

**Question taken on notice at Joint Committee on the Australian  
Crime Commission – Friday 6 July 2007**

*Page 11 of the Proof Committee Hansard*

**Mr HAYES**—A lot has been made of the issue of a cement truck getting through. I know that, for instance, in Sydney when they upgraded their aprons and things of that nature, the way of getting heavy vehicles airside was to persuade a driver to surrender his driver's licence. Is that still the way that you would get a heavy vehicle airside?

**Mr Retter**—I cannot comment on the specific example that you have given. I suggest that we take on notice the matter of what the airside inspection regimes involve in terms of access. As was explained before, there will be slight variations in the access procedures followed at each airport, depending upon the reason that a particular individual is going airside. I can say that for those people who are going airside on a regular basis for legitimate purposes there are inspections that occur as they go onto the airport. We are progressively tightening the airside inspection regime and it will improve over time. Regarding your specific question, I am not sure that I could comment without further investigation as to what is going on.

**Mr HAYES**—I still think there are probably very good logistical reasons. If you are doing an upgrade to the airport and have a contract with Boral, they will have a whole series of owner-drivers who will have to come through. Not everyone is going to have an ASIC if they have only just landed the contract, for instance.

**Mr Retter**—In that case, we would normally see that the airport put in place arrangements to ensure that the access afforded to those contractors did not prejudice the overall security of the airport. This might involve restricting their access to a particular gate; putting in place additional security fencing that effectively isolated whatever work was being done to a particular part of the airport; or restricting their access either to a particular time of the day or to a particular area, thus not compromising the overall security of the airside. That is my normal understanding of what occurs. I would be happy to provide you with further advice in relation to that matter where it pertains to cement truck drivers or any other construction worker coming on site.

**Mr HAYES**—It is how we maintain the integrity of our security there. We are always going to be doing work in and about airports. We understand that. But what mechanisms are in place to maintain the integrity of our security?

**Mr Retter**—We will provide you with some written advice if that is suitable.

---

**Office of Transport Security Response:**

The matter of what the airside inspection regime involves in terms of access was taken on notice.

On 7 June 2005 the Government decided to tighten airside access arrangements, including inspection of persons, goods and vehicles entering areas around terminals and baggage handling facilities.

Measures were developed to further tighten airside access to sensitive areas at major airports. These measures include:

- a tightening of airside perimeter and access security by reducing the number of access points into the airside;
- an even tighter focus on access to airside areas at major airports, particularly areas around terminals and baggage handling facilities; and,
- a comprehensive regime of inspection of persons, goods and vehicles entering sensitive airside areas through increased checks of a person's security identification and appropriate vehicle identification.

For airside access to evolve and strengthen over time the Department will work with industry to ensure access requirements strike a reasonable balance between robust security and flexibility for airports to determine security arrangements based on their individual circumstances.

In the instance of contractors undertaking airside construction or a special event circumstance, the airport operator will put in place arrangements to ensure that the access afforded to those persons accessing airside areas does not prejudice the overall security of the airport. Temporary measures could include:

- restricting entry access through a particular gate;
- restricting access to a particular time of day;
- restricting access into a particular area of the airside;
- erecting additional security fencing/barrier to isolate the area;
- additional airport security guards to patrol perimeters/boundaries;
- at CTFR airports additional AFP patrols of perimeters/boundaries;
- for persons without a valid ASIC a valid VIC is issued, unless exempt;
- additional CCTV monitoring of the area, e.g. special events zone.

Airport Operators outline in their Transport Security Programs what physical security and access control measures they have in place to control access at the airport and maintain the integrity of access to the airport.

In addition to access controls required under the Aviation Security legislation each airport operator is required to have an Airside Vehicle Control Handbook. Regulation 123 of the *Airports (Control of On-Airport Activities) Regulations 1997* details the requirements for operating a vehicle airside at an airport.

**Question taken on notice at Joint Committee on the Australian  
Crime Commission – Friday 6 July 2007**

*Page 13 of the Proof Committee Hansard*

**CHAIR**—So you get the AFP to do the criminal checks?

**Mr Hanna**—That is correct.

**CHAIR**—Could you take it on notice and let us know if there is a privacy policy or other issues which would prevent those who are issued with cards going onto the CrimTrac databases? Perhaps you know the answer now, but, if you do not, could you take that on notice and let us have half a page—

**Mr Retter**—The intent of that would be that we would have a list in one place of all people who have applied and received a card; is that your question?

**CHAIR**—Yes. So that CrimTrac could join them up with some guy who is wanted on a warrant in Melbourne for a double murder or something. We would like to ensure that in years to come—when I say, ‘We would like to ensure,’ that is a bit presumptuous but—

**Mr Retter**—We can have a look at that matter and provide advice to you; however, you might care to talk with the AusCheck division within the Attorney-General’s Department, who from 3 September this year will have responsibility for coordinating and pursuing the background checking of all maritime and aviation security identity card applicants.

---

**Office of Transport Security Response:**

CrimTrac have advised that it would be technically possible to include information pertaining to maritime and aviation identification security card (ASIC/MSIC) applicants by adding new data elements onto the Minimum Nation-wide Person Profile (MNPP). However, this could not occur until the system is rolled out nationally in July 2008.

The information could be used to show when a particular applicant’s circumstances change. For example, if a person, subsequent to the issue of their ASIC/MSIC received a criminal conviction, or where a warrant was issued for the applicants arrest in a particular jurisdiction. It is important to note that currently, unless technical changes are made to the MNPP, linking of records provided about applicants can only occur if a fingerprint number is also provided.

CrimTrac is obliged to comply with the Information Privacy Principles contained in the Privacy Act 1998. Privacy matters would need to be formally investigated before any information of this nature could be added to MNPP, it is expected this would

require the informed consent of the applicant, such as the applicant would have to have knowledge that the information would be matched against law enforcement information holdings and disclosed to law enforcement agencies.

The sharing of information pertaining to ASIC and MSIC applicants is consistent with CrimTrac's strategic plan, in particular the 'continuous improvement of law enforcement information sharing'. Privacy matters would need to be formally investigated before the information could be added to the MNPP, however, there are currently no internal CrimTrac policies that would prevent the placement of the information for sharing with other law enforcement agencies.

It should be noted that for the information to be included in the MNPP a policy justification would be required for the new candidature rules (new elements of information) to be added. This would need to be approved by policing jurisdictions.

Date: 7 August 2007