

economic and cultural fields and add weight and credibility to Australia's expressed concerns for basic defence self-reliance and confidence in the region. In the words of the Department of Foreign Affairs,

'While relatively small, the programs afford tangible evidence of Australia's readiness to assist these countries in their efforts to maintain their own security and underline Australia's commitment to regional security. To the extent that the programs are successful, they serve as a disincentive to the intrusion into the region of outside powers with interests inimical to those of Australia.'¹⁰⁹

Expenditure on the program has recently increased from approximately \$A14m in 1979/80 to approximately \$23m in 1983/84. Emphasis in the program is being placed on activities involving the transfer of knowledge and skills, such as technical advisory assistance, study visits and training as well as equipment projects. Funding for the year 1983/84 is as follows:¹¹⁰

	<u>\$ million</u>
Malaysia	5.576
Singapore	1.539
Indonesia	10.310
Thailand	4.389
Philippines	1.468
TOTAL =	<u>23.282</u>

2.96 A feature of defence relations since 1980 has been the use of Australian training facilities by the Singapore armed forces. Since February 1982, eight Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) fighter aircraft have been deployed at RAAF Williamstown on a long-term basis, with rotations of six months, for aircrew training. Australia agreed to the deployment of 12 aircraft between January and July 1984. Singapore conducted a unilateral battalion group exercise ('Boomerang 82') in the Shoalwater Bay training area in March-April 1982, and is planning a further unilateral deployment of six weeks for late September - early November 1984.¹¹¹

c) Australia's military association with the Five Power Defence Arrangements

2.97 The Five Power Defence Arrangements (entered into in 1971 by Malaysia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand) provide the basis for Australia's defence relations with Malaysia and Singapore. The FPDA involve Australia's only multilateral defence association with ASEAN members and its only regular deployment of forces in the region. In 1980 it was agreed by member countries that an enhanced level of multinational exercises should be conducted under the FPDA. Major air, maritime and land exercises have been held since 1980 under FPDA auspices and more are planned. The arrangements have been accepted by the other ASEAN members.¹¹²

2.98 The Australian presence at Butterworth currently comprises one Mirage Squadron (a second squadron returned to Australia in August 1983), two P3 Orion long range maritime patrol aircraft conducting surveillance operations in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, ancillary units and an infantry company, on rotation. The Committee is aware that the Australian role in the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) has been regarded as an important contribution to Malaysian and Singaporean defence. Relations between the two states were cool for a number of years after their separation in 1965 and only limited contacts have taken place between their two armed forces. Singapore's armed forces, for example, have not trained in Malaysia and a small number of Singapore personnel were admitted to Malaysia's jungle warfare school only in 1982. Given the difficulties in relations between the Malaysian and Singaporean air forces, it has been argued that the Australian participation in IADS has provided a valuable 'umbrella' for the steady development of co-operation among the air forces involved.¹¹³

2.99 The Committee heard varying estimates of the relevance and value of Australia's ongoing role in the FPDA and in IADS. The Malaysian ISIS argued that there appeared to be a prevailing mood in Australia for its presence in Butterworth through the FPDA to be 'eventually withdrawn or vastly diluted by 1985'. The ISIS stated that 'It is recognised that there are valid domestic and economic considerations as regards such a policy stance'. It continued:

'The existing linkage in defence cooperation through training, consultation, technical assistance, joint exercises and the like should thus be maintained, if not strengthened. A continuing presence at Butterworth helps tremendously in extending Malaysia's and Singapore's aerial defence capability as well as in enhancing technical competence in [their] air force personnel. But, perhaps more importantly, Australia offers valuable insights and lessons as well as facilities in defence management, armed forces education and training for the Asean countries. In turn, continued use of Asean experiences in defence and security enhances the professionalization of the Australian armed services. No state in Asean wants the Australian contribution to be withdrawn. Every Asean state wants this to continue. It is essential to note also that once Australia leaves it will be problematical for it to come back.'¹¹⁴

2.100 The ASEAN Section of the ASEAN-Australia Business Council also endorsed a continuing Australian defence presence.¹¹⁵ Alternative views were presented by Professor Miller, Dr Catley¹¹⁶ and Professor Mackie. Professor Miller in his submission, stated that,

'The military arrangements characteristic of the Five Power agreements are out of date, so far as actual military protection is concerned, though Singapore (and Malaysia to some extent) seems reluctant to give up such symbolic support'.¹¹⁷

In discussion with the Committee he added that the Five Power arrangements,

'... do not seem to me to have any rationale at the present time. It is helpful domestically and in their bilateral relations for Malaysia and Singapore that there should be, as it were, some tame foreigners around. But is there any more to it than that? I do not see a role of actual military activity for Australia in the ASEAN region at the present time. My impression is that we would have either to have a very different kind of approach to the whole matter on the part of the United States or to be a very much larger and totally different kind of force in our own right to be a significant factor any longer.'¹¹⁸

2.101 When asked what role in regional security would he envisage Australia playing, Professor Mackie commented that,

'... I find it hard to anticipate a situation where any military role we might play would be politically credible ... (the) expeditionary force era of our foreign policy is over ... I see regional security as something which has to be worked out by the countries of the region primarily. We can give them what help they feel they would like from us, but unless we are invited by, say, ASEAN to do so, I cannot see us unilaterally going in in any other way whatever. I come back to my point: the security of the region is our security but it is not our, let us say, responsibility or capability any more ... it is theirs.'¹¹⁹

2.102 The Committee considers that there is value in continuing defence cooperation programs, provided they are monitored regularly to ensure that they serve Australia's interests and fulfil valid local defence requirements. The Committee notes the reservations expressed by some witnesses as to the continuing utility and relevance of the Five Power Defence Arrangements and Australia's RAAF involvement. Re-evaluation of Australian involvement may be desirable, but any rapid contraction of Australia's involvement in FPDA might lead to concerns in some ASEAN countries about Australia's commitment to regional security at a time when it would appear to be in our interests to underline our continuing strong commitment to the security of ASEAN.

7. Immigration and refugees

2.103 Migration, including refugee issues, has become an increasingly significant element in Australia's relations with ASEAN and our bilateral relations with ASEAN member countries. The proportion of nationals of ASEAN countries in Australia's global migrant intake has shown a small increase in recent years and this pattern is likely to continue.¹²⁰ Nationals in some ASEAN countries have shown interest in the government's business migration program. Serious refugee problems in the Southeast Asian region continue, as does the need for an effective Australian response.

a) Trends in migration from ASEAN countries

2.104 The number of people in Australia born in ASEAN countries (excluding Brunei) increased from 45 851 at the 1976 Census to 74 828 at the 1981 Census. These figures represented 0.34% and 0.51% of the respective total Australian population. The percentage of total settler arrivals born in ASEAN countries increased gradually during the early 1970s, from 1.2% of all settler arrivals in 1970-71 to 3.6% in 1974-75. This proportion grew to 6.1% in 1975-6 and has remained reasonably constant since then. During 1982-3 6.5% of settler arrivals were born in ASEAN countries.¹²¹

2.105 While absolute numbers of ASEAN migrants declined slightly up to 1982-83, in line with the migrant intake generally, numbers increased very slightly in 1983-84 (from 6269 to 6383). ASEAN migration as a proportion of total migration into Australia has risen slightly. There has been an increase in absolute numbers in family migration, mainly from the Philippines. Although migration in the Labour Shortage category from both the ASEAN countries and the rest of the world has declined significantly because of reduced employment opportunities in Australia, the decrease for ASEAN countries has been proportionally smaller.¹²²

2.106 The most recent detailed figures on migrant entry confirm these general trends. During the twelve month period ending 30 June 1984, total settler arrivals - excluding refugees - from ASEAN countries amounted to 6383 persons. This represented 11.6% of the world-wide total of 55 036 non-refugee settlers for the same period. The Immigration submission provides details of movements by category for each ASEAN country, for the year ending 30 June 1983, and for the six month period 1 July - 31 December 1983. On a world wide basis the ASEAN contribution remains reasonably constant across the two periods in most categories. Among the ASEAN countries, there has been a relative increase in Family Migration, principally from the Philippines. This increase has been offset by a decrease in movements in the labour shortage category - reflecting reduced Occupational Demand Schedule opportunities. Although migration from all ASEAN countries in the labour shortage category was reduced the Philippines and Singapore were especially affected.¹²³

2.107 In terms of movement in all categories from ASEAN countries, Brunei represented .6% of the total for the year ended 30 June 1984, Indonesia 12%, Malaysia 26.1%, the Philippines 47.8%, Singapore 9.1% and Thailand 4.3%.¹²⁴

2.108 The Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs commented in its submission that migration from ASEAN countries was likely to continue at around the same level in the immediate future, although the precise level could not be predicted. With improved economic conditions in Australia there is likely to be an increase in the number of settlers in both the Family Migration and Labour Shortage categories.¹²⁵ The Department of Foreign Affairs noted that given the Government's commitment to an immigration policy that is universal and non-discriminatory, no specific or different policy applies to would-be migrants from Asia, including the ASEAN countries. In reference to Family Migration it commented:

'The Government has, for humanitarian reasons, given priority in immigration policy to family reunion cases and has encouraged extended families i.e. spouses, children, parents and brothers and sisters, to reunite in Australia under sponsorship arrangements. The potential for growth in migration from Asia, including the ASEAN countries, is a natural outcome of a non-discriminatory policy with emphasis on family reunion, combined with a reduction of interest in migration from traditional migrant sources.'¹²⁶

2.109 Foreign Affairs also drew attention to evidence of interest within some of the ASEAN countries in the Government's business migration program. The program aims to attract people who possess business skills and who propose to establish undertakings which will benefit Australia. Malaysia has been one of the major sources of entrepreneurs seeking entry.¹²⁷

ii. Visitor Entry

2.110 Australia's visitor entry policy, in the words of the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, is designed

'... to facilitate the entry of bona fide visitors to this country, in order to promote growth in tourism, trade advantages associated with the development of business visitor contacts and economic and social advantages associated with the visit of friends and relatives, as well as to encourage general cultural exchange.'¹²⁸

As the affluence of ASEAN countries increases, it can be expected that visitors from those countries will come in increasing numbers to Australia. An example of recent visitor numbers is indicated by the numbers of visas issued at Immigration posts in the period October-December 1983:¹²⁹

Bangkok	1112
Hong Kong	5976
Jakarta	2712
Kuala Lumpur	6300
Manila	1388
Seoul	630
Singapore	12351

2.111 The Committee received some evidence that visitors to Australia might be inconvenienced by the Australian requirement that a visa be obtained prior to entry. It was pointed out that with the exception of Indonesia, no ASEAN country imposes a similar requirement for Australian visitors arriving by air.¹³⁰ The Department, in evidence to the Committee, pointed to the need to minimise the numbers of people 'overstaying' beyond their allotted visa periods. The ASEAN countries, it was stated, were among those '... which have high rates of refusal of visitors visas and of overstayers ...'.¹³¹

b) The refugee situation in Southeast Asia

i. Scope and dimensions of the Indochina refugee problem

2.112 The movements of refugees and displaced persons from the states of Indochina have taken place in several major phases since 1975. The flow of refugees and displaced persons has consisted of those (primarily Vietnamese) who have left Indochina by boat and those from all three countries who have crossed by land. In each case, the outflows have taken place in several phases.

2.113 Over 525 000 people have left Vietnam by boat since 1975. Between mid-1975 and 1977, people left at a rate of over 5000 a month. From early 1978 to July 1979, over 250 000 people

left, at a rate which reached 17 000 per month in 1979. After the Geneva Conference on Refugees in July 1979, the current phase was initiated: Vietnam agreed to impose a 'moratorium' on officially sanctioned departures, to discourage 'illegal' departures, and to facilitate orderly departure arrangements. In 1983, the monthly rate of illegal departures from Vietnam was 2 300. Factors in the continuing decline in the boat outflow have included the maintenance of the 'moratorium' on 'illegal' departures by Vietnam, the 'humane deterrent' policies of austere conditions and limited resettlement imposed by some of the principal Asian countries providing temporary refuge, decreased expectations of resettlement in Western countries and the availability of legal departure from Vietnam through Orderly Departure Programs.¹³²

2.114 Over 523 000 Indochinese people have crossed land borders into Thailand or have clustered in the unclearly-defined Thai/Cambodian border zone since 1975. Approximately 300 000 people have left Laos; many are hill tribe people (Hmong) of whom large numbers were involved in the anti-communist Vang Pao army during the Second Indochina War. Small numbers of Vietnamese have reached Thailand through Cambodia.¹³³

2.115 From Cambodia, there have been three major exoduses of people. After the fall of the Lon Nol regime in 1975, 30 000 Cambodians crossed into Thailand and 130 000 to Vietnam. A much larger movement took place from late 1978, after the Vietnamese invasion and the collapse of the Pol Pot/Khmer Rouge regime; this continued until June 1979, when Thailand temporarily closed its border. A third exodus began when Thailand opened its borders in October 1979. Since February 1980, Thailand has declined to admit any more Cambodians into camps inside Thailand. Those who have arrived at the Thai border have clustered into agglomerations. Land arrivals of Vietnamese and Lao have decreased in 1982 and 1983, largely because of stringent Thai border controls. Movements between Cambodia and the border agglomerations has continued.¹³⁴

2.116 The international response to the outflows of Indochinese expanded from the involvement of a few nations after 1975, to a worldwide assistance and resettlement effort from 1978-1979. This effort, however, has declined in recent years. Immigration commented that:

'As the arrival rate of boat people has fallen and appears to have stabilised, third country resettlement efforts have declined. Fewer countries are willing to participate significantly in resettlement and in the early 1980s, those countries still participating gradually decreased their program levels. A growing realisation has developed that resettlement efforts alone will not suffice to handle the refugee problem'.¹³⁵

Particular attention has focussed on proposals for voluntary repatriation (see below).

ii: Refugee problems in the regional political context

2.117 Immigration in its submission noted that 'Australia has responded generously to the Indochinese refugee crisis as a major humanitarian emergency.' It went on to suggest, however, that the Indochina refugee issue is

'... enmeshed with regional political and social problems which influence the refugee policies of involved countries and which have complicated international efforts to achieve lasting and humane solutions to the wide variety of situations in which the various groups of displaced Indochinese now find themselves.'¹³⁶

The Department argued that the ongoing refugee problem is closely bound up with the major political problems facing the region

'Resolution of the major political questions facing the region, such as the deep political and ideological differences between the countries of Indochina and their ASEAN neighbours and the

Vietnamese presence in Cambodia, would undoubtedly remove many of the conditions generating refugee outflows and some of those preventing those displaced from returning to their homelands.'¹³⁷

2.118 The Department drew particular attention to the political and humanitarian problems posed by the Cambodians congregated on the Thai/Cambodia border.

'The future of the border population in humanitarian terms must be regarded as precarious. The pattern of recent years is that military engagements on the border result in the evacuation of tens of thousands of "civilians" into temporary shelters across the border in Thailand which permits their stay only for the duration of hostilities.

Although at present the border population is not regarded internationally as a refugee population (they are within their own country and do not claim international protection from persecution), the prospect must be faced that, should the forces comprising the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea suffer a major military reversal, much of the border population will seek refuge in Thailand and ultimate resettlement by third countries.

Because of [the] history of the border population, which includes a large proportion of Khmer Rouge, the likelihood of large-scale international refugee resettlement is at least problematic.'¹³⁸

iii. The Indochina refugee situation and the ASEAN countries

2.119 ASEAN as a group has continued to express its concerns about the ongoing refugee problem and the extensive burdens on ASEAN member states which are involved. While matters relating to aspects of the refugee problem continue to be raised by individual ASEAN countries, this is done within the general framework of the ASEAN position.¹³⁹

2.120 ASEAN's current perceptions of the refugee issue were presented in the Joint Communique issued by the Foreign Ministers after their meeting in Jakarta on 9-10 July 1984.

- . The Foreign Ministers '... deplored the premeditated and indiscriminate attacks launched by the Vietnamese occupation forces this year against the Kampuchean civilian encampments along the Thai-Kampuchean border ...'.

- . The Foreign Ministers 'noted that since 1978 there remain hundreds of thousands of Indochinese refugees and displaced persons in the ASEAN countries. They considered that the most viable solution to the Indochinese refugees and displaced persons continue to be their voluntary repatriation and resettlement in third countries. They once again called on the traditional and potential resettlement countries to exert and intensify their efforts to provide resettlement opportunities for these unfortunate people in the spirit of international burden-sharing and humanitarianism.'

- . The Foreign Ministers also 'reaffirmed that the granting of first refuge by ASEAN countries to Vietnamese illegal immigrants continues to be based on the understanding that resettlement in third countries is assured so that there would not be any residual problem in the ASEAN countries. They reaffirmed their conviction that the problem of these illegal departures especially by sea, must be resolved at the point of origin, through a fully effective orderly departure programme. They strongly urged Vietnam, the UNHCR and resettlement countries to intensify their efforts to make the existing orderly departure programme for Vietnamese fully effective.'¹⁴⁰

2.121 The following figures¹⁴¹ show the historical trends in annual patterns of Indochinese refugee arrivals in countries of the region as well as the refugee population in ASEAN countries as of 29 February 1984.

2.122 Thailand has borne the greatest refugee burden. Since 1975 nearly 600 000 Indochinese people have sought refuge in Thailand, most of them from Laos (over 300 000) and Cambodia (about 210 000), but also including 75 000 Vietnamese boat people. At 29 February 1984, there were 130 675 persons in 'first refuge' camps in Thailand, comprising 8 028 Vietnamese boat arrivals, 69 226 Lao and Vietnamese land arrivals (virtually all Lao) and 53 421 Cambodians. This represented a 20% decline from the numbers of refugees one year previously.

2.123 The Lao refugee caseload has declined marginally over the last years, due to resettlement and a limited voluntary repatriation program operating for the Lao. The Vietnamese boat caseload has fallen slightly, while the Cambodian caseload has declined most significantly due to resettlement and some voluntary relocations to the border. In addition to the Indochinese in UNHCR-supervised camps and holding centres within Thailand, there are the Cambodians located in settlements on the Thai/Cambodia border in encampments controlled by the factions of the CGDK.

2.124 Malaysia has been the major landing place for Vietnamese boat people. Since 1975, over 130 000 have arrived; in 1982 and 1983, arrivals were 15 000 and 10 000. At 29 February 1984, there were 9 627 refugees in Malaysia; 13% more than in February 1983.

2.125 Indonesia, since 1975, has provided temporary refuge to over 79 000 people. Indonesia maintains two holding camps on the island of Galang, near Singapore; 9 155 people remained in these camps at 29 February 1984.

2.126 The Philippines' geographic position has meant that it has received comparatively few boat refugees. The rate of arrivals has recently decreased; arrivals in 1983 totalled 1759, a decline of 47% on 1982. The Philippines offers first asylum and it also hosts a substantial refugee processing centre. At 29 February 1984, the Philippines had 1726 'first asylum' refugees, and the refugee reprocessing centre at Bataan held 16 499, an increase of 24% on the previous year's figure of 13 271.

2.127 Brunei has provided temporary refuge for 159 boat refugees; at 29 February 1984, however, there were no Indochinese refugees recorded as being in Brunei.

2.128 This review of the refugee situation in each ASEAN country underlines the scale of the problem which they continue to face.

2.129 The problem of Indochina refugees is not the only refugee situation in the Southeast Asian region, although it is by far the most important. Other important refugee movements in the region have recently included,

- . Movements from the southern Philippines to Sabah; in 1982, the UNHCR estimated the numbers of Filipinos in Sabah at 90 000.¹⁴²
- . Irian Jaya; approximately 9000 people crossed to PNG in early 1984 (see section 8 below).¹⁴³

c) Australian refugee policies

2.130 Australia has made a substantial commitment to alleviating regional refugee problems. This commitment has involved both extensive refugee resettlement and a number of other policies and initiatives to assist refugees in the region and seek non-resettlement solutions.

i. Refugee resettlement

2.131 Australia by June 1984 had accepted over 88 000 Indochinese refugees since 1975. Australia's resettlement of Indochinese is proportionately the highest in the world. The resettlement program peaked at around the 15 000 level in 1978-80 and 1980-81. The program for 1983-84 involved acceptance of 10 000 people with about 5000 being received from Malaysia and Indonesia.¹⁴⁴

2.132 The emphasis of Australia's program since 1975 has consistently been on the acceptance of boat refugees. Immigration commented on the balance of factors involved in pursuing the policy in detail:

'The distribution of Australia's resettlement program reflects a complex range of considerations including the size of camp populations in countries of first refuge, the views of UNHCR, the scale of the refugee exodus actually being experienced, the policies and requests of the countries of South East Asia experiencing refugee arrivals and the number of places in refugee camps at any one time and those known to be of interest and concern to Australian sponsors'¹⁴⁵

2.133 Priorities in resettlement has been given to people with close relatives in Australia. A declining order of priorities is accorded to more distant relatives, those with other ties to Australia or those with special qualities which will facilitate resettlement. Australia also accepts some cases on special humanitarian grounds, such as disabled refugees. Guidelines were introduced in July 1982 on a global basis to tighten refugee selection procedures to ensure that only people with a genuine claim to refugee status were granted entry under the refugee programs.¹⁴⁶

2.134 Australia also accepts people through the Orderly Departure Program (ODP) established by agreement between the Governments of Australia and Vietnam in 1982. Internationally the ODP is regarded as an important element in the management of the refugee problem since it provides an alternative to dangerous boat journeys and uncertain resettlement prospects. Twenty-five countries now participate in ODPs and 'international and regional expectations are that orderly departures will continue and hopefully expand'.¹⁴⁷ By 30 June 1984, Australia had accepted 2334 people under the ODP.

ii. Non-resettlement initiatives

2.135 Australia has contributed in a variety of ways other than through resettlement to international efforts to lessen the Indochinese refugee burden on countries of the region and to pursue a resolution to the causes for the regional refugee exodus.

- . Humanitarian assistance from Australia has amounted to \$50 million. This has included food aid and provision of personnel. Aid has been provided bilaterally, multilaterally and through non-government organisations. Of the funds, over \$24m has been directed to Cambodian refugees. Immigration pointed out that the aid to Indochinese refugees,

'... has been concerned not only with meeting demonstrated relief needs but also, where practicable, developing conditions conducive to the achievement of non-resettlement solutions such as voluntary repatriation and the reduction of circumstances impelling people to leave their country of origin.'¹⁴⁸

Australian humanitarian aid has focussed on displaced Cambodians on the Thai/Cambodian border, people in UNHCR holding camps in Thailand, and displaced persons inside Cambodia, including Vietnamese.

- . Australia has supported anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Thailand by contributing \$905 000.¹⁴⁹
- . Australia has also directly supported repatriation efforts by contributing to the UN Fund for Durable Solutions. The Fund has been used for village level projects inside Laos to encourage the repatriation of Lao refugees and displaced persons in Thailand.¹⁵⁰

2.136 As Immigration observed in its submission Australia's policies towards the Indochina conflicts are highly relevant in the refugee context.

'Australia's diplomatic initiative to seek a regional reconciliation over the Cambodia issue, though important for reasons beyond the refugee problem, carries significant implications for the possible resolution of the plight of the Khmer refugees inside Thailand and displaced persons on the Thai/Cambodian border.'¹⁵¹

2.137 While Australia's concerns in the area of refugees in the ASEAN region have necessarily focussed very heavily on people from Indochina, Australia has also received over 5000 refugees from East Timor since 1975. Some 2500 people were evacuated from the territory to Australia in 1975. Subsequently, over 1150 more Timorese have been accepted by Australia. Further Timorese (about 2000) have been resettled in Australia from third countries.¹⁵²

d) The Indochina refugee issue: future prospects

2.138 Given the continuing outflow of people from Indochina, the burdens imposed by the ASEAN countries providing 'first asylum' and the insistence by ASEAN (reiterated in July 1984) that the international community maintain its efforts to alleviate the problem, refugee issues are likely to continue to play a substantial role in Australia-ASEAN relations. The ongoing importance of the issue was stressed in submissions from Immigration and the Department of Foreign Affairs. Foreign Affairs stated that:

'Given the rate of natural increase in camps throughout the region, diminishing resettlement, the difficulties in the way of programs to encourage voluntary repatriation, and the likelihood that illegal departures from Vietnam will continue at approximately their present levels, in the short to medium term camp populations will probably continue to decline only at a fairly slow rate.

'This could lead to expressions of concern by countries of first refuge, notably those which have borne the brunt of Indochinese arrivals (Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia) and pressure on resettlement countries (including Australia) to intensify their effort. There will be countervailing pressures in the major countries of resettlement to reduce intakes further.'¹⁵³

2.139 Immigration drew particular attention to the problem of declining interest in the major Western states in the acceptance of Indochina refugees: the problem sometimes referred to as 'compassion fatigue'.

'It is increasingly apparent that, internationally, programs for resettlement of Indochinese are declining or not being renewed ...

'The reality of the present situation is that the two major resettlement countries actively screen persons before accepting them as refugees from Indochina, rejecting those not believed to be refugees. The issue as a humanitarian one no

longer commands anxious world attention and there is growing recognition that resettlement alone is not a viable long-term solution to the Indochinese refugee problem. This is combined with a growing international expectation that progress on non-resettlement solutions is overdue and that affected countries of the region have a greater role to play than has so far been conceded.¹⁵⁴

2.140 Both Foreign Affairs and Immigration emphasised that increased attention would need to be given to 'non-resettlement solutions'. Particular problems are posed by those refugees who have spent long periods in camps and are unable to gain resettlement in a third country. The issue of the 'residual' refugees is a highly sensitive one to the ASEAN members, who fear that they may ultimately be forced to consider accepting some of these refugees on a long-term basis.¹⁵⁵ Foreign Affairs commented, in the context of the need to actively pursue non-resettlement solutions, that some problems may result in our relations with the ASEAN states.¹⁵⁶ Immigration concluded that,

The resolution of problems associated with displaced people in the Indochinese region will thus be an important element in Australia's relations with ASEAN (and concurrently the countries of Indochina) in the foreseeable future.¹⁵⁷

e) Australia's immigration and refugee policy and relations with ASEAN

i. Resettlement issues and problems.

2.141 The Committee gave some consideration to resettlement experiences of both migrants from the ASEAN states and refugees from Indochina. Immigration's research on resettlement patterns suggests that most migrants from ASEAN states do not experience major problems in adjusting economically and culturally to life in Australia, despite current economic difficulties in

Australia.¹⁵⁸ Two specific groups of migrants, however, have encountered some difficulties in settlement: refugees and immigrants from Timor and Filipino brides.

2.142 In addition to their experiences as refugees, some Timorese appear to be having problems related to: the large number of single-parent families; language problems; difficulty in settling into an urban environment, as many are from a rural background; loss of extended family; difficulty in getting family members out of Timor; and education difficulties.¹⁵⁹ With reference to Filipino women who have married Australians (often with the assistance of intermediary agencies) concern was expressed by the Australian Council for Overseas Aid that some of the women '... may be exploited or destined to live a lonely, isolated life ...'.¹⁶⁰ In response to problems being experienced by some Filipino brides, Immigration has introduced a counselling service for those intending to come to Australia to enhance their knowledge of Australian conditions, increased checks on the bona fides of those wishing to come, and a special post-arrival settlement service.¹⁶¹

2.143 The Committee's inquiry took place in a context of extensive debate within Australia on policies towards migration and refugee acceptance. The Committee's consideration of migration and refugee policies in relation to the ASEAN region, and the evidence¹⁶² received by the Committee on these issues, reflected this debate.

2.144 One submission (from Dr Catley) suggested that a task force should review contingency plans for dealing with further major refugee arrivals in the light of '... the difficulties of assimilation experienced with and by the last wave of Indo-Chinese'. Enthusiasm for multi-culturalism 'does not involve a mandate for the massive Asian immigration which appears to be developing.' He continued:

'... the apparent ease with which Asian immigrants can enter the country on compassionate/family reunion grounds contrasts with the difficulty of entry for immigrants from our more traditional and European sources. Around forty per cent of immigrants are now coming from Asia and, unless the Hong Kong problem is resolved more satisfactorily then presently seems likely, this proportion can be expected to be sustained. Two courses then suggest themselves. Either the policy on entry qualifications should be changed to reduce it; or greater resources should be devoted to a programme of education and assimilation to at least try to avoid the problems of intercontinental immigration encountered elsewhere.'¹⁶³

2.145 The submission received from the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) stated:

'ACFOA is deeply concerned that the recent debate on Australia's Migration program may be used to exploit fears and give encouragement to racist attitudes in the community towards Asian-Australians and refugees from Indo-China. The emotionalism of the debate may well increase with anti-Asian feeling on Australian university campuses and in communities where large numbers of Asian migrants have settled.'¹⁶⁴

2.146 Immigration provided detailed information on a variety of settlement problems being experienced by recently arrived Indochinese. The Department noted that refugees experience the normal difficulties facing all migrants, such as lack of English, unfamiliarity with Australian procedures, conflict over different cultural norms, and difficulty in obtaining suitable employment, or any employment. Refugees also face special additional problems: they often lack the work skills and family connections which assist other migrants to settle; they have left their previous homes and environments in traumatic circumstances; they may have been forcibly separated from their families, and the uncertainty of reunion is a psychological impediment to settlement.¹⁶⁵

2.147 The Department stated that, 'The Indochinese refugee community is showing a great deal of initiative and energy in overcoming initial settlement hardships and becoming established in the Australian community.'¹⁶⁶ Refugee communities were developing leaders and building bridges to Australian society. In response to requests from the Khmer community a conscious effort was being made to select people with professional and other skills needed by that community. The Department stressed the vulnerability of the refugee community.

'The Indochinese community is still vulnerable to outside pressures. Sensationalized or trivialized media presentation of individual or community problems can cause much harm both within the community and in its relationship with the host and other communities. The understanding and goodwill of the host society in particular are important factors at this stage of their development.'¹⁶⁷

2.148 The problems of the Indochinese community have been exacerbated by recent economic problems in Australia. Immigration stated that while the national unemployment rate in the quarter ending June 1983 was 10.1%, the rate for overseas born persons was 12%. However, while migrants who arrived before 1971 had an unemployment rate of 9.8%, 30.6% of arrivals since January 1982 were unemployed. High rates of unemployment, the Department stated, are causing many social problems in the refugee community.¹⁶⁸

2.149 Other information supplied by the Department suggested that the high rate of unemployment of recent migrants (and Indochinese) is partly a function of their newly-arrived status. It indicated that while unemployment rates of recently arrived Indochinese were high - over 35% - after two to three years the rate declined to approach that of other migrant communities: '... the Vietnamese experience, which has this high initial period of unemployment but then ... starts to improve, is a reflection of the fact that the community itself is establishing itself in Australia.'¹⁶⁹

2.150 In other submissions relating to resettlement issues, it was argued that there is a need for enhanced coordination and communication between the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and voluntary agencies.¹⁷⁰ The need for information and education on immigration and refugees issues was also emphasised. ACFOA stated in its submission:

'ACFOA believes that our Government should urgently increase its efforts to fully inform the Australian people about the facts of Government Immigration policy, and through community education programs, to foster tolerance, sympathy and understanding in the community for the needs of refugees and newly arrived immigrants ...

'In order to dispel misleading rumours and misunderstandings about refugees and immigrants on the part of the Australian population, and to stress the advantages of a multicultural society, ACFOA recommends that the Government fund a community education program.'¹⁷¹

ii. The significance of immigration and refugee issues for
Australia-ASEAN relations

2.151 The nature of immigration by residents of ASEAN states and by Indochinese refugees differ, as previous sections have indicated. However, both immigration and refugee acceptance have been, and are likely to continue to be, of importance in Australia-ASEAN relations.

2.152 With reference to immigration, the Department of Foreign Affairs commented,

'It is clear that the entry into Australia of people from the ASEAN countries - whether for temporary residence or permanent settlement - has enhanced the cultural exchange between Australia and its neighbours and has helped dispel any lingering memories of the so-called 'White Australia policy'. Whether this exchange has been facilitated by the student intake from ASEAN, visiting relations and businessmen, or exposure to art, fashion and life-styles from our close neighbours, the result has been an enrichment of Australian society.'¹⁷²

2.153 In considering the role of refugees policy in Australia-ASEAN relations, Immigration commented that,

'Given ASEAN perceptions of the Indochinese refugee situation, it is understandable that Australia's generous role as a resettlement country coupled with our pursuit of other durable solutions has meant that refugee issues have been a positive element in Australia/ASEAN relations.¹⁷³

2.154 Immigration went on to highlight the scale of Australia's role in refugee acceptance, a role which in the past year has proportionately increased in importance.

'Australia's generous Indochinese resettlement program has been an important element in developing this goodwill. In percentage terms, since 1975 Australia has been responsible for 7% of resettlement from Thailand, 9% from Brunei, 11% from Singapore, 15% from the Philippines, 18% from Indonesia and 21% from Malaysia, or 12% of resettlement from all ASEAN countries. In recent months, the Australian resettlement effort has formed a more significant part of total resettlement from the ASEAN countries. In the period from July-December 1983, for example, Australia has been responsible for 14% of resettlement from Singapore, 24% from Thailand, 40% from the Philippines, 50% from Malaysia and 57% from Indonesia, or 32% from all ASEAN countries.¹⁷⁴

2.155 Given Australia's substantial role in refugee acceptance, alterations of policy on levels of refugee acceptance may have an impact on relations with the ASEAN states. The degree to which ASEAN citizens (beyond foreign policy-making circles) are aware of Australia's role in refugee resettlement is uncertain. It was suggested to the Committee, however, that substantial variations and/or cutbacks in Australian acceptance of refugees could have an adverse impact on ASEAN attitudes to Australia.¹⁷⁵

2.156 The Committee received several perspectives on the possible significance of debate and policy consideration in Australia on migration and refugee issues. One submission commented that:

'The politicisation of the debate and the use of intemperate language in the debate can only damage Australia's reputation and standing in Asia.'¹⁷⁶

An additional perspective on Australia's policies on these issues was received from another witness who commented, with specific reference to ASEAN attitudes to Australia's acceptance of refugees:

'I do not think they are particularly grateful to us for having done so ... I would put it in negative terms ... I would say rather that if we had not done that, we would have a much worse reputation in the region.'¹⁷⁷

f) Conclusions

2.157 The refugee situation in the region at present is substantially less serious than it was in 1978-1979, but the Committee notes that major problems persist for the ASEAN states. Australian policies towards Indochinese refugees (including resettlement) have undoubtedly been an area of extensive and successful cooperation with ASEAN and its member states. Because of declining rates of refugee acceptance by other major resettlement countries, Australia's role, on a proportional basis, has recently increased in significance.

2.158 The Committee notes the reiterations by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers that their countries' willingness to grant temporary asylum to arriving refugees is conditional on continuing commitments by third countries to resettlement. The Committee also notes the statements by the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs that 'The resolution of problems associated with displaced people in the Indochinese region will

... be an important element in Australia's relations with ASEAN (and concurrently the countries of Indochina) in the foreseeable future.'178

2.159 The migration of ASEAN nationals has, by comparison, attracted much less attention, no doubt because of the success of most migrants from ASEAN countries in settling in Australia and because of the limited numbers involved. The Committee considers that the immigration which has so far taken place from the ASEAN region has both helped promote Australian contacts with the ASEAN states and helped allay the image of Australia as a country practising discriminatory policies in this area.

2.160 The Committee concludes that Australia's immigration and refugee policies are an important part of our relations with ASEAN. The adoption and maintenance of non-discriminatory immigration policies have contributed towards overcoming the formerly hostile perception of a White Australia. Australia's immigration and refugee policies in relation to the ASEAN region need to try to accommodate at least two important sets of interests:

- i. the capacity and willingness of the Australian community to welcome and accept immigrants and refugees arriving into Australian society, bearing in mind that the rate and volume of intake should be seen as being at the discretion of the recipient country.
- ii. the interests of Australia's ASEAN neighbours, who wish to continue the process of regional and international co-operation pursued since 1978 which has helped substantially to alleviate the burdens imposed on the countries of ASEAN.

2.161 It is in both Australia's and ASEAN's interests that efforts be continued to alleviate the refugee situation in the region. Longer-term solutions must depend on several factors, including changes in Vietnam's internal policies and actions which gave rise to the mass departures; economic and political stability in Indochina including resolution of the conflict in Cambodia; and partly on measures including international aid and resettlement of refugees in third countries, and on non-resettlement solutions, especially voluntary repatriation. Efforts should also be made in Australia to promote awareness of the importance of Australia's immigration and refugee policies in Australia-ASEAN relations. Additional efforts may also be required within Australia to help refugees and immigrants arriving from ASEAN countries adapt into the Australian community and to promote community acceptance.

8. Bilateral and multilateral relationships

2.162 Australia's relations with the ASEAN region are conducted through a series of both multilateral and bilateral contacts over a wide variety of areas. It is important for Australia that its bilateral relations are pursued in ways which harmonise with its multilateral association with ASEAN as a group, especially since ASEAN members have a demonstrated capacity to negotiate either individually or as a group. Australian interests can also be affected by the course of bilateral relations between ASEAN members and third countries; the most notable case of this is the Indonesia-Papua New Guinea relationship. Both these aspects of interrelationships between bilateral and multilateral associations will be considered briefly.

2.163 There is an obvious asymmetrical aspect to Australia-ASEAN relations stemming from the fact that ASEAN members have the option of negotiating either singly or as a group. The Department of Foreign Affairs commented that:

'ASEAN has now reached the stage in its development where the Association's corporate identity and the future of that identity is secure. ASEAN countries, however, retain the ability to negotiate either bilaterally or as a bloc depending on the assessment of which method best serves their interests. They have well-developed mechanisms to adopt bloc positions and negotiate as a bloc. Individual countries, including Australia, have found that the reverse situation does not apply; except during the regular, but not frequent, consultations which form a part of ASEAN's diplomatic year, such as the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting with dialogue partners, and, for Australia, the ASEAN-Australia dialogue meeting; and it is not always easy for individual non-ASEAN countries to respond to ASEAN as a bloc.¹⁷⁹

2.164 Many issues in the context of Australia-ASEAN relations arise at the bilateral level and will most appropriately be conducted at that level; these issues include most aspects of trade and economic relations, for example. As Foreign Affairs observed, however, ASEAN has the capacity to take up an issue that might have originated on a bilateral basis and pursue it jointly. The example of the dispute in 1978-1979 over Australia's International Civil Aviation Policy illustrates this clearly.

2.165 The civil aviation dispute had its origins in issues which had played no part hitherto in Australia's dialogue with ASEAN. The issues revolved around the problems of QANTAS which had by the late 1970s come under considerable competitive pressure from airlines including Singapore Airlines on Australia-Europe routes at a time when there was also considerable pressure for the achievement of lower fares on these routes. QANTAS had gradually come under increasing pressure and had encountered a declining market share and a declared financial loss in 1976. Australia's International Civil Aviation Policy (ICAP) was developed in response to this problem.¹⁸⁰

2.166 ICAP was designed to achieve lower fares by offering passengers regular scheduled flights by airlines, with stopovers strongly discouraged by imposition of a high rate of surcharge. It aimed to control the market for travel between Australia and overseas ports by establishing a 'duopoly' of QANTAS and the national airline at the other end of the route, and by ensuring that the airlines could fly these routes with very high passenger load factors - thus ensuring the profitability of the flights with low fares. It was argued that the restriction on stopovers was necessary to ensure that flights departing from Australian or European ports would, in fact, maintain their high load-factors throughout the entire flights.¹⁸¹

2.167 In seeking to restrict access to the Australian air traffic market the Australian government pursued the normal bilateral negotiations common in international civil aviation negotiations. SIA was the only Southeast Asian airline heavily dependent on its Australian routes, and it was expected that bilateral arrangements could be made by Australia which would be beneficial for other ASEAN carriers. Singapore, however, had a considerable amount to lose; it had a large investment in SIA and in airport facilities in Singapore (SIA by the late 1970s was contributing over 3% of the nation's GDP).¹⁸² Singapore was highly concerned at the implications of ICAP, and by 1978 there was an established framework for considering problems in relations between Australia and ASEAN countries. While Singapore's ASEAN partners could have gained some immediate advantages by accepting the proposed bilateral arrangements under ICAP, Singapore was able to gain support for a joint ASEAN stand on the issue.¹⁸³

2.168 Australia announced ICAP on 11 October 1978 and it initially hoped to conduct negotiations on a bilateral basis. However, ASEAN jointly criticised the policy at the end of October and the ASEAN Economics Ministers endorsed a joint stand

in December. ASEAN portrayed ICAP as an example of protectionist policies pursued by developed Western countries in relations with the Third World.¹⁸⁴

2.169 After a series of negotiations, Australia offered substantial concessions to ASEAN and the ASEAN airlines. The concessions did not meet all of ASEAN's demands but they did involve a substantial modification of the original ICAP policies. By 1981, after re-evaluation by the Australian Government, the attempts at control of the air traffic market attempted by ICAP were largely abandoned.¹⁸⁵

2.170 The ICAP dispute illustrated several important aspects of the potential of ASEAN as a negotiating group in relations with Australia, including its ability to appeal to the rhetoric of North-South dialogue in advancing its case. It also illustrated clearly the ASEAN members' ability to coordinate a joint policy stand on an issue which involved somewhat differing individual interests for the members. ASEAN was able to avoid internal division on the issue even though Singapore's interests were affected much more than those of any other member. The fact that issues on the bilateral level can develop into a multilateral dispute points to the importance for Australia of monitoring its bilateral relations to avoid such an eventuality.

2.171 In considering the possible relations between bilateral issues and multilateral associations between Australia and ASEAN it should be noted that Australia's bilateral relations with the ASEAN members are characterised by considerable diversity. This reflects both the diversity of the ASEAN members themselves and historical factors which, as Chapter One noted, saw Australia develop relatively closer relations in the post-World War II period with Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia than with Thailand and the Philippines. Differences of emphasis in bilateral relations continue in a variety of policy areas. In the area of

trade, relations have been relatively more extensive with Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. In defence cooperation Australia has a comparatively higher degree of involvement with Malaysia and Singapore because of the Five Power Defence Arrangements. In the field of immigration, Australia receives considerably more settlers from Malaysia and the Philippines than from other ASEAN members. In relation to overseas students, the preponderance of Malaysians among students from ASEAN (see Chapter IV, Section 7) has produced a degree of personal contact which is greater than that taking place with any other ASEAN member. This diversity in the character of bilateral relations is not surprising and it has not inhibited the development of the multilateral relationship. That relationship, however, can clearly be affected by the special character of individual bilateral associations, particularly if a particular association was to encounter persistent areas of discord.

2.172 In the context of regional and bilateral relations Indonesia is clearly of particular importance to Australia. Indonesia is the only ASEAN country with which Australia shares a territorial boundary (in the Timor Sea). Indonesia's contiguity with both Australia and with Papua New Guinea is also of significance. Australia has important relationships with Papua New Guinea and with other members of the South Pacific Forum.

2.173 Foreign Affairs drew special attention to the significance of the Australia-Indonesia relationship.

'Indonesia's geographical size, population and proximity give it a special significance for Australia. Also, as the largest country in ASEAN, Indonesia plays a leading role in the Association and in South East Asia more generally. Indeed, Australia's relations with South East Asia are influenced in the first instance by the relationship with Indonesia. For these reasons, successive Australian Governments have placed importance on the development of a close and co-operative relationship with Indonesia. The

conduct of the relationship has not been easy. The euphoria in Australia-Indonesian relations at the time of independence contrasted with hostilities between the two countries during Confrontation. The extension of Indonesian sovereignty over Irian Jaya and East Timor has also led to bilateral strains.

Differences in culture and tradition and in political and social values complicate the task of establishing a broadly based relationship. In this context, the level of rapport at government to government level takes on considerable significance.¹⁸⁶

2.174 In the context of regional and bilateral relationships, the Committee notes the emphasis placed by the Department of Foreign Affairs on relations with Indonesia - and the Department's reference to bilateral strains which have arisen over the East Timor and Irian Jaya issues. The Committee received some evidence which considered the present and possible future importance of these issues in the context of regional and bilateral relationships.¹⁸⁷ Problems or tensions arising in relations between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea could have the potential to affect Australian interests, given Australia's important relationships with both countries and with both ASEAN and the South Pacific regions.

2.175 The Committee considers that the problems arising from the situation in Irian Jaya appear to have the potential of being long-term and of possibly greater future significance than those arising over the East Timor issue, particularly because the situation in Irian Jaya may impinge not only on relations between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea but also between Indonesia and some of the Melanesian states of the Pacific. This in turn could affect ASEAN's relations with the countries of the South Pacific, with potentially important implications for Australia.

2.176 The Committee concludes that the state of bilateral relations will be one important component factor in the maintenance by Australia of productive relations with ASEAN as a group. ASEAN has shown an extensive capacity for solidarity and mutual support; the Association's members have, for example, in recent years supported Indonesia's position on East Timor, in the United Nations. ASEAN has also demonstrated on several occasions a capacity to cooperate effectively in pursuing issues with Australia on a joint basis that might not necessarily have been of equal salience to each individual ASEAN member.

ENDNOTES (Chapter II)

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3. Evidence, (Dr Girling), p.S173
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5. Leszek Buszynski, *S.E.A.T.O.: The Failure of an Alliance Strategy*, Singapore, 1983, pp.55-59.
6. George P. Schultz, US Secretary of State, Address to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, Jakarta, July 13, 1984.
7. Michael Richardson, 'The influence on the ASEAN community of Australian-American security relations', Paper prepared for delivery at the conference on: American influences on Australian defence, 24-26 June, 1984, Australian Studies Centre, The Pennsylvania State University, p.27.
8. Richardson (1984), Schultz (1984).
9. Evidence, (Dr Lim, 18 April 1984), p.437.
10. Evidence, (18 April 1984), p.418.
11. Department of Defence submission
12. Richardson (1984) pp.32-33; *The Age*, 7 October 1982.
13. Evidence, (18 April 1984) pp.413-414.
14. Evidence, (18 April 1984) p.415.
15. Evidence, (18 April 1984) pp.415-416.
16. Evidence, (18 April 1984) p.416.
17. Allan Gyngell, 'Looking Outwards: ASEAN's External Relations' in Alison Broinowski, ed., *Understanding ASEAN*, London, 1982, pp.138-140.
18. Evidence, p.S429.
19. Evidence, Dr Mediansky and Dr Lim, (18 April 1984) pp.433-435.
20. *Canberra Times*, 11 August 1984.
21. Evidence, (13 April 1984) pp.204-205.
22. Evidence, (13 April 1984) p.204.
23. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 11 August 1984: Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, address to National Press Club, 10 August 1984.
24. Evidence, p.S414; see also Sheldon W. Simon, 'Davids and Goliaths: Small Power - Great Power Security Relations in Southeast Asia', *Asian Survey*, Vol.XXXIII, No.3, March 1983, pp.308-309.
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26. Leifer (1983); Richardson (1984).
27. *Nation Review* (Bangkok) 13 September 1984; *Straits Times* (Singapore) 14 September 1984.
28. Evidence, p.S565.
29. Evidence, pp.S565-566.
30. Evidence, pp.S171-173.
31. Evidence (Dr Catley), pp.S565-566; (Professor Mackie) pp.S970; (Dr Girling) pp. S171-174.
32. Evidence, pp.S391-427.
33. Evidence, p.S566.
34. Evidence, p.S172.

35. Evidence, p.S411.
36. Evidence, p.S410.
37. Evidence, (Dr Lim) (18 April 1984) pp.436-437.
38. Evidence, (Dr Lim) pp. 436-437; (Dr Girling) pp.539-540.
39. Evidence, (Dr Lim) p.438; Richardson (1984) pp.3-5, 26-31.
40. Evidence, (in camera).
41. Evidence, pp.S264-265.
42. Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 March 1984.
43. Evidence (Dr Angel) p.S261; Department of Foreign Affairs p.S359-365.
44. Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 March 1984.
45. Evidence, p.S186.
46. In camera evidence - cited with permission.
47. Richardson (1984) pp.16-17; Tim Huxley, 'Recent Military Developments in Southeast Asia: Their Implications for Australia's Security', Basic Paper No. 2, 1983, Legislative Research Service, Canberra, 1983, pp.19-26. Thailand, for example, has recently confronted problems of cost in relation to possible purchase of the American F-16 fighter; see Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 December 1983, and 12 July 1984.
48. Huxley (1983) pp.19-26.
49. Huxley (1983) pp.26-28; Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 July 1979.
50. Richardson (1984) pp.22-25; Huxley (1983) pp.26-28.
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54. K.K. Nair, 'ASEAN-Indochina Relations Since 1975: The Politics of Accommodation', (Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No.30, A.N.U., 1984), p.111-194.
55. The International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) was convened in New York on 13-17 July; 79 states participated including the ASEAN members, China and the US, but not Vietnam or the Soviet Union. The ICK produced a declaration which reaffirmed the rights of all states to sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and expressed concern that these principles had been violated in Cambodia. The Conference noted 'the serious international consequences' arising from the situation in Cambodia and called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces. To reach a 'comprehensive political settlement' the ICK advocated: a cease-fire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces; 'appropriate arrangements to ensure that armed Kampuchean factions will not be able to prevent or disrupt the holding of free elections ...'; free elections to be held under UN supervision; respect by the great powers and Southeast Asian regional states for Cambodia's neutrality; and a program of international aid. See Report of the International Conference on Kampuchea, New York (13-17 July 1981), United Nations, 1981, pp.7-9.

56. Asian Wall Street Journal, 13 and 16 July 1982; Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 July 1982.
57. Asian Wall Street Journal, 13 and 16 July 1982; see also Kishore Mahbubani, 'The Kampuchean Problem: A Southeast Asian Perception', Foreign Affairs, Winter 1983/84, pp.407-425. The Far Eastern Economic Review provided a summary of estimates of the strengths of the Coalition factions up to late 1983. It estimated the Khmer Rouge at 30 000 armed men, the KPNLF at between 9000 and 12 000 and the pro-Sihanouk forces (the Armee Nationale Sihanoukiene - ANS) at about 5000 (Asia Yearbook, 1984, pp.143-144).
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60. Evidence, pp.S189-190.
61. Evidence, p.S190.
62. Evidence, (11 May 1984) p.S61.
63. Evidence, (13 April 1984) pp.206-207.
64. Evidence, (Dr Chandler and Dr Kiernan, 12 April 1984) pp.166-180; (Professor Yahuda and Dr Vickery, 13 April 1984) pp.206-215; (Dr Mediansky and Dr Lim, 18 April 1984), pp.424-428; (Dr Girling, 11 May 1984), pp.S42-S48; (Dr Khien Theeravit, submission) pp.S187-193; (Dr H.S. Leng, submission) pp.S854-863.
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72. Sydney Morning Herald, 4 October 1983; Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 October 1983; Sydney Morning Herald, 31 October and 10 November 1983; The Age, 9 November 1983.
73. Evidence, p.S428.
74. Evidence, p.S429.
75. Evidence, p.S429.
76. Evidence, p.S300.
77. Evidence, p.S302.
78. Evidence, P.S187.
79. In camera evidence, 14 June 1984.
80. Evidence (Dr Buszynski, submission), pp.S66-69.
81. Evidence, p.S430.
82. Evidence (12 April 1984); p.166.
83. Evidence, (11 May 1984) p.596.
84. Evidence, (11 May 1984) p.595.
85. Evidence, pp.S303-304.
86. Evidence, pp.S73.
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88. Evidence, p.S154.
89. Evidence, p.S430.
90. Evidence, (13 April 1984) p.215.
91. Evidence, (Dr Chandler, 12 April 1984) pp.188-189; (Dr Girling, 11 May 1984) p.553; (Professor Mackie, 11 May 1984) p.596; Dr Catley (submission) p.S566; Australian Council for Overseas Aid (submission) pp.S1038-1039; Dr Mediansky (18 April 1984), pp.425-426.
92. Evidence, (Dr Catley), p.S566; (Professor Mackie) p.970; (Professor Yahuda, 13 April 1984), pp.213-215.
93. Evidence, p.S303.
94. Evidence, p.S429.
95. Evidence, (13 April 1984) p.216.
96. Evidence, (12 April 1984) p.168.
97. Evidence, p.S173.
98. Evidence, (18 April 1984), p.425.
99. Evidence, (12 April 1984), pp.172-173.
100. Evidence, (12 April 1984) pp.182-183.
101. Evidence, (13 April 1984) p.246.
102. Evidence, p.S71.
103. Evidence, (Dr Buszynski submission), pp.S69-71.
104. Evidence, (11 May 1984) p.596.
105. Evidence, (18 April 1984) pp.405-407.; see also Dr Buszynski, submission, pp.S77.
106. Evidence, (Department of Defence submission).
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120. Evidence, (Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, submission) p.S1065.
121. Evidence, p.S1086.
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123. Evidence, S1086-1088.
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163. Evidence, pp.S586-587.
164. Evidence, p.S1042.
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172. Evidence, pp.S383-384.
173. Evidence, p.S1107.
174. Evidence, p.S1108.
175. Evidence, (Dr Girling, 11 May 1984), p.547; (Professor Mackie, 11 May 1984) pp.603-604.

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