



**CWS Submission to the Senate
Standing Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Defence and Trade:
*Inquiry into Australia's involvement in
peacekeeping***

***Forward by Nick Grono, Vice President for
Advocacy and Operations, International Crisis
Group***

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ii. About CWS

CWS (Christian World Service) is the international humanitarian and development agency of the National Council of Churches in Australia. (NCCA).

CWS is involved in development programs in 23 countries and is the Australian member of newly formed ACT Development group of agencies whose 14,223 staff are working on 901 development programs in 157 countries, with a combined annual budget of over \$1 billion.

CWS began in 1948 though only became known as 'CWS' in 1994. Since 1994, we have been able to invest over:

- \$46 million in overseas humanitarian and development programs; and
- \$6 million in refugee and indigenous programs in Australia.

CWS has full accreditation and adheres to Australian and international humanitarian and development Codes of Conduct.

iii. Forward by Nick Grono

On operationalising the Responsibility to Protect Norm in Australia

Nick Grono – Vice President for Advocacy and Operations, International Crisis Group

In response to failure of the international community to respond to the tragic crises in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s, a broad international debate was generated about the balance between the right of the outside actors to launch coercive military "humanitarian interventions" against that of sovereign governments to have untrammelled freedom of internal action. Born of this debate was the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and its landmark report: "The Responsibility to Protect". The concept of responsibility to protect (R2P) proposed a change in the terms of the debate by focusing not on anyone's 'rights' but rather their responsibilities - in the case of sovereign states to protect their own populations from genocide, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing; and in the case of other members of the international community to exercise that responsibility when a government is unable or unwilling to do so, acting through political, diplomatic, economic, legal, security or in the last resort military measures.

Since its birth, the endorsement by prominent Australians - and the Australian government - of this conceptual and moral shift has proved critical in nurturing R2P from an idea to an international norm, now adopted by the UN General Assembly in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and subsequent UN Security Council resolutions.

Australia early-on established its ownership in building the foundations of the R2P norm. Former foreign minister Gareth Evans co-chaired the ICISS, provided the intellectual and diplomatic firepower to develop this international norm, and continues to be one of its most active and effective proponents. In 2005, acting through then Ambassador to the United Nations John Dauth, Australia played an instrumental role in shaping the World Summit Outcome document, including paragraphs 138 and 139 -- the birth of R2P as an internationally recognized norm. Expanding that leadership across the Australian political spectrum at home will serve to build a permanent, deliverable, broad-based and politically potent public and political constituency for Australian engagement in the face of global atrocities.

Australia's international reputation will be significantly enhanced if we not only maintain our country's principled general commitment to R2P, but also recognize the strategic and moral benefits of ensuring that its nature and implications are more widely understood domestically, and play a leadership role internationally in preventing mass atrocities by making the concept not just rhetorically but operationally effective.

By pledging nearly \$3 billion of official development assistance this year (up half a billion dollars from last year) to the Asia Pacific region and beyond, with plans to further enhance its foreign assistance by 2010, and as a major provider of humanitarian assistance, Australia has been doing more to pull its weight in meeting its global responsibilities.

Through refugee resettlement and disaster relief -- such as its support for the United Nations' Central Emergency Response Fund -- and its response to conflict in East Timor, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere, Australia has played an important leadership role in responding to a number of humanitarian protection concerns around the globe. But the concept of R2P provides an opportunity to escape the trap of having to respond to each new crisis involving mass human rights atrocities by stressing as well the need to prevent these crises from occurring and the need to rebuild nations after conflict has subsided.

Partnering with the global community to improve global stability, to prevent and help nations recover from conflict, and to protect people from the worst atrocities is in the interest of Australian security in both regional, and global, contexts. As a mid-range international power, Australia has been a strong proponent for the creation of a rules-based system of international order -- rather than an ad hoc

response to each new emerging crisis -- and R2P is a vital step in developing those norms. In addition, it is in Australia's interest to strengthen countries vulnerable to mass atrocities, since states that cannot or will not stop internal mass atrocity crimes are states that cannot or will not stop terrorism, weapons proliferation, trafficking in people and drugs, the spread of health pandemics and other risks to Australia's national security.

But ultimately, we must support R2P simply because it is the right thing to do: our common humanity demands that the world never again sees another Holocaust, Cambodia, Rwanda, or Bosnia. This question cuts to the core of who we are as nations, and who we are as individuals.

1. Executive Summary

Across the spectrum of submissions already made to this committee, the need for Australia to solidify its response to situations of insecurity and mass human suffering formed a broad consensus. Notably, the *Responsibility to Protect* doctrine (R2P), the most significant conceptual breakthrough in International Humanitarian Law since the Geneva Conventions¹, has emerged repeatedly as the foundation from which changes should be made, and guidelines sought.²

R2P was endorsed in 2005 by the General Assembly, and in 2006 the Security Council used the R2P framework to make mass atrocities a matter of international peace and security.³ The Australian government has supported the Doctrine from the beginning, and during the lead-up to the General Assembly endorsement “worked to gain support from UN member states for the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine.”⁴ More recently, R2P has been endorsed by members of both the Coalition government, and the Australian Labour Party.⁵

Oxfam⁶, Austcare⁷ and World Vision⁸, have all referred to R2P in their submissions as a frame of reference for different aspects of Australia's involvement in peacekeeping. Each submission draws

¹ R2P provides a viable solution to the controversy over state sovereignty versus humanitarian intervention. The Responsibility to Protect. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001.

² R2P was referred to in submissions to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade by Oxfam, Austcare and World Vision. (See notes 6-8)

³ General Assembly World Summit Outcome document, principles 138 – 139:

Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity

138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.

⁴ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Annual Report 2005-2006. p107.

⁵ The Hon. Bruce Billson MP, Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence mentioned R2P repeatedly in a speech delivered at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI – who provided a great deal of assistance drafting this report) on March 26, 2007. The Hon. Robert McClelland MP, Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to R2P in an address on responsible global citizenship given at the Lowy Institute on March 14, 2007, and the Hon. Bob McMullan MP, Shadow Minister for International Development Assistance has written extensively on the implications of R2P in the Asia-Pacific Region.

⁶ Oxfam Australia Submission to the Senate Standing Committee Inquiry, 30 March, 2007. Pp 2, 3, 4, 5 and 11. On page 3: “Our intention in writing this submission is to see that the Australian government develops a strategy to implement the principle of the Responsibility to Protect, inclusive of all relevant government departments. Such a strategy would provide a clear policy framework for the deployment of Australian peacekeepers and hence satisfy the objectives of this inquiry.”

⁷ Austcare's Submission to the Senate Standing Committee, March 2007. Pp 2, 6, 7 and 8. On page 18: “Concept 6: The Responsibility to Protect”, and page 22 “Who has the Responsibility to Protect?”

⁸ World Vision Australia Submission to the Senate Standing Committee, 2007. On page 10 World Vision encourages Australia to engage in international dialogue surrounding R2P.

from of the original ICISS 2001 report *Responsibility to Protect*⁹, which, taken as a whole, forms a viable “whole-of-government” foundation for Australia’s involvement in peacekeeping. Notably, the R2P “threshold criteria”¹⁰ for engagement outlined by Oxfam¹¹ works in concert with the R2P Framework for Human Protection Operations (HPOs) suggested in this submission; the threshold criteria determine when Australia should engage, the HPO Framework govern participation once begun, and under what circumstances Australia should cease to participate.

Moreover, the R2P doctrine provides a viable base from which the broadly recognised needs for change can be unified under a single, comprehensive and internationally endorsed framework.

In brief, CWS recommendations to the Senate Standing Committee reflect developments in international humanitarian law since 2001, notably:

- the *Responsibility to Protect* doctrine;
- trends in Australian and regional contributions to peacekeeping operations; and,
- lessons learned in major international operations.

Above all, this submission is intended to give “frank, specific and realistic recommendations for change,”¹² in order to achieve the greatest success for Australian contributions to Human Protection Operations (HPOs) within the limits of the existing system.

1.1 List of Recommendations

CWS recommends that the Australian Government:

- 1) Rename operations traditionally associated with “peacekeeping” to the more broadly encompassing “Human Protection Operations” (HPOs), which include peacebuilding, peacemaking and peace enforcement;
- 2) Adopt a framework for Australian participation in HPOs, as outlined in section 3.1.2 of this submission;
- 3) Endorse and uphold the *Responsibility to Protect* doctrine as outlined in the 2001 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty; and
- 4) Build awareness and support in Australia and within the Asia-Pacific region for the *Responsibility to Protect* doctrine and the potential for an Australian lead Asia-Pacific Human Protection and Security Force.

⁹ Ibid note 1.

¹⁰ Threshold Criteria:

a) Just cause – the actual or apprehended large scale loss of life or large scale ethnic cleansing.

b) Right intention – to avert human suffering. It is best assured through multilateral organisations, supported by victims and regional organisations.

c) Last resort – all non-military mechanisms have been explored and there are reasonable grounds for believing peaceful means would be unsuccessful.

d) Proportional means – the scale, duration and intensity proportional to achieve the humanitarian protection objective.

e) Reasonable prospects – there exists a good chance of success and consequences of the action are not likely to be worse than before.

f) Right authority – the Security Council is the right authority and has the international mandate for peace and security. Peacekeeping operations should be authorised by the Security Council to avoid unilateral interventions.

Ibid note 1. Pp 32-37.

¹¹ Ibid note 6 p 4.

¹² See also: Harry Broer and Michael Emery. "Civilian Police in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations." Policing the New World Disorder. Washington D.C.: National Defence UP, 2002.

2. The Need for Change

....Military operations other than conventional war are becoming more common. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a worldwide upsurge in intra-state conflicts. These disputes have placed new demands on the armed forces of many countries, including for humanitarian relief, evacuations, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. The Government believes this is an important and lasting trend with significant implications for our Defence Force.¹³ ... Preparing the ADF for such operations will therefore take a more prominent place in our defence planning than it has in the past.¹⁴

– Department of Defence White Paper, 2000

As the Senate Standing Committee considers what role Australia will play in future HPOs, lessons from past failures must be taken to heart and implemented within a comprehensive policy framework.

International action may have prevented the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians in Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia and Somalia, but was crippled by:

1. Lack of preventative action¹⁵,
2. Lack of sufficient political will and civic courage, both to engage at the necessary level and to provide adequate resources for response,¹⁶
3. Lack of a “clear, credible and achievable mandate”¹⁷ and robust rules of engagement, which could respond to escalating situations with adequate, proportionate use of force,¹⁸
4. Lack of a single, comprehensive command structure, with disposal of adequate resources as and when needed, without the lengthy and counter-productive process of committee review under threat of veto,¹⁹
5. Bad planning, execution and strategizing for exits.²⁰

These failings have been well documented, and are attributed to the long-held conception that humanitarian intervention infringes upon state sovereignty.²¹ The international community — as represented in the UN General Assembly and Security Council — adopted the *Responsibility to Protect* doctrine (See 3.1.3 below) in answer to these controversial questions of state sovereignty, and to provide a framework for ensuring that future efforts to prevent and halt mass-atrocities are not crippled by these same failings. It is therefore vital that any discussion of Australia's participation in HPOs include a consideration of the *Responsibility to Protect* doctrine.

3. Implementing Change

3.1. Policy framework, procedures and protocols

3.1.1 A New Framework for 'Peacekeeping' involvement: “Human Protection Operations”

In order to cater to Australian strengths and to conduct the most effective and efficient operations possible, a *single* framework, which encompass the range of non-traditional warfare operations

¹³ Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force "White Paper" Department of Defence. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, p8.

¹⁴ Ibid, p10.

¹⁵ As seen in Rwanda.

¹⁶ As seen in Rwanda.

¹⁷ The Brahimi Report. United Nations General Assembly Security Council. A/55/305-S/2000/809. p4.

¹⁸ As seen in Bosnia.

¹⁹ As seen in Kosovo.

²⁰ As seen in Somalia.

²¹ Ibid note 1.

customarily associated with 'peacekeeping', is required. However, 'peacekeeping', meaning a supervisory presence, no longer accurately describes nor serves these operations. Instead, CWS believes HPOs are a better description for these activities. HPOs encompass peacebuilding, peacemaking and peace enforcement, which are distinguished by specific circumstances of deployment and a mission's Rules of Engagement ('ROE').

In addition to the need for robust ROEs and definitive exit strategies, the HPO framework detailed below caters to Australia's unique strengths and ideal contribution opportunities, including the significant role of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) in Australian peacekeeping operations.

3.1.2 Framework for Australia's Participation in Human Protection Operations

Experience shows that an HPO is far more likely to successfully prevent or halt mass human suffering if the following 8 guidelines are observed:

1. Australian participation in HPOs must be based on a **precisely defined political objective**. A defined objective must be either a pre-condition for an Australian contribution to international operations, or a first-step in uni- or bilateral Australian operations. This requirement includes:
 - a. A **clearly defined mission mandate**, which extends beyond simply monitoring and supervising when necessary, and
 - b. **Robust rules of engagement** that recognize proportionality but also the realities of environments in which Australian personnel will operate, including the occasional need to respond to escalating situations. When involved in UN-led operations, Australia should encourage the Security Council to authorize a Chapter VII mandate²² as a condition of Australian participation, lest Australia contribute to a lost cause.
2. Australian participation in multilateral HPOs should contribute positively to the most comprehensive, **single chain of authority** possible. Whether lead by Australia or the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the commander of the HPO must have disposal of adequate resources to execute his mission.
3. The aim of an HPO is not the defeat of a state, but rather to enforce compliance with human rights and the rule of law as quickly and comprehensively as possible. As such, the **use of force in Australian HPOs should aim to meet the objective of protection**.
4. All operations in which Australia participates must comply with our obligations under **international humanitarian law**.
5. **Force protection** for the intervening force, although important, **should not have priority** over the resolve to accomplish the mission.
6. Every endeavor should be made to maximize **coordination between military and civilian authorities** and organizations.
7. Within the time constraints presented by each crisis, HPOs should not be deployed without **effective mission planning** that includes contingency plans for the move from prevention to intervention if and when it becomes necessary.

²² Chapter VII of the UN Charter describes the Security Council's power to authorise military sanctions and the use of force to resolve disputes. Thus, mandates granted under Chapter VII provide for the possibility that force may become necessary, as opposed to mandates granted under Chapter VI which describe the Security Council's power to investigate and mediate disputes, short of the use of force. Chapter VII mandates are necessary for effective HPOs, as "even the most benign environment can turn sour." [A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility](#). Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. United Nations, 2004. p68.

8. Finally, a viable **exit strategy** should be a condition of entry into HPOs. Exit criteria would include a long-term rebuilding commitment, whether or not it is implemented by Australia or another international contingent.²³

3.1.3 Responsibility to Protect doctrine

"The so-called "right of humanitarian intervention" has been one of the most controversial foreign policy issues of the last decade - both when intervention has happened, as in Kosovo, and when it has failed to happen, as in Rwanda. Then United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his report to the 2000 General Assembly, challenged the international community to try to forge consensus, once and for all, around the basic questions of principle and process involved: when should intervention occur, under whose authority, and how. The independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was established by the Government of Canada in September 2000 to respond to that challenge,"²⁴ and in 2001 published its report, *The Responsibility to Protect*²⁵.

The *Responsibility to Protect* doctrine (R2P) provides the vital conceptual breakthrough in the long-held debate over state sovereignty vs. humanitarian intervention. It asserts that state sovereignty carries with it the responsibility to protect; and when a state is unwilling or unable to protect its citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, it is the responsibility of the international community to not only *react*, but to *prevent* conflict and *rebuild* the afflicted region. State sovereignty is thus no longer a viable pretext for global inaction in the face of such atrocities.

To prevent – HPOs charged with a prevention mandate must be deployed rapidly when early warning indicators suggest an imminent threat. They must be backed by the political willingness of deploying states to engage parties to the conflict and other regional actors in the diplomatic process. To effect positive results, sustain conflict deterrence and enable forceful responses when necessary, HPOs must be given robust ROEs.

To React – If by neglect or surprise a human security crisis emerges, an HPO deployed with a peacemaking or enforcement Chapter VII mandated must be mobilised with a coherent command structure that can dispose of adequate resources.

To Rebuild – Whether engagement begins at the rebuilding stage or an HPO has effectively created stability in a conflict zone, any mandate for deployment must include a viable exit strategy that recognises the responsibility to rebuild, and a commitment to long-term regional rehabilitation.

R2P was adopted by the General Assembly in the *2005 World Summit Outcome (A/60/1)* and unanimously passed in Security Council Resolution 1674, *The Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict* in April 2006, thereby making atrocity crimes a matter of international peace and security under international law.

²³ Bearing in mind that such a strategy must be "directed towards defining an over-all objective, not an arbitrary, self-imposed, artificial deadline which encourages belligerents to outwait the outside intervention." C. Gray, "Peacekeeping After the Brahimi Report: is There a Crisis of Credibility for the UN?" *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* Oxford University Press, 2nd ser. 6 (2001):p275.

²⁴ Note 1.

²⁵ Ibid.

3.1.4 R2P and Australia's National Security

It is of tremendous significance that the Security Council has adopted the R2P doctrine. As represented in the UN, the international community has recognized that genocide and other crimes against humanity constitute grave atrocities and are a threat to international peace and security. Beyond the moral outrage that Australian citizens feel at these acts, our national security is at stake. Humanitarian crises regularly generate massive displacement and migratory flows. They also attract "uncivil society" groups such as terrorists and organized crime, as has been evident in Somalia and Afghanistan. Abandoning crumbling societies to these forces is a short-sighted view of the international security threats we will allow to proliferate. Not only does international law promote a responsibility to protect others; our own security gives us an interest in doing so.

Australia has often been at the forefront of positive, strongly mandated operations. We need to identify and consolidate the knowledge created by our involvement. If Australia is to continue to honour its international responsibility and lead efforts to secure and protect the region, it is in our interest to make all efforts to ensure our missions are effective and efficient.

3.1.5 Effective Protection: Prevention

Prevention is the single most important element of R2P, and of effective HPOs, and yet it is the weakest part of current peacekeeping practice²⁶. Both the economic and political viability of a protection activity, as well as its ultimate purpose to save lives, are far more likely to succeed if early response is engaged. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict noted that of the \$200 billion spent on conflict management in seven major interventions in the 1990s, \$130 billion could have been saved had more effective preventative measures been taken.²⁷

Though traditionally a non-engagement phase of humanitarian operations, experience shows that prevention must be accompanied by the real presence of deterrence and authority that only a robust mandate can provide. Should prevention fail, deployed forces must be ready and equipped in such a way that they can easily be redesignated as part of an intervention force.

The deployment of UNPREDEP in Macedonia from 1992-1999 is the main example (indeed, only example) of an effective preventative force deployment²⁸. It is the only time the Security Council has deployed a peacekeeping operation with an explicitly preventative Chapter VII mandate²⁹, and it is argued that the simple act of international interest shown by the deployment was enough to have a stabilizing influence on the situation.

3.2 Training and Preparedness

HPOs are a mixture of traditional military engagement and limited peacekeeping deployment. Pre-deployment training must be sensitized to this. For the safety of Australia's personnel and to improve their effectiveness, particular concern should be given to the preparation of civilian actors, such as AFP contingents, for what are often situations of greater insecurity than their normal operating environments.

²⁶ Susan C. Breau, "The Impact of the Responsibility to Protect on Peacekeeping." *Journal of Conflict & Security Law* 11 (2007) p431.

²⁷ Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, extracted in Note1 at p20.

²⁸ Note 1 at pp 25 and 58, AND note 13 at pp 431 and 443.

²⁹ See note 23.

There is consensus that training for military engagements can be substituted for peacekeeping training but not vice versa³⁰. However, pre-deployment mission-specific training may be insufficient to address the precarious position Australian forces will have to occupy once deployed as part of an HPO, especially as the need for rapid deployment capabilities will limit pre-deployment training opportunities.

To this end, CWS commends the work of the Australian Defence Force Peacekeeping Centre in delivering on-going peace operations training – not only to the Command and Staff Colleges and Deployed Forces Support Unit but also to the Australian Federal Police. We further commend the Centre's efforts to provide the UNITAR POCI Distance Learning Program for Nations correspondence courses to forces deployed on peacekeeping missions. We support and encourage any expansion of the ADFPKC's activities to also target unassigned contingents or individuals who may in future be assigned to rapid deployment operations.

3.3 Coordination among Australian agencies, United Nations and relevant countries

3.3.1 Regional Protection Force

The benefits of a standing agreement on coordinated engagement are great, especially regarding regional protection issues. If recent Australian operations are any indication³¹, the trend in non-war deployments has been towards an Australian-led regional security and protection force in the Asia-Pacific. As with the trend towards strengthened mandates, this regional collaboration has as yet been ad hoc. A standing agreement can help prevent damaging foot-dragging when mobilization is required and when rapid responses are critical.

The same General Assembly Outcome Document that adopted the R2P doctrine, also dealt explicitly with regional forces. "93. Recognizing the important contributions to peace and security by regional organizations... and the importance of forging predictable partnerships and arrangements... we: support the efforts of... regional entities to develop capacities such as for rapid deployment, standby and bridging arrangements."³²

The Brahimi report, at 9(a), also notes the emerging importance of regional security forces: "Member States should be encouraged, where appropriate, to enter into partnerships with one another, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), to form several coherent brigade-size forces, with necessary enabling forces, ready for effective deployment within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a traditional peacekeeping operation and within 90 days for complex peacekeeping operations."³³

When considering how Australia's involvement in Human Protection Operations can best contribute to international peace and security, CWS believes that the Senate Standing Committee should seriously contemplate the formalisation of an Australian-lead Asia-Pacific Region Human Protection and Security Force. In addition to the Framework for HPOs outlined in this submission, guidance for such a force should be sought from UNSAS, to fulfil and solidify the region's need for a rapid deployment capability. Given its relative strength in the region, Australia has much to gain in establishing such a force and in specifying its terms of mobilization. Australia has a strong interest in encouraging buy-in

³⁰ Ibid note 13. p12.

³¹ Australia's leadership and contributions have been invaluable to INTERFET, UNTAET, UNMISSET, UNOTIL, and now UNMIT operations in East Timor.

³² 2005 World Summit Outcome. United Nations. General Assembly. A/RES/60/1. para93.

³³ Ibid note 17. At 9(a).

from its neighbours in order to share the responsibility to protect and allow for smooth and rapid deployments.

3.3.2 Command Structure

As set out in the ICISS report, unity of command is essential for conducting HPOs successfully. Poorly defined chains of authority can stunt even the most robust HPO deployments.³⁴ Further, “the fewer the national reservations on the deployment of the national contingents in such an operation are, the greater the capacity of the force commander to act decisively and flexibly.”³⁵ While political leaders are responsible for setting clear objectives and making strategic decisions for each phase of an HPO, a military commander should conduct each phase to the fullest extent possible. The operation commander must also not be further hindered by lack of access to adequate resources needed to execute the mission.

Australian commanders have been in charge of many recent UN operations in which Australia has participated. However, Australia needs to prepare for the eventuality that a significant Australian contingent is part of a mission led by another country. Crucially, Australia must strive to create and energize a single chain of command.

4 Conclusion

The timing of this senate review could be no more appropriately situated to solidify the positive trends in recent Australian participation in HPOs and to take forward the invaluable *Responsibility to Protect* doctrine, for which a firm foundation within HPO policy frameworks is vital for participation by nations like Australia to remain a positive and effective contribution to international peace and security operations.



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³⁴ Ibid note 1. p21.

³⁵ Ibid note 27.

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