

**SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFENCE AND
TRADE**

**Australia's involvement in international peacekeeping operations
AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE**

Question No. 1

Senator Trood asked the following question on notice on 25 July 2007:

- a) When you get to 1,200, what proportion of AFP resources will be tied up in the IDG capability?
- b) What proportion of your budget would be dedicated to IDG?

The answer to the honourable senator's questions is as follows:

- a) If the AFP remains at approximately 6500 people, the IDG at full strength (1200) would be approximately 18.5% of the AFP resources.
- b) The IDG proportion of AFP appropriations for the 2007/2008 financial year equates to 23.4% of AFP Budget. Of this, the IDG Future Strategy funding represents 19.7% of IDG Budget.

**SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFENCE AND
TRADE**

Australia's Involvement in Peacekeeping

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

Question No. 2

Senator Payne (Chair) asked the following question on notice on 25 July 2007:

- a) Will the performance measures and the results of the assessments against the performance measures be made public?
- b) If it is material that you can provide to the committee, that would be helpful.

The answer to the Senator's questions is as follows:

A copy of the University of Queensland report is attached.

The University of Queensland Social Research Centre (UQSRC)

DIRECTORS

Professor Paul Boreham, BEcon, PhD
Professor Mark Western, BA, PhD

MANAGER

Warren Laffan, BAppSc, MMRS, QPMR

Level 4, GPNorth 3

The University of Queensland
Brisbane Qld 4072 Australia

Telephone (07) 3346 9686

International +61 7 3346 9686

Facsimile (07) 3346 9676

Email uqsrc@uq.edu.au

www.uqsrc.uq.edu.au/

**Framework for Performance Indicators in Australian Federal Police
(AFP) Peace Operations
Final Report**

**Prepared for:
Australian Federal Police**

The University of Queensland Social Research Centre (UQSRC)

October 2006

Reference: J6008

Dr Alex Bellamy

Professor Daniel Druckman

Professor Paul Boreham

Professor Paul Diehl

Mr Regan Neal

CONTENTS

Executive Summary i

1. Introduction 1

1.1 Success for Whom? 1

1.2 Time Perspective 2

1.3 Baseline for Assessment 3

1.4 Types of Peacekeeping Missions 4

1.5 Reasonable Expectations 4

1.6 A Decision Template 5

2. Peace Operations Decision Template 8

3. References 37

Figures

Figure 1 Decision Template Approach 7

Executive Summary

The development of effective performance indicators plays a crucial role in measuring the success of peacekeeping operations, increasing knowledge about the factors associated with success, and learning lessons from past missions in order to improve future missions. Existing performance indicators are often problematic in that they measure the elements that contribute to success, rather than measuring success itself.

To be effective, indicators need to focus on outcomes and be constructed independently from the factors that influence those outcomes. Extensive research into peace operations has identified five key considerations when designing such indicators:

- **Success for whom?**

The variety of stakeholders involved within a peace operation (including contributing agencies and nations, and the local population) bring a variety of standards for determining success, with the goals of one actor potentially affecting the goals of another. Effective performance measurement requires identifying whose success is being assessed and how this impacts on overall mission goals.

- **Time Perspective**

Peace operations involve both short and long term goals. Short term success is easier to measure, but may not provide an accurate assessment of broader goals. Long term assessment provides a better indication of overall success, but is affected by issues such as timeframe (when do we assess outcomes?) and causality (the impact of unpredictable external factors upon success).

- **Baseline for Assessment**

There needs to be an appropriate baseline against which to measure success. The complex nature of peace operations is reflected in the variety of approaches to such baselines, all of which have their own benefits and limitations. These range from broad measures, such as comparing conditions during and after deployment with those pre-deployment, to measures which use a mission's specific mandate to assess success.

- **Type of Mission**

Different types of mission have different goals, and therefore require different sets of criteria. For example, a mission that aims to monitor elections needs to be assessed differently from a mission that aims to reform a local police force. The more complex the mission goals, the more complex the criteria for success.

- **Reasonable Expectations**

Determining the conditions for peacekeeping success requires setting mission goals which are reasonable and achievable. The more ambitious the goal, the more potential for factors which undermine the chances of success. Reasonable goals mean a reasonable chance of success.

These considerations have led to the development of a **decision template**, which provides a practical framework for measuring success. The template sets out a variety of mission goals, both generic and mandate-specific. It identifies key questions associated with the achievement of these goals, and suggests measures of progress that can be used to answer these questions, and therefore assess levels of success. The various benefits and limitations associated with these measures are identified, as are the sources used to construct the measures. The format of the template allows for, and encourages, additions from practitioners and scholars based on further research and operational experience.

In its current form, the template presents a number of alternative ways to address mission goals, rather than using a linked sequence of questions to measure achievement. In the future, the template could be used to develop a **decision aid**, which would use a sequential question and answer approach to inform decisions about mission deployment, progress, and withdrawal.

1. Introduction

Determining what constitutes success or failure in peace operations is a prerequisite for building knowledge about the factors associated with those conditions. Despite the centrality of this concern, the scholarly literature on peacekeeping and related missions is not well developed in this respect. The abundance of attention has been given to the inputs (or independent variables) in peacekeeping studies, and considerably less (if any at all) is given to the outcomes (or dependent variables); that is, most studies focus on the factors thought to produce peacekeeping success rather than devoting attention to the criteria used to assess that success.

Even when scholars have paid explicit attention to peacekeeping success, a number of other problems have prevented the emergence of a consensus. There has been a tendency to confound the inputs with the outcomes; that is, scholars often confuse the element needed for success and the measures of success itself. For example, a number of analysts attempt to judge whether a peace operation was successful or not by reference to whether adequate resources were allocated to the mission and its personnel. Yet the provision of resources is a possible determinant of success, not a measure of whether success occurred or not. Some of the more applied studies refer to “measures of progress,” what should be short term indicators of success. Nevertheless, factors listed such as the establishment of training regimens for local police or the support of local religious leaders may be prerequisites of success, but they are not successful outcomes themselves.

Indicators of success must be constructed independently of the factors thought to influence the desired outcomes. To do so, however, is not an easy task. Several choices or considerations are necessary: the reference group, the time frame, and the baselines for assessment. Added to these considerations for indicators are the type of mission and the scope of the expectations developed for success.

1.1 Success for Whom?

First, when conceptualizing peacekeeping success, the question arises: success for whom? Although rarely addressed directly, there are several sets of stakeholders in peace operations, each of which might generate different standards for success: the international community, the main protagonist states or groups, the local population, and the states contributing personnel (Durch in Druckman and Stern, 1997). Although each stakeholder may share some

common interests (e.g., limiting violence), their interests are not completely coterminous. For example, a contributing state may have as one of its goals limiting casualties to its personnel. Succeeding in that goal, however, may necessitate actions that undermine the international community's goal of human rights protection of threatened population. Thus, there needs to be a clearer specification of whose success is assessed and recognition that different factors may affect success in multiple ways across stakeholders.

1.2 Time Perspective

Second, defining success will vary according to whether one adopts a short versus long-term perspective (Weiss, 1994; Bellamy and Williams, 2005b). Success may be conceptualized as achievement of goals that occur during the course of a peace operation or in some time frame immediately following the withdrawal of the peacekeeping force. An example of the former is alleviation of starvation and improvement of medical conditions during a humanitarian operation; an example of the latter is the absence of violent conflict for several years following the operation (e.g., Enterline and Kang, 2003). These are certainly valid conceptions and ones most amenable to the needs of policymakers. Yet we know that a longer-term perspective often leads to a different assessment of an operation's success or failure. For example, various peacekeeping efforts in East Timor were almost universally considered a success in the immediate aftermath, only to prompt a reassessment when violence and instability returned in 2006.

As with different stakeholders, there may be significant differences in the predictor and outcome variables for short and long-term success. With respect to the latter, two problems arise. The initial problem is determining how long a window should be considered in assessing peacekeeping outcomes. Given path dependency (what happens in an earlier phase (or phases) of conflict has an impact on the dynamics of subsequent phases) and other effects, peacekeeping may have consequences that extend for decades. Yet, extraordinarily long time frames make it impossible to assess ongoing and recently concluded operations (Bellamy and Williams, 2005b). Furthermore, the longer the time period that passes between the end of the operation and the assessment, the more difficult it will be to draw causal conclusions about the impact of the operation *per se*; intervening forces are likely to have as great or greater impact as the peace operations on future conditions. For example, regime change or a global economic downturn may influence local conditions more than the legacy of a peacekeeping operation a decade before.

1.3 Baseline for Assessment

A third consideration is developing a baseline against which to assess peacekeeping's effects. Some suggest that peacekeeping be compared against a situation in which no action was taken by the international community (e.g., Durch in Druckman and Stern, 1997). Related to this standard is one in which the conditions prior to deployment are compared to those during and following the operation (e.g., Kaysen and Rathjens, 1995; Heemskerk and Weller, 2002). This standard has the advantage of "normalizing" (making comparisons across missions possible) the baseline, as moderate levels of violence during peacekeeping may be considered progress in some contexts (e.g., deployment during full-scale civil war), but backsliding in others (e.g., deployment following a cease-fire). Yet, decision makers' choices are rarely between just peacekeeping and inaction (Diehl, 1994).

Some scholars suggest that analysts consider opportunity costs imposed by the choice of peacekeeping (Ratner in Druckman and Stern, 1997). Problems with this standard, however, are that it requires an adequate specification of alternative policies and then an accurate counter-factual analysis of what would have happened if other alternatives had been selected. Needless to say, neither of these steps is straightforward and the validity of such efforts would be difficult to determine. Still others suggest comparing effectiveness across peacekeeping operations (Ratner, 1995; Stiles and McDonald, 1992 refer to this as a trend-based assessment), but this generates only comparative assessments of what may be dissimilar operations and provides no assessment baseline.

Not surprisingly, most analysts advocate using guidelines provided in the operations mandate, the authorizing document (e.g., Security Council resolution) provided by the organization carrying out the mission (e.g., Bratt, 1996, Bellamy and Williams, 2005; Durch, 1993; Ratner, 1995; O'Neill and Rees, 2005). Mandates often contain specific tasks to be completed or benchmarks that should be reached. In one sense, this is appropriate as a particular mission is only judged according to the task with which it was assigned. On the other hand, there are a number of drawbacks associated with using mandates to define success.

First, the mandates given for operations are the products of political deliberation and compromise, and the result is that they are frequently vague. There is much room for debate on the scope and detail of the operation's mission; this alone makes it difficult to assess whether the designs of the mandate have been achieved (Diehl in Druckman and Stern, 1997).

Second, mandates may be inflexible in the face of changing conflict conditions, and thus what peacekeepers are attempting to do may no longer reflect the standards present in the mandate (Bellamy and Williams, 2005b). Third, “mandate clarity” is associated with peacekeeping success, again confounding the inputs or influences with the outcomes.

1.4 Types of Peacekeeping Missions

Different kinds of missions may require different criteria for evaluating success. Some missions have as their goal the reduction of violent conflict. Others have more specific aims such as supervising elections, providing human rights protection, or contributing to the building of new societal institutions. The various missions have been shown to differ on a variety of characteristics, particularly with regard to the role of peacekeepers and the type of conflict management process set in motion by peacekeepers’ activities (Diehl et al., 1998).

For this reason, the questions asked about success and the indicators used to diagnose progress are specific to the mission’s goal. For example, if the goal is to contain violence, we would ask whether the violence levels have decreased and measure the number of shooting incidents and casualties both for members of the disputing parties and for the peacekeeping force. If, however, the goal is to protect human rights, we would ask, at one level, whether atrocities have been reduced or genocidal incidents avoided and, at another level, whether a judicial system is in place and functioning. Progress in achieving the goal of human rights is indicated by both a significant reduction in atrocities and by a system that insures due process.

1.5 Reasonable Expectations

Mission goals can shape the way that outcomes are evaluated. The more ambitious the goal, the less likely the mission would be regarded as being successful. For example, a mission intended to transform adversaries into allies or collaborators is a larger challenge than one intended to hold a democratic election following a peace agreement. The larger goal may be accomplished over a longer period of time with contributions made also by NGOs and civilian peace activists. The more modest goal increases the chances for short-term success, especially when the task is mostly under the control of the peacekeeping force. It is also the case that a variety of factors may militate against the force’s contribution to achieving the mission’s goal. International events, restrictions imposed by host states, available resources, and the vagaries of national policies are some of the factors that may influence a conflict but are largely out of the peacekeepers’ control. For these reasons it would seem advantageous to set reasonable

expectations, usually over a shorter time frame, for mission accomplishments. Peacekeeping is then understood to be part of a larger context that includes other factors that also contribute to settling and resolving conflicts.

1.6 A Decision Template

The considerations discussed above inform the development of a decision template. Intended as an aid to the decision-making process, the template highlights several considerations that should be entertained when evaluating the success of peace operations. It turns on distinctions made among different mission objectives. A number of generic goals (such as conflict mitigation) and mandate-specific objectives (such as arms control and disarmament) are included. We include only those types of missions about which there is at least some discussion in the literature of outcomes and indicators. This excludes such mission objectives as observation, pacification, and protective services. For a larger taxonomy of missions see Diehl et al. (1998). For an illustration of the decision template approach, please see Figure 1 below.

Key questions asked are tailored to the mission goals. The goals and many of the questions are suggested by the large scholarly and government report literature. These questions are then answered by specifying appropriate measures of progress. This is a more difficult task because the literature is weaker on defining mission success or effectiveness. The relevant literature cited in the template covers what appears to be available, supplemented by our recommended measures designated with an asterisk. In developing the measures, an attempt is made to separate the conditions for success (referred to above as inputs) from assessments of progress (referred to as outcomes). This distinction is rarely made in the literature; conditions are often confused with assessments in both academic writing and government documents.

Further, the values of many of these measures are largely unknown. Without empirical evaluation, it is difficult to judge their validity or even to know how to use them for policy purposes. These are gaps in the literature that call for attention in future research. Further, some indicators may be relevant primarily to local condition or cultures. These are also important but less relevant to a more general scheme that emphasizes types of missions conducted in a variety of contexts. (For examples of local indicators, see AusAID, 2006.)

Commentary on the measures takes the form of a listing of benefits – such as “easily assessed” – and limitations, such as the “need for baseline data”. Of value also are the sources


for many of the measures. An attached bibliography enables readers to consult relevant articles for more detailed discussions of those indicators that have received attention. The template's format allows for additions in each of the categories. We invite both practitioners and researchers to contribute their observations to this work in progress.

In its present form, the template addresses the way that possible indicators of success derive from practical questions asked about missions. It is a framework for organizing a large amount of information about missions and measures of progress. It does not, however, provide a step-by-step guide to decisions about entering into or exiting from conflict zones. Such a guide – or decision aid -- requires a question-answer format that builds on the template's information.

The aid would begin with the key questions asked of each type of mission goal. It would then organize the questions in a linked sequence. They are not organized in this manner in the template: The questions are presented as alternative ways of addressing the goals rather than as sequential time orderings. An exception is the mandate-specific goal of arms control and disarmament. The four questions asked suggest step-wise progress toward the goal of disarmament: combatants disarmed in preparation for negotiation, negotiated agreement signed, combatants withdraw from war zones, and demobilization. Each step can be monitored with the appropriate measures.

An affirmative answer moves monitors to the next question in the sequence. A negative answer suggests either more personnel are needed or that the strategy must be re-evaluated. More complex sequences can be organized as decision trees with branches and feedback loops. Such recursive aids are familiar to many programme evaluators; they are less often used to assess peace operations (See Druckman et al., 1997, Figure 5-1, for an example from the area of organisational mergers). The question-indicator sequences can also provide benchmarks to progression through conflict phases and activities.

Figure 1. Decision Template Approach



2. Peace Operations Decision Template

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
GENERIC					
1. Conflict Mitigation (the reduction or elimination of armed violence)					Enterline and Kang, Diehl, Bratt, Fortna, Bildt, Pushkina, Welch, Bellamy and Williams, Heemskerk and Weller, Durch, Mullenbach, Paris, Doyle and Suntharalingam, Ofuately-Kodjoe, Malaquias, Doyle and Sambanis, Laremont, Sesay, James, Lake, Astroff and Meren, Jett, Cohen
A. Violence Abatement (reduced violence between primary conflict combatants)					
	Is Violence Still Present?	New Crises, Militarized Disputes, or Wars	Transparent		Diehl, Heemskerk and Weller, Doyle and Sambanis, Bildt
	Have Violence Levels Decreased?	Shooting Incidents	Quantifiable		Diehl

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
		Disputant Casualties	Data Available	Must Differentiate Between Random and Mission Threatening Violence	Diehl, Dobbins et al, Jett
		Peacekeeper Casualties	Data Can Be Gathered Unobtrusively	Indicators Do Not Detect Threat	Bratt, Fleitz
		Days/Months Without War (Peace Duration)	Quantifiable	Major Failures Provide Feedback Too Late, (No Necessary Link Between Failure and Policing Mission) Peace Duration is Post hoc	Fortna, Mullenbach, Doyle and Sambanis, Enterline and Kang
B. Conflict Containment (External: prevent conflict from spreading to include new areas or additional actors)					Pushkina, Bratt, Allan, O'Neill and Rees, Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Weinberger, Jett
	Has the Conflict Expanded Geographically?	Field Reports of Conflict by Location*	Transparent	Containment Not Always Exclusively Geographic	
	Does the Conflict Now Include More Actors?	Number of Active Combatants/Actors*	Mostly Transparent	Covert Aid May Not Be Detected	

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
		Involvement of Neighbouring States	Quantifiable	May Be Hard to Attribute Responsibility for Actions (e.g., snipers), Difficult to Track Off-Budget Involvement, Difficult to Measure Involvement	Bratt
		Involvement of Major Powers	Quantifiable	Difficult to Track Off-Budget Involvement, Difficult to Measure Involvement, May Be Hard to Attribute Responsibility for Actions	Bratt
	Are External Actors Aiding Combatants?	Weapons Flows to Combatants*	Quantifiable	Accurate Data May be Difficult to Obtain	
		Financial Flows to Combatants*	Quantifiable	Irregular Military Forces Are Hard to Identify, Not All Financial Flows Are Necessarily or Equally Harmful	
		Contribution of Forces to the Combat Zone*	Quantifiable	Off-Record Contributions Difficult to Track and Politically Sensitive.	
2. Conflict Settlement (resolve the issues in dispute between the conflict participants)	Have the Parties Resolved Their Major Disagreements?				O’Neill and Rees, Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Diehl, Weinberger, Bellamy and Williams, Jett, Bratt, Welch, Allan, Lake

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
		Agreements/Treaties	Documentation is Available	Progress Observable Only at End of Process	Ofuatey-Kodjoe, Diehl (97)
		Reunification of States in Civil Wars	Observable	Only Relevant for Pre-Settlement Deployments	Lake
		UN Secretary-General Reports on Progress	Relies on External Validation	Agreement Doesn't Guarantee Implementation	Bratt
				PK Force May Have Little Direct Influence on Diplomatic Process	
		Ongoing Negotiations/ Press Briefings*	Public Statements and Interviews with Delegates	Negotiation May Not Reflect Actual Progress in Private/Secretive Sessions	
				Many Negotiations Fail	
				Actors May Use Negotiations as Delay Tactic	
3. Post-Conflict Relations	Has the Relationship Stabilized or has Conflict Re-occurred?	Incidence of Violence Between the Parties	Quantifiable	Stabilization May Be Confused with Resolution	Druckman (02)
MANDATE/MISSION SPECIFIC					
1. Election Supervision (ensure the smooth operation of democratic elections)	Were the Elections "Free" and "Fair?"				Rikhye, Doyle and Suntharalingam, Malaquias, Farris
		Voter Turnout	Quantifiable	Turnout is Post-Hoc	Rikhye, Farris

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
		Registration Figures	Quantifiable	Dependent on Conflict Abatement	Rikhye
		Certification by IOs and NGOs*	Data Available	Not in Full Peacekeeper Control, Depends on Civil Administration	
		Number and Intensity of Protests by Losing Groups*	Quantifiable	Short-Term	
		Number of Other States Recognizing Results*	Quantifiable	Short-Term	
2. Humanitarian Assistance (protection and delivery of food and medical aid to civilian population)	Was Human Suffering Reduced?	Reduction in Epidemics, Hospital Admissions*	Quantifiable When Health Ministries Collect Data	Lack of Accurate Data	Pushkina, Ratner (97), Rikhye, Ofuately-Kodjoe, Hillen
	Has the Quality of Life Improved?	National (or Private) Surveys*	Repeated Surveys Document Change	Difficult to Reach (and Conduct Interviews with) Many Citizens	Johansen (97), Fetherston
	Was Aid Distribution Protected?	Reduction in Areas with Land Mines	Measurable Through De-Mining Agents	Reliable Maps of Mined Areas May be Scarce	Ratner (97), Rikhye
		Amount of Aid that Reached Intended Recipients*	Quantifiable	Data May Not Always Be Available, Requires High Levels of Cooperation With Other Agencies, and Relief May Not Involve Areas Controlled By Peacekeeping	

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
	Was there Improvement in Food Distribution	Percentage of Population Receiving Food*	Direct Indicator	Difficult to Monitor	
	Were the Conditions for Aid Distribution Facilitated?	Opinions of Agencies Responsible for Delivering Aid*	Direct Indicator of Perception of Conditions	Time Consuming to Collect and Process Data, Very Subjective, Agencies Have Incentives to Overestimate Success	
		Infant Mortality Rate*	Quantifiable	Presents Only Part of the Picture	
3. Arms Control and Disarmament					Welch, Hillen, Farris, Rikhye, Doyle and Suntharalingam
	Have Combatants Disarmed?	Reduced Shooting Incidents	Quantifiable	Not a Direct Indicator of Disarmament	
		Number of Weapons Collected*	Quantifiable	Difficult to Measure Impact without Data about Arms in Circulation Prior to Disarmament Never Sure That All Weapons Have Been Surrendered	
	Has a Disarmament Agreement Been Negotiated?	Documentation, Briefings*	Available Data		

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
	Have Troops Withdrawn from Designated Zones?	Physical Observations/Field Reports*		Combatants Have Incentives for Deception, Irregular Forces Hard to Monitor	
	Have Troops Demobilized?	Certification by Combatants*	A Consequence of Disarmament	Re-mobilization Possible	
	Are Weapons Carried Openly?	Field Reports	Available Data	Accurate Data Difficult	
			Translates Disarmament into Behaviour Change, Relates Closely to Law and Order	Only an Indirect Measure of Disarmament	
4. Human Rights Protection (prevent violations of international human rights standards)					Ratner (97), Malaquias, Ofuatey-kodjoe, Doyle and Sambanis, Fleitz, Hillen
	Have Atrocities Been Reduced?	Number of Atrocities*	Quantifiable, Certifiable by a Range of Other Agencies	Must Define 'Abuses'	
	Was Genocide Avoided?	Number of Major Abuses	Quantifiable	Hard to Differentiate Arbitrary from Other Killings, May Have Been No or Little Threat of Genocide	Doyle and Sambanis
	Was There a Reduction in Arbitrary Killings?	Number of Civilian Deaths	Quantifiable	Must Define Major Abuses	Fleitz

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
	Were Designated Areas Protected?	Number and Scale of Attacks in Protected Areas*	Quantifiable	Presents only a Partial Picture	
	Were 'Protected Persons' (Refugees, IDPs, etc) Protected?	Number of Deaths of Protected Persons*	Quantifiable	Requires Clear Definition of Protected Persons	
	Is There a Functioning Justice System?	Relative Frequency of Free and Fair Trials	Certifiable by a Range of International Observers	Requires Clear Guidelines, Involves Collating Subjective Judgments	Ratner (97)
		Reports of IOs and NGOs*	Provides Overall Picture	Not Necessarily Specific to Problem Areas	
		Access to Legal Advice for all Parties*	Partly Measurable	Difficult to Get Country-Wide Data	
			International Police in a Good Position to Judge	Need Clear Guidelines for 'Adequate' or 'Good' Treatment	
	Are Institutions (police, military, judiciary) Publicly Committed to Human Rights Standards	Statements by Security Institutions	Demonstrable	Not Clear That Statements Always Translate Into Practice	Hansen, Marotta
5. Democratization (the promotion of democratic elections and political processes)					Doyle and Sambanis, Zisk-Marten, Welch, Paris, Heemskerck and Weller, Laremont, Sesay
	Is There Broad Political Participation?	Number of Years of Free Elections	Quantifiable	Some Indicators Not Measurable for Many Years	Laremont

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
		Percentage of Voters Participating*	Quantifiable	Assumes Comprehensive Voter Registration Process	
		Number of Politically Engaged Indigenous NGOs*	Quantifiable	Does Not Present Whole Picture	
		Existence of a Plurality of Views in the Public Media*	Transparent and Measurable	Involves Subjective Judgments	
		Number of Women Actively Involved in Political Process*	Quantifiable	May Be a Problematic Measure in Patriarchal Societies	
	Is There a Minimum Level of Political Openness?	Regime Survival Through Two or More Elections	Transparent	May Take Decades to Assess	Heemskerk and Weller
	Is There Power Sharing Among Groups?	No Overthrow of Legal Authority	Transparent	No Coups=Only “Negative” Success	Sesay, Blechman et al,
		Multiparty Electoral Competition*	Transparent	Does Not Necessarily Relate to Power Sharing, May Be Associated with Patrimonialism	
		Surveys of Public Attitudes*	Quantifiable	Expensive, Politically Sensitive	
6. Peacebuilding					
A. Local Security (Physical Protection of Civilians in Everyday Activities)					GAO, Welch, Malaquais, Dobbins et al., Blechman et al, Cohen, Dzedzic

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
	Is There Freedom of Movement?	Roads Opened or Re-Opened	Physical Evidence		GAO
		Checkpoints Removed	Physical Evidence		GAO
		Percentage of Primary Roads Experiencing Violent Attacks in Previous Month	Quantifiable	Reporting is Not Necessarily Universal	Cohen
		Number of Estimated Landmines in Area	Quantifiable	Only Meaningful as an Indicator If the Number Increases or If Compared against Targets	Cohen
		Percentage of Residents Who Consider it Safe to Travel to Market, Work, and School	Quality of Life Indicator	Depends on Survey Data Which May Be Difficult to Obtain	Cohen
	Are National Military Forces Capable?	Number of National Forces Deployed in Areas Vacated by Peacekeepers	Accessible	Numbers Do Not Necessarily Translate Into Effectiveness	GAO
		National Forces Assume Responsibility for Defence		Greater Numbers Could Stem from Lower Efficiency	GAO
		Withdrawal of Foreign Forces	Transparent	Difficult to Measure Clandestine Deployments, Not All Foreign Deployments Necessarily or Equally Harmful	GAO

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
		Number of Training Programs with Benchmarks on Effectiveness of Training*	Transparent	Need Clear Benchmarks, Measures of Effect of Training Courses, and Measures of Numbers and Types of People on Training Courses	
	Are Ex-Combatants Reintegrated into Society?	Number of Ex-Combatants Disarmed?	Quantifiable	Requires Operational Definition for Disarmament	GAO
		Number of Ex-Combatants Repatriated	Quantifiable	Repatriation Isn't Always Politically Feasible or Desirable	GAO
		Ban on External Supply of Weapons to Armed Groups-Absence of Extra-Governmental Supply of Weapons	Observable	May Be Disguised or Circumvented	GAO
		High Level Command of Unified National Forces-Absence of Para-Military or Alternative Military Organizations	Observable	Formal Structures Do Not Always Correlate to Informal Networks of Security Governance	GAO
	Is There a Continuing Pattern of Violence and Crime in the Post-Conflict Period	Post-Conflict Death Rate	Quantifiable for All the Measures that Address this Question	Difficult to Get Accurate Crime Statistics in Post-Conflict Environment	Dobbins et. al,
		Frequency of Politically Motivated Acts of Violence	Data Already Being Collected	Difficulty in Defining What is Meant by Politically-Motivated	Blechman et al,

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
		Number of Execution Style Murders	Quantifiable	Difficult to Define 'Execution Style' , Societal Reluctance to Report Such Crimes	Dziedzic
		Positive Changes in Daily Activity of Population – e.g., Market Activity	Measurable from a Number of Sources	Time Consuming to Collect and Process Data	Dziedzic
		Homicides per 100k Population	Quantifiable	Record-keeping May Be Problematic; Definition of Homicide May Be Contended	Dziedzic
				Need Context-Specific Baseline for What Counts as 'Acceptable' Level	
		Percent of Population as Victims of Violent Crimes, Threats, and Intimidation in the Past Year	Quantifiable	Difficult to Get Reliable Data on Victims of Threat and Intimidation	Dziedzic
		Number of Assassinations per Province	Quantifiable	Problem of Distinguishing Between Different Types of Killing	Dziedzic
		Number of Kidnapping Crimes per Province	Quantifiable	Record-keeping May Be Difficult	Dziedzic

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
		Average Number of Hours per Day with Imposed Curfews	Quantifiable	Time Consuming to Collect and Process Data, Curfews May Have Preventive Aspect (e.g. around elections) and Do Not Necessarily Correlate to Deterioration of Security	Dziedzic
		Polling Data on Group or General Public Satisfaction with Security Protection	Quantifiable	Difficult to Conduct, Expensive/May Not Be Available	Dziedzic, UNDP
		Number of Civilian Casualties	Quantifiable	Cause of Casualties May Be Ambiguous	Bratt, Fleitz
B. Rule of Law					Dziedzic
(Political Decisions are Made According to Legal Rules)	Does a Legal Framework Exist?	Approval of Constitution by Parties	Documented Event	Formal Approval Does Not Always Correlate with Defacto Acceptance	GAO
		Polling Data on Population Knowledge of Legal Processes and Civil Rights	Quantifiable	Difficult to Conduct, Expensive/May Not Be Available	Dziedzic
		Courses on the Country's Legal System Available in High Schools and Colleges*	Observable	Significant Lag Time Before Effect on Attitudes	
		Usage Rates for Legal Library Services			AusAID
		Polling Data on Percent Who Know How to Access the Legal System	Quantifiable	Difficult to Collect, Question Wording Important	Dziedzic

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
		Polling Data on Legitimacy Ascribed to Legal Codes and Procedures by the Population	Quantifiable	Difficult to Collect, Expensive/May Not Be Available	Dziedzic
	Is There Impunity for Political and Criminal Elites?	Number of Criminal Cases Involving Elites Taken to Trial	Quantifiable	Two-Edged Sword- Large Numbers Mean System Works, but also That Such Crime is Frequent	Dziedzic
		Number of Convictions at Above Trials	Data Available	Two-Edged Sword- Large Numbers Mean System Works, but also That Such Crime is Frequent	Dziedzic
	Does Judicial Coverage Extend to All Areas?	Number of Districts Without Courts or Administrative Centres	Data Available		GAO USAID
	Are Protections Provided to Detainees?	Percent of Population in Pre-Trial Detention	Data Available	Reporting Depends on Likely Perpetrators	Dziedzic USAID
		Number of Prisoners Subject to Torture, Degrading, or Other Improper Treatment	Quantifiable	Requires Frequent or Constant Monitoring	Dziedzic
		Number of “Disappeared” Citizens Attributable to Government Security Services	Measurable	Attribution is Politically Sensitive, Acquisition of Information Very Difficult	Dziedzic
		Percent of Prisoners Without Access to Counsel	Quantifiable	Western Standards May Not Translate to Local Context	Dziedzic

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
		Presence of Detainee Registry	Available	Requires Constant Monitoring	Dziedzic
		Frequency with which Victims are Denied Access to Legal Proceedings	Quantifiable	Difficult to Define the Parameters, Difficult to Identify Cases	Dziedzic
				Time Consuming	
		Number of Persons Detained for More than 72 Hours Without Case Review by Administrative Judge	Quantifiable	Requires Constant Monitoring, Criteria Must Be Sensitive to Local Laws	Dziedzic
		Polling Data on Group or General Public Perception of Treatment of Detainees and Prisoners	Quantifiable	Difficult to Collect, Expensive; May Not Be Available	Dziedzic
		Percent of People for Whom Lawyers are Available or Affordable; Availability of Pro Bono Services*	Quantifiable	Difficult to Collect, Expensive; May Not Be Available	Dziedzic
		Percent of Pre-Trial Detention Facilities Operating Under International Human Rights Standards	Quantifiable	Requires Clear Articulation of Standards and Permanent Monitoring	Dziedzic
	Does the Judicial System Function Fairly and Efficiently?	Percent of Judges with Personal Security Protection	Quantifiable	Personal Sense of Insecurity May Not Correlate with the Real Threat	Dziedzic
		Number of Judges Kidnapped or Assassinated	Data Should Be Available	May Be Difficult to Assign Responsibility	Dziedzic

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
		Number of Attempted Attacks on Judges, Courts, and Court Personnel	Data Should Be Available	Reliability of These Data May Be Problematic	Dziedzic
		Number of Witnesses Assassinated	Data Should Be Available	Reliability of These Data May Be Problematic, Responsibility May Not Always Be Clear	Dziedzic
		Number of Attempted Assassinations of Witnesses	Data Should Be Available	Confidence in Reporting May Be Problematic	Dziedzic
		Polling Data on Percent of Citizens Who Perceive They Will Not Be Treated Fairly by the Justice System	Quantifiable	Difficult to Collect, Expensive, May Not Be Available	Dziedzic, AusAID
		Reports from External Professional Associations	Data Available	Need Robust Criteria for Which Associations to Include; Reliability of Data Will Vary	Dziedzic
		Percent of Complaints that Result in Convictions	Quantifiable	In Societies With Low Trust of the Police, Most Abuses Will Not Be Reported	Dziedzic
		Polling Data on Group or General Public Trust in Legal System vs. Sectarian Leaders as Source of Protection	Quantifiable	Difficult to Collect	Dziedzic

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
		Percent of Prison Facilities Operating Under International Human Rights Standards with International Assistance	Quantifiable	Requires Robust Benchmarking; Questions about Appropriateness of Applying World's Best Standards	Dziedzic
		Percent of Judges Removed for Cause Relative to the Number of Ethical Violations Reported	Quantifiable	Two-Edged Sword- Publicized Cases Show Both the Problem and the Problem Being Dealt With	Dziedzic
		Existence of Record Keeping System to Deter Judicial Misconduct Cover-ups	Observable	Procedures Don't Guarantee Compliance	Dziedzic
		Existence of Complaint Procedures for Misconduct in the Judicial System	Data Available	Procedures Don't Guarantee Compliance	Dziedzic
		Frequency of Use of Complaint Procedures*	Quantifiable	Two-Edged Sword- Frequency of Complaints Also Indicates Frequency of Abuses	
	Is There a Professional and Sustainable Prison System?	Number of Prison Security Incidents			AusAID
	Is There a Functioning Rehabilitation System?	Number of Probation Orders Made and Implemented			AusAID

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
		Number of Rehabilitative Programs Established and Used			AusAID
C. Governance					Laremont, GAO
(the provision of standard governmental services)	Has Local Governance Been Restored?				GAO
		Elections for Local Officials	Easy to Record	Little International Consensus on What Level is Appropriate	GAO
		Number of District Officials	Easy to Record	Says Little About Their Role, Effectiveness and Legitimacy; High Numbers May Indicate Corruption and Patrimonialism	GAO
	Who Controls Access to Food, Shelter, Healthcare, etc – Government or Local Faction Leaders?	Number of Government Offices (vs. Factions) Charged with Responsibility for Access	Good Challenge to Functioning Local Government Offices	Difficult to Measure Precisely; Requires Normative Judgments	Cohen
	Is There Civilian and Democratic Control of the Military?	Removal of Discredited Members of the Military	Observable	Difficulties in Defining ‘Discredited’	Ratner (97)
		Attempted Military Coups*	Data Available		
	Is the State Independent from Foreign Powers or Fully Sovereign?	Presence of Foreign Troops or Foreign Intelligence Officers in Key Governmental Positions or Geographic Locations			Doyle & Suntharalingam

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
		Size of 'Off-Budget' Military Expenditures*	Quantifiable	Data is Difficult to Collect	
		Military Has a Clear Mission Statement and Well-Defined Roles*	Observable	Mission Statements Do Not Guarantee Compliance	
		Elected Representatives Hold Ultimate Legal Authority Over the Security Forces (parliamentary scrutiny)*	Observable	Difficult to Discern Informal Networks	
		Merit Based Promotion System*	Observable	Requires Constant Monitoring and Clear Standards	
	Is Corruption Limited?				Dziedzic, Johansen
		Number of Officials Arrested for Corruption	Records Available	Two-Edged Sword-High Numbers Indicate System Works, but Also Corruption Levels are High.	Dziedzic
		Number of Investigations of Corruption	Records Available	Two-Edged Sword-High Numbers Indicate System Works, but Also Corruption Levels are High.	Dziedzic
		Number of Investigation Cases Referred to Trial	Records Available	Two-Edged Sword-High Numbers Indicate System Works, but Also Corruption Levels are High.	Dziedzic

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
		Percent of Cases Resulting in Convictions	Records Available	Two-Edged Sword-High Numbers Indicate System Works, but Also Corruption Levels are High.	Dziedzic
		Polling Data on Population Perception on Whether Corruption was Better, Worse, or Stayed the Same over the Last 3 Months	Quantifiable	Requires Periodic Monitoring Which May be Difficult, Expensive; Corruption May be Covert	Dziedzic
D. Restoration, Reconciliation, and Transformation (changing attitudes and relationships so as to prevent a recurrence of conflict)					Ratner (95), Johansen, Paris, Fetherston, Welch, Rikhye, Dobbins et al.
	Have War Criminals Been Brought to Justice?	Frequency of Trials	Data Available	Assumes Societal Agreement with 'War Crimes' Path Rather than Truth and Reconciliation	Welch
	Do Institutions and Culture Promote Peaceful Conflict Resolution?	Number of Programs (including courses) for Developing Conflict Resolution Skills*	Data Available	Courses Must Be Connected to Application/Practice	Fetherston, AusAID
		Number of Professional Mediation Associations*	Quantifiable	Number of Associations Doesn't Directly Correspond with What They Do	Fetherston

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
	Have Relations Between Conflicting Parties Changed?	Number and Type of Collaborative Activities Among Members of the Different Parties*	Observable	Difficult to Discern Whether Collaboration is Strategic Bargaining or Genuine Cooperation	Fetherston
	Are Displaced Persons Being Resettled?	Percentage of Refugees Returned	Data Available	Refugees May Not Always Want to Be Returned, Danger of Encouraging Forced Repatriation	Dobbins, et al, Ratner (95), Ratner (97), Rikhye, Doyle and Suntharalingam. Cohen
E. Economic Development (improved standards of living for the local population)					Cohen, GAO
	Are Basic Needs Being Met?	Increase in Percentage of Households with Access to Safe Drinking Water	Quantifiable	Not Directly Related to Policing	GAO, Cohen
		Increase in Percentage of Children Enrolled in Primary School	Data Available	Effects Will Be Long-Term	GAO
		Increase in Health Units Rehabilitated and Functional	Quantifiable	Not Directly Related to Policing	GAO
		Increase in AIDs Awareness Among Women	Quantifiable	Not Directly Related to Policing, Requires Opinion Surveys that Could be Expensive, AIDs Awareness Not Pivotal in Every Case	GAO
		Increase in Budget Devoted to Road Maintenance			AusAID

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
	Is the Economy Improving?	GNP Growth Rate	Data Available	Not Directly Related to Policing	GAO, Johansen
		Return of Trade Lost to Conflict	Quantifiable	Not Directly Related to Policing	Rikhye
		Economic Agreements between Conflicting Parties	Data Available	Positive Effects May Not Be Immediately Apparent	GAO
	Has the Black Market Diminished?	Change in Tax Revenues*		Indicators May Be Unreliable	
	Is There a Functioning System of Financial Accountability?	Accurate Reporting on Tax Exemptions			AusAID
	Does the Government Have the Capacity for Economic Reform and Promoting Development?	Customs Processing Time			AusAID
F. Local Policing Capacity (the ability to maintain order and responsiveness to the government and public)	Are Local Police Seen to Operate Effectively and Professionally	Crime Statistics (Compared to Previous 6 Months)	Quantifiable	Data Collection Difficult if Violence Still Present	Bajraktari et. al., Plunkett
		Polling of Public Perception regarding Crime Rates		Public May Have Unrealistic Expectations of Progress	UNDP, Hansen, Schmidl
		Number of Officers Per Specified Number of Inhabitants	Quantifiable	Numbers Do Not Represent Quality/Capacity	GAO, Bajraktari et. al, Jones & Wilson et. al.

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
		Survey of Issues/Incidents in Which Police (Rather than Military, Community Leaders etc.) Seen as Most Capable of Addressing*		Highly Subjective	UNDP
		Proportion of Police with Standardized Uniform and Equipment	Measurable	Has to be Tested Against Agreed Criteria; May Not Directly Correspond to Outputs	ICG-Haiti
		Proportion of Police Vehicles Per Number of Officers	Quantifiable	Numbers Do Not Represent Quality/Capability	ICG-Haiti, Bajraktari et. al., Schmidl
		Proportion of Officers with Specialized Skills (Investigative; Forensic; Intelligence; Riot Control, etc.)	Quantifiable	Requires Context-Specific Benchmarks	ICG-Kosovo
		Data on Geographic Distribution of Police	Data Available		ICG-Bosnia Jackson
		Survey of Police Academy Graduates on Confidence to Handle a Variety of Issues/Incidents as a Result of Training Received	Measurable	Data Collection May Be Inaccurate and Data Gained Subjective, Belief in Ability May be Ill-Founded	
	Do the Public Have Confidence in Police?	Surveys of Public Perceptions re. Police (e.g. Do They View Them with Respect, Fear, Indifference, etc.)	Quantifiable	Danger of Unrealistic Public Expectations	UNDP, Krasno

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
	Are Police Seen to Protect Citizen's Interests	Percentage of Population Who View Police as Protecting Interests of the Public, as Opposed to Those of the State	Quantifiable	Possibility of Imperfect Results, Politicized Answers, etc.	UNDP, Brzoska, Dziedzic, Groenwald & Peake
		Polling Data on Investigations/Prosecutions Into Prior and Existing Crimes?	Quantifiable	Data Gathering May Be Expensive and Results Subjective	Brzoska, Jackson
		Polling Data on Proportion of the Population that Views the Local Police as Legitimate?	Quantifiable	Data Gathering May Be Expensive and Results May Be Subjective	Bajraktari, et. al, Brzoska, Nield, Jackson
a. Police Accountability (Responsiveness to the Public)	Does Public Have Confidence in Police Accountability	Data on Number of Complaints/Allegations	Quantifiable		Bajraktari, et. al.
		Percentage of Complaints/Allegations Investigated	Quantifiable	May Be Difficult to Gather; Veracity of Investigation Requires Normative Judgment	Bajraktari et. al.
		Percentage of Prosecutions/Disciplinary Action Relating to Complaints/Allegations	Quantifiable	Difficult to Make Judgments about Veracity of Complaints	Bajraktari et. al.
		Polling of Public Attitudes regarding Accountability of Police	Quantifiable	Polling May Be Difficult and Expensive	

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
b. Police Loyalty and Accountability (response to government control)					
	Are the Local Police, Loyal and Accountable to the Government?	Presence of Training and Mentoring-Number in Those Programs	Quantifiable	Training Doesn't Guarantee Successful Implementation	GAO, Donais
		Presence of Strategic Management/Planning	Visible	Planning Alone Doesn't Indicate Capability	GAO, Groenwald & Peake
		Comparison of Present Force Levels with Pre-War Levels	Quantifiable	Levels Must Be Compared with Threats	GAO
		Provision of Equipment		Must Be Compared with Level of Equipment Deemed Necessary	GAO
		Transfer of Policing Duties from Peacekeepers to Local Authorities-Number of Districts	Quantifiable/Data Available	Effectiveness/Outcomes Must Be Measured By Other Outcomes	GAO
		Downsizing of International Police	Quantifiable/Data Available	Response to Rather Than Indicator of Success	GAO
		Polling Data on Group or General Public Confidence Police Will Uphold the Law	Indicates Legitimacy	May Be Difficult to Obtain	Dziedzic

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
	Do Police Have Loyalties to Other Political Elites, Former Regime Elements, Community or Religious Leaders?	Survey of Police Officer/Public Regarding Feelings of Loyalty	Quantifiable	Total Depoliticisation May Be Unrealistic	Brzoska, Donais, Perito, Call & Stanley, Jackson
	Do Police Have Professional Independence to Operate Effectively?	Examination of Written Frameworks Guaranteeing Independence	Observable	Too Much Independence May Inhibit Reform; Questions of Democratic Accountability; Police Ought to be Subservient to Civilians	Bajraktari et. al., Brzoska, Call & Stanley (2001)
		Data on Number of Promotions, Awards for Good Service, etc.	Measurable	Involves Difficult Judgments on a Case by Case Basis; Difficult to Generalize, May be Politicized	Peake
c. Representativeness of Police (makeup of force vis-à-vis society as a whole)	Do Police Have an Appropriate Ethnic Balance?	Ethnic Breakdown of Force (particularly important in conflicts relating to ethnic identity)	Quantifiable	Political Ramifications? Ethnic Balance May Not Always Be Appropriate	OSCE, UNDP, Brzoska, CALL, ICG-Kosovo
	Do Police Have an Appropriate Gender Balance?	Number of Female Officers as a Percentage of Force	Quantifiable	May Be a Problematic Measure in Patriarchal Societies	Harris, ICG-Haiti
	Do Police Operate Effectively in Different Ethnic Areas?	Percentage of Officers with Multiple Language Abilities and Cross-Cultural Awareness	Quantifiable	Politically Sensitive, Statistical Correlation Does Not Equate to Causation, Difficulties in Assigned Responsibility	Jones & Wilson et. al., Wilson

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
d. Governance of Local Police (control of police by government authorities)	Is There Civilian and Democratic Control of the Police?	Removal of Discredited Members of the Police*	Observable	Difficulties of Defining 'Discredited'	
		Size of 'Off-Budget' Police Expenditure*	Quantifiable	Data is Difficult to Collect	
		Police Have a Clear Mission Statement and Well-Defined Roles*	Observable	Mission Statements Do Not Guarantee Compliance	
		Elected Representatives Hold Ultimate Authority over the Police Force*	Observable	Difficult to Discern Informal Networks	
		Merit Based Promotion System*	Observable	Requires Constant Monitoring and Clear Standards	
OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS (goals specific to the peacekeepers as stakeholder)					
1. Good Relations with Local Population (cooperative interactions between peacekeepers and civilians)	Does the Local Populace Support the Peacekeeping Operation	Public Support for the Mission	Quantifiable	Requires Survey but Many Missions Already Do This	Johansen, Neack, James
		Does Local Population Understand the Purpose of the Operation?	Quantifiable	Requires Expensive Surveys	

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
	Are Social Ills Created by the Peacekeeping Force?				
		Incidence of Rape Associated with Mission	Quantifiable	Difficult to Draw Parameters for 'Associated with Mission' Label	James
		Incidence of Prostitution Association with Mission	Quantifiable	Difficult to Draw Parameters for 'Associated with Mission' Label	
		Incidence of Local Crime Association with Mission	Quantifiable	Difficult to Draw Parameters for 'Associated with Mission' Label	Johansen
		Attacks Against Peacekeepers			
2. Maintain Organizational Values (goals that support the protection and development of the military and police)					
	Was National Command and Control Maintained?	Command Structure	Observable	Doesn't Say Much about Outputs	Clinton
	Was the Burden (\$ and Personnel) Shared with Allies?	Mission Composition	Observable	Doesn't Say Much about Outputs	Clinton
	Were Personnel Protected?	Peacekeeper Casualties*	Data Available		

GOALS/OBJECTIVES	KEY QUESTIONS	MEASURES OF PROGRESS	BENEFITS	LIMITATIONS	RELEVANT LITERATURE
	Was Squad Cohesion Maintained?			Difficult to Measure	Harris
	Was the Health of Personnel Maintained?				Harris
	Was the Mission Cost Effective?			Definition of Effectiveness May Be Disputed	Canada, Fleitz
	Did the Military Peacekeepers Coordinate and Cooperate with Police Peacekeeping Units?	Existence of Standard Operating Procedures*			
		Number of Conflict Incidents Between Units*			
	Did the Peacekeepers Engage in Conflict Resolution/Mediation Activities?	Incidents of Contact Activities Reported by Peacekeepers	Part of Required Reporting	Retrospective Accounts May Be Inaccurate	Last and Eyre (1995), Wall, Druckman, and Diehl (2002), Wall and Druckman (2003)

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**SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFENCE AND
TRADE**
Australia's involvement in international peacekeeping operations

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

Question No. 3

Senator MacDonald asked the following question on notice on 25 July 2007:

- a) What is the youngest age for a recruit under the present recruiting regime?
- b) In the broad what number of recruits are raw recruits – so it is their first job, their first port of call in terms of employment? [in relation to sworn positions].

The answer to the honourable senator's questions is as follows:

- a) 18 years of age. The AFP also emphasises life experience and a mature attitude as being of direct relevance to a person's employment suitability.
- b) A sworn member deployed to the IDG for peacekeeping operations requires a minimum of 4 years policing experience as noted in Question on Notice 6. By applying this eligibility criterion, 'raw recruits' are not part of IDG operations.

**SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFENCE AND
TRADE**

Australia's involvement in international peacekeeping operations

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

Question No. 4

The answer to question 4 was covered in question 6, and therefore there is no separate number 4.

SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFENCE AND TRADE

Australia's involvement in international peacekeeping operations

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

Question No. 5

Senator MacDonald asked the following question on notice on 25 July 2007:

The Senator raised several matters relating to rehabilitation and compensation and complementarity between the ADF and AFP in accordance with the Proof *Committee Hansard* 25 July 2007 p. 29.

The answer to the honourable Senator's questions is as follows:

The responses to the questions raised by Senator MacDonald have been provided within the written questions on notice numbers 24 to 28.

The AFP however does not consider it appropriate at this time to comment on the complementarity of the proposed AFP rehabilitation and compensation scheme to that of the ADF.

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE

Senate inquiry into Australia's involvement in peacekeeping operations

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

Question No. 6

Senator FORSHAW asked the following question on notice on (25 July 2007):

1. How many of those [6,500, total number of AFP personnel], in round figures, are sworn officers? How many members of the AFP would be, say, eligible for or capable of being deployed to a peacekeeping policing mission overseas?

The answer to the honourable senator's questions is as follows:

As at 8 August 2007 the AFP had a total staffing of 6567, with 2623 sworn police officers. For a member to be eligible to deploy with the IDG the member would need to meet the following requirements:

- have a current passport;
- have completed pre-deployment training;
- be medically cleared for deployment (with immunisations for whichever country the deployment is for);
- no current Professional Reporting Standard issues;
- no current open compensation case;
- have a current psych clearance;
- have a current senior first aid certificate

A sworn member would also have to have the following:

- have more than 4 years policing experience;
- be Use of Force qualified for the period of deployment; and

There are approximately 2000 sworn members with more than 4 years policing experience and 2100 unsworn members that would be able to deploy providing they meet the above criteria. This is inclusive of current IDG members.

**SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFENCE AND
TRADE**

Australia's involvement in international peacekeeping operations

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

Question No. 7

Senator Forshaw asked the following question on notice on 25 July 2007:

I now want to go to one of the missions which I have a particular interest in because I have visited it, and that is Cyprus. There was some discussion at the UN level, as I understand it, whereby the UN may vacate the mission and hand over the monitoring etcetera to the European Union. That has not occurred, but I am wondering if you could update me on what is happening, if anything, with regard to that.

The answer to the Senator's questions is as follows:

- As stated in the 4 June 2007 "Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus", the UN is committed to its long standing role in Cyprus.
- The EU supports the lead role played by the UN in Cyprus.
- There is no suggestion of the EU taking over the UN role in Cyprus.

**SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFENCE AND
TRADE**

Australia's involvement in international peacekeeping operations

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

Question No. 8

Senator Payne (Chair) asked the following question on notice on 25 July 2007:

Language, cultural and human rights training.

- a. Would you like to flesh out a little for us—on notice perhaps—the sorts of external providers you use and the extent of the language, cultural and human rights training—some of the issues that you have already identified on page 12?
- b. Regarding your response to the question I asked earlier, which you undertook to take on notice—that is, the training detail—could you add gender awareness training to that answer?

The answer to the Senator's questions is as follows:

The AFP Pre-Deployment Training (PDT) program utilises the expert knowledge of internal and external providers to facilitate language, culture and human rights training during the pre-deployment training program. The external providers linked to these include:

- Dr Abby McLeod (formerly ANU, now AFP) for culture
- the Stolmack Group for coaching, (within the culture setting)
- Anthony McLean (Command and Control with a link to the cultural expectations)
- Ms Neva Wendt from the Australian Council for International Development
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees representatives
- International Red Cross
- Greenpeace
- Medical Health Services for health and safety and first aid
- The ADF Peacekeeping Centre provides presentations on the United Nations and ADF/AFP interoperability
- Other presentations are given by internal subject matter experts across a wide range of duty of care matters such as OH&S, climatic conditions, country history and politics

A generic cultural briefing is given to all participants on the program to establish a base knowledge of the possible cultural differences AFP members deploying overseas may encounter. This is followed by a country specific briefing shortly before members depart overseas.

PDT participants on the program receive literature concerning cultural differences in the country they are deploying to. This literature also contains a language “ready reckoner” with common words and phrases. A program of individual language training is being scoped for

future programs, however the time frame allocated for PDT dictates that any additional language training will remain at a basic level for the majority of members deploying.

Further, as the Committee was advised by Assistant Commissioner Walters:

“Language training has been an issue that we have been looking at quite a bit in the last 12 to 18 months. It has also been an issue that has been identified through some of the work of the Policing the Neighbourhood project. We are looking at ways to provide an enhanced language training capability for people deploying into missions. There are some challenges with that, given the volume of police that do deploy into missions — for example, RAMSI—and the amount of time that we can take them offline to provide them with the language training. But we are looking at options.”

“The AFP’s learning and development area is looking at language training opportunities across Arabic, Chinese and Bahasa. We do provide opportunities for people to undertake language training whilst they are in the mission, and many of the officers have done that. They see learning another language whilst they are in the mission as another opportunity they are quite keen to pursue.”¹

However, given the throughput of AFP members in various missions and the duration of some deployments AFP official support for language training must be viewed in the long term benefit the AFP would get from its investment rather than the personal satisfaction individuals may have.

Last year, members of the Solomon Islands Police Force (SIPF) attended the training program as guest instructors on a series of pilot programs to gauge their effectiveness in delivering training to Australian members. This pilot program was very successful. Negotiations are currently underway to bring members of the SIPF to Australia on a regular basis as presenters on the pre-deployment program. These members will deliver on culture, language and operational issues.

Human Rights presentations and assessments are provided by the AFP Legal Team. This is based on the United Nations generic training package requirements. Within this package gender and child issues are covered.

Cultural and human rights knowledge is assessed during scenarios in the practical nine day field exercise phase of the program.

The Committee’s attention is also drawn to the answer of written question on notice 13.b. on health aspects as it provides women, human rights and ethics training being undertaken in RAMSI.

¹ Proof Committee Hansard , Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Reference: Australia’s involvement in international peacekeeping operations Wednesday, 25 July 2007 Canberra, p FAD&T 37

**SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFENCE AND
TRADE**

Australia's Involvement in Peacekeeping

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

Question No. 9

Senator Payne (Chair) asked the following question on notice on 25 July 2007:

Specifically, there are couple of other points in the World Vision submission that the committee and I take very seriously. They may not need to be pursued on the record here today—in terms of the time frame—but would the AFP please look at that submission and take those specific allegations and issues on notice and respond to the committee?

The answer to the honourable senator's questions is as follows:

The AFP is concerned with the manner in which World Vision raised allegations pertaining to the use of force in the Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands. Further, the AFP is surprised that World Vision would use this public forum to table allegations almost 12 months (submission published 29 March 2007) after they are alleged to have occurred without first, if the concern was so great, having referred the allegations to the AFP or the Commonwealth Ombudsman.

The three use of force related matters raised in the World Vision submission have, as the Committee was advised at the hearing, been fully investigated by AFP Professional Standards.

a. Munitions used on the Solomon Islands. “Concerns have been expressed to us by serving AFP officers about the deployment of non-approved munitions in the Solomon Islands around the time of the riots in Honiara on 18 –19 April 2006. These included either 40mm bean bag rounds or 40mm foam rounds, 12 gauge bean bag rounds, CS Gas and possibly Stinger grenades containing rubber balls.”

The outcome of the Professional Standards investigation conducted in 2006 was that all these munitions are approved for use by the AFP. The investigation identified that there was no AFP training package for 40mm grenade launchers used by the AFP and therefore no AFP members were endorsed to use the weapon. Subsequently, an accredited external training organisation was identified to deliver an accredited training curriculum to ensure AFP members were appropriately endorsed.

b. Inappropriate and possibly illegal information on the use of force. “Concerns have been expressed to us by serving AFP officers who witnessed inappropriate, and possibly illegal information, given by an IDG Team Leader in the Solomon Islands during his presentation on the use of less than lethal force to members of the ADF and the New Zealand Police.

The outcome of the Professional Standards investigation into this matter found there was no substance in the allegation.

c. Weapon qualifications. “...concerns have been expressed to us by serving AFP officers about some IDG members using weapons overseas without having undertaken either

the AFP approved training program, or if they were already qualified in their own police forces, the AFP validation programme to ensure their competency.”

The outcome of the Professional Standards investigation conducted in 2006 found the allegation was too general to be properly investigated as it did not identify a member or weapon system. The investigation did identify that a training adviser with the AFP Operations Support Team used a less than lethal weapon on a non AFP member during a presentation of less than lethal use of force. This is a breach of Commissioner’s Orders 3 (Use of Force).

In this instance the AFP member providing the training had not undertaken an AFP validation program; however he was a highly trained tactical operator with 10 years experience with a state police tactical response team and had been delivering training on this weapons system for four years.

**SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFENCE AND
TRADE**

Australia's Involvement in International Peacekeeping Operations

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE

Question No. 10

Senator Payne (Chair) asked the following question on notice on 25 July 2007:

One point we did not really have an opportunity to discuss with the ADF yesterday was the status of UN Security Council resolution 1325 [involvement of women in peace operations].

- a) What approach does the AFP take in this regard, both in relation to the deployment of female members of the AFP and in relation to the engagement of women in the communities in which you are operating?
- b) Does that reflect the general proportions in the AFP?

The answer to the Senator's questions is as follows:

a) The AFP values the unique contribution women make to policing and sees the deployment of women on overseas missions as essential to the effectiveness of the International Deployment Group's (IDG) capacity building operations and peace operations commitments.

The AFP recognises that female peacekeepers play a crucial role in providing support and leadership to local female police. They also provide valuable role models to women in the community, often in societies where women have been suppressed or subjected to violence.

b) Currently 17.5 per cent of AFP personnel serving overseas on IDG missions are women. More than half of these are sworn officers and make up 12.9 per cent of the total sworn component of all IDG overseas missions.

The AFP encourages all suitable applicants to apply for peacekeeping roles.

Table 1: The following table shows the gender breakdown of AFP staff (not including State Police).

	Sworn	PSO	Unsworn	Total
Male	2026 – 77%	1238 – 92%	1010 – 45%	4274 – 70%
Female	597 – 23%	102 – 8%	1236 – 55%	1935 – 30%