

**Rural Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee**  
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON NOTICE  
Supplementary Budget Estimates October 2011  
**Infrastructure and Transport**

**Question no.:** 127

**Program:** n/a

**Division/Agency:** (ATSB) Australian Transport Safety Bureau

**Topic:** National Transport Reform

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** 10 (18/10/11)

**Senator Nash asked:**

**Senator NASH:** I did, on the expenditure on the ATSB. There was a figure given at the last estimates that in the 2012-13 budget there is new capital of \$3 million. And in an answer to a question on notice Mr Dolan said:

Of this, \$2.367m is earmarked for the fit-out and equipping of new and expanded office accommodation so that additional ATSB staff can be accommodated to undertake additional investigation work in rail and maritime. How many additional ATSB staff?

**Mr Mrdak:** I will check that with Mr Dolan. That figure of \$3 million refers to the capital component of the additional funding. There was additional funding over and above that for resourcing of the ATSB for staffing.

**Senator NASH:** Yes, but in the answer it says particularly that the reason for the extra fit-out is so that 'additional ATSB staff can be accommodated'. I am just trying to get a sense: is it 200, 300?

**Mr Mrdak:** No, it is a relatively smaller number. But I will come back to you through the day and ensure Mr Dolan, when the ATSB appears later in the day, as an independent agency—

**Senator NASH:** If for some reason I miss him later, could you take on notice for me a breakdown? It is a significant figure for a fit-out to accommodate some new staff, so if you would not mind sending us a breakdown of that figure.

**Mr Mrdak:** Certainly. If Mr Dolan cannot deal with that this evening, I will take that on notice on his behalf.

**Answer:**

The cost estimates were developed early in 2010 on the basis that the ATSB would deliver the following additional outputs:

- a. Additional complex marine investigations - 26
- b. Additional complex rail investigations - 22
- c. Additional marine incidents received, coded and analysed - 2,000
- d. Additional rail incidents received, coded and analysed - 30,000
- e. Additional research and analysis investigations - 6

The additional resources required to achieve this were determined as follows:

Rail Investigators	11
Marine Investigators	11
Notifications staff and Analysts	14
Research Analysts	4
Corporate Staff	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>46</b>

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**Question no.:** 128

**Program:** n/a

**Division/Agency:** (ATSB) Australian Transport Safety Bureau

**Topic:** Instrument Departure Procedure Design – Archerfield (AI-2008-038)

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** 115-116 (18/10/11)

**Senator Fawcett asked:**

**Senator FAWCETT:** My last question before the chair moves me on is talking around departures. I notice on page 3 of your report, where you talk about the turn initiation area, you describe in the PANS-OPS terms things like the obstacle identification surface and 150 metres which is normally the inner edge running along. Under the old MOS 139 it was table 7-1 and under the new one it is table 10-1. Table 10-2 applies to take-offs whereas table 10-1 applies to landings. The figure of 150 is relevant for approach runway considerations for a code 3 runway. For a code 3 runway for departures it is actually 180 metres. Would you care to comment on that discrepancy, given that, as you said, your investigation focused on departures as opposed to arrivals?

**Mr Dolan:** On the basis of what I have in front of me, I do not think I am in a position to comment.

**Senator FAWCETT:** Please take that on notice and whether whoever worked on that area of the report could explain the different numbers between the various versions of MOS. He could explain whichever one he wishes to use.

**Mr Dolan:** I would be very happy to take that on notice. There are two things to come back to this committee based on the view we come to on that consideration. It is always open to us, if additional information comes to light, to reopen one of our investigations if that is necessary. I am not undertaking to do that, but I am certainly undertaking to consider it if necessary.

**Answer:**

Page three of Australian Transport Safety Bureau report AI-2008-038 refers to an area known as a turn initiation area (TIA), as defined in PANS-OPS (Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Aircraft Operations). The question on notice relates to an apparent discrepancy from a comparison between two similar sounding items: a TIA, and its associated obstacle identification surfaces (OIS); and an obstacle limitation surface (OLS), which has a separate function.

The TIA is used in the design of a specific instrument departure procedure to ensure safe operations from a specific runway. Its width is 150 m each side of the runway centreline – a total width of 300 m. An OIS continues from the end of the TIA. These surfaces cannot be penetrated by obstacles, and are referred to in the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) Manual of Standards (MOS) Part 173.

Obstacle limitation surfaces apply to all operations on all runways at registered or certified aerodromes, in good and bad weather conditions. Departure OLS provisions ensure the safe operation of both instrument and visual departures. The total width of the inner edge of the OLS is 180 m for code 3 runways and it splays laterally at an angle that differs from the TIA. Unlike the TIA and OIS, an OLS may be penetrated by obstacles if suitable mitigation

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measures are in place. OLS are derived from CASA MOS Part 139, and the departure provisions are contained in MOS 139 Table 7.1-2.

In short, the 150 m width that is highlighted in the Senator's question refers to a surface that is used to design an instrument departure, whereas the 180 m width refers to an obstacle surface that is used for all operations in all weather conditions. The ATSB's report AI-2008-038 considered the safety issues relating to both the OLS and the OIS for departures in runway 28 right at Archerfield Airport.

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**Question no.:** 129

**Program:** n/a

**Division/Agency:** (ATSB) Australian Transport Safety Bureau

**Topic:** Investigation of rail operations on the interstate rail line between Sydney and Melbourne

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** Written

**Senator Heffernan asked:**

1. Can you please provide an update on your inquiry into mud holes on the Melbourne-Sydney rail line?
2. You were given quite a broad scope in your inquiry's terms of reference so can you describe the scope of your inquiries?
3. What resources are the ATSB using to investigate this matter?
4. Since the release of your preliminary report, what consultation have you undertaken?
  - a. With whom?
  - b. What has this involved?
  - c. Has there been an opportunity for confidential reporting?
5. What has the ARTC's involvement in the investigation been?
6. Have you any findings at this point in relation to the cause of mud holes on the line?
7. Have you any findings at this point in relation to the side insertion method for resleepering?
8. How many incidents posing a serious potential safety risk have you been made aware of in this investigation?
9. How many of these incidents have been confirmed or proven?
10. Have the speed restrictions on the track been sufficient to address the track deterioration?
11. Have you identified any process failures that can be corrected? If so, give details.
12. When is the final report expected?

**Answer:**

1. The ATSB's investigation of rail operations on the interstate rail line between Sydney and Melbourne is ongoing. The ATSB released a preliminary factual report outlining the investigation to that time and the focus of our enquiries on 29 September 2011 (Attachment A).
2. The investigation is addressing the request from the Minister for Infrastructure and Transport, in particular, by identifying safety issues in relation to rail operations on the line. Further details of the investigation are included in the preliminary factual report.
3. The ATSB is using a range of internal resources on the investigation including four senior rail safety investigators and other ATSB specialist resources in human factors and data analysis as required.
4. The ATSB investigation team have and are continuing to gather information for the investigation from a wide range of individuals and organisations involved in rail operations on the Sydney to Melbourne rail line.
  - 4a. These include the Australian Rail Track Corporation, Pacific National, V Line, RailCorp, train drivers, track and rolling stock maintainers, the Independent Transport Safety Regulator in NSW, Transport Safety Victoria, the Office of Transport Safety

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Investigations NSW, the Chief Investigator Transport Safety Victoria and the Rail Tram and Bus Union.

- 4b. The investigation team has conducted a series of meetings with senior management from organisations involved in rail operations on the line, solicited a range of information from these organisations and also interviewed a number of individuals with information pertinent to the investigation.
- 4c. As with all ATSB investigations, details of the investigation are published on our website and there is the opportunity for any party to make contact with the investigation team via our website.
5. A meeting was held with key ARTC staff and senior management in the earliest stage of the investigation. Since then ARTC staff have and are continuing to provide the investigation team with an extensive range of information, data and documents pertinent to the investigation.
6. The investigation is ongoing, these matters will be analysed, discussed and published in the final report.
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9. The investigation is ongoing, these matters will be analysed, discussed and published in the final report.
10. The current management of rail safety on the line, including the use of speed restrictions, is an early focus of the investigation. An interim report that will focus on the safety of operations on the Sydney to Melbourne rail line will be published on Wednesday 8 February 2012.
11. The investigation is ongoing, these matters will be analysed, discussed and published in the final report.
12. The final report is expected to be completed in the third quarter of 2012.

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**Question no.:** 130

**Program:** n/a

**Division/Agency:** (ATSB) Australian Transport Safety Bureau

**Topic:** Investigation of rail operations on the interstate rail line between Sydney and Melbourne

**Proof Hansard Page/s:** Written

**Senator Edwards asked:**

1. Can you please provide an update on your inquiry into mud holes on the Melbourne-Sydney rail line?
2. There was quite a broad scope in your inquiry's terms of reference so can you describe the scope of your inquiries?
3. What resources are the ATSB using to investigate this matter?
4. Since the release of your preliminary report, what consultation have you undertaken?
5. With whom?
6. What have these consultations involved?
7. Has there been the opportunity for confidential reporting?
8. What has the ARTC's involvement in the investigation been?
9. Have you any findings at this point that you can share in relation to the cause of the mud holes on the line?
10. What about the side-insertion method for resleepering?
11. How many incidents posing a serious potential safety risk have you been made aware of in this investigation?
12. How many of these have been confirmed or proven?
13. Have the speed restrictions been sufficient to address the track deterioration?
14. Have you identified any process failures that can be corrected?
15. If so, give details.
16. When is the final report expected?

**Answer:**

Please see Question 129.