1. Introduction
   1. A strong democracy needs robust institutions that are accountable and can be scrutinised. It is important that Australia models the behaviour of a highly functional democracy, in order to promote democracy in our region. Australia needs to be able to demonstrate to the international stage: good governance and integrity; the ability to hold free and fair elections; have demonstrative action on climate change; showcase a free and independent media; be supportive of civil society organisations; and have a transparent parliament that has a clear separation of powers.
   2. It is in Australia’s interests to support democracy in our region whilst respecting the sovereignty of each nation. It is crucial for all nations to aspire to peace, stability and economic prosperity which go hand in hand with supporting democracy. Australia and its neighbours all benefit from a strong rules-based international system that prioritises trade and investment, peace and security, human rights and the environment. The weakening of democratic governance, civil society and human rights presents a challenge to Australian interests in preserving a secure and prosperous region.
   3. Stability, prosperity and sustainable development in our region are under threat from a range of factors including growing inequality, COVID-19 and other health challenges, climate change and environmental degradation, systems of economic and gender injustice, diminishing human rights and a closing civic space.[1]
   4. In August 2023, the Department of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (DFAT) released Australia’s new International Development Policy.[2] This policy focuses on listening, respect and genuine partnerships. One of the key themes it identifies includes targets and action on climate change. It reaffirms the centrality of gender equity, disability and LGBTQI+ rights to Australia’s foreign policy. This policy has a new strategy to guide Australia’s humanitarian engagement internationally, to ensure Australia has a responsive framework to humanitarian needs and can build resilience.[3]
   5. In the 2023–24 Budget the Australian Government committed to spending $4.77 billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA) to support a range of development programs in the Indo-Pacific. This is in addition to the $1.4 billion boost to ODA announced in the October 2022-23 Budget.[4]
   6. The Australian Government recently elevated the work of indigenous issues in the foreign affairs and trade portfolio. The ‘First Nations Foreign Policy' was announced which focuses on recognising the multiplicity of societies, cultures and histories across the Indo-Pacific. It is important to recognise that all versions of 'democracy' are to some degree socially and culturally specific, and that oversimplified notions of democracy fail to capture contextual complexity and nuance.[5]
   7. International IDEA highlighted some sobering facts on global democracy. Democracy is in decline around the world with the number of countries moving towards authoritarianism more than double the number of those moving towards or consolidating democracy.

As per the International IDEA Global State of Democracy Indices, the number of backsliding democracies has never been as high as in the last decade. In 2022, more than two-thirds of the world’s population live in either a backsliding hybrid or authoritarian regime, indicating a significant rise in authoritarianism.[6]

Challenges to supporting democracies in our region

1.8The Committee received evidence emphasising that different people, living in different contexts, may choose different models of democratic governance. For example, what Australia considers an ideal ‘liberal democracy’ may not be the preferred model in parts of the Pacific Islands region, where ‘relational democracy’[7] may be favoured.[8]

1.9Contributors to a co-authored submission from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) commented:

In the Pacific, commitment to democracy does not necessarily reflect adequate representation of the needs of the people, access to free and fair elections, or functioning public services. Although leaders across the region are democratically elected, some - like Prime Minister Sogavare in Solomon Islands and Prime Minister Bainimarama in Fiji - operate their government with autocratic tendencies, and often ignoring the needs of citizens. Each of these countries requires its own unique style of democracy that co-exists and complements existing cultural leadership systems.[9]

1.10An obstacle to supporting the sovereignty and independence of our immediate neighbours is managing perceptions of political interference and fear of externally imposed regime change. Mr Robert Heron stated:

A weakness of small states is their vulnerability to espionage compounded by their reliance on foreign funded civil society groups.[10]

1.11Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy & Defence Dialogue (AP4D) commented that peace and stability in Australia’s region goes to the heart of Australia’s own security, prosperity and national interest. AP4D stated:

It is clearly in Australia’s interest to shape a region where a vibrant civil society supports good governance. The weakening of democratic governance, civil society and human rights poses a challenge to Australian interests in preserving a secure and prosperous region that supports human freedoms and social and economic flourishing.[11]

1.12ASPI contributors suggested that Australia should continue to show that it can work with all regional partners regardless of the political system so long as our respective values, principles and interests are not compromised.

… regardless of the political system, international laws and rules such as territorial integrity, national sovereignty and human rights should be respected by all. Through the lens of the combination of values, principles and interests, Australia can work with partners both within and outside the region to enhance regional cohesion, security and stability.[12]

1.13The Committee received evidence that suggested Australia had limited influence in assisting some countries to adhere to democratic principles where there were autocratic governments and obvious signs of corruption.

1.14Professor Robison and Professor Rodan commented that the hard reality is that there are no institutional fixes that will enable Australian policymakers to engage in democracy promotion without becoming, directly or indirectly, part of the bitter struggles over power and wealth between different forces and interests within the region.[13]

… liberal democracies cannot simply be parachuted in where powerful reformist forces have not already emerged and who see democracy in liberal terms as a key to securing their interests. Western democracy promotion has failed because it has handed the task of democratisation to the wrong interests.[14]

1.15Sussanah Patton suggested that Australia has very limited influence and has generally been able to secure its interests in the region by working with the current mix of regime types. She stated promoting democracy should not be the main aim of Australia’s foreign policy, rather, it should be to ‘engage with Southeast Asia as it is, rather than as it would like it to be.’[15]

1.16Several submitters suggested that corruption was one of the greatest challenge of our time.

Transparency International Australia believed that corruption is one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world. Corruption undermines good government, distorts public policy, leads to the misallocation of resources, harms private and public sector development and particularly hurts the poor. It drives economic inequality and is a major barrier in poverty eradication.[16]

1.17International IDEA echoed this point.

In Melanesia, corruption is one of the biggest drivers of democratic decline. These countries have policies about reforms to combat corruption including legislation to establish anti-corruption commission and whistle-blowers protection policies but are struggling with implementation. In some instances, anti-corruption commissions have been used by the incumbent party to criminalise their opponents. This in turn causes the population to lose trust in formal institutions.[17]

1.18The Committee received the following information from Dr Mike Pepperday that suggested converting the unicameral parliaments in several countries in our region to proportional representation:

The political disorder in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands is basically caused by having a single chamber of parliament comprised of single-member electorates. This design has never worked in any country and should never have been installed. For a stable democracy, these countries must either acquire a second chamber or, preferably, convert the unicameral parliament to Proportional Representation.[18]

Impacts of COVID-19 on democracy

1.19COVID-19 has had mixed effects on democratic indicators across our region. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAT) stated that ‘On the positive side, there have been examples of increased transparency and focus on delivering services in response to the pandemic. There has been more local leadership in designing and delivering solutions during and post COVID-19.’[19]

1.20However, there have been many serious consequences of COVID-19 including states and countries becoming more authoritarian:

… new forms of technology and a rise in social media is having a disruptive influence on many countries in the Indo-Pacific region. More concerning has been a tightening of both government and general public information flows, including internet and media, less transparency around decision making, more restrictions on movement and assembly and less emphasis on protecting civil rights.[20]

1.21COVID-19 placed stresses on democracies across the region by requiring inevitable restrictions on movement including freedom of expression. In some cases the pandemic gave an excuse to those governments with a penchant for control to further limit transparency and oversight and to increase crackdowns on dissent. For example, some countries during the pandemic increasingly used security forces to enforce government policies, and there was a growing reliance on emergency legislation that gave normalcy to harsh policy measures that were introduced by executive government.[21]

Pacific countries

1.22The Australasian region comprises numerous democratic states, including Australia, Kiribati, Fiji, Micronesia, Aotearoa New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.[22]

1.23DFAT provided the Committee with an overview on the state of democracies in the Pacific.

… all countries have established parliamentary democracies, although there is significant diversity in democratic models and norms. Political power and decision making is often characterised by a complex informal web of personal relationships, familial obligations and traditional leadership and influence systems. Australia’s engagement and development cooperation programs in the Pacific often draw on the full range of partnership and programming options.[23]

1.24Academics from the University of Adelaide suggested Australia should ‘Rethink how it engages with the Pacific, including being more respectful and humbler in its relationships with Pacific Island Countries.[24]

Southeast Asia

1.25DFAT commented that ‘in the Asian region, governing systems range from established (but varied types of) democracies to authoritarian regimes. Australia’s approach to supporting democracy and governance in the Asian region is therefore highly differentiated – politically and practically.’[25]

1.26ASPI contributors reflected on the range of democracy across our region as being extremely varied and countries have different government structures and approaches, including mixed access to free and fair elections. In relation to Southeast Asia, ASPI noted:

Home to eleven states, Southeast Asia has a very diverse political landscape, which includes an absolute monarchy, a military junta, two communist governments, several semi-democracies, and five representative democracies (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Timor-Leste).[26]

1.27While Southeast Asia was at the forefront of the ‘third wave of democratisation’ in the 1990s and 2000s, the region is going through a wave of illiberalism that has affected even some of its most democratic states. ASPI stated the following:

Thailand’s and Myanmar’s once-flawed democracies were eroded by the emergence of military juntas. Meanwhile, Indonesia and the Philippines, once among the most democratic nations in Southeast Asia, have experienced clampdowns on civil liberties.[27]

1.28Susannah Patton, echoed these comments that democracy in Southeast Asia is in decline.

Authoritarianism is becoming entrenched in mainland Southeast Asia, while electoral democracies in maritime Southeast Asia are increasingly illiberal.[28]

Recent studies on development and democracy

2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

1.29In 2015, Australia endorsed the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals along with 193 world leaders. The 2030 Agenda is both a domestic and international agenda. It is well-aligned with Australia's foreign, security, development and trade interests - especially in promoting regional stability, security and economic prosperity. It helps Australia in advocating for a strong focus on economic growth and development in the Indo-Pacific region and in promoting gender equality, governance and strengthening tax systems.[29]

Supporting the Rules-Based Order in Southeast Asia (SEARBO)

1.30Scholars at the ANU conducted a project that looked at supporting the Rules-Based Order in Southeast Asia (SEARBO). It was a project motivated by the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, which called for Australia to support an ‘increasingly prosperous, outwardly-focused, stable and resilient Southeast Asia’. In that White Paper, the primary goal was to sustain a rules-based order at the regional level.

1.31The SEARBO project emphasised the importance of encouraging domestic arrangements in the countries of the region that would be conducive to fostering a rules-based order by nurturing more inclusive democratic structures in Southeast Asia as well as upholding human rights and the rule of law.[30]

Pacific Perspectives on the World

1.32The Whitlam Institute within Western Sydney University published Pacific Perspectives on the World in 2020. It focused on listening to Australia’s Island Neighbours in order to build strong, respectful and sustainable relationships.

1.33This report recommended three main issues:

• Improve the relationship by working with the Pacific and deepening relationships beyond just the capitals
• Invest in Australia’s Pacific literacy by promoting knowledge of the Pacific for Australians and working with the Pacific diaspora communities to build greater capacity in the region
• Improve Australia’s own domestic policies on Indigenous Australians, climate change policy and inequality of trade opportunities.[31]

The Global State of Democracy Report

1.34The Global State of Democracy has been produced by International IDEA since 2017. The report tracks Global and Regional trends in democracy around the world. It provides evidence-based and balanced analysis and data on the state and quality of democracy globally and 173 countries across all regions of the world. It aims to contribute to the public debate on democracy and inform policy interventions to strengthen democracy.

1.35The Global State of Democracy 2022 report found that ‘democracies are declining or stagnating in the face of a rapidly changing global context. Even countries previously considered ‘established’ democracies have vulnerabilities that cannot be ignored.’[32]

1.36This report concluded by stating that ‘Governments, civil society, media, expert groups, academics and individuals each have a role to play in supporting and participating in the renovation of social contracts.’[33]

2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent

1.37In June 2022, the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent was endorsed by Pacific Islands Forum. This strategy acknowledges that the future cannot be left to chance and requires a long-term vision and a carefully considered regional strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.

1.38The 2050 Strategy sets out the region’s approach to collectively work together to achieve the long-term vision and aspirations of the 2050 Strategy, through seven key thematic areas:

• political leadership and regionalism
• people centred development, peace and security
• peace and security
• resource and economic development
• climate change and disasters
• ocean and natural environment
• technology and connectivity.[34]

Inquiry conduct

1.39On the 28 September 2022, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon Penny Wong, requested the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JSCFADT), through its Foreign Affairs and Aid Subcommittee, to inquire into matters related to supporting democracy in our region.

1.40The Chair of the Foreign Affairs and Aid Subcommittee, Mr Josh Burns MP, announced the Committee’s inquiry in a media release on 11 October 2022 and published information about the inquiry on the Committee’s website.

1.41The inquiry received 58 submissions, which are listed at Appendix A.

1.42The Committee held 10 public hearings as outlined in the table below. A list of witnesses and organisations who attended these public hearings is in Appendix B.

1.43The following Committee Members, Mr Josh Burns MP (Chair), Ms Kate Thwaites MP and Hon Andrew Wallace MP, travelled on an overseas delegation to the Solomon Islands (12 – 15 July 2023) and Papua New Guinea (15 – 19 July 2023) to have discussions with stakeholders in country about this inquiry. Reflections from Committee Members’ overseas visit are in Chapter 6 of this report. A program of the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea visitation can be found at Appendix C.

Report structure

1.44Chapter 2 examines the importance of free and fair elections and discusses the best way for Australia to provide support to countries in our region. This chapter focuses on the benefits of strengthening electoral management bodies in the Indo-Pacific region. It highlights the need for Australia to continue to work in partnership with other countries and share information to assist countries in our region to achieve robust and transparent elections.

1.45Chapter 3 discusses the impact that climate change is having on the stability and governance of countries in our region. It highlights the challenges climate change is presenting on social and economic prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. This chapter focuses on how Australia can assist in building stronger partnerships with these countries.

1.46Chapter 4 focuses on the important role a free and independent media plays in supporting democracy. It discusses the rise in mis and dis information around the world and how it should be addressed. This chapter comments on cyber security issues and the future of media in the Indo-Pacific region.

1.47Chapter 5 discusses the valuable work that is being carried out by Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the region. It looks at the value of CSOs and the role they have in supporting democratic systems and the rule of law in the region. This chapter highlights the value of strengthening partnerships between Australia and its neighbours including bi-lateral and multi-lateral partnerships. Lastly, this chapter addresses some challenges that Myanmar faces and discusses the impacts of targeted sanctions.

1.48Chapter 6 provides an overview of the Committee’s delegation visit to the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea in July 2023, as part of this inquiry into democracy in our region.

Footnotes

[1]Oxfam, Submission 23, p. 1.

[2]www.dfat.gov.au/development/new-international-development-policy, viewed 11 September 2023.

[3]www.dfat.gov.au/development/new-international-development-policy, viewed 11 September 2023.

[4]Australia's Official Development Assistance Budget Summary 2023-24 | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (dfat.gov.au), viewed 13 October 2023.

[5]The Asia Foundation, Submission 13, p. 2.

[6]International IDEA, Submission 12, p. 1.

[7]‘Relational Democracy’ is a theory designed to achieve greater concurrence between citizens’ wishes and leaders’ decisions.

[8]Academics from University of Adelaide, Submission 51, p. 2.

[9]ASPI contributors, Submission 45, p. 1.

[10]Mr Robert Heron, Submission 1, p. 1.

[11]AP4D, Submission 4, p. 1.

[12]ASPI contributors, Submission 45, p. 2.

[13]Professor Richard Robison and Professor Garry Rodan, Submission 6, p. 1.

[14]Professor Richard Robison and Professor Garry Rodan, Submission 6, p. 2.

[15]Susannah Patton, Submission 18, p. 3.

[16]Transparency International Australia, Submission 39, p. 2; Dr Vafa Ghazavi, Submission 28, p. 1.

[17]International IDEA, Submission 12, p. 3.

[18]Dr Mike Pepperday, Submission 20, p.1.

[19]DFAT, Submission 11, p. 5.

[20]DFAT, Submission 11, p. 5.

[21]The State of Democracy in Asia and the Pacific 2021, International IDEA, p. 37.

[22]Associate Professor Glenn Patmore, University of Melbourne, Submission 58, p. 9.

[23]DFAT, Submission 11, p. 7.

[24]Academics from University of Adelaide, Submission 51, p. 2.

[25]DFAT, Submission 11, p. 7.

[26]ASPI contributors, Submission 45, p. 1.

[27]ASPI contributors, Submission 45, p. 1.

[28]Susannah Patton, Submission 18, p. 1.

[29]2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (dfat.gov.au), viewed 20 September 2023.

[30]Department of Political and Social Change, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Submission 7, p. 1.

[31]Pacific Perspectives on the World, Whitlam Institute, February 2020, p. 6.

[32]www.idea.int/democracytracker/gsod-report-2022#introduction, viewed 6 October 2023.

[33]www.idea.int/democracytracker/gsod-report-2022#introduction, viewed 6 October 2023.

[34]2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent – Pacific Islands Forum (forumsec.org), viewed 22 September 2023.