4.1
This chapter outlines the various views provided to the committee on the strengths and weaknesses of existing practice with regards to publicly funded foreign policy research, as well as ideas and proposals for improving processes and outputs.
Funding challenges
4.2
The committee received a range of evidence which argued that current levels of public funding for foreign policy research are insufficient, and processes to apply for such funding are onerous and restrictive.
4.3
Submitters also raised concern regarding the coordination of public funding, and the need for sustainable and flexible funding.
Insufficient funding
4.4
Several submitters submitted that the current level of public funding for foreign policy research is insufficient. For example, the Group of Eight submitted that, without adjusting for inflation, government investment in research and development in the foreign affairs and trade portfolio 'has more than halved between 2018-19 ($201.74 m) and the budget estimate for 2020-21 ($96.7m), which itself is also less than half the funding that was allocated a decade ago ($198.66m in 2010-11)'. The Group of Eight called for this funding to be restored to at least 2018-19 levels.
4.5
Similarly, the Initiative for Peacebuilding, University of Melbourne stated that 'Australian diplomacy is being starved of funds and so, therefore, is research on foreign affairs'. Dr Tania Miletic, Assistant Director, stated:
During the last quarter-century, the share of total Commonwealth outlays allocated to diplomacy has been halved, despite the slight increases in each of the last two years. Australian diplomacy is being starved of funds and research inhibited.
4.6
Dr Miletic argued that 'reversing the long-term trend of reducing the proportion of Commonwealth funding for diplomacy is essential'. And that 'within that required and growing budget, funding research could be substantially increased to allow universities to undertake rigorous and relevant research to enhance diplomacy and foreign affairs'.
4.7
The Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) described a 'significant capacity gap' when it comes to writing grant applications':
Many of the more lucrative Australian Government tenders are for specific innovative projects whose parameters are determined by the government. Organisations that do not have base funding and, therefore, staff with time dedicated to researching and responding to specific tenders will prefer to either stick to their familiar sources of funding or to create their own projects and seek funding for them. This may well create a vicious cycle where only certain institutes have the capacity to apply for tenders. This would decrease the diversity of thinking on foreign policy.
4.8
To address this problem, the AIIA recommended that government staff from departments offering tenders be specifically tasked with 'approaching time-and resource-poor institutions to explain both what is available and the requirements of tender applications'.
Coordination and transparency
4.9
Several submitters noted that the government's approach to funding foreign policy research 'appears to be conducted on an ad-hoc, as needs basis' and could benefit from a more strategic and coordinated approach. Dr Tania Miletic, Initiative for Peacebuilding, University of Melbourne stated:
…a lot of initiatives, including contracting for research, were ad hoc and not sustained, even when they were felt to be very impactful or effective. These limits to funding meant that the main actors that the Australian government has been supportive of, who are very well placed to be working on these complex challenges locally, do rely on funding from DFAT, but it's often ad hoc. We haven't really had that sort of integrated approach to working with partners both in practice and in research in a sustained, integrated way.
4.10
Professor Rory Medcalf called for better coordination in the provision of public funding for foreign policy research:
…there needs to be, I think, a more comprehensive picture in Australia of how research resources are, if you like, allocated and acquitted across the wider research community. That's not about reopening a lot of old debates as to the virtues or otherwise of think-tanks versus universities; I would say that both kinds of institutions bring a particular value to the conversation. But I do think it would be useful for government to have a more comprehensive picture of what resources are being allocated and how the value of those is being assessed by the policy community.
4.11
The AIIA also called for a 'whole-of-government register to show which Australian Government departments are contributing resources to which think tanks'. The AIIA argued that :
…this would not only allow for greater public oversight, it would allow important committees such as the joint standing committee on foreign affairs, defence and trade to better assess the efficacy of think tank funding and the rationale for funding by different departments.
4.12
Similarly, Dr Bryce Wakefield, National Executive Director, AIIA, argued for increased transparency regarding government funding. Dr Wakefield stated:
I believe that the Australian public, who the AIIA sees as its key stakeholder, deserves the right to know what the Australian government, in terms of its various agencies, is paying for when it pays for research into foreign policy issues. Such information is, of course, available if you go hunting for it, but there's no one-stop shop that allows the public to examine the role of government funding for think tanks or, indeed, allows various government actors to craft a rational strategy that would improve the efficiency of public funding.
4.13
Asialink similarly called for a strategy encompassing federal and state governments, and education providers to ensure that 'Asia literacy' is achieved in schools and universities. In addition, the strategy should set achievement targets for such literacy.
4.14
The Group of Eight also advocated for additional scrutiny of public funding for non-university think tanks. Ms Vicki Thomson, Chief Executive, Group of Eight stated:
What we are asking is that the flow of public money to non-university think tanks be scrutinised in the same way it is for our universities. Unlike research funding which supports public universities, this funding is ordinarily not subject to competitive tender, review or performance appraisal. Public funding of foreign policy research is not a second order issue. Excellence in foreign policy research has possibly never been more important. Therefore, funding mechanisms must also meet the highest of standards.
Desirability of sustained and flexible funding
4.15
The Coral Bell School at the ANU called for the provision of 'sustained, targeted research funding to research institutions at the program level' as the 'most effective way to build knowledge to inform future foreign policy.' It noted that the provision of such funding to the Pacific Research Program (PRP) had been successful and provided a model that could be applied to other foreign policy challenges. The Group of Eight also submitted that the government should 'maintain consistency and certainty in its funding' for foreign policy research.
4.16
Professor Medcalf called for consideration to be given to building salary components into research funding:
…there are researchers, whether in think-tanks or universities, whose job security, frankly, is not what it could be; having a very explicit salary component built into research funding can make an enormous difference in their ability to deliver, and persuade their employers that a particular piece of work is a priority as opposed to other things that their employers may have them do.
4.17
Save the Children recommended that international development programs and projects funded by official development assistance include a '5 percent research and policy advocacy weighting':
Structuring grants in this way would allow Australian foreign policy stakeholders to better access the deep pool of foreign affairs and foreign policy expertise that resides in CSOs [civil society organisations] because we will be better equipped to participate in public policy debates in a more systematic manner.
4.18
Mr Fergus Hanson and Ms Danielle Cave submitted that the current practice of government departments funding research 'using very small buckets of ad-hoc money' encourages the 'production of reports that are the result of short-term, and by definition shallower, research efforts.' They urged departments to instead pool their grants into 'a smaller number of bigger grants and/or increase the grant sizes'.
4.19
Similarly, Dr Michael Fullilove AM, Executive Director, Lowy Institute, told the committee that grants are often 'quite small'. As such,
When grants are very small, it's hard to use a grant to employ a researcher. You spend as much time applying for the grant initially and then acquitting the grant afterwards as you do actually executing the grant. My suggestion, for what it's worth, is that having fewer larger grants that really allow the employment of researchers, enable you to develop people's careers and do longer term research tends to enable you to address larger issues. I think the issues facing Australia are large. In my experience over a number of years, having fewer smaller projects usually produces better outcomes than having lots of little projects.
4.20
Mr Hanson and Ms Cave considered that requests for proposals are often too narrow:
…research grant parameters are often written in such restrictive ways that it limits opportunities for innovative solutions. Allocating all grants in this way also leads to a focus on yesterday's problems.
The best think tank research is empirical research that grapples with policy questions just ahead of public servants' current horizon of immediate concerns. On issues of immediate concern departments have built up internal capability and/or brought in experts to help. Issues just beyond these immediate priorities are where think tanks can best serve policy makers by conducting deep empirical research to understand the issues and distilling findings. In this way they can help create a framework for public servants to grapple with policy challenges that are about to land on their desks.
4.21
Mr Hanson and Ms Cave also noted that current funding models do not allow for government support for ad hoc research opportunities that would need to be conducted in timeframes of a few days to a week to be relevant. They suggested:
To enable research that seizes on these opportunities, consideration could be given to making small and medium, rapid release grants for timely projects.
4.22
Dr Bryce Wakefield, National Executive Director, AIIA, told the committee that:
…a lot of government funding is based around projects that are tailored to whatever the whims and trendy ideas in DFAT are at the time. I think there needs to be a lot more consistent, multi-year funding for projects that can be sustained on a long-term basis and are not necessarily targeted at very, very granular policy questions.
Policy relevance
4.23
Several submitters pointed to the importance of research being relevant to policy, as opposed to the traditional academic research conducted by universities, with a view to growing knowledge and furthering debate. For example, Mr Peter Jennings PSM told the committee that:
…governments should expend public funding for research on any policy issue only on the explicit expectation that the funding will produce better policy options for government and, through government, the Australian people.
4.24
Ms Dimity Fifer submitted that:
I believe that research funding allocations to Australian and overseas universities and research institutions…by the Commonwealth must clearly articulate the 'downstream' purpose of the research and include a contractual requirement for plain English. Obtuse poorly constructed research papers are not acceptable, or relevant, for policy or program design or round table dialogue. Government funding agencies must take increased responsibility for the impact of their research grant allocations; the contractual requirements and monitor compliance to well defined and negotiated research performance indicators.
4.25
Mr Trent Hagland discussed the utility of the different types of outputs of foreign policy think thanks. He noted that 'the supply of commentary is abundant – it is a saturated market versus the one in which sophisticated policy-oriented research is produced'.
4.26
Mr James Batley PSM, Distinguished Policy Fellow, ANU Department of Pacific Affairs, said that under the terms of the PRP's agreement with DFAT, they talk 'all the time', continuing:
…we do it formally on a quarterly basis, but we have very regular informal consultations with them as well. We're very conscious of what their priorities are, the sorts of issues that are engaging them and the needs that they have for deep research to back up some of their policy development.
4.27
Professor Nicole Haley, ANU, built on this observation, noting that the PRP has learned over time how to improve the relevance of its work for policy makers:
Being a resource that can be on tap and respond to things is obviously one way in which we do it. We've certainly changed the nature of the research products; we've added new research products in terms of short two-page 'in briefs' and things like that. But a lot of face-to-face engagement is really important, because it's through those conversations that people can ask questions about emerging issues and we can reflect on the long-term engagement that we've had.
4.28
In its submission the PRP provided similar input, noting that:
…high quality research on its own is not sufficient to shape sound policy-making. Policy-relevant research needs to be effectively communicated to the policy making community. This requires people who are able to exercise influence within the various policy making communities and who understand and can contribute to policy-making processes at the right junctures.
Politicisation
4.29
The committee received a range of evidence regarding the risk of foreign policy research becoming politicised through government funding. For example, Ms Yun Jiang submitted that foreign policy research 'is becoming increasingly politicised in Australia' with projects that 'may be critical of the government…less likely to be funded.' Ms Jiang discussed Ministerial involvement in ARC grants to demonstrate this politicisation. She noted that in 2020, the Minister vetoed five ARC grants on national security grounds with no 'official announcement or any explanation provided by the Minister'. She continued:
The opaque process of referring specific applications to national security agencies as well as the lack of explanation by national security agencies or the Minister on the decisions mean there is substantial scope for political interference and corruption.
As the process is not transparent and the scope for discretion is high, there is a real risk of censorship. The Minister may use grant decisions to promote only those views that are aligned with the Government. Future applicants are also more likely to self-censor as they try to guess the Minister's intentions for vetoing projects.
4.30
Ms Jiang contended that it is 'deeply problematic and undemocratic if only the government of the day or the minister gets to decide what is in the national interest' since the national interest is contestable and subjective. She argued that this means transparency on decision-making processes is of particular importance but that the trend has been toward less, not more, transparency:
The government has instituted a new process where ARC College of Experts and detailed expert assessors cannot even see the national interest statements provided by grant applicants. So these [experts], or anyone else for that matter, are unable to scrutinise the minister's decisions supposedly based on national interest.
4.31
The University of Melbourne Peacebuilding Initiative discussed its own experience in this regard:
An application for an ARC [Linkage] grant was refused despite one of the assessors reporting that the applicants were a 'dream team'. The ARC would make no comment on why they refused funding, so it was impossible to learn from months of work preparing the detailed proposal why it was not funded.
4.32
However, the ARC noted that funding decisions in relation to its grants are at the discretion of the Minister, in accordance with the Australian Research Council Act 2001. Further the Minister may (but is not required) to rely solely on recommendations made by the Council's Chief Executive Officer.
4.33
Mr Hagland noted that both governments and oppositions make use of think tanks to prosecute policy issues, but that they 'only see the benefit of doing this when the think tank is perceived to be centrist, or non-partisan'.
4.34
The Northern Territory Government noted that 'think tanks receiving government funding can be perceived to be promoting that government's agenda' and that '[m]aintaining editorial independence from government is crucial to the credibility of any research output.' Mr Hanson and Ms Cave said that 'true research independence is certainly achievable' but that there are risks, 'especially when creating new entities', which could be 'captured' by either the funding government department or university host.
4.35
The Group of Eight said that the 'independence and institutional autonomy' of universities 'needs to be protected' if they are to remain effective. Further, 'independence is critical to the production of high-quality research, that can be used to inform public policy'.
4.36
The Australia Indonesia Business Council (AIBC) said that research organisations should aim to diversify their funding and 'not be wholly dependent on government so as to generate greater buy-in from business, less funder-capture and better market signals for research priorities'.
4.37
The committee also received evidence detailing the measures utilised to protect against the politicisation of research. For example, the Lowy Institute submitted that it is 'independent of government' and 'home to many different opinions, but the advocate of none'. It explained that it has 'a longstanding practice of not adopting house positions and allowing researchers to speak and publish in their own names' and that 'we conduct a rigorous research-commissioning process in which all senior Institute researchers participate. We insist on independent peer reviews of our published research'.
4.38
Similarly, ASPI noted that it 'regularly publishes material that offers perspectives quite different from current Defence policy settings' and that ASPI's charter requires it to offer 'contestability of policy advice'. Mr Peter Jennings PSM submitted that:
Critical to ASPI's success is the simple but powerful design of the Institute's governance structure, which makes delivering contestable policy advice the central mission of the Institute. This creates a strong foundation enabling ASPI's independence. It's the job of the ASPI team to live up to that expectation in our daily work.
4.39
The Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) also submitted that it 'does not actually take a position of its own. It invites both speakers with status quo opinions and speakers who challenge the regular consensus and are very critical of the government'. It stated:
We think that enhanced knowledge about international affairs is a public good, so we care about having the debate, less so in supporting the messages being espoused by particular speaker. We want people to challenge the status quo. We also want them to defend it. We also host talks that have nothing to do with the position of the Australian government.
4.40
The AIIA also noted that when members of the organisation provide expert advice or commentary, they do so as individual experts.
No individual view represents that of the institute. Any publication that the AIIA produces contains the view of the author(s) not the institute. As a general principle, we do strive for political diversity, not because we are trying to avoid “politicisation,” but because knowledge derived from the discussion of issues and the debate between opposing viewpoints constitutes in itself the public good we strive to achieve. We attempt to inform Australians, to help them understand problems of international affairs for themselves, not tell them what to think on a certain issue.
Foreign interference
4.41
The committee received a range of evidence in relation to foreign interference or influence in the foreign policy research space. For example, Ms Jiang submitted that the funding of Australian foreign policy research by foreign governments 'can entrench existing prejudices':
If we assume that Australia's national interest is perfectly aligned with the US, we then would deem all funding from the US Government as acceptable. The US Government can then fund foreign policy research in Australia that further promote the idea that the national interests of the two countries are aligned.
On the other hand, if we assume Australia's national interest is always opposed to China, we then see any funding with connections to China as suspicious. The result is that projects that identify common interests between the two countries are less likely to be funded.
4.42
Dr Shumi Akhtar, Associate Professor and the University of Sydney Business School said that existing processes 'do not appear to have sufficient mandatory instructions/requirements that may help to detect possible conflict of interest and harmful consequences that Australia could potentially face as a result of research collaboration with foreign countries [and] researchers'. Dr Akhtar further suggested that the government could consider revising relevant guidelines to ensure grant funding 'drives positive [outcomes] for Australia, protects its national interest and [does] not allow other countries [to take] unfair advantage of Australia's relaxed collaborative research funding approach'.
4.43
Ms Vicki Thomson, Chief Executive, Group of Eight, however told the committee that:
First of all I would not necessarily agree 100 per cent with your assertion around the level of foreign interference and/or influence. That's not to say that it doesn't exist. I think Duncan Lewis, a former director-general of ASIO, made comment just today that we need to be measured in our commentary and the reality of what's happening in our universities. So I'm not disputing the fact there is foreign interference and has been evidence of foreign interference on our university campuses; I would just say it's not something we're not unaware of, but we're certainly dealing with it through examples such as the foreign interference task force and the guidelines that the government has now asked us to refresh.
4.44
The AIIA also submitted that while it accepts funding from foreign sources, 'what it does not do, however, is act "on behalf of" any "foreign principal"'. It also noted that it declares all its funding from institutional sources, and does not accept any anonymous contributions from individuals over $5000.
4.45
The committee notes the work of the University Foreign Interference Taskforce looking to refresh the guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian higher education sector.
Prioritising defence over diplomacy
4.46
A related criticism is that government has privileged defence over diplomatic perspectives in its funding over recent years. The AIIA said that this 'may well be justified by the fact that increases in the cost of technology to field a first-rate military expand faster than the staffing costs to fund the diplomatic service.' It went on to argue however that just because the Department of Defence has a larger budget than the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade:
…there is little reason why a government, in its allocation of funding, should prioritise think tanks that focus on defence over those that focus on foreign policy….Both types of institutions focus on intellectual problems that require the same level of brainpower.
4.47
As well as recommending that the government consider rebalancing its funding of research for foreign policy and defence, the AIIA also recommended that DFAT should 'be in control of relatively more funding for think tanks and similar organisations, to ensure that the institutional needs of the foreign service are better catered for in the discussion on foreign policy.'
Ensuring quality
4.48
Mr Hagland argued that Australia possesses high-quality foreign policy scholars, but is not 'currently maximising the value of intellectual resources we possess', with the most 'serious barrier-to-entry preventing the development of a genuine marketplace for foreign policy ideas' being the 'adequate provision of financial, not intellectual, resources'.
4.49
Dr Akhtar said that research quality is 'dependent on many factors' including the 'depth and breadth of real data and information the researcher/analyst has access to', as well as skills, methods and models and interpretation of results.
4.50
The ARC provided information on its Engagement and Impact assessment, which seeks to assess 'how well researchers are engaging with end-users of research'. To use this it employs 'discipline-based assessment by panels of experts, comprising distinguished researchers and highly experienced research end-users to review narrative studies and supporting quantitative information.'
Peer review
4.51
The Group of Eight argued that the 'peer review of public research in Go8 universities – indeed, at all Australian public universities – is ubiquitous and provides the highest guarantee of quality, independence and accountability in research and analysis.' The Group of Eight further recommended that additional scrutiny be applied to public money provided to non-university think tanks and that steps be taken 'to ensure that low-quality, non-peer reviewed research does not have an outsized impact upon Australia's foreign policy.'
4.52
The Group of Eight also rejected calls to move past traditional quality measures such as peer review processes in order to rapidly produce research. It submitted:
We would also argue that a focus on speed is not always in the national interest. Good public policy needs a level of rigour if it is to be effective and achieve its goals, and this in turn requires a level of confidence in the quality of the research that underpins it. The key lies in achieving a good balance between quality of output and time of production.
4.53
Professor Medcalf said that publicly-funded research 'should involve transparent and credible quality control, and this will vary according to the material'. He continued:
An insistence that the 20th century convention of academic peer review is the only, or indeed the most appropriate, form of quality control for contemporary policy research misses some key considerations that a policy audience will have in mind. Academic peer review typically involves the 'blind' assessment of a finished draft by two or three academics from related disciplines. Levels of rigour vary from editor to editor and journal to journal, although they can be highly demanding.
From my experience, a good think tank – or think-tank like unit within a university – can offer a different kind of rigour, more suited to the needs of policy. Universities should be encouraged to consider this more blended approach to quality control, involving direct consultation with policymakers at the early stage of framing research questions (with a focus on the 'so what?'), road-testing analytical judgements with a wide range of practitioner and expert voices, and final review involving both academic and policy experts.
4.54
Mr Hagland said it would be advisable for think tanks to look at peer review processes, highlighting the process used by the Lowy Institute as an example of best practice in this regard.
4.55
The Lowy Institute explained that it has a 'rigorous research commissioning process' with the Institute's Research Committee, comprising its senior researchers and chaired by the Director of Research, meeting regularly to consider proposals from both internal and external researchers. The Committee 'discusses the merits of each proposal, how it can be improved, and whether to approve it…[deciding] which issues we wish to address in the form of long-form research, which authors we will commission, and where we will invest our resources'. The Lowy Institute also has a 'robust editing and peer review process' with at least two independent peer reviewers consulted for every paper. Further, 'the Institute supervises the author's incorporation of the reviewers' feedback into their work'.
4.56
The Lowy Institute noted that reviewers are selected on the basis of expertise, reputation, independence, and ability to provide critical feedback. The Institute explained:
The author is not informed of the identity of the reviewers. The Institute also draws on the expertise of our scholars – both resident and non-resident – when assessing papers for publication. All Institute long-form research is signed off by the Director of Research and the Executive Director. Finally, for particularly large and important data-driven projects, for example the Asia Power Index and the Pacific Aid Map, we sometimes apply additional fact-checking and red-teaming processes.
Incentivising empirical research
4.57
Mr Hanson and Ms Cave noted the 'widespread trend across think tanks globally to focus on opinion and analysis rather than original, empirical, data-driven and policy-focussed research.' They continued:
Original empirical research that is policy-relevant is much harder and more costly to conduct but is infinitely more useful to policy makers as it is grounded in facts and new datasets that help inform policy recommendations, rather than abstract analysis.
Data gaps
4.58
Mr Turtle told the committee there was a 'pressing need for better and more transparent data and analysis of Australia's international relationships'.
4.59
The AIBC noted 'gaps in data both official and from research organisations – about Australia's foreign relationships, which are concerning given Australia's international exposure'. It provided as examples:
…information about two-way foreign investment is not as comprehensive as some other nations' data, notably the United States; data on trade in services (including services embedded in goods trade) is inadequate relative to the growing importance of services in Australia's and global trade; and the effectiveness of Australia's trade agreements is not well-documented
4.60
The AIBC called for 'better and more transparent data and analysis', including the following:
…more detailed data on two-way investment and trade in services, including linkages with goods trade. Better information is also needed on how foreign aid is applied and with what effect, and how Australia's international relationships and economic interests are supported by aid. Measurement of the effectiveness of Australia's trade agreements and identification of opportunities for improvement to the agreements themselves and to implementation can also improve. AIBC recommends that both official data collection and analysis by research organisations be oriented towards filling the information needs as well as maintaining the quality of current data.
4.61
Asialink suggested the initiation of a polling project to 'examine perceptions of Australia's strengths and weaknesses as a regional partner', to fill the gap in information about 'how Australia is regarded by the region militarily, economically, and as a responsible regional player'.
Enhancing diversity and collaboration
4.62
Several submitters considered that there is presently a lack of diversity in foreign policy. There was also a view that collaboration needed to be encouraged and incentivised. For example, Mr Peter Jennings PSM stated:
…there's quite a remarkable degree of conformity in much of Australian debate on many policy areas, but particularly in the foreign affairs field, and that there's not a lot of warmth or welcome towards people who challenge that conformity. You could argue that perhaps that's a product of the design of the federal capital, which means that foreign and defence policy is very much a Public Service business inside the ACT and that, unlike Washington or London, it's not troubled by a broader exposure to a range of views. But whatever the reason, I have found that it's not so much a search for plurality and diversity of view as there's a rather deadening hand of consensus on a lot of Australian policy thinking.
4.63
Mr Hanson and Ms Cave also noted that it is difficult to attract funding for research that breaks new ground or concerns topics government sees as sensitive:
…policymakers will actively avoid funding it, no matter how much the need it.' They argued that ensuring such research can occur requires greater flexibility and proposed the establishment of 'a small pool of untied funding grants for think tanks to use for original research they cannot finance from elsewhere would enable this innovative research to be produced.
4.64
The Australia China Business Council (ACBC) said that 'Australia's national interest is best served by a diversity of voices that balance national security interests alongside the trade and investment needed to fuel Australia's prosperity.' In the ACBC's view, security perspectives receive more generous government research funding support than prosperity perspectives.
4.65
Mr Hanson and Ms Cave said that Australia 'currently lacks a think tank sector of sufficient size and breadth to provide the diversity and depth of perspective and analysis which is critical to robust policy making.'
4.66
The AIBC noted the lack of a wider lens in relation to foreign policy:
…most research organisations are located in Canberra, Sydney and Melbourne, away from regions that host many trade-exposed industries and that are highly dependent on overseas migration to maintain skills and provide labour, as well as sustain populations. This may lead to analysis that is biased towards major city perceptions and less well-informed about the foreign relations interactions of other Australian regions.
Most research organisations by their very nature tend to take academic approaches to analysis and/or aim commentary at fellow travellers in foreign relations and not seek to engage mainstream business and community stakeholders.
4.67
Mr Turtle called for a greater diversity in the location of research organisations to better 'reflect the diversity of Australia's regional economies and their international relationships'. Mr Turtle also called for the diversification of research target audiences and of funding sources, including business, to ensure 'greater buy-in from business…and better market signals for research priorities'.
4.68
DFAT provided information about how it supports and informs Australian business, noting measures introduced following the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper which have resulted in 'strengthened public advocacy in support of our trade and investment agenda, greater industry engagement and a high-level dialogue with business on foreign and trade policy'. Business engagement has also been strengthened to promote economic recovery from COVID-19.
4.69
The Northern Territory government said that resources should be 'spread across universities and think tanks, to avoid over-dependence on any one institution and to allow for regional think tanks and universities to contribute'.
4.70
Mr Hagland noted that Australian government funding for foreign policy research is 'substantially concentrated' in the hands of the Lowy Institute and ASPI. He said there is 'limited diversity in Australia's foreign-policy-related think tank industry'. He continued:
Few institutes have the available resources (fiscal and intellectual) to consistently produce detailed, policy-relevant research which might reasonably attract the attention – and impact the thinking – of our policymakers.
4.71
Mr Hagland substantiated these claims by pointing to the fact that only the Lowy Institute 'provides dedicated resources to international affairs beyond Asia and the United States'. He noted that the academic community is well versed in affairs in other regions, including potential hotspots, but that it is 'questionable whether policymakers are amenable to their offerings'.
4.72
The Initiative for Peacebuilding, University of Melbourne, however stated that 'there is considerable diversity in the analysis, expression and discussion of Australian foreign policy when all the forms of research translation are taken into account'. It pointed to the growth of online channels specialising in or including discussion of foreign policy' as having 'multiplied avenues for debate about international relations'. The Initiative did however note that:
There can be no doubt that many important aspects of Australian international relations receive too little original research attention, and that is coupled with the constraints on research funding for original research. We believe there would be substantial value in more sustained inquiry into understanding contemporary drivers of conflict in the Asia Pacific region and how Australia is best placed to support approaches to transforming these as part of foreign policy.
New foreign policy institute
4.73
Several witnesses promoted the notion of a new foreign policy institute following the model of ASPI in order to improve the diversity of foreign policy research in Australia. For example, Mr Hagland said that:
Beyond the Lowy Institute and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, there is no systematic policy oriented prosecution of foreign policy related issues beyond those specific to the Asian region. Even within the Asian region, policy oriented research tends to be heavily focused on the major Indo-Pacific nations rather than on many of the smaller consequential nations that might determine the future path of Australian foreign policy. My submission suggests that the Australian government establish a new independent policy institute that focuses on global affairs but with a predominant focus on the Asian region. It's apparent that events such as the Arab Spring, the European debt crisis and Brexit were consequential from an Australia perspective, but my research suggests that we, as a nation, are very light in terms of our policy production capabilities through policy institutes in these associated geographies.
…more voices in Australia's foreign policy focused think-tank community will lead to greater discussion of foreign policy ideas in the public sphere, and an escalation of debate will doubtlessly enhance public understanding of Australia's global, regional and bilateral interests.
4.74
Mr Hagland further recommended that the government 'jointly fund this new think tank with a private partner of a willing state government', based on the model provided by the domestically-focussed Grattan Institute. Mr Hagland noted that the Grattan Institute was seeded with $35 million, provided over several years, with the Australian government contributing $15 million. Finally, Mr Hagland recommended that the new institute be structured similarly to ASPI, whereby the Board of Directors includes nominees from both the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition.
4.75
Mr Peter Jennings PSM also supported the notion of a foreign policy ASPI. Mr Jennings noted that ASPI's original charter letter established three underlying purposes:
providing alternative sources of input to government decision-making processes on major strategic and defence issues;
nourishing public debate and understanding; and
nurturing a body of people, working inside and outside government, who are expert in the strategic policy issues faced by government.
4.76
Mr Jennings told the committee:
…would Australian foreign policy be better if we had a foreign policy institute based on something that looked like the ASPI business model, working to produce contestability of advice, improved public understanding and nurturing more foreign policy expertise? In my view, the answer to that question is: unequivocally, yes. I think that DFAT would benefit enormously from the challenge of having to engage with informed policy-relevant alternative policy advice and not just from ASPI.
4.77
Mr Jennings stated that such a foreign policy institute 'could help shape some creative new policy thinking, which over time could benefit DFAT, government, parliament and all Australians'. Mr Jennings submitted:
Much like Defence, DFAT has its own powerful workplace culture which makes the shielding of policy continuity and 'steady as she goes' policy thinking the order of the day. However Australia faces a range of foreign policy challenges which will not be overcome by the cautious application of policy continuity – as we have seen with China policy in recent years. A Foreign Policy Institute could help to shape some creative new policy thinking that, over time, could benefit DFAT, Government, Parliament, and all Australians.
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Mr Jennings further recommended that such an institution should be: genuinely independent; not housed in a university; of sufficient scale to attract high quality staff; given the time to properly establish itself; non-partisan; and adequately funded.
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Mr Jennings noted that alternatively an expansion of ASPI to take on this role could also be considered, stating:
ASPI would be more than happy to be considered to take on this role. That said, a separate, standalone Foreign Policy Institute is also worth seriously contemplating. An ASPI and a 'FPI' would generate a sense of creative competition, putting two useful voices into policy debates that will only become more important to Australia's future interests. Whether or not it is part of ASPI, the Committee should consider recommending the creation of a substantial Foreign Policy Institute. This will enhance Australia's foreign policy capabilities at a time when that is desperately needed in the national interest.
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Dr Michael Fullilove AM, Executive Director of the Lowy Institute however cautioned that although 'competition keeps us match fit', it 'takes an enormous amount of effort to assemble the right staff, create the right culture, work out your research priorities and your practices and work out how you're going to operate and what your personality is. It really takes a lot of time and effort and money to do that'. Dr Fullilove concluded, 'I'm not convinced about whether the startup costs would really be justified in creating a new foreign policy ASPI'.
Enhancing collaboration and exchange
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Professor Medcalf said that 'opportunity for greater collaboration needs to be endorsed, encouraged and motivated in some way by government.' Professor Medcalf also spoke of the need to build 'regular channels of communication, trust and mutual understanding between quite different intellectual cultures.'
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Associate Professor Julien Barbara of the PRP noted that 'one of the benefits or flexibilities of the funding that we're provided by the government is that we can put a lot more emphasis on partnerships, including outward-looking partnerships.' He continued:
…we invest quite a bit of effort into forming relationships with governments in the region and with other development partners, so that informs the research. Often we conduct it with our partners in the region, so it underlines the relevance of the research that we do and, I think, the responsiveness of the research to a range of policy agendas.
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Mr Batley, also of the PRP, said that the lack of understanding between academia and government works both ways. To address this, the PRP has 'made a conscious effort to bring in some people who've worked in government', promoting a 'cross-fertilisation that…has really promoted a sense of mutual trust and an ability to be able to talk across that divide'.
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The University of Melbourne Initiative for Peacebuilding suggested that it could be useful to appoint 'more advisory groups of academics and civil society leaders for swift advice, provision of expert comments and preparation of reports'. It expanded on this idea:
Such advisory groups facilitate the formation of professional networks which can be called on for swift comment. Networking is a vital and cost-effective skill. An expert group could also be assigned small funds for sponsoring public discussion; creating opportunities for generating public discussion; and being ready to undertake tasks for the minister and department. Organisation of such groups takes time and modest cost (provided they do not meet too frequently) but their value can be substantial to both the Department and to strengthening public understanding.
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The Coral Bell School also noted that there is 'little visibility of the opportunities offered by relationships with social scientists in departments outside historically foreign policy focussed departments.' It suggested that government efforts to 'increase the impetus on departments to engage with the academic sector' would be 'useful for both parties and the broader community.'
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Mr Hanson and Mr Cave said that many foreign policy challenges cut across many areas so that it can be 'impossible for any one individual to grapple with them alone'. For this reason:
Teams comprising a wide range of expertise allow for a much richer range of approaches to empirical research and allow for a more holistic perspective in understanding policy problems.
Exchanges
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Witnesses spoke about the regular exchanges between think tanks and government in the United States as a positive aspect of that system that Australia should aspire to emulate. Professor Jackman discussed how this could be promoted in Australia:
Perhaps we need a slight rethink and some real leadership here to compel or encourage senior public sector leaders to say to some of their up and comers, 'A two-year secondment out in the public square, perhaps working in a slightly different environment with a public facing charge, student facing, media facing and community facing part to your role, would be extremely valuable and not a CLM, a career-limiting move, back here in Canberra.' I think right now it would be a very dicey proposition for some people in the Australian Public Service essentially to hit pause on navigating the greasy pole, as it were, here in Canberra and to come for a spell in Perth or with us in Sydney or elsewhere. I think we need to offer some reassurance and, indeed, reward people who are willing to take that step.
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Asialink said that the 'expansion of DFAT secondments to key think tanks would be of considerable value.'
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Mr Hagland considered that an additional benefit of establishing a foreign policy ASPI would be promoting the development of 'a so-called 'revolving door' between government and the independent think tank industry. Think tanks can be both incubators and 'holding pens' for highly-capable future public administrators'.
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The Coral Bell School recommended the government facilitate 'visiting fellowships for academics within [DFAT] and other relevant government departments and facilitate equivalent fellowships for government staff within universities'. The Coral Bell School noted that its existing engagements with government were 'extremely valuable' but 'relatively ad hoc'. It continued:
There is an opportunity to engage in more regularised reflective exchange. A fellowship model in two parts would facilitate an even more productive relationship between academic and the foreign policy community.
The first part of this model should adopt the example provided by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Knowledge Exchange. Initiated in 2017, this program facilitates the secondment of academics into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for 0.6 to 0.8 FTE for 24 months. Secondees, known as fellows, bring fresh thinking, depth and breadth of expert knowledge and apply their learning to policy challenges.
…
The second part of this model would see government foreign policy staff offered a university secondment as a visiting fellow. The fellowship would be relatively short term and would focus on secondees working on big, 'sticky', complex problems which would benefit from engagement with the whole of the university.
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The Group of Eight similarly stated that there is 'significant merit in reciprocal visiting fellowships or like mechanisms to provide government officials a chance to gain experience in a university setting, or for academics to acquire exposure to government and policy making environments in practice'. It stated that this would allow for the 'useful exchange of ideas, experience, and the growth of valuable connections'. The Group of Eight highlighted that similar exchanges occur with public servants from Federal Government departments seconded to the National Security College at the Australian National University. In addition, the Australian Policy Fellowship Program managed by the Office of Australia's Chief Scientist, offers the opportunity for academics at Group of Eight universities to receive on the job training and exposure to policy making.
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Mr Hanson and Ms Cave said that Australia's foreign policy communities 'suffers from a lack of movement between government, think-tanks and the business community', in contrast to the United States and Europe. They said this reflected not only the small size and relative immaturity of Australia's think tank sector but was also 'deeply cultural':
Most public servants working in this sector have never worked outside government, and sometimes never outside their department or agency. This is partially because the public service makes this movement difficult, and culturally, many departments and agencies have not previously valued outside experience and expertise.
Engaging with civil society
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Save the Children (STC) noted that civil society organisations (CSOs) are not eligible for ARC grants and that other public funding for foreign policy research is for specific initiatives or issues and hence targeted at a select and exclusive set of institutions. STC continued:
Because of this uneven access to appropriate pools of dedicated funding, CSOs active in Australia's international development program across the Indo-Pacific can be hampered from participating in foreign policy research and debate. This problem stems from the fact that many of the funding pools to which we do have access, from both the Australian Government and a range of other donors, strongly incentivise narrow, top-down approaches to project delivery. Compounded by the scarcity of funding, the granting environment in Australia leads CSOs to prioritise the needs of their program teams over their contribution to public debate.
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STC argued that the inability for CSOs to contribute to participate in debate on foreign policy was 'part of the reason that the Australian public's understanding of foreign policy issues is often shaped by voices that are overwhelmingly drawn from similar, tightly defined, strategic policy circles, with all the equity and diversity challenges that can accompany such concentration of resources.'
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The Oaktree Foundation noted that there is valuable expertise residing in 'NGOs, charities, professional organisations, diaspora groups and volunteer groups', which should inform Australian foreign policy. It further explained:
In particular, NGOs are vital partners in advising government efforts to shape security, stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific through the Australian aid and development assistance program, as their expertise of local contexts, understanding of networks, and knowledge and relationships with communities is unmatched.
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DFAT noted that it engages with a range of stakeholders, including civil society. It provided information on its consultation with NGOs on human rights as a case study.
Other proposals for a new body
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Save the Children proposed the establishment of 'an independent institution and standing fund that would invest in programs and projects aimed at understanding human security challenges and strengthening democratic institutions and cultures around the Indo-Pacific.' It provided the following rationale:
This action would allow Australia to invest in projects and programs aimed at strengthening democratic institutions and cultures around the Indo-Pacific, an increasingly important priority in light of the extent of democratic backsliding evident across the region. It would also assist in resolving the fragmentation of national expertise related to Indo-Pacific human security issues, which causes a great deal of knowledge to be overlooked while public foreign policy debates remained narrowly focused on the interests of states.