2.1
This chapter considers current threats and incursions impacting upon Australia's biosecurity system, with a particular focus on foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), lumpy skin disease (LSD) and varroa mite. The committee examined the nature of the threat or incursion, and the risks they pose to Australian agriculture, trade, and the economy, as well as impacts on the environment and our communities.
Foot-and-mouth disease
What is foot-and-mouth disease?
2.2
FMD is an internationally and nationally notifiable, highly contagious viral disease that affects cloven-hoofed animals such as cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, camels, alpacas, and deer. FMD spreads through close contact between animals, and through feeding infected products to animals, and has the capacity to infect an entire herd within 48 hours. FMD can also spread through animal products including hides, meat and dairy products, farm equipment, clothing, and by the wind.
2.3
FMD is not generally a fatal disease for adult animals, but it can kill young animals and have serious impacts on productivity. It is very rare for FMD to infect humans. FMD is a category two disease under the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA).
Where is foot-and-mouth disease found?
2.4
At the time of reporting, Australia was officially free from FMD.
2.5
FMD is found in over 70 countries around the world, and is considered endemic in several parts of Asia, most of Africa, and the Middle East.
Indonesian foot and mouth disease outbreak
2.6
Australia became aware of reports of an FMD outbreak in Indonesia on 6 May 2022, with reports that the first cases were detected in late April 2022. Indonesia notified the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) of FMD on 9 May 2022. On 5 July 2022, Indonesian authorities reported that the incursion had reached Bali. Prior to this outbreak Indonesia had been FMD free since 1986.
2.7
With around 65 million FMD-susceptible animals in the country, the potential economic impact of an FMD outbreak in Indonesia could be as high as 9.9 trillion Indonesian rupiah, or around $965 million.
Indonesian response
2.8
Indonesia's initial response focussed on policy and technical approaches. It was reported that the response was hampered by the geographic spread of the country, inadequate compensation, lack of access to vaccines, vaccine hesitancy, and the makeup of the livestock industry, with over 90 per cent of the cattle industry characterised by smallholder farms.
2.9
Around mid-June the Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (BNPB, National Disaster Mitigation Agency) launched nationwide movement restrictions and segregation, disinfection, the slaughter of affected animals, an education campaign and planning for compensation scheme for affected farmers.
2.10
At the same time, the government approved the purchase of 29 million vaccines and commenced work on the development of a local vaccine, with plans to vaccinate at least 8,000 cattle by early July and triple vaccinate 17 million head of livestock—or around 80 per cent of livestock in affected provinces—by 2023.
2.11
By early August, FMD had spread to 23 provinces, including Bali, with just over 992 000 animals vaccinated, 7 702 animals slaughtered, and 4 847 animal deaths. From mid-August the Indonesian government reported a decline in daily case numbers and no new FMD cases in a number of provinces.
2.12
On 18 November, the Ministry of Agriculture was reporting around 46 000 active cases of FMD across 17 provinces, with nine provinces reporting zero cases. Based on numbers provided by the Ministry, around 87 per cent of infected animals clinically recovered, with 1.5 per cent of animals dying and just over two percent slaughtered.
2.13
In November 2022, DAFF officials advised the committee that Indonesia's progress in vaccinating its livestock was 'very encouraging', with nearly six million animals vaccinated and plans for all animals in Bali to be vaccinated by the end of the year. The department advised that the FMD situation in Indonesia appeared to be stabilising after a peak of cases in June 2022, and stated that 'as far as FMD is concerned, our view is that the situation has plateaued in Indonesia, and they're making every effort to get it under control. That is our best assessment of what is happening in Indonesia'. However, DAFF also noted that, for the moment, the risk to Australia remains:
We would think that as they start to move through both natural infection and vaccination and their other control measures we would be able to see a reduction in the risk. Is it the case now? No. Our risk settings have not changed at the border, and we still remain highly alert and have large numbers of people, processors, engaged at the border in Indonesia and also post-border to make sure that we have all the bases as covered as we can in that process.
Risks and impacts of an Australian FMD outbreak
Risk of outbreak
2.14
The Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN) notes that the highest risk of entry of FMD to Australia is via the illegal import of infected meat and dairy products brought in by passengers, through the post, or via rubbish discarded by sea craft or planes. The risks posed by the illegal swill‑feeding of pigs with infected meat products makes it likely that any FMD outbreak will first be seen in pigs.
2.15
Over the previous 18 months DAFF has worked with the Centre of Excellence for Biosecurity Risk Analysis (CEBRA), at the University of Melbourne, to conduct Structured Expert Judgement (SEJ) exercises. The group considered a range of factors when developing their risk level, including those in Figure 2.1 and the FMD outbreak in Indonesia (including Bali).
2.16
SEJs are not based on modelling; rather, they consider a variety of views, and form just one of the tools that the department uses to assess risk, with risk dependent upon 'both the probability of an event and its consequences'.
2.17
In March 2022, the likelihood of an outbreak of FMD in Australia in the next five years was assessed as nine per cent. After FMD was detected in Indonesia in May 2022, the group reconvened and revised the likelihood up to 11.6 per cent. DAFF also reported a combined estimated probability, which included FMD and LSD, submitting that:
The combined estimated probability of an outbreak in Australia of any one of FMD, LSD, AHS [African Horse Sickness] or ASF [African Swine Fever] was 56 per cent … over a five-year period.
2.18
Angus Hobson advised the committee of his concerns at the 'disproportionately high emphasis placed on qualitative assessments of incursion risk (and insufficient value placed on on-the-ground expertise from potential countries of FMD origin).' He argued that the SEJ should be repeated to take account of additional risks and that there should be greater transparency and third-party auditing of the SEJ process to build stakeholder confidence.
Direct risks and impacts
2.19
With around 100 million head of livestock susceptible to FMD, at an estimated value of $30 billion, the consequences of an incursion in Australia would be significant, particularly for trade and the economy. Around 70 per cent of Australia's beef, lamb, sheep and goat meat is exported each year, so the overnight loss of trade markets if Australia were to have an FMD or LSD incursion would be 'devastating'.
Economy and trade
2.20
In 2013, the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences (ABARES) estimated the direct economic impact of a large Australian, multi-state FMD outbreak to be $52 billion over 10 years. Around 99 per cent of these costs were anticipated to be direct economic costs, with one percent being disease control costs.
2.21
In 2022, ABARES updated its estimate to reflect changes in industry structure and economic conditions, the value of industry output, and the application of discount rates and risk in economic analysis. ABARES forecast that an FMD outbreak would have a direct economic impact of around $80 billion.
2.22
An FMD outbreak could be expected to directly impact a range of industries including breeders, meat, dairy, wool, hides and skins, and exporters, with the Queensland beef industry bearing the largest impact.
2.23
Actual impacts would be affected by the eradication strategy selected, with submitters highlighting significant economic impacts including:
nation-wide trade and export bans—return to normal trade would be dependent upon certification of FMD freedom with the potential for prolonged uncertainties and impacts;
outlay of cost of disease control strategies for governments, industry and producers;
payment of compensation for slaughtered animals (shared government and livestock industry cost);
economic losses for producers which may result in a sustained drop in livestock and production numbers following an FMD outbreak; and potentially resulting in higher costs for consumers.
2.24
DAFF is proactively discussing trade and export matters with trading partners but noted that 'pre-emptive negotiations may not be possible, as information specific to the variant of FMD detected will be needed.'
2.25
Several submitters noted Australia's 'clean and green' reputation which has given the country a competitive edge in global markets. There is potential for this valuable reputation to be lost, with ongoing impacts, if there were an FMD incursion.
2.26
The Australian Livestock Export Corporation Limited (LiveCorp) advised the committee that the Indonesian FMD outbreak has already impacted Australia's live cattle export trade, with higher prices and some supply challenges, and exports down by approximately one third. The FMD outbreak in Indonesia has also impacted the Indonesian registration of Australian feedlots live exporting to that country, potentially significantly restricting the number of animals exported from Queensland ports. This is anticipated to have food security impacts in Indonesia.
Agricultural and environmental impacts
2.27
An FMD outbreak is expected to have the following agricultural and environmental impacts:
animal welfare issues—due to animals having to be killed (particularly in intensive farming where there is no space to accommodate rapidly growing animals), overcrowding resulting from livestock movement restrictions, and poor animal husbandry practices;
environmental issues associated with the culling and disposal of large numbers of livestock, including contamination of water, visual pollution and toxic emissions resulting from burning of carcasses; and
abandonment of livestock production in some areas, leading to land vacancies and deterioration because of uncontrolled pest and weed populations.
Community, health and other impacts
2.28
With an estimated workforce of around 445 000, including producers, processors and the broader economy, an FMD outbreak is also anticipated to have significant social impacts:
social disruption for individuals, families and communities directly associated with livestock production and processing—including immediate and long term mental and physical health issues, strained family relationships, and reduced social cohesion resulting from financial stress, hardship and uncertainty;
social impacts for other producers and communities as a result of FMD control measures, such as isolation, animal welfare concerns and anxiety caused by living with movement restrictions, vaccination and culling of livestock;
response fatigue and social impacts for other industries including local councils, emergency response staff, veterinarians and health providers;
potential risk to the continuity of meat supplies if the closure of export markets impacts on the commercial viability of local meatworks; and
wider public concerns over animal welfare.
2.29
Matthew Journeaux, Acting Federal Secretary of the Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union (AMIEU) was unequivocal about the impacts of an FMD incursion:
If foot-and-mouth disease was to be found in Australia, it would have devastating and immediate consequences for our industry. The industry would grind to a halt and all of these jobs that rely on it would stop. The resulting economic and social consequences would be significant. Australia relies heavily on exports and the meat industry exports approximately 70 per cent of what it produces. Essentially, that part of the turn-off would stop immediately. Re-establishing lost access to markets would likely be a very lengthy process and may persist for a considerable length of time after any disease outbreak had been contained or dealt with. Indeed, market share may never fully be restored.
Indirect risks and impacts
2.30
Anticipated indirect impacts of an Australia FMD outbreak include:
increased costs and losses for associated industries such as transport, processing, and feedstock suppliers of $11.5 billion over 10 years;
loss of employment and social impacts on related industries including shearers, traders, transport providers, meat processing, feedstock suppliers, dairy processors, agricultural contractors, and fuel and tyre suppliers;
potential for loss of consumer confidence in meat products due to misconceptions about food safety;
major supply chain disruptions and panic buying due to public lack of awareness or understanding of movement controls; and
potential flow-on losses for small business, education, tourism, hospitality, transport and sport.
2.31
David Hill, cattle producer and Chair of the Cattle Council of Australia (CCA) LSD and FMD Working Group, told the committee of his concerns:
There is some concern about the lack of accuracy on the impact. We don't really know what the actual cost would be, because of the whole of the supply chain. It's what we've talked about. We've had processors and the transport industry, but it's all the other supply industries and the small communities in rural and regional areas…I wouldn't like to try and put a figure on it. Everyone agrees it's a lot higher than what has been bandied around…There are so many things they're not taking into account as far as that goes.
2.32
The Australian Livestock and Rural Transporters Association (ALRTA) also noted that industries indirectly affected by an FMD incursion are not signatory to cost-sharing compensation arrangements. While such industries may be able to access short-term compensation arrangements through states and territories, these will not enable recovery and build resilience into these sectors.
Lumpy skin disease
What is lumpy skin disease?
2.33
LSD is a highly infectious, internationally and nationally notifiable viral disease that affects cattle and water buffalo. LSD spreads through vectors, primarily biting insects such as flies, mosquitoes and ticks, and may be spread through fomites such as equipment or feed, air-dried hides, and possibly animal to animal. It is possible for the disease to spread longer distances through wind dispersal of vectors.
2.34
LSD has a relatively low mortality but can still result in significant illness, including fever, emaciation, depression, and characteristic skin nodules. This often results in production losses such as infertility, abortion, low milk yield and animal welfare issues. There is no threat to human health. LSD is a category three disease under the EADRA.
Where is lumpy skin disease found?
2.35
At the time of reporting, Australia had no reported cases of LSD.
2.36
LSD is endemic in Africa, but since 2012 has spread through the Middle East and south-east Europe. Since 2019 it has spread through Asia, including India, China and Southeast Asia, with the disease confirmed in Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia in 2021.
Indonesian LSD outbreak
2.37
On 3 March 2022, the Indonesian government notified the World Organisation for Animal Health of the detection of LSD in cattle across 31 villages in Riau Province, Sumatra. There is some evidence of cases in Indonesia from mid‑February. The disease is thought to have entered the Malacca Straights from Malaysia and, at the time of reporting, was forecast to spread through the Indonesian archipelago over the next 12 months.
2.38
Indonesia had already been preparing for a possible LSD outbreak, given the presence of the disease in the region, and had communicated its challenges with diagnostic capability, staff training, access to vaccines and compensation for producers. By 15 March 2022, the disease had spread to 10 districts.
2.39
In November 2022, the department advised that it was difficult to determine Indonesia's progress on addressing LSD, due to its focus on FMD. At the time of reporting the disease was reported to have spread to Java.
Risks and impacts of an Australian LSD outbreak
2.40
The AUSVETPLAN notes that the highest risk of entry of LSD to Australia is via vectors carrying the disease into Northern Australia. The presence of cattle and water buffalo (including feral populations) and the geographic extent and isolation of grazing may make discovery more difficult and delay detection, as well as making eradication difficult. Importation of products or equipment carrying the LSD virus are another potential source of entry to Australia.
2.41
In March 2021, the SEJ process identified the probability of an LSD outbreak in the next five-years as eight per cent. After LSD was detected in Indonesia the SEJ exercise was repeated considering a range of factors, such as those in Figure 2.2, and the probability was revised up to 28 per cent.
Direct risks and impacts
2.42
An LSD outbreak would have significant impacts on domestic and international trade for cattle and water buffalo industries including producers, live animal and reproductive material exports. The economic and trade impact is estimated to be $7.39 billion of exports per year.
2.43
Some trading partners may impose their own import bans, despite lack of LSD certification requirements, making the timeframe for the return to normal trade uncertain. DAFF has commenced work on the development of new trade conditions, in preparation for a possible LSD outbreak.
2.44
Direct and indirect impacts are anticipated to be similar to those outlined for FMD outlined earlier in this chapter.
Varroa mite
What is varroa mite?
2.45
The varroa mite (Varroa destructor and Varroa jacobsoni) is an external parasite of the European (Apis mellifera) and Asian honey bees (Apis cerana). The varroa mite is spread via the movement of drone bees between hives, where the mite quickly and easily transfers itself between bees. Should a hive become infested with the varroa mite and left untreated, its inhabitants are weakened and subsequently killed within three to four years.
2.46
An endemic infestation of the varroa mite would likely result in the progressive destruction of 95 to 100 per cent of Australia's wild European honey bee (honey bee) population. The varroa mite can be controlled through the application of chemical mite killers and other management strategies, meaning farmed honey bees and pollination services could manage an incursion at an additional and ongoing cost. Native bee species are not impacted by the varroa mite.
2.47
The varroa mite is regarded as the most serious global pest for the honey bee. Varroa destructor is found across most of Asia, Europe, the United States, South America and New Zealand. Australia is the only inhabited continent without the varroa mite, with previous outbreaks of Varroa jacobsoni contained in Queensland (2016, 2019 and 2020) and Varroa destructor contained in Victoria (2018). In those instances, the identification took place at sea ports (Port of Townsville and the Port of Melbourne). The most recent incursion in New South Wales (NSW) is the first outbreak to be found in commercial hives in Australia.
2.48
The varroa mite is listed as a category three Emergency Plant Pest (EPP) under Schedule 13 of the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD), in recognition of the damage varroa mite would have on Australia's agricultural sector should it become endemic. Internal and external mites of bees are listed in the top ten of Australia's 42 National Priority Plant Pests. The Honey Bee Industry Biosecurity Plan also lists the varroa mite as the most serious threat to the industry. This plant biosecurity threat is in addition to other notable plant pest risks, including the khapra beetle (listed as number two on the Australia's National Priority Plant Pests list) and the brown marmorated stink bug.
Current and potential impacts
2.49
Honey bees play a crucial role in the agricultural sector, primarily through pollination services. Approximately 65 per cent of agricultural and horticultural crops in Australia rely on honey bee pollination. In 2014, the honey bees' contribution to the Australian economy was estimated to be $14.2 billion per annum.
2.50
The cost of the varroa mite becoming established in Australia would be substantial. The NSW Department of Primary Industries (DPI) reported that the annual cost of controlling the varroa mite across Australia's 600 000 managed hives would be $54 million. In NSW, which hosts 300 000 managed hives, the annual cost would be $27 million. In addition, the availability of honey bees for pollination services could be significantly reduced due to the loss of wild honey bees and varroa mite's impact on managed hives. ABARES estimated that a varroa mite incursion at the Port of Sydney would cost producers and consumers $5.2 billion without containment and approximately $3.8 billion with containment over 30 years. Modelling by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) predicted that the economic costs avoided by keeping Australia varroa mite free ranged from $21.3 million to $50.5 million per year.
2.51
As demonstrated by the most recent incursion, pollination services and the producers that rely upon those services are highly vulnerable to a varroa mite incursion. According to Horticulture Innovation Australia (Hort Innovation), '[o]f Australia's $30 billion agricultural production per annum, approximately $1.8 billion is estimated to be responsive to honey bee pollination'. Vulnerable pollinator reliant crops include: almonds, canola, cotton, papaya, apples and pears, grains, passionfruit, avocados, lychees, strawberries/berries/blueberries, macadamias, summer fruits, melons, vegetables, cherries and onions. Of those sectors, the almond industry was substantially impacted by the NSW incursion. Prior to the incursion, the sector had anticipated a $1 billion crop for 2022. However, due to restrictions placed on the movement of hives by various governments in response to the NSW incursion, the almond industry may have 'hundreds of millions of dollars [sic] worth of production losses'.
2.52
Impacts of the varroa mite outbreak go beyond the commercial sector. Hobby beekeepers found within the eradication zone have had their hives and bees euthanised. The rationale for such an action was contested, with some beekeepers supportive of the eradication process and others questioning its rationale. For many beekeepers who have had a close bond with their honey bees, the eradication of their prized hives has been a deeply distressing experience.
New South Wales incursion
2.53
Australia's most recent varroa mite incursion in NSW has highlighted the strength of the nation's bee biosecurity program and the importance of effective collaboration between governments, industry and impacted communities.
2.54
On 22 June 2022, the DPI detected a varroa mite incursion in two DPI-managed sentinel hives located at the Port of Newcastle. Response plan measures specified within the EPPRD were immediately enacted, with the Australian Government co-funding 25 per cent of response activities in NSW, including an $18 million compensation package. The National Management Group approved an overall budget of $65 million to facilitate eradication activities as part of the 100-day eradication plan.
2.55
The eradication plan established a biosecurity zone, containing the infected hives and euthanising honey bees. Initially the biosecurity zone covered an area within a 50-kilometre radius of the Port of Newcastle. Within this zone, no beekeeper was permitted to move or tamper with their hives, unless authorised. Beekeepers were also required to advise the DPI of the location of their hives.
2.56
On 26 June 2022, DPI announced a state-wide emergency order that prohibited the movement of bees across NSW. The control order was in response to the probability of varroa mite being found outside the initial biosecurity zone. Subsequently, a 25km surveillance zone was established, where DPI officials monitored and inspected managed and feral honey bees in the region. At this time, eradication measures continued within the 10km emergency zone in proximity to the Port of Newcastle.
2.57
Testing of hives outside of the initial biosecurity zone resulted in further detections, at the NSW mid north coast and Seaham. By 28 June 2022, a total of seven infested premises had been discovered, in addition to those sentinel hives near the Port of Newcastle. The varroa mite emergency order was subsequently extended to the Port Stephens peninsula (3 July), Narrabri and Wards River (9 July) as further detections occurred. By 25 July 2022, 43 premises had been found to contain hives infested with varroa mite.
2.58
The timing of the NSW incursion coincided with the pollination season. Without access to bee hives, the pollination dependent agricultural and horticultural sectors would faulter. In response, DPI announced on 16 July 2022 a risk-based approach that would permit the movement of low‑risk hives to enable critical pollination services. Under the plan, commercial beekeepers were required to alcohol wash a proportion of their hives and record a negative detection of varroa mite, as well as complete a short online training course. Beekeepers located within biosecurity zones were not permitted to move their hives. Should a beekeeper unintentionally move hives from the biosecurity zone, they risked a fine of $1.1 million. If intentional, the fine would be $2.2 million and potentially jail time.
2.59
As of 25 October 2022, 102 premises had reported a varroa mite detection. 90 per cent of hives located within the eradication emergency zones had been euthanised. All hives located in Jerrys Plain, Narrabri, Denman and Wards River areas had been euthanised and disposed of, with the euthanasia program ongoing in the Nana Glen, Newcastle and the Hunter eradication zones. The department intends to fully eradicate the varroa mite throughout NSW.
2.60
In October 2022, the Wild European Honey Bee Management Program commenced. This program established fipronil baiting stations within a 10‑kilometre zone around premises where varroa mite had been detected within the eradication emergency zone. The use of the fipronil baiting stations is strictly managed by trained DPI personal in accordance with the requirements of the Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority permit. Honey beekeepers from across Australia have reportedly volunteered to support efforts to eradicate the varroa mite in the wild. The use of baiting stations also plays a vital role in the eradication of unregistered hives within a biosecurity zone, such as unregistered (hobby) hives.
2.61
DPI advised the committee that discussions were taking place with the Consultative Committee on Emergency Plant Pests to finalise the three-year eradication and surveillance program. This program's success will support a proof of freedom declaration. Once the plan has been endorsed by the Consultative Committee, a proposal will be made to the National Management Group to approve a cost-shared budget for the three-year program.
2.62
Whilst remaining cautious, various stakeholders expressed optimism that the incursion could be eradicated. The DPI assured the committee that the response met national and international standards for identification and management of eradication and surveillance zones. Concerning the surveillance zones, the DPI pointed out that testing across 100 000 hives with no cases of varroa mite was a positive indicator that the biosecurity zones were appropriately established.
2.63
This outlook was not shared by all stakeholders. The NSW Apiarists' Association (NSWAA) remained doubtful, largely due to the difficulty of managing an incursion in wild bee populations. The NSWAA also queried the impact of non-compliance on the prospect of eradication, based on reports of beekeepers not following the control order. Witnesses also questioned the effectiveness of fines as a deterrent, with many doubting whether the DPI would seek to persecute those in breach of the state's biosecurity control order. The DPI assured the committee that all non-compliance infringements that have been issued were being followed up by DPI personnel, with a number of ongoing investigations into potential infringements.
2.64
The vulnerability of the eradication process was highlighted on 27 November 2022, with a report that the varroa mite had been detected outside of the Hunter Valley's eradication zone. This detection resulted in the expansion of the eradication zone in that area by 10 kilometres, encompassing 80 more sites and the anticipated eradication of 650 beehives. An additional infected premises was identified on 29 November 2022, taking the total infected premises to 104, and resulting in a further expansion of the eradication zone.
2.65
Overall, the committee received positive reports on the response to the incursion, despite various issues being revealed throughout the process. The Australian Honey Bee Industry Council (AHBIC), which has been on the ground since the first detection of varroa mite, made clear that the DPI's commitment 'has been second to none' and those staff on the ground and based in Orange 'have been outstanding'.
2.66
The scale of the operation across NSW was extensive. Over the first 70 days of the incursion, a total of 250 personnel were on the ground identifying and testing hives, with a further 1,600 government employees working on the response during this time. As of 11 October 2022, 13 819 of the 17 538 hives in the eradication zone had been euthanised (75 per cent). Sampling had taken place across 28 850 hives, with a further 85 569 hives sampled by beekeepers. The DPI has also processed 1 996 movement permit declarations for a total of 333 000 hives. Of those hives, 116 000 supported pollination services within the state. The first 100 days of the outbreak is anticipated to have cost governments and industry between $52 million and $54 million, which does not include direct costs to NSW and individuals.
Origin of the incursion
2.67
Whilst the varroa mite incursion was first detected in sentinel hives located at the Port of Newcastle, further investigation has revealed the incursion had started several months to a year before its detection. The investigation has found the area around Williamtown (including Tomago, Raymond Terrace and Salt Ash) to have had the highest density of infected hives, with clear evidence of the natural spread of varroa mite across the area. Extensive alcohol wash data has revealed some of the highest infestation rates to be centred in the Williamtown area, which is home to a Royal Australian Air Force Base (RAAF Base Williamtown).
2.68
On 10 August 2022, DAFF advised the committee that it was not aware of any contact with the Department of Defence concerning the varroa mite outbreak, but was waiting the outcome of an epidemiological assessment by the DPI. At the time, DAFF hypothesised two potential scenarios for the cause of the incursion. The first hypothesis outlined was that the incursion came from a ship waiting off the coast of Newcastle because of supply chain issues caused by the COVID pandemic. The other hypothesis was that the incursion originated from a hitchhiker in an aircraft.
2.69
The AHBIC agreed that the incursion most likely had not originated from the Port of Newcastle. It pointed out that the Williamtown area had multiple pathways of high risk, such as a commercial airport, RAAF base and an industrial area that imports containers and equipment.
2.70
Further information provided to the committee noted that NSW had commenced an investigation into the potential origin of the incursion. However, DAFF indicated that a determination would be difficult due to the nature of the varroa mite. It added that it was likely that 'we will never know the exact first point of entry or how long it may have been present in Australia before detection'.
2.71
On 12 October 2022, DPI updated the committee on its findings. It reported that genetic sequencing had found the varroa mite outbreak to be a common species, indicating that there was only one outbreak, rather than multiple incursions. Regarding its origin, the DPI agreed that it would be difficult to identifying how varroa mite entered Australia, and potentially unlikely. The DPI clarified that its investigation would not consider biosecurity protocols at entry points into Australia because it is the Commonwealth's jurisdiction. However, it has had discussions with the Commonwealth about the potential point of entry for the varroa mite incursions.
Endemic outbreak
2.72
As previously noted, whilst governments and industry remain focused on the eradication of the varroa mite in Australia, the NSWAA was doubtful eradication was feasible. It called for authorities to start considering measures should varroa mite be declared endemic. In this case, beekeepers would need to have access to organic and chemical solutions capable of protecting their hives. The NSWAA reassured the committee that the bee industry could manage an endemic varroa mite situation based on the experience of other countries. However, it simultaneously supported the implementation of measures (such as traceability) to slow the spread of the varroa mite to minimise its initial impact on industry.
2.73
Concerns with the prospect of an endemic outbreak of varroa mite were not shared by Dolfi Benesh, a commercial beekeeper within the NSW eradication zone. Mr Benesh submitted that the eradication strategy was scientifically controversial, and the approach taken by the DPI was not practical. He questioned the scientific evidence of the approach and referenced the ease of treatment methods utilised worldwide to manage the varroa mite. Mr Benesh's objections to the eradication approach were shared by over 25 000 signatories to an online petition calling for a new approach.
Committee view
2.74
The committee notes the actions of the Indonesian government in response to the challenges of simultaneous FMD and LSD outbreaks in 2022, and the challenges associated with Indonesia's wide geographic spread and working with a large number of livestock smallholders to ensure appropriate biosecurity measures are in place.
2.75
The committee commends the efforts of governments, industry and local communities impacted by the NSW varroa mite incursion. This incursion has had a profound impact on all stakeholders involved, especially for those beekeepers who have had their hives exterminated as part of the response. The committee is supportive of the response measures implemented by the DPI, in recognition that such activities were agreed to by all stakeholders of the EPPRD.
2.76
The committee notes a lack of clarity regarding the potential origins of this varroa mite incursion. Whilst the committee recognises the difficulty of identifying the original entry pathway, a reasonable expectation is that DAFF, in partnership with the DPI and other relevant government bodies, publicly reports on findings from the investigations into the incursion. This information may result in a better understanding of biosecurity protocols in the Williamtown area, with potential insights gained for varroa mite preparedness measures across Australia.
2.77
The committee recommends that the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and the New South Wales Department of Primary Industries, publicly report on findings from their investigations into the origin of the varroa mite incursion in the Williamtown area.
2.78
The committee is pleased that the goal shared by the DPI and industry is the eradication of the varroa mite, and that most stakeholders are optimistic of this outcome. The committee will remain engaged with this matter as it progresses from the 100-day eradication plan to the three-year eradication and surveillance program.