

Chapter Six

DISSENTING REPORT

Senator Bob Brown, Australian Greens

Senator Natasha Stott Despoja, Australian Democrats

‘Militants may target Australian citizens and interests ... extremists see [tourist hotels] as havens of Western decadence... a tourist hotel in Bali would be an important symbolic target.’ (*ONA Report 27 September 2001*)

Intelligence

6.1 The September 11 attack on the Twin Towers in New York in 2001 was a shocking event, warning the world of the reach, intent and capability of extremist Islamic terrorism.

6.2 Australia's intelligence agencies quickly gathered a considerable amount of information about terrorism in South East Asia and Indonesia itself.

6.3 Within 6 months of the realisation by ASIO in December 2001 that JI had converted to a terrorist organisation, the agencies knew:

- that terrorists were transiting various parts of Indonesia¹ through its very porous borders;
- that they almost certainly had links with international terror networks including al-Qaeda, and links with Hambali, Imam Samudra² and possibly Amrosi and other terrorists who plotted the Bali bombings;
- that there was an abundance of explosives and other material readily available;³
- that terrorist groups had the intention and capability to conduct attacks against Western targets, including soft targets and including Australian interests.⁴

6.4 Australia's intelligence agencies had been in constant communication with their counterparts in the US and elsewhere, and DFAT officials had been monitoring the advice of allied foreign affairs agencies.

1 *Committee Hansard*, 24 September 2003, p. 167 (Richardson, ASIO)

2 *Committee Hansard*, 20 June 2003, p. 71 (O'Malley, ONA)

3 *Committee Hansard*, 28 November 2003, p. 378 (Wardlaw, AFP) and 28 May 2004, p. 435 (O'Malley, ONA)

4 *Submission 2*, p. 3 (ASIO) and *Committee Hansard*, 24 September 2003, p. 148 (O'Malley, ONA) and 27 November 2003, p. 316 (White, ASPI)

6.5 In December 2001, Indonesia was assessed by ASIO as being at high risk of terrorist attack. Thereafter, as every month went by, more and more information emerged about the intensity of that threat and the capacity of the terrorists to realise it. Osama bin Laden and others issued unequivocal warnings to the West, even identifying Australia as a 'crusader' country. The Indonesian government was reluctant to take the necessary action to address it. It is not clear that the Australian Government made any representations to Indonesia to address the increasing threat within its borders.

6.6 In April 2002, the Committee has been told, Australian and US intelligence analysts carried out simulations which canvassed scenarios about possible al-Qaeda action arising out of the dispersement of terrorists from Afghanistan.⁵ The Australian agents were part of group which built a scenario in which Bali became identified as an attractive al-Qaeda target.

6.7 Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Australian tourists—roughly 20,000 per month - continued to flock to Bali, the vast majority of them ignorant of the assessed level of threat, with very few of them apparently having consulted the DFAT Travel Advice pertaining to Indonesia, and probably not one of them aware of ASIO's view that the level of threat across Indonesia, including Bali, was 'HIGH'.

6.8 In June 2002, ONA had become so concerned about the terrorist threat in the region that it sought a face-to-face briefing with the Foreign Minister, Mr Downer. The ONA officials laid out their understanding of JI in particular. In their list of examples of targets that would be attractive to JI was Bali. The minister was told that Islamic extremists had the intent and ability to attack such targets as hotels, bars and airports. The DFAT official who was taking notes at the meeting subsequently briefed other DFAT officers who in turn sought advice from ONA about 'what evidence or theory is behind the idea that terrorists might target western interests in Bali?'.⁶

6.9 In July ASIO reported to QANTAS that the threat across all Indonesia was high, and that Jakarta and Bali could not be considered exempt from attack.

6.10 Intelligence reports kept flowing to the government. These included advice that:

- 'reports of planned terrorist violence in Southeast Asia are coming more frequently';
- 'suicide attacks have not been part of militants' modus operandi in Southeast Asia. But that may be changing'.⁶

5 *Submission 3*, p. 6 (ONA)

6 *Submission 3*, p. 8 (ONA)

- 'we have no collateral for but cannot dismiss reports that Indonesian Islamic extremists intend to launch attacks in Indonesia in August and in Southeast Asia in September'.
- 'protests in support of Islamic law, attacks on Christians, raids on brothels and nightclubs, bomb attacks, or terrorist attacks on US or other Western targets are all possible'.⁷

6.11 The increasingly frequent reports of planned terrorist violence, and the threats to target Western embassies obtained from the custodial interviews of al-Qaeda operative Umar Faruq, triggered DIO to warn of increasing evidence of capability and intent to mount terrorist attacks against Western interests in Indonesia.

6.12 Similar advice was issued on 9 August by ASIO, warning that Indonesian-based Islamic extremists may be planning a series of coordinated 'actions' across Indonesia in the August/September period.

The nature of the action was not well defined but appeared likely to range from demonstrations to terrorist attacks. ASIO assessed the threat of terrorist attack against Australian interests in Indonesia remained HIGH and noted the following:

- The reports suggested Western interests, principally US, but also British and Australian, were among the intended targets.
- The information was fragmentary, uncorroborated and of unknown credibility. Some aspects possibly reflected circular reporting of earlier discredited threats.
- The number and nature of the reports, however, taken in the context of the raised threat in Indonesia, collectively warranted updated threat advice⁸

6.13 However, the Travel Advice to tourists remained unchanged from 2001, at HIGH.

6.14 The de-briefing of al-Qaeda operative Umar Faruq had delivered valuable information into the hands of the intelligence agencies. According to ONA's 13 September 2002 report, Faruq's disclosures 'reinforced earlier reporting that al-Qaeda has access to the extensive Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network criss-crossing Southeast Asia.'

6.15 DIO reported on 26 September 2002, 16 days before the Bali blasts, that:

We assess that local JI capability will restrict any attack to small arms or improvised explosive devices. Although this might obviate mass-casualties,

⁷ Submission 3, p. 8 (ONA)

⁸ Submission 2, p. 5 (ASIO)

if timing and location come together a large number of casualties could result.⁹

6.16 In the post-September 11 2001 context, the regional intelligence picture—if still seeming somewhat surreal—was well fleshed out. In the case of Indonesia, it was a frightening picture, and it was staring Australian government decision-makers in the face.

6.17 Unlike most other Indonesian islands, Bali did not have a Muslim majority but did have a great concentration of nightclubs, bars and hotels seen as 'soft targets'. Bali was a highly predictable target, attracting some 1.4 million tourists each year. Kuta, with its nightclubs, bars and other congregating points, had a population of perhaps 7,000 Westerners, principally Australians, on 12 October 2002. Three of every four Australians visiting Indonesia were in Bali. It was a prime target and the government had been alerted.

Travel advice

6.18 During the first half of 2002, while intelligence agencies were becoming increasingly agitated about the terrorist threat in Indonesia, DFAT's Indonesian Travel Advice was not commensurate with that agitation. It was not until July 2002 that the Travel Advice began to pick up on the dangers.

6.19 Even so, the warnings in the Travel Advice, to the extent that they did refer to terrorist activity, were hardly likely to raise much concern in the mind of the would-be Bali tourist. While there were references to bombs having exploded, including in areas frequented by tourists, the headline in each Travel Advice concluded with the words: 'Tourism services elsewhere in Indonesia are operating normally, including Bali'.

6.20 While "operating normally" in the sense that there had been no disruptions to tourism services in Bali, those services were nevertheless operating under a significant threat of terrorism. For this reason, the reference in the travel advice to tourism services operating normally was misleading. Not only did it fail to counter the average tourist's false perception that Bali was especially safe, but it fostered the misconception that Bali was exempted from HIGH risk.

6.21 The public advice regarding tourism services in Bali 'operating normally' did not accurately reflect the intelligence available to the Government. Bali was a predictable target. It was mentioned as a possible target to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in June 2002 and it had been the location of a fictional attack in a training scenario involving Australian intelligence officers.

9 DIO Answers to Questions on Notice, p. 5.

6.22 Given the thousands of Australians in Bali at any given time, coupled with the evidence concerning soft targets and the fact that Bali had been mentioned as a predictable terrorist target, the travel advice should not only have sought to counter the prevalent view that Bali was a safe haven, but should have specifically warned that tourist areas including Bali were highly threatened.

Findings

6.23 In terms of DFAT's Travel Advice, the main Committee report has argued cogently that it failed to contain the one factual piece of advice that was most relevant to tourists travelling to Bali was that Bali was just as much at risk of terrorist attack as anywhere else in Indonesia.

6.24 The DFAT Travel Advice failed to counter the flawed assumption embedded in the mind of the average Australian tourist—that Bali was a safe haven. It failed to convey adequate warning to travellers to Bali.

6.25 Australia had significant intelligence about the extent and imminence of the terrorist threat to Australian interests in South-east Asia more generally. It was clear that groups in Indonesia had the intent, capability and resources to mount terrorist attacks, and that Australian interests were not exempt from this high risk.

6.26 This risk was evolving in a context that included:

- calls by al-Qaeda for an international jihad against the West;
- Indonesia's domestic political situation which had become increasingly precarious and unstable;
- the invasion of Afghanistan (involving Australia), and events in Palestine, being regarded by many Muslims as an attack on Islam
- a diaspora of fighters in SE Asia after the fall of the Taliban;
- simmering resentment in Indonesia about Australia's actions in East Timor; and
- a statement by Osama bin Laden specifically condemning Australian 'crusader forces'.

6.27 The Australian government was receiving regular and more insistent reports that conveyed a consistent upgrading of the level of threat, not only in the regular written reports of the agencies, but in meetings and briefings at high levels of officials up to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

6.28 When ONA briefed Minister Downer about JI in June 2002, the Minister inappropriately asked ONA officials for advice about whether consular advice should be changed. ONA is *not* a policy agency—its task is intelligence assessments. The Minister did *not* ask the DFAT official present to develop advice from the relevant sections of DFAT (namely SE Asia Division, Consular Branch and the Australian Embassy in Jakarta) and to report back to him.

6.29 It was a serious lapse. The minister, having been briefed personally about an issue considered to be of sufficient seriousness to warrant a face-to-face discussion with the head of Australia's peak intelligence agency and key officials, then failed to ask his Department to provide formal advice on the matter. Especially is this so when it was the minister himself who, as a result of the ONA briefing and the examples of Western targets they judged to be on JI's hit-list, immediately thought of the implications for consular advice.

6.30 The government was not alerted or, if it was, no commensurate public action ensued. Mr Downer could have taken the evidence of the danger of an attack to cabinet. He could have used his considerable influence to persuade the Indonesian authorities, who appeared unwilling to recognise the terrorist danger, to act. The minister's inaction contributed to Australia's unpreparedness for the attack in Bali.

6.31 More recently Mr Downer said of the FBI's failure to pass on to Canberra, from the Jabara interrogation in August 2002, the Bali bombing mastermind Hambali's intention to attack 'soft targets' in the region. "I am sure it was nothing more than an oversight, but it wouldn't have added to the sum total of the knowledge we had ...".

6.32 The Minister's comment is unsatisfactory and the Jabara episode warrants more scrutiny and analysis.

6.33 It is not possible for this committee to judge whether the destructive intent of the Bali bombers might have been interdicted.

6.34 The limitations on the committee, and the gravity of the issues which have not been resolved, warrant the recommendation of a judicial inquiry into the Bali bombings.

Recommendation

A Royal Commission should be set up to fully assess the performance of agencies and government in the lead up to the Bali bombings on 12 October 2002 and, more particularly, to help prevent any similar attack on Australians or Australian interests in the future.

Senator Bob Brown

Senator Natasha Stott-Despoja

Timeline to terror

Date	Event and source
<u>1998</u>	
	Osama bin Laden states that there is no difference between military personnel and civilians. ASIO, 1.54 ¹⁰
<u>1999</u>	
April 19	Terrorists bomb Istiqlal Mosque, Jakarta (?JI).
April	ONA co-ordinates National Assessment dealing with Islamic terrorism and Osama bin Laden (OBL). Conclusion: The main danger to Australian interests is collateral damage from attacks on US or UK targets, including in the Asia Pacific. ONA, 1.38
April	Possibility of OBL links with Indonesian terror groups such as Laskar Jihad being explored. ASIO, 1.39
1999--2000	Thousands slaughtered in Moluku in Islam extremist attacks on Christians and retaliation. JI involved.
<u>2000</u>	
During 2000	ONA advises: 'the security apparatus that has held militant Islam in check has been gradually dismantled and Islamic Jihad groups, such as those now operating in Maluku, could become a permanent threat to communal harmony elsewhere in Indonesia ...'. ONA, 1.41
August	DIO reports that Al-Qaeda has 'the potential to influence terrorist action elsewhere in the world through its support and encouragement of proxy terrorist organizations'. DIO, 1.42
August—September	Two embassies and the Indonesian Stock Exchange bombed in Jakarta.

10 References are to the paragraph numbers in the main report

Late 2000	ONA Research Report notes that in Indonesia ‘militant groups are becoming more assertive; they could increasingly turn to terrorism’. ONA, 1.43
December 24	Christmas Eve bombings of churches in four Indonesian cities (by Hambali, Imam Samudra and others, but this is not then evident).
December 28	Pekanburu church bombed. Singapore police later blame JI.
<u>2001</u>	
	JI runs 'dozens' of training camps throughout Indonesia.
Early 2001	ONA convened a meeting to inform intelligence collectors of the higher priority it was giving to radical Islam in Indonesia and its external links. ‘Collection agencies made a concerted effort to increase coverage of Islamic extremists....’. ONA, 1.44
May	DIO indicated that ‘Indonesia provide(s) fertile ground for extremist groups with diverse motivations and international connections’.
July 22	Gereja HKBP bombed in Jakarta (?JI). DIO, 1.46
August 1	Atrium Mall (Christian church) bombing in Jakarta by JI (Imam Samudra later found to be responsible).
August 15	Jakarta Embassy <i>Bulletin to Australian Citizens Living in Indonesia</i> : ‘Bali is calm and tourist services are operating normally. Australian tourists on Bali should observe the same prudence as tourists in other parts of the country’. DFAT, 2.38
August	DFAT Travel Advice: ‘Tourist services are operating normally on Bali and Lombok’. 2.36
September	Research project by ONA and its US counterparts reports that ‘of more immediate concern is the potential for growth of Islamic militancy and international Islamic terrorism, especially given the difficulties Jakarta is likely to face in restoring law and order’ ONA, 1.45

September	DIO reported 'extensively on the growth of radical and extremist Islam in the region consistently and well before September 2001'. There was 'clear agreement across the (intelligence) community about extremism and the capacity for terrorist attacks within South-East Asia'. DIO, 1.46
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September 23	Jakarta's Atrium Mall bombed again.
September 27	<p>ONA report states:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • '... The threats by Muslim extremists of violence against the citizens and assets of the US and its close allies must be taken seriously'; • 'Militants may target Australian citizens and interests'; • A tourist hotel in Bali would be an important symbolic target'. <p>(It also observed that there was: 'no sign that Laskar Jihad plans to target hotels on Lombok or Bali though extremists see them as havens of Western decadence'). ONA, 1.49</p>
September 28	<p>ASIO raised the threat level for Australian interests in Indonesia to HIGH, based on :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'reporting indicating that a number of Islamic groups in Indonesia were taking a unified approach against US-led actions directed at al-Qaeda'. • 'these groups regarded Australia as a 'soft target' alternative to the US ...'. ASIO, 1.52
2001—2002	<p>Between the New York bombings and Bali bombings, ONA hosts 13 meetings of the National Intelligence Collection Requirements Committee to provide guidance on terrorism collection priorities. ONA, 1.50</p> <p>ASIO made 'dramatic resource reallocations': 'We devoted our resources overwhelmingly to counter-terrorism'. ASIO, 1.51</p>

17 OCTOBER AUSTRALIA SENDS TROOPS TO AFGHANISTAN

October 17	ASIO considers the Afghanistan deployment to have raised Australia's profile as a terrorist target but that the announcement itself did not change the threat of terrorist attack in Australia or against Australian interests abroad. ASIO, 1.53
November 3	Osama bin Laden (OBL) broadcast names Australia and 'crusader Australian forces'. 1.54
November 9	Church bombed in north Jakarta.
November 9	<p>The OBL statement 'must be seen within the context of (O)BL statements since 1996, which consistently have laid down general markers for subsequent terrorist action'. ASIO, 1.54</p> <p>'Looked at against (Osama bin Laden)'s track record, ASIO considers this statement will have force, and significance, for at least the next 18 months.'</p> <p>'the statement will be seen as particular encouragement for individuals or groups in Indonesia who are followers of (O)BL, and who may have the capability to commit violent acts. More importantly however, (O)BL's al-Qaeda network does have the capability and means to carry out an act of terrorism in Indonesia. The only question in respect of Australian interests there, is one of intent. In this context, since at least 1998, (O)BL has been explicit in stating there is no distinction between military personnel and civilians; both Australian official representation in Jakarta and other identifiable Australian interests certainly would be seen as extensions of the Australian "crusader" forces.'</p>
November 9	DFAT 'determined that the (travel) advisories did not need further strengthening'. DFAT, 3.56
Early November	Grenade thrown into the grounds of the Australian International School in Jakarta, clearly showing the increased threat to Australians in Indonesia. 1.55
November	US agencies convinced of links between OBL and south-east Asian radical Islamic groups: eg al-Qaeda training camp in Sulawesi revealed. 1.56
November 29	ONA report notes 'unsubstantiated' claims of international terrorist camps in Indonesia. ONA, 1.56

November 29	Laskar Jihad 'says it will establish a presence in Lombok as a platform for ridding Bali and nearby island of non-Muslim communities'. ONA, 1.57
December 2	Riau church attack. Man paid by Imam Samudra arrested and jailed.
December	Jemaah Islamiyah conversion to a terrorist organisation recognised after the Singapore bombings plot and capture and interrogation of terrorists. ASIO, 1.58
December	Report on 146 organisations: 'Many younger Indonesian Muslims have been attracted to the ideas of Osama bin Laden These external influences have also inculcated a belief that it is legitimate for Indonesian Muslims to engage in jihad anywhere within Indonesian borders'. ONA, 1.60
<u>2002</u>	
	Clive Williams: 'In 2002 there was perhaps a failure to pick up on the growing anger among Indonesian Muslim extremists about the US-led war on terror and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.' 1.62
January	Dr Gunaratna: Al-Qaeda operative Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi's testimony revealed: 'a huge network of trained al-Qaeda operatives and sympathisers at work in South East Asia, about which more will doubtless be learned in the months and years ahead'. 1.74
January 6	SE Asia offers 'a range of soft and symbolic targets for anti-Western Islamic terrorists' and the most 'vulnerable and numerous of Western interests in the region are tourists and expatriate business people'. DIO, 1.61
January 16	ONA and ASIO: Joint report outlines 'planned terrorist attacks against Western targets in Singapore' and the evolution of Jemaah Islamiyah into a terrorist organisation. 1.63
February 21	DIO report notes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'there must be individual associations between JI members and al Qaeda'. • 'We cannot discount the possibility [of operational terrorist cells] as detection of cells is likely to be difficult ...' • 'Weapons and explosives expertise is freely available in the region, and high-interest individuals can be difficult to track

'. 1.64, 1.65
April	<p>ONA attends US-sponsored seminar where the consensus is that terrorist activities are likely to be dispersed, with al-Qaeda contributing to operations in various parts of the world.</p> <p>One scenario canvassed the possibility of terrorist attack on tourist facilities in Bali.</p> <p>"We actually used the scenario of al-Qaeda elements linking up with terrorists in South-East Asia and attacking Bali"1.66, 1.67</p>
Early 2002	Al-Qaeda has 'a presence in Indonesia which gives it the capability to conduct terrorist acts in and from Indonesia'. ONA, 1.68
Early 2002	We (ONA) 'were concerned that there was a local capability in Indonesia that was not necessarily reliant on al-Qaeda ... we were in fact dealing with a homegrown movement ... this was a pretty hard message to sell at the time...'. ONA, 1.70
May	<p>"Globalising Terror" seminar at University of Tasmania attended by experts on terrorism.</p> <p>A. Muir: 'The modern world ... provides terrorist groups with a plethora of potential targets (including) ... a vast array of people and facilities associated with the burgeoning tourism industry ... In terms of bombing targets there is a well discernable trend for attacking the softer vulnerabilities of liberal democratic states, primarily those of a social and economic nature.'</p> <p>Dr Rohan Gunaratna's report '<i>The Bomb and Terror: trends and possibilities</i>' notes the January 2002 al-Ghozi testimony and describes JI spiritual leader Abu Bakr Bashiyar as 'most vocal, always exhorting the people to join the jihad ... and utterly opposed to compromise'. 1.71, 1.72, 1.73, 1.74</p>
June	Al-Qaeda's Omar al-Faruq spirited out of Indonesia for interrogation.
June	ONA wanted to 'draw to the Government's attention by means other than written reports its conclusions on the existence of a regional extremist network with connections to al-Qaeda'. ONA, 1.75
June 18--19	<p>Foreign Minister Downer briefed on 'the domestic, regional and international radical Islamic movements ...and the potential for terrorist activity...from JI in particular'.</p> <p>'We were trying to make the impact on the minister ... and explain</p>

	<p>the danger ... we knew that there was no shortage of explosives available to them in Indonesia ...’.</p> <p>‘Much, but not all, of the briefing was confined to Indonesia.’</p> <p>‘In South-East Asia we knew there was no shortage of explosives and no shortage of weapons. We made these points clear. We said that basically they had the intention, they had the capability, and getting access to the kinds of equipment they needed would be no problem.’</p> <p>The briefing alluded to possible targets including hotels, nightclubs and the airport. ONA, 1.76. 1.77</p>
Late June	<p>Writes to ONA: ‘What evidence/theory is behind the idea that terrorists might target Western interests in Bali?’. No reply. DFAT, 1.192</p>
June 27	<p>‘Al-Qaeda is actively supporting extremists’ in particular fostering ‘a relationship with Jemaah Islamiyah’. ONA, 1.80</p>
July	<p>‘The general threat to Qantas (and) ... to Australian interests in Indonesia (is) currently assessed as HIGH.’</p> <p>‘Australia’s profile as a potential target of terrorist attack by Islamic extremists has been raised by our involvement in the War on Terrorism.’</p> <p>‘Islamic extremists in the region have shown a capability and intent to conduct terrorists attacks ...’</p> <p>‘Islamic extremists associated with both Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and/or al Qa’ida are known to have transited both airports (Jakarta and Denpasar-Bali) in the past.’</p> <p>Hambali ... ‘is still at large in Indonesia.’</p> <p>‘Given the JI presence in Indonesia, neither Jakarta nor Bali could be considered exempt from attack’. ASIO, 1.80</p>
July	<p>Of this period, Mr Denis Richardson recalls ‘we had</p> <p>the threat level to Australian interests in Indonesia at ‘high’ ... We could not separate out Bali from the rest of Indonesia. We were very conscious of the terrorist threat posed by JI and we were very conscious that it could pose a threat quite differently to Laskar Jihad.’ ASIO, 1.83</p>

July 26	‘ ... reports of planned terrorist violence in Southeast Asia are coming more frequently ... suicide attacks have not been part of militants’ modus operandi in Southeast Asia. But that may be changing.’ ONA, 1.84
July 26	<p>‘We ... cannot dismiss reports that Indonesian Islamic extremists intend to launch attacks in Indonesia in August and Southeast Asia in September.’ (pre-Ramadan warning)</p> <p>‘...attacks on Christians, raids on brothels and nightclubs, bomb attacks, or terrorist attacks on US or other Western targets are all possible’. (pre-Ramadan warning) ONA, 1.85, 1.86</p>
July-- August	Warns of increasing evidence of capability and intent to mount terrorist attacks against Western interests in Indonesia (al-Qaeda operative Umar Faruq’s interrogation). DIO, 1.87
August 5	<p>Warns of ‘... increased threat of a terrorist attack against Western targets, possibly in August ... remnants of the regional extremist organization, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), continue to possess the capability and intent to undertake future attacks ...’.</p> <p>JI poses 'a greater threat to foreigners in Indonesia than do domestic extremist groups'. DIO, 1.88</p>
August 9	<p>Warns: Indonesian-based Islamic extremists may be planning a series of coordinated ‘actions’ across Indonesia in the August/September period.</p> <p>The threat of terrorist attack against Australian interests in Indonesia remains HIGH.</p> <p>'Reports suggested Western interests, principally US, but also British and Australian, were among the intended targets. The number and nature of the reports ... collectively warranted updated threat advice.' ASIO, 1.89</p>
August	<p>FBI had interrogated Jabara in US: gained information that Jabara had met (Bali bombing mastermind) Hambali in January 2002: Hambali wanted to hit ‘soft targets’ like bars and nightclubs. FBI fails to tell Canberra. FBI Report</p> <p>Alexander Downer: ‘I am sure it was nothing more than an oversight’. ABC radio, 12.07.04</p>
August 22	Three associates of Imam Samudra (who supplied weapons) rob Banten goldsmith's shop. After October 12, it was alleged this

	robbery helped fund the Bali bombers.
September 13	Jakarta Stock Exchange bombed.
September 13	Interrogation of Umar (Omar) Faruq reinforced earlier reporting that 'al-Qaeda has access to the extensive Jemaah Islamiyah network ...'
September 23	Grenade explodes near US embassy, Jakarta. ONA,
September 23	Time Magazine cover story: Omar al-Faruq's interrogation. He planned to destroy US Jakarta Embassy with a large car bomb. Story says JI boasts a cadre of 20 suicide bombers waiting and ready to carry out attacks.
September 26	"We assess that local JI capability will restrict any attack to small arms or improvised explosive devices. Although this might obviate mass casualties, if timing and location come together a large number of casualties could result.' DIO, 1.93
September 26	Warning to 'all Westerners to avoid large gatherings and locations known to cater primarily to a Western clientele such as certain bars, restaurants and tourist areas' (ASIO did not monitor such State Department advice). US Jakarta Embassy
October 6--8	Statements by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri suggest 'another large scale attack or attacks by al-Qaeda are being prepared'. 1.98
October 10	<p>ONA reports that substantial numbers of terrorists remain free in Southeast Asia, capable of and intent on further attacks...including against US targets in Indonesia.</p> <p>Report states that weapons and explosives are still easily available in Southeast Asia, and that many potential attackers with the requisite skills remain active. Key JI leaders, who have even bigger plans, are still free. ONA, 1.96. 1.97</p>
October 10	<p>ASIO Threat Assessment issued after bin Laden and al-Zawahiri statements -- days earlier -- warning that attacks may be imminent.</p> <p>The assessment noted that: the attacks could be against US interests abroad, including against US allies and, while there is no information specifically related to Australian interests, Australia's profile as a potential terrorist target had increased since 11 September 2001. ASIO, 1.99</p>

OCTOBER 12**BALI BOMBINGS – 202 PEOPLE KILLED**

November 5		Amrozi arrested
November 21		Imam Samudra arrested
December 3		Muklas arrested
<u>2003</u>		
August		Hambali captured in Thailand

Abbreviations

ASIO	Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DIO	Defence Intelligence Organisation
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
ONA	Office of National Assessment