On 16 September 2021, Australia, the UK and the US signed the AUKUS trilateral security partnership. Although not a formal military alliance, AUKUS enables members to develop and transfer advanced military capabilities. AUKUS is intended to facilitate ‘integrated deterrence’ in the Indo-Pacific region.
The AUKUS agreement includes two pillars: Pillar 1, an enhanced trilateral strategic partnership which involves the supply and delivery of a total of 8 nuclear-powered conventional attack submarines (SSN) by the 2040s; and Pillar 2, which serves as a platform for advanced technology cooperation.
It is expected that Pillar 1 will face obstacles, including industrial pressures, cost overruns, and recruitment. To mitigate these, AUKUS partners are strengthening industrial bases, increasing skilled employment opportunities, and boosting innovation and research sectors.
Beyond the acquisition of SSNs, some argue that Pillar 2 should be given higher priority as a force multiplier and that it should be expanded to other partners, such as Japan and South Korea.
What does Pillar 2 do?
Pillar 2 originates from ‘The Technical Cooperation Program’ of the Five Eyes countries. It is organised under 8 working groups – ‘innovation’, ‘information-sharing’, and the 6 ‘advanced capabilities’ listed in Australia’s National Defence Strategy:
Cooperating partners in Pillar 2 will aim to reduce the significant lead China has in dual-use emerging technologies.
Expanded AUKUS?
Due to the wide scope of the emerging technologies for transfer and interoperability involved, Pillar 2 will be an open-ended, multilateral arrangement involving military industrial integration and multi-nation force interoperability.
Consideration of extending Pillar 2 began as early as 2021, including New Zealand’s potential ‘Tier 2 AUKUS’ participation. Engagement with ‘Strand B’ countries Japan and South Korea was also recommended. With criteria for Pillar 2 participation based on shared strategic culture and a military strategic symmetry to maximise AUKUS’s effectiveness in the Indo-Pacific, prospective countries include Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Canada. In addition, Taiwan has also expressed interest.
Both Japan and South Korea have bilateral security alliances with the US, have increased their military spending and share close military interoperability with US forces. Each country also plans to increase defence industrial integration (shipbuilding, munitions production, repair), boost its economic security and diversify its supply chains with the US.
On 8 April 2024, the AUKUS members announced Japan’s potential Pillar 2 participation on a project-by-project basis, which was reciprocated by Prime Minister Kishida. A similar announcement for South Korea’s participation followed on 1 May 2024 at the Australia-Republic of Korea 2+2 meeting in Melbourne.
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has advanced uncrewed and undersea systems, conducts satellite-assisted maritime surveillance, mapping and monitoring (including undersea warfare research projects with Australia), and contributes to integrated air and missile operations. Japan has also launched a new policy on military AI.
Meanwhile, since the Yoon government’s foreign policy shift to a ‘global pivotal state’ in 2022, South Korea has boosted bilateral ties with Japan and under the US–Korea–Japan trilateral format. It has also established the Defense AI Center, strengthened its AI-powered surveillance and robotic systems, and increased defence exports, including to the Australian Defence Force.
Either country’s Pillar 2 participation is not a policy certainty, however, given the Kishida cabinet’s low approval rating, and the weakened position of Yoon’s party since electoral losses in the National Assembly. Moreover, Japan’s participation would be conditional upon constitutional and budgetary limitations.
However, both South Korea and Japan would need to develop stringent legal frameworks to manage highly sensitive information and technologies before their participation is confirmed.
In addition, just as AUKUS Pillar 1 has been interpreted by China and some other countries as fuelling an arms race, risking nuclear proliferation in the region, and stoking bloc confrontation, AUKUS partners would need to be satisfied that the benefits of Pillar 2 participation outweigh any risks to regional security.
How will AUKUS Pillar 2 capabilities be used?
As the undersea domain becomes more complex and challenging, the Department of Defence is increasing its focus on undersea warfare capabilities. Recent operational outcomes for AUKUS include a method of ‘data-sharing’ between the buoys used by the PA-8 Poseidon aircraft for submarine detection, and tests of ‘AI-enabled assets’ and machine-learning models.
Some analysts argue, however, that Australia needs to further develop a ‘complete family’ of crewed and autonomous underwater and surface capabilities, which would also extend into the air and space domains.
With the recent advances in maritime visualisation for anti-submarine warfare, this would involve integrated undersea surveillance systems using enhanced quantum-based technologies, AI and space-based LiDAR capabilities. According to some analysts, novel technologies which use the electromagnetic spectrum, satellite-mounted remote-sensing systems, as well as improved quantum communications and laser-optical undersea communications, may render the oceans less opaque and submarines more detectable within the next 10–15 years.
In December 2023, AUKUS defence ministers confirmed that Pillar 2 will also involve boosting ‘space domain awareness’ networks. As confirmed by US Space Command, this will involve partner integration in space monitoring and will advance space mobility. However, a lack of clarity and a binding treaty in the current international space law regime, as with other emerging technologies that come under Pillar 2, means there are few guardrails for managing an unintended escalation in space.
To maximise the benefits of collective security capabilities, the Pillar 2 arrangement will likely be more effective by building confidence with partners, minimising bureaucratic hurdles, and ensuring complementarity with ASEAN.
In the febrile geopolitical climate in the Indo-Pacific region, Pillar 1 is already attracting concerns over nuclear proliferation. Pillar 2 may better manage risks and reciprocal activities by focusing on controlled defence spending, clear communications, and minimising strategic miscalculations.