

**SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE  
REFERENCES COMMITTEE**

**INQUIRY INTO RECRUITMENT & RETENTION  
OF DEFENCE PERSONNEL**

**SUBMISSION**

**Submission No: 103**

**Submittor: Mr T L Barker**

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**No. of Pages: 9**

**Attachments: 4**

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23 May 2001  
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THE SECRETARY  
SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE REFERENCES COMMITTEE  
PARLIAMENT HOUSE  
CANBERRA ACT 2600  
FAX 02 6277 5818

Attached is a copy of my letter dated 18 May 2001 and :-


- \* pages 3-9 of ANNEX D
- \* pages 1-2 of APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX D

Please note that I omitted a page number on the second page of ANNEX B. Also that the rail and road maps constitute page 3 of APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX D.

I apologise for the confusion and delay.

Yours Sincerely

*Trevor Barker*  
Trevor Barker




T.L. Barker  
11 Rankin St  
Campbell ACT 2612  
19 May 2001  
(02) 6248 6750

THE SECRETARY  
SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE REFERENCES COMMITTEE  
PARLIAMENT HOUSE  
CANBERRA ACT 2600  
FAX 02 6277 5818

Attached is a copy of my Submission to your Committee on the "Inquiry into Recruitment and Retention of Defence Personnel".

You will note that I have already sent copies to the Minister for Defence, the CDI, the Chief of Army and Brigadier P.J Greville CBE (ret).

Yours sincerely

  
Trevor Barker

T. H. Barker  
11 Rankin St  
Campbell ACT 2612  
17 May 2001  
(02) 6248 6750


HON PETER REITH MP  
MINISTER FOR DEFENCE  
PARLIAMENT HOUSE  
FAX 02 6273 4115

Dear Minister

Attached is a copy of my Submission to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on the "Inquiry into Recruitment and Retention of Defence Personnel".

For information.

Yours Sincerely



Trevor Barker

Copy to:- ADMIRAL C.A. BARRIE AO RAN  
CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE FORCE  
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE  
CANBERRA ACT 2600  
FAX 6265 1228

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL PETER COSGROVE AC MC  
CHIEF OF ARMY  
ADF HQ  
RUSSELL OFFICES ACT 2600  
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BRIGADIER P.J.GREVILLE CBE [Ret]  
3 RIVERDOWNS CRESCENT  
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## INQUIRY INTO RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF DEFENCE PERSONNEL

SUBMISSION BY T.L.BARKER

## INTRODUCTION

I. Attached are :-

ANNEX A Abbreviations used in this Submission. These are used for brevity but it is likely that some may well be out of fashion nowadays.

ANNEX C Australian Army Operations since 1940 - excluding INTERFET in East Timor. Summary:-

a. In the 30 years from 1940, the Australian Army adopted and adapted the operational and administration procedures of the British Army. By the end of the Vietnam War the Australian Army was at its peak in efficiency and experience. Collectively the senior officers (one star and above) and quite a few middle ranking officers (colonels and some majors) had a corporate memory covering:-

\* Nine operational theatres - the Western Desert, Greece and Syria in the Middle East, Singapore/Malaya, PNG and the Islands, Korea, Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam. A few had been observers with the British and US Armies elsewhere.

\* All four phases of war (advance, attack, defence and withdrawal) plus counter-insurgency and survival as prisoners of-war.

\* Eight enemy armies - Italian, German, Vichy French, Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Indonesian and Vietnamese.

\* A variety of air situations.

b. To add to this, the senior Department of Army public servants at AHQ Russell Offices, from Secretary Bruce White down, were all career Department of Army officials. Furthermore, all but one had been on active service during WW2 (the one exception had been a junior official in the Department of Defence) and, while able to spot bulldust at a hundred yards, knew the Army very well and instinctively identified urgency in operational and administrative matters.

c. During the Vietnam War there was complete trust and mutual respect between the senior public servants of the Department of Army and senior uniformed members at AHQ in Canberra. Furthermore the Commonwealth Department of Works, which was responsible for design and contracting of major works for nearly all Commonwealth departments, was highly skilled and experienced. Similarly the Department of Interior was well established as the authority for almost all Commonwealth property acquisitions and disposals. Both of those Departments had a central office and branch offices in each state and territory - which corresponded with the then geographical organisation of Army "Commands". The liaison between Army and those Departments at both head and branch office levels worked smoothly.

d. Finally it should be noted that at each senior level there was a Departmental Secretary, Branch Secretary or "Command" Secretary to concur with financial outlays and to advise on Parliamentary and Departmental matters. But no public servant had any role in the Army command chain. There were a few public servants who filled positions in Army establishments.

### ANNEX B Background of T.L.Barker.

#### Summary.

e. I am a quarter of a century out of touch with current conditions in the ADF in general and the Army in particular, but as mentioned in the Summary of ANNEX C above, I served at AHQ when the Army was at its peak in efficiency and experience.

f. I had substantial experience in Army logistics matters in peace and war, particularly in Army "works". It is relevant to note that the two other civil engineers from my class at RMC also had practical experience in peace in preparation for war. One had a couple of years as a Chief Engineer (Works) in a region in PNG designing and contracting works for the PNG Administration and was later the Chief Engineer at HQ AFV in Saigon. The other spent a similar period working in the field for the Snowy Mountains Authority and was later the CO of the Australian Civil Affairs in Vietnam.

### THE ARMY IS DIFFERENT (See ANNEX D)

2. It is considered that the Australian Regular Army [ARA] should have a ready reaction force based in each State with the ability to reinforce it from other States. Initially the Army Reserve should also be organised to augment the ARA in action in its own State.

a. Each State would have:-

i. An infantry battalion.

ii. A combat group of an armoured squadron, an artillery battery and a RAE squadron.

iii. A logistic group of divisional sub-units.

b. Each of these three groups to have barracks and family housing in a regional town and should have essential warlike stores readily available.

c. These units would be available to assist State Emergency Services during natural disasters and could contribute to the economic viability of the host towns. Local civilians could be employed to do things like running contracts for catering, minor barracks maintenance, vehicle maintenance, liaison with educational and medical providers, repairing damage to close training areas, paying rates and charges, management of married quarters for families (either Army owned or rented).

3. The Army comes from the people and, hopefully, by living in the community, mutual understanding and respect will develop over time. The Army should contribute in various ways e.g.

a. Building and helping to operate and maintain a swimming pool in each town hosting a group. The military requirement is that all soldiers should be able to swim, it is good physical training and would help morale of families relocated inland from the coast.

b. Contributing to the cost of additional services needed to cope with the military influx e.g. additional power or sewerage.

c. RAE units could, as part of their training, construct or repair things needed by the community.

d. Field ambulance medical personnel could keep their hand in by doing locums in the community.

e. Both c. and d. above could be extended to Aboriginal communities in the State.

4. State Governments must be involved with the selection of barracks areas so that State development plans are satisfied as much as possible - this could involve State incentives for industry decentralisation. In return, State Governments should undertake to provide adequate medical and educational facilities to serve the needs of families of soldiers.

5. These arrangements could encourage a "State of Origin" spirit and should allow families to be located nearer to support from other members of their families.

6. Army Aviation. Because of the vast distances involved in Australia it is desirable that a group of gunships and load carriers (a regiment) should be located in both the East and the West - for the same reasons that we have a two ocean navy. This would probably mean a significant increase in the number of helicopters required. They could be located at RAAF airfields.

## RESERVES

7. Expansion of the RAN or RAAF usually follows major acquisitions of ships or aircraft and is usually a measured and orderly process. By contrast expansion of the Army can occur quickly and with short notice e.g. WW2, Korea and Vietnam. To do this either Army Reserves or conscription are required. The expansion may be more of the same (e.g. more infantry battalions) or new types of units which are not normally needed in peace and are only needed in certain operational circumstances. For instance RAE might require a variety of specialist units such as railway, port operating, well-boring, quarrying, refrigeration, electricity supply, fire fighting.

## 8. Supplementary Reserve. (SR)

An extract from ANNEX B follows:-

"1957 Major Sydney BM 5 Engr Gp.

This was an army reserve formation commanded by a citizen force Colonel for whom I was senior staff officer. It consisted of two ordinary fd sqns plus a number of "Supplementary Reserve" units sponsored by various institutions in NSW, namely by the Snowy Mountains Authority and by the NSW Government Railways, Department of Main Roads and Maritime Services Board."

The sponsor of a "supplementary reserve" unit had the right to nominate when the annual camp should take place, e.g. NSW Railways would not accept a date in the middle of the wheat harvest. The sponsor also had a major say about who the officers would be, as they regarded such Army service as part of their management training of their up-and-coming executives. The sponsor's senior personnel officer was the authority to allow refusal to attend camp to avoid a less senior sponsor manager spoiling the show. In return the sponsor would encourage volunteers to participate. They were successful units even if their regimental drill was varied, particularly from the Snowy. They already had the necessary professional and technical skills and their camps were confined to basic military matters. Perhaps the SR system could be applied to other parts of the Army e.g. Sydney hospitals could sponsor a medical unit, Mitsubishi could sponsor an Army field workshop. Maybe it would work if a major bank sponsored, say, a field artillery unit.

9. If the State based ARA unit proposal in paragraph 2 above were accepted there could be much closer liaison between ARA and Army Reserve units which could help recruiting and retention in both.

#### MULTI-CULTURAL AUSTRALIA

10. My mother had Scottish ancestry and I remember, as a small boy in the 1930s, the popularity of the Victorian Scottish Regiment, complete with kilts and pipes. After WW2 we had a massive immigration program from Europe and I recall the multicultural composition of the Snowy Mountain Authority RAE (SR) squadron. When I took command of 1 Fd Sqn in 1960 the roll book had some unfamiliar names but the only observable result was that we had a much better soccer team. It should be remembered that National Service in the 1950s, while of limited use militarily, mixed every one together irrespective of socio-economic or cultural background.

11. In more recent years we have had migrants from a number of African, South American and Asian countries, many of whom would have unhappy memories of armies in their country of origin and therefore may not be attracted to Army service here. Perhaps we could consider establishing Army Reserve ethnic rifle companies from which they could graduate to multi-cultural infantry battalions or other Reserve units. The Indian Army used to have a number of ethnic regiments so perhaps the Indian High Commissioner could provide advice.

12. Finally there could be a case to re-institute a type of National Service for 18 year-olds. This should take the form of adventure training and not military basic training.



## PAY AND CONDITIONS

13. Attached is a copy of my letter dated 20 October 1995 on this subject. It does not pretend to say what ADF pay and conditions should be but puts forward a proposal for how they should be determined. One important point is that personnel management in the three services should be the responsibility ~~of~~ of the Chiefs of Navy, Army and Air Force.

## HIGHER DEFENCE MANAGEMENT

14. The TANGE Report of the early 1970s, which was accepted by the Government, made the sensible suggestion that the then three separate Service Departments should be amalgamated with the Department of Defence. This was intended to reduce the inter-Service friction and improve the efficiency of strategic planning at "Head Office", including deciding the priorities for major capital and recurrent expenditures.

15. Regrettably this amalgamation appears to have spread beyond "Head Office". Unless this reduction of military control in the three Armed Services of matters military is reversed, a substantial reduction of military preparedness and operational capacity is inevitable. It is like reverting to the times of the aristocratic General Haig in France in WWI, when, due to ignorance of the situation on the ground by him and his staff (living in a chateau distant from the battle area) we had the slaughter in the mud at Passchendale.

16. Extracts from SENATE STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE REPORT ON THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY, November 1974.

"The Committee records its regret at the unwillingness of the Government to allow other regular servicemen to present evidence to the Committee, either publicly or in private."

para 1.3 p2

### Civil-Military Relations.

"Whereas relations between uniformed personnel and the civilians in the Service Departments were generally satisfactory (due to frequent contact, mutual goodwill and the war-time service experience of many of the latter) the same comments cannot be made in respect of the expanding Defence Department where there are greater numbers of younger staff having little or no service background and lacking knowledge and understanding of the Army.

para 8.12 p88

### RECOMMENDATIONS.

#### Civil-military relations.

"The Committee also observes that unjustified intrusions have taken place by civilians into purely military matters; this is undesirable and should be stopped. para 69. p124

17. As mentioned in ANNEX D, the concept of "Logistic Command" (paragraph 19) and "Training Command" (paragraph 23) are not appropriate for the Army even if suitable for the RAN and RAAF. Furthermore the Army locations proposed in ANNEX D paragraph 28 suggest that the Army should revert to geographic Commands. This argument is strengthened by the likelihood that any enemy intrusion would occur in a State or Territory and that would require a rapid Army response in that area - in all probability before National Security Regulations were in force.

18. Department of Defence Structures.

a. The Defence Personnel Organisation should be abolished. Personnel management is a function of command and should revert to the Chiefs of Navy, Army and Air Force.

(See paragraph 13 above and ANNEX D paragraphs 15-17)

b. The Defence Estate Organisation should be abolished. It should be replaced by re-activating:-

- i. The Commonwealth Department of Works and Department of Interior.
- ii. The Army RAE Works Service and RAE Engineer Stores Service.

(See sub-paragraphs 1. b, c, d and f above  
and ANNEX B paragraphs 3-4)

19. Although not argued at length in this Submission, it is suggested that we should adopt a similar structure to the UK where there is a Minister for Defence and a separate Armed Forces Minister, presumably with an Armed Forces Department. An Australian Armed Forces Minister should also be the Minister for Veterans' Affairs so that all ADF personnel matters have a defined and sensitive home.

20. My praise for the professionalism of the Department of Army senior public servants at the time of the Vietnam War (see ANNEX B paragraph 4.d.ii.) may be offensive to some current Defence Department public servants. Which leads me to suggest that we should revert to the career type Defence bureaucrats exemplified by the late Sir Fred Shedden. While we cannot expect them now to have the war experience available in 1965-72, it would not go amiss if, in 2001, priority for promotion to senior Defence positions were given to those officials who had :-

- \* served for a continuous period of at least 15 years in the Department of Defence.
- \* served for a period of 5 years in one of the ADF Reserves and also for 5 years in a Defence appointment outside Canberra.
- \* served in a peace-keeping force overseas.

20. I hope that this Submission is of use to the Committee.

ANNEX A

## ABBREVIATIONS

- AHQ - Army Headquarters. Part of AHQ (the "Material Branch") was located in Melbourne and I am not aware of the situation there.
- BCOF - British Commonwealth Occupation Force
- BM 5 Engr Gp - Brigade Major 5 Engineer Group.
- Capt - Captain
- CMF - Citizen Military Force - now Army Reserve.
- CGS - Chief of the General Staff - now Chief of Army.
- Const Sqn - Construction squadron. A combat engineer unit which may operate within or behind the divisional area. Usually for logistic tasks e.g. accommodation, roads, tactical airfields, refrigeration.
- DES - Director of Engineer Stores
- DFW - Director of Fortifications and Works.
- DTN - Director of Transportation.
- Fd sqn - Field squadron. A combat engineer unit which usually operates within a divisional or brigade area in close support of other combat units e.g. demolitions, minewarfare, tactical tracks.
- HQ AFV - HQ Australian Force Vietnam.
- HQ 1 Div - HQ 1st Division.
- LSM - Landing Ship Medium - capable of carrying Centurion tanks.
- Lt - Lieutenant
- Lt-col - Lieutenant-colonel.
- RAE - Royal Australian Engineers.
- RMC - Royal Military College.
- SME - School of Military Engineering.
- SR - Supplementary Reserve.

## ANNEX B

## BACKGROUND OF T.L.BARKER

## PART 1 - OUTLINE

1. I was born in November 1926 and entered RMC in March 1944. From 1948-1951 I gained a Bachelor of Civil Engineering degree at the University of Melbourne. I resigned as a lieutenant-colonel in the RAE in March 1974. From 1974-76 I completed an Arts degree at ANU with majors in politics, economics and history. For a decade from 1977 I was a Liberal Party staffer in the Federal Parliament.

## PART 2 - SOME ARMY DETAIL

## 2. Army appointments.

YEAR	RANK	LOCATION	UNIT & TASKS	1944
1944	Cadet	Canberra, ACT	RMC Duntroon - officer training.	
	-46			
1947	Lt	Hiro, Japan	28 Fd Sqn RAE. Mainly supervising Japanese contract labour building facilities for Australian units in BCOF.	
1948	Lt	Mildura, Vic	) University of Melbourne	
1949	Lt/Capt	Melbourne	) Bachelor of Civil Engineering.	
	-51		)	
1952	Capt	Puckapunyal, Vic	Commander of 21 Const Sqn RAE.	
1953	Capt	Canberra, ACT	RMC Duntroon - Adjutant.	
	-54			
1955	Capt	Chatham, UK	British SME. Assistant Instructor - Plant, Roads and Airfields.	

Also there were a few weeks of attachments to:-

\* Joint School of Chemical Warfare, Winterbourne Gunner.

\* US Army Engineer Aviation Battalion building a strategic airfield in Wales.

\* RE Engineer Regiment based at Osnabruck, Germany. Included a NATO bridging demonstration over the Rhine.

1956	Major	Casula, NSW	SME. Senior Instructor Plant, Roads and Airfields.
1957	Major	Sydney	BM 5 Engr Gp.

This was an army reserve formation commanded by a citizen force Colonel for whom I was senior staff officer. It consisted of two ordinary fd sqns plus a number of "Supplementary Reserve" units sponsored by various institutions in NSW, namely by the Snowy Mountains Authority and by the NSW Government Railways, Department of Main Roads and Maritime Services Board.

1958	Major	Queenscliff, Vic	Staff College - student.
1959	Major	Hobart	Chief Engineer, Tasmania Command. See para 3 below.
1960	Major	Casula, NSW	OC 1 Fd Sqn. This was the first engineer cad off the rank in the field force. The only operational task was a troop of about 30 "sappers" deployed by RAAF to Vila to help repair cyclone damage.
	-61		

1962	Major	Sydney	HQ 1 Div - operations staff officer. HQ 1 Div was responsible for planning army field force operations, supervising unit training, conducting formation training and, if required, providing a field HQ for operations - joint or otherwise. The field force units were located in various States and their peace administration was the responsibility of the then geographic Army Command HQ in each State and the NT.
1963 -64	Lt-Col	Queenscliff, Vic	Staff College - member of the Directing Staff.
1965 -66	Lt-Col	Canberra, ACT	AHQ - Director of Fortifications and Works (DFW) See para 4 below.
1967 -68	Lt-Col	Canberra, ACT	AHQ - Deputy Director of Movements. See para 5 below.
1969 -71	Lt-Col	Canberra, ACT	AHQ - Director of Transportation (DTN) See para 6 below.
1972 -73	Lt-Col	Canberra, ACT	AHQ - Office of the CGS - Logistics Project Officer.

### 3. Chief Engineer, Tasmania Command. (1959)

Based in Hobart. Responsible for supervision of RAE training and personnel management. Technical control of an ARA Construction Sqn and a CMF Field Sqn. The Construction Sqn was building its own barracks, including a first for Australia - an electrically heated concrete floor for the workshops. Liaison with civil engineers in Hobart, particularly with retired WW2 RAE engineer commanders. Control of minor works program and preparation of proposals for major works which required the approval of AHQ. I had a financial delegation for small works and engineer stores contracts - for larger contracts I needed the prior concurrence of the senior Department of Army public servant in Tasmania - the "Command Secretary" with whom I had close rapport.

### 4. AHQ - Director of Fortifications and Works (DFW). (1965-66)

a. The situation at that time was that the Army had a battalion, plus supporting units, deployed in Malaysia, together with two Pacific Island Regiments in PNG. In mid 1964 the Menzies Government had announced the re-introduction of Army National Service including a liability for operational service outside Australia. Early in 1965 the Government announced the deployment of a battalion to Vietnam which was built up to a task force of three battalions in a year or two. In 1971 the Gorton Government reduced the size of the task force and in 1972 the McMahon Government withdrew the force. When the Whitlam Government came to office in December 1972 there were about 100 troops left there and most were involved as guards at our Embassy in Saigon.

b. DFW was the senior works appointment in the Army and became responsible, in conjunction with the Commonwealth Department of Works (and with the RAE Chief Engineers in each of the then Army geographic Commands in each State and the NT), for the biggest Army building spree since WW2, to cater for an Army about to double in size in about 18 months. In "then" dollars the works programs were \$18.4M in 1964/65, \$42.9M in 1965/66 and \$63.5M in 1966/67 - in "now" dollars these amounts approximate to \$150M, \$350M and \$500M. These works included new barracks at Holsworthy, Enoggera, Puckapunyal, Swanbourne, Townsville, Scheyville and in Papua-New Guinea.

c. The "Fortifications" part of DFW related to works in operational areas which were separate from the peace works program. Early in 1965 one of my majors (who had seen service in WW2) brought up to date the WW2 scales and design of field accommodation, taking into account then current construction materials - this data was sent to the RAE Director of Engineer Stores (DES), who arranged procurement for despatch to Vietnam, where a RAE construction squadron built the accommodation and related engineer services at Nui Dat and Vung Tau. In 1966 I was sent to Vietnam and Malaya to view works in progress and on my return I sent my civilian architect to Vung Tau to design the R&R centre. On his return another of my majors (younger and a civil engineering graduate) did the engineering design and again DES got the necessary stores on a ship to Vietnam where the RAE construction squadron there did the work. It is worthy of note that, way back then, we did not have fax machines and that, because DES and his staff were all RAE, we could describe over the phone any urgent changes needed.

d. This was a busy time and most things came in on time and on budget. This result was helped by two situations:-

i. The staff organisation was consistent throughout the Army i.e. a commander and a staff organised into four branches - operations, personnel, logistics and materiel - with an additional civilian branch at AHQ and geographical "Command HQs" which dealt with Departmental parliamentary, financial and special to Public Service personnel matters. My bosses were the Quarter-Master General (Chief of Logistics - a Major-General) for staff matters (i.e. for WHAT was to be done) and the Engineer-in-Chief (a Brigadier in Operations Branch) for tactical and technical matters (i.e. for HOW it was done).

ii. To add to this, the senior Department of Army public servants at AHQ Russell Offices, from Secretary Bruce White down, were all career Army officials. Furthermore, all but one had been on active service during WW2 (the one exception had been a junior official in the Department of Defence) and, while able to spot bulldust at a hundred yards, knew the Army very well and instinctively identified urgency in operational and administrative matters.

## 5. AIHQ - Deputy Director of Movements. (1967-68)

This was the period of the growth and relocations of the Army in Australia with a consequent increase in soldier repostings and family removals. It also included the deployment of the force to Vietnam and its maintenance there - it totalled about 8000 members of the ADF (mostly Army) for a few years. The tour of duty in Vietnam was 12 months so there was a large flow of people and stores and equipment both ways. This involved the use of HMAS SYDNEY, two requisitioned merchant ships and Army landing ships medium (LSM) plus QANTAS and RAAF aircraft.

## 6. AHQ - Director of Transportation (DTN). (1969-71)

D TN was the Army's "admiral" running our brown water navy - in addition to the four LSMs used to carry cargoes between Australia and Vietnam, Singapore and PNG, smaller landing and other craft were used around Australia for various training and administrative tasks. In addition, D TN was responsible for the technical operation of Army sea terminals and for the Movement Control Service - the latter can best be described as a travel agency handling ADF people and things through road, rail, sea and some air terminals, wherever the Army was operating, at home and overseas. Finally D TN had a watching brief on railway developments in Australia.

## AUSTRALIAN ARMY OPERATIONS SINCE 1940

ANNEX C

## MIDDLE EAST

## 1940/41 WESTERN DESERT

Enemy - Italian. Air - parity. Terrain - desert.  
 Attack on BARDIA followed by a lengthy advance to BENGHAZI -  
 British armour provided flank and advance guard for the  
 advance. RAF and some RAAF provided air support.

## 1941 TOBRUK

Enemy - German, Italian. Air - parity. Terrain - desert.  
 Extended defence - RAN "scrap-iron" flotilla provided resupply  
 and eventual withdrawal support.

## 1941 GREECE

Enemy - German. Air - German supremacy. Terrain - hilly,  
 wooded with rivers. Temperate climate.  
 Deployment, defence, withdrawal, evacuation mainly by RN. Many  
 prisoners.

## 1941 CRETE

Enemy - German. Air - German supremacy. Terrain - hilly.  
 Defence - German airborne assault - evacuation mainly by RN.  
 More prisoners.

## 1941 SYRIA

Enemy - Vichy French. Air - our superiority. Terrain -  
 hilly, some timber. Arid.  
 Advance with attacks - eventual French surrender.

## 1942 ALAMEIN

Enemy - German some Italian. Air - our superiority. Terrain  
 - desert.  
 Defence then attack. After success, Australians withdraw and  
 return to Australia.

## MALAYA/SINGAPORE

## 1941/2 MALAYA/SINGAPORE

Enemy - Japanese. Air - Japan supremacy. Terrain - jungle.  
 Tropical.  
 Defence - withdrawal - surrender. All prisoners except a few.

NOTE. In the Middle East and Singapore/Malaya, the British Army  
 provided base support and most logistic "back up" for the  
 Australian Divisions. On return to Australia the Australian Army  
 had to become self-reliant in these matters for the first time.



C 1

## PNG AND THE ISLANDS

Enemy - Japanese. Air - initial parity gradually changing to our supremacy. Terrain - jungle, several islands usually with inland mountain spine. Wet or wetter.

1941 Battalion or smaller garrisons defeated at RABAU, AMBON and TIMOR.

Brigade in defence at MILNE BAY, with very close RAAF support, defeated Japanese landing attempt.

Battalion forced back from KOKODA by Japanese. A new brigade stopped Japanese advance and forced them back across the OWEN STANLEY Ranges. Savage attacks at BUNA, GONA and SANANANDA destroyed Japanese there.

1942-45 Lengthy land offensive operations to overcome Japanese in many areas, including:-

a. Three major assault amphibious landings at LAE, TARAKAN and BALIK PAPAN. US Navy provided amphibious support as RAN had no amphibious capacity.

b. An airlanded operation at NADZAB with US paratroop and air transport support.

c. Several smaller landings at various places on various islands. Some were opposed landings and, in some, Army provided landing craft - again RAN unable to assist.

## JOINT SERVICE CO-OPERATION.

a. Army responsible for provision of supplies and engineer services to shore based elements of RAN and RAAF.

b. Army responsible for logistic support by watercraft between islands, along the coast and along rivers. RAN had agreed that ships up to 300 tons capacity could be used for that purpose. In addition there were smaller craft including landing craft, launches, barges and lighters (some specialised such as for refrigeration). This "brown water" navy eventually totalled about 600 craft.

c. It was usual for an Army staff officer to be attached to major RAAF operational HQ and vice versa.

d. Army officers were attached to RAAF flying HQ to brief and de-brief pilots about ground attack targets for fighters and fighter bombers.

e. RAAF transport support for aerial resupply, often by air dropping. Army air despatch soldiers worked as crew in RAAF "biscuit bombers"

f. Army artillery officers flew in RAAF Wirraways to perform aerial direction of army gunfire.

g. Army officers served in naval ships to assist ~~naval~~ gunners to engage land targets and in aircraft carriers to brief and de-brief pilots about ground targets.

C3

## POST WWII

1946 JAPAN

Brigade Group on occupation duties. Initially came from volunteers from units still in the Islands after WWII. Later replacements direct from Australia.

1950-53 KOREA

Enemy - initially North Korean later Chinese also. Air - parity. Terrain - coastal plains to mountains, some trees. Hot summers, freezing winters.

One (later two) battalions as part of a British Commonwealth Brigade Group. Initially defence then advance, withdrawal, defence and advance to Truce boundary in 1953. One battalion remained there until 1956.

1955-60 MALAYA

Enemy - Communist guerillas. Air - our supremacy. Terrain - tropical jungle.

One battalion group as part of a British brigade. Mainly low level jungle patrols.

1963-66 MALAYA/BORNEO

Enemy - Indonesian regular army. Air - our supremacy. Terrain - tropical jungle.

"Confrontasi". As for 1955-60 above plus elements of SAS.

1962-72. VIETNAM

Enemy - North Vietnamese. Air - our supremacy. Terrain - tropical varying from savannah to jungle.

1972 - Training Team deployed with South Vietnamese forces.

1965 - One battalion at Bien Hoa with a US "brigade".

1966 - To Nui Dat and joined by a second battalion as part of an Australian Brigade Group.

1966-72 - Third battalion added and a logistic base developed at Vung Tau. Force reduced in 1971 and withdrawn in 1972.

Operations consisted of lengthy patrolling in strength (company or sometimes bigger) from a defended fixed base to dominate the task force area. Extensive use of helicopters for troop deployment, logistic support, as gun ships and for return to base. A Civil Affairs Unit deployed to help win the "hearts and minds" of South Vietnamese.

C4

## OTHER ACTIVITIES

## PEACEKEEPING

Australian Army individuals and units have participated with distinction in many peacekeeping actions since the late 1940s, some of the more recent being Namibia\*, Somalia\*, Cambodia\*, Rwanda, Bougainville, Bosnia and the Middle East. Those marked with a "\*" provided realistic operational training for, respectively, the construction squadron, infantry battalion and signals squadron involved.


## ATTACHMENTS TO OTHER ARMIES

Individual Army members on attachment to British and US Army units may well have had valuable operational experience with those units if deployed in, for example, the Falklands, the Gulf or the Balkans (Mks 1 or 2).

DI-3




### Australian Railway System



Source: Australasian Railway Association DI 1997

### National Highway System



Source Department of Transport and Regional Development 1996

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PRINT TIME 13. MAY. 14:42 ART



## ANNEX D

## THE ARMY IS DIFFERENT

## STRATEGIC MOBILITY

1. RAN ships and submarines can sail from their home port to where the action is and can operate away from base for some weeks using replenishment at sea or at some other port. Similarly, RAAF aircraft fly off to war, returning to base for replenishment of arms and fuel. Some can be refuelled in the air. One exception is that STOL aircraft such as C130 and CARIBOU, if operating from a tactical airfield for some time, have to have part of their administrative caravan provided at that airfield.
2. However the Army cannot move itself from where it is based in Australia in peace-time to where it is required to conduct battle as a "formation" of an organised integrated group of units - within Australia or overseas. An exception is Army aviation which has some limited strategic mobility. A small force (e.g. a lightly equipped infantry battalion) could be deployed and maintained by air or road. However for any significant operations, the Army must rely on land (mainly rail) or sea transport to get near to the battle area, although air transport can be helpful for urgent or small cargoes. Civil or military transportation facilities should be used when possible but care must be taken to ensure that there are not delays due to:-
  - a. Damage to infrastructure by enemy action or by sabotage.
  - b. Strike action by Australian transport workers, as happened during WW2 and the Korean and Vietnam wars.
3. It is necessary to remember that Australia is an enormous land mass. APPENDIX 1 to this Annex shows:-
  - a. Some comparative distances in Australia and in Europe and for Pearl Harbour.
  - b. A table showing the areas, in '000 square kilometres (sq kms), of Australia and some other countries with which military commentators sometimes compare us. And for the same countries, a table showing the number of soldiers (both full time and reserves) per each '000 sq kms - this is based on army strengths in about 1989.

## THREATS

4. NOT considered are - which country might attack Australia, why or when. What is considered is what type of attack on Australia might be launched, where and in what strength, given current or imminent military capacities and techniques.

02

5. MISSILE ATTACKS e.g. by Tomahawk type precision guided weapons.
- a. Land Based. Could be launched from the island chain extending from Indonesia through PNG, Vanuatu, New Caledonia to New Zealand - possibly from Fiji. Could hit targets in northern or eastern Australia.
  - b. Sea Launched from ships or submarines. Could be launched from any where off the Australian coast at targets anywhere in Australia. More risky to the "enemy" for such a launch from relatively enclosed waters between Indonesia/PNG and the north of Australia.
  - c. Could damage military targets such as RAAF airfields (particularly craters in runways) or large concentrations of military personnel or equipment, especially if warheads of mass destruction were to be used. Could also be used to damage, or to threaten to damage, the civilian population or infrastructure.
  - d. There is not much the Army can do about missiles except:-
    - i. Avoid large concentrations. Dispersed Army units and essential stores depots would require more missiles to do a lot of damage.
    - ii. Be prepared to help civilian authorities care for casualties and restore essential services.
6. RAIDS - SEA LAUNCHED.
- a. Recent arrivals by "boat people" can so far be handled by civil authorities with help from RAN and RAAF in surveillance and interception. Army assistance may be required to locate and apprehend people who have landed, although civil authority (police?) would probably be needed to execute arrests.
  - b. In WW2 the German Navy showed that converted merchant vessels could cause damage by the use of surprise e.g. the sinking of HMAS SYDNEY. It would not be difficult for a smallish ship to land about 100 armed soldiers at most places on our coastline, including Tasmania - more than one ship could do this at the same time at one or more places. A bulk carrier could be modified to carry and land a battalion group at many of our ports or beaches.
  - c. It is possible for a submarine to land small armed groups at most places on the coast. Hopefully local residents will report them and a small Army force could be deployed to remove the threat if appropriate legislation is in force.

23

## 7. RAIDS - AIR LAUNCHED.

a. 6 to 8 x C130 type aircraft could fly off an aircraft carrier a few thousand kms off our coast, travel at low altitude and land a battalion group on an unguarded airfield e.g. RAAF LEARMONTH or RAAF CURTIN in WA or on lesser airstrips.

b. As for submarines, small groups could be airlanded from small aircraft at many places and again it is hoped they will be reported by locals.

## 8. AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT.

In the Pacific in WW2, the US Navy showed that a carrier group with an amphibious capability could launch a major amphibious assault on a defended shore thousands of kms from its base. More recently the British did the same in the Falklands. There does not seem to be any reason why a maritime power in the early 2000s could not do likewise to Australia. Satellite surveillance might locate such an invading fleet but could we stop it, particularly in the Indian Ocean well away from possible prompt US Navy assistance.

## 9. SUMMARY

a. It would not be difficult for an "enemy" to land a rifle company anywhere on the Australian coast and not much harder to land a battalion group at many places. Exclusive emphasis on a Northern land threat seems unwarranted and in any case forward deployment of families is unwise. A major maritime power could carry out an amphibious assault from most directions. The threat of missile attack suggests that the Army should be dispersed e.g. in groups not bigger than battalion size. Those groups should have readily available essential warlike stores.

b. Therefore it is considered that the Australian Regular Army [ARA] should have a ready reaction force based in each State with the ability to reinforce it from other States. Initially the Army Reserve should also be organised to augment the ARA in action in its own State.

## TECHNOLOGY

10. It is reasonable to say that technology controls strategy, equipment and tactics of the RAN and RAAF. Once the Government has decided on equipment acquisition and home ports or home airfields the personnel needs of the RAN and RAAF are defined, as are their peace locations.

11. On the other hand when the Government decides on the numbers and types of Army units (both ARA and Army Reserve) to be raised in peacetime, the equipment requirements are defined. Equipment acquisition must take into account possible future increases in the numbers or types of units to be raised and the lead-times for equipment procurement. The peace-time locations of Army units is subject to a number of factors - see paragraph 27 below. While technology is very important to the Army it remains a servant and not the master - trained officers and soldiers with high morale are the keys to a good Army.

177

D4

## GEOGRAPHY

12. Generally speaking one piece of sea is much the same as other pieces of sea in our region - the same applies to airspace. Admittedly adverse weather can make life difficult for the RAN as can areas with navigation restrictions. Poor visibility or heavily wooded or mountainous terrain can cause problems for the RAAF in attacking ground targets.

13. However for the Army, organisation, equipment, tactics and logistics are influenced substantially by things such as:-

a. Terrain - topography, vegetation, soil types, rivers and tides e.g. armoured units will have priority for operations in flat, treeless, large areas - infantry will have priority in the jungle.

b. Climate and weather e.g. the "wet" in the Top End makes vary different demands than, say, mid winter on the WA coast.

c. Natural resources - water, food, construction materials.

d. Infrastructure - ports, airfields, roads, rail, bridges and engineering services.

## COMBAT - ORGANISATION

14. The RAN and RAAF each have a number of self-contained fighting units - ships, submarines and aircraft. After adequate training those units can work together using electronic communications. By contrast the Army, for each operation, has to build a "formation" made up of numbers and types of units suited to the geography, the enemy and the phase of war - and there is physical as well as electronic contact.

## COMBAT - PEOPLE

15. RAN. As an estimate, roughly half RAN personnel are serving in ships or boats and half are in shore jobs - they interchange between sea and shore service. Once allotted as part of a ship's complement all ranks live, sink or swim together. Senior active command positions are usually not higher in rank than Commander although sometimes could be a Captain. A RAN task force could be commanded at sea by a Commodore or junior Admiral.

16. RAAF. Only a very small proportion are aircrew who are actively involved in operations. Most of the remainder serve at airfields or in offices - this does not imply that their service is unimportant but emphasises that a very different type of personnel management is appropriate. A commander of a RAAF FA18 or F111 Wing is usually a Group Captain. Higher ranks usually do not have combat commands.



D5

## 17. ARMY.

a. As another estimate, about two-thirds of ARA personnel are in field force type units. Which ones would be engaged initially in a war depends on where, when and in what circumstances a war develops - and this can happen without much warning. All must be prepared for deployment if a war expands.

b. The combat arms have most exposure to close contact with an enemy and usually suffer the highest casualties. While in tank battles armoured personnel are often at greatest risk, overall the infantry do most of the hard yakka and deserve the best treatment in preparation for war in training and administration. An Army usually gains its reputation from its infantry but unfortunately in peace-time the media and the Australian population tend not to regard infantry as "glamorous" in the same way that aircraft, ships and tanks are portrayed. Service in the infantry is not seen as valuable in civilian life as service as, say, a pilot or an electronic technician. Strong efforts should be undertaken to overcome this misconception - one way is to locate infantry soldiers in peace-time within the civilian community it will serve in war, rather than isolate them in vast often remote cantonments. Concentration on these matters is also vital to maintain adequate recruiting figures.

c. Depending on the size of the Army deployed Army officers up to the rank of lieutenant-general may be in field command positions.

## LOGISTICS

18. The Department of Defence idea of "logistics" seems to be concentrated on what happens in defence industry, acquisition, storage and workshops in base areas and perhaps delivery in bulk to RAN home ports and RAAF airfields. That for the Army used to be the "Materiel" function.

a. RAN. Ships and submarines, in their home ports, take on board all the things needed for a voyage of a few weeks. Ships can be replenished at sea, to extend their range, or at another port.

b. RAAF. Aircraft take off from their home base and some can be refuelled in the air - they then return to base to be refuelled and re-armed. STOL aircraft (C130 and Caribou), if deployed forward to a tactical base for a period, may need to take part of their administrative caravan with them.

19. ARMY LOGISTICS refers to what happens to people and things between home bases in Australia and the operational area and within the operational area. Once in battle an Army must be resupplied, usually every day, with a varying tonnage of various things. In addition provision must be made to evacuate casualties to personnel and equipment and replace them if necessary. The daily usage rate of things and the number and type of casualties can vary markedly

D6

depending on the type and intensity of operations, e.g. in mobile action much fuel is used; in defence and attack, ammunition usage is high. Other special stores which may be heavy or bulky or both, may also be required for some types of operations in some areas e.g. equipment bridging, watercraft, mines and/or explosives, road and airfield construction plant and stores. In short logistics are an integral part of Army operations and must be under the complete control of the Army commander. And logistic units (ARA or Army Reserve) must exist and be adequately trained in peace so that they are readily available for war. In short a separate "Logistics Command" is not appropriate for the Army even though it may be suitable for the RAN and RAAF.

## TRAINING

20. The three Services all use their own types of centralised basic and specialist training at base type schools - it is possible that some of these could become tri-service. However subsequent "unit" training and operations are poles apart.

21. RAN and RAAF. As already mentioned the RAN sail, and the RAAF fly, off to war and similarly their peace-time training is almost always carried out well away from the Australian population and can reproduce near to realistic conditions. Simulation of electronic warfare is another advantage enjoyed by the RAN and RAAF, conducted individually or as joint Service exercises. Exercises with forces from other countries is also readily possible.

22. ARMY TRAINING. The Army conducts almost all of its unit and formation training on land in Australia and if it is to be worthwhile - i.e. realistic - is messy, noisy and dangerous and can interfere with other Australians going about their normal lives or business. Consequently there is an overwhelming need for the Army in peace-time to have close and extensive relationships with the Australian population and the relevant State or Territory Government so that, over time, mutual understanding and respect is developed and maintained. This cannot be done by per-pushers sitting in offices in Canberra and, among other things, is an important argument for the existence of a strong Army Reserve element.

a. Close training areas are needed near barracks of sizes and types suitable for the types of units concerned. Larger training areas are also required in each State and the NT for bigger exercises.

b. Movement Training. Because the place of an enemy intrusion is unknown and because Australia is so large, it is essential that all units regard movement from their barracks over large distances as a normal part of Army existence - by land, sea or air - by commercial or military transport. Army movement staffs are essential in each State and Territory - with continuous close links with all transportation agencies.

D7

c. If trained for war, appropriate bits of the ARA Field Force can be selected to take part in other activities such as peacekeeping and aid to the civil power.

23. Finally it seems to be not understood that training in the Army is a continuum through:- general individual, specialised individual, section, platoon, company, battalion, in conjunction with other related units and finally formation exercises - in amongst this progression there is also the need for additional training for unit officers and NCOs, sometimes at Army Schools distant from the unit. There is not the clear distinction, as there is for instance in the RAN, where there is shore training and training as part of a ship's complement. Again a separate "Training Command" may be useful for the RAN and RAAF but is not appropriate for the Army.

### DEFENCE EFFICIENCY REVIEW

24. "Defence Efficiency" seems to be defined as reducing recurrent Defence dollar expenditure, which is not surprising considering the membership of the "Senior Review Panel" (see p2 of Report). Little regard was given to preparedness for war probably because the Panel did not know how the ADF in general and the Army in particular functions in peace or war.

25. For example in the last paragraph on p49 of the Report it is suggested that there is a high degree of commonality between military police, cooks and medical staff in the three Services.

a. Military Police Army military police, in operational areas, are required to control road traffic and run military prisons - not a role in the RAN or RAAF.

b. Cooks A RAN cook works in a ship's galley using fresh or canned food stored on board before the ship leaves port. A RAAF cook has all the RAAF base facilities and fresh food readily available. An Army cook may be working in a desert, a tropical forest or in savannah - in rain, frost or extreme heat - preparing canned food or sometimes fresh food, for varying numbers each day, using a variety of field cooking devices. In combat, the Army cook may well be subjected to shot and shell and do some shooting himself.

#### c. Medical Staff

i. RAN ships have a sick bay where the doctor and orderlies look after sprains, bruises, broken bones and sometimes battle wounds. Bad casualties can be evacuated to shore hospitals by helicopter.

ii. RAAF medical facilities at airfields are similar to civilian facilities.

iii. Army medics in forward areas have make-shift facilities to treat battle wounds and lesser problems together with treating diseases related to the area. As soon as possible casualties are evacuated back to field ambulances where more extensive treatment can be provided - the casualty is then evacuated further back to a field hospital or, if cured, sent back to his unit.

DE

26. Probably one of the most ridiculous proposals in the Defence Efficiency Review is in the Addendum to the Report which records on p224 that:-  
 "Nevertheless, there is a view that the development of large, tri-Service bases with populations of up to 5,000 people will reduce operating overheads and allow for the provision of improved, and more cost-effective services to ADF personnel."

#### LOCATIONS

27. As mentioned in paragraphs 9 and 11 above there is no overwhelming strategic argument to put the Army anywhere in particular in Australia in peace-time. Also there is a good case to abandon the habit of lodging the Army in large cantonments, often remote from the Australian people they are supposed to be defending. In particular, if the Top End is considered to be most at risk, it is ridiculous to put soldier's families in the front line, at considerable extra cost and a long way from the familiar environments of the families. It is worth remembering that the British Army used cantonments overseas (e.g. in India) to protect their families from "the natives" - but back in the UK they were English, Scottish, Welsh or Irish regiments lodged in their regional areas.

28. Repeating paragraph 9.b. "Therefore it is considered that the Australian Regular Army [ARA] should have a ready reaction force based in each State with the ability to reinforce it from other States. Initially the Army Reserve should also be organised to augment the ARA in action in its own State."

a. Each State would have:-

- i. An infantry battalion.
- ii. A combat group of an armoured squadron, an artillery battery and a RAE squadron.
- iii. A logistic group of divisional sub-units.

b. Each of these three groups to have barracks and family housing in a regional town and should have readily available essential warlike stores.

c. These units would be available to assist State Emergency Services during natural disasters and could contribute to the economic viability of the host towns. Local civilians could be employed to do things like running contracts for catering, minor barracks maintenance, vehicle maintenance, liaison with educational and medical providers, repairing damage to close training areas, paying rates and charges, management of married quarters for families (either Army owned or rented).

D9

29. The Army comes from the people and, hopefully, by living in the community, mutual understanding and respect will develop over time. The Army should contribute in various ways e.g.

- a. Building and helping to operate and maintain a swimming pool in each town hosting a group. The military requirement is that all soldiers should be able to swim, it is good physical training and would help morale of families relocated inland from the coast.
- b. Contributing to the cost of additional services needed to cope with the military influx e.g. additional power or sewerage.
- c. RAE units could, as part of their training, construct or repair things needed by the community.
- d. Field ambulance medical personnel could keep their hand in by doing locums in the community.
- e. Both c. and d. above could be extended to Aboriginal communities in the State.

30. State Governments must be involved with the selection of barracks areas so that State development plans are satisfied as much as possible - this could involve State incentives for industry decentralisation. In return, State Governments should undertake to provide adequate medical and educational facilities to serve the needs of families of soldiers.

31. Army Aviation. Because of the vast distances involved in Australia it is desirable that a group of gunships and load carriers (a regiment) should be located in both the East and the West - for the same reasons that we have a two ocean navy. This would probably mean a significant increase in the number of helicopters required. They could be located at RAAF airfields.

Lt Col T.L. Barker RAE (RL)  
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20 October 1995  
06-2486750

THE MANAGING EDITOR  
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL  
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Dear Sir

I was fascinated by the two articles on "Industrial Relations" in your September/October 1995 issue. While I do not question their accuracy or value, the one thing that stands out is that trying to impose the complexities of civilian Industrial Relations to the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is a confusing and irrelevant failure - even if it is Government policy.

My background is 30 years in the Permanent Army, followed by a degree in politics and economics at the ANU. After that I spent 10 years as Federal Parliamentary staffer. This leads me to what I believe to be a better, safer and simpler way of sorting out ADF pay and conditions.

My starting point is that a standing army in particular, and the armed services in general, in our tradition, are a creature of the Parliament. They are not the servants of the Departments of either Defence or Industrial Relations. They certainly have nothing to do with the ACTU unless we wish to emulate the political commissars of Stalin's USSR. In short the "employer" of the ADF is the Parliament.

My solution starts with extracting the Defence Force Remuneration Tribunal (DFRT) from the "Industrial Relations Club" and making it the servant of a SENATE ARMED FORCES COMMITTEE (SAFC). This Committee could be a new one or a sub-committee of an existing Senate committee. A SENATE committee is desired for two main reasons :-

1. The House of Representatives is usually subservient to the Government of the day. On the other hand, on most occasions, the composition of the Senate is such that a bi-partisan approach is more likely. This is important, to reduce the risk of the Executive regarding the ADF as its sole preserve and using it for Party political purposes. This has happened with the current Government e.g. Gareth Gareth-Biggles sending RAAF F111 spy flights over Tasmania, PM Bob Hawke using the Admiral's barge to convey him to the Sydney location of the ALP Policy speech for the 1987 Election.

2. Senators are elected for a 6 year term and, in most cases, are more likely to be re-elected for at least two terms than are Members of the House of Representatives (MHRs). Furthermore, not having the heavy detailed electorate work required of MHRs, they have more time available to take part in committee deliberations. Consequently Senators are more able to gather a considerable amount of experience and expertise about ADF matters.

Such a Senate Armed Forces Committee (SAFC) could also be charged with making recommendations for promotions to "One Star" and more senior ranks in the ADF, but that is another story.

The DFRT should be allowed to raise matters as and when it so desires but would also be required to report on matters when so requested by the Governor-General (in his role as Commander in Chief), the Government, the SAFC or the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF).

To provide flexibility a separate Appropriation should be made for pay and allowances for all ADF personnel. The dollar values of those pay and allowances should be determined by the application of guidelines determined by the SAFC. The Government would retain control of its expenditure by deciding the total numbers of ADF personnel.

The principal guidelines to be decided are :-

1. THE INDIVIDUAL UPPER LIMIT. There is an existing high level Commonwealth Remuneration Tribunal which determines the salary packages of senior Commonwealth appointments such as MPs, Judges and Heads of various statutory authorities. This Tribunal could also determine the salary packages appropriate for the CDF and the Chiefs of the RAN, Army and RAAF.

2. TOTAL UPPER LIMIT. The DFRT could recommend the average salary for the whole ADF for determination by the SAFC.

3. INDIVIDUAL LOWER LIMIT. Once again the DFRT could recommend the minimum salary for a member of the ADF who has completed recruit training.

In addition the DFRT could recommend, for determination by SAFC, pay levels for special "command" appointments, which could be significantly greater than the normal rates for the rank concerned e.g.

1. Captains of sea-going ships and watercraft.
2. Pilots of various aircraft and helicopters.
3. Commanding officer of an Army field force unit e.g. of an infantry battalion.
4. Officer commanding an independent Army field force unit of squadron or company size e.g. of a SAS squadron or of a field squadron RAE.

As at present the DFRT would continue to make and review special payments for special circumstances such as Submarine Allowance and Field Allowance, to be confirmed by the SAFC.

When the SAFC has made its determinations, perhaps having appended the approval of the Governor-General, the three Service Chiefs could then go ahead and sort out the detailed relativities within each of their Services. If some disputes arise because of apparent inequities between different Services, the DFRT, supported by the SAFC, could adjudicate. In any case, if the inequities were real, difficulties in recruitment or retention would be a compelling reason for the Service Chiefs concerned to make changes.

Placing the responsibility for pay relativities with the Service Chiefs means their management and morale responsibilities can co-exist.

None of this should be interpreted to mean that the search for productivity improvements should stop. Nevertheless it should be recognised that many of the aims of the new civilian "IR" changes have been stock in trade in the ADF for years e.g. multi-skilling, career training and leadership rather than autocratic management.

I suspect that this is too long for a letter and too short for an article - therefore I will call it a contribution.

Yours Sincerely

Trevor Barker



APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B

SOME COMPARATIVE DISTANCES AND AREAS

DISTANCES - kms (approx)

LONDON to	FLANDERS	322	Comparative lengths of some coastlines are shown on the next page.
	BERLIN	928	
	MOSCOW	2500	
	CAIRO	3500	
	FALKLANDS	12900	

NW CAPE (EXMOUTH) to	COCOS IS	2800
	DARWIN	2040
	TOWNSVILLE	3400
	BRISBANE	3900
	SYDNEY	3800
	MELBOURNE	3500
	ADELAIDE	2870
	PERTH	1150

JAPAN to	PEARL HARBOUR	6000
	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	

COUNTRY	AREA '000 SQ KMS	COUNTRY	SOLDIERS PER '000 SQ KMS
CANADA	9976	SINGAPORE	408333
CHINA	9597	ISRAEL	28762
USA	9363	SWITZERLAND	14268
AUSTRALIA	7687	BELGIUM	6216
INDIA	3288	NETHERLANDS	5248
ARGENTINA	2767	UNITED KINGDOM	1676
WA *	2526	CHINA	1490
INDONESIA	2027	SWEDEN	1321
Q *	1727	PAKISTAN	1219
NT *	1346	FRANCE	1182
SOUTH AFRICA	1221	JAPAN	543
SA *	984	MALAYSIA	523
PAKISTAN	804	INDIA	512
NSW*	802	NORWAY	309
FRANCE	547	USA	207
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	462	ARGENTINA	189
SWEDEN	450	INDONESIA	163
JAPAN	372	SOUTH AFRICA	109
MALAYSIA	330	NEW ZEALAND	55
NORWAY	324	PAPUA NEW GUINEA	16
NEW ZEALAND	269	AUSTRALIA	7
UNITED KINGDOM	245	CANADA	4
VIC*	228		
TAS*	68		
NETHERLANDS	41		
SWITZERLAND	41		

D1 - 2

BELGIUM	31
ISRAEL	21
ACT*	2.4
SINGAPORE	0.6

## COASTLINES OF SOME COUNTRIES

COUNTRY	COASTLINE KMS
CANADA	90908
INDONESIA	54716
AUSTRALIA	36735
USA	19924
NORWAY	16093
NEW ZEALAND	15134
CHINA	14500
WA *	12500
UNITED KINGDOM	12429
JAPAN	12075
Q *	7400
INDIA	7000
NT *	6200
PAPUA NEW GUINEA	5152
ARGENTINA	4989
MALAYSIA	4675
SA *	3700
FRANCE	3427
SWEDEN	3218
TAS*	3200
SOUTH AFRICA	2881
NSW*	1900
VIC*	1800
PAKISTAN	1046
NETHERLANDS	451
ISRAEL	273
SINGAPORE	193
BELGIUM	64
ACT*	35
SWITZERLAND	0

NOTE. Unlike AUSTRALIA, almost all of these countries have land boundaries as well. However some lands can be more easily defended than others e.g. alpine country, deserts, swamps, wide rivers.

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THE SECRETARY  
SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE REFERENCES COMMITTEE  
PARLIAMENT HOUSE  
CANBERRA ACT 2600  
FAX 02 6277 5818

INQUIRY INTO RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF DEFENCE PERSONNEL

SUBMISSION BY T.L.BARKER

Reference:- my letter dated 18 May 2001.

AMENDMENT NO 1.

At top of front page of Submission :-  
Delete "ANNEX B" and insert "ANNEX C".

On page 2 of Submission :-  
In line 5 delete "ANNEX C" and insert "ANNEX B".  
In line 8 delete "ANNEX B" and insert "ANNEX C".

On page 4 of Submission :-  
In line 10, first word should be "should".

Yours Sincerely

*Trevor Barker*  
Trevor Barker