Question no.: 98

Program: 2.1
Division/Agency: (OTS) Office of Transport Security
Topic: Prohibited items
Proof Hansard Page/s: Written

Senator Heffernan asked:

1. I refer to the list of 'prohibited items' not allowed on board aircraft as specified in the *Aviation Transport Security Regulations*. Are these regulations based on ICAO recommendations?
2. The regulations set out types of items which are not allowed on aircraft such as "items that can be used to restrain someone" giving the examples of cable ties and handcuffs. What is the scope of this provision?
3. Does this provision include:
    a. A belt,
    b. Rope, or,
    c. Masking tape?
4. Who administers these regulations at Australian airports?
5. What training is in place to ensure that the regulations are enforced appropriately?
6. Upon reading the regulations, the officer undertaking the screening is given the discretion to determine what items should be disallowed. What mechanisms are in place to ensure this discretion is exercised appropriately?
7. Does OTS or the Department provide precedent information to officers on what common items are considered to fall within the definition of 'prohibited'?
8. What mechanisms are in place to ensure that unusually strict or loose interpretations of the regulations do not develop?
9. What mechanisms are in place to ensure that the regulations are applied consistently across various airports?
10. What avenues are available to passengers who have a complaint about the confiscation of a particular 'prohibited item'?

Answer:

1. Yes.
2. The scope is as stated in the regulations.
3. a) No b) yes c) yes.
4. Persons appointed as screening authorities under the *Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005* are responsible for administering security screening requirements.
5. Screening service providers conduct their own training.
6. Screening authorities are subject to audit, inspection and systems testing.
7. The prohibited items list is as set out in the regulations.
8. Screening authorities are subject to audit, inspection and systems testing. Screening point incidents are reviewed in response to any feedback or complaints by members of the public.

9. Screening authorities are subject to audit, inspection and systems testing.
10. A passenger who has a complaint about surrender of a particular prohibited item can:
    - request an assessment at the screening point by the screening point supervisor;
    - contact the security company providing screening services at the airport;
    - contact the screening authority at the airport;
    - contact the Department of Infrastructure and Transport by mail, email or feedback via the Department's website;
    - write to their local member; and/or
    - write to the Minister for Infrastructure and Transport.

Question no.: 99

Program: 2.1
Division/Agency: (OTS) Office of Transport Security
Topic: Standard protocol for explosive devices on board
Proof Hansard Page/s: Written

Senator Xenophon asked:

1. In the event of what appears potentially to be an explosive device is found on board, what is the standard protocol for crew and the airline to deal with it?
2. Would it be expected that the Captain of the aircraft with a suspected explosive device on board could contact the airline's Security management immediately to obtain advice?

Answer:

1. Protocols for the particular airline are included in the airline's transport security program.
2. The procedures that would be followed would be those contained in the airline's transport security program.

Question no.: 100

Program: 2.1
Division/Agency: (OTS) Office of Transport Security
Topic: Maritime Security Identification Cards
Proof Hansard Page/s: Written

Senator Xenophon asked:

1. Regarding the issuing of Maritime Security Identification Cards, how many cards are issued each year, on average?
2. Since changes to the scheme were made in December last year, has the rate of cards issued dropped? Has the lifting of the criteria resulted in less cards being issued? What are the numbers?
3. Were the December criteria changes applied retrospectively; e.g. to those already holding MSICs, or did it only apply to new applications or applications for renewal?

Answer:

1. For financial year:
   - 2008-09 - around 14,000 MSICs were issued.
   - 2009-10 - around 18,000 MSICs were issued.
   - 2010-11 - around 30,000 MSICs were issued.
   For the current financial year (until 30 September 2011), approximately 19,000 MSICs have been issued.
2. No, the rate of cards has increased in line with increased activity at ports. Since the revised eligibility criteria was introduced the rate of MSIC applicant found to be not eligible has slightly increased from around 0.3 per cent of all applications to around 0.7 per cent in the current financial year.
3. No.

Question no.: 101

Program: 2.1
Division/Agency: (OTS) Office of Transport Security
Topic: Sydney T3 domestic terminal security check issues
Proof Hansard Page/s: Written

Senator Heffernan asked:

19 September 2011 two people walked through an exit door at the Sydney T3 domestic terminal, bypassing security checks. Consequently 2000 passengers had to be evacuated and re-screened (including those who had already boarded their flights).

1. Has there been an inquiry into this incidence, if so, can we have a copy of the report, what was the response
2. How was it possible that security staff allowed a member of the public to enter the sterile area through an exit?
3. Are there security measures on this door which would stop this sort of incident occurring again?
4. How long did it take for the security staff to realise that a breach had occurred?
5. Were the two people found? If so what was the result? If not, how did they escape detection and what has been done in an attempt to find them?
6. In April of 2011 there was an almost identical incident which occurred at Melbourne Airport. Were there any security changes which came from the incident in Melbourne and were they applied to Sydney?
7. If not, why were they not applied? If they were applied, what allowed this breach to occur for the second time?
8. Have the security staff on duty at the time been briefed and reprimanded for this lapse?
9. Has there been a change in security practice following this incident?
10. If there has not been a change does the Department accept that there is a need for a review of procedure? That being the case, why has there not been a change?

Answer:

1. Yes. A report was produced by the industry participant. The industry participant has implemented a corrective action plan.
2. Human error.
3. Yes.
4. Four minutes.
5. No. As there was a break in the continuous monitoring of the persons, the screening authority decided to clear the terminal rather than continue to search for them.
6. Yes. New technology is being installed to minimise the possibility of human error and CCTV coverage is to be improved in the area surrounding the exit race.
7. N/A
8. The security staff member on duty at the exit race was immediately stood down from screening duties. The security guard was interviewed by the Australian Federal Police.

Qantas has advised that the guard in question has been retrained and has currently been relocated to off-airport duties.

9. See answer to Question 6.
10. N/A

Question no.: 102

Program: 2.1
Division/Agency: (OTS) Office of Transport Security
Topic: Townsville Airport
Proof Hansard Page/s: Written

Senator Heffernan asked:

On Monday 10/10/2011 a member of the public was allowed to enter the secure section of Townsville Airport, through x-ray scanners, carrying two metal box cutting knives in his pocket. The gentleman became aware of this after he had left the airport and was not discovered by security staff.
1. Would the department please provide details of how the breach was able to occur as soon as a report is made?
2. What scanning equipment does Townsville Airport use? Is it the same as is used in other airports?
3. Does the department believe that a replacement of the security scanners is necessary? If not why not.
4. Is there a technical reason why this breach was allowed to occur (e.g. sensitivity of the machine, metal used in the blade etc)? If so provide details.
5. Is there an investigation into this breach?

Answer:

1, 3, 4 & 5. The Department does not hold information on this incident and is therefore unable to comment.
2. Townsville Airport uses the same combination of screening equipment that is used at all other domestic screened airports as required by regulation.