

**Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade**  
Inquiry into Australia's involvement in Peacekeeping Operations; 24 July 2007  
Responses to questions taken on notice from the Department of Defence

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**Question 1**

**ADF Peacekeeping Centre**

How many people work at the Australian Defence Force Peacekeeping Centre?

**RESPONSE**

The authorised establishment of full-time staff at the ADF Peacekeeping Centre is currently two. This is supplemented by Reserve personnel and staff from the ADF Warfare Centre when required. The ADF Peacekeeping Centre also co-opts specialists and experts from other government departments, the United Nations, non-government organisations and other parts of the ADF.

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**Question 2**

**ADF language capability**

How many ADF members are Tetum language specialists? How many of those specialists are currently serving in Timor Leste? How is Defence dealing with the issue of ADF language skills in countries like Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands?

**RESPONSE**

Defence does not use the term "language specialist", rather it trains personnel to differing levels of linguistic proficiency, categorised as Lower, Intermediate, Higher and Advanced.

From the years 2000-07 inclusive, 353 ADF members attended the 12-week Basic Tetum course run at the ADF School of Languages in Melbourne. A further 275 ADF members participated in a two-week Introductory Tetum course during the same period. The basic course produces graduates with some effective communication skills, but in a limited range of topics. They would not be considered highly skilled linguists.

Personnel records indicate 299 current ADF members have skills in Tetum. As at 27 July 2007, 11 of the ADF personnel serving in Timor Leste had Tetum skills.

Defence schedules training courses in Tetum, Indonesian, Portuguese and Solomon Islands Pijin annually. This provides an ongoing pool of staff trained across the required languages for Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands. When required to support operational requirements, additional courses are provided.

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**Question 3**

**ADF language training**

Please provide an overview of the extent to which language training in Defence is conducted according to ADF operational requirements.

**RESPONSE**

Language training focuses on skill requirements for our immediate region, for current and foreseeable deployments and for longer term strategic interests. For ADF operations beyond the immediate region and in areas that may not be enduring strategic priorities, language training is implemented where linguist skills are critical to operations.

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**Question W1**

**Assessing support for peacekeeping operations**

How does Defence assess local acceptance of an operation and Australia's participation?

**RESPONSE**

One of the fundamental principles guiding a peace operation is consent. Peacekeeping requires the consent and cooperation of the parties to the conflict in order to allow a peacekeeping force to deploy and carry out its tasks. However, peace enforcement operations may be undertaken where consent of all parties in conflict is not guaranteed or universally acknowledged.

Any potential Defence involvement in a peace operation is considered as a part of a whole of government response. Defence, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, AFP, AusAID, the Department of the Attorney-General and the intelligence agencies, among others, work together to form a clear understanding of local conditions, including the degree of local and international acceptance of a peace operation.

The impartial and objective pursuit of the mandate, regardless of provocation and challenge, is essential to preserving the legitimacy of the operation and the consent and cooperation of the parties to the conflict. These factors are continuously assessed during the conduct of a peace operation.

Further, within any peace operation, security sector reform and disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration strategies are often used as a means of preventing the reassumption of a conflict. The success of these strategies is often dependent on obtaining agreement from local authorities and the wider population, and the degree to which they are involved in the implementation of these strategies. An ADF element would normally assess local consent as part of planning for specific tasks.

## **Question W2**

### **Additional Army battalions**

In its submission, DFAT stated that, in August 2006, the Government announced measures that would increase overall operational preparedness for peacekeeping operations. They included the raising of two additional Army battalions 'to enhance the ADF's operational capability, including its capacity to contribute to peacekeeping operations' (DFAT submission, page 7).

To what extent have these goals been achieved?

### **RESPONSE**

In August 2006, the Australian Government directed the ADF to raise two additional Infantry Battlegroups, including their essential joint and Defence enablers in a two-staged process.

The first stage was to raise the 7<sup>th</sup> Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (7 RAR) and all its enabling support elements. The second stage was to re-raise the 8<sup>th</sup>/9<sup>th</sup> Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (8/9 RAR) and its enablers.

Stage One approval to commence occurred in December 2006. The timing for Stage Two commencement is a demonstrated growth in Stage One, in order to confirm that achieving the necessary personnel growth underpinning this initiative remains feasible.

Stage One progress to date:

- **Management**
  - A joint directive from the CDF and the Secretary to the Chief of Army has been issued.
  - Cascading directives have been issued to all levels and a detailed, comprehensive implementation plan has been issued.
  - Governance, accounting and reporting lines have been established and are being complied with.
- **Capability**
  - All new capability structures have been developed, approved and loaded onto the ADF Personnel Management Information System.
- **Equipment**
  - Immediate equipment needs are being met through in-service equipment holding fleets.
  - Comprehensive planning for additional equipment required to support progressive growth is maturing.
  - Major capital equipment needs have been identified and procurement scheduled in order to support the growth.

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- Facilities
  - All temporary facilities requirements have been established and are underway to support the immediate requirements of the project.
  - Permanent facilities, including workplace and living accommodation, have been scoped and are subject to the normal planning and governance processes.
  - Infrastructure development remains in accordance with established project timelines.
  - Additional recruiting targets have been established.
- Personnel
  - Personnel growth through recruiting reform and retention schemes as a result of the ADF Recruitment and Retention initiatives has provided positive results.
  - 7 RAR has already grown by a headquarters and two company groups and projections remain positive for further growth.
  - This growth has not come at the expense of any other element of the ADF.
- Training
  - A comprehensive individual training plan has been developed and implemented in order to meet the increased training throughput.

As a result of strong personnel growth results, the Government is expected to consider Stage Two approval later this year.

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**Question W3**

**INTERFET leadership**

In 2003, Dr Alan Ryan, Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre, observed with regard to INTERFET that 'the fact that the Australian command adopted a 'strong' lead-nation approach made this operation stand out'. He stated:

*UN peacekeeping missions generally follow a more bureaucratic and collegiate model of command, where national representation often has priority over operational effectiveness.*

(Alan Ryan, Senior Research Fellow, Land Warfare Studies Centre, *Australian Perspectives on the Military Challenges Faced in Post-Conflict Iraq, Modern Peacekeeping and Coalition Operations*, paper delivered at the Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, 7 April 2003, p. 7.)

Could you explain the nature of Australia's leadership in INTERFET, why it was so successful and the lessons that can be drawn for future operations?

**RESPONSE**

INTERFET was the largest single Australian taskforce deployment since World War II. Australia took the lead in establishing a multinational force of over 13,000 personnel, 36 ships, 49 aircraft and 1,300 vehicles from over 21 troop-contributing nations.

INTERFET benefited from a clearly defined mission and endstate - a clear goal to which the coalition could be led. A timely and appropriate United Nations mandate, together with nations willing to contribute quality assets to a common cause was also important to success.

Australia provided decisive leadership early in the planning process via an established Headquarters. Subordinate-level planning was conducted by an existing and well practised Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, which had a parallel peacetime role, ensuring that there was a large core of staff established as an effective team. This combination provided in-depth and comprehensive planning that robustly supported later execution.

Clearly defined command relationships were established and the direct chain of command from the Commander back to the Chief of the Defence Force in Australia aided the ongoing coordination of political and military operations. Relationship building within the coalition and other agencies through extensive and open communication was a hallmark of INTERFET's success.

This strong emphasis on communication created a healthy, positive and friendly environment that greatly enhanced the relationships and understanding between all nationalities and organisations.



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INTERFET benefited from its relationship with the media. Ready access was provided to senior officers which assisted in creating good will and support.

The key lessons learnt for future operations were the need for the ADF to:

- enhance its self-evaluation capability;
- update its command and control doctrine;
- develop coalition building doctrine;
- exercise and evaluate theatre-level civil-military operations;
- further develop information operations;
- continue to address personnel issues arising as a result of high operational tempo;
- address theatre-level logistic issues; and
- further develop civil-military operations doctrine and practice.

These have been implemented along with pertinent lessons from other operations and exercises. Incremental and evolutionary improvements routinely continue.

#### **Question W4**

##### **Coordination with the UN**

Austcare has commented on the decision to deploy Australian military personnel after the 2006 violence under bilateral arrangements rather than as part of UNMIT. Austcare considered that 'more cohesion would be achieved if the ADF was under unitary control of UNMIT, if UNMIT was properly resourced by the international community, and if better civil-military coordination mechanisms were in place through the auspices of UNMIT'. (Austcare submission, p. 11)

- a) Can you elaborate on why ADF personnel were not deployed as part of UNMIT?
- b) What have been the advantages of deploying separately as the ISF? Have there been any disadvantages to this approach?
- c) Are the different security roles of parties operating in Timor-Leste clear, complementary and well coordinated?

##### **RESPONSE**

- a) ADF troops were not deployed under the UN mission because Australia believed that an Australian-led international security force (ISF) was best placed to provide the necessary military support for the UN and the East Timorese Government to ensure peace and stability.
- b) There were a number of advantages associated with deploying separately as the ISF, which included being a force that was:
  - flexible, with organic air mobility which could, at short notice, be reinforced to meet unexpected circumstances;
  - familiar with the environment and the tasks with proven command and control arrangements; and
  - able to focus on security issues which then allowed the UN to focus its contribution where its expertise is most needed, such as in the area of nation building.

The disadvantages of deploying separately as the ISF were that the majority of the operation's costs were incurred by Australia and that the non-UN operational structure was less attractive to some potential coalition partners.

- c) Yes. In particular, Australia's role in relation to security is defined in a Technical Arrangement between the ISF and the UN. Security roles for all parties are coordinated through a Trilateral Coordination Body, which was formalised by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding, made up of the UN, ISF and East Timorese Government. This body allows for regular discussion of security issues relevant to the management and stabilisation of the security environment, including security operations.

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**Question W5**

**Coordination with the AFP**

In response to a question about future coordination and engagement between ADF and AFP in peace operations, Lieutenant General Gillespie identified a number of areas where AFP personnel are seconded to or work in ADF units or attend ADF courses. (eg Joint Operations Command, Land Headquarters in Sydney, courses at Weston Creek. *Hansard*, 24 July 2007, p. 20)

Could Defence identify exchange programs where ADF personnel are seconded to or work in AFP units and the AFP courses attended by ADF personnel?

**RESPONSE**

While ADF personnel across a range of areas have participated in exchange programs, it is Service Police personnel which undertake the majority of secondments and exchanges.

Service Police attend a number of AFP courses on a needs basis. The courses attended in recent years are:

- Management of Serious Crime program;
- Disaster Victim Identification Practitioner's Course;
- Disaster Victim Identification Commander's Course;
- Forensic Document Examiner's Course;
- DNA Recovery Workshop; and
- Close Personal Protection course.

In addition to these courses, the AFP provides instructors to deliver the Defence Forensic Procedures Course at the Defence Police Training Centre in Sydney.

ADF Investigation Service personnel are soon to commence an ongoing three-month secondment for two personnel to the AFP Forensic Services at Weston Creek in the ACT.

## **Question W6**

### **Division of roles with the AFP**

In response to a question referring to issues in Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands about whether there was a division of authority between the ADF and the AFP in peace operations, Lieutenant General Gillespie said:

*One of the issues that we had there at that time was not that the police were there to look on; they were there to help us effect arrests and things like that. Many of the issues that we had in a law and order sense were about riot control or crowd control. That is not a military function; it is a police function. But we did not have that police function in the police contingent there. This was part of the international deployment division and its role and what we do. We learnt many lessons from that'.  
(Hansard, 24 July 2007, p. 23)*

- a) Could you be more specific about the lessons learnt and how they have been captured?
- b) What role falls to ADF personnel engaged in a peace operation who are present where unanticipated violence or serious disturbance in law and order occurs and there is not the appropriate police presence?

### **RESPONSE**

- a) The ADF uses a Defence-wide evaluation system for the capture and dissemination of issues and lessons learnt, and provides the staffing mechanism and audit trail to apply resources to resolve identified problems. The ADF Activity Analysis Database System covers all ADF operations and major exercises and has been in operation for the last decade.

Within the system, the initial Timor-Leste operation (Operation Warden) has 145 issues and lessons learnt raised, the follow-on (Operation Tanager) has 49, the 2006 Timor Stabilisation operation (Operation Astute) has 145, and the Solomon Islands operation (Operation Anode) has 164. A brief description of identified ADF issues and their current status is set out below:

- There was a need for a contingency requiring a combined ADF and AFP response to be included in Defence's planning scenarios. This is being actively addressed with new and revised scenarios including AFP involvement.
- A more inclusive whole-of-government planning regime involving concurrent planning with other agencies such as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the AFP was needed. This issue arose in May 2004 and notes subsequent operations have further integrated ADF and AFP planning processes.
- Headquarters Joint Operations Command saw a need to formalise personnel liaison and exchange requirements between Defence, the AFP, the

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Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Emergency Management Australia. This issue is relatively new, arising from Operation Quickstep (Fiji and Tonga), and is still a work in progress. Nevertheless, each organisation has identified or embedded liaison and planning officers to work with other organisations.

- AFP personnel needed to be involved in all phases of the planning and conduct of whole-of-government missions. In November 2006, Headquarters Joint Operations Command established the requirement for suitable liaison officers from other agencies, such as the AFP, in its planning processes.
  - Interagency contacts within the UN and the AFP proved a useful forum for the sharing of humanitarian assistance information with the ADF civil military organisation. This was a positive lesson noted during Exercise Talisman Sabre 2007 and work is progressing to resolve this.
- b) ADF members are able to take action in such instances, but only in accordance with their Rules of Engagement. The common thread in Rules of Engagement is the right for personnel to use force in self defence. This right is aligned with the international and domestic definitions of self defence which include the right to use force in defence of others, including civilians. Military members can therefore protect civilians in the absence of the police, who would normally have primacy in such matters.

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**Question W7**

**Coordination with AusAID**

In response to a question regarding secondments from other departments to the Fragile States Unit, AusAID indicated that Defence at present had not taken up AusAID's invitation to second Defence personnel to the unit. (Hansard, 25 July 2007, p. 75)

Could you explain why Defence currently does not have personnel seconded to the Fragile States Unit?

**RESPONSE**

Defence supports a whole of government approach to strategy development for failing states. We have appointed a Director (APS Executive Level Two) from within International Policy Division as the first point of contact within Defence and nominated a First Assistant Secretary for the proposed senior interdepartmental steering group that would oversee the work of the Fragile States Unit. Due to staffing pressures, and the deployment of policy officers overseas to operational areas, Defence has been unable to provide a secondee to the Fragile States Unit in 2007. Later in the year we will assess our ability to assign a Defence member to the unit in 2008.

**Question W8**

**Australian Training Support Team East Timor – relationship with other deployed forces**

The Committee received a number of submissions related directly to the Australian Training Support Team East Timor (ATSTEM).

Could you clarify the role of ATSTEM and the relationship between ATSTEM and other forces present in Timor Leste at the time?

**RESPONSE**

The Australian Training Support Team East Timor (ATST-EM) was responsible for all direct ADF cooperation training for the East Timor Defence Force (ETDF). The team's functions included delivering specialist training, such as English language training and assisting ETDF personnel in preparation for, and subsequent management of, the ETDF Training School. The team also provided advisers to the ETDF's 1st Battalion.

The team was a separate entity from UN peacekeeping forces and was deployed under the auspices of the bilateral Defence Cooperation Program to conduct training that supported the development of the ETDF. National support to the team was provided by Australia.

The training support team relied on the local UN Peacekeeping Forces for their immediate protection under a working-level arrangement between the Commander of the Australian National Contingent and the UN Headquarters in Dili.

**Question W9**

**Australian Training Support Team East Timor – situational awareness**

Submission 7 stated that ATSTEM personnel received ADF pre-deployment training in Darwin but argued that:

*There was a total lack of situational awareness of what was required of the ADF ATST EM members operating in a high risk environment under warlike conditions, Force preparation personnel in Darwin were unaware of ATST EM Members' role and mission in EM and were therefore unable to prepare them properly, particularly with regards to operating in a high risk threat environment unarmed.*

*ATST EM members on arrival in EM were positioned as advisors/trainers to the ETDF, in this capacity there were times when they were exposed to acts of violence or aggression by rival ETDF members. Having to physically separate and placate rival ETDF members who were armed, during training who threatened other ETDF soldiers with stabbing or shooting, threats from ETDF soldiers to members of the Civil Police and to members of the ATST EM.*

(Submission 7, pp1-2)

Captain Wayne McInnes described similar situations whereby force protection failed to be provided. He noted that:

*We deployed armed only with pick handles, inadequate radio communications and without an interpreter. Numerous incidents occurred where our personal security was placed at extremely high risk...*

(Captain McInnes' submission, p2)

- a) To your knowledge, have suggestions of 'poor situational awareness' been raised in other peacekeeping operations involving Australians? If so, what have been the main causes and what measures have been taken to address the problem?
- b) What agreements were made with the UN regarding provision of armed support in the event of an emergency and provision of logistical support for ATSTEM?
- c) What was the rationale for keeping the ATSTEM unarmed?
- d) Was any additional support or training provided to the ATSTEM personnel, considering they were required to remain unarmed in a high-risk environment and where the UN indicated it may not provide support in an emergency?

**RESPONSE**

- a) No.



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- b) The working-level agreements within East Timor provided the option of calling on the United Nations Peacekeeping Force for assistance, in an emergency, should the response required be beyond the capacity of Australian Training Support Team East Timor to resolve. Logistics support to the team was a national responsibility and was facilitated primarily through ADF assets already deployed in support of the UN Peacekeeping Force.
- c) General practice is that Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) personnel are posted unarmed to countries they assist. The activities of the training support team were deliberately and intentionally developed to be of a peacetime nature. The members deployed as part of the team were in a training role and part of the DCP and not involved in peacekeeping activities or combatant roles or otherwise assigned to the UN Peacekeeping Force.
- d) Preparation training was initially conducted with other Australian force elements. This was changed in 2002 to be conducted in Dili and focus on relevant DCP issues.

**Question W10**

**Australian Training Support Team East Timor – chain of command**

Submission 7 stated: *The Chain of Command for members posted to ATST EM was convoluted to say the least, I and members of my team were not aware of who was our overall (ATST EM) commander (p 2).*

- a) What were the command arrangements for ATSTEM and can you comment on why members of ATSTEM were confused about the chain of command?
- b) Is a complicated chain of command endemic to multilateral peace operations, or was this an exception?
- c) What measures have been taken to ensure that confusion about chain of command in a multinational coalition peacekeeping force is minimised in future?

**RESPONSE**

- a) The lack of a designated Commanding Officer for the training support team was identified early in the deployment, which may have caused some initial confusion, but was rectified. A comprehensive command structure was put in place for the team, reinforced in a directive from the CDF and the Secretary to the team's commanding officer.
- b) No. Multilateral contingents deploy on a peace operation under the operational control of a force commander often with national operational constraints. While negotiations between parties are sometimes required, these follow standard operating procedures. It is Australian practice to deploy a national command element to effect national command responsibilities over ADF personnel assigned to a UN operation or multinational force thereby allowing ADF personnel to remain under Australian command. The command arrangements for the training support team were separate to that of a peace operation.
- c) See response to b) above.

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**Question W11**

**Australian Training Support Team East Timor – legal status**

Submission 7 relating to ATSTEM comments that, although members of ATSTEM were not part of the UN operation and could not rely on direct support from the UN peacekeeping forces, they were required to be registered and wear UN identification (Submission 7, p 3).

- a) Could some further information be provided as to the legal status of the ATSTEM deployment?
- b) What procedures govern the identification of personnel as UN staff? Is it usual for non-UN personnel to be identified in this way?

**RESPONSE**

- a) It was agreed by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), and subsequently the Government of Timor-Leste, that the Australian Training Support Team East Timor would be afforded the same legal protection, privileges and immunities as that afforded to the Australian contingent of UNTAET.
- b) While it is not usual for non-UN personnel to be required to wear UN identification in a mission area, in this case the UNTAET had agreed to extend to members of the training support team the legal protection, privileges and immunities normally applicable to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force. UNTAET was the governing authority in Timor-Leste at the time, in lieu of an East Timorese government. Given this, the registration of personnel in the country by the UN was appropriate.

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**Question W12**

**Australian Training Support Team East Timor – lessons learnt**

Overall, could you identify the lessons learnt from the ATSTEM experience and the measures taken to ensure that these lessons have been captured?

**RESPONSE**

The experience has reinforced the need to clearly define the mission, command structure and conditions of service when preparing or conducting similar deployments.

**Question W13**

**Medication for ADF personnel**

Captain Wayne McInnes, ATSTEM, stated that he was directed to take Malaria Medication (Lariam Mefloquine). According to Captain McInnes, this medication had:

*Some serious side effects when taken for long periods of time which we were not aware of until we returned to Australia. Further that at that time ATSTEM were directed to take this medication we were not informed that it was a trial drug. Also now several years later many members of ATSTEM who were ordered to take the drug have mental health and medical problems.*

(Captain McInnes' submission, p 3)

- a) Have there been recorded medical problems associated with this drug?
- b) What is the ADF's policy on the use of trial drugs and of informing ADF members fully of the drugs being administered to them and likely side effects of those drugs?

**RESPONSE**

- a) Yes. Lariam (trade name for mefloquine) has known side effects. The most common adverse effects, when mefloquine is used to treat malaria, are dizziness, muscle pain, nausea, fever, headache, vomiting, chills, diarrhoea, skin rash, abdominal pain, fatigue, loss of appetite and tinnitus. When used to protect against malaria, the rate of adverse events is similar to that of other antimalarial prophylactic medications.
- b) Lariam (mefloquine) is not a trial drug. It is registered for use in Australia by the Therapeutic Goods Administration.

The ADF does not use trial drugs routinely. If a trial drug is used, such as during a formal clinical drug trial, use of the drug is voluntary and occurs only after the ADF member is provided with a written information sheet detailing the reason why the drug is being proposed and the risks and benefits of taking the drug. The member is provided with an opportunity to ask questions and have these answered to their satisfaction. Ultimately, the member must provide informed written consent. This process is overseen by the Australian Defence Human Research Ethics Committee which ensures that the ADF complies with the guidelines on health research promulgated by the National Health and Medical Research Council.

**Question W14**

**Post-deployment medical care**

Submission 7 stated:

*Three months after I returned to Australia I was post deployment debriefed, I expressed concerns about some difficulties I was having adjusting and was told it will settle down, you will be fine, if you have any further issues call this number, four years later I am still waiting for it to 'settle down'.*

(Submission 7, p 4)

- a) Could you provide the committee with information on the number of ADF personnel returning from peacekeeping operations who have expressed dissatisfaction with their post-deployment medical care?
- b) Could you explain the process that an ADF member, such as the author of Submission 7, would follow to receive appropriate attention?

**RESPONSE**

- a) The information sought in the committee's question is not readily available. To collect and assemble such information from individual members' files would be a major task and Defence is not prepared to authorise the significant expenditure and effort that would be required.
- b) The post-deployment debriefing is designed to identify those in need of further assessment. If the debriefing indicates the need for this, the member is identified for a follow-up consultation, either immediately, or within a certain period of time. The follow-up consultation will normally be undertaken by a psychologist who may then recommend more specialised assessment where appropriate. This may be with a clinical psychologist or a psychiatrist. In a case such as that outlined by the author of Submission 7, the member may also seek further assistance. This may be through a medical officer, psychologist, or through the Veterans and Veterans Families Counselling Service. Again, should specialised assessment and treatment be identified, the member will be referred to the appropriate specialist.

**Question W15**

**Australian Training Support Team East Timor – classification and conditions of service**

The Australian Peacekeeper and Peacemaker Veterans' Association (APPVA) and Submission 7 drew attention to ATSTEM as one particular unit that has been denied Warlike Service or Non-Warlike Service classification and access to entitlements under the *Veterans' Entitlement Act 1986*. Submission 7 stated: 'ATSTEM although serving in the same country under the same conditions and unarmed was not given the same conditions of service in regards to allowances' (p 3).

- a) Could you clarify the service classification that applies to personnel who deployed with ATSTEM?
- b) Why is this different to other personnel who deployed to Timor Leste in the same period?
- c) Why did ADF members serving in ATSTEM come under a different set of Conditions of Service to other personnel?

**RESPONSE**

- a) The Australian Training Support Team East Timor deployment was originally given a 'peacetime' nature of service classification. However, following a recent review of the circumstances of their deployment, the Chief of the Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston AO, AFC, has recommended that, in the interest of fairness to the personnel concerned, they be retrospectively assigned for duty to the United Nations operations that were being conducted at the time of the deployment. Both the Minister for Defence and the Minister for Veterans' Affairs support the CDF's recommendations. The Prime Minister's concurrence for the proposed change has been sought. The effect of assigning the training team for duty to the UN operations is to include them in the forces that were on 'warlike' and later 'non-warlike' service.
- b) It was considered at the time and prior to their deployment that members of the training support team would not be required to use force to achieve their training objectives and that casualties were unlikely. They were not armed and their protection was provided by international peacekeepers from other nations. The nature of their service was therefore considered, at the time, to be similar to normal peacetime duty in Australia.
- c) Because of the peacetime nature of service classification that was applied to the training support team's deployment, these personnel were awarded a different set of financial conditions of service compared with other ADF personnel serving in East Timor. In their case, normal long-term overseas allowance provisions applied. It should be noted that, for personnel on a six-month training support team rotation, the financial element of the package generally exceeded the financial components of the package for personnel on 'warlike' service in the same area of operations.

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The effect of the decision to assign the training support team members for duty on the UN operations in progress in East Timor at the time is to grant them the same conditions of service that applied to other deployed ADF personnel. Training team members will also now be eligible for the Active Australian Service Medal and an approach will be made to the UN for the award of the appropriate UN medal.



**Question W16**

**Pre-deployment training**

The United Nations Association of Australia pointed out that conflict resolution and negotiation skills are critical skills for peacekeepers involved in non-violent interventions (UNAA submission, p 7).

- a) What emphasis is given to negotiation and conflict resolution skills in pre-deployment training and could you provide practical examples of the type of training available?
- b) Are military contingents specifically trained in pacific settlement of disputes?

**RESPONSE**

- a) and b) Negotiation and mediation skills have in the past been presented on several pre-deployment courses, but gradually removed after feedback from deployed forces. Negotiation and mediation training is now usually conducted in the area of operations as part of the 'Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration' (RSOI) process for deploying personnel, led by the UN or multi-national force and observers as appropriate.

Additionally, 39 Personnel Support Battalion conducts force preparation training in Australia for deploying forces, and this may include negotiation and mediation sessions which involve the United Nations standard presentation of approximately one hour or a one-day session using training developed by the ADF Peacekeeping Centre. These sessions are usually delivered when RSOI personnel within the area of operations are unable to present the training.

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**Question W17**

**Health awareness**

The United Nations urges member states to educate its personnel in health matters, including AIDS and HIV awareness.

How are health, including HIV/AIDS awareness and mental health issues, covered in ADF training?

**RESPONSE**

All three Services provide specific training in health and first aid to all personnel as part of their initial employment training. The exact content varies between Services and between officers and other ranks, but focuses on health and hygiene issues applicable to their respective service environments. The training includes education on the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS. The first-aid training includes the use of universal precautions to minimise the risk of blood-borne diseases (including HIV) while performing first aid.

Mental health training in the ADF is in accordance with the ADF Mental Health Strategy. There are two areas in which all personnel receive annual awareness training: namely, alcohol, tobacco and other drugs, and suicide.

It is common practice for health and hygiene, first-aid and mental health training to be refreshed throughout members' careers as part of promotion courses and general unit training.

In addition to this, mandatory pre-deployment training includes a brief on health and hygiene issues applicable to the deployment (there is a more detailed brief for commanders and health personnel) and a brief on the psychological and mental health preparation for the deployment and subsequent return to Australia.

**Question W18**

**Post-deployment debriefing**

- a) What post-deployment training or briefing does the ADF organise for personnel returning from peace operations?
- b) How soon after deployment is the debriefing taken? Is it compulsory?
- c) What topics are covered in the post-deployment training?

**RESPONSE**

- a) Personnel have both a Return to Australia (RTA) medical screen and Return to Australia psychological screen (RtAPs), which are followed up with a post-deployment medical check and a post-operational psychological screen.
- b) The RTA medical screen and the RtAPs are usually conducted in the area of operations in the week prior to returning to Australia. For personnel returning urgently, or for smaller operations, the screening is done in Australia as soon as possible after return. These checks are compulsory.

The post-deployment medical check and psychological screen are usually conducted three months after return to Australia. These checks are also compulsory.

- c) The RTA medical screen covers a standardised targeted health questionnaire and physical examination, documentation of hospital admissions during the deployment and documentation of exposure to hazards during the deployment. Information is provided on health issues applicable to returning to Australia including a health alert card for the member to carry in his or her wallet. Health countermeasure medications (such as malarial eradication treatment) are also prescribed as appropriate for the operation.

The RtAPs covers a series of standard psychological screening instruments:

- Deployment Experience Questionnaire, Kessler 10 Questionnaire;
- Traumatic Stress Exposure Scale - Revised;
- Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Check list - Civilian;
- Major Stressors Inventory, and Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test for those deployments where alcohol consumption is permitted; and
- a structured interview by a psychologist or a psychological examiner.

The post-deployment medical check covers an annual health assessment, post-deployment screening for HIV and Hepatitis C and, if indicated, tuberculosis.

The psychological screen covers a series of standard psychological screening instruments:

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- Kessler 10 Questionnaire;
- PTSD Check list - Civilian;
- Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test; and
- a structured interview by a psychologist or a psychological examiner.

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**Question W19**

**UN Senior Mission Leadership courses**

Major General Tim Ford AO (Retd) sees opportunities for Australia to contribute further to peacekeeping training and development activities internationally, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, he suggested there 'would be value in offering to host one of the UN Senior Mission Leadership courses in the region' (submission 11 p 3).

- a) What are Defence's views on the suggestion that Australia host a UN Senior Mission Leadership course in the region?
- b) Have ADF personnel participated in the course elsewhere?

**RESPONSE**

- a) Defence has not been approached to host a UN Senior Mission Leadership course. Defence will discuss the feasibility of hosting the course with the UN through our post in New York. Given the multi-agency nature of the course, the proposal would have to be examined in a whole-of-government context, with consultation and support from other relevant Australian departments and agencies.
- b) None to date.

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**Question W20**

**ADF Peacekeeping Centre**

Austcare submitted that the ADF Peacekeeping Centre (ADFPKC) has 'contributed little to the development of peace operations, it has been starved of resources for many years, staffed by only 2-4 middle ranking officers, and having little clout within the ADF' (Austcare submission, p 15).

- a) What is Defence's response to this assessment?
- b) Could you please outline the ADFPKC funding over the past decade?
- c) What is the planned future for the Centre?

**RESPONSE**

- a) The ADF Peacekeeping Centre is small but it continues to meet all its tasking by utilising outside resources and the resources of the ADF Warfare Centre, of which it is an integral part.
- b) Over the last decade, the ADF Peacekeeping Centre has received \$0.89 million in funding. It should be noted that this does not reflect major costs such as ADF and Australian Public Service salaries, or capital costs of facilities, as these are met by other areas in Defence. Activities that were met from this allocation principally include overseas and domestic travel, and training.
- c) The ADF Warfare Centre is currently being examined for possible commercialisation. As part of the ADF Warfare Centre, the Peacekeeping Centre will be considered as part of this proposal. The current proposal for the Peacekeeping Centre is to maintain all its responsibilities with two full-time staff supported by a contractor pool and Reservists.

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**Question W21**

**ADF Peacekeeping Centre**

Lieutenant General Gillespie advised that: 'The ADF Peacekeeping Centre at Williamstown trains many people from countries in the region in issues to do with working with the United Nations, military observers and capacity building. (*Hansard*, 24 July 2007, p. 17)

Could you provide details about the number of people, and the countries from which they come, who have attended training courses by the ADF Peacekeeping Centre?

**RESPONSE**

Over the last three years, 251 personnel have attended training activities conducted by the ADF Peacekeeping Centre. In addition to Australia, countries represented are Bangladesh, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, PNG, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga, UK, US and Vietnam.

**Question W22**

**Civil-Military Coordination**

Austcare, in its submission to the inquiry, is critical of the ADF's civil-military doctrine and coordination, noting, for example, that current ADF Civil-Military Coordination (*sic*) (CIMIC) doctrine remains classified; is focused on how cooperation with civil actors can be implemented to achieve the commander's mission rather than accommodating civilian agency views; and that ADF has been slow to develop CIMIC capabilities within its force structure. Austcare recommends that the ADF align its CIMIC doctrine and procedures with that of the UN.

- a) Could you provide an overview of ADF's existing CIMIC doctrine?
- b) Is the ADF's CIMIC doctrine classified and, if so, why?
- c) What advantages and disadvantages would there be in aligning ADF CIMIC procedures with those of the UN?

**RESPONSE**

- a) There are two extant publications that relate to this issue: Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP) 3-11 and Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) 5-2.

The aim of ADDP 3-11 is to describe the nature and scope of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in support of ADF operations. This publication provides a philosophical and application-level reference on CIMIC for use by commanders, joint planning staff in all headquarters and units, joint training organisations including the ADF Warfare Centre and the Australian Defence College, civil actors and Australian government agencies. It is designed to shape the thinking of those personnel responsible for the planning and coordination of CIMIC and for key personnel who have responsibility for the conduct of civil-military cooperative activities. Additionally, ADDP 3.11 describes the legal framework in which CIMIC may take place.

LWD 5-2 is an Army doctrine, designed to explain the nature and characteristics of civil-military cooperation in an area of operations. It provides interim application-level doctrine for the conduct of civil-military operations for use by Army personnel involved in CIMIC. It also provides guidance on civil-military operations to commanders, staff, the CIMIC unit and personnel conducting civil-military operations.

- b) ADF CIMIC doctrine is unclassified. A printing error on LWD 5-2 has inadvertently labelled it 'Restricted'.
- c) The ADF can and does work within United Nations CIMIC procedures whenever appropriate and necessary. However, ADF doctrine and procedures are detailed and specific to the ADF's operational outlook, and are designed to assist planning



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and implementation of the ADF mission within the wider civilian context. To the extent that these procedures can produce greater cooperation in mutually securing respective ADF and civilian goals, there may be some benefit in further alignment with UN procedures. Overall, it is considered that current ADF procedures which focus on role definition, planning and consultation are meeting the objectives of ADF peacekeeping operations.

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**Question W23**

**ADF investigations**

In February 2007, two East Timorese were killed by Australian soldiers responding to a disturbance at a displaced persons facility. According to media reporting, the ADF, East Timorese authorities and the UN are investigating the matter.

- a) How are investigations coordinated into incidents involving Australian personnel operating in conjunction with a UN mission?
- b) What are the disciplinary ramifications in the event of conflicting findings from different investigations?

**RESPONSE**

- a) There is a cooperative agreement in place between the ADF, the UN and Timor Leste authorities with regard to policing. When a situation arises in which both the ADF and the UN have an interest, the relevant commanders will cooperatively make a decision on how the matter is to be investigated. ADF legal officers play a role in this decision-making process as the legal requirements regarding evidence are important in ensuring that it is admissible in any future proceedings.
- b) The findings from the different investigations are likely to be based upon the different focus established in each investigation. The UN and the ADF have their own standards and evidential requirements. Findings made by a UN investigation may not fulfil the evidential requirements necessary for proceedings under the Defence Force Discipline Act. There may not be any conflicting disciplinary ramifications, despite different findings, because of the differences of useable evidence. In addition, an examination would be conducted of all reports which would assist the commander in making any determinations based upon ADF policy and procedure.

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**Question W24**

**Lessons learnt**

Defence's submission mentions 'operational analysis teams' that deploy to identify and record lessons from operations.

- a) Could you provide some more information about these teams – how are they comprised and to whom do they report?
- b) Do these teams assess operations only from a Defence perspective, or do they consider lessons for other areas of government?

**RESPONSE**

- a) Operational analysis teams are small teams of usually two to three personnel, made up of a combination of Defence Science and Technology Organisation personnel and ADF staff. They are included in the establishment of a unit or headquarters and report to the relevant commander. This reporting is passed up the chain of command as appropriate.
- b) The teams may consider lessons relating to ADF operations in cooperation with other areas of government, but always from a Defence perspective.

## **Question W25**

### **Health literacy among peacekeepers**

Dr Graeme Killer, Principal Medical Officer, DVA, informed the committee of 'the low levels of health literacy amongst younger peacekeepers and peacemakers'. He stated:

*We are so used to dealing with Vietnam veterans who know more about PTSD than I do...But, when we looked at the younger peacekeepers and peacemakers in this study, which was called Pathways to Care, we found that they had very low levels of health literacy. They did not really understand what the trauma had done to them in the way they were feeling and they were dealing with their families. So many of them, because the consultation and medication had not worked, would often then self-medicate with alcohol.*

(Hansard, 31 May 2007, p 96)

What is the ADF doing to address the problem of low health literacy in ADF peacekeeping veterans?

### **RESPONSE**

The ADF Mental Health Strategy, launched in 2002, recognised that there may be a low level of mental health literacy in all ADF members, not just peacekeeping veterans.

The strategy focuses on the mental health and well-being of all Service personnel and ensures that symptoms of all mental health problems are thoroughly assessed and managed according to evidence-based principles. A major focus of the strategy is aimed at breaking down barriers to care, including the concept that mental ill health is a sign of weakness. Defence members are encouraged to maintain a sense of personal well-being and to develop a healthy and physically fit lifestyle.

As part of the key initiative of enhancing mental health literacy, a total of 18 fact sheets have been developed aimed at providing mental health education to members and commanders on a wide range of mental health topics such as anxiety, depression, alcohol, drug use and Post Traumatic Street Disorder.

Further mental health education is provided to members in the various phases of their Service life including garrison service, pre-deployment, deployment and in the post-deployment phase. This includes pre-deployment psychological briefings on topics such as preparing for separation from family, identifying and managing operational stressors, fatigue management and cultural adaptation. While deployed, ADF members have access to mental health support through embedded assets, fly-in capabilities or coalition forces. Post-operational support is inclusive of reintegration briefs, psychological screening and, as required, referral for further assessment and treatment. Reintegration programs have been utilised in some operational contexts, with policy currently under development to formalise this arrangement.

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Consistent with support provided on operations, medical and psychological personnel and chaplaincy and command elements are positioned to provide immediate and ongoing support to the ADF member in garrison. These services are augmented by the Defence Community Organisation and the Veterans and Veterans Families Counselling Service which are also available to provide support to families.

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**Question W26**

**Peacekeeping health study**

In response to a question to DVA about health studies undertaken specifically concerned with peacekeeping, DVA informed the committee that it thought that Defence was looking at 'doing some sort of post-deployment study'. (Hansard, 25 July 2007, p 30)

Could you provide details on studies undertaken or being undertaken to assess health issues related to service on peacekeeping operations?

**RESPONSE**

Issues concerning the health of veterans of past deployments have been difficult to resolve because insufficient data was collected at the time of those deployments. Defence, assisted by DVA, has established a program of post-deployment health surveillance. This program will conduct retrospective studies on East Timor, Bougainville and Solomon Islands veterans. It will also conduct studies on veterans from the current operations in the Middle East, including Afghanistan.

All the studies are expected to be conducted by the Centre for Military and Veterans' Health. This is a joint venture involving Defence and DVA and a consortium consisting of the University of Queensland, University of Adelaide and Charles Darwin University. The studies are similar to those being conducted by allies such as the US and UK.

It is anticipated that the studies will inform a continuing, comprehensive health surveillance program for the ADF, concentrating on the health effects of operational deployments.

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**Question W27**

**Medical records**

The Regular Defence Force Welfare Association raised concerns about the availability of medical treatment records when health care is provided by a non-ADF health service. It stated:

*Such services could be provided by a UN military health service or a UN contractor.*

*We understand that some veterans have had problems establishing their entitlement to a DVA entitlement in that medical records could not be obtained or those that were available were deemed inadequate. In any such case the burden of proof should not rest with the individual.*

(RDGWA submission, p 3)

The APPVA also noted difficulties obtaining medical evidence and documentation to support a peacekeeping veteran's claim (APPVA submission, page 3)

- a) What measures are in place to ensure that the ADF and ADF personnel deployed on a peacekeeping mission have access to full and complete medical records including records taken by non-ADF medical officers?
- b) What measures are in place to ensure that medical records taken by non-ADF practitioners are consistent with the requirements of Department of Veterans' Affairs (DVA) in relation to veterans' entitlements?

**RESPONSE**

a) and b) Each mission has a supporting Health Support Plan which details what medical documentation ADF members should deploy with. This includes all or some of the Unit Medical Record, International Certificate of Vaccination and other documents as appropriate to each member's particular deployment.

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**Question W28**

**Classification of service**

The APPVA cited deployments to Somalia in 1993 and Namibia in 1989 as other examples of contingents that are not eligible for full VEA, ADF and medal entitlements. In particular, it cited Operation Astute which commenced on 25 May 2006. It noted:

*Current serving members who have served in both INTERFET, and/or UNTAET have commented that OP ASTUTE has been more dangerous than that of service during INTERFET and UNTAET. Both INTERFET and UNTAET were classified as warlike service (WLS). Operation ASTUTE was classified as non-warlike service (NWLS)... This had considerable effect toward the morale of the Soldiers and continues as a matter of concern for those who have served on JTF 631.*

(APPVA submission, paragraph 4.10)

- a) Are you aware of these views and have you sought, or is Defence in a position, to have classification of these operations reviewed?
- b) Could you provide the committee with information on the avenues for redress for ADF personnel who believe that they have been unfairly treated with regard to the classification of their service as non-warlike service?

**RESPONSE**

- a) Operations in Namibia in 1989 and Somalia in 1993 are included in Schedule 2 of the *Veterans' Entitlement Act 1986*, at items 9 and 14 respectively. As such, all personnel assigned for duty to those two operations are entitled to the full range of benefits under the Act. In regard to the specific groups mentioned in the Australian Peacekeeper and Peacemaker Veterans' Association letter (paragraph 4.9), Defence is not aware of any lobby for change to the current status of these two groups. Should a submission be received, it will be considered on its merits.

In the case of Operation Astute, its classification as 'non-warlike' continues to be regularly reviewed.

- b) ADF personnel can request a review of the classification of specific elements of their service history through their chain of command. Personnel can also write to the Minister for Defence directly to seek a review of their classification of service.

Additionally, a nature of service review team has been established to review outstanding anomalies in service classifications, with individuals and groups able to provide submissions.



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**Question W29**

**Australian Peacekeeping Medal**

“The APPVA argued that medal recognition is necessary to adequately reward ADF members for their service on PKO (APPVA submission, paragraph 8.7). According to the APPVA ‘The striking of an Australian Peacekeeper medal, would be considered by most Peacekeepers as a positive recognition of their service by the Australian people. This proposal has been met with negative comments within Government’ (APPVA submission, paragraph 5.2).

What is Defence's view on the striking of an Australian Peacekeeper Medal, as recommended by the Australian Peacekeeper and Peacemaker Veterans' Association?”

**RESPONSE**

The establishment of such a medal is not supported. ADF members who contribute to peace enforcement or peacekeeping operations can be awarded the Australian Active Service Medal or the Australian Service Medal, depending on the nature of service at the time of the operation.

If the ADF contributes to peace enforcement or peacekeeping operations carried out under the auspices of the United Nations, ADF members may also be awarded the UN Medal.

In certain circumstances, the Australian Government may also establish a campaign medal to recognise a major campaign or significant operations. A recent example which would apply to peace enforcement operations is the International Forces East Timor Medal.

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**Question W30**

**Australian War Memorial Roll of Honour**

The APPVA recommended that Australian Peacekeeper Deaths be listed in the Australian War Memorial Roll of Honour (APPVA submission, paragraph 9.1).

Does Defence have a view as to the appropriateness of including the names of those who have died in peacekeeping service on the Roll of Honour?

**RESPONSE**

No, Defence considers that this is a matter for the Department of Veterans' Affairs.