

**SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE  
REFERENCES COMMITTEE**

**INQUIRY INTO RECRUITMENT & RETENTION  
OF DEFENCE PERSONNEL**

**SUBMISSION**

**Submission No:** 91

**Submittor:** Name Withheld

**Address:**

**Telephone No:**

**Fax:**

**E-Mail:**

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# AN ARMY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

## COMMENTS ON THE PAPER

1. The relationship between the Regular and Reserve elements needs further clarification (page 2.) We should be able to clearly define our role and establish a force structure that will allow this role to be carried out in peace and war. The traditional view of the Reserve as a reserve combat component to be committed after the primary force is only one facet of the operation of Reserves. The Reserve has a local defence role within Australia and low level regional role for defence of vital assets.
2. In recent history, the Reserve forces have been a valuable recruitment medium for the Regular Army. This is particularly true of some of the critical areas such as Medical where there is a requirement to employ Reserves so that Exercises can even function. In 1991 during the Gulf War, Reservists served on US ships as part of the UN Medical support force. The Regular Army is often unable to provide sufficient medical support to operations as was evidenced in Kangaroo '95 where medical teams were redeployed to meet each new offensive operation.
3. Although there are no results readily available, Officers in the Reserve graduating from OCTU and University Regiments have been accepted into the Regular Army to perform essential functions. These Reserve Officers have provided a cost effective supplement to other systems of Officer production involving training at Duntroon and ADFA.
4. An Army Reserve having a similar demographic distribution to the population around Australia will provide an secure base for expansion of the Army in times of war. It will allow us to provide a broad recruiting base and assist in the development of national pride and a sense of security in the ability of our armed forces.
5. The Ready Reserve provided an alternative to the Regular Army where soldiers were prepared to a state of readiness in their first 12 months of service which was similar to their regular Army counterparts. The cost of production of this force was possibly 5 to 10 times the cost of a similar size Reserve force. A larger Reserve force would seem preferable to a smaller Ready Reserve force in times of peace providing there is sufficient lead time to bring the Reserve forces up to an acceptable state of readiness. The concept of 180 days warning seems too long!
6. If a Ready Reserve type force is felt to be essential, then empower a Reserve force of say one or two Brigades to assume a role of this nature. Give them priority for training days and opportunity to attend specialist courses to achieve a higher level of training than their counterparts in other units.

7. Page 6. The concept of citizen soldiers will provide our Armed Services with a wide cross-section of expertise often not found in the Regular forces. Jobs such as transport supervisors of large movement organisations, Information Technologists, nurses, police and similar professions are essential to our force structure as we are unable to generate appropriate work for these professionals in a limiting Regular Army environment.
8. Page 5. A Reserve force represents a group of volunteers who provide a rank structure and training structure that cannot be duplicated quickly or easily in time of conflict.
9. Page 6. - Development of the concept of 'credible contingencies' may need further reinforcement. The defence of vital assets over perhaps the Eastern seaboard may be of greater relevance than always looking North for these assets exclusively. Training in other areas of Australia will fulfil a credible role for the Reserve.
10. Page 7 - Reserve forces during K'95 not only worked with the Orangelander force, but Reservists worked in the Northern Command HQ, with the Joint Exercise Control as umpires and Liaison Officers coordinating tactical plans and force activities. Reserve forces provided critical support to the Exercise with operational support to augment the Regular forces. Norforce provided essential intelligence which allowed Commanders to move about the region with some confidence about the level of enemy activity. The Reserve provided invaluable operational and logistic support to the operation of K'95.
11. The Defence Efficiency Review chaired by Malcolm MacIntosh identified a role for much of the non-technical component of Defence force operations to be outsourced. The Army Reserve with its variety of levels of expertise can provide this outsourced capability. Much of the training component particularly for Officers in the Reserve has been designed and implemented across Australia through a series of Training Group organisations. These Training Groups provide a regional resource for the development and delivery of training to all elements of the Armed Forces. The role for Regional Learning Centres using the flexible delivery techniques of the Internet and CD-ROM technology will reduce the reliance on Individual Training Centres. The use of simulation will reduce the need for training in our vehicles and weapons systems. We will follow the lead of our pilot training simulators to reduce the training cost and cost of training areas currently required for our equipment's.
12. Page 8. A21 needs to develop a rational cost effective plan to move both Regular and Reserve units forward into the next millennium. The different capabilities of a Reserve soldier and the Regular counterpart should be recognised rather than trying to bring both entities up to the same standard of training when there is clearly an expensive overhead involved in attempting to maintain Reserve training levels at the same standard as their Regular counterpart.
13. Page 9. The identification of a Task Force as the most appropriate size of a deployable Joint force HQ may need further development to incorporate a Reserve component to provide the command and control requirements for Reserve training and deployment. It is essential that Reserve elements remain involved in every aspect of operational deployment and logistic support considerations in the planning and implementation of activities. The TFHQ need to have the capacity for joint force command & control. This was a clearly identified deficiency throughout K'95 both with the Brigade HQ operation and the Northern Command HQ function where the appropriate resources for Navy and air force were not placed Under Command of the local commander.
14. Page 10. In many Public Service departments experiencing budget cuts and pressure to outsource the first to be affected are the contract and weekly paid employees. Such is the case historically with the Reserve. Over the past 5 years there have been significant restrictions placed on Reserve Force operations by reductions in Training Days, cuts in vehicle miles, availability of rations and ammunition to name just a few. As a part-time training force, the ability of the Reserve to react to sudden changes in funding or policy may take longer to implement and disseminate than in a Regular Force structure. There is often no consideration given to this part-time feature when timeframes are decided for 'all-of-Army' planning.

15. Page 11. The way in which we focus on Northern Australia and the deployment of much of our strategic resources into the 'Combat Zone' must be questioned. In peacetime, the development of an infrastructure to support partners and families for our service personnel in Darwin and Tindall will require a large infrastructure and potential high wastage rate as we maintain forces in a potentially harsh environment away from other family members and support groups. The cost of training and resupply to the North would appear significantly higher than the use of training areas closer to our major population centres.
16. Page 12. The location of HQ Northern Command and RAAF Base Darwin are both prominent targets and are vulnerable to destruction by a relatively small force operating at the commencement of any conflict. Without the airport and command & control structures, a large group of Service organisations based in the Northern Territory become more vulnerable. For Reserve force development, recruitment and retention across Northern Australia will be expensive when compared to the existing infrastructure further South.
17. Will the defence of Northern Australia be the mostly likely scenario for our development into the next millennium? Over the past 10 years our most creditable threat or operational deployment has been the support of UN Peacekeepers in SE Asia and Africa. Incidents recently in Fiji and Bougainville would probably be a more realistic scenario that require a more mobile ready reaction force that perhaps does not need all of the 'high tech' equipment that we have purchased over this period. Army may need to look more closely at its requirement for short duration amphibious operations using reinforced battalions as the joint force operational arm. The role of the Reserve in this type of scenario would be to provide infrastructure and support after the initial operation to restore order to the community under minimum threat and hostilities.
18. Page 14A. Although the latest K Series exercise (K95) was used as a training and testing activity for Reserve forces, there was the intention to give each Reserve unit a separate AO and a very reduced operational tasking. The impression of many was that the involvement of Reserve forces was almost a 'bolt-on' afterthought rather than an integrated team approach. Two elements in the areas of Weipa and Katherine were given limited roles and little enemy activity and the Headquarters in Darwin played 'lip-service' to the Reserve activities in their respective AO.
19. The three Services should develop contingency plans that give a creditable role for the Reserves of those Services which will then clearly identify the training requirements. The integration of some Reserve forces into the operational structures should be encouraged provided that it involves a sharing of the operational responsibility and not just an appeasement to a community expectation or Government preference.
20. The size and organisation of the Reserve needs revisiting. As there are moves to rationalise Units and centralise resources we should constantly reassess the role as a requirement of our operational and training objectives. The regional base of the Reserves should be encouraged to allow the youth of Australia to take advantage of Reserve training without having to travel large distances or move to larger population centres to do so. The depletion of jobs and employment opportunities in Rural Australia is encouraging an exodus into major population centres and secondary industry employment.
21. Should Reserves have a greater civil defence role deployed to cyclone or bushfire ravaged areas? The training and infrastructure capacity of the Reserve may enhance the recovery requirement of regions hit by natural disasters. This type of training would change the role somewhat and provide higher levels of community acceptance of the role of the Armed services in peacetime. The acceptance of a civil defence role would allow for some specialisation by regions for various types of emergency situations.
22. Page 14 E. The Defence Efficiency Review does not appear to address any relativity issues between Regular and Reserve components. The pre-occupation with the sale of depots and training areas depict a short term monetary gain to fund other developments and the equipping of a larger operational deployment force. The Report fails to address the integration issues and the ability of

the Reserve to pick up many of the functions that may be dispersed with or outsourced.

23. Page 16. The debate on training days is relevant. It is interesting to note that whenever pressure is placed on Regular Army policies concerning training requirements, there has been a reduction in time taken to complete that training. Experiments are currently being undertaken to trial a 5 week recruit course for Regular and Reserve soldiers. The integration of Regular and Reserve Officers on the Intermediate Operations course has identified a reduction in training time from 5 to 4 weeks. There is still a reluctance to recognise that many of our existing and potential new Reserve members will have some difficulty in obtaining more than two weeks leave of absence from employers. Many Reservists are taking annual leave to fulfil their requirement. The idea of conducting 5 week recruit courses and 7 week first appointment courses at Duntroon will severely restrict the type and number of persons progressing in the Army Reserve. The role of part-time training establishments such as Training Groups and University Regiments should be fostered and enhanced to provide training for Reserve and Regular personnel who will not have the time to attend courses away from the workplace for long periods of time.
24. Project Wellesley appeared to have as its premise that centralised training was the only cost effective alternative with the quality control aspects being managed by Individual Training Establishments controlling delivery. The Defence Efficiency Review now talks of alternative forms of delivery, regionalisation of training and outsourcing some of the non technical training. The result of these various reviews has been to throw a level of uncertainty on Reserve training and threaten the so-far successful operation of Reserve Training Groups at a cost that is a fraction of the cost of the equivalent Regular Army training establishments.
25. Page 19. Suggestions that the wastage rate in the Reserve is high and that the effectiveness of operation of Reserve units is called into question. In an environment where the training days allocation varies from 26 to about 50 days per year per active serving member is clearly not sufficient to maintain entry level training skills. Units are usually burdened with high equipment maintenance requirements and limited deployment skills for camps and exercise. Many of the Reserve Brigade units have a limited opportunity to participate in major exercises and can usually only take a select few to these important training activities. During these independent exercises they have little interface with their Regular Army counterparts. The concept of ARTEP's to test a form of operational efficiency was dropped during the early 80's because of costs and perceived difficulties in preparation of Reservists for this challenge.
26. In the Reserve system the wastage rates may in part be attributed to a perceived difference in training opportunities to those consistently portrayed in the advertisements on television. Restrictions on track miles for armoured vehicles, ammunition and pyrotechnics, helicopter and air support to Reserve units and a limited 'realism' in training all contribute to retention problems. It is interesting to note that when Units are preparing for high profile involvement in exercises such as K95 or Tasman Exchange, we see retention rates improve in reserve Units as the soldiers perceive they are doing something 'worthwhile' and interesting.
27. For many years there has been discussion about rewards and incentives for extending service in the Reserve. Little has happened. Eligibility for Service loans for housing were discussed, the Efficiency Grant of the 70's provided some stimulus to retention and the provision of superannuation and long service entitlements have often been discussed. The provision of these as basic entitlements of Reserve service is long overdue. Service personnel who retire from the services are sometimes lucky to receive a commendation from a senior commander which is little recompense for the additional time and effort they have put into their career in the military. The so called tax free incentive of the Reserve pay scales is little comfort for many Reservists who put in significant amounts of unpaid time to ensure that their Unit performs its assigned tasks.
28. The regional distribution of Reserve brigades should be preserved. (page 26) It is essential that a Reserve HQ takes into account the patterns of activity appropriate to the needs of their soldiers. Seasonal difficulties in rural communities and economic pressures in urban centres will place additional demands on Reserve personnel that are unique to this form of service. The immediate availability of Regular forces for tasking and deployment is often seen as a disadvantage in the use

of Reserve to Regular personnel tasking. The Brigade structure is the smallest structure giving a functional HQ with elements of other Arms and Services that can support the units under its command.

29. Page 27. The recent proposal to send Engineers and Medical teams to remote corners of Australia to assist in improving living conditions of indigenous people at first glance would seem like a noble cause. In civilian circles we read of the difficulties in getting our doctors and nurses to move and work in rural towns within reasonable proximity to major cities. It is unlikely that the military will be able to sustain a group of Engineers or Medical personnel in outback Australia for any significant time doing community service work. It may however provide an excellent role for a series of now disbanded Field Ambulance units and field hygiene teams to go for annual exercises into some of these areas on project work for 2 or 3 weeks. Engineers could pre-position stores and equipment ready for a Reserve force to move into the area and construct, clear, rebuild etc a community project task.
30. There is significant discussion throughout the paper about the role of 2<sup>nd</sup> Division in keys tasks of protection, mobilisation and vital asset protection. The need of the HQ in itself will provide command & leadership training at the Operational Level requirement of training. The lack of an appropriate HQ for the Reserve would mean that staff could only obtain that level of training by attachment or posting to the Regular Division HQ. This would be difficult to structure into the career management of Officers and cause some problems in geographical dispositions. The demise of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Division has meant a significant reduction in operational training to staff in the Southern States of Australia, particularly in Victoria which has traditionally been a base for a significant recruiting effort.
31. Page 28. The profile of the Army Reserve will change if the entry points require a 6 weeks Recruit Training, and a further full-time component for Corps Training. The Legislation introduced during National Service in the late 60's has given government public servants the right to attend a 2 week camp or exercise at full pay from the employer and 2 weeks of made up pay. This 'incentive' has swelled the proportion of public servants enlisting and remaining in the Reserves where their counterpart in free enterprise has struggled under an Employer Support Scheme that relied largely on good faith of employers to grant leave without pay to attend Reserve training. Long periods of continuous training would disadvantage both groups and reduce the capacity to attract tertiary students and graduates which is a requirement in the preparation and development of ARA Officers. Reserve availability for continuous training will be limited unless employers are compensated and the structure of tertiary studies is changed. (We cannot conduct all of our training in the December/January break from studies!)
32. Page 29. Our various training establishments such as command & Staff College and Joint Services Staff College (JSSC) have paid token regard to the training of Reservists. At Staff College we accept some 20 - 30 students from other countries and we do provide some training in the form of 1 week courses to Reservists. At a cost of approx \$300,000 per student at these establishments it would be appropriate to see about 20% of places offered to Reserve Officers to continue their career training. At present Reserve Officers are offered one or two positions at JSSC which is not representative of the commitment or training requirement of our reserve forces.

33. It is interesting to note the relative costs in salaries and on-costs of a Reserve versus a Regular Officer

Service	Rank	Salary	Salary + variable on-costs	Full Recovery Costs	Remarks
ARA	CAPT	\$39,016	\$81,284	\$111,989	based on Sydney South
ARES	CAPT	\$106.27 per day	\$106.27 + \$3.35 allowances	<b>\$34,530.30</b>	based on a 7 day working week for 45 weeks

Source: Ready Reckoner of Personnel costs and Related Overheads July 1996

34. The cost of a Reserve Officer is approximately 1/3 to 1/5 of their ARA counterpart assuming a similar availability for training. This ratio could be increased significantly when you consider that a Reserve soldier receives much of their training in a civilian environment as part of their professional development at no expense to the Services.
35. The Regular Army has rightly placed significant emphasis on physical fitness for all ranks regardless of their need for operational readiness. Many Units spend the first hour of each day in physical fitness training. By the time the soldier commences their daily work routine it is possibly 9.00 - 9.30am in the morning. This time plus the morning tea break which is ritually maintained in many Units represents a significant 'downtime' in terms of the Unit productivity. It is particularly noticeable with the ARA staff posted to Reserve Units where the early morning is a time devoted to fitness maintenance rather than maintaining fitness in their own time like their Reserve counterpart.
36. Page 31. The reference to University Regiments should be strengthened. Policies recently adopted by the Chief of the Defence Force stipulate that Officers will need to obtain degrees in the early part of their careers together with a second language preferably of SE Asian origin. In supporting University Regiment structure and training the Services are able to select from a far wider range of professions than the training provided to a select few at ADFA. The University Regiment system not only allows us to identify and commission young Officers without bearing the costs of their tertiary studies and professional development, but it also allows us to tap into their training environment where they will be able to maintain these skills at no additional cost to the military. The emerging technologies in computing, electronics, specialised medicine and personnel management provide training opportunities to our Reserve soldiers that the Regular forces have needed to outsource. The Reserve Force should be seen as a fertile area for project work given the strength and depth of expertise that is required.
37. The so called Price Report on Officer Education tabled in October 1995 outlines the relationship between a variety of Regular Service Courses and the transfer of Credit available to a civilian equivalent. (Appendix 6 to the Report) Many Reservists have these qualifications and receive little or no Recognition of Prior Learning for their civilian qualifications. Our teachers and trainers are still required to undertake Instructor Development courses and TDO courses. Our transport drivers only recently have received some recognition for civilian licenses etc. Some recognition of the intellectual talent available in the Reserve would assist in significantly reducing the training requirement in the Regular forces.
38. Page 34. Over the past 30 years there have been various opportunities put to use individual Reservists to undertake periods of Full-Time Duty. This has been offered on a piece meal basis usually to fill a perceived short term vacancy in Regular ranks caused through policies leading to high resignations or lack of forward planning. Reservists have responded to the call only to find that the window of opportunity closes off and they are left without the opportunity to return to their former employment and no opportunity in the Services who took them on and discarded them. This has often been the case where much of the tedious administration and technical maintenance has been carried out by dedicated individuals who give up largely their civilian careers to work for the Army