must be able to rapidly adapt to the ever-changing operating environment as well as ready itself for future competition, crisis, and potential conflict.
3.2This chapter emphasises the importance of understanding space in a strategic context as the ADF fosters a pathway towards greater maturity that is commensurate with allies and partner nations with more established capabilities. Understanding the importance of strategic guidance, the establishment of clear Government priorities, and how policy needs to evolve to ensure Australia can establish and retain its access to space-based operations was considered.
3.3The role of Space Command was discussed including future workforce requirements and the justification from Defence for the recent change of command of Space Command from Air Force to the Joint Capabilities Group. Academics and industry discussed the opportunities this presents as well as future challenges.
3.4The Committee heard from an array of stakeholders regarding the importance of space industry engagement and the development of greater sovereign capability. Evidence presented during the public hearings proposed mitigation strategies to alleviate concurrency pressures and the risks of over-reliance on more advanced nations including the United States (US).
3.5The Committee noted the importance of establishing a more robust global governance framework to mitigate the risks associated with Space Traffic Management, and why Australia’s participation in a such a body can improve its national security.
3.6Finally, the Committee explored the importance of fostering routine professional development opportunities with international partners. These unique experiences in the conduct of contemporary space-based operations and the use of specialist assets and capabilities will ultimately inform the ADF’s future growth requirements.
Strategic context
3.7Geopolitical ambition has resulted in increased competition in the pursuit of national space programs. Australia, along with many other countries are attempting to keep pace with the rate of technological innovation relevant to space-based operations. Governments are attempting to adjust to these new parameters as well as consider foreign policy and national security implications noting the number of active participants in space is making it congested and disordered.
3.8The changing strategic circumstances warrants a revision of current policy that informs the conduct of space-based operations. Dr Cassandra Steer from the Australian National University Institute for Space, proposed that Australia has an opportunity ‘to take a strong middle power position, in collaboration with our Combined Space Operations partner nations, to ensure space remains accessible, stable, and secure’.
3.9The 2020 Defence Strategic Update discussed a methodology of ‘shape, deter, and respond’. Dr Steer referenced the requirement that current policy should address how these objectives apply in the context of space policies, capabilities, and deployment.
Definitions and importance of Space literacy
3.10Current legislation defines a space object as:
- an object the whole or a part of which is to go into or come back from an area beyond the distance of 100 km above mean sea level; or
- any part of such an object, even if the part is to go only some of the way towards or back from an area beyond the distance of 100 km above mean sea level.
- The legislation articulates the areas of the Australian economy that is involved in manufacturing any of the following products:
- advanced manufacturing technologies or materials technologies
- artificial intelligence technologies
- advanced information or communication technologies
- quantum technologies
- autonomous systems
- robotics technologies
- positioning, timing, and sensing technologies
- biotechnologies
- space objects or products for use in, or in connection with, space objects
- other advanced technologies.
- Increased space domain awareness and understanding the interplay between policy and industry is a fundamental requirement for Defence to transition from an emerging and developing capability, to an established command that can integrate and actively participate within a global network. Mr Duncan Blake, member of the Australian Centre for Space Governance, stated:
The recent Defence Strategic Review observes that Defence has had an over-reliance on bottom-up proposals and a surprising lack of top-down direction. One of the manifestations that I see of that observation in respect of the space domain is the capability known as space domain awareness. It's been difficult for Defence to articulate from a strategic or top-down perspective what it needs in terms of the nature, amount, and features of space domain awareness.
3.13Dr Steer proposed there is currently a lack of space literacy. Dr Steer referenced there is no clear prioritisation in terms of what matters to Australia in the context of space and space-based operations. Effective space-based policy provides an agreed and well-considered set of Government priorities that informs capability needs, industry requirements, and the role of Defence in this domain.
3.14Dr Malcolm Davis, Senior Analyst from ASPI identified the requirement for the ADF to consider how it will reconstitute lost assets and augment existing allied space capabilities. Additionally, Dr Davis proposed detailed consideration is required as to how policy will enable deterrence measures, and if that fails, how will it enable Defence to respond to ensure its freedom of action in this domain, noting space-based operations will be essential for all future conflict.
Space Command role and establishment
3.15The clear articulation of respective organisational mandates is a central tenant of ensuring role clarity and promoting command accountability. The Department of Defence Annual Report 2021–22 referenced that Space Command ‘will provide centralised coordination of all Defence space-related projects and capabilities’.
3.16Dr Steer proposed this ‘this is too generic and unclear, given space related projects and capabilities are many and are integrated across all three of the armed services’. Dr Steer referenced the importance of Space Command enhancing policy guidance across the three services inclusive of positively influencing the decision-making cycle as it pertains to space-based systems.
3.17The DSR recommended that Space Command transition from the Air Force to Joint Capabilities Group from 01 July 2023, and be integrally supported by relevant funding lines and appropriate authorities to manage it. Dr Dowse proposed ‘there'll be a far greater centralised capability management of space capabilities under this new arrangement…’
3.18Air Marshal Robert Chipman, Chief of Air Force, supported this organisational change by stating that Space Command:
… in Joint Capabilities Group, and in particular, having a newly appointed Chief of Personnel that can direct workforce outcomes in Defence Space Command’… alleviates one of those friction points that exist.
3.19Space has transitioned from being an enabler to its own operational domain. Dr Bec Shrimpton, Director Defence Strategy and National Security at ASPI, referenced the importance of focusing on the enhancements and opportunities Space Command’s transition to Joint Capabilities Group provides; specifically, being able to monitor ‘counter-space capabilities being developed by potential adversaries, competitors, rogue states and bad actors’.
3.20Gilmour Space recommended establishing a pathway for Defence Space Command to become a stand-alone Service in the next three to five years. This is coupled with an ability to ‘direct and control all space activities and programs on behalf of the entire ADF’. This proposal served to achieve efficiencies in the procurement life cycle as well as the ‘short notice tasking of capabilities, such as sovereign satellite constellations and tactical launch’.
3.21Personnel requirements within Space Command may conflict with adjacent and complementary organisations. Dr Steer states that ‘[s]pace and ICT/cyber security should be more closely integrated … [and] … efforts to recruit into Cyber Operations Branch should include training and cross-postings into Space Command, and vice-versa’.
3.22Dr Steer referenced the requirement for Defence to improve its commitment to creating a diverse workplace noting ‘certain specialisations can be fulfilled by people with disabilities and would benefit from the range of perspectives offered by a workforce made up of a range of genders, Indigenous and racially diverse Australians’.
Space industry engagement and sovereign capability
3.23The creation of Space Command has prompted increased interaction between Defence and industry as well as fostering competitiveness in the development of technology to support Space-based operations.
3.24Boeing commented this newly formed command has ‘significantly unified effort within Australia’s Department of Defence, the Australian Defence Force, and industry, regarding space programs capability development, operations and developing the space workforce’. Conversely, ASPI proposed that further work needs to be done to support the commercial space sector as well as making a concerted effort to combine ‘commercial and Defence acumen into capability development, moving beyond the provider-consumer relationship that has dominated in the past’.
3.25The development of sovereign space-based capabilities enhances Australia’s national security architecture as well as strengthening its relationships with allies. Higher levels of independence enable a greater chance of sustained access to space and cyber assets during conflict. It builds trusts within alliances and reinforces deterrence measures as referenced in the DSR.
3.26ASPI stated that ‘[a] focused sovereign capability also supports burden sharing with partners, notably our US ally, and hedges against us being deprioritised for access to space in a conflict where the US is also engaged’. Mr Blake reinforced this view by referencing that a robust sovereign capability will also help mitigate the likelihood of significant concurrency pressures on the US’ access to their own commercial assets at time of competition and conflict.
3.27The US’ reliance on commercial launch will inform Australia’s analysis on future investment requirements. Maintaining access is a central tenant to be able to successfully implement any military or national strategy; therefore, a dedicated sovereign launch capability enables the flexibility to sustain operations in this domain. Investments in space ports and enabling the requisite supply chain remains a fundamental consideration for future policy settings regarding space-based operations and associated capability investment. Dr Dowse stated that Australia does not ‘have to own every asset that the military requires for space services … [w]e have a long history of burden sharing and I believe that should continue to some extent, balanced with sovereign capability’.
3.28Capability requirements are derived from directed and specific operational demands. Gilmour Space referenced that although Space is listed as a Sovereign Industrial Capability Priority, there are limited details regarding industry or implementation plans. This would enhance confidence in the Australian space sector and there is an opportunity to address this concern within the Defence Industry Development Strategy.
3.29Boeing suggested that industry has limited visibility into Defence Space Command’s capability needs and acquisition; therefore, it is unable to focus investment, technology, and collective workforce to best support the Government’s significant investment in space-based operations. Defence acknowledged that, at times, there is a distinction between the work of industry which is not well aligned to clearly articulated requirements set by the department.
3.30Air Marshal Chipman stated there is a requirement to balance a reliance on allies and international partners, and the development of a sovereign capability. This is noting the reality that some specific space services are reliant on overseas capabilities not currently resident within sovereign industry.
3.31Future space capability investments will be informed by the rapidly evolving operating environment. Gilmour Space proposed that low earth orbit (LEO) satellites, with a focus on securing a sovereign fleet should be a priority which will require an elevation of Defence Space Command’s resources and mandate. A sovereign LEO satellite constellation will enable:
- alignment with Australia’s strategic circumstances and existing capability mix
- benefits across all ADF domains and Australia’s broader security and resilience
- unique implications for Australia’s sovereignty.
Space Traffic Management and global governance
3.32Competition in space is resulting in greater congestion. Space Traffic Management (STM) refers to the ‘set of technical and regulatory provisions for promoting safe access into outer space, operations in outer space and return from outer space to Earth free from physical or radio-frequency interference’.
3.33STM will become an important consideration as international participants consider a global governance framework to support space-based operations. RAND Australia recommended the ‘Australian Government should consider engagement in pursuit of an international governance institution for [STM], as well as deciding which agency should take the lead’.
3.34There is currently no established international framework for STM. Space domain awareness forms a key component of emerging governance requirements; however, role clarity amongst primary stakeholders is still developing. There is a requirement to fuse intelligence in support of operational planning inclusive of data analytics regarding collision avoidance. However, while Defence and the Australian Space Agency consider STM as part of planning requirements, neither organisation currently has the resources, systems, and mandate to specifically conduct STM.
3.35STM is an important mitigation strategy to address the ‘Kessler effect’, as well as signalling a unified framework to potential adversaries. The Kessler effect occurs when ‘the number of artificial satellites in earth orbit increases, increasing the probability of collisions between satellites’. This is prompting greater analysis on the global benefits that ‘Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) satellites brings as well as the proliferative nature [of] LEO’ capabilities. Mr Blake proposed there is an opportunity for Australia to be more prominent in STM as well as reiterating the importance of promoting that Australia is part of a ‘normative framework’, supported by Allies, and will respond in accordance with a set of agreed principles.
Annual number of objects launched into space
*this includes satellites, probes, landers, crewed spacecrafts, and space station flight elements launched into Earth orbit or beyond
Source: United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs
Cooperation with international partners
3.36Australia can clearly benefit from strengthening international ties and relationships with those nations more advanced in space-based capabilities. This includes US Space Force and US Space Command, as well as established and emerging space powers such as India and Japan. ASPI proposed these relationships ‘should extend beyond traditional areas of cooperation (policy, operations, and architecture) and consider the role of defence and commercial space capabilities located in Australia for regional contingencies and engagement’.
3.37Defence Space Command is actively pursuing professional development and information sharing opportunities with international partners. This includes bilateral discussions and space engagement talks with the US which serve to promote dialogue on command and control, operational planning, and the generation of a specialist workforce. Australia is an active participant of exercises involving Five Eyes plus France and Germany. These involve discussions on what constitutes responsible behaviours in space and a series of ‘wargames’ that analyse potential eventualities in different scenarios.
3.38Defence provided evidence regarding the ‘Sprint Advanced Concept Training’ which is an initiative facilitated at the unclassified level that brings industry and Defence together, with the potential to integrate international partners. The intent for this forum is to promote active dialogue as to how industry and the Defence enterprise can improve space domain awareness with what is currently available – not necessarily dependent on future technologies.
Committee comment
3.39The Committee notes the changing strategic circumstances in the Space and Cyber domains and the importance of Defence keeping pace with emerging technologies and requirements. The Committee considers the forthcoming National Defence Strategy provides an opportunity for Government to clearly articulate the role of Defence within the deterrence-by-denial strategic framework, requisite policy settings, and the expectations for space-based interoperability with coalition partners.
3.40The effort Defence is already undertaking to improve its strategic considerations and awareness of space command and control, and space literacy is acknowledged. The Committee believes that Space literacy will become increasingly important as Defence continues to analyse its role and contribution within this domain, and the circumstances in which they may be called upon by Government, in response to adversarial conduct against Australia’s national interests.
3.41Evidence received during this inquiry that, at present, the role of Space Command is too broad and would benefit from a revised and more considered and focused mission statement is persuasive. This Committee welcomes the integration of Space Command, and the Cyber Warfare Division into Joint Capabilities Group and expects this will assist in enhancing role clarity as well as ensuring the planning and commitment of tasks is within a dedicated joint effects architecture.
3.42Defence’s recent challenges with lower-than-expected workforce recruitment and retention clearly pose an inherent risk in achieving capability realisation requirements within Space Command and Joint Capabilities Group. Efforts to ensure future recruiting and retention initiatives are implemented using an approach that promotes holistic growth in dedicated space-based roles are supported by this Committee. This may, however, need to be supplemented by non-uniformed Defence personnel in the short term.
3.43The Committee notes the likelihood of space-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and communication services provided by other nations to be disabled or re-tasked in the early stages of conflict. This will necessitate the requirement for a sovereign capability to replace the lost asset(s) in a timely manner; therefore, it is essential the Government refines its expectations by identifying those military response options it assesses can only be achieved by Australian industry.
3.44It seems clear from the evidence received that greater priority on Space Traffic Management is required, however, the Committee acknowledges there is currently no established international governance framework. Australia of course is just one nation amongst many operating in space and cannot alone control or determine Space Traffic Management frameworks and issues. The Committee recommends however, that greater clarity is established within Australia across Government, private enterprise, and industry regarding roles and responsibilities and realistic expectations pertaining to Space Traffic Management. Australia can clearly play a constructive role globally in refining and seeking adherence to international guidelines, including the fostering of alliances, signalling that Australia is part of a normalised global process.
3.45The Committee agrees that Defence should participate in international engagement opportunities as well as learn from more established nations within the space domain. The Committee acknowledges there will be an interim period that will see a conscious decision to gain and retain access to overseas space-based capabilities not currently resident within our sovereign industry base.
3.46Evidence indicates that Defence could better leverage and develop industry capability by more clearly articulating its current and future planning and capability requirements to trusted industry partners. As Space Command matures over the coming year, the Committee would welcome practical steps by Defence to address the apparent confusion amongst industry partners and harness their willingness to invest and develop new technology. This should include a considered priority and approach to developing greater sovereign industry capabilities while recognising that Australia will continue to rely on global allies and partners in the space domain.
3.47These non-partisan observations by the Committee are made cognisant of the fact this is an emerging domain involving highly sophisticated technologies. There are inherent challenges that successive governments have and will need to continue to grapple with, about the appropriate balance between access to allied and partner technology and developing sustainable domestic technologies and industrial capability.
3.48In transitioning Space Command to Joint Capabilities Group, the Committee recommends the Department of Defence consider evidence referenced through this inquiry to clearly articulate the role of Space Command within Defence and its contribution to the National Defence Strategy.
3.49To maximise efficiencies, promote complementary effects, and ensure clear accountabilities, the Committee recommends the Department of Defence examine the relationships and demarcations amongst all relevant inter and intra-departmental stakeholders as it pertains to the conduct of space-based operations and clarify the roles of key units/entities.
3.50The Committee recommends the Government review and clearly articulate the role and contributions of all relevant stakeholders regarding Space Traffic Management, including which agency is the lead for strategic thinking and implementation of any international governance framework initiatives/requirements.
3.51The Committee recommends:
- the Department of Defence develop a more structured and strategic approach to communicating its future capability and operational requirements to trusted industry partners
- the Government refines its expectations of a sovereign space capability by identifying those military response options it assesses can only be achieved by Australian industry in scenarios whereby services provided by other nations are disabled or re-tasked in times of conflict
- the Government makes a strong commitment to sovereign industry and capability development noting the practical realities that some systems may be difficult for Australia to deliver in the short term. Additionally, there needs to be a concerted national effort towards long-term investment in sovereign capability with the purpose of delivering assets and effects that may be vulnerable in future conflict. This will ensure less reliance upon our allies for continued access to critical space-based infrastructure
This will better leverage industry investment and technologies, and foster growth in sovereign capability in areas where that is required and realistic to do so.