

30 June 2008

The Secretary  
Senate Standing Committee on  
Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport  
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## **Inquiry into the administration of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and related matters**

Thank you for the opportunity of providing comment on the Committee's reference.

We are supportive of initiatives that will enhance Australia's aviation record and advise that we are also preparing a response to the Aviation Issues Paper released by the Government as part of the process of producing the National Aviation Policy Green Paper.

We note that the Issues Paper provides a more overarching view of the aviation industry safety issues whereas the Senate has a more focussed brief on the governance and administration of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority itself. In this latter regard we have already responded to the ATSB/CASA Review 2007 and a copy of our response is attached for your review.

We understand the need for a fair but strong regulator and also support the focus on safety of the fare paying passenger.

The regulator has to balance often competing priorities in the aviation industry. In particular, the General Aviation (GA) sector at times struggles for commercial viability and regulation can be seen as an additional and unnecessary burden. On the other hand the Australian public, media and Parliament have shown a very low tolerance to aviation accidents involving multiple fatalities, i.e. Monarch Airlines, Seaview Air and Transair (Lockhart River) accidents.

We therefore urge the committee to give its support for effective and fair regulation and provide ongoing support for the body charged with this function.

It is also worth noting that CASA is only one component of the national aviation safety management system and any review of an individual component of this system must be considered in the context of the total aviation system of which it is a part. Elements in the system include: Airservices Australia; ATSB; CASA; Emergency Services; and the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government. The interaction of all of the elements must be considered holistically.

We have also prepared a short contextual chapter on the Aviation Safety Foundation Australasia (the Foundation) to assist the Committee in understanding our role in the aviation industry. The Committee will note from this that the Foundation has a unique role working with industry and the range of government bodies with a role in aviation safety.

This is a crucial role within the industry providing a conduit of communication between key players that may otherwise be unavailable in the regulated environment being otherwise clouded by the respective sometimes juxtaposed corporate roles. The recent expansion of the Foundation was in response to the strong call from industry for an independent voice and broker.

It is acknowledged that there should not be industry competition in safety. The Foundation provides a forum outside of the competitive business environment for the industry to come together for frank discussion and cooperation on this vital area of operation. To be truly

effective the Foundation must have a strong dialogue with the bureaucratic and business entities within the sector. In this regard our discussions are truly robust in a private healthy exchange of ideas whilst maintaining a positive and supportive public profile.

The Foundation prides itself in being an organisation that provides support, advice and assistance across government and industry on an ongoing basis, in addition to specific actions such as this inquiry and the Government's issues paper.

As such, we look forward to maintaining a strong dialogue with the Federal Government and the relevant aviation agencies responsible for maintaining Australia's well earned reputation for safety in the aviation sector. Thank you once again for your invitation to participate in this process.

### **About the Aviation Safety Foundation Australasia**

*The Aviation Safety Foundation Australasia is a national independent not-for-profit company focussing specifically on aviation safety in the Australasian region. It is administered by an honorary Board of Directors and supported by its Patron His Excellency Major General Michael Jeffery AC CVO MC (Ret'd) Governor General of the Commonwealth of Australia.*

*Globally the aviation industry will double in size by 2025. Despite having one of the best safety records in the world, Australia will not be immune from the added risks posed by growth. The risks must be evaluated and addressed through effective management and safety education. The Foundation recognises this challenge and has aligned its work to the Global Aviation Safety Roadmap, the international aviation safety plan adopted by ICAO.*

*The Foundation aims to actively promote aviation safety and deliver important training, research, and thought leadership in the aviation sector. Representing all areas of the aviation industry, the Foundation is committed to promoting and facilitating safe aviation practices across all industry sectors in the Australasian region.*

*Members of the Foundation are able to access to the latest safety information and research through its publications, special briefings and professional development programs.*

*The Foundation has strategic partnerships with a broad range of organisations including, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Airservices Australia, Aerospace Maritime and Defence Foundation Australia and the major Australian airlines.*

*Through its partnership with the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) the Foundation provides an international aviation safety perspective. The relationship with FSF gives access to international research as well as advice from the leading global aviation and airline safety organisation. It allows Foundation to address safety challenges across organisational boundaries, be the catalyst in producing end-to-end safety solutions and gives access to a global network and assistance network.*

*The Foundation is currently working with the FSF, IATA and ICAO on the 'Industry Training and Qualification Initiative' - An International Aviation Industry Approach to the Global Shortage of Pilots, Mechanics and Engineers.*

*Following the initial Task Force research process around the world, the Foundation will host a Global Summit as part of the initiative, to be held in Melbourne, Australia in early 2009. The Summit is being convened to bring together the key decision-makers from the major airlines and regulators across the world to discuss the issues, review the Task Force reports and begin developing strategies to 'safely staff the world's growing aviation system'.*

Yours Sincerely,



Paul Fox  
Executive Director



Response to the ATSB/CASA Review 2007  
(The Miller Report)

Submitted to:

Mr Michael Taylor AO  
The Secretary  
Dept. of Infrastructure, Transport,  
Regional Development and  
Local Government

Submitted:

5 May 2008

## Table of Contents

Response to the ATSB/CASA Review 2007 .....	2
Introduction .....	2
An International Perspective from the Flight Safety Foundation .....	2
Overview .....	2
Recommendation 5 and 6 – ATSB Governance .....	2
Recommendation 7 – Information Sharing .....	3
Comments from the Aviation Safety Foundation Australasia .....	4
Recommendation 1 – TSI Act Objects .....	4
Recommendation 2 – TSI Act Objects: Requirement for Co-operation .....	4
Recommendation 3 – Policy Statements .....	4
Recommendation 4 – Policy Development .....	4
Recommendation 5 – ATSB Governance .....	5
Recommendation 6 – Alternative ATSB Governance .....	5
Recommendation 7 – Information Sharing in the Interests of Safety .....	6
Recommendation 8 – Inadmissibility of Compelled Evidence .....	6
Recommendation 9 – Court Access to Information .....	6
Recommendation 10 – Section 32 Notices .....	7
Recommendation 11 – Building Inter-Agency Understanding .....	7
Recommendation 12 – ATSB/CASA Executive Meetings .....	7
Recommendation 13 – ATSB Investigations and Reports .....	8
Recommendation 14 – CASA’s Co-operation with ATSB Investigations .....	8
Recommendation 15 – Monitoring ATSB Safety Recommendations .....	9
Recommendation 16 – Coronial Inquests .....	9
Recommendation 17 – MOU .....	10
Recommendation 18 – CASA Protocols .....	10
Recommendation 19 – Inter-Agency Meetings .....	11
Contact Details .....	12
Contact Person: .....	12
Postal Address: .....	12
Office Address: .....	12
Support Information .....	13
About the “Aviation Safety Foundation Australasia” .....	13
About the “Flight Safety Foundation” .....	13

## Response to the ATSB/CASA Review 2007

### Report to the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government. (The Miller Report)

#### Introduction

The Aviation Safety Foundation of Australasia (ASFA) is an independent, not-for-profit, apolitical, incorporated company. It has a national focus with a primary function of independently promoting and facilitating "safe" and complimentary "sound" business practices within the aviation industry through the identification, development, delivery and audit of accreditation and other programs that meet current and future priorities and demand.

ASFA welcomes the opportunity to comment on the ATSB/CASA Review of 2007 (The Miller Report) and commends all parties involved in the initiation and management of the review.

The relationship between regulatory and investigative bodies is an issue in many advanced aviation States and to place this report in a global context, ASFA requested that the Flight Safety Foundation (United States of America) provide brief comments on the international issues raised by the report. Their advice is reproduced below.

#### An International Perspective from the Flight Safety Foundation

##### Overview

The Flight Safety Foundation is pleased to have the opportunity to provide comments on selected recommendations of the Miller Report.

As an international aviation safety organization, the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) will not attempt to offer detailed advice on those areas unique to Australian Government rules and administrative structure. Instead it will offer more general comments on selected recommendations.

The FSF commends the effort to improve the relationship and flow of information between CASA and the ATSB. It is always difficult to balance the need for independent and credible accident investigations with the need for cooperation with regulatory authorities. States around the world struggle with this balance and in almost every case some level of residual tension between such agencies remains.

#### Recommendation 5 and 6 – ATSB Governance

##### **FSF Response:**

These recommendations address issues of structure and function of the accident investigation function within the Australian Government. It is difficult to evaluate such proposals from an external perspective. We can say, however, that the opposing objectives need to be balanced as any such options are considered. Agencies are typically realigned at the ministerial level in order to achieve consistent policy, and administrative efficiency. While these objectives still apply to the accident investigation function, other criteria must be considered as well. The accident investigation function will not be judged by its efficiency in routine matters, but rather by its competence and objectivity following a national disaster. This determination, however, will not be made by policy analysts, but by the international media and the public.

A recent example of this is the case of the Gol accident in Brazil that occurred in September of 2006. The Brazilian Aeronautical Accident Investigation and Prevention Center (CENIPA) had a well-deserved reputation as a professional and independent investigation agency. Following the Gol accident, the independence of this agency was called into serious question based on its position within the military structure responsible for civil regulation and air traffic control. It was never proven that this affected the investigation of this accident. But the mere possibility of interference caused severe criticism by the domestic international press and called into question the integrity of the investigation. The presiding administration in Brazil ultimately faced severe political consequences.

Since the decisions taken regarding the structure of the accident investigation function will ultimately be evaluated in the difficult circumstance of an investigation, it may be wise to emulate some proven models that have withstood this test in other advanced aviation countries. Suitable organizational models include the Canadian Transportation Safety Board, the United States National Transportation Safety Board, or the New Zealand Transport Accident Investigation Commission.

## Recommendation 7 – Information Sharing

### **FSF Response:**

Protection of safety information is central to the improvement of aviation safety. Any change that requires the disclosure of additional restricted information to CASA could have a chilling effect on safety reporting unless it is managed very carefully. The FSF cautions that one proceed with extreme care in implementing this recommendation.

### Recommendation 7 (a)

As safety management systems (SMS) are implemented around the world, safety data collection systems and voluntary reporting systems continue to grow beyond those originally outlined in ICAO Annex 13 standard (5.12). It should be noted that the updated language in Appendix E to Annex 13 recommends the protection of data associated with all safety data collection and processing systems. This definition goes beyond 5.12 to include mandatory incident reporting systems, voluntary incident reporting systems, and self-disclosure systems including data capture systems. It would be unwise to restrict the scope of the TSI Act to address those items mentioned in 5.12 at a time when the international community is moving to a much broader definition of protected information.

### Recommendations 7 (b), (c), (d)

It may seem reasonable to take on protective action in the face of serious safety risks but when the operational context of an accident is considered, the argument is not as compelling. By international standards, regulators are expected to adjust surveillance of operators based on risk. Any operator that has an accident and chooses to continue operations, would normally be characterized as high risk. The operator would be subject to serious organizational and financial stresses and increased surveillance of this operator by the regulator would be advisable. This surveillance would have an immediate “protective” effect and would also serve to independently identify serious safety deficiencies that may still be present. All of this would normally occur without relying on additional safety information from the accident investigator.

Given the fact that other tools are available to the regulator to protect the flying public following an accident, the marginal contributions of proposals that require the disclosure of confidential data should be weighed against the potential negative impact of on safety information.

## Conclusion

The FSF appreciates the opportunity to comment on this important report and we applaud the efforts of the Miller Commission to closely examine the relationship between CASA and the ATSB. It is our hope that this report will lead to improvements to an aviation industry that is already one of the safest in the world.

## Comments from the Aviation Safety Foundation Australasia

The Report is a comprehensive and thought provoking document. Before commenting on individual recommendations it is useful to consider an overarching issue. During the development of the TSI Act, commitments on the security of information provided to ATSB were given to industry stakeholders. There was considerable suspicion that evidence could be used by either the regulator or the courts in subsequent enforcement or legal action. It is vital that in allowing CASA to take important and often urgent regulatory safety action ATSB does not lose the confidence of the industry as this would jeopardise both current and future investigations.

### Recommendation 1 – TSI Act Objects

*A subtle but important amendment to the objects in the TSI Act is warranted. The TSI Act should be amended to make it clear that the primary object of the Act is to contribute to improved transport safety. The tasks referred to as current objects in (sub) section 7(1) should be a statement of the outcomes the Act is directed to in order to achieve that object.*

**ASFA Response:**

ASFA supports this recommendation.

### Recommendation 2 – TSI Act Objects: Requirement for Co-operation

*TSI Act (sub) section 7(2) is inappropriately limited. It should provide that, in the performance of the Executive Director's powers and duties under the Act, the Executive Director is required to co-operate, in the interests of improved transport safety, with CASA, regardless of whether CASA has powers or responsibilities under another law of the Commonwealth to also investigate the matter under investigation by the ATSB. Furthermore, the objective of co-operating with CASA should not be limited to the period during which the ATSB is conducting an investigation.*

**ASFA Response:**

ASFA does not support this recommendation as it considers the present legislation is adequate and that cooperation is a responsibility of both agencies.

### Recommendation 3 – Policy Statements

*Consideration should be given to including in the TSI Act a provision to the effect that the Minister may issue policy statements from time-to-time setting out the Government's policy in relation to the administration of the TSI Act and its role in the Australian transport safety system. Any such policy statement should be general in nature and not relate to a specific investigation. If the ATSB remains a Division of the Department, the policy statements should be directed to the Portfolio Secretary and the Executive Director should be required to act in accordance with them. If the Commission model is adopted, the Minister's policy statements should be directed to the Commission.*

**ASFA Response:**

ASFA is concerned that this recommendation might compromise the independence of the Executive Director or at the very least, lead to such a perception.

### Recommendation 4 – Policy Development

*Primary responsibility for policy in relation to proposed amendments to the TSI Act and for Australia's policy positions at ICAO should be assumed by a policy Division within the Department, with that Division seeking input from the Executive Director and all other relevant stakeholders.*

**ASFA Response:**

Australia is a member of ICAO. The State is the representative entity – not individual agencies. ASFA suggests that any policy changes should be cognisant of the Bureau's independence.

## Recommendation 5 – ATSB Governance

*If the current ATSB governance arrangements remain, there is merit in resolving ambiguities over the ATSB's roles and responsibilities within the Department. This should include:*

- (a) the Executive Director, with the agreement of the Portfolio Secretary, appointing an expert peer review panel to review each draft and final investigation report and advise the Executive Director before the reports are issued. The TSI Act could subsequently be amended to provide for this if necessary;*
- (b) administrative arrangements changing so that the position of Executive Director is filled for a fixed term, thereby reinforcing the autonomy and impartiality of that office in relation to accident and incident investigations; and*
- (c) the memorandum setting out the Portfolio Secretary's expectations of the Executive Director being replaced with a new memorandum taking account of the matters above.*

### **ASFA Response:**

- (a) ASFA sees merit in the Executive Director having an expert panel available to him should he wish to have an independent view of a particular issue. This should not however replace the DIP process.
- (b) ASFA would not oppose the concept of a fixed term for the Executive Director. It is suggested that given the complexity of the multimodal role, any new Director would have a steep learning curve in at least some of the disciplines. While acknowledging that the Director would not necessarily need to be a technical expert, he or she would need to come to terms with the political and stakeholder issues. As such, a tenure of 5 years might be a more reasonable minimum.
- (c) A MOA might be useful.

## Recommendation 6 – Alternative ATSB Governance

*Although there are good reasons for the ATSB to remain in the Minister's Portfolio, consideration should be given to changing the Executive Director's statutory role and responsibilities and improving the status of the ATSB by establishing an Australian Transport Safety Commission, based on the International Air Services Commission model. The Commission should have the following attributes:*

- (a) the Commission should consist of three part-time commissioners with broad safety related experience, not all in the aviation field;*
- (b) the Executive Director should be appointed by the Portfolio Secretary, after consultation with the commissioners, for a term of 3 years;*
- (c) the Commission should be responsible for approving all draft and final investigation reports, but with power to delegate approval of less significant reports to one commissioner;*
- (d) the current powers of the Executive Director in the TSI Act should reside in the Commission, with the normal power to delegate to appropriate levels within the ATSB; and*
- (e) staff of the Commission, including the Executive Director, should be provided by the Department.*

### **ASFA Response:**

ASFA is concerned that any change to governance arrangements should not compromise the industry's trust in ATSB's independence. The perception within the industry might well be that this is a direct attempt to remove power from the Executive Director.

ASFA would support governance changes based on well established international models such as those of New Zealand, the Netherlands, Canada and the USA.



## Recommendation 7 – Information Sharing in the Interests of Safety

*The sharing of information between the Executive Director and CASA, where it is appropriate to do so in the interests of aviation safety, should be facilitated by:*

- (a) *recasting the definition of the term "restricted information" in the TSI Act to limit its scope to the types of information referred to in Annex 13. As presently drafted, the term is expressed in significantly broader terms than is appropriate in the interests of aviation safety because it results in information that should be available to CASA to take protective action (but not criminal or civil proceedings against individuals who provided information compulsorily). As defined, the term "restricted information" is also significantly broader than the (ICAO) Annex 13 standard (5.12) provides;*
- (b) *requiring the Executive Director to disclose restricted information to CASA where the Executive Director has reason to believe that there is a serious and imminent risk to air safety and the information is evidence of that risk. The TSI Act section 61 should be amended accordingly;*
- (c) *entitling CASA, where it receives evidence from the Executive Director, to use the information as evidence to take protective action where there is a serious and imminent risk to air safety, but not for any other purpose. The CA (Civil Aviation) Act should be amended accordingly; and*
- (d) *providing that, in cases where restricted information is disclosed to CASA to take protective action that requires CASA to present evidence to a court, the court should limit publication of that information to the parties and their representatives.*

### **ASFA Response:**

ASFA would support a review of the definition of "restricted information" if it is clearly targeted at improving the flow of information during current and future investigations.

ASFA would suggest that – any change that would result in the disclosure of sensitive information to CASA should be managed with the greatest care as, if industry confidence is eroded, improvements to future safety (resulting from learnings from investigations) could be compromised.

## Recommendation 8 – Inadmissibility of Compelled Evidence

*Evidence not publicly available, obtained by the Executive Director compulsorily under section 32 of the TSI Act, should continue to not be admissible against the individual providing the information in any civil or criminal proceedings but should otherwise be available in accordance with other recommendations in this Review.*

### **ASFA Response:**

ASFA supports this recommendation.

## Recommendation 9 – Court Access to Information

*The TSI Act should be amended to make it clear that:*

- (a) *section 7(3)(b) does not inhibit the Executive Director from sharing "restricted information" with the Department and CASA, in the interests of safety;*
- (b) *the court is entitled to consider whether restricted information should not be disclosed on the basis that it is likely to interfere with an active investigation, rather than the Executive Director being required to give the certificate provided for in section 60(4)(c)(i) before the court can consider the matter.*

### **ASFA Response:**

ASFA would not support vesting the decision to disclose restricted information to other than the Executive Director. This was a very contentious issue with industry during the development of the TSI Act.

#### Recommendation 10 – Section 32 Notices

- (a) *Except in exceptional circumstances or when requested by CASA, the Executive Director should request information required from CASA for an investigation and expect CASA's full co-operation in identifying what is required and providing the information in a timely manner without the need for a Section 32 Notice;*
- (b) *CASA should co-operate fully in identifying what is required and providing the information in a timely manner where ATSB advises CASA that it requires information from CASA in the course of an investigation into an aircraft accident or incident;*
- (c) *where a Section 32 Notice is to be issued it should, except in exceptional circumstances, only be issued after discussions between the Executive Director and the Director of Aviation Safety.*

**ASFA Response:**

This is an internal administrative issue between the agencies.

#### Recommendation 11 – Building Inter-Agency Understanding

*The ATSB and CASA should:*

- (a) *hold regular seminars involving ATSB and CASA staff at the operational level to consider agreed aviation safety issues, including the presentation of research outcomes;*
- (b) *exchange personnel with the main objective being that officers from both agencies obtain the benefit of the training and experience the other agency can offer; and*
- (c) *(enhance) co-operation with joint research initiatives on matters relating to aviation safety.*

**ASFA Response:**

ASFA supports any efforts to improve collaboration and understanding between CASA and the ATSB.

#### Recommendation 12 – ATSB/CASA Executive Meetings

*The ATSB and CASA should institute quarterly meetings at the Executive level, with a positive agenda. Although the meetings should be strategic and forward-looking, they should also deal with emerging issues between the two agencies.*

**ASFA Response:**

ASFA supports any efforts at increased collaboration and understanding between the agencies.

### Recommendation 13 – ATSB Investigations and Reports

- (a) *During an investigation, where CASA has expertise that might be brought to bear on the likely causes of an accident or incident, the ATSB should utilise that expertise as its investigation progresses, whether by including CASA experts on the investigation team or by regular inter-agency consultations;*
- (b) *Before including safety recommendations in a draft report directed to regulatory changes CASA should make, the ATSB should discuss the proposed recommendations with CASA and take account of CASA's views, in order to ensure that the ATSB has taken account of all relevant issues that may impact on the relevance and practicality of its proposed recommendation;*
- (c) *Where CASA or any other interested party provides a substantive response to a draft report the final report should contain a balanced explanation of substantive information or comments provided and the facts supporting them and should set out the Executive Director's reasons for accepting or rejecting the views expressed;*
- (d) *ATSB reports should speak for themselves. The ATSB should not continue the practice of including press releases in its reports and should give careful consideration to not issue substantive press releases on its reports;*
- (e) *Where the ATSB proposes to issue a substantive press release on an investigation report that refers to another portfolio agency it should provide a copy of the draft press release to the Department and the relevant agency in advance for comment.*

#### **ASFA Response:**

ASFA has reservations that any CASA officer involved in an investigation might be put in an invidious position if they were to become aware through access to confidential information, of a need for safety critical regulatory action.

- (a) This process should not be different if it involves CASA.
- (b) ASFA supports this recommendation in the case of reports involving complex analysis.
- (c) Agreed.
- (d) ASFA supports the current practice of a media release by the ATSB if it is factual and non-emotive.
- (e) ASFA has no objection to this proposal.

### Recommendation 14 – CASA's Co-operation with ATSB Investigations

*CASA should develop an internal system to ensure it appropriately monitors and co-operates with ATSB investigations relevant to its regulatory functions and adequately resources those responsible for the system. If this is done, there is no need for the Minister to issue a direction to CASA in that regard, but the opportunity to do so if required.*

#### **ASFA Response:**

This recommendation would address some of the concerns of the Queensland Coroner and is supported.

### Recommendation 15 – Monitoring ATSB Safety Recommendations

- (a) *Responsibility for registering, monitoring and reporting on progress with ATSB aviation safety recommendations should be assigned to another Division in the Department.*
- (b) *The Portfolio Secretary, or the appropriate Deputy Secretary, should convene a bi-annual meeting of the Executive Director of the ATSB, the CEO/Deputy CEO of CASA and the CEO of AMSA to:*
  - (i) *receive reports on progress with all active safety recommendations;*
  - (ii) *note the reasons for closure of recommendations, including those found by the appropriate regulatory agency to be impractical or unfeasible;*
  - (iii) *share, to the extent desirable, information on current investigations and, perhaps, the safety research programs of CASA, AMSA and ATSB; and*
  - (iv) *report to the Minister on the "state" of ATSB safety recommendations so that he can form a view on the degree to which the regulatory agencies are pursuing implementation of safety recommendations and the degree to which ATSB is contributing to the improvement of transport safety.*

**ASFA Response:**

The management of ATSB recommendation(s) has long been a source of irritation between all parties, the industry and both the agencies. Improved, efficient processes are supported by ASFA.

### Recommendation 16 – Coronial Inquests

- (a) *Recognising that it is the Commonwealth, rather than the ATSB, that is entitled to seek leave to intervene in coronial inquests, decisions to retain counsel to appear for the Commonwealth in coronial enquiries should be the exception rather than the rule. The decision to do so should be made by a senior Departmental officer, taking account of the views of the Executive Director and the Department's Legal Counsel.*
- (b) *Before CASA decides to instruct counsel to appear for it at a coronial inquest, CASA should be required to inform the Portfolio Secretary. The Director of Aviation Safety should take account of the Portfolio Secretary's views in making the decision to seek leave to intervene or not.*
- (c) *CASA should regard itself as obliged to inform ATSB of any view it has, or evidence it proposes to present, suggesting that the ATSB may have overlooked relevant evidence or come to an incorrect expert opinion, prior to presenting the evidence or making the relevant submission to the coroner.*

**ASFA Response:**

ASFA would support this recommendation as it promotes natural justice, procedural fairness and sound business practice.

## Recommendation 17 – MOU

*The agencies should negotiate a new MOU and include such matters as:*

- (a) a means of encouraging more day-to-day interaction between the agencies when serious accidents and incidents occur;*
- (b) a review as to whether the current time periods for CASA responses to ATSB reports and safety recommendations should be more flexible, taking account of the need for timely investigation outcomes;*
- (c) ways of enabling CASA personnel to obtain greater value from participation in ATSB investigations;*
- (d) a mechanism for developing common safety messages in cases where the agencies have come to different views on the causes of the accident or incident;*
- (e) provision for regular seminars involving ATSB and CASA staff at the operational level to consider agreed aviation safety issues, including the presentation of research outcomes;*
- (f) exchanges of personnel between the ATSB and CASA with the main objective being that officers from both agencies obtain the benefit of the training and experience the other agency can offer;*
- (g) improved co-ordination of research initiatives and education programs on matters relating to aviation safety;*
- (h) the information that CASA can expect to have disclosed to it from the ATSB's confidential voluntary reporting scheme (REPCON);*
- (i) guidance on the circumstances in which the Executive Director might be expected to provide information to CASA under the TSI Act and a mechanism for that to occur;*
- (j) reviews of information holdings of both agencies to see whether greater sharing of data would be beneficial and feasible;*
- (k) a review of the principles applied by ATSB in seeking information from CASA (including a reduction in the number of requests for information under section 32 of the TSI Act);*
- (l) discussion of legislative proposals in areas of interest to both agencies; and*
- (m) provision for annual reviews of the MOU.*

### **ASFA Response:**

The renegotiation of a new MOU is supported by ASFA.

ASFA does have strong concerns over industry perception and concerns over items 17(c) and 17(f).

## Recommendation 18 – CASA Protocols

*CASA should develop clear internal protocols setting out the mechanisms for active co-operation with the ATSB, including clear lines of responsibility. CASA should allocate the necessary resources to ensuring that it co-operates fully with the ATSB provides timely and appropriate feedback to ATSB draft investigation reports and safety recommendations.*

### **ASFA Response:**

ASFA supports this recommendation.

## Recommendation 19 – Inter-Agency Meetings

*The ATSB and CASA should institute quarterly meetings at the Executive level, with a positive agenda including such matters as:*

- (a) presentations on each agency's strategic direction and business/operational plans;*
- (b) approval of operating protocols;*
- (c) review of ATSB's research program;*
- (d) review of CASA's progress in implementing or otherwise dealing with ATSB safety recommendations;*
- (e) international visitor and staff exchange programs; and*
- (f) review of joint and individual research projects.*

*Although the meetings should be strategic and forward-looking, they should also deal with emerging issues between the two agencies.*

### **ASFA Response:**

ASFA fully supports the recommendation of inter-agency meetings as this should lead to increased understanding and collaboration.



**AVIATION SAFETY  
FOUNDATION**  
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## Support Information

### About the “Aviation Safety Foundation Australasia”

The Aviation Safety Foundation Australasia (the Foundation) aims to actively promote aviation safety and deliver important training, research, and thought leadership in the aviation sector. Representing all areas of the aviation industry, the Foundation is committed to promoting and facilitating safe aviation practices across all industry sectors in the Australasian region.

Established in 1997, the Foundation is a non-government, not-for-profit, incorporated public company administered by an honorary Board of Directors and supported by its Patron His Excellency Major General Michael Jeffery AC CVO MC (Ret'd) Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia.

Providing both corporate and individual membership, the Foundation offers its members access to professional development programs and special briefings, as well as direct access to the latest safety information, research and publications.

The Foundation has a broad range of industry strategic partnerships. Within the region, the Foundation works closely with organisations including, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Airservices Australia, Aerospace Maritime and Defence Foundation Australia, and many of the major airlines within Australia.

Internationally, the Foundation is a regional partner of the United States based Flight Safety Foundation providing access to substantial research and other resources, regarded as one of the leading players globally in the area of aviation/airline safety.

### About the “Flight Safety Foundation”

Flight Safety Foundation is an independent, non-profit, international organisation engaged in research, auditing, education, advocacy and publishing to improve aviation safety. Membership is open to everyone interested in promoting aviation safety - in any of its aspects. The FSF roster of more than 1,070 members from 142 countries represents a “who’s who” of industry leaders from airlines, helicopter manufacturers, corporate operators, suppliers, insurance companies, regulators and others.

The Flight Safety Foundation’s mission is to pursue the continuous improvement of global aviation safety and the prevention of accidents.

Their objectives are to:

- Pursue the active involvement and participation of the diverse elements of global professional aviation;
- Anticipate, identify and analyse global aviation safety issues and set priorities;
- Communicate effectively about aviation safety; and,
- Be a catalyst for action and the adoption of best aviation safety practices.



Often referred to as the “conscience of the industry,” Flight Safety Foundation has contributed significantly to the evolution of aviation safety and the saving of lives. The Flight Safety Foundation occupies a unique position among the many organisations that strive to improve flight safety standards and practices throughout the world. Effectiveness in bridging cultural and political differences in the common cause of safety has earned the Flight Safety Foundation worldwide respect.

They are distinguished by their objectivity. While interacting with others in the aviation industry, they are independent of government and commercial organisations.

The air transport industry is a unique global enterprise — a single flight can cross the borders of several countries and several continents. The Foundation, with members from more than 142 nations around the globe, transcends local, regional or national political interests.