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## Submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission

**Inquiry into the future impact of serious and organised crime on Australian Society with particular reference to:**

- (a) Future trends in serious and organised crime activities, practices and methods and their impact on Australian society;**
- (b) Strategies for countering future serious and organised crime;**
- (c) The economic cost of countering future organised crime at a national and state and territory level; and**
- (d) The adequacy of legislative and administrative arrangements including the adequacy of cross-jurisdictional databases, to meet future needs.**

### Introduction

The Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission ('CMC') was created with the enactment of the *Crime and Misconduct Act (Qld) 2001* ('the Act') effectively merging the functions and activities of the Queensland Crime Commission and the Criminal Justice Commission. In terms of serious and organised crime the Act confers on the CMC jurisdiction to investigate major crime which in turn includes organised crime<sup>1</sup>, paedophilia<sup>2</sup> and serious crime<sup>3</sup>. In effect the CMC distinguishes itself from the activities of the Queensland Police Service ('QPS') through the investigation of major crimes that cannot be appropriately or effectively carried out by the Queensland Police Service or other state-based agencies on their own.

In responding to the invitation for submissions the CMC has restricted itself to commenting on those areas where the CMC has expertise conferred by virtue of its jurisdiction and activities. In this context it is noted that CMC operational, intelligence and research activities are concentrated on state legislative matters as opposed to those matters controlled by Commonwealth legislation<sup>4</sup>. The CMC's interest in organised crime focuses on well recognised illicit markets exhibiting a division of labour and a degree of organised enterprise. While, as noted above, the Commission has jurisdiction to investigate serious crime, in practice crimes such as murder, armed robbery and similar offences are most effectively targeted in Queensland by reference to the special investigative units located within the QPS. The CMC assists in QPS investigations as and when requested by the QPS and directed by the Crime Reference Committee.

The CMC monitors the criminal environment in Queensland by reference to an ongoing series of strategic assessments. This process was commenced by the then Queensland Crime Commission ('QCC') which in 1999, in partnership with the QPS, produced *Project Krystal: A Strategic Assessment of Organised Crime in Queensland*. That report proposed the ongoing monitoring of organised crime markets in Queensland by the QCC/CMC. The CMC fulfilled that commitment in 2004 with the publication of *Organised Crime Markets in Queensland: A Strategic Assessment*. It is envisaged that a further assessment will be completed in 2008.

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<sup>1</sup> Organised crime is defined in Schedule 2 of the Act to involve criminal activity undertaken with the purpose of gaining profit, power or influence, and involving offences punishable by not less than seven years' jail, two or more people, and planning and organisation or systematic and continuing activity

<sup>2</sup> Paedophilia is defined in Schedule 2 of the Act as criminal activity involving sexual offences against children or child pornography

<sup>3</sup> Serious crime is defined in Schedule 2 of the Act as unsolved criminal activity involving offences punishable by not less than 14 years' imprisonment (e.g. murder, arson).

<sup>4</sup> Such as politically motivated violence or terrorism, illegal immigration, social security fraud and tax evasion.

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During the intervening periods the CMC's Strategic Intelligence Unit, in consultation with the CMC's operational and research areas and the QPS, is involved in ongoing monitoring of the Queensland organised crime environment. Where warranted, Intelligence Digests and Crime Bulletins are produced addressing developments of interest.

In the CMC's 2004 *Organised Crime Markets Assessment*, the following illicit markets were identified and ranked according to the level of threat posed to the Queensland Community<sup>5</sup>. The results were as follows:

<b>Organised Crime Market</b>	<b>Assessed level of risk</b>	<b>Market trend</b>
Amphetamine	Very High	Stable
Cannabis	Medium	Stable
Cocaine	Medium	Increasing
Ecstasy	High	Increasing
Firearms	Low	Stable
Fraud	Medium to High	Increasing
GHB/Fantasy	Low	Stable
Heroin	High	Moderate Increase
Identity Crime	High	Increasing
Money laundering	High	Stable
Prescription drugs	Low	Increasing
Property crime	Medium	Moderate Increase
Vehicle rebirthing	Low	Stable

In this submission organised crime matters are discussed where available information and intelligence suggests possible future increased levels of risk likely to impact on Australian society. Those areas not discussed are considered by the CMC to remain consistent with the risk assessed in 2004<sup>6</sup>.

### **Future trends in serious and organised crime activities, practices and methods and their impact on Australian society**

As indicated above, the CMC assesses the organised crime environment in Queensland by utilising a market or commodity based approach reflecting the fact that many current organised crime groups consist of people from varied ethnic backgrounds. The CMC also recognises however that law enforcement agencies including the CMC, QPS and ACC continue to target criminal networks with a recognised ethnic affiliation or shared ethos<sup>7</sup>. The discussion of future trends will include both market and ethnic/ethos based observations.

#### Amphetamines

The risk assessed in terms of amphetamine in 2004 was 'very high' with the market assessed as stable. While little has occurred to alter this situation, amphetamines continue to warrant discussion due to the sustained prevalence of the drug in Queensland coupled with increasing interest in social and political spheres. In December 2006 Queensland Premier Peter Beattie

<sup>5</sup> Markets are assessed in terms of a risk assessment methodology where:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Desire} \times \text{Confidence} &= \text{Intent} \\ \text{Resources} \times \text{Knowledge} &= \text{Capability} \\ \text{Intent} \times \text{Capability} &= \text{Likelihood of Threat} \\ \text{Likelihood} \times \text{Harm (consequences)} &= \text{RISK} \end{aligned}$$

<sup>6</sup> A new assessment is planned for 2008 and will involve extensive consultation and market scanning. The assessment completed for the purposes of this submission is, of necessity, based on information currently at hand. Timeframes did not allow for considered consultation.

<sup>7</sup> For example Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, Middle Eastern Organised Crime, Eastern European Organised Crime *inter alia*.

formed a multi-agency group known as the Ice-breaker Strategy Taskforce<sup>8</sup>. Membership of the Taskforce includes representatives from Health, Education, Justice and Attorney General, the Queensland Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, QPS and the CMC. The taskforce was charged with overseeing the development and implementation of the Queensland Government's Ice-breaker Strategy to reduce uptake and use of methamphetamine and to reduce harms associated with its use.

The most recent IDRS data specific to Queensland<sup>9</sup> suggests that the price and availability of amphetamines has remained stable in recent years with 2005 data showing an increase of methamphetamine use among injecting drug users ('IDU')<sup>10</sup>. The increase was attributed to an increased use of powder methamphetamine with the use of base and ice methamphetamine by IDU decreasing markedly. Also of interest in terms of impact on society, the report notes that in 2005 there was an increase in the number of calls to the Queensland Alcohol and Drug Information Service regarding amphetamines. There was also an increase in the number of hospital admissions where amphetamine was the primary diagnosis.

In law enforcement terms, seizures of amphetamine products has risen considerably in recent years however the significance of this data is difficult to interpret as changes may simply be illustrative of shifting law enforcement priorities. The data also makes no distinction between the different amphetamine products (powder, crystal and base) and includes seizures of ecstasy (MDMA). The Queensland amphetamine production market continues to be characterised as a cottage industry with many low level producers evidenced by the high level of detection of small clandestine laboratories. There are some indications however of the amphetamine market becoming more organised with some amphetamine importations detected.

The material on the whole supports the continued rating of the amphetamine market as a 'very high' risk with some indicators suggesting that the market may be increasing in size. In terms of future trends, issues worthy of consideration include:

- The likely impact of the strategies implemented by the Ice-Breaker Strategy Taskforce – The Taskforce has already been active in introducing legislative amendments designed to prohibit the display and sale of ice pipes and the implementation of an education campaign. Yet to be addressed in detail however is the possible future impact of these strategies. For example, historically IDRS data suggests an interdependence between the heroin and amphetamine markets. An increase in one market traditionally mirrors a decrease in the opposing market. Accompanied with information suggesting that many amphetamine users are also poly-drug users, it is possible that changes such as decreased demand in the amphetamine market might result in increased demand in other illicit drug markets.
- The Ice-breaker Strategy Taskforce has also formed a working group tasked with examining the possibility of making the use of pseudoephedrine in the manufacture of pharmaceutical products illegal. While this is likely to be a difficult outcome to achieve it is also important to consider the potential ramifications of such legislation.

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<sup>8</sup> While the Taskforce name contains reference to 'Ice' amphetamine (crystalline methamphetamine) the mandate of the taskforce extends beyond ice to all amphetamine based products including crystal, base and powder.

<sup>9</sup> *Queensland Drug Trends 2005: Findings from the Illicit Drug Reporting System (IDRS)*, S Kinner, J. Fischer and B Lloyd, NDARC Technical Report No. 254

<sup>10</sup> Much of the information about drug use relied on by researchers in publications such as the IDRS derives from injecting drug users. As such the CMC has some concerns that information about drug use may be significantly underreported. Many consumers of illicit drugs employ methods other than injection and this is significantly the case in relation to commodities including cocaine, MDMA and some forms of amphetamine.

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The amphetamine market in Queensland is currently largely facilitated by a series of independent small scale producers. If the inability to source pseudoephedrine stifles cottage production, consumer demand for amphetamines may result in the market being supplied by imported product. This moves amphetamine supply firmly into the realm of established and organised crime syndicates and may result in making the detection and disruption of amphetamine supply routes much more difficult on the part of law enforcement.

- There is increasing evidence of the undesirable effects of long term sustained use of amphetamines on an individual's health and social welfare. If amphetamine use continues to increase then society can expect greater and costly demands to be placed on our health infrastructure.

### Cocaine

The cocaine market in Queensland was assessed by the CMC in 2004 as a 'medium' risk, with a suggestion that this may increase in the future. However, significant information gaps were identified and still exist in relation to the actual extent of cocaine activity in Queensland. The lack of specific information can be associated to the assertion that the nature of the cocaine market is 'closed and hidden'. As traditionally described in many studies on cocaine, a significant portion of market demand is believed to be comprised of individuals with a high socio economic status. Although it is acknowledged that some level of use would occur among this demographic in Queensland, there continues to be a significant lack of information on the actual dynamics of the market. A theory regarding the lack of available data on the cocaine market is that individuals comprising this hidden market do not come to law enforcement attention because they are less likely to be involved in criminal activities to support their drug use, and that such individuals are unlikely to seek recourse to public health services if they have issues arising from their use of illicit drugs.

However, information and data exists that does assist in providing indicators and identifying potential expansion of the cocaine market. Preliminary results from the 2006 IDRS identified that cocaine prevalence had remained relatively stable among injecting drug users with a slight increase in hospitalisations.<sup>11</sup> The study noted that cocaine was most common in New South Wales, with low use in all other states and territories. The 2006 EDRS (Ecstasy and Related Drugs Reporting System) identified that cocaine remained present in the social drug market within nightclubs, major events and private homes, with 29% of the survey respondents sampled in Queensland, identifying that they could also purchase cocaine from their normal source of ecstasy.<sup>12</sup> This appears to be consistent with operational and investigative information, which suggests that many drug dealers are diversifying the range of drugs that they supply. There is limited to no information available to suggest that there are distribution networks that specialise solely in cocaine distribution<sup>13</sup>.

In relation to supply of cocaine to Queensland, small amounts sent as scatter importations through the mail system remains one of the most common identified methods, while investigative information suggests that larger amounts are being sourced from the Sydney and Melbourne cocaine markets through criminal syndicates. There is currently limited evidence to indicate any regular significant importations directly into Queensland from international sources. However, in September 2006 a joint ACS and AFP operation resulted in the discovery of \$35 million of cocaine imported from Canada. The attempt to import more than

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<sup>11</sup> Figures and data from this study should be interpreted cautiously as the actual number of cocaine users (or poly drug users using cocaine) surveyed for the IDRS and the number of persons hospitalised for cocaine use is very small compared to other illicit drugs.

<sup>12</sup> The study interviews a small sample of approximately 100 people in each capital city, therefore the information from Queensland would relate to the Brisbane area.

<sup>13</sup> There is, however, recent operational material suggesting that there are specific dealers within broader distribution networks that specialise solely in the supply of cocaine.

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135 kilograms of cocaine in the back of computers is believed to be biggest seizure of the drug in Queensland's history and the fifth largest in Australian history. The shipment also contained approximately 120,000 MDMA (ecstasy) tablets with an estimated street value of \$3.5 million.

The most prevalent area for cocaine use, identified through available data, remains South East Queensland (such as Brisbane and the Gold Coast). There are suggestions that use may be increasing in areas outside this location. The CMC is currently undertaking an in-depth assessment regarding the cocaine market in Queensland, with an objective of better understanding and quantifying the extent of the market. Current available data would suggest that cocaine is not currently a significant problem in Queensland, particularly in comparison to other drugs such as amphetamine and ecstasy, however this data should be read in the context of the information gaps discussed above. The current level of social and individual harms associated to cocaine use in Queensland is minimal (e.g. from 2001 to 2006 cocaine accounted for 0.3% of all hospitalisations for illicit drug abuse or dependence, while amphetamines accounted for 25%). The current CMC assessment on cocaine will identify any indications of potential market expansion, which may impact upon the current threat assessment level.

### Cannabis

Cannabis was assessed by the CMC in 2004 as a 'medium' risk illicit commodity. Cannabis has however been identified in recent times as a drug that warrants closer attention from law enforcement and the possibility exists that following a proper consultative process the risk level may be upgraded in future assessments due to an increase in the perceived level of harm posed by the commodity.

The cannabis market remains entrenched in Queensland where considerable local production continues and the market is also supplemented by cannabis being transported into the state from interstate locations. Law enforcement has identified and successfully targeted a number of schemes where cannabis from interstate was being transported into Queensland in exchange for amphetamines. This is an emerging trend warranting ongoing monitoring.

The 2005 IDRS reports that prices in terms of both hydro and bush cannabis<sup>14</sup> appear to have remained stable in recent years. In terms of availability, users report that cannabis is still in most instances easy to obtain, with hydro slightly easier to source than bush cannabis. This contradicts law enforcement reporting which suggests that most cannabis in Queensland tends to originate from large outdoor plantations as opposed to smaller hydroponic set-ups.

In recent years cannabis use and production, while still attracting law enforcement attention<sup>15</sup>, has been afforded less of a priority for investigative action. Drug survey information suggests that cannabis is widely used throughout all levels of the community. Couple this with the perception of many that cannabis is a largely harmless commodity and that the efforts of law enforcement and health experts should be focussed on those drugs perceived as presenting greater health risks to society such as amphetamines and heroin. There are now however a number of health experts coming forward arguing that cannabis can be associated with a

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<sup>14</sup> 'Hydro' refers to cannabis produced hydroponically under closely controlled circumstances while 'Bush' refers to cannabis grown outdoors, usually in a large plantation. Many users perceive Hydro cannabis as being more potent than Bush cannabis however law enforcement experience refutes this perception.

<sup>15</sup> Arrest data suggests that arrest figures for use and possession of cannabis continues to increase steadily.

growing number of behavioural and mental health issues<sup>16</sup>. Should the harms currently suspected of being associated with cannabis use be sustained this is likely to result in an increase in the risk assessment associated with the drug.

#### Identity Crime

In the 2004 assessment the CMC assessed the risk in relation to identity crime as 'high'. The report noted that the risk assessment was likely to be applicable until such time as sufficient prevention strategies were in place to reduce the impact of identity crime on society

The CMC has noticed in a number of recent operations continuing evidence of individuals using aspects of identity crime to facilitate other organised crime activity. For example, search warrants executed in relation to one person associated with an Outlaw Motorcycle Gang (OMCG) resulted in the location of a number of forms of false identification including a number of photographic drivers licenses involving pictures of the target with false name and address details. The future intended purpose of these documents is unknown however possible uses include the facilitation of pseudoephedrine purchases, credit and bank fraud.

In the three years since the last detailed organised crime assessment was completed significant change in prevention terms has not been effected and as a result the risk posed by identity crime continues to be assessed as 'high'. Identity fraud has such potential for considerable impact on society in terms of monetary and social costs that the CMC considers that advancing technology and prevention strategies to deal with the phenomena should remain a high priority for not only law enforcement agencies, but also the government as a whole.

#### Money laundering

Money laundering activity continues to feature in CMC organised crime, official misconduct and confiscation related investigations. The trend towards the involvement of professionals, particularly lawyers, is confirmed in a number of recent organised crime and confiscation related investigations. Few of these matters involving professionals result in prosecution due to the evidential difficulty of proving to the requisite standard that the offender knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that the subject property was tainted. The CMC notes with interest recent moves in Commonwealth and some State jurisdictions to amend money laundering offence provisions to introduce offences for recklessly or negligently engaging in money laundering.

Recent CMC investigations have also revealed an increasing sophistication in money laundering schemes with greater use of overseas jurisdictions and the use of false identities to hold property both onshore and offshore. It is expected that this trend will gain momentum as the effectiveness of recently introduced civil confiscation legislation impacts on the criminal community. The ability of criminals to hold property outside of the jurisdiction will challenge law enforcement agencies in the future and focus attention on the efficiency and effectiveness of the current mutual assistance regime.

#### Property Crime

In November 2005 the CMC published *Property Crime in Queensland: An intelligence Assessment*. The report was directed towards examining the property crime market for evidence of organised property crime activity. The report confirmed the existence of organised activity and confirmed a strong correlation between property offending and illicit drug use in Queensland, with amphetamine recorded as the most commonly preferred illicit drug for exchange. Most significantly the report identified a considerable intelligence gap in

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<sup>16</sup> These reports should be considered cautiously however as many users of cannabis also report use of amphetamine type substances. Given the known effects of amphetamines it may be difficult to confirm the role of cannabis in the behavioural and mental health problems being evidenced.

terms of our understanding of the property crime market with very little known about the motivations of the ultimate consumer – the purchaser of the stolen goods. Police investigations invariably focus on finding the original offender in terms of the stealing of the goods rather than identifying the ultimate receiver and considering their role in the broader market picture.

While offender statistics and insurance company claims data suggest that property crime is on the decrease in Queensland, the report noted significant increases in the incidences of shoplifting and identified the on-line selling environment as a corner of the stolen property market that was ripe for exploitation. The stolen property market remains assessed as a 'medium' risk area. The potential for future expansion and the continuing correlation with illicit drug activity suggest that close monitoring should continue

### Paedophilia

The CMC maintains an active role in the investigation and prosecution of persons committing child sex offences, with a specific reference focused on networked<sup>17</sup> child sex offenders (CSOs), and those who use the internet to groom, procure and ultimately commit sexual offences against children. The Act confers that the CMC maintain a responsibility for investigating criminal paedophilia<sup>18</sup>. The CMC uses its powers to undertake proactive rather than reactive investigations into matters involving criminal paedophilia and provide assistance to other LEAs through the use of specialist powers and expertise to supplement conventional investigative strategies.

Investigations have identified that CSOs continue to widely use the internet with the purpose of, amongst other things, gaining access to children, developing social networks and seeking validation of their offending behaviours<sup>19</sup>. This is evidenced by the continual use of the Internet to develop relationships on-line with children, involve them in sexually oriented conversations and expose them to sexually explicit material, including chat, video, and images. The expanding use of web cameras and instant messaging programs has greatly improved the ability of a CSO to establish a level of personal contact with the child, that was not previously possible, and later resulting in the commission of sexual offences.

The vastly expanded in use of social networking websites, such as MySpace<sup>20</sup>, have made it easier for CSOs to initiate contact with younger children, and develop the on-line relationship into a situational relationship. The wealth of knowledge able to be gleaned from a person's personal social networking page makes it easier for persons to contact and develop the relationship to one outside of the Internet and into reality.

CSOs routinely utilise the Internet to search, trade, obtain and distribute child exploitation material. Peer to Peer (P2P)<sup>21</sup> networks pose the greatest risk in the continual distribution and availability of child exploitation material. Investigations targeting offenders using P2P networks have identified that offenders continue to possess a large number of highly explicit child exploitation images, maintain sophisticated libraries and undertake searches specific to their interest in the age and sex of the child<sup>22</sup>. These images also include child sexual torture,

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<sup>17</sup> For this purpose, a network is defined as two or more persons operating with a common interest. The offenders do not need to be operating in concert.

<sup>18</sup> Criminal Paedophilia is defined in Schedule 2 of the Act as criminal activity involving offences of a sexual nature committed against children, or offences involving obscene material depicting children.

<sup>19</sup> Operation Atrax (2007) – CMC ongoing Controlled Operation targeting persons whom use the internet to groom, procure and commit sexual offences against children, including meeting for sexual activity.

<sup>20</sup> As at 23 February 2007, the MySpace network had 157,868,782 registered users globally [Source: MySpace Australia [www.au.myspace.com](http://www.au.myspace.com)] – approx. 7.6 times Australia's population of approx. 20.76 million persons [Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics].

<sup>21</sup> Peer to Peer (P2P) Networks involve a program that allows a user to share electronic files via the Internet, incorporating search engines to locate specific file types and names, including child exploitation material.

<sup>22</sup> Operation Atrax – CMC ongoing Controlled Operation.

bestiality and newborn child sexual abuse. Numerous offenders have been identified as using advanced encryption technology to defeat law enforcement and secure their child exploitation collections. The introduction of Microsoft's VISTA operating systems with inbuilt 256 bit hard drive encryption will further frustrate law enforcement efforts to locate and retrieve stored images of child exploitation material. The reduction in price of available broadband Internet services has also resulted in the ease in transmission and trading in high quality images and video, along with streaming video via web cameras.

Networked CSOs remain intrinsically difficult to investigate, and undertake well-developed techniques to access children for sexual exploitation. The very nature of the offences committed, the ability of the offender to place themselves in situations whereby they can access children, and the covert nature of their activities continue to challenge law enforcement agencies. Investigations have shown that whilst persons may be networked, the indicators are that the network is used to share contact details, their own experiences, reinforcement of their paraphilia and gain positive reinforcement from like-minded peers. There have been indications that the networks are also used to discuss measures to counter law enforcement strategies<sup>23</sup>.

Advances in technology, and the ability for CSOs to cloak themselves in a layer of anonymity will continue to pose significant investigative challenges for law enforcement.

#### Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs

The QPS maintains an intelligence desk in relation to law enforcement holdings concerning OMCG activity in Queensland and are acknowledged as having more extensive holdings and expertise in this area than the CMC. However, the CMC has been involved in a number of operations targeting OMCG members, including the recently closed Operation NAVAN/DANSON<sup>24</sup>, and has access to a number of human sources capable of reporting on OMCG activity. The Commission in 2006 produced a comprehensive intelligence assessment examining the Gold Coast Chapter of the Finks OMCG and on 19 December 2006 the Commission approved a Standing Reference to investigate the activities of OMCGs.

OMCGs continue to play a significant role in the amphetamine and cannabis markets in Queensland with recent indications suggesting they are branching out into cocaine distribution. They are also implicated in a broad range of criminal activity including fraud, identity crime, property offences, firearms, extortion and offences involving extreme violence. OMCGs are noticeably more active in rural and central Queensland where their criminal activities are of a high profile. While they are certainly active in the more populated southern regions of the state they have less of a monopoly and compete with other crime groups for a share of the illicit market.

When considering the criminal activities of OMCGs it is important to note that in general the criminal activity involves small groups of OMCG members, rather than being facilitated by the OMCG as a collective group. In the case of some of the larger OMCGs it is not uncommon for the club to include two or three criminal syndicates who in fact are competing against one another for business. There is also evidence of cooperation between the criminal syndicates of different OMCGs in order to effect specific transactions.

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<sup>23</sup> Operation Atrax – CMC ongoing Controlled Operation, Operation Verona – 2005 and Operation Autumn – 2006 – CMC networked paedophilia investigations.

<sup>24</sup> Operation NAVAN/DANSON was a joint CMC/NSW Police operation targeting members of the Nomads OMCG located on the Gold Coast, Ipswich and Byron Bay. A number of OMCG members have been charged with a range of drug offences including drug trafficking, drug supply, produce dangerous drugs, possess dangerous drug, possess drug utensils, possess concealable firearms and tainted property. In this instance evidence was obtained concerning the importation of large quantities of amphetamine from New South Wales into Queensland.



While many OMCGs located in Queensland are chapters of a national OMCG, in the past they have conducted both their criminal and business activities on a fairly local basis with little consideration of national priorities. More recently however there is evidence of closer national ties and a greater allegiance between the various inter and intra state chapters. There is also evidence of a number of persons moving from interstate to set up new chapters or augment existing Queensland chapters.

OMCGs are also increasingly engaging in legitimate business activities that can be used to further illicit purposes and/or to launder tainted money. Recent operations have identified OMCG members involved in trucking companies, real estate agencies and licensed premises. OMCG members continue to be involved in security provision especially in the Gold Coast night club district. While legislative provisions prohibit persons with criminal convictions from obtaining a security provider's licence, OMCG members and associates employ a number of techniques to avoid this requirement including employing unlicensed security personnel.

Recent indications are that OMCGs are, if anything, becoming more active in Queensland and more widely spread with a number of new chapters being established in the past two years. The threat posed by them is likely to increase in line with their membership. They warrant ongoing close monitoring on the part of law enforcement.

#### Middle Eastern Organised Crime Groups

Middle Eastern Organised Crime ('MEOC') activity in Queensland refers both to criminal activity engaged in by members of established New South Wales/Victorian MEOC groups seeking to obtain a foothold in Queensland, as well as persons of Middle-Eastern background who are not part of an existing group, who are engaging in organised criminal activity in Queensland. While Queensland does not have the same problem with MEOC as experienced in other jurisdictions such as NSW, there is increasing evidence of MEOC involvement in a range of organised criminal activity including drug trafficking, property crime and vehicle re-birthing. Law enforcement has also seen increased involvement on the part of persons of a Middle-Eastern background in the activities of OMCGs.

The CMC is currently working on an assessment of MEOC in the Queensland environment. The assessment will seek to establish whether MEOC is in fact an issue in this state and if so the nature and extent of the criminal activities of the group. It is expected that the report will be published for law enforcement agencies in June 2007.

#### Romanian involvement in organised crime

Reference to intelligence indices indicates a long and continuing involvement on the part of persons of Romanian descent in drug trafficking activity. Traditionally such persons have tended to involve themselves in the supply and distribution of heroin brought into Australia via Sydney and Melbourne. They have been successfully targeted in Queensland on a number of occasions proving themselves to be recidivist offenders with many of them serving several terms of imprisonment in relation to drug activity.

Recent information and intelligence suggests that these Romanian groups are now diversifying and are involved in the importation and trafficking of a range of drugs including cocaine. There are unconfirmed reports of importations direct into Queensland and analysis of seized cocaine has indicated that the drugs in which they are dealing are of high purity. There is also evidence that this move into the cocaine markets is not restricted to persons of Romanian descent residing in Queensland, but extends to members of the Romanian community in Melbourne and Perth.

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### Poly-Drug Supply

Reports on drug use such as the IDRS, EDRS and the National Household Drug Survey are increasingly indicating that most drug users are now involved in poly-drug use. While they have a preferred drug of first choice, many users use a variety of illicit substances depending on commodity availability, pricing and the purpose of the drug use. Similarly we are now seeing more diversified drug suppliers. Whereas in the past a supplier was likely to specialise in a particular illicit commodity, most suppliers will now be able to source a variety of drugs according to consumer demand. As indicated above, Romanian criminal groups who previously specialised in heroin supply are now actively involved in the supply of cocaine, ecstasy and amphetamines. Similarly OMCG groups that previously dealt primarily in amphetamines and cannabis are now also involved in the distribution of cocaine, ecstasy and in some instances heroin. Organised crime groups have clearly responded to a need to provide a diversified range of products in what is an evolving market. The ability of criminal groups to expand and adapt to changing market needs presents both challenges and opportunities in law enforcement terms.

### Cross Jurisdictional Crime

Technological advances have long meant that we now operate within a global economy where state and national boundary lines are largely unimportant to the advancement of business. This situation is reflected in the illicit markets with illegal activity being without boundaries and able to be carried out in a national and international context. Even some of the more primitive organised crime networks have evidenced an ability to operate to some extent in a national way.

Recent CMC operations have targeted networks with interstate connections, often involving three or more state jurisdictions. While criminal activity is unrestricted by borders it will continue to present investigative challenges to law enforcement agencies. For an operation to successfully target a national network each of the affected state agencies must enter into joint operational agreements. This process takes time to effect and can involve protracted negotiations. The ACC ideally alleviates this situation by enabling a state law enforcement agency quick access to national resources requiring an agreement with only one agency. In reality however many of these national investigations fall below the criteria required to bring the ACC on board, especially during the initial stages when substantial evidence of criminality is still being gathered. However, it is during these initial stages that national cooperation and resource access is most required in order to pull an operation together.

National and international networking of criminal groups is likely to continue and to become more sophisticated. The criminal activities of networks acting together are likely to have a substantial impact on Australian society. Law enforcement agencies throughout Australia need to move rapidly to resolve the investigative difficulties inherent in an environment of state based legislation.

### Telecommunications and Voice over Internet Protocol

The geography of Australia, its relative isolation from key overseas crime markets and the increasing geographic diversity of crime syndicates make effective real time communication important for organised crime networks. This necessity is also *prima facie* a potential vulnerability which can be exploited by law enforcement agencies. Unfortunately, organised crime networks are becoming increasingly adept at exploiting deficiencies in the regulatory arrangements which apply to telecommunications services in Australia. All agencies rely to a greater or lesser extent on carriers and carriage service providers obtaining accurate data on the identity of users of telecommunications services before the service is activated. This is important for both the interception of services and the analysis of call charge record data. Regrettably, the unintended impact of some marketing, distribution and cost-minimisation strategies in the telecommunications industry has been that many telecommunications

services are now activated in false names, in contravention of government guidelines. Prepaid SIM cards are regularly purchased and used by target identities (including in bulk) in false names or in the names of real persons without the knowledge of the person in question. A number of proprietors of mobile telephone outlets, and some smaller service providers, have been implicated in activity of this type. Initiatives by the Commonwealth Government-sponsored Law Enforcement Advisory Committee (LEAC) have experienced difficulties keeping pace with criminal activity in this area. This has tangible and ongoing effects on the ability of agencies to target organised crime and other related activity.

The advent of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) systems has the potential to significantly erode law enforcement attempts to keep pace with organised crime networks. VoIP technology is currently used commercially in Australia (mainly to replace PABX systems) but is also being increasingly used by private consumers who have access to broadband. VoIP has not been actively marketed to date, although companies such as ENGIN have started to do so. Current private usage is based largely on word-of-mouth but it is likely to expand rapidly due to the significant cost savings for long distance and international calls and free local calls. The systems are simple to establish and can be used with relatively inexpensive additions to traditional PCs and telephones. The incorporation of VoIP into popular web-based games and messaging systems is likely to see rapidly increasing popularity. The current constraint of patchy communication quality is reportedly being progressively overcome, so the growth of this aspect of the market is likely to be a function of consumer awareness and acceptance.

The CMC is aware of at least one crime network in Australia which is already employing VoIP to defeat law enforcement scrutiny of its activities. A number of factors work in favour of the crime network. VoIP providers are all located offshore at present and there is some doubt whether they are 'service providers', which creates both jurisdictional and legal difficulties for law enforcement agencies. Moreover, the communication takes the form of data packages passing over a system operated by a third party, which presents significant interception challenges. Although there will be provision in Australia for VoIP services to have distinct 'telephone' numbers, a VoIP service can be activated without a number – using the email address of the respective users. This has serious implications for law enforcement agencies – all call charge record checks are predicated upon providers collecting and retaining call data yet there will be a very limited requirement for the (overseas) VoIP providers to retain such data. Usage of the system is either free or charged against prepaid accounts. Although local service providers may be responsible for the broadband service they will not retain any record of the VoIP transactions.

The challenges posed by VoIP are now a live issue and there is a need for LEAC to lead the way in developing an appropriate response to address law enforcement and national security concerns in this area.

### **Strategies for countering future serious and organised crime**

The CMC remains committed to the production of periodic strategic assessments which scan the Queensland organised crime environment identifying trends in illicit activities, vulnerabilities capable of exploitation and make recommendations about strategies designed to address and counter future trends.

In the context of those matters considered above, the following strategies warrant consideration and in many instances are already being affected by the CMC.

#### Joint Agency Arrangements

Paramount to any future strategies to be effected by law enforcement in Australia is the need to strengthen partnerships nationally and internationally, intra and interstate. Relevant law

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enforcement partnerships should not be restricted to operational matters but extend to intelligence activities and policy matters.

On a state level targeting decisions and intelligence gathering should not be made by law enforcement agencies in isolation but should involve relevant consultation with all state based agencies avoiding duplication and ensuring best practice in terms of the diversion of resources. By sharing information and intelligence operational opportunities are maximised rather than missed. There needs to be greater information sharing and more 'looking outside the box' to see what other agencies may be able to assist in advancing operations. In Queensland considerable steps have already been taken in this direction with cross-operational checking, regular operational briefings involving all agencies and joint operational and intelligence forums already occurring.

Nationally law enforcement agencies need to be more prepared to work together. While a considerable number of operations are undertaken these days involving a number of state based agencies working together, the processes involved in getting such an investigation off the ground remain cumbersome. The execution of Memorandums of Understanding and Joint Operational Agreements can involve protracted negotiations even when each agency has the best of intentions and a genuine desire to assist one another.

Internationally, Australian law enforcement agencies need to develop networks with other nations recognising that much criminal activity is perpetrated in an international context.

#### Cross Jurisdictional Investigations

Australian law enforcement agencies are now ready and willing to engage in investigations that span the continent and involve illicit activity occurring simultaneously in a number of states and territories. Efforts are however frustrated by the disparity of the legislative frameworks in which all agencies operate. Consideration needs to be given to enacting a framework in which the different agencies are able to work together more effectively in targeting organised crime activity.

For cross jurisdictional investigations to be productive more thought needs to be given to national targeting initiatives and agreed priorities. The ACC performs a valuable role in this context however in order for the ACC to be brought on board the level of criminality and the threat posed must be proven to be significant. This is problematic in the crucial early stages of target development when levels of threat and risk are still being established and access to national resources may be crucial to establishing an operational case.

#### Shared Intelligence

Independently law enforcement agencies in Australia possess significant intelligence holdings in relation to organised crime activity. Successful target identification and development would be enhanced if each agency had a greater level of access to the intelligence holdings of other agencies. Australia has an increasingly mobile population. Crime identities move between the different jurisdictions and have criminal associates in other states who form part of their criminal enterprise. In order to form a complete picture of criminality law enforcement needs to be able to identify all of the 'pieces of the puzzle'.

The Australian Criminal Intelligence Database ('ACID') goes some way towards achieving this outcome but the ability of each individual agency to access the intelligence holdings of other agencies remains restricted. While most law enforcement agencies in Australia upload some of their intelligence holdings to ACID, very few contribute all of their material. In many cases material on ACID is caveated and access restricted to members of the owning agency.

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### Proactive Partnership Policing

One of the strategies proposed by the *Organised Crime Markets Assessment* in 2004 was that of proactive partnership policing. The assessment noted that high-growth areas of organised crime include the amphetamine market, fraud, identity crime and money laundering. These markets are best disrupted and assessed by reference to proactive partnerships involving law enforcement agencies, relevant government departments and the private sector. While reactive investigations will always play an important role in disrupting crime there is now broad recognition that such investigations must occur within the context of proactive law enforcement strategies. In turn an important factor of proactive strategies is preventive action. For example the Queensland Government's Ice-Breaker Strategy Taskforce combines law enforcement initiatives with supply reduction and harm minimisation strategies.

The CMC believes that all law enforcement agencies should pursue proactive policing partnerships involving stakeholders in the public and private sectors. Such partnerships increase our understanding of organised crime problems and allow organised crime investigations to proceed within the broadest possible understanding of all issues affecting the environment in which these groups operate.

### Human Source Initiatives

During the past five years the CMC has invested significant resources in the establishment of a Human Source capability. The CMC recognises that organised crime groups are increasingly diverse and involve relationships and associations established and consolidated over many years. Law enforcement must dedicate considerable resources in order to remain abreast of current criminal trends while continuing to identify those individuals involved in criminal activity. Given the resource limitations of the CMC, one of the most efficient ways of achieving this objective has been through the establishment and maintenance of long term covert human sources able to report on criminal activity. Human sources add an extra dimension which can not always be derived by reference to technical or physical surveillance. They can be tasked both to retrieve and plant information and to contrive situations of benefit to law enforcement methodologies.

In the absence of direct access to telephone interception powers the CMC has advanced a number of operations and target development initiatives relying largely on the abilities and efforts of well placed, proactively recruited Human Sources.

### Witness Protection

As part of its functions the CMC is responsible for administering the *Witness Protection Act (Qld) 2000* for the state of Queensland. In carrying out this function, the CMC's Witness Protection Unit ('WPU') provides protection to persons admitted to the program who have assisted a law enforcement agency in the performance of its functions, and who are in danger as a result of having done so.

Witness protection is seen worldwide as an increasingly valuable asset in the suppression and prosecution of organised crime. Organised crime flourishes in an environment where threats encourage silence, and the witness protection program supports witnesses through allowing them to safely provide crucial evidence in relation to serious offences; evidence that, due to fear and intimidation, may have otherwise gone unheard.

The role of witness protection in the investigation of organised crime is exemplified by the success of a witness protection operation conducted by the CMC. In this matter, the CMC's Witness Protection Unit provided protection available under the program to eleven witnesses who gave evidence against numerous members of an OMCG. Effectively, the first hand evidence of these witnesses resulted in the securing of convictions against eight members of the OMCG for offences including drug trafficking, drug supply, torture, deprivation of

liberty, firearms and weapons offences. These convictions significantly disrupted the ongoing criminal activities of this particular group.

### Risk Based Approach

The CMC is committed to applying a risk based approach when determining resourcing priorities and related investigative and preventative strategies.

In strategic terms, as discussed above, in assessing and considering the various illicit commodities and related markets the CMC uses a risk assessment matrix comprising the following formula<sup>25</sup>:

$$\begin{aligned} \textit{Desire} \times \textit{confidence} &= \textit{Intent} \\ \textit{Resources} \times \textit{knowledge} &= \textit{capability} \\ \textit{Intent} \times \textit{capability} &= \textit{likelihood of threat} \\ \textit{Likelihood of threat} \times \textit{harm/consequences} &= \textbf{RISK} \end{aligned}$$

In terms of this equation, threat equates to the ability of a criminal individual or group to successfully carry out the planned activity, which in turn depends on both intent and capability. Intent combines the desire of the subject to engage in the activity coupled with their confidence of success. Capability refers to whether the subject possesses the requisite knowledge and/or resources to carry out the act.

Harm refers to the potential impact should the threat be realised and includes physical, psychological, economic and political damage<sup>26</sup>. Stakeholders play a considerable role in determining levels of harm which derive not only from facts but from perceptions of harm. Law enforcement needs to consult widely with all relevant stakeholders in order to make an accurate assessment of the harms related to an illicit activity.

Risk equals the product of threat and harm combined and is expressed qualitatively in terms from low to very high.

This risk assessment matrix can also be applied to operational and targeting decision making processes and it is highly desirable that this approach is adopted. Using a rigorous and transparent process such as this means that resource allocation can be appropriately accounted for and decisions made in best practice circumstances.

Similar risk assessment methodologies are adopted by law enforcement agencies throughout Australia including the ACC and QPS.

### Proactive Financial Investigations

The recent transition of anti-money laundering legislation from a transaction reporting regime to risk based reporting is seen as potentially yielding higher value financial intelligence to law enforcement agencies and consequently, providing greater opportunity to identify significant money laundering schemes. Because money laundering is a derivative crime it is also a valuable indicator of underlying criminal activity. In that sense it also provides an opportunity for law enforcement to target the senior levels of organised crime networks in a proactive way. The value and frequency of financial transactions may well be a useful indicator of the scale of the underlying activity to assist the targeting of proactive, intelligence driven, tactical investigations into major organised crime groups.

<sup>25</sup> Organised Crime markets in Queensland: A Strategic Assessment 2004

<sup>26</sup> This concept of harm does not however extend to a detailed examination or consideration of health-related harms.

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Effective implementation of proactive financial investigations is seen to be dependent upon three complementary areas of financial investigation:

1. The financial intelligence capability to detect suspicious financial activity and identify those involved;
2. The forensic accounting capability which can be applied to 'value add' to organised crime investigations; and
3. An asset confiscation capability.

Over recent years the forensic accounting capability available to law enforcement has rapidly increased and the recent introduction of civil confiscation regimes by the Commonwealth and most states has markedly improved the capacity of law enforcement to recover the proceeds of illegal activity. The recent combination of improved financial intelligence, improved forensic accounting capacity and improved asset confiscation regimes presents a valuable opportunity for law enforcement to better target organised crime groups and to recover the illicit proceeds.

### **The economic cost of countering future organised crime at a national and state and territory level.**

In the absence of extensive consultations it is impossible to comment knowledgeably on the likely future economic cost of organised crime in Australia. Economic costs will include those related to law enforcement, health, social, policy and justice administration to name a few.

The costs of investigating organised criminal activity in Australia will only increase. Law enforcement agencies investigate increasingly sophisticated criminal enterprises which have sufficient funds available to them to facilitate access to expensive cutting edge technology. It stands to reason therefore that in order to effectively investigate these groups law enforcement would need to invest equivalent funds into the technology required to identify and uncover these behaviours. Technologically speaking law enforcement lags considerably behind many criminal groups in this respect. For example, we now have the technology to intercept certain telecommunications, however technology has already advanced beyond this point with criminals utilising VOIP and related technologies to communicate outside of the reach of law enforcement.

Given the escalating costs associated with investigating organised crime there is much to be said for the diversion of increasing resources to preventative strategies, which in the case of some crime categories including identity crime, are likely to be more cost effective in the longer term.

### **The adequacy of legislative and administrative arrangements, including the adequacy of cross-jurisdictional databases, to meet future needs**

As economic and crime markets become increasingly globalised the major issues under this heading from a state perspective will revolve around the difficulties associated with investigating national activity which can be substantially hampered by jurisdictional differences. From a Queensland perspective, the absence of state based legislation allowing access to telephone interception powers continues to be a frustration.

#### Telephone Interception

The CMC and the QPS have been jointly arguing for the introduction of Queensland based telecommunications interception ('TI') powers for the past decade. The continued absence of TI powers severely impedes the capacity of Queensland law enforcement to detect, investigate and dismantle organised crime activity in this state. TI powers, which are available to federal agencies and in all other state jurisdictions, have enabled law enforcement

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agencies elsewhere to secure arrests in circumstances where traditional law enforcement techniques alone would have been insufficient.

TI provides an investigative capacity far advanced from the more resource intensive alternative of Call Charge Record ('CCR') analysis. Where CCRs can be used to establish associations only, TI product can establish the nature of the association. CCRs, when cross referenced against other investigative tools, can suggest a criminal course of conduct, whereas TI product can result in evidence of the criminal act able to be tendered in court. Alternatively TI can prove the innocence of an association allowing allocation of investigative resources for other purposes.

Both the CMC and the QPS can currently access information resulting from TI, and TI itself, by entering into joint operations with agencies which have these powers, principally the ACC and Australian Federal Police ('AFP'), and less frequently other state agencies. In practice however access is not so easily obtained. The AFP and ACC have their own national intelligence and investigative priorities which consume significant portions of their resources. Requests for access to TI by way of a joint operation made by Queensland agencies must compete for resources against these national priorities. Queensland TI legislation would allow local access to TI product in accordance with state based priorities and ease some of the external demand for resources in terms of the federal agencies.

Organised crime in Queensland is characterised by a number of significant criminal identities who have been involved in organised crime activity for a number of years and have successfully evaded prosecution. As time progresses they become more experienced in terms of the way they operate and increasingly more difficult to investigate. Were TI powers available in Queensland it is highly likely that a number of these criminal identities would have been successfully prosecuted or at the least had their activities curtailed.

#### Cross Jurisdictional Legislation and Administrative arrangements

In April 2002 the Leaders Summit on Terrorism and Multi-Jurisdictional Crime agreed to develop model laws covering:

- Controlled operations;
- Surveillance devices;
- Assumed identities; and
- Witness anonymity.

At that time each state and territory jurisdiction operated under legislative provisions applicable only to that particular state or territory. In practice this meant that in order for an investigation involving multi-jurisdictional activity to be carried out effectively, investigators had to meet the different legislative requirements of each jurisdiction. There was no mechanism or legislative provision allowing for the recognition in one jurisdiction of a warrant or authorisation obtained in another jurisdiction. As a result when an investigation crosses a border the relevant law enforcement agency needs to obtain new authorities and warrants generally requiring the assistance and use of resources from the new jurisdiction. This process inevitably results in investigative delays and can lead to the loss of evidence and investigative opportunities.

Subsequent to this meeting the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General and the Australasian Police Ministers Council established the Joint Working Group on National Investigative Powers ('JWG') to further examine the issues. The JWG published its report, *Cross Border Investigative Powers for Law Enforcement* in November 2003. The JWG resulted in the development of model laws which may be adopted by each jurisdiction and mutually recognised by each other jurisdiction.

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On 30 June 2006 Queensland Parliament enacted the *Cross-Border Law Enforcement Legislation Amendment Act, 2005* which amended relevant sections of the *Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000*, *Crime and Misconduct Act 2001*, *Evidence Act 1977* and *Witness Protection Act 2000*.

In effect the enactment of the legislation allows that when a Queensland law enforcement agency is granted an authority or warrant under the Queensland legislation, that authority or warrant will be recognised in another state jurisdiction, provided that jurisdiction has enacted equivalent legislation. At this time only Queensland and Victoria have introduced the legislation.

The legislation in this state is less than six months old. This fact, combined with the absence of equivalent legislation in most other jurisdictions, means it has not yet been possible to assess the success or otherwise of the legislation. In theory at least multi-jurisdictional investigations should now be possible, but in practical terms the success of such investigations will still depend heavily on law enforcement co-operation and coordination at every level.

#### RICO Legislation

As criminal sophistication increases it is not uncommon for a single criminal network to be involved simultaneously in a range of illicit activities. Law enforcement can experience difficulties in targeting such networks because each prosecution generally concerns itself with specified offences and the evidence able to be presented against a defendant is restricted accordingly. Moreover the successful prosecution of one, or even more members of a network, often has only a limited effect on the broader operations of the larger group.

Similar problems experienced by law enforcement agencies in the United States of America have been overcome, to an extent, by the introduction of the *Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 USC – 1961 (1970)* which was passed by Congress as part of the *Organized Crime Control Act of 1970*. RICO legislation is designed to attack and destroy criminal enterprises rather than focus on individual criminal acts. The legislation permits the prosecutor to lead evidence that provides a comprehensive picture of the defendant's criminal activity and associations.

RICO makes it a crime to use a pattern of racketeering activity<sup>27</sup> or any proceeds of such activity to conduct or acquire and interest in a criminal enterprise. The prosecution must prove that the defendant has an association with an 'enterprise'<sup>28</sup> and has engaged in a 'pattern'<sup>29</sup> of racketeering activity.

RICO has been used in the United States to imprison the leadership and key members of entrenched organised crime networks such as those which had dominated New York for generations. The assets of these crime families were also seized by the State. One obvious application of RICO in Australia would be to target OMCGs as 'criminal enterprises' on the basis of the criminal activities of their members, with the aim of imprisoning members who are engaged in criminal activity and seizing the assets of both the OMCG and the membership.

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<sup>27</sup> Racketeering activity is defined to be a violation of specified state and federal offences.

<sup>28</sup> An enterprise may be a highly structured long term entity or a relatively *ad hoc* group formed for a limited period to engage in short term criminal activity.

<sup>29</sup> A pattern of activity has been held by US courts to be two or more separate incidents of racketeering activity with a common scheme, plan or motive carried out with some regularity and continuity.

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The criminal provisions of RICO would arguably sit well within the civil confiscation provisions of existing Queensland legislation. Enactment of RICO provisions, appropriately modified for an Australian context, could prove to be a highly effective weapon against organised crime networks and identities.

Before RICO legislation should be considered in Australia however, considerable evaluation and a critical review of the US experience would need to be undertaken.

#### ACID

All law enforcement agencies in Australia largely use their own specialised databases for the storage of data pertinent to their responsibilities, investigations and case management. The only truly shared database in Australia is ACID which, as mentioned previously, is administered by the ACC. ACID, which exists on the Australian Law Enforcement Intelligence Network (ALEIN), allows member agencies to access, store and retrieve intelligence data, however each of the agencies tends to use ACID in different ways. Some simply use it to access and search the holdings of other agencies, some use it as a repository of information. A number of agencies allow others to see the information they have uploaded onto ACID while some caveat their information restricting access to persons from within the same organisation.

For ACID to be the effective tool that it has the potential to be, a greater commitment is required on the part of participating agencies in terms of the uploading and sharing of intelligence. The CMC considers that proper use of ACID is an essential strategy for future successful investigations in multi-jurisdictional operations. ACID is also of increased importance in an age when the criminal element is increasingly mobile.

The broader context of ALEIN should also be referenced under this heading. ALEIN, as well as housing ACID, provides a useful and secure bulletin board for law enforcement agencies in Australia. It includes recent and historical intelligence publications, provides insight into the current activities and priorities of the ACC and also provides a secure means of messaging communication between member agencies.

With both ACID and ALEIN the issue is not so much the adequacy of the facility as the need to increase use and acceptance of the tools by law enforcement agencies throughout Australia.

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