




Senator the Hon Robert Hill
Leader of the Government in the Senate
Minister for Defence



17 MAR 2005

Senator Steve Hutchins
Chair
Senate Foreign Affairs Defence
and Trade References Committee
Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600

Dear Senator Hutchins

I write further to my reply of 10 February 2005 regarding the Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade References Committee's inquiry into Australia's relationship with China.

I am pleased to forward you the Defence submission to the Committee on the Australia – China defence relationship. The subject of Australia's relationship with China is obviously important to Australia's strategic and national interests, and I look forward to seeing the results of your Committee's inquiry.

I trust you will find the Defence submission of interest to the inquiry.

Yours sincerely

Robert Hill



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE SUBMISSION



Australian Government

Department of Defence

**SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE REFERENCES
COMMITTEE**

**INQUIRY INTO AUSTRALIA'S RELATIONS WITH
CHINA**

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE SUBMISSION
SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE REFERENCES
COMMITTEE

INQUIRY INTO AUSTRALIA'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE SUBMISSION

INQUIRY INTO AUSTRALIA'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA

Executive Summary

- China's importance to Australia as an interlocutor on strategic and defence issues is increasing. China will not only be of direct strategic importance to Australia, but will also have a growing capacity over coming decades to influence Australia's strategic environment.
- China is seeking to build its regional influence while expanding its global reach in response to its broadening interests. Beijing recognises that China's continued economic development requires a stable environment. To these ends, China is engaging actively in multilateral forums as well as building bilateral relations and is increasingly prepared, within limits, to compartmentalise strategic and political differences so they do not adversely impact on China's economic interests.
- China will continue to view military strength as a key component of comprehensive national power, vital to securing its territorial claims, protecting its economic interests and building political influence. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is modernising rapidly with modernisation programs emphasising the exploitation of technology and quality over quantity.
- The defence relationship between Australia and China, which has experienced a period of unprecedented growth in recent years, is now better than it has ever been. Consequently, we intend to develop existing areas of engagement further and to explore additional opportunities cooperation in peacekeeping and counter-terrorism, particularly consequence management. The current level and nature of Australia's defence engagement with China is mutually acceptable to both Australia and China.
- Our defence engagement with China is focused on strategic activities designed to generate mutual goodwill, trust and understanding between our respective defence organisations while providing the opportunity for personal contacts to develop, especially at senior levels.
- As China continues to view its relationship with Australia, particularly in defence issues, through the prism of our alliance with the US, we welcome opportunities to discuss Australia's involvement in US initiatives of particular interest to China. These discussions serve to enhance understanding between our two defence forces and to dispel any misconceptions that may exist regarding either these initiatives or Australia's involvement in them.
- The maintenance of the Australia - China bilateral defence relationship will remain an objective of the Australian Government in recognition of China's current and future strategic influence.
- The Australia - China bilateral defence relationship contributes depth and breadth to our engagement with China, thereby complementing the broader bilateral relationship.



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE SUBMISSION INQUIRY INTO AUSTRALIA'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA

Introduction

1. This submission focuses on those aspects of the Inquiry's Terms of Reference most relevant to Defence, particularly with respect to Australian responses to China's emergence as a regional power.
2. In addressing the Terms of Reference most relevant to Defence, this submission focuses particularly on Australian responses to China's emergence as a regional power and the effect this has on regional security, and also Australia's political relationship with China in the context of China's increasing influence in East Asia and the South Pacific. This submission will review the policy basis and rationale for Australia's defence relationship with China, the relationship's development and current status. While this Inquiry will also review the political, economic, social and cultural aspects of the bilateral relationship, these aspects would be most appropriately addressed in the submissions of other agencies.

Policy Basis for the Australia – China defence relationship

3. The Defence relationship with China complements the broader bilateral relationship between Australia and China. The maintenance of this bilateral relationship, of which the defence relationship is a key component, will continue to be a priority for the Australian Government.

4. The policy underpinnings of the defence relationship are contained in the Government's White Paper on Defence, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*. When referring to the Australia-China defence relationship, the White Paper states:

5.25 China, as the country with the fastest growing security influence in the region, is an increasingly important strategic interlocutor for Australia. The Government places a high priority on working with China to deepen and develop our dialogue on strategic issues.

5.26 All countries in the region have an interest in finding approaches to regional security issues which serve shared interests in a stable and cooperative international environment. Nonetheless, some hard issues will need to be addressed frankly, such as different perceptions of the value and importance of the US role in the region. Our strategic dialogue with China provides an opportunity to contribute to that process.¹

5. The *Defence Update* policy paper, which reviewed Australia's strategic environment and defence posture in light of significant global events that had occurred since the release of the 2000 White Paper, states:

Despite tensions in early 2001, US-China relations have stabilised. But strategic competition between the US and China will continue over the next decade, and the possibility of miscalculation over Taiwan persists. While China's economic rise will pose challenges for some countries over the next

¹ Department of Defence, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*, Defence Publishing Service, 2000, pp 37 – 38.

decade, notably Japan, the consequences for regional stability could be greater if growth stalled or there was social breakdown in China.²

China's strategic perceptions and strength

6. China is seeking to build its regional influence while expanding its global reach in response to its broadening interests. Beijing recognises that China's continued economic development requires a stable environment. To these ends, China is engaging actively in multilateral forums as well as building bilateral relations and is increasingly prepared, within limits, to compartmentalise strategic and political differences so they do not adversely impact on China's economic interests. Beijing's key strategic concerns include: an enduring perception that the US is trying to contain China's rise; independence sentiment in Taiwan (and perceived US support for Taiwan); Japan's strengthening relationship with the US and the more assertive profile of Japan's military forces; the regional security implications of both North Korea's nuclear ambitions and the potential for collapse of the Pyongyang regime (and the desire to avoid either outcome) and China's growing need for secure access to foreign energy sources and raw materials to sustain its economic growth.

7. China will continue to view military strength as a key component of comprehensive national power, vital to securing its territorial claims, protecting its economic interests and building political influence. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is modernising rapidly to develop sufficient capabilities to deter Taiwan from pursuing formal independence. Beijing has clearly stated on many occasions that its preferred outcome remains peaceful reunification, but it will not hesitate to use force if necessary. China's new anti-secession law outlines Beijing's preference for peaceful reunification under the 'one-country, two systems' model, but has clear provision for the use of non-peaceful means if Taiwan asserts independence or if the possibilities for peaceful reunification are exhausted.

8. The PLA's military modernisation program emphasises the exploitation of technology and quality over quantity. Key aspects of the program include: foreign acquisition and indigenous production of modern weapons and defence systems; organisational reform and the promotion of a joint approach to strategy and operations; logistics reform, including a growing emphasis on commercialisation of support functions; and personnel reforms such as improved training and education. The bulk of the modernisation efforts and resources are focused on naval, air and missile forces. The Navy is developing a blue-water capability with new destroyers and submarines. The Air Force is extending its power projection and its maritime strike capabilities. The Missile Force is increasing survivability with a variety of mobile Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and medium and short range ballistic missiles, with the latter based near the Taiwan Strait. Ground force modernisation is a lower priority, but improvements are being made in terms of mobility.

9. China's program of military modernisation will improve both the PLA's military strength and its power projection capabilities. These factors will contribute to a growing self-confidence in China's strategic posture, particularly where sovereignty issues are at stake. China's military modernisation may on occasion, contribute to friction in its bilateral relationships with the US and Japan.

² Department of Defence, *Defence Update*, Defence Publishing Service, 2003. P 8

10. The PLA is likely to further expand its levels of international engagement as it seeks to learn from foreign forces, and will probably also slowly expand its participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping activities.

11. China's priorities are likely to include, but not be limited to, stable economic growth and development, internal stability and the longevity of the ruling Chinese Communist Party, expanding China's regional and global sway, containing US influence, and maintaining territorial integrity and sovereignty, particularly in regard to Taiwan. China's rise will have direct strategic implications for Australia, with China having a growing capacity over coming decades to influence events vital to Australia's strategic and defence interests.

Why do we have a defence relationship with China?

12. Australia's defence relationship with China contributes to the strength of Australia's broader bilateral relationship with China. As stated in the White Paper, China's importance to Australia as an interlocutor on strategic and defence issues is increasingly important. The benefits of a solid defence relationship and constructive defence engagement to the broader bilateral relationship will grow in conjunction with China's importance to Australia's strategic environment.

13. China's influence in regional security issues is evident in its strong support for a peaceful resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue through the Six Party Talks. This contribution is illustrative of the increasing role that China plays in the maintenance of regional stability. We encourage China to maintain a constructive role in regional issues.

14. The defence relationship provides Australia with valuable opportunities to discuss matters of mutual interest with the PLA. We derive benefit from this as Australia and China share many strategic interests, most notably the maintenance of regional stability and security. We welcome the opportunity to discuss issues of mutual interest and exchange perceptions regarding contemporary developments in regional and global security. We regularly brief the PLA on Australia's strategic environment and policies, the ADF's current operational deployments and major capability developments. We welcome reciprocal briefings by the PLA.

15. The US-China relationship will be the key bilateral relationship shaping the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region for the foreseeable future. As China continues to view its relationship with Australia, particularly in defence issues, through the prism of our alliance with the US, we welcome the opportunity to discuss Australia's involvement in US initiatives of particular interest to China. On 8 March 2005 media reports quoted He Yafei, Director - General for North American and Oceanian Affairs in China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, warning Australia not to invoke the ANZUS alliance in the event of a Taiwan Strait conflict. Australia strongly supports the ANZUS treaty and continued US presence in the Asia-Pacific as a critical factor in the maintenance of regional stability. In the interests of transparency we regularly brief PLA interlocutors on Australia's strategic involvement in activities such as the Joint Combined Training Centre (JCTC) and the US's Missile Defence program. These discussions serve to enhance understanding between our two militaries and to dispel any misconceptions that may exist regarding either these initiatives or Australia's involvement in them.

Defence engagement between Australia and China

16. Prior to 1989 the Australia – China defence relationship developed slowly but steadily. A program of senior level visits began to develop in 1988, with a visit to China by the Australian Chief of General Staff, in addition to a fledgling program of middle level functional visits primarily in the medical area. Australia established Defence Attache representation in Beijing in 1982. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) made ship visits to China in 1981, 1984 and 1986. Australian defence contact with China was frozen in July 1989, along with the broader bilateral relationship, following events in Tiananmen Square. Defence contact between Australia and China resumed in late 1992 with a senior level visit by Australian Defence officials to China. Since then, the Australia – China bilateral defence relationship has grown steadily and is now the strongest it has been.

17. Our defence engagement with China is focused on strategic activities designed to generate mutual goodwill, trust and understanding between our respective defence organisation while providing the opportunity for personal contacts to develop, especially at senior levels. Our program of defence engagement activities with China includes senior level visits, strategic dialogue, staff college and student exchanges, language training, functional working level exchanges and ship visits. Both Australia and China fund these activities with a view towards reciprocity of financial commitment. The expenditure for the Defence Engagement Program varies from year to year in accordance with the range and nature of exchanges anticipated. In financial year 2004-2005 it is planned to spend approximately \$300 000. This funding will cover costs associated with a range of activities including strategic dialogue, educational cooperation and support to senior visits.

18. Nurturing senior officer ties is the centrepiece of the Australia's defence engagement program with the PLA and will continue to be so in the coming years. These activities allow Australia and China to exchange views and to improve our understanding of each other's respective strategic assessments and policies and build personal contacts at the senior level. Highlights of the program of senior officer engagement between the ADF and PLA include the visit to Australia by Central Military Commission member and Chief of the PLA General Staff, General Liang Guanglie, in November 2004 and the visit of Chief of the Defence Force, General Peter Cosgrove, to China in August 2004. Details of recent senior PLA visits to Australia are listed at [Annex A](#) and recent senior Australian Defence Department visits to China are listed at [Annex B](#)³.

19. Other engagement activities include:

- Junior Officer Exchange between the Royal Military College Duntroon and the Shijiazhuang Mechanised Infantry Academy: This is an ongoing reciprocal exchange between the RMC, ADFA and the Shijiazhuang Mechanised Infantry Academy, which aims to develop the relationship with the PLA at the junior officer level. It also aims to develop constructive contact between officer training institutions.
- Peace Operations Seminars: PLA attendance at ADF Peace Operations seminars furthers our objective of expanding cooperation and understanding between the ADF and PLA in the field of peacekeeping.
- Attendance at relevant seminars and conferences.

³ These annexes reflect available records and may not be exhaustive.

20. The RAN has regularly conducted port visits in China. Most recently, HMAS ANZAC visited Qingdao in October 2004 and conducted a Search and Rescue Exercise (SAREX) with the PLA Navy (PLAN). This exercise presented a useful opportunity to develop interoperability measures between the RAN and PLAN through the creation of a benign scenario comfortable to both Navies. This allowed the RAN and PLAN to operate cooperatively and understand basic tactical instructions and manoeuvres. This was the first SAREX performed between the RAN and PLAN, with the first joint exercise a Passage Exercise (PASSEX) conducted in 2002 during a port visit by HMAS SYDNEY to Qingdao. Details of recent RAN ship visits to China and PLAN ship visits to Australia are contained at Annex C.

21. Australian defence exports to China are currently at a modest level. Over the past three years, Defence has approved permits to export to China up to a total value of \$517 470 worth of military items and a total of \$15 million of dual use items (while Defence is responsible for issuing approvals or denials for applications, actual export figures are the responsibility of the Australian Customs Service)⁴. A standing inter-departmental committee of which Defence is a member considers proposals for any defence exports on a case-by-case basis. Consideration of proposals takes into account the impact of a proposed sale based on a number of different criteria ranging from human rights to regional security. Proposals for the export of “dual use items” which might be used in military systems or WMD development and production are monitored carefully to ensure that they are not used in a manner contrary to international instruments to which Australia is a party.

Outlook for the Australia – China defence relationship

22. We are pleased with both the current nature and level of engagement underpinning the Australia –China bilateral defence relationship, particularly high level engagement and educational exchanges. Consequently, we are entering into a new phase in our defence relationship, one of consolidation rather than expansion. We intend to develop existing areas of engagement further and to explore additional cooperation in peacekeeping and counter-terrorism, particularly consequence management, with a view to the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008. Cooperation in both of these areas will be explored further in 2005. While we are comfortable with the current level of between the ADF and PLA there remains scope to encourage greater openness and reciprocity from the PLA. Currently ADF access to the PLA is tightly controlled and often confined to show units.

23. The Australia - China bilateral defence relationship has developed well over recent years and the trends are positive. The strong pattern of senior visits and strategic dialogue between our two militaries contribute to the strength of the defence relationship and assist the relationship in overcoming any challenges. Our defence relationship with China contributes depth and breadth to our engagement with China, thereby complementing the broader bilateral relationship. The maintenance of the Australia - China bilateral defence relationship will continue to remain a high priority for the Australian Government in recognition of both China’s current and future strategic influence.

⁴ Details of successful or denied applications are commercial in confidence and thus are unable to be supplied.

**SENIOR PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY VISITS⁵ TO AUSTRALIA
1999 - 2004**

Senior Officer	Purpose of Visit	Dates of Visit
General Liang Guanglie Chief of the General Staff Central Military Commission (CMC) Member	Counterpart visit	3 – 8 November 2004
Lieutenant General Wang Wenrong Vice President PLA National Defence University	Staff College	24 – 30 October 2004
Major General Li Tiance Head of the Department of Management and Service Support General Staff Department	Functional Visit	22 October 2004
General Xiong Guangkai Deputy Director General Staff Department	To attend the 8 th Annual Australia – China Strategic Dialogue (military to military) talks	17 – 19 October 2004
Air Vice Marshal Lin Hongsong Deputy Commandant PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Command College	To attend biennial Air Power conference	15 – 17 September 2004
Rear Admiral Li Guang Director General Security Department General Political Department	Functional Visit	23 – 28 May 2004
General Ge Zhengfeng Executive Deputy Director General Staff Department	Counterpart Visit	30 November – 5 December 2003
Vice Admiral Yao Xingyuan Deputy Commander PLA Navy (PLAN)	Navy training delegation visit	23 – 28 November 2003
Lieutenant General Xu Genchu Vice President Academy of Military Sciences	Staff College Visit	27 September – 3 October 2003
Major General Li Erbing PLA Nanjing University of Science and Engineering		13 - 15 April 2003
Major General Sun Junzhe Director Political Command PLAAF Major General Ruan Chaoyang Director General Equipment Department of the PLAAF	To attend Avalon Air Show	10 – 13 February 2003
General Xiong Guangkai Deputy Chief General Staff Department	To attend 6 th Annual Australia – China Strategic Dialogue (military to military) talks	21 – 26 October 2002
Major General Du Yunsheng Chief of Construction and Housing, General Logistics Department	Functional Visit	14 – 19 October 2002
Major General Yang Wenxiu Major General Liu Jinlong Deputy Political Commissar Guangzhou Regional Air Command	Visit to attend RAAF Aerospace Conference	24 – 30 May 2002
General Qian Shugen Deputy Director General Staff Department	Counterpart Visit	1 – 6 April 2002
Admiral Shi Yunsheng Commander of PLAN	Counterpart Visit	5 – 7 March 2002

⁵ This table includes official visits only and does not incorporate transits through Australia by Senior PLA Officers.

General Liu Shutian Political Commissar Guangzhou Military Region	Headquarters Joint Operations Command – Guangzhou Military Region relationship	3 – 9 February 2002
Rear Admiral Yang Fucheng Deputy Commander South Sea Fleet	Visit to accompany port visit by PLAN Ships YICHANG and TAICANG	2 – 7 October 2001
Lieutenant General Zhou Youliang Deputy Chief General Logistics Department	Guest of Inspector General	19 – 26 August 2001
Lieutenant General Jing Xueqin Deputy Commander of PLAAAF	Visit to attend RAAF Aerospace Conference	15 – 22 July 2001
Major General Qu Guifu Deputy Director of Research National Defence University	Visit to attend Centre of Defence and Strategic Studies Conference	17 – 20 May 2001
Major General Luo Yudong Chief of Military Intelligence Department	Intelligence Liaison	3 – 7 May 2001
General Zhang Wannian CMC Vice Chairman	Counterpart Visit	29 March – 5 April 2001
Major General Tan Shi Lu Deputy Chief of Staff Chendu Military Region	Visit to attend Higher Defence Management Seminar	18 – 25 November 2000
General Yuan Shoufang Deputy Director- General General Political Department	Functional Visit	12 – 18 November 2000
General Xiong Guangkai Deputy Chief General Staff Department	Visit to attend 4 th Annual Strategic Dialogue talks	6 – 11 November 2000
Major General Zhan Yongsheng Chief of Armament Department	Functional Visit	26 October – 2 November 2000
General Xing Shizhong President PLA National Defence University	Staff College Visit	30 April – 6 May 2000
General Liu Shun Yao Commander of the PLAAF	Counterpart Visit	8 – 14 March 2000
General Yu Yongbo Director General General Political Department CMC Member	Counterpart Visit	11 – 18 November 1999
Major General Xu Xinde Deputy Chief General Staff Department	Staff College Visit	29 May – 7 June 1999
Lieutenant General Song Wenhan Chief of Staff Guangzhou Military Region	Headquarters Joint Operations Command – Guangzhou Military Region relationship	23 – 28 February 1999.
General Fu Qanyou Chief General Staff Department	Counterpart Visit	20 – 24 January 1999

**SENIOR AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE ORGANISATION VISITS TO CHINA
1999 – 2004**

Senior Officer	Purpose of Visit	Dates of Visit
Air Marshall Angus Houston Chief of the Air Force	Counterpart Visit	5 –9 December 2004
Mr Shane Carmody Deputy Secretary Strategy	To attend the ASEAN Regional Forum Defence Officials' Dialogue	3 -6 November 2004
Rear Admiral Rowan Moffitt Maritime Commander Australia	In conjunction with HMAS ANZAC visit to Qingdao	8 – 14 October 2004
Rear Admiral Marc Bonser Commander Australian Defence College	Staff College Visit	16 – 23 September 2004
General Peter Cosgrove Chief of the Defence Force	Counterpart Visit	27 – 31 August 2004
Mr Ross Bain Assistant Secretary Governance and Counter Proliferation	To attend Department of Foreign Affairs/ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Australia – China Regional Security and Arms Control (political to military) talks.	21 – 24 March 2004
Rear Admiral Marc Bonser Deputy Chief of Joint Operations	Headquarters Joint Operations Command – Guangzhou Military Region relationship	27 February - 3 March 2004
Mr Ben Coleman Assistant Secretary Asia	To attend ASEAN Regional Forum Defence Officials' Dialogue	17 – 22 November 2003
Vice Admiral Russ Shalders Vice Chief of the Defence Force Ms Myra Rowling First Assistant Secretary International Policy	To attend the 7 th Annual Australia - China Strategic Dialogue (military to military) talks	15 – 18 October 2003
Senator Robert Hill Minister for Defence	Counterpart Visit	23 – 29 September 2003
Mr Paul Varsanyi Principal Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies	Staff College Visit	14 – 17 September 2003
Lieutenant General Peter Leahy Chief of Army	Counterpart Visit	28 –31 May 2003
Mr Claude Neumann Inspector-General	Counterpart Visit	30 March – 6 April 2003
Major General Jim Molan Commander Australian Defence College	Staff College Visit	9 – 17 October 2002
Rear Admiral Raydon Gates Maritime Commander Australia	In conjunction with HMAS SYDNEY visit to Qingdao	23 – 27 September 2002
Mr Frank Lewincamp Director Defence Intelligence Organisation	Intelligence Liaison	3 – 6 June 2002
Lieutenant General Des Mueller Vice Chief of the Defence Force Dr Richard Brabin-Smith Deputy Secretary Strategy	To attend the 5 th Annual Australia – China Strategic Dialogue (military to military) talks.	21 – 27 October 2001
Rear Admiral Raydon Gates Commander Australian Defence College	Staff College Visit	4 – 11 September 2001
Mr Peter Reith Minister for Defence	Counterpart Visit	1 – 3 March 2001
Mr Frank Lewincamp Director Defence Intelligence Organisation	Intelligence Liaison	6 – 12 October 2000

Air Vice Marshal Treloar Deputy Chief of Joint Operations (formerly Commander Australian Theatre)	Headquarters Joint Operations Command – Guangzhou Military Region relationship	5 –9 June 2000
Admiral Chris Barrie Chief of the Defence Force	Counterpart Visit	19 – 28 April 2000
Mr Allan Behm Head International Policy	To attend Department of Foreign Affairs/ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Security and Disarmament talks.	December 1999
Air Vice Marshal Brendan O’Loughlin Commander Australian Defence College	Staff College Visit	30 October – 16 November 1999
Rear Admiral Jonathan Lord Maritime Commander	In conjunction with HMAS ADELAIDE visit to Shanghai and Hong Kong	26 October – 3 November 1999
Air Marshal Doug Riding Vice Chief of the Defence Force	To attend the 3rd Annual Australia – China Strategic Dialogue (military to military) talks	12 – 18 October 1999
Mr Claude Neumann Inspector General	Visit at the invitation of the Deputy Auditor-General of the People’s Liberation Army Audit Office.	24 June – 1 July 1999
Mr John Moore Defence Minister	Counterpart Visit	20-25 May 1999

**ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY SHIP VISITS TO CHINA AND
PEOPLES' LIBERATION ARMY NAVY SHIP VISITS TO AUSTRALIA
1999 – 2004**

Ship (s)	Port Visited	Dates of Visit
MV XUE LONG	Hobart	26 – 29 March 1999
HMAS PERTH	Hong Kong	18 – 21 April 1999
HMAS ADELAIDE	Hong Kong	24 – 28 October 1999
HMAS ADELAIDE	Shanghai	30 October – 2 November 1999
YUAN WANG No 4	Fremantle	2 – 9 November 1999
MV XUE LONG	Fremantle	20 – 24 November 1999
MV XUE LONG	Fremantle	10 – 14 March 2000
HMAS BRISBANE HMAS CANBERRA HMAS DARWIN	Hong Kong	15 – 21 September 2000
HMAS SUCCESS	Hong Kong	18 – 21 September 2000
HMAS BRISBANE HMAS SUCCESS	Shanghai	24 – 29 September 2000
YUAN WANG No 4	Fremantle	22 – 27 December 2000
HMAS ARUNTA HMAS MELBOURNE HMAS NEWCASTLE HMAS SUCCESS	Hong Kong	11 – 16 April 2001
YICHANG	Sydney	2 – 7 October 2001
MV XUE LONG	Fremantle	11 – 16 March 2002
YUAN WANG No 4	Fremantle	12 – 17 March 2002
YUAN WANG No 4	Fremantle	15 – 18 December 2002
MV XUE LONG	Fremantle	2 – 3 March 2003
HMAS Sydney	Qingdao	25 – 29 September 2002
YUAN WANG No 4	Fremantle	18 – 23 October 2003
YUAN WANG No 1	Fremantle	30 July – 5 August 2004
HMAS ANZAC	Qingdao	10 – 14 October 2004
XUE LONG	Fremantle	10 – 15 November 2004