Chapter 4

Cultural issues and CASA

4.1
The committee received evidence regarding the importance of the general aviation (GA) industry. The committee heard that given the size of the country, and the vast distances Australians are required to travel, a robust, thriving and safe GA industry—one that supports rural and regional connectivity and liveability—is absolutely essential.
4.2
The committee also received evidence from individuals and stakeholder groups noting that they have, over many years, been providing submissions and feedback to various reviews and inquiries regarding Australia’s aviation industry. The Aerial Application Association of Australia (AAAA), for example, argued that it has made ‘many relevant submissions over two decades on improving the management of aviation policy in Australia—with a focus on general aviation and aerial application in particular’.1
4.3
In this context, the following chapter examines the culture within the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA). The chapter outlines some of the issues raised by GA industry stakeholders throughout the inquiry, which include systemic and structural problems within CASA, persistent inefficiencies, the glacial pace of regulatory reform, a lack of consistency in interpreting regulations, staff and skill shortages, inadequate resourcing and problematic relationships between industry stakeholders and CASA.2

General stakeholder views regarding CASA

4.4
The committee received evidence which acknowledged that the task of balancing the competing priorities of promoting safety, developing systems and procedures, administering regulations, conducting investigations, and generating income would be challenging for any organisation.3
4.5
However, the committee also received a number of submissions which raised specific concerns about CASA, and pointed to the systemic, structural and process problems that exist within the organisation. The Australian Federation of Air Pilots (AFAP) noted, for example, that one of the criticisms aviation industry stakeholders most frequently made about CASA is that they are inconsistent.4 It was also argued that CASA fails to set clear and concise aviation safety standards, internal silos within CASA lead to inefficiencies, stakeholder feedback is ignored or disregarded, and efforts toward structural and cultural reform have stagnated.5
4.6
In evidence, representatives from McDermott Aviation, a helicopter company based in Queensland, wanted it placed on record that they were not ‘CASA bashers’ and that they recognise that regulators are necessary. Mr John McDermott indicated that the company works within three different authorities around the world – the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), PNG Civil Aviation and the system in New Caledonia – and submitted that they ‘operate safely and fine within those regulations, as we do within CASA’.6
4.7
Mr McDermott explained that the company’s problem with CASA is:
… that we’ve been fed a set of regulations that, to be quite honest with you, are far too onerous to understand, are very brutal to comply with and defy the Civil Aviation Act 1988, where it says that economic consideration should be given to the impact of any regulation. We would like to see the outcome of this being CASA working with us as an industry and identifying that general aviation is a big part of the Australian aviation industry…7
4.8
One stakeholder referred to the Aviation Safety Regulation Review (ASSR) Report, released in May 2014,8 and suggested that had the recommendations from the ASSR Report been implemented effectively ‘many of the problems that plague general aviation today would have been resolved’. Further, it was argued that ‘despite claims by CASA that it has acted on all of the recommendations, there is no evidence of a ‘trust and verify approach’ or ‘collaborative relationships’ between CASA and general aviation’.9
4.9
The AAAA also argued that while there have been some minor improvements, after many years, and a number of inquiries, ‘little has changed in terms of negative overall outcomes for general aviation’.10 Further, the AAAA submitted that:
While there have been some advances in CASA’s approach to the regulation of GA, these advances are not systemic, not significant in the larger scheme of regulation, not particularly impactful – and are only given up grudgingly as a last resort.11
4.10
A similar view was expressed by another submitter, who raised concerns about CASA’s Aviation Regulation Reform Program and stressed that the process has taken more than 30 years, and still remains incomplete.12 The submitter argued that:
The time and public money that this program has consumed, frankly disgusts me. I understand that regulatory change may take substantial time and expenditure, and could possibly even accept that if the desired outcomes are achieved (greater net safety benefits to general aviation and the public). However, this ongoing regulatory reform has resulted in little or no aviation safety benefits. The public not only expects more than this from public entities, but is entitled to more.13
4.11
In her submission, Ms Maude Telfer indicated that she has been involved in the GA industry for more than 40 years. Ms Telfer noted that she has seen various challenges and changes in the sector, many of which have had a bearing on aviation safety, success and sustainability and have also impacted negatively on the GA industry. Ms Telfer argued that these issues have all been caused by CASA—which she suggested has been acting as the legislator, judge, jury and executioner to the GA industry.14
4.12
Further, it was posited by Ms Telfer that CASA is ‘trying to make all GA operators RPT (airline standard)’ which could ‘cripple the industry and force a large number of GA operators to close down forever’. This led to questions about how vital community services would be provided if there were fewer GA operators and prohibitive operational costs.15

Stakeholder views regarding CASA employees

4.13
While critical of CASA as an organisation, several submitters were less critical of those employed by CASA, indicating that their interactions with individual employees had been positive and professional. Some also argued that a large number of the officers employed by CASA are highly skilled, professional and competent.16
4.14
The Chief Executive Officer of Fleet Helicopters corporate group, Mr Mike Watson, for example, argued that while CASA was having a detrimental effect on Australia’s GA industry, he was supportive of front-line CASA staff. Mr Watson indicated that:
I know this is not the case in all areas, but we have CASA staff that provide us with great service, and who have a positive and realistic attitude to aviation regulation and consistently achieve beneficial results for us in short timeframes due to our operational pressure. This, I would say, is despite the organisational culture of CASA, not because of it. In general, the staff we work with have an incredibly high workload and they are burdened with trying to find a way to achieve a positive outcome for us despite being given a poor legislative framework to operate within.17
4.15
The AFAP also indicated that the Federation’s Safety and Technical team are regularly involved in industry standard matters, and that as a result have developed working relationships with CASA staff, with ‘a high level of trust and engagement to many of these interpersonal relationships.’18
4.16
The AAAA likewise noted that there are ‘good people in CASA working towards a better aviation regulator’. At the same time however, it was argued that ‘they are regularly thwarted by an apparent indifference to good practice, standard business operating systems and a more cooperative regulatory posture’.19
4.17
Mr Clinton McKenzie expressed the view that many of the individuals employed by CASA are intelligent, professional and competent people, and argued that:
The problem is not the individuals – aside from those who impose their personal opinions on the aviation industry with a crusader’s zeal, in the mistaken belief that being in a position of power turns their opinion into an objective truth. The problem is structural. The aviation safety regulatory framework is analogous to making the police responsible for the road toll, and at the same time giving the police practically unfetered [sic] power and unquestioning political support to make whatever road rules they like, set the speed limits wherever they like and decide who can have a driver’s licence and on what conditions.20
4.18
North Queensland Aviation Services described the company’s interaction with CASA representatives on the ground, and in the field offices, as exceptional. It argued that:
The guys on the ground work very hard to support us as best they can, so we don’t have an issue with the people we are interacting with. … They know the environment we’re all operating in and they understand the challenges we’re facing and the particular idiosyncrasies of each and every business.21

Criticisms of CASA staff

4.19
Despite these positive views, the committee received evidence from several submitters raising concerns about CASA employees, and pointed to situations where CASA staff did not have appropriate qualifications, were not given access to appropriate training, or simply lacked specific experience.22
4.20
Ms Telfer submitted that CASA does not understand how the GA industry works and, as a consequence, CASA employees do not ‘have the required GA experience to make informed decisions about this sector of air services’.23
4.21
One organisation which described its interactions and relationships with CASA staff as less than positive was the Australian Helicopter Association (AHA). The AHA argued that a lack of qualifications, training and experience among CASA staff has caused ongoing problems for the helicopter industry.24
4.22
The AHA also submitted that:
CASA’s functions are not being applied or exercised uniformly across all regional offices;
oversight of regional offices (and poorly performing CASA staff within them) has not been strong;
CASA does not appear to have sufficient will to take action against, or re-educate underperforming staff; and
there are some Flight Operations Inspectors (FOI) who are not appropriately qualified or experienced to oversee complex company flight operations (with many examples where the FOI is considerably less qualified than the aircrew being tested).25

The CASA Code of Conduct

4.23
These unfavourable comments about CASA’s staff should be considered alongside CASA’s 2019-20 Annual Report, which details the expectations of CASA staff and the Code of Conduct.
4.24
CASA’s Code of Conduct outlines the standard of behaviour expected of its employees. It is promoted to new employees during their orientation, and covered in on-line training for all staff. During 2019-20, in consultation with staff, CASA revised its Values and Code of Conduct (and associated procedures). CASA’s Annual Report noted that during 2019-20, two Code of Conduct allegations were referred for further investigation. Both matters were finalised, and resulted in five employees being found in breach of the Code of Conduct and three employees receiving formal reprimands.26
4.25
It was noted that CASA managers continue to resolve lower-level workplace issues through its Performance and Communication Scheme, (and alternative dispute resolution methods) or communication to raise awareness of appropriate behaviour in the workplace.27

Resourcing, training and corporate knowledge of CASA staff

4.26
Several of the submitters who were critical of CASA employees argued that a lack of resources and appropriate training for staff has seen a progressive deskilling of the organisation, further adding to CASA’s problems.
4.27
One submitter, a Licenced Aircraft Maintenance Engineer (LAME) and a former CASA employee, argued that with each change of Director/CEO, there has been a progressive deskilling of CASA’s inspectorate. The LAME submitted that the industry is a fast developing one, which is often required to deal with significant advances in technology. It was noted, however, that:
… little opportunity is provided to staff to upskill and/or maintain their tradecraft knowledge base. From a regulatory aspect most CASA based staff training courses are designed to be a tick and flick exercise to meet external audit expectations, these external audits (typically [International Civil Aviation Organization] and the FAA) do not delve sufficiently enough to look at course feedback and interview employees as to the worth/effectiveness or adequacy of the training.28
4.28
Professionals Australia – the union which represents professionals working in both the aviation industry and the Australian Public Service – noted that civil aviation underpins Australia’s business and tourism sectors. It was submitted that given these sectors have an estimated annual revenue of approximately $43.54 billion, the safe and reliable functioning of commercial and general aviation is in the national interest. It was also argued, however, that this is currently not the case, and ‘despite their essential role in delivering CASA’s mission, the technical workforce is in crisis’.29
4.29
Professionals Australia pointed to ‘understaffing, workload intensification, and a seemingly endless process of restructuring’ as some of the problems that are ‘stretching the technical workforce to its limits’. Further, it was argued that retirements, resignations and redundancies, technical positions that remain unfilled, a reduction in corporate knowledge and decreased oversight are adding to CASA’s problems and putting Australia’s aviation safety record at risk. 30 The union noted that the decrease in the number of technical staff was having a number of impacts, such as:
without a plan to transfer knowledge from existing staff to new staff, CASA is losing corporate knowledge and becoming less informed and capable as a regulator;
there is a greater reliance on remaining staff to manage the workload with fewer staff resources; and
workloads are intensified as a shrinking pool of professionals need to become adept at performing a broader range of tasks.31
4.30
Professionals Australia argued that a number of the problems which have arisen in CASA are the result of constant restructures and frequently changing workplace policies and procedures. It further submitted that these problems were exacerbated by senior management’s top-down approach to managing workplace change and its failure to adequately engage with the workforce.32
4.31
The union argued that not explaining issues, or involving CASA staff in workplace change, has resulted in employees feeling isolated and ignored, and as though they are somehow separate to the changes being implemented. It recommended, therefore, that an ‘independent, systemic review of CASA’s organisational culture must be undertaken to address the serious issues in culture, confidence, and engagement of employees’.33
4.32
The Australian Licenced Aircraft Engineers Association (ALAEA) indicated that it has been involved in a number of CASA’s Technical Working Groups, and noted that:
…what has become very clear is the lack of appropriate resourcing in CASA’s Aviation Standards group to acquit the work required to develop and promulgate the appropriate, clear and concise aviation safety standards in the manner required by the Act.34

Case study – resources for training and maintenance

4.33
In evidence, Mr Stephen Re, a Technical Manager with ALAEA indicated that the introduction in 2011 of European-style legislation for licensing was specifically designed for large aircraft operators. Mr Re submitted that, as a result, the new legislation had had an impact on helicopter training. A commercial training course is now required to fly particular types of helicopter, where once this had been covered under a pilot’s licence.
4.34
Mr Re noted that he had been trying to have this change rectified for five years, and told the committee that:
Recently, there’s been a little bit of movement, and they’ve recognised that that’s an issue, but it’s five years since the regulation took effect. CASA were aware that it was an issue. They simply said: ‘We don’t have the resources within the regulator to try to correct what we put in place.’ And that’s one of the biggest issues, too: that there’s a real lack of resourcing being put towards aircraft maintenance and licensing and engineering. I feel for the people who work there, because they’re struggling under the load, or struggling with: ‘We want to put in in a regulation, but we don’t have any drafting capacity,’ and they have to wait for what they call the sixpack, or the flight-ops regs, to be done first, and it’s been like that for 10 years, and I’m not seeing much progress go forward.35

Lack of consistency in regulatory interpretation

4.35
As noted earlier in this chapter, one of the issues frequently raised by those critical of CASA is a lack of consistency—particularly in relation to the interpretation of regulations and policy. This lack of consistency and poor interpretation of the legislative framework is arguably related to the evidence regarding a lack of adequate resourcing and retention of corporate knowledge amongst CASA staff.
4.36
The AAAA drew attention to the findings and recommendations of previous reviews into aviation safety regulation,36 which found that ‘individual officers within CASA continue to make interpretations that are not bound by regulatory heads of power, consistency, experience, sector knowledge or specific safety risks’.37 The AAAA described it as a case of ‘opinion parading as policy – and frequently ill-informed opinion’, and argued that:
CASA continues to lack a coherent, centralised policy interpretation and expertise centre to standardise regulation. Different offices have different interpretations, and generally CASA is not troubled by using subject matter experts that it may have on staff – as there is no centralised policy development system.
In a modern regulator that had this pointed out to them in an independent review (the [Aviation Safety Regulation Review]), serious questions must be raised about why this situation is perpetuated by senior management.38
4.37
In evidence, Mr John McDermott told the committee that: ‘Factually, the only thing consistent within CASA is the inconsistency’.39 McDermott Aviation submitted that it was not unusual for multiple CASA staff to disagree on outcomes and possible pathways – and frequently these staff are within the same office. A situation was described where there were different interpretations (around helicopter types used for firefighting) between CASA staff. It was submitted that a conclusion regarding an appropriate action had been reached with two CASA inspectors (in August 2019), however then:
… their management got hold of it and it went around and around in circles. We got an exemption in January of this year to actually do what those two flying operations inspectors had suggested that we were going to do in August last year but were overridden.40
4.38
Mr Tim Vercoe, McDermott Aviation’s Quality and Safety Manager, also told the committee that:
Sometimes it’s not about the adverse finding or the adverse interpretation that’s the problem: it’s the interminable discussion about it, or the differences of opinion that just make things just go longer and longer. It’s death by attrition, rather than by an act, in some of those findings, and those time frames can be killers for smaller organisations.41
4.39
CASA’s submission indicated that, to ‘ensure consistency in the interpretation and application of the [Civil Aviation Safety Regulations]’ the organisation is currently ‘managing an organisational transition from a decentralised model to a functional model for regulatory oversight; the hallmark of which will be a consistent and centralised solution’. It was noted that the new Regulatory Oversight Division would consist of four functions: national oversight strategy and planning, guidance delivery, regulatory services and regulatory surveillance.42
4.40
When responding to the committee’s questions regarding the issue of consistency, CASA’s then CEO, Mr Shane Carmody indicated that CASA was restructuring the organisation to create a central guidance function. He told the committee that:
What we are proposing in terms of guidance is that our local officers will always have one place to go – only one place – to seek guidance before they make a regulatory decision, so we will always be consistent across the country. We have trialled the arrangement already. We’ve said that we’ll put the same arrangement in place for review of fatigue rules, so the same people will look at all of the applications for relief-from-fatigue rules. So we are moving very much to that centralised function, and it’s taken a long time, but it is a fundamental structural change to the organisation.43
4.41
Mr Carmody also noted that developing a new process, and a new approach to consistency had been quite challenging because:
… consistency and outcomes based regulation don’t always work together, if I can put it that way. Consistency can be binary. We are trying to come up with consistent decisions to complex regulatory matters that can apply across the country and it is quite a challenge.44

Lack of consultation with stakeholders

4.42
The way in which CASA undertakes consultation was also raised by stakeholders as an issue of concern. In addition to evidence which suggested that CASA does not fully understand how the GA industry works, stakeholders pointed to changes which are made by CASA without consideration of their impact on GA. Ms Maude Telfer argued, for example, that:
When CASA changes a rule, they do not check to see how much of an impact it will have on pilots, engineers, aircraft operators and nor do they think of the cost burden for the industry. When CASA put out a change of rule to industry for ‘feedback’, the decisions have already been made and therefore comments and feedback will have no influence on the rule change at all. CASA do it just to make them look good and to justify their existence.45
4.43
Ms Telfer also noted that she had at one time been involved with the Regional Airspace Procedures Advisory Committee (RAPAC). CASA had set up the committee with a view to industry stakeholders being able to provide feedback on proposed rule changes. Involvement in the committee was voluntary, and members attended meetings at their own cost. Ms Telfer submitted that it had been her experience that member feedback and input was often ignored by CASA employees. She noted that CASA employees did not like to be challenged by RAPAC members who often had ‘far greater knowledge’ of the subject matter and the effects of proposed changes to the GA industry. Further, Ms Telfer argued that:
CASA only want to be right and did not want more experienced and knowledgeable industry people putting forward sensible and sustainable proposals. This is another example of CASA’s unconscionable misconduct.46
4.44
The Royal Federation of Aero Clubs of Australia, also submitted that, even though CASA has introduced mechanisms for both formal and informal consultation with the GA sector, the relationship remains sub-optimal.
It is reasonable to speculate that CASA’s corporate culture is a poor fit for the task it has been given. Its mandate is an exclusive focus on only one aspect of aviation – safety – and it adopts a technocratic approach to regulating a highly technical industry… It leads to inflexibility, needless complexity (which drains internal resources and drives up external costs) and a lack of self-criticism and organisational renewal.47
4.45
The Regional Aviation Association of Australia (RAAA) was, however, more positive about its involvement in CASA’s consultation forums. The RAAA argued that the ‘efficacy of CASA’s engagement with the aviation sector, including via public consultation, has never been better’.48 It submitted that:
The formation of the Aviation Safety Advisory Panel and the applicable Technical Working Groups brings significant and relevant industry expertise directly to the tables of senior leaders in CASA. The resulting undiluted intelligence leaves CASA with the most up to date and relevant [information on the] state of the industry. This system needs to maintained and protected at all costs.49

CASA’s accountability, governance and complaints processes

4.46
As previously noted, the aviation industry has, over a period of many years, raised concerns about CASA’s governance, the cost of regulatory compliance, the progress of the regulatory reform process, the organisation’s interactions with the aviation industry, its level of accountability and the need for an effective, and impartial complaints process.

Aviation Safety Regulation Review

4.47
In response to these concerns, in November 2013 the Federal Government announced that it had commissioned an independent review of aviation safety regulation. The Aviation Safety Regulation Review (ASRR) was to be conducted and led by a Panel of three experienced members of the international aviation community. Mr David Forsyth, AM was appointed Panel Chair, while Mr Don Spruston and Mr Roger Whitefield acted as Panel Members.50
4.48
In making the announcement, the Hon. Warren Truss MP, then Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development, indicated that the ASRR Review would:
consider the structures, effectiveness and processes of all agencies involved in aviation safety, and the relationships and interactions of those agencies as they work together in one system;
consider the outcomes and direction of the regulatory reform process undertaken by CASA, and benchmark Australia’s safety regulations against other leading countries; and
take into account the issues raised in the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee’s Report on its Inquiry into Aviation Accident Investigations (which was tabled in May 2013).51

Findings of Aviation Safety Regulation Review

4.49
The ASSR report contained 37 recommendations and was presented to the Parliament in June 2014.52
4.50
In setting the context for the Review’s findings, the Panel indicated that the relationship between industry and the regulator was cause for concern, noting that in ‘recent years, the regulator had adopted an across the board hard-line philosophy’. This situation was described as inappropriate for an advanced aviation nation such as Australia, particularly because, as a result of this hard-line attitude, relationships between the industry and CASA had ‘in many cases, become adversarial’.53
4.51
The Panel also noted that despite Australia’s good standing in relation to aviation safety, ‘the aviation industry is highly self-critical and regularly has a ‘take no prisoners’ approach to public discourse’. It was argued that while this type of critical introspection may contribute to its good record ‘it can at times be counter-productive to promoting rational public debate on aviation safety and to building a positive and collaborate national aviation safety culture’.54

Regulatory oversight and the appeals process

4.52
As a result of its findings, the Review made a number of recommendations for necessary changes around regulatory oversight. Recommendation 14, for example, recommended that:
The Civil Aviation Safety Authority changes its regulatory philosophy and, together with industry, builds an effective collaborative relationship on a foundation of mutual understanding and respect.55
4.53
It was also recommended that:
the regulatory audit program should reflect international auditing standards by fully disclosing findings during audits and at exit briefings;
findings should be graded on a scale of seriousness; and
CASA should make use of third party commercial audits as a means of supplementing its surveillance program.56

Industry Complaints Commissioner

4.54
According to CASA, the Industry Complaints Commissioner (ICC) provides members of the industry, the wider aviation community and the public with an easy, accessible and effective way to make a complaint about:
the decisions, administrative actions or services provided by CASA staff, delegates or authorised persons to determine if they are wrong, unjust, discriminatory or unfair; or
the behaviour of CASA staff.57
4.55
The Commissioner is appointed by the Director of Aviation Safety (DAS), following consultation with the Board.58
4.56
The website also notes that the office of the ICC reports directly to the CASA Board, and to ensure impartiality, it does not sit within CASA’s organisational structure.59
4.57
However, where the ICC is the subject of a complaint, the ‘complaint should be referred to the Board, who will attempt to resolve the issue fairly or decide on appropriate action to do so.’60 In addition, if the subject of the complaint is the DAS, the following process is followed:
Where the DAS is the subject of a complaint, the complaint should be referred in the first instance to the Chair of the Board. The Chair of the Board will attempt to resolve the issue fairly or decide on appropriate action to do so. If the matter remains unresolved, the Chair will raise the matter at the next Board meeting following notification to other Board members. The Board will determine the appropriate action to resolve the issue fairly or decide on appropriate action to do so.61
4.58
Under its Governance Arrangements, the ICC is unable to consider certain matters, including (but not limited to):
complaints made by a CASA employee about other staff, delegates or authorised persons;
complaints about or concerning the conduct of a member of the Board; or
any matter the ICC is satisfied the complainant does not have a legitimate or sufficient interest; or
complaints that are frivolous or vexatious, or the complainant is not pursuing it in a reasonable way.62
4.59
CASA’s 2020-21 Annual Report recorded that the ICC resolved a total of 103 complaints in 2020-21 (including cases on hand at 1 July 2020). These included:
43 simple complaints, which were clearly outside the ICC’s jurisdiction or not related to CASA (with 100 per cent resolved within the target of five days);
40 standard complaints (with 91 per cent resolved within the target of 30 days); and
20 complex complaints, which required expert advice related to novel issues or which presented a wide range of questions (with 100 per cent resolved within the target of 90 days).63
4.60
Of the resolved complaints, the majority concerned matters involving the Stakeholder Engagement Division, which includes areas such as aviation medicine, general aviation, aircraft registration and the client services centre.64
4.61
The Annual Report references complaint prevention strategies, and indicated that the ICC ‘has the power to make recommendations to CASA about individual cases and systemic issues’. Noting that ICC recommendations are made ‘with the aim of reducing future complaints and ensuring best practice’, it was reported that:
In 2020–21, the ICC made nine recommendations, all of which were accepted by CASA. They included recommendations that CASA should issue endorsements on a flight crew licence, reconsider exam results, provide partial refunds for regulatory service tasks, and reconsider the results of medical tests that had been excluded by CASA in error.65

Previous reviews into the ICC

4.62
As part of its review, the ASSR Panel noted that the appeals processes had a sound basis, however there was room for improvement. Recommendation 37 of the Panel was for CASA to amend the Terms of Reference of the ICC so that:
(a)
the ICC reports directly to the CASA Board;
(b)
no CASA staff are excluded from the ICC’s jurisdiction;
(c)
the ICC will receive complaints that relate to both the merits and the process of matters;
(d)
on merits matters, including aviation medical matters, the ICC is empowered to convene an appropriately constituted review panel, chaired by a CASA non-executive director, to review the decision; and
(e)
while all ICC findings are non-binding recommendations, the original decision-maker is required to give reasons to the CASA Board if a recommendation is not followed.66
4.63
The Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport, also noted in its 2008 report into the Administration of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and Related Matters, that it had received a number of submissions which advocated for the establishment of a more independent complaints mechanism. Some stakeholders also suggested that the ICC be established as a separate statutory office with powers to investigate and report to the CASA Board. Other submitters to the inquiry suggested that the establishment of a transport or aviation ombudsman – independent of CASA and responsible to the Parliament – would be more appropriate.
4.64
At the time, the committee indicated that:
Given recent legislation passed in the United States in response to concern over similar problems in the FAA, which some witnesses have compared to the performance of CASA, the committee is of the view that the suggestion that Australia create such a statutorily independent office has some merit.67

Concerns with the complaints and accountability processes

4.65
Accountability issues—particularly the need for an independent complaints process, and the independence of the ICC—have been raised by industry stakeholders a number of times over the years.
4.66
The committee received a number of submissions in which stakeholders raised the issue of CASA’s governance and accountability. Evidence to the inquiry pointed to serious concerns with the operations and outcomes of the ICC and commented on potential conflicts of interest and other issues in the appeals process.
4.67
For example, in its submission, the AFAP argued that one of the ‘key means for aviation stakeholders to successfully appeal against CASA actions’ (and possibly establish a path toward restitution) is actually ‘undermined by the organisational structure within which the CASA office of [ICC] sits’.68
4.68
AFAP acknowledged the information provided about the ICC on CASA’s website, but at the same time argued that while the ICC’s stated aim makes sense in theory, the ‘organisational structure that is meant “to ensure independence and impartiality” actually has flaws within it that allow for a conflict of interest to occur’. AFAP contended that these flaws bring ‘into question the legitimacy of any such assurance’.69
4.69
Further, AFAP argued that the possibility for a conflict of interest is most acute when the CASA Board (or a member of the Board) are involved in, or are the subject of, a complaint. Noting that the ICC does not consider ‘complaints about or concerning the conduct of a member of the Board’, it was asserted by AFAP that ‘the aims of the ICC are finite and are limited to only part of CASA’s conduct and decisions’.70
4.70
AFAP also made the following points:
The ultimate decision-making responsibility within CASA sits with the office of the Chief Executive Officer/DAS. Given the Chief Executive Officer/DAS is currently both a staff member and a Board Member, the position enjoys immunity from ICC review and has the ability to influence the Board’s acceptance—or otherwise—of ICC review outcomes.
Given the ICC reports to the Board (in which CASA’s most senior staff member sits) this undermines a process that is meant to ensure independence and impartiality.
The current organisational structure for the office of ICC may preclude the office from engaging in certain reviews where senior CASA staff are involved. In some circumstances, organisational structure may also prevent potential complainants from having a simple, accessible and effective way to make a complaint.
CASA’s current structure means that the DAS is ultimately responsible for the decisions which can become the subject of ICC review as well as a responsible party for where the complaints review is subsequently reported to. 71
4.71
AFAP concluded its argument by recommending that:
… the ICC should be established as a separate statutory office to CASA with powers to investigate and report to an authority, independent of CASA and responsible to the Parliament.72
4.72
Similar views were expressed by another submitter, who noted that the ICC reports to the CASA Board, and argued ‘this arrangement is akin to being the judge and the jury’.73
4.73
The AAAA stressed the need to establish an effective, independent complaints system, arguing that this should:
… include an appeal mechanism for all medical decisions [made] by CASA. This should include the role not reporting to the DAS as it currently does, but reporting to the Minister and publishing regular reports available to industry. The Complaints Commissioner (howsoever called under a reformed system) should be given the power to order certain remedial actions from CASA which CASA must comply with in a reasonable timeframe.74
4.74
In its 2020 paper, A New Strategy for the Australian General Aviation Sector, the General Aviation Advisory Network argued that CASA should urgently establish key management systems. The organisation should also embed continuous improvement and quality management across all aspects of its interactions with GA, ‘and include an enhanced complaint handling and appeals mechanism’.75

CASA’s response

4.75
In evidence, the previous CASA CEO and DAS, Mr Shane Carmody noted that ‘the Industry Complaints Commissioner is one person with a staff of one’.76 The committee was also told that the Commissioner is not supported by the CASA legal team:
He is a lawyer by training. He conducts his investigations completely impartially and reports to the board. … I accept the fact that people might have difficulties with regulation and may have difficulties with the CASA legal team, but the industry complaints commissioner is a very clear process put in place around 2006-2007. He deals with about 130 complaints a year and as far as I know deals with them quickly and efficiently, but sometimes people don’t get what they want.77

Committee views and recommendations

4.76
Historically, Australia’s geographic isolation and its sheer size have presented significant challenges. The vast distances between communities, vital infrastructure and isolated industry sectors means that a robust, wellregulated, safe and sustainable GA industry, is both essential and in the national interest.
4.77
The GA industry has been key to providing solutions to many of the problems —economic, social and environmental—that have arisen due to geographic isolation and distance. The sector provides essential services to rural, regional and remote communities. It also underpins Australia’s freight, tourism and agricultural industries, and provides significant social and environmental benefits: including bushfire mitigation, the delivery of emergency services, transportation of goods and recreational activity.
4.78
The committee acknowledges the frustration of those individuals and stakeholder groups who have, over several decades, taken the time to participate in consultation processes, provide submissions and feedback to a range of discussions, reviews and inquiries about Australia’s aviation industry, including the GA sector.
4.79
During the inquiry, one of the most frequently raised issues was CASA’s lack of consistency. The committee agrees that this lack of consistency—particularly in relation to the interpretation of regulations and policy—is completely unacceptable, particularly when it negatively impacts aviation safety and the economic sustainability of small businesses.
4.80
Over many years, GA industry stakeholders have identified, commented on and suggested solutions to some of the systemic and structural problems that continue to plague CASA. These have included the organisation’s inefficiencies, the slow pace of regulatory reform, the lack of consistency in the interpretation of regulations, and the difficult relationships which exist between CASA and the GA industry.
4.81
The committee is of the view that CASA’s lack of consistency and poor interpretation of legislative policies and frameworks is, at least in part, due to a lack of adequate resourcing and an inadequate level of priority placed on the retention of staff and of corporate knowledge within the organisation.
4.82
It is also clear that despite the positive views put forward about individual CASA staff, the culture at the organisation as a whole needs to be addressed. As noted by Professional Australia, a full, independent and systemic review of CASA’s organisational culture is needed.
4.83
The committee fully supports an immediate rootandbranch review of CASA’s organisational culture. This review should be conducted by an independent party and engage not only with current and previous CASA employees, but with key GA stakeholder groups.
4.84
The findings of such a review could help address those issues around staff retention, corporate knowledge and consistency in decisionmaking. It would also provide CASA with the opportunity to present a more coherent and consistent message to its stakeholders, while placing aviation safety at the forefront of its administrative approach in the most cost-effective way possible.

Recommendation 7

4.85
The committee recommends that the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Development instigate an immediate independent review into the organisational culture at the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. The review should be completed no later than 31 December 2022, with the findings publicly reported.

Industry Complaints Commissioner

4.86
In addition to CASA’s lack of regulatory consistency, another of the key concerns raised by stakeholders has been the issue of CASA’s accountability. The need for an appropriate complaints process, and concerns about the independence of the ICC, has been raised by stakeholders for a number of years.
4.87
The committee acknowledges that a number of inquiries have been undertaken over recent years, several of which have examined issues around CASA’s accountability and the need for an independent complaints process. Inquiries—including the one undertaken by the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Committee in 2008—have identified serious concerns in relation to the operations and outcomes of the ICC.
4.88
During this inquiry, stakeholders have again called for an independent, effective and impartial complaints process.
4.89
The committee was informed by CASA that its current ICC is one person with a staff of one, who currently deals with around 130 complaints per year. While the committee acknowledges the timeliness within which the Commissioner resolves complaints, it is concerned that this lack of adequate resourcing is prohibiting the ICC consider matters about CASA more broadly.
4.90
In addition, the ICC’s Governance Arrangements place considerable limitations on the scope of complaints which can be lodged with the ICC, including about CASA employees or Board members. The ICC can also determine complaints to be ‘frivolous or vexatious’, or that a complainant has insufficient interest in a matter—a considerably broad and subjective approach, especially in light of the ICC consisting of one person.
4.91
The committee is further seriously concerned that, along with the Board, the ICC is appointed by the DAS—who is also the CASA CEO—but the ICC reports to the DAS and the Board and could be asked to consider a complaint made about a decision of the DAS. There is a clear conflict of interest here.
4.92
The committee echoes the calls of the Aviation Safety Regulation Review for the remit of the ICC to be expanded and be made clearly independent, including by allowing any CASA staff to access the complaints process, and for the ICC to consider complaints both on merits and process.
4.93
The committee further agrees with those stakeholders who argued that an independent complaints mechanism has become a matter of urgency. The committee is of the view that a statutory office should be established as soon as is practicable, which is independent of CASA and has powers to investigate all aspects of CASA’s operation, including the actions, performance and decisions of the DAS and the Board.
4.94
The independent complaints office should be provided with sufficient funding to ensure it is adequately staffed and can meet its statutory requirements. Further, it is important that any independent complaints commissioner reports not only to the CASA Board, but publicly to the Parliament on any of its findings.

Recommendation 8

4.95
The committee recommends that a new aviation Industry Complaints Commission be established as a statutory authority. The Commission should sit outside the organisational structure of and be independent from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA). In addition to the existing complaints mechanisms available under the current Industry Complaints Commissioner, the new Commission should have the power to investigate and respond to complaints concerning CASA employees, the Director of Aviation Safety and the CASA Board.
4.96
The statutory authority should be supported by adequate financial and staffing resources and be required to table its findings and reports directly to the Parliament.

  • 1
    Aerial Application Association of Australia, Submission 12, p. 2.
  • 2
    See, for example: Name withheld, Submission 15; Gliding Australia, Submission 17; The Royal Federation of Aero Clubs of Australia, Submission 18; NQ Aviation Services, Submission 21; Australian Federation of Air Pilots, Submission 44.
  • 3
    Mr John Hoore, Submission 1, p. 5.
  • 4
    Australian Federation of Air Pilots, Submission 44, p. 4.
  • 5
    See, for example: Name Withheld, Submission 6; Name Withheld, Submission 9; Name withheld, Submission 15; Gliding Australia, Submission 17; The Royal Federation of Aero Clubs of Australia, Submission 18; NQ Aviation Services, Submission 21; Australian Federation of Air Pilots, Submission 44.
  • 6
    Mr John McDermott, McDermott Aviation Pty Ltd, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2020, p. 1.
  • 7
    Mr John McDermott, McDermott Aviation Pty Ltd, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2020, p. 1.
  • 8
    Some of the findings of the Aviation Safety Regulation Review are discussed later in this chapter.
  • 9
    Name Withheld, Submission 6, [p. 1].
  • 10
    Aerial Application Association of Australia, Submission 12, p. 2.
  • 11
    Aerial Application Association of Australia, Submission 12, p. 2.
  • 12
    The committee notes public reporting that the Aviation Regulation Reform Program has since been completed, after 31 years. See: ‘CASA completes Aviation Regulation Reform Program’, Australian Flying, 16 December 2019, https://www.australianflying.com.au/latest/casa-completes-aviation-regulation-reform-program (accessed 24 March 2022).
  • 13
    Name Withheld, Submission 9, [p. 1].
  • 14
    Ms Maude Telfer, Submission 13, p. 1.
  • 15
    Ms Maude Telfer, Submission 13, p. 2.
  • 16
    Mr John Hoore, Submission 1, p. 5.
  • 17
    Fleet Helicopter and Commercial Helicopters, Submission 40, [p. 1].
  • 18
    Australian Federation of Air Pilots, Submission 44, p. 16.
  • 19
    Aerial Application Association of Australia, Submission 12, p. 2.
  • 20
    Mr Clinton McKenzie, Submission 5, p. 3.
  • 21
    Mrs Mary Brown, North Queensland Aviation Service, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2020, p. 14.
  • 22
    See, for example, Name withheld, Submission 15.
  • 23
    Ms Maude Telfer, Submission 13, p. 2.
  • 24
    Australian Helicopter Industry Association, Submission 11, [p. 2].
  • 25
    Australian Helicopter Industry Association, Submission 11, [p. 2].
  • 26
    Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Annual Report 2019-20, p. 96.
  • 27
    Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Annual Report 2019-20, p. 96.
  • 28
    Name withheld, Submission 15, p. 1.
  • 29
    Professionals Australia, Submission 34, p. 2.
  • 30
    Professionals Australia, Submission 34, p. 2.
  • 31
    Professionals Australia, Submission 34, p. 4.
  • 32
    Professionals Australia, Submission 34, pp. 5-6.
  • 33
    Professionals Australia, Submission 34, p. 11.
  • 34
    The Australian Licenced Aircraft Engineers Association, Submission 65, p. 3.
  • 35
    Mr Stephen Re, Australian Licenced Aircraft Engineers Association, Committee Hansard, 7 September 2021, p. 7.
  • 36
    Specifically, the Aviation Safety Regulation Review, discussed later in this chapter.
  • 37
    Aerial Application Association of Australia, Submission 12, p. 17.
  • 38
    Aerial Application Association of Australia, Submission 12, p. 17.
  • 39
    Mr John McDermott, McDermott Aviation Pty Ltd, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2020, p. 3
  • 40
    McDermott Aviation Pty Ltd, Submission 39, [p. 3].
  • 41
    Mr Tim Vercoe, McDermott Aviation Pty Ltd, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2020, p. 4.
  • 42
    Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Submission 46, p. 6.
  • 43
    Mr Shane Carmody, Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2020, p. 46.
  • 44
    Mr Shane Carmody, Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2020, p. 46.
  • 45
    Ms Maude Telfer, Submission 13, p. 2.
  • 46
    Ms Maude Telfer, Submission 13, pp. 2-3.
  • 47
    The Royal Federation of Aero Clubs of Australia, Submission 18, p. 3.
  • 48
    Regional Aviation Association of Australia, Submission 19, p. 3.
  • 49
    Regional Aviation Association of Australia, Submission 19, p. 3.
  • 50
    Statement by the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development, the Hon. Warren Truss MP, The Australian Government’s Aviation Safety Regulation Review, 14 November 2013.
  • 51
    Statement by the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Infrastructure and Regional Development, the Hon. Warren Truss MP, The Australian Government’s Aviation Safety Regulation Review, 14 November 2013.
  • 52
    Australian Government, Aviation Safety Regulation Review, May 2014, pp. 3-5.
  • 53
    Australian Government, Aviation Safety Regulation Review, Executive Summary, May 2014, p. 1.
  • 54
    Australian Government, Aviation Safety Regulation Review, Executive Summary, May 2014, p. 1.
  • 55
    Australian Government, Aviation Safety Regulation Review, Executive Summary, May 2014, p. 2.
  • 56
    Australian Government, Aviation Safety Regulation Review, Executive Summary, May 2014, p. 1.
  • 57
    Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Industry Complaints Commissioner, https://www.casa.gov.au/about-us/who-we-work/industry-complaints-commissioner, (accessed 17 March 2022).
  • 58
    Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Industry Complaints Commissioner Governance Arrangements, August 2021, p. 6.
  • 59
    Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Industry Complaints Commissioner, https://www.casa.gov.au/about-us/who-we-work/industry-complaints-commissioner, (accessed 17 March 2022).
  • 60
    Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Industry Complaints Commissioner Governance Arrangements, August 2021, p. 9.
  • 61
    Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Industry Complaints Commissioner Governance Arrangements, August 2021, p. 9.
  • 62
    Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Industry Complaints Commissioner Governance Arrangements, August 2021, pp. 7-8.
  • 63
    Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Annual Report 2020-21, pp. 124-125.
  • 64
    Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Annual Report 2020-21, p. 125.
  • 65
    Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Annual Report 2020-21, p. 125.
  • 66
    Australian Government, Aviation Safety Regulation Review, Executive Summary, May 2014, p. 5.
  • 67
    Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport, Administration of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and Related Matters, 18 September 2008, p. 39.
  • 68
    Australian Federation of Air Pilots, Submission 44, p. 13.
  • 69
    Australian Federation of Air Pilots, Submission 44, p. 13.
  • 70
    Australian Federation of Air Pilots, Submission 44, p. 13.
  • 71
    Australian Federation of Air Pilots, Submission 44, p. 15.
  • 72
    Australian Federation of Air Pilots, Submission 44, p. 15.
  • 73
    Name Withheld, Submission 9, p. 2.
  • 74
    Aerial Application Association of Australia Ltd, Submission 12, p. 7.
  • 75
    General Aviation Advisory Network, A New Strategy for the Australian General Aviation Sector, December 2020, p. 24.
  • 76
    Mr Shane Carmody, Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2020, p. 46.
  • 77
    Mr Shane Carmody, Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Committee Hansard, 20 November 2020, p. 46.

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