Bills Digest no. 58, 2017–18
PDF version [467KB]
Don Arthur and James Haughton
Social Policy Section
12 December 2017
Contents
The Bills Digest at a glance
Expanding the cashless debit card
trial
The cashless debit card trial and the
evaluation
Issues
Purpose of the Bill
Background
History
Cash support and concerns about
alcohol abuse
Proposals for cashless welfare
The ‘Little children are sacred’
report
Income management and the BasicsCard
The Forrest Review and the healthy
welfare card
The cashless debit card
How the card works
Objectives
Policy rationale—welfare dependency
as resistance to opportunity
Committee consideration
Senate Community Affairs Legislation
Committee
Senate Standing Committee for the
Scrutiny of Bills
Policy position of non-government
parties/independents
Australian Labor Party
Australian Greens
Pauline Hanson’s One Nation
Other parties and independents
Position of major interest groups
Minderoo Foundation
Breaking the ‘welfare poverty cycle'
Reducing the harm caused by drugs,
alcohol and gambling
Limitations of the existing cashless
debit card system
Prospects for a national roll out
Cape York Institute
Banking industry
Limitations of the existing cashless
debit card system
Community engagement
Other ways to assist target groups
Professional bodies
Problems with the cashless debit card
Limitations of the evaluation
Government should consider alternative
approaches
Unions
Indigenous organisations
Discrimination and disempowerment
Poor targeting
Community engagement
Investment in services
Welfare sector
Assumptions behind the trials
Blanket application of the cashless
debit card
Inability to use cash for
non-excluded goods and services
Limitations of the evaluation
Alternative policies for reducing
alcohol and gambling related harm
Alcohol industry
Support for targeted rather than
population-based measures
Concern about impact on mixed
merchants
Financial implications
Statement of Compatibility with Human
Rights
Parliamentary Joint Committee on
Human Rights
Key provisions and issues
Repealing the restrictions on the
trials
Risk of mission creep
Technical problems that may affect
the potential for expansion
The risk of circumvention
Evaluation findings and limitations
Methods
Findings
Methodological limitations
Date introduced: 17
August 2017
House: House of
Representatives
Portfolio: Social
Services
Commencement: The
day after Royal Assent
Links: The links to the Bill,
its Explanatory Memorandum and second reading speech can be found on the
Bill’s home page, or through the Australian
Parliament website.
When Bills have been passed and have received Royal Assent,
they become Acts, which can be found at the Federal Register of Legislation
website.
All hyperlinks in this Bills Digest are correct as
at December 2017.
The Bills Digest at a glance
Under the current legislation, the
cashless debit card trial must end on 30 June 2018. It is limited to three
sites and 10,000 participants.
These restrictions are set out in Section 124PF of the Social
Security (Administration) Act 1999.
The purpose of this Bill is to remove the restrictions in
the Social Security (Administration) Act by repealing section 124PF.
Expanding
the cashless debit card trial
Repealing section 124PF will enable the Government to expand
the trial by introducing disallowable instruments to authorise individual
trials rather than through further amendments to the Social Security (Administration)
Act.
The Government suggests that this change is justified
because an evaluation of the two trial sites in Ceduna (South Australia) and
the East Kimberley (Western Australia) has demonstrated that the trial has been
successful.
The cashless
debit card trial and the evaluation
According to section 124PC of the Social Security
(Administration) Act, the cashless debit card is a trial measure. This Bill
does not amend this section.
The trial’s objectives include gathering information about
the effectiveness of the intervention. For example, the trial’s objectives
include determining whether limiting access to cash reduces violence and harm.
As a result, the success or failure of the trial hinges on the quality of
evaluation.
The Government commissioned ORIMA Research to evaluate the
first two sites: Ceduna and the East Kimberley. ORIMA has delivered two
reports, an interim evaluation report and a final evaluation report. Based on
the findings of the evaluation, the Government claimed that the trial has been
a success.
A number of researchers and interest groups have
questioned whether the data presented in the evaluation reports does, in fact,
demonstrate that the measure has been successful.
Issues
According to the Government, positive results from the first
two sites has led to a number of other communities asking to be included as
part of the trial. The amendments in the Bill will allow the Government more
flexibility in responding to these requests.
A number of interest groups support the Bill. These include
the Minderoo Foundation and the Australian Hotels Association. A number of
groups have expressed concerns about the expansion of the cashless debit card
in its current form. These include the Australian Bankers’ Association, the
Australian Council of Trade Unions, welfare sector organisations, and a number
of Indigenous groups.
There are a number issues related to the extension of the
cashless debit card trial:
- The
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights has raised concerns about whether
the measures are rationally connected to and proportionate to their objective.
- The
Government appears to be moving beyond the trial’s original objectives (as set
out in the Social Security (Administration) Act) and is promoting the
cashless debit card as a more general anti-welfare dependency measure.
- The
cashless debit card was originally promoted as a cheaper and easier to
administer alternative to the existing BasicsCard and income management system.
It was also promoted as less stigmatising because it would look like any other
debit card and would block spending on excluded goods like alcohol
automatically. In practice the cashless debit card system has fallen short of
original expectations:
-
the
card cannot automatically block purchases of excluded goods at merchants that
sell excluded goods alongside non-excluded goods (for example, merchants that
sell gift cards that can be used to buy alcohol). As a result, the Government
needs to work with mixed merchants in each location to ensure that they
manually prevent the sale of excluded goods and
- in
order to manually prevent the sale of excluded goods, merchants need to be able
to identify the cashless debit card. This means that there is the possibility
that card users will experience stigma.
- The
Department of Social Services (DSS) is looking to further develop the cashless
debit card system to enable it to automatically block purchases of excluded
goods. It is not clear whether this will be possible.
- The
current cashless debit card system may be vulnerable to circumvention.
Cardholders may find ways to get around the restrictions on spending and this
problem may become worse over time as card users find and exploit
vulnerabilities in the system. It is not clear whether this problem can be
overcome by upgrading the technology.
- Unless
they can be overcome, the card system’s current limitations may prevent the
Government from expanding it beyond a small number of regional and remote
communities. This is because the current system relies on DSS working closely
with mixed merchants (for example, supermarkets that sell alcohol as well as
groceries) to make sure they take steps to manually block the purchase of
excluded goods. While this is feasible in a small, relatively isolated regional
centre, it may not be feasible in a large town or urban area.
- A
number of welfare groups have criticised the blanket application of the
cashless debit card. Some argue that the card should only be applied on a case
by case basis to those who have problems with alcohol, drugs or gambling or
those who volunteer.
- Some
welfare groups have suggested alternative policies for dealing with alcohol,
drug and gambling problems. These policies include increased taxation on high
volumetric content alcohol products, alcohol advertising restrictions,
restricted opening hours for liquor outlets, changes to liquor licencing,
online gambling reforms, and additional investment in support services for
people with alcohol and gambling problems. Alcohol industry groups such as the
Australian Hotels Association support the cashless debit card and other
targeted measures in preference to population-based measures.
Purpose of
the Bill
Under Section 124PF of the Social Security
(Administration) Act 1999, the cashless debit card trial is limited to
three sites and 10,000 participants.[1]
The trial must end on 30 June 2018.
The purpose of this Bill is to remove the restrictions in
the Social Security (Administration) Act on the Government’s existing ability
to expand the trial by introducing disallowable instruments.
Background
Currently the cashless debit card is being trialled in Ceduna
(South Australia) and the East Kimberley (Western Australia). Indigenous people
make up approximately two-thirds of the population and 75–80% of trial
participants in each of these sites.[2]
The Government plans to extend the trial to the Goldfields region and the
Federal Electorate of Hinkler.[3]
The cashless debit card was established as a trial. Under
current legislation, the trial is limited to three sites and 10,000
participants.[4]
It must end on 30 June 2018.[5]
Because it is a trial, its objectives include gathering information about the
effectiveness of the intervention.[6]
For example, the trial’s objectives include determining whether limiting access
to cash reduces violence and harm.[7]
As a result, the success or failure of the trial hinges on the quality of
evaluation.
The Government commissioned ORIMA Research to evaluate the
first two sites: Ceduna and the East Kimberley. ORIMA has delivered two
reports, an interim evaluation report and a final evaluation report.[8]
Based on the findings of the evaluation, the Government claimed that the trial
has been a success. According to Alan Tudge, the Minister for Human Services:
The trials have been completed, an evaluation has been
conducted, and it's been shown to work and now there's an opportunity to expand
the cashless debit card to new locations.[9]
A number of commentators have questioned whether the data
presented in the evaluation reports demonstrates that the measure has been
successful.[10]
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights has also questioned whether
the data presented in the interim evaluation report shows that the measure has
been altogether successful (see below).[11]
Part 3D of the Social Security (Administration) Act
still identifies the cashless debit card as a trial measure (including, for
example section 124PC). This Bill does not remove references to the card as a
trial measure. This suggests that new sites will also need to be evaluated.
History
The cashless debit card responds to longstanding concerns
that paying income support in cash could contribute to alcohol and drug abuse
and that, in turn, alcohol and drug abuse could contribute to long term
reliance on income support. Politicians and community leaders have been
particularly concerned about the behaviour of working age Indigenous people in
rural centres and remote communities.
Cash
support and concerns about alcohol abuse
Before 1959, most Aboriginal people were ineligible for any
form of social security payments unless specifically exempted from controlling
legislation.[12]
Before the late 1960s, the Government distributed income support payment for ‘nomadic
or primitive’ Indigenous people (including those employed on cattle and sheep
stations and living on reserves or missions) through Aboriginal welfare
authorities, missions or station owners. Rather than receiving payments
directly, these Indigenous people received support in-kind with only a small
amount of ‘pocket money’.[13]
However, by the late 1960s most Indigenous people eligible
for income support payments received their payments directly. This led to
concern that income support was fuelling alcohol abuse. For example, in Ceduna
in 1974 a local Member of the South Australian Parliament called for an end to
cash payments:
Mr Gunn said that Aboriginal problems in his electorate were
being caused by the abuse of unemployment relief. “The issuing of unemployment
relief should be altered so that these people receive only rations and
clothing”, he said. “We are not helping Aborigines if they are handed money to
spend on wines”.[14]
In 1977 a House of Representatives Committee reported that
in some places ‘a large proportion of social security benefits is spent on
alcohol’ with men forcibly taking money from their wives and younger people
from older people. The Committee called for changes to the payment of income
support to prevent spending on alcohol:
The Committee believes that in cases where social security
benefits are being spent mainly on alcohol, the provisions of the Social
Services Act should be used to ensure that the purchase of food and clothing
and the payment of rent be guaranteed. The Department of Social Security
informed the Committee that there are administrative difficulties in
implementing the suggestion relating to the purchase of food and clothing. The
Committee questioned officers of the Department and concluded that the
difficulties could be overcome and that they should not prevent the
introduction of acceptable schemes.[15]
The Government did not act on this recommendation. However
the introduction of the Community Development Employment Program (CDEP) in 1977
saw social security money given to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
community organisations instead of individuals, who then paid their members to
perform community work (at the minimum wage rate). This also supported the
contemporary development of small, often alcohol-free ‘outstation’ communities,
away from larger centres where alcohol was more available. This removal of ‘sit-down
money’ was believed by communities to greatly reduce the level of idleness,
alcohol abuse and other community problems. The phased removal of CDEP by the
Howard and Rudd governments after the Northern Territory Emergency Response
(NTER), in favour of placing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians
back in the regular social security system, was criticised at the time as being
likely to lead to an increase in social ills.[16]
Proposals
for cashless welfare
More recently a number of politicians and community leaders have
proposed cashless welfare schemes. In 2003 Northern Territory Opposition Leader
Denis Burke argued that the Government should replace cash support with food
vouchers to reduce violence by ‘habitual Aboriginal drunks’.[17]
Also in 2003, Lionel Quartermaine, acting Chairman of the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Commission, proposed using smart cards as a way to control
spending on alcohol and drugs.[18]
At the time, Indigenous leader Noel Pearson said he supported the idea of
compulsory money management but said it was important to work out the details.[19]
Not all proposals were targeted at Indigenous people. For
example, in 2005 Liberal Party MP Steve Ciobo proposed that people who were
unemployed for two years or more should receive most of their payments on a
smart card that blocked access to cash and could not be used at locations such
as casinos, clubs and pubs.[20]
In 2006 Mal Brough, Minister for Families, Community
Services and Indigenous Affairs, spoke about ‘the danger of putting cash in the
hands of those with dysfunctions like substance abuse and problem gambling’ and
proposed a scheme that would ‘quarantine’ a proportion of income support
payments for families where children were at risk of neglect.[21]
He said:
The Australian Government is proposing to allow a proportion
of welfare payments, potentially around 40 per cent, to be quarantined to pay
for children’s needs in cases where children have been identified at risk of
neglect. This proposal will provide another tool to child protection
authorities.[22]
The ‘Little
children are sacred’ report
In 2007 the Northern Territory Government Inquiry into the
Protection of Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse reported that alcohol abuse
was contributing to violence and the neglect and abuse of children in
Indigenous communities. The inquiry also looked at the impact of drug abuse,
gambling and pornography.[23]
During the inquiry a number of people suggested that a proportion of people’s
income support payments should be paid as food vouchers rather than cash as a
way of limiting spending on alcohol. The inquiry’s report—‘Little Children
are Sacred’—suggested that the idea was ‘worth investigating’ but did not
include it as a recommendation.[24]
Income
management and the BasicsCard
In response to the ‘Little children are sacred’ report, the
Howard Coalition Government announced the NTER to stabilise communities and
protect Indigenous children.[25]
The NTER applied to 73 prescribed communities, with associated outstations, and
10 town camp regions.[26]
The Indigenous Affairs Minister, Mal Brough, presented the
intervention as a temporary measure similar to the Government’s response to a
natural disaster. He said that the NTER would have three phases: stabilisation,
normalisation, and exit.[27]
Because the measure targeted communities that were largely Indigenous, the
Government suspended the operation of Part II of the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975 (RDA) in relation to the NTER.[28]
(Part II of the RDA prohibits racial discrimination.) The NTER
legislation also deemed the NTER measures to be ‘special measures’ under the RDA.[29]
Income management was a key part of the NTER. Under income
management Centrelink set aside 50 per cent of income support, family
assistance payments and Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) wages
so that recipients could not use it to buy alcohol, tobacco or pornography or
to gamble.[30]
Initially Centrelink used a combination of store cards from
selected merchants (for example, Coles and Woolworths) and direct deduction
facilities where income managed funds were transferred to particular merchants.[31]
These measures were difficult and time consuming for Centrelink staff and
inconvenient and time consuming for both income support recipients and
merchants. According to the Department of Human Services, these problems ‘were
expected to get worse and the welfare payment reform initiative was therefore
at risk of being perceived as failing to meet its objectives.’[32]
After a change of government in late 2007, the Department of
Human Services developed the BasicsCard to overcome problems administering
income management.[33]
BasicsCard is a PIN protected magnetic stripe card that can
only be used at merchants approved by the Department of Human Services. Under
their agreement with the department, merchants accept responsibility for
preventing the sale of excluded goods such as tobacco and alcohol.[34]
Checkout staff may have to manually check customers’ cards to make sure that
income managed customers do not buy excluded goods such as cigarettes.[35]
A form of income management was introduced in a number of
Cape York communities in July 2008. The Cape York Institute for Policy and
Leadership developed this model before the change of government.[36]
As well as introducing the BasicsCard, the Rudd Labor
Government expanded income management to cover the entire Northern Territory
and to a number of other sites around the country.[37]
The new Government was committed to reinstating the Racial Discrimination
Act and extending income management beyond Indigenous communities helped
enable this.[38]
Evaluation findings have been mixed. For example, an
evaluation of income management in the Northern Territory reported that:
... there is no evidence of any consistent positive impacts on
problematic behaviours related to alcohol, drugs, gambling, and financial
harassment, in the extent to which financial hardships and stresses are
experienced – for example, running out of food, not being able to pay bills, or
on community level outcomes such as children not being looked after properly,
school attendance, drinking, and financial harassment.[39]
Similarly, an evaluation of Place Based Income Management (a
model introduced in 2012) reported survey results that indicated no
‘substantial or sustained impact on the level of alcohol, tobacco or gambling
consumption, although face-to-face interviews confirmed that it had been
effective for some individuals’.[40]
Evaluation results suggest that part of the problem could be
the way income management is targeted. Targeting income management to entire
categories of income support recipients includes many individuals who are
unlikely to benefit from the intervention. Evaluation findings suggest that income
management may be more effective if it is targeted on a case by case basis.[41]
Another possible explanation for the disappointing results
could be the proportion of payments that are income managed. As Minister for
Social Services in 2014, Kevin Andrews argued that the 50 percent rate of
income management used in the Northern Territory may be too low to have a
significant impact on consumption of alcohol, tobacco, gambling and
pornography.[42]
The Forrest
Review and the healthy welfare card
In 2013 the Abbott Coalition Government commissioned Andrew
Forrest to chair a review of Indigenous training and employment programs.[43]
One of the review’s recommendations was to introduce a new cashless debit card
for working age income support recipients. According to the review’s 2014
report—Creating parity:
Our thinking was influenced by the pioneering experience of
the current income management system and BasicsCard in the Northern Territory
and the Family Responsibilities Commission in Cape York. These initiatives have
demonstrated the benefits to welfare recipients of a more stable financial
environment in which rent and other bills are paid and sufficient food is
provided. This system is, however, very expensive to deliver and unaffordable
on a large scale.[44]
Mr Forrest referred to the proposed card as the ‘healthy
welfare card’ and argued that it would overcome problems with the existing
income management system.
One problem was the high cost of income management. In a
2013 report on income management in the Northern Territory, the Australian National
Audit Office (ANAO) reported that the estimated cost per person per year could
be as high as $7,900 for income support recipients in remote areas.[45]
According to the review, the cost of income management made it ‘unsustainable
and unsuitable for broader application’.[46]
The review implied that the cashless debit card would be cheaper because it
relied on existing technology.
Another problem is that income support recipients can only
use the BasicsCard at approved retailers. In contrast, the cashless debit card
could be used anywhere that accepted mainstream debit cards (except retailers
that are blocked because they sell alcohol or gambling products).[47]
Stigma was also a problem according to Mr Forrest. He
wrote that ‘the BasicsCard readily identifies its user as a welfare recipient,
unnecessarily degrading someone who has fallen on hard times’ and argued that
the healthy welfare card would be different because it would ‘look and work
like any other debit card’.[48]
Like Kevin Andrews, Mr Forrest argued that income
management allowed income support recipients too much cash. This left
recipients with enough cash to ‘fuel alcohol or drug dependency.’ He proposed
that the healthy welfare card would allow little or no access to cash.[49]
According to Mr Forrest, the ultimate aim of the cashless
debit card is to help people move off income support and into work. The card is
designed to provide ‘stability for families and individuals so they can
concentrate on finding employment, providing adequately for their families, and
sending their children to school.’[50]
The
cashless debit card
How the
card works
The cashless debit card is a Visa debit card issued by
payments company Indue. Cardholders can use their card at any physical store
that accepts Visa debit unless the store has been blocked. Cardholders can also
use the card to make online purchases at approved online stores.[51]
The card works by using merchant category codes (MCCs) to
block certain merchant categories. An MCC is a four digit code that identifies
merchants by the kind of goods or services they sell.[52]
The cashless debit card automatically blocks a number of MCCs including those covering
drinking places, packaged liquor stores, gambling venues and ‘quasi cash.’[53]
(Quasi cash refers to articles such as travellers cheques and money orders that
can be converted into cash as well as transactions related to gambling.)
However, on its own MCC blocking is too blunt. For example,
some merchants with MCCs that are not blocked may sell alcohol as well as other
goods and services. These ‘mixed merchants’ include restaurants, takeaway food
shops, grocery stores and supermarkets. To deal with this problem either Indue
or the department has to make decisions about whether particular merchants
should be blocked or approved. Merchants that sell excluded goods can be
approved if they agree to have their staff identify customers who are using the
cashless debit card and refuse to put through transactions that include
excluded goods.[54]
The Department of Social Services (DSS) is searching for a
technological solution to this problem.[55]
However it is not clear whether this will be possible.
Objectives
The objectives of the cashless debit card trial are set out
in section 124PC of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999. They
are to:
- reduce
the amount of money in the community that is available to be spent on alcohol,
gambling and illegal drugs
- determine
whether such a reduction decreases violence or harm in trial areas
- determine
whether such arrangements are more effective when community bodies are involved
and
- encourage
socially responsible behaviour.[56]
However, the Government has indicated that its objectives
for the card are broader than those set out in the Act. Ministers have said
that they hope ‘the card will assist people to break the cycle of welfare
dependency by stabilising their lives and helping them into employment.’[57]
When announcing the latest trial site in the Federal
electorate of Hinkler, Human Services Minister Alan Tudge said that there were
three indicators of success: more people moving off welfare and into work,
children better looked after, and less welfare money being spent on alcohol,
drugs and gambling.[58]
The Minister said that intergenerational welfare dependency
was a serious problem in the electorate and that the Government thought that
the cashless debit card ‘could provide that additional motivation for a capable
young person to take the jobs which are available.’[59]
Policy
rationale—welfare dependency as resistance to opportunity
The expansion of the cashless debit card is part of the
Government’s response to what it sees as the problem of intergenerational welfare
dependency. The card is part of a broader approach that aims to move
individuals off income support and into work.
Welfare dependency is a controversial idea.[60]
At its core is the idea that long-term reliance on income support can undermine
an individual’s ability and motivation to take advantage of economic
opportunity. According to this idea, while income support can protect
individuals from hardship in the short term, in the longer term it can be a
trap. Human Services Minister Alan Tudge has made this argument:
I get disappointed and frustrated that sometimes [welfare
agencies] won’t acknowledge there are very significant intergenerational
dependency welfare problems even in the presence of work. You do nobody a
favour by ignoring this key fact. In my view, long-term welfare dependency is a
poison. It sucks the motivation, frequently removes capacity, and people lose
confidence.[61]
According to Minister Tudge, increases in income support
payments or more spending on welfare services fail to solve the underlying
problem of dependency. Instead, policymakers need to look how the design of the
welfare system contributes to the loss of capacity and motivation.
Indigenous leader Noel Pearson has argued that abuse of
alcohol and other drugs is one pathway by which individuals and communities lose
their capacity and motivation to work and develop a kind of disadvantage that
is resistant to opportunity. Mr Pearson argues that certain conditions enable
substance abuse to spread:
Five factors are needed for an outbreak of substance abuse:
(i) the substance being available (ii) spare time (iii) money (iv) the example
of others in the immediate environment and (v) a permissive social ideology. If
these five factors are present, substance abuse can spread rapidly among very
successful people as well as marginalised people.[62]
Mr Pearson argues that once substance abuse takes hold it
becomes a cause of disadvantage in its own right rather than just a symptom of
underlying disadvantage. According to this view, restoring opportunity or offering
voluntary treatment will not stop the problem from spreading.[63]
Part of the rationale for the cashless debit card is to cut
off access to the cash alcohol and drug abusers need in order to continue their
habit. And if Mr Pearson’s theory is correct, applying it broadly across
working age income support recipients could also make it more difficult for the
problem to spread to other members of the community who are susceptible because
they not working or studying.
The cashless debit card is designed around the assumption
that long term cash support creates a risk of dependency. It represents an
attempt to modify the income support system to reduce this risk. As Fiona Jose,
CEO of the Cape York Institute explained: ‘The Healthy Welfare Card is about
supporting disadvantaged Australians to meet their basic needs, without setting
up dependency as a long-term destination.’[64]
Committee
consideration
Senate
Community Affairs Legislation Committee
The Bill has been referred to the Senate Community Affairs
Legislation Committee for inquiry the Committee reported on 6 December 2017.
Details of the inquiry and the Committee’s report are at the inquiry
homepage.[65]
The majority of the Committee recommended that the Senate
pass the Bill.[66]
The Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Australian Greens issued dissenting reports.
The ALP recommended that the Senate reject the Bill in its current form.[67]
The ALP considers that ‘there is an insufficient basis to establish further trials
at this stage’ and therefore recommended that the Bill be amended to:
- confine
the trial to the current trial areas (Ceduna and East Kimberley) and maintain
the current maximum participants (10,000)
- establish
a trial end date of 30 June 2019
- specify
how people in the trial areas who are on the cashless debit card can have the
proportion of their income support payments on the card reduced, or exit the
trial and
- guarantee
funding for wrap-around services.[68]
The Greens recommended that the Senate refuse to pass
the Bill.[69]
Senate
Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills
The Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills
reported on the Bill on 6 September 2017. The Committee noted that: ‘this Bill
converts authority to run a trial program into a general power to implement
that program.’ [70]
The Committee also noted that that a legislative instrument
‘is not subject to the full range of parliamentary scrutiny inherent in
bringing proposed changes in the form of an amending Bill’. The Committee
requested advice from the Minister on why the primary legislation does not
include more guidance and safeguards on matters such as site selection and
participant criteria.[71]
The Minister responded, arguing that the primary legislation provides guidance
on site selection and participant criteria and that the use of delegated
legislation ‘allows the Government, with appropriate parliamentary scrutiny, to
work out the application of the Cashless Debit Card on a community-by-community
basis’.[72]
The Committee asked for the key information provided by the Minister to be
included in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill.[73]
Policy
position of non-government parties/independents
Australian
Labor Party
The Australian Labor Party does not support the Bill.
According to a media release from Jenny Macklin (Shadow Minister for Social
Services) and Linda Burney (Shadow Minister for Human Services):
Federal Labor will support the continuation of the existing
cashless debit card trial sites in Ceduna and the East Kimberley.
However Labor will not support the rollout of the cashless
debit card to the two new proposed sites of Bundaberg and the Goldfields due to
insufficient consultation with these communities, and the widespread criticism
of the evaluation and the effectiveness of the card.[74]
Australian
Greens
The Australian Greens have called on the Government to
abandon trials of the cashless debit card.[75]
Pauline
Hanson’s One Nation
Pauline Hanson’s One Nation supports the use of the cashless
debit card. According to a recent media release ‘Senator Hanson said that she
would monitor the continued progress of the trials but was confident that the
overall benefit to Australia’s most vulnerable communities would be extremely
positive.’[76]
Other
parties and independents
At the time this digest was drafted, the position of other
parties and independents was not clear.
Position of
major interest groups
Minderoo
Foundation
The Minderoo Foundation was established by Andrew and Nicola
Forrest in 2001. The Foundation supports the Bill.
However the Foundation’s submission also argues that the
current cashless debit card system suffers from technological limitations that
make it difficult and expensive to implement. The submission argues that the
Government needs to take action to overcome these limitations. This means
upgrading to technology so that it can block purchases of individual products
types rather than relying entirely on MCC blocking:
If the Government considers expanding the [cashless debit
card] to other vulnerable communities, including in more urbanised settings, it
must invest in technological solutions that allow for ‘item-level (SKU)
blocking’. This will not only allow DSS to prohibit specific items (such as
gift cards) rather than blocking the entire merchant, but also dramatically
reduce the cost of implementation and administration.[77]
The Foundation also argues that the Bill does not go far enough
in giving the Minister discretion to determine sites for the cashless debit
card. The submission states: ‘Parliament must not unnecessarily inhibit
progress and the Minister should be empowered to implement policy that clearly
benefits all Australians.’[78]
Breaking
the ‘welfare poverty cycle’
The Foundation draws on the Forrest Review to argue that the
cashless debit card ‘can empower people to break out of the welfare cycle.’[79]
The Forrest Review argued that individuals would move into employment more
quickly because they are able to focus on their return to work.[80]
The Minderoo Foundation has also argued that the card means more children will
attend school and this will have flow on effects: ‘Education leads to training
which leads to jobs which breaks the welfare poverty cycle.’[81]
Reducing
the harm caused by drugs, alcohol and gambling
Drawing on the results of the Orima evaluation of the first
two cashless debit card trials, the Minderoo Foundation argues that the card
‘is a powerful tool in minimising the harm caused by excessive alcohol
consumption, illegal drug use and gambling.’[82]
Limitations
of the existing cashless debit card system
The Minderoo Foundation’s submission points out that the
current cashless debit card system suffers from a number of technological
limitations. While DSS has found ways to manually work around these
limitations, the submission argues that the Government needs to find
technological solutions to the problem.
The major limitation is that that the system relies on
merchant category codes to block purchases of excluded goods:
This ‘merchant-level blocking’ approach works well for liquor
and gambling outlets, but does not solve for mixed merchants that sell both unrestricted
and restricted items, or merchants that sell secondary forms of credit (such as
gift cards). Examples include a mixed-merchant pub that is categorised as a
supplier of alcohol, but also has an attached bistro, or a supermarket that
sells gift cards which can be redeemed next door at a bottle shop.
The Department of Social Services (DSS) has worked with gift
card sellers and mixed merchants within the trial communities (supermarkets,
service stations, pubs and clubs with a bistro, and other licensed restaurants)
to implement operational controls as a fix to the limitations of
‘merchant-level blocking’. This has included installing a separate payment
device at the local pub for approved bistro purchases, and the training of
supermarket staff to recognise a [cashless debit card] at the point of sale and
manually decline the transaction if it includes a restricted item or a gift
card.[83]
The submission argues that while DSS’ manual work arounds
have been effective, they are costly to administer.
The Foundation has set up a technology working group that
brings together senior executives from the banking and retail sectors in an
effort to develop a technological solution to this problem. Minderoo favours a
system that is able to block purchases at the product level.[84]
Prospects
for a national roll out
The Foundation argues that the Government needs to overcome
the system’s technological limitations before considering a national roll out.[85]
Cape York
Institute
A submission from the Cape York Institute argues that
experience with the BasicsCard shows that it is possible to create a system
that blocks spending on excluded goods. As a result, trials are not needed to
demonstrate that the cashless debit card can achieve this. However, according
to the submission, there are a number of questions that still need to be
answered.
One question is:
... whether the blanket implementation of models such as Income
Management or the cashless debit card to an entire population of welfare
recipients, is more or less effective than more targeted/nuanced approaches
such as that under Cape York Welfare Reform where only those who fail to meet
basic community standards can be subject to a clamp on their spending of their
welfare income?[86]
In the Cape York conditional income management model,
income management is designed as a ‘catalyst for behavioural change.’ In the
Cape York model the emphasis is on encouraging individuals to take
responsibility for managing their own behaviour.[87]
The submission suggests that: ‘Blunt approaches that stigmatise all welfare
dependent people as alcoholics and drug addicts may be counterproductive.’[88]
Another issue raised in the submission is whether the
cashless debit card can help individuals build the capability they need to
start the journey from welfare to work. The submission argues that success
ultimately relies on individuals changing their own behaviour and that the
‘overall goal is to increase intrinsic motivation so that change serves a
person’s own goals and values.’[89]
The Institute’s submission also argues that measures such
as the cashless debit card need to be linked to an effective welfare to work
initiative.[90]
Banking industry
The Australian Bankers’ Association (ABA) and the
Commonwealth Bank made submissions to the inquiry.
The ABA submission raises concerns about the cashless debit
card and encourages the Government to explore alternative approaches. The
Commonwealth Bank submission makes recommendations about measures to support
the expansion of the cashless debit card if the Government decides to go down
this path.
The Commonwealth Bank is a participant in the Minderoo
Foundation’s cashless debit card technology working group.
Limitations
of the existing cashless debit card system
The ABA submission suggests that the Government needs to
overcome some of the limitations of the current cashless debit card system before
any expansion:
The ABA encourages the Federal Government to give further
consideration to the program design and implementation before the cashless
debit card is extended to other areas and/or expanded. The program should not
require manual workarounds, rather it should recognise that the needs and
circumstances of welfare recipients will differ and the program should
accommodate debt management, payments and savings strategies.
It is understood that manual workarounds have been adopted to
deal with particular situations where payment restrictions would create money
management problems. For example, some welfare recipients have established
payment arrangements to help manage their money, which the program interfered
with. Additionally, some welfare recipients have repayment obligations on
loans, which the program disrupted.[91]
Community
engagement
Both the ABA and the Commonwealth Bank submissions encourage
the Government to work with Indigenous communities and other local stakeholders
when implementing the cashless debit card.
Other ways
to assist target groups
The ABA submission urges the Government to:
... explore whether there may be opportunities to progress
alternative approaches to the cashless debit card, including promoting access
to affordable banking options and supporting participation in financial
literacy and financial inclusion programs.[92]
The Commonwealth Bank submission makes a number of
suggestions for measures to support the expansion of the cashless debit card.
These include ensuring appropriate wrap-around services, empowering community
leaders to make decisions about participation in the trial and investing in job
creation.[93]
Professional
bodies
The Australian Association of Social Workers (AASW) opposes
the Government’s policy on the cashless debit card.
Problems
with the cashless debit card
The AASW argues that the cashless debit card undermines the
dignity and autonomy of those forced to use it:
... the Bill proposes that the CDC will be mandatory, permanent
and imposed on all residents of a geographic area regardless of their personal
history. Inevitably this will lead to the inclusion of some people who have
never abused alcohol, illicit drugs nor gambled. To this extent it contravenes
the expectation of fairness and assumption of autonomy that underpins welfare
support payments. People who have remained sober, who have supported their
families on limited income, are receiving the same treatment as people who have
not achieved these personal goals.[94]
Limitations
of the evaluation
The AASW argues that the evidence of effectiveness presented
in the evaluation of the first two trial sites (Ceduna and East Kimberley) is
weak.[95]
Government
should consider alternative approaches
The AASW acknowledges that there are high rates of alcohol
and drug abuse and high levels of problem gambling in some communities. However
it argues that the current cashless debit card policy is not the only option
for dealing with these problems.
The AASW argues that ‘it has not been conclusively
established that limiting cash it is the most effective long-term response to
gambling or to the abuse of alcohol and other drugs’ and suggests that
Government could consider measures that target the providers of alcohol,
illicit drugs and gambling.[96]
The AASW also suggests that the Government consider
alternative ways of using the cashless debit card or income management. The
card could be ‘voluntary, adjustable and responsive to changes in a person’s
behaviour or circumstances.’ It could be implemented through a partnership with
community organisations and integrated into measures designed to improve
opportunities for employment.[97]
Unions
The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and the
Queensland Teachers’ Union are opposed to the Bill.
The ACTU criticised the recent evaluation of the cashless
debit card trials stating: ‘the government has undertaken a rushed evaluation
designed to get the answers it wants and is using those results to justify
further intrusion into the lives of disadvantaged Australians.’[98]
The Queensland Teachers’ Union submission was critical of
the ‘privatisation of welfare to generate profits’, noting that companies like
Indue would receive thousands of dollars for each participant. The Union also
condemned claims that school breakfast programs were evidence that parents were
spending income support money on drugs and alcohol instead of food.[99]
Indigenous organisations
Discrimination
and disempowerment
The National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples opposes
the cashless debit card and argues that compulsory income management has
failed:
The Debit Card Bill repackages the worst aspects of the
income management policy introduced with the Northern Territory Emergency
Response, continued with the ‘BasicsCard’ in the Stronger Futures package and
the ‘Healthy Welfare Card’ proposed by The Forrest Review: Creating Parity.
The cashless debit card similarly continues to punish the majority for the
problems of the few; exacerbates perceptions of disempowerment; encourages
discrimination by government authorities toward Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Peoples.[100]
Poor
targeting
A submission by the Goldfields Land and Sea Council argued
that the cashless debit card should be used in a more targeted way:
In the Board’s view, the CDC as structured is poorly
targeted, inefficient, ineffective and potentially damaging. They would like to
see it redesigned to target individuals exhibiting the problem behaviours that
the scheme purports to address, without the damaging impact on responsible
citizens associated with the current approach.[101]
The Aboriginal Health Council of Western Australia (AHCWA)
argued that the card should be applied only to those who choose to opt-in and
those who are identified as at-risk on a case by case basis.[102]
Community
engagement
A submission by the MG Corporation (based in the East
Kimberley) argues that the Government did not properly consult the Miriwoong
and Gajerrong (MG) people:
While not all local Indigenous people on the CDC are MG
native title holders, the government’s failure to draw on well-established
representative structures for the purposes of consultation demonstrates a
continuation of the government’s top-down approach to the development and
implementation of policy without properly engaging Indigenous Australians.[103]
During hearings in Kalgoorlie, MG Corporation Chairperson
Lawford Benning said he had initially supported the roll out of the cashless
debit card in the East Kimberley but withdrew his support because he believed
that the Government had failed to deliver on promises such as support for the
community to deliver alcohol, drug and employment services before the card was
introduced and authority for the community to easily assess and remove people from
the card.[104]
Investment
in services
A number of submissions stressed the importance of adequate
support for services. For example, a submission from the Ceduna Koonibba
Aboriginal Health Service Aboriginal Corporation (CKAHSAC) and Tullawon
Aboriginal Health Service (THS) stated:
... there needs to be greater investment at the primary care
level to reduce the demand for [alcohol and other drug services] including
education, early intervention, counselling, supervised detoxification, referral
to rehabilitation, active case management and aftercare and monitoring
medication use for relapse prevention. There also needs to be greater
investment in the capacity of CKAHSAC and THS to provide social and emotional
wellbeing services to their communities recognising that grief, loss, chronic
stress and poor mental health are large contributors to [alcohol and other
drug] misuse.[105]
Welfare
sector
Assumptions
behind the trials
The Queensland Council of Social Service (QCOSS) notes that
much of the narrative of the cashless debit card trial draws on the idea of
welfare dependency and the goal of moving trial participants from welfare to
work. [106]
Human Services Minister Alan Tudge has argued:
...the welfare system is creating problems that we never
intended. The design and structure of it has meant that for many capable
working age people, welfare is no longer a safety net, but a destination.[107]
According to Minister Tudge, some individuals and families
become stuck in a ‘welfare cycle’ where their capabilities and motivation erode
over time. He argues that, because of the effect of dependency on behaviour,
increasing income support payments will not make people less impoverished.[108]
According to this view, alcohol and drug abuse is both a consequence and a
cause of disadvantage. The Minister has expressed frustration that welfare
agencies refuse to accept that welfare dependency is real and needs to be
tackled.[109]
It is clear that many organisations in the welfare sector do
not accept the Minister’s assumptions. For example, in her comments on the
budget, Anglicare’s Executive Director Kasy Chambers said: ‘Pushing the line
that we need to stop 'welfare dependency' allows the government to disguise
inequality as a personal failure rather than a market failure.’[110]
The Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) has
rejected the link between income support and anti-social behaviour and argues
that Government needs to address underlying problems such as lack of job
opportunities, poor education and severe health problems.[111]
In its submission, UnitingCare states:
It is our view that the card’s logic appears to be based on
the assumption that alcohol, drug use and gambling are the primary causes of
financial insecurity and poverty in the communities where it is being used. In
contrast to this view, we highlight that a number of factors contribute towards
the incidence of drug and alcohol use and prevalence in communities, as do
factors that lead towards poverty and financial instability. A nuanced
understanding of these factors and ways to mitigate them is vital in ensuring
positive long-term solutions for individuals and communities.[112]
Blanket
application of the cashless debit card
A number of submissions from organisations in the welfare
sector criticised the blanket application of the cashless debit card to all
recipients on certain payments or in certain age groups. For example, the
submission by ACOSS noted:
In the evaluation of [the cashless debit card], around 75% of
survey respondents stated that they did not drink, take drugs or gamble, or had
not changed their behaviour since the commencement of trial. In other words,
three-quarters of people affected by [the cashless debit card] either do not
engage in the behaviours the government is seeking to change or their
consumption of these goods are unchanged by [the cashless debit card].[113]
Catholic Social Services Australia (CSSA) argues that ‘blanket
application of income management to recipients who do not need can be wasteful
and counterproductive.’[114]
CSSA opposed the Forrest Review’s proposals for this reason. CSSA has argued
measures such as income management may be useful when applied on a case by case
basis but has opposed the application of compulsory measures that are not
driven from the bottom up by local communities.[115]
Inability
to use cash for non-excluded goods and services
The National Social Security Rights Network argued that the
card made it more difficult for income support recipients to buy non-excluded
goods and services at the best price:
The [cashless debit card] removes the option of seeking out
cheaper goods and services, and prevents individuals from reducing spending.
CDC holders have reported being unable to purchas[e] second hand goods or buy
items collectively in bulk. As food and other goods are typically more
expensive in remote locations, this may have a devastating effect on the
capacity for individuals to meet basic needs.[116]
According to ACOSS: ‘people on low incomes depend on being
able to find cheaper goods and services to make ends meet, but [the cashless
debit card] prevents them from doing so because of lack of access to cash.’[117]
Limitations
of the evaluation
A number of submissions discussed the limitations of the
evaluation by Orima. For example, the Western Australian Council of Social
Service stated:
Our overriding concern with the proposed legislative
extension of the Cashless Debit Card trials is the significant gap between the
actual evidence of the impacts of the trials carried out to date and the claims
being made politically about that evidence. Quite simply the evidence is not
there to support the claims of positive impacts and improved outcomes being made
by Minister for Social Services and the Minister for Human Services to justify
extending the measures to other populations and location.[118]
The Queensland Council of Social Service (QCOSS) provided a
23 page review of the evaluation as an attachment to its submission. The review
concluded: ‘there is insufficient evidence of success to warrant any further
expansion of the trial at this stage’.[119]
QCOSS also noted that the Government’s rationale for the
trial has shifted from a focus on the harms associated with alcohol, drugs and
gambling to a broader set of objectives that include reducing welfare
dependency and promoting employment.[120]
QCOSS notes that the evaluation does not provide any evidence that the use of
the cashless debit card led to improved employment outcomes.[121]
Alternative
policies for reducing alcohol and gambling related harm
UnitingCare Australia’s submission questioned the extent to
which the Government had considered evidence-based alternatives for reducing
harms related to alcohol and gambling.
Alternative policies listed in the submission included
increased taxation on high volumetric content alcohol products, alcohol
advertising restrictions, restricted opening hours for liquor outlets, changes
to liquor licensing to prevent saturation of liquor outlets, pursuing reforms
on online gambling, and looking at what additional investment is needed in
support services for people with alcohol and gambling problems.[122]
QCOSS has called on the Government to ‘(c)learly articulate
the objectives of the Cashless Debit Card and explore a full range of
alternative options to address objectives of the Cashless Debit Card.’[123]
Alcohol
industry
The Australian Hotels Association (AHA) supports the
amendments in the Bill.
Support for
targeted rather than population-based measures
The AHA argues that policies designed to reduce alcohol
related harm should be targeted to individuals and groups who misuse alcohol.
AHA opposes measures that aim to reduce the overall level of alcohol
consumption across the whole population.[124]
The AHA has opposed blanket restrictions on the sale of
alcohol and argued for an approach that recognises differences between individual
communities.[125]
When the Western Australian Government was considering introducing restrictions
on the sale of alcohol in Port Hedland, AHA WA chief executive Bradley Woods
argued that the cashless debit card should be considered as an option before
any decision to introduce restrictions.[126]
In its submission to the inquiry on this Bill the AHA
suggests including two other targeted measures in the cashless debit card trial
sites—Takeaway Alcohol Management Systems (TAMS) and a Banned Drinkers’
Register. AHA notes that these measures are a state and territory
responsibility.[127]
Concern
about impact on mixed merchants
In its submission the AHA argues that merchants that sell
alcohol as well as other goods and services (mixed merchants) risk being
blocked from accepting the card unless they are individually identified:
Because the card stops purchases of alcohol at the merchant
level, shops that serve both alcohol and food are either banned from being
allowed to accept the [cashless debit card] or, in the case of key pubs in
Kununurra, require one till specifically to process only accommodation
transactions. This developed during the trial because domestic violence victims
were unable to use the [cashless debit card] to stay at the hotel in order to
escape their situations.[128]
According to the AHA, excluding mixed merchants risks
harming the viability of businesses and inconveniencing income support
recipients.[129]
Financial
implications
The Government has not provided information on the funding
associated with this Bill because it has yet to finalise negotiations with
potential commercial providers.
In response to a freedom of information request, the
Department of Social Services provided information on the cost of the current
trial sites:
The estimated maximum cost of implementing and managing the
Cashless Debit Card trial in Ceduna and the East Kimberley from 1 July 2015 to
April 2017 is $18.9 million (GST exclusive). This includes both departmental
and administered funding for both the Department of Social Services and the
Department of Human Services and one-off costs to establish the trial.[130]
Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights
As required under Part 3 of the Human Rights
(Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth), the Government has assessed the
Bill’s compatibility with the human rights and freedoms recognised or declared
in the international instruments listed in section 3 of that Act. The
Government considers that the Bill is compatible.[131]
Parliamentary
Joint Committee on Human Rights
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights
reported on the Bill on 5 September 2017. The Committee noted that the Bill engages
and limits the right to social security, privacy and family, and equality and
non-discrimination.[132]
While the Committee accepted that the measures aim to
achieve a legitimate objective it raised concerns about whether the measures
are rationally connected to and proportionate to their objective.[133]
For the measures in the Bill to be rationally connected to their
objective, they need to be effective. However, the Committee raised concerns
about the findings of the Cashless Debit Card Trial Evaluation Wave 1
Interim Evaluation Report (conducted by ORIMA Research) noting that these
‘suggest the trials have not been definitively positive.’[134]
The Committee questioned whether the extension of the trials
is a proportionate limitation on human rights.
... the cashless debit card would be imposed without an
assessment of individual participants' suitability for the scheme. In assessing
whether a measure is proportionate, relevant factors to consider include
whether the measure provides sufficient flexibility to treat different cases
differently or whether it imposes a blanket policy without regard to the
circumstances of individual cases.
As the cashless debit card trial applies to anyone residing
in locations where the trial operates who is receiving a social security
payment specified under the scheme, there are serious doubts as to whether the
measures are the least rights restrictive way to achieve the stated objectives.
By comparison, the income management regime in Queensland's Cape York allows
for individual assessment of the particular circumstances of affected
individuals and the management of their welfare payments.[135]
The Committee asked the Minister to provide further
information. The Minister’s response has been included in Report 11 of 2017.[136]
The Committee remains concerned:
- as
to whether the trial is effective to achieve its stated objectives
- that
the measures may not be a reasonable and proportionate limitation on human
rights and
- that
the measures may not be compatible with the right to social security, the right
to privacy and family and the right to equality and non-discrimination.[137]
Key provisions
and issues
Repealing
the restrictions on the trials
Item 2 of Schedule 1 to the Bill will repeal
section 124PF of the Social Security
(Administration) Act 1999.
Section 124PF currently constrains the cashless welfare
arrangements to:
- being
trialled between 1 February 2016 and 30 June 2018
- taking
place in up to three discrete trial areas and
- including
no more than 10,000 trial participants.
The ability of the Minister to determine, by legislative
instrument, whether a trigger payment is to apply to a particular trial area or
class of person is found in the existing section 124PG of the Social
Security (Administration) Act.
Risk of mission
creep
If the Bill passes, there is a risk of mission creep. As new
sites are added and policymakers adapt the card to address community concerns,
the Government may gradually move beyond the original objectives of the
cashless debit card. Instead of remaining a time limited trial with a clear and
limited set of objectives, the scheme may become a more open ended commitment
with a broader (but not explicitly stated) set of objectives. Without clear
criteria for judging success or failure, future policymakers may find it
difficult to bring the trial to an end.
This may already have happened with income management in the
Northern Territory. Income management began as part of the Northern Territory
Emergency Response, an initiative that was originally envisaged as time
limited.[138]
Technical
problems that may affect the potential for expansion
The Government has announced that it will extend the cashless
debit card trial to two new locations—the Goldfields in Western Australia and
the Hinkler electorate in Queensland. According to a submission by the
Department of Social Services, these new sites will be ‘an opportunity to test
the scalability’ of the card.[139]
There has been some speculation in the media that the Government will
eventually roll the card out nationally.[140]
However, a submission from the Minderoo Foundation argues
that the Government needs to overcome the technological limitations of the
current card system. [141]
As explained above, the current model is expensive and difficult to administer
because automatic blocking only works at a merchant level. Currently the
Government and Indue need to identify mixed merchants individually and these
merchants need to enter an agreement with Indue to manually block purchases of
excluded goods such as alcohol. Minderoo proposes creating a new system that
can block purchases at the product level.[142]
DSS is currently searching for a technological solution to this problem.[143]
If the Government cannot find a way to overcome the
technological limitations of the current system, it may not be feasible to
expand the cashless debit card beyond a small number of regional and remote communities.
This is because the current system relies on DSS working closely with merchants
to make sure they take steps to manually block the purchase of excluded goods.
While this is feasible in a small, relatively isolated regional centre, it may
not be feasible in a large town or urban area.
The risk of
circumvention
Aside from formal agreements with mixed merchants, the cashless
debit card system relies on technology and voluntary cooperation from merchants
to prevent the sale of excluded goods to cardholders. There is no legislation
that enables the Government to enforce restrictions through measures such as fines.
This is a problem because the current system cannot
automatically block the purchase of all excluded goods. As the Minderoo
Foundation’s submission explains, the current cashless debit card system cannot
automatically block purchases of cash substitutes such as gift cards. This is a
problem because some gift cards available at supermarkets can be used at bottle
shops while other cash substitute cards can be used for online gambling.[144]
According to the Orima evaluation, researchers received
reports that cardholders were accessing:
... cash substitute cards (which were not restricted by the
Indue card) for online gambling—relevant stakeholders indicated that merchants
had been educated about the practice and most had stopped stocking the cards
and/or monitored the method of purchase and avoided selling cash substitute
cards to customers who wished to use an Indue card for their purchase.[145]
Relying on merchants to prevent the sale of gift cards may
be a more serious problem if the cashless debit card is rolled out in an urban
area where there are too many potentially problematic merchants to work with
each of them individually. Even if gift cards cannot be used to directly
purchase excluded goods, they can be sold for cash. Cards can be traded
informally between individuals, using online sites such as Gumtree or,
potentially, through businesses that buy and sell cards (a 2012 Commonwealth
Consumer Affairs Advisory Council review reported that there was a small but
growing secondary market for gift cards in Australia).[146]
The evaluation of income management in the Northern
Territory suggests that cardholders are also likely to find simpler ways of getting
around restrictions. While researchers found evidence that some BasicsCard
holders were swapping phone, power and other cards for cash, alcohol or
tobacco, a more common approach was to swap food or groceries for cash, alcohol
or tobacco. These kinds of circumvention were more commonly reported in urban
areas and among non-Indigenous people.[147]
This means that experience with the cashless debit card in Ceduna and the East
Kimberley may not be a good guide to what may happen in a larger centre such as
Bundaberg.
Evaluation findings and limitations
The Department of Social Services contracted Orima Research
to perform an independent evaluation of the cashless debit card trial.
Methods
The evaluation took the form of three waves of interviews
with community stakeholders (including community leaders, local government,
police, and service delivery personnel), one before and two after the cashless
debit card trial was rolled out, and two waves of interviews with the general
public, both conducted after the cashless debit card trial was rolled out,
which were separated during the analysis into those included in the cashless
debit card trial, family members of those in the cashless debit card trial and
those not taking part in the cashless debit card trial.[148]
Sufficient interviewees (more than 500) were contacted that the results are
statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level for outcome
differences of five per cent or greater.
Findings
The evaluation found a reduction in self-reported alcohol
consumption, gambling or illegal drug use among those who said they had
previously done one or more of these things. Thirty-three per cent of relevant
participants said that they did at least one of these behaviours less in Wave
1, strengthening to 48 per cent in Wave 2, suggesting an ongoing change.[149]
Stakeholders generally reported positive social changes, and numerous anecdotes
of improvement are included.[150]
However these positive reports were not matched by any significant change in
crime statistics or electronic gaming (poker) machine revenue during the period
of the trial.[151]
The final evaluation report cites both increases (in Ceduna) and decreases (in
the East Kimberley) in the use of community patrol services and sobering up
shelters as evidence the cashless debit card trial is having an effect, suggesting
some inconsistency in analysis.[152]
No data on alcohol sales is included and alcohol-related hospital admissions
data, which shows a slight (five per cent) decline in Ceduna, is only provided
for a short period in Ceduna but not for the East Kimberley.[153]
In addition to the key targets of drinking, gambling and
drugs, the final evaluation report claims significant additional ‘spillover’
benefits, such as an increase in the ability to save money (increased from 31
per cent to 45 per cent between waves), but also reports significant
additional negative effects, such as an increase in people running out of money
for school supplies (increased from 32 per cent to 45 per cent) and children’s
essentials (31 per cent to 44 per cent) (and running out of money for food in
Ceduna increased from 42 per cent to 52 per cent) and having to borrow money
from family or friends (increased from 50 per cent to 55 per cent).[154]
Significantly fewer people in Wave 2 than Wave 1 thought that the cashless
debit card trial had made their lives worse (declined from 48 per cent in Wave
1 to 32 per cent in Wave 2) but there was no significant increase (22 per cent
to 23 per cent) in those saying their life was better.[155]
There was an increase from 31 per cent to 40 per cent in those who said they
could care better for their children since becoming a cashless debit card trial
participant, but also a slight increase from 20 per cent to 24 per cent in
those who said the cashless debit card trial had made their children’s lives
worse, mostly because they could not give children cash or buy items for their
children with cash. Stakeholders and participants reported parents on the cashless
debit card trial taking more interest in their children’s school attendance and
performance, however there was no increase in recorded school attendance.[156]
Methodological
limitations
The design of the evaluation means that only limited weight
can be attached to many of the findings. Limitations of the evaluation include:
- the
absence of baseline qualitative or quantitative data on prospective
participants’ alcohol, drug or gambling use before the trial[157]
- the
absence of control sites (except for a limited set of administrative data) and
- the
non-randomised nature of participation, and the very limited use of
administrative or other hard data for triangulation (only data for the previous
12 months, or less, for some services, was available, and no direct
measurements of alcohol sales or other merchants’ sales were used).
These limitations mean that the cashless debit card trial
evaluation would rank at 1 or below on the 1–5 Maryland Scientific Methods
Scale (where 5 is the strongest form of evaluation), or between 5 and 6 on the
1–6 Leigh ‘Evidence Hierarchy for Australian policymakers’ scale (where 1 is
the strongest form of evaluation).[158]
Issues with the evaluation design mean that the results may have been
influenced by perceptual errors and biases. The results may also have been
affected by confusion with other programs or broader trends, such as the new
restrictions on alcohol put in place in both Ceduna and the East Kimberley
shortly before the cashless debit card trial rollout, or concurrent changes in
the Community Development Programme (CDP).[159]
Despite the final evaluation report’s attempts to explain the discrepancy as
being due to inadequate crime statistics, the lack of correlation between
stakeholder observations of less crime and no change in police reports of crime
suggests the possibility of perceptual errors, particularly since it is well
known that public perceptions of crime levels rarely correlate with recorded
crime rates, and the role of many stakeholders in lobbying for the cashless
debit card trial rollout means that their views are vulnerable to confirmation
bias or motivated reasoning.[160]
These and other methodological concerns (for example,
although participants were assured of confidentiality, IDs were recorded and
used to recontact participants, increasing statistical validity but potentially
undermining belief that their answers would be anonymous) mean that some social
scientists and commentators have cast doubt on the evaluation’s reliability.
For example, social researcher Eva Cox claims that most of the responses to the
survey used in the evaluation ‘should be seen as seriously flawed.’[161]
Janet Hunt of the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy
Research at the Australian National University is similarly sceptical about
claims that the trials have been a success. Citing the Prime Minister’s claim
that there has been a ‘massive reduction’ in alcohol and drug abuse and in
violence, Dr Hunt writes:
Someone needs to tell them [Minister Tudge and the Prime
Minister] that the report does not say that. Indeed, the authors qualify a
number of their apparently positive findings with various caveats, but, at the
same time, the evaluation itself has serious flaws, so even these findings are
contestable.[162]
Similar concerns are raised in some submissions to the
Senate Inquiry, such as the WACOSS, QCOSS and AASW submissions discussed above.
Members, Senators and Parliamentary staff can obtain
further information from the Parliamentary Library on (02) 6277 2500.
[1]. Social Security
(Administration) Act 1999.
[2]. Orima
Research, Cashless
Debit Card Trial evaluation: final evaluation report, August 2017, pp.
34, 37. See also: Orima Research, Cashless
Debit Card Trial: Wave 1 interim evaluation report, February 2017.
[3]. Department
of Social Services (DSS), ‘Cashless
debit card – overview’, DSS website, last updated 5 December 2017.
[4]. On
21 September the Government announced a fourth site—Bundaberg/Hervey Bay. See:
A Tudge (Minister for Human Services) and K Pitt (Federal Member for Hinkler), Cashless
welfare card for Bundaberg/Hervey Bay, media release, 21 September
2017.
[5]. Paragraph
124PF(1)(b), Social
Security (Administration) Act 1999.
[6]. Section
124PC, Social
Security (Administration) Act 1999.
[7]. DSS,
‘8.7.1.20
Objectives of the cashless debit card trial’, Guide to social security
law, version 1.238, DSS website, 8 February 2016.
[8]. Orima
Research, Cashless
debit card trial evaluation, DSS, August 2017.
[9]. A
Tudge, ‘Second
reading speech: Social Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card)
Bill 2017’, House of Representatives, Debates, 17 August 2017, p.
8839.
[10]. E
Cox, ‘Much
of the data used to justify the welfare card is flawed’, The Guardian,
7 September 2017; P Martin, ‘Practical
love or practically useless?’, The Age, 7 September 2017; J Hunt, The
cashless debit card evaluation: does it really prove success?, Centre
for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research Issue no. 2/2017, Australian National
University, Canberra, 2017.
[11]. Parliamentary
Joint Committee on Human Rights, Report,
9, 2017, 5 September 2017, p. 37.
[12]. D Shaw, ‘Myths
and facts about Aborigines and social security’, Indigenous Law Bulletin
26, 4(19), 1999
[13]. This
policy was justified by a widely shared belief that Aborigines were incapable
of understanding or rationally spending money. M A Jebb, Blood,
sweat and welfare : a history of white bosses and Aboriginal pastoral workers,
University of Western Australia Press, Crawley, WA, 2002; J C Altman and W
Sanders, ‘From exclusion to dependence: Aborigines and the welfare state in
Australia’, in J Dixon and R Scheurell, Social welfare with indigenous
peoples, Routledge, London, 1995, pp. 210–211. I Sinclair, ‘Answer
to a question without notice: Aboriginals: social services’ [Questioner: G
Bryant], House of Representatives, Debates, 18 May 1967.
[14]. ‘Drunken orgies by Aborigines
alleged: The white backlash’, The Canberra Times, 20 March 1974, p.
15.
[15]. House
of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, Alcohol
problems of Aboriginals: final report, House of Representatives,
Canberra, 1978, p. 54.
[16]. K
Jordan, ‘Closing
the employment gap through work for the dole? Indigenous employment and the
CDEP scheme’, Journal of Australian Political Economy, 69, 2012, pp.
30–58
[17]. P
Jackson, ‘CLP
food voucher plan’, Sunday Territorian, 30 March 2003.
[18]. V
Laurie, ‘Card
plan to save black welfare cash’, The Australian, 27 October 2003.
[19]. H
Fitzsimmons, ‘Pearson
supports welfare “smart card”’, AM, ABC, 30 October 2003.
[20]. S
Ciobo, Address to Federal Young Liberal Convention, ‘Tax
and welfare reform: a forward focus for the Party organisation’, speech,
23 January 2005.
[21]. M
Brough (Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs), Quarantining
of welfare payments in the best interests of children, media release,
23 November 2006.
[22]. Ibid.
[23]. Board
of Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse, Report
of the Northern Territory Board of Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal
Children from Sexual Abuse (Ampe Akelyernemane Meke Mekarle ‘Little
children are sacred’), Darwin, Northern Territory, 2007, p. 6.
[24]. Ibid.,
p. 171.
[25]. M
Brough (Minister for Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs), National
emergency response to protect Aboriginal children in the NT, media
release, 21 June 2007.
[26]. J
R Bray, M Gray, K Hand and I Katz, Evaluating
new income management in the Northern Territory : final evaluation report,
Social Policy Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 2014, p.
14.
[27]. M
Brough, ‘Answer
to Question without notice: child abuse’, [Questioner: D Fawcett], House of
Representatives, Debates, 21 June 2007, p. 76.
[28]. Australian
Human Rights Commission (AHRC), The
suspension and reinstatement of the RDA and special measures in the NTER,
AHRC, Sydney, 2 November 2011, p. 6; subsection 132(2) of the Northern Territory
National Emergency Response Act 2007, as made.
[29]. Subsection
132(1) of the Northern
Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007, as made. Article 1(4)
of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination provides that ‘special measures taken for the sole purpose
of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or
individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure
such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and
fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided,
however, that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance
of separate rights for different racial groups and that they shall not be
continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved’: International
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,
done in New York on 7 March 1966, [1975] ATS 40 (entered onto force for
Australia (except Art. 14) on 30 October 1975; Art. 14 came into force for
Australia on 28 January 1993).
[30]. Bray,
Gray, Hand and Katz, Evaluating
new income management in the Northern Territory: final evaluation report,
op. cit., p. 17.
[31]. Australian
National Audit Office (ANAO), Management
of the tender process for a replacement BasicCard, Commonwealth of
Australia, 9 February 2011, p. 11.
[32]. Department
of Human Services (DHS), Submission
to Senate Select Committee on Regional and Remote Indigenous Communities, February 2009,
p. 14.
[33]. Ibid.,
p. 14.
[34]. Australian
Government, BasicsCard
merchant approval framework policy guidelines, DSS, Canberra, May 2017.
[35]. Deloitte
Access Economics, Consolidated
place based income management evaluation report 2012–2015, DSS, Canberra,
27 May 2015, p. 39.
[36]. D
Arthur, Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Queensland Commission Income Management Regime)
Bill 2017, Bills digest, 110, 2016–17, Parliamentary Library, Canberra,
2017.
[37]. D
Arthur, Income
management: a quick guide, Research paper series, 2015–16,
Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 2015.
[38]. L
Buckmaster, D Spooner and K Magarey, Income management and
the Racial Discrimination Act, Background note, Parliamentary Library,
Canberra, 28 May 2012.
[39]. Bray,
Gray, Hand and Katz, Evaluating
new income management in the Northern Territory: final evaluation report,
op cit., p. 306.
[40]. Deloitte
Access Economics, Consolidated
place based income management evaluation report 2012–2015, op cit., p.
65.
[41]. D
Arthur, M Sheppard and A Grove, Social
Services Legislation Amendment (No. 2) Bill 2015, Bills digest, 123,
2014–15, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 2015.
[42]. K
Andrews, ‘Putting
welfare dollars to work’, The Australian, 18 December 2014.
[43]. T
Abbott (Prime Minister), Review
of Indigenous training and employment, media release, 8 October 2013.
[44]. A
Forrest, The
Forrest Review: creating parity, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet,
Canberra, 2014, p. 103.
[45]. Australian
National Audit Office, Administration
of New Income Management in the Northern Territory, Commonwealth of
Australia, Canberra, 2013, p. 94. According to the Department of Social
Services, it is difficult to calculate estimates of the cost per person of
administering income management in different locations because some costs are
centralised and apply across all locations (for example establishing a hotline)
and others vary between locations. See: L Hefren-Webb (Branch Manager, Welfare
Payments Reform, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and
Indigenous Affairs) Evidence to Senate Community Affairs Legislation Committee,
Official
committee Hansard, 18 October 2012, p. 72.
[46]. Forrest,
The
Forrest review: creating parity, op cit., p. 27.
[47]. A
Forrest, ‘Healthy
welfare card will protect the vulnerable’, The Daily Telegraph, 24
March 2015.
[48]. Ibid.
[49]. Ibid.
[50]. Forrest,
The
Forrest review: creating parity, op. cit., p. 103.
[51]. For
a more detailed description of how the cashless debit card works see: D Arthur,
Social
Security Legislation Amendment (Debit Card Trial) Bill 2015, Bills
digest, 27, 2015–16, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 2015.
[52]. Visa,
Visa
merchant data standards manual, Visa website, November 2016.
[53]. Indue,
‘Blocked and excluded merchants’,
Indue webpage, 2017.
[54]. D
Arthur, ‘"The
computer says no": automatic product blocking for the Cashless Debit Card’,
FlagPost, Parliamentary Library blog, 22 June 2017.
[55]. Department
of Social Services (DSS), ‘Republished:
The Cashless Debit Card - Product-level blocking at the Point of Sale’,
Digital Marketplace website, 14 July 2017.
[56]. DSS,
‘8.7.1.20
Objectives of the cashless debit card trial’, op. cit.
[57]. C
Porter (Minister for Social Services) and A Tudge (Minister for Human
Services), Cashless
debit card extended following positive independent evaluation, media
release, 14 March 2017.
[58]. A
Tudge, ‘Doorstop interview with
Keith Pitt MP’, transcript, Bundaberg, 21 September 2017.
[59]. Ibid.
[60]. For
a discussion of the concept of and literature on welfare dependency as applied
to Australia, including Indigenous people, see R Penman, ‘Psychosocial
factors and intergenerational transmission of welfare dependency: a review of
the literature’, Australian Social Policy 2006, pp. 93–107.
[61]. P
Kelly, ‘Welfare
divide: Turnbull's team is staking its claim’, The Australian, 4
October 2017.
[62]. N
Pearson and M Hall, On
the human right to misery, mass incarceration and early death, Dr Charles
Perkins Memorial Oration, University of Sydney, speech, 25 October 2001.
[63]. Ibid.
Mr Pearson’s thesis that substance abuse becomes self-sustaining has been
supported by some studies of Indigenous criminology; L Snowball and D
Weatherburn, ‘Theories
of Indigenous violence: a preliminary empirical assessment’, The Australian
and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 41(2), August 2008.
[64]. F
Jose, Letter
to the Department of Social Services, Welfare System Taskforce, Cape
York Institute, Cairns, 8 August 2014.
[65]. Senate
Standing Committees on Community Affairs, Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, Australian
Parliament website.
[66]. Senate
Standing Committees on Community Affairs, Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017 [Provisions],
The Senate, Canberra, 6 December 2017, p. 29.
[67]. Ibid.,
p. 36.
[68]. Ibid.
[69]. Ibid.,
p. 49.
[70]. Senate
Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Scrutiny
digest, 10, 2017, The Senate, 6 September 2017, p. 25.
[71]. Ibid.,
p. 26.
[72]. Senate
Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills, Scrutiny
digest, 12, 2017, The Senate, 18 October 2017, p. 136.
[73]. Ibid.,
p. 139.
[74]. J
Macklin and L Burney, Cashless
debit card, media release, 5 December 2017.
[75]. N
Walker, Greens
write to PM about cashless welfare card concerns, media release,
2016.
[76]. P
Hanson (One Nation Senator for Queensland), Communities
welcome welfare card as a helping hand, media release, 13 October 2017.
[77]. The
Minderoo Foundation, Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, 29
September 2017, [submission no. 5], pp. 6–7. SKU stands for stock keeping unit,
an individual item offered for sale. Each item will usually have a unique code
that identifies it.
[78]. Ibid.,
p. 7.
[79]. The
Minderoo Foundation, Cashless
debit card extension will protect our most vulnerable, media release,
22 September 2017.
[80]. Forrest,
The
Forrest Review: creating parity, op. cit., p. 105.
[81]. The
Minderoo Foundation, ‘Cashless debit card’,
online video, vimeo, 2017.
[82]. The
Minderoo Foundation, Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, op. cit.,
p. 3.
[83]. Ibid.,
p. 6.
[84]. Ibid.,
p. 7.
[85]. The
Minderoo Foundation, ‘Cashless
debit card’, op. cit.
[86]. Cape
York Institute, Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, September
2017, [submission no. 40], p. 5.
[87]. Cape
York Institute for Policy and Leadership, From
hand out to hand up: Cape York welfare reform project, Cape York
Institute for Policy and Leadership, Cairns, May 2007, pp. 67–68.
[88]. Cape
York Institute, Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, op. cit.,
p. 5.
[89]. Ibid.,
p. 6.
[90]. Ibid.,
pp. 7–8.
[91]. Australian
Bankers’ Association (ABA), Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, September
2017, [submission no. 35], p. 2.
[92]. Ibid.,
p. 3.
[93]. Commonwealth
Bank of Australia, Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, 4 October
2017, [submission no. 41], pp. 3–4.
[94]. Australian
Association of Social Workers (AASW), Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, September
2017, [submission no. 12], p. 3.
[95]. Ibid.,
pp. 4–5.
[96]. Ibid.,
p. 4.
[97]. Ibid.,
p. 6.
[98]. Australian
Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, September,
2017, [submission no. 27], p. 2.
[99]. Queensland
Teachers’ Union, Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, 28
September 2017, [submission no. 24], p. 2.
[100]. National
Congress of Australia’s First Peoples, Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, October 2017,
[submission no. 42], p. 5.
[101]. Goldfields
Land and Sea Council, Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, 26
September 2017, [submission no. 22], p. 6.
[102]. Aboriginal
Health Council of Western Australia, Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, 28
September 2017, [submission no. 21], p. 2.
[103]. MG
Corporation, Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, September
2017, [submission no. 6], p. 3.
[104]. L
Benning, Evidence to the Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Official
committee Hansard, 12 October 2017, p. 57. See also: MG Corporation, Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, September
2017, p. 2.
[105]. Ceduna
Koonibba Aboriginal Health Service Aboriginal Corporation and Tullawon Health
Service, Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, September
2017, [submission no. 23], p. 5.
[106]. Queensland
Council of Social Services (QCOSS), Attachment 2 to the Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, September
2017, [submission no. 45], p. 6.
[107]. A
Tudge, Welfare
Reform - Reducing dependency and setting higher expectations, speech,
24 October 2016.
[108]. Ibid.
[109]. P
Kelly, ‘Welfare
divide: Turnbull's team is staking its claim’, The Australian, 4
October 2017.
[110]. K
Chambers, quoted in: ‘Budget
2017: This budget forgets that we're all in this together’, Huffington
Post, blog, 10 May 2017.
[111]. Australian
Council of Social Service (ACOSS), Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, 6 October
2017, [submission no. 39], p. 1.
[112]. UnitingCare
Australia, Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, 29 September
2017, [submission no. 44], p. 6.
[113]. ACOSS,
Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, op. cit.,
p. 7.
[114]. Catholic
Social Services Australia (CSSA), Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, 21
September 2017, [submission no. 9], p. 1.
[115]. CSSA,
CSSA
Position — Income management and the Healthy Welfare Card, CSSA
website, 20 December 2014, p. 2.
[116]. National
Social Security Rights Network (NSSRN), Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, 25
September 2017, [submission no. 25], p. 5.
[117]. ACOSS,
Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, op. cit.,
p. 8.
[118]. Western
Australian Council of Social Service (WACOSS), Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, 29
September 2017, [submission no. 7], p. 1.
[119]. QCOSS,
Attachment 2 to the Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, op. cit.,
p. 4.
[120]. Ibid.,
p. 6.
[121]. Ibid.,
p. 6.
[122]. UnitingCare
Australia, Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, op. cit.,
p. 7.
[123]. QCOSS,
Attachment 2 to the Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, op. cit.,
p. 18.
[124]. Australian
Hotels Association (AHA), Submission
to the Senate Standing Committees on Economics, Inquiry into Restrictions of
Personal Choice, 4 November 2015, p. 4.
[125]. AHA,
Submission
to the Department of Racing, Gaming and Liquor, West Pilbara: report on
alcohol-related harm, ill-health and disorder, March 2012 (AHA submission
begins on p. 17).
[126]. E
Borrello, ‘Alcohol
industry backs cashless welfare card over Port Hedland liquor restrictions’,
ABC, 23 March 2017.
[127]. AHA,
Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, 29
September 2017, [submission no. 4], pp. 2–4.
[128]. Ibid.,
p. 4.
[129]. Ibid.,
p. 4.
[130]. DSS,
FOI
Request No. 16/17-140, DSS website, 26 May 2017.
[131]. The
Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights is attached to the Explanatory
Memorandum to the Bill.
[132]. Parliamentary
Joint Committee on Human Rights, Report,
9, 2017, 5 September 2017, p. 35.
[133]. Ibid.,
p. 36.
[134]. Ibid.,
p. 37; DSS has now released a final evaluation report. Both reports are
available from: DSS, ‘Cashless
Debit Card trial - evaluation reports’, DSS website, last updated 6
December 2017.
[135]. Ibid.,
pp. 38–9.
[136]. Parliamentary
Joint Committee on Human Rights, Report,
11, 2017, 17 October 2017, Appendix 3.
[137]. Ibid.,
p. 137.
[138]. M
Brough, ‘Answer
to Question without notice: child abuse’, [Questioner: D Fawcett], House of
Representatives, Debates, 21 June 2007, p. 76.
[139]. DSS,
Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, 29
September 2017, [submission no. 8], p. 3.
[140]. P
Wearne, ‘National
cashless card in offing’, The West Australian, 7 October 2017.
[141]. Minderoo
Foundation, Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Services Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, 29
September 2017, [submission no. 5], pp. 6–7.
[142]. Ibid.
[143]. DSS,
‘Republished:
The Cashless Debit Card - product-level blocking at the point of sale’, op.
cit.
[144]. The
Minderoo Foundation, Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social Services
Legislation Amendment (Cashless Debit Card) Bill 2017, op. cit., p. 6.
[145]. Orima
Research, Cashless
debit card trial evaluation: final evaluation report, op. cit., p. 85.
[146]. Commonwealth
Consumer Affairs Advisory Council (CCAAC), Gift
cards in the Australian market: final report, Commonwealth of
Australia, July 2012, p. 26. At the time the review was conducted there
was at least one company that bought and sold gift cards online (Cardlimbo).
It appears that this company is no longer trading.
[147]. Bray,
Gray, Hand and Katz, Evaluating
new income management in the Northern Territory : final evaluation report,
op. cit., p. 135.
[148]. Orima
Research, Cashless
debit card trial evaluation: final evaluation report, op. cit., pp.
157–67.
[149]. Ibid.,
p. 43. 32% (Wave 1) and 43% (Wave 2) of CDCT participants interviewed said they
did not drink, gamble or take drugs before the trial. It is not clear why this
figure increased significantly between waves. It may indicate sampling
problems, participants not understanding or not wishing to answer the question,
or unreliable recollections.
[150]. Ibid.,
p. 5.
[151]. Ibid.,
pp. 59–66. The evaluation reports that electronic gaming (poker) machine
revenue was lower for the period of the trial than for the 12 months before it,
however the decline in revenue began before the trial started and the data is
not for Ceduna alone but for a larger are that includes Ceduna. There are
around 140 gaming machines in the Ceduna, Streaky Bay, Le Hunte, Elliston and
Lower Eyre Peninsula area. Only around 40 of these machines are in Ceduna. See:
South Australian Centre for Economic Studies (SACES), ‘Gambling database
(EGMs)’, SACES website.
[152]. Orima
Research, Cashless
debit card trial evaluation: final evaluation report, op. cit., pp. 48–9
[153]. Ibid.,
p. 48. Alcohol sales data has been available in the past. Cf Office of the
Liquor and Gambling Commissioner (OLGC), Report on Liquor sales within
Ceduna Region, OLGC, Adelaide, January 2011, Annex 2 of District Council of
Ceduna, Submission
to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into the Social
Security Legislation Amendment (Debit Card Trial) Bill 2015, 31 August 2015
[submission no. 1].
[154]. Orima,
Cashless
debit card trial evaluation: final evaluation report, op. cit., pp.
69–73.
[155]. Ibid.,
p. 82.
[156]. Ibid.,
pp. 77–80.
[157]. The
reports of behavioural change in the evaluation are based upon the respondents’
subsequent recollections of their behaviour before the cashless debit card
trial was rolled out. This means that as well as social desirability bias
(discussed briefly on pages 50 and 149 of the final evaluation report) there is
a significant risk of inaccurate recall, particularly when alcohol and drug
consumption can themselves damage memory and cognition. The significant
increase in participants claiming that they never drank/gambled/took drugs
before the trial (footnote 149 above) may be one indication of faulty
recollection influencing results. F K Del Boca and J Darkes, ‘The validity of
self‐reports of alcohol consumption: state of the science and challenges
for research’, Addiction, 98(2), 2003, pp. 1–12.
[158]. What
Works Centre for Local Economic Growth (WWCLEG), ‘The
Maryland Scientific Methods Scale (SMS)’, WWCLEG webpage; A Leigh, ‘What
evidence should social policymakers use?’, Economic Round-up, 1,
2009, Treasury, Canberra, pp. 27–43.
[159]. While
the final evaluation report’s Executive Summary claims (p.8) that alcohol
restrictions had been in place ‘for a considerable period of time’ before the
cashless debit card trial, new restrictions on alcohol purchases were put in
place in Ceduna in September 2015 (p.40) and a new Takeaway Alcohol Management
System (TAMS) was put in place in the East Kimberley in December 2015 (p.41),
that is within six months of the CDCT rollout. The evaluation of the TAMS
system found participants could not distinguish between the TAMS and the
cashless debit card trial, believing they were all part of the one program.
Shire of Wyndham East Kimberley, Takeaway
Alcohol Management System (TAMS): a review into the effectiveness of the trial
system: January – October 2016, Codeswitch, Mt Lawley, Western
Australia, October 2016.
[160]. Orima
Research, Cashless
debit card trial evaluation: final evaluation report, , op. cit., p.
63, 73–4; B Davis and K Dossetor, (Mis)perceptions
of crime in Australia, Trends & issues in crime and criminal
justice, 396, Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra, July 2010; D M
Kahan, ‘Ideology,
motivated reasoning and cognitive reflection’, Judgment and Decision
Making, 8(4), July 2013, pp. 407–424.
[161]. E
Cox, ‘Much
of the data used to justify the welfare card is flawed’, The Guardian,
7 September 2017; Martin, ‘Practical
love or practically useless?’, op. cit.
[162]. Hunt,
The
cashless debit card evaluation: does it really prove success?, op.
cit., p. 1. The Prime Minister made the statement in an address to the Western
Australian Liberal Party State Conference in September 2017. See: M Turnbull
(Prime Minister), Address
to the WA Liberal Party state conference, 2 September 2017, p. 1.
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