

# Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade

## Supplementary Estimates Hearing 21 October 2009

### Responses ordered by Outcome and Program Groups

#### Questions Taken on Notice

#### DEFENCE

##### Outcome 1

**The protection and advancement of Australia's national interests through the provision of military capabilities and the promotion of security and stability**

##### **Program 1.1: Office of the Secretary and CDF**

##### **Q7**

**ADF briefings to NGOs on Afghanistan, Hansard pp41-42**  
**Senator Ludlam**

**Could Defence please check whether it has had any approaches from Australian NGOs working in Afghanistan for advice?**

##### **Response:**

Defence is not aware of any formal approaches from NGOs for briefings on Afghanistan.

##### **Q11**

**Military Justice Reform Bill Hansard, pp 89-90**  
**Senator Bishop**

**Could Defence please advise when the government intends for that amending bill to come before the Parliament?**

##### **Response:**

The Defence Force Discipline and Other Measures Bill was originally proposed for the 2009 Spring session of Parliament. The Bill was intended to amend the *Defence Force Discipline Act 1982* and the *Defence Act 1903* in order to implement the recommendations of the *Report of the Independent Review on the Health of the Reformed Military Justice System* of 23 January 2009 by Sir Laurence Street and Air Vice Marshal (Retired) Fisher.

The High Court's decision in *Lane v Morrison* on 26 August 2009 superseded many aspects of the Bill which related to the previous invalid court structure.

Those measures not affected by the High Court decision have been the subject of a legislative 're-bid' for the 2010 Autumn sittings. These measures are:

- a) To amend the *Defence Act 1903* to clarify the independence, powers and privileges of the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force and also provide for the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force to prepare an annual report to Parliament relating to the functions of his office set out in sub-section 110C(1) of the Defence Act.
- b) To amend the *Defence Force Discipline Act 1982* to enable the appointment of Chief Petty Officers and Flight Sergeants as discipline officers, to clarify the jurisdiction of discipline officers and align the punishments available to be imposed in respect of certain ranks.

While Defence is closely engaged with the Attorney-General's Department, any legislation for a Chapter III court would be a matter within the portfolio responsibilities of the Attorney-General.

## **Q9**

### **Red Beach Grave Site in Kiribati, Hansard pp72-73**

**Senator Payne**

#### **Regarding Red Beach grave site:**

- (a) Does the ADF have any connection with Red Beach (through visits or aid)?**
- (b) Is there any awareness in Defence of efforts to secure a clean up of Red Beach?**
- (c) Has the United States made any approaches on the issue?**

#### **Response:**

- (a) The ADF is aware of the historical significance to the US Marines of Red Beach but does not currently have any involvement, through visits or aid, with this site.

During the period 7-26 August 2008 as part of Operation Kiribati Assist, Defence did assist the Kiribati government with the disposal of unexploded ordnance throughout Kiribati, which were remnants from the fighting following the landing of US Marines at Betio in 1943. It should be noted that Australian involvement in the landings was limited to the presence of merchant navy personnel and some civilians. These Australians supported the amphibious task force, but did not play a direct role in the fighting on Red Beach itself.

- (b) In July 2009 the Minister for Defence received a letter from a private citizen requesting information concerning the role of the Australian Naval Officer stationed at Tarawa, Kiribati. This letter expressed concerns about the state of Red Beach and detailed the efforts of this individual to enlist the support of the US Government to clean up the beach. The ADF is unaware of any current activities relating to the clean up of Red Beach, or of any other government agency involvement in this matter.
- (c) The ADF has not been approached by the US government on this issue.

**W1**

**Defence White Paper**

**Senator Ludlam**

**Minister Faulkner had not yet read a report by Mark Thomson of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute at the time of the last Estimates hearing, but indicated that he was looking forward to doing so. What is the Department's response to Mr Thompson's analysis, in particular claims of a 'downward spiral of disclosure', that the White Paper is simply not fully costed and affordable, there are no tangible targets, that it is deliberately vague, that the public and parliamentary scrutiny is thus tightly curtailed, and so is Defence's accountability?**

**Response:**

As indicated in the *2009-10 Portfolio Budget Statements*, the Government provided Defence with an additional \$146.1 billion dollars to fully fund the White Paper over the 21 years to 2029-30. In addition to this funding, Defence has made available, through the Strategic Reform Program, \$20 billion of savings for reinvestment in Defence.

An important part of Defence's funding package was the transition to a new funding model which provided Defence with 3 per cent average real growth to 2017-18, 2.2 per cent average real growth from 2018-19 to 2029-30 and a 2.5 per cent fixed price indexation from 2009-10 to 2029-30. This will allow for long term funding stability, which is essential for long term planning.

With regard to diminishing disclosure, Defence's *Portfolio Budget Statements* focus is the Forward Estimates period similar to that of other Government Agencies. In addition, the only real change to the *Portfolio Budget Statements 2009-10* compared to the last is the table showing variations since the last 2000 White Paper. With a new White Paper recently released, this reconciliation was no longer relevant and was too early for changes from the 2009 White Paper. Defence also provided information on the source and application of White Paper Savings and Initiatives as shown in Table 3 (page 16) of the *Portfolio Budget Statements 2009-10*.

It is also worth noting that the *Portfolio Budget Statements 2001-02* did not contain details of the White Paper funding or budgets over the decade and the reconciliation table did not appear until later years. The level of disclosure has not diminished in Defence's Budget documentation in relation to either Defence's budget or Defence White Papers.

**W9**

**Afghan National Army Trust Fund**

**Senator Barnett**

- (a) Could Defence please provide the reasons as to why Australia has made such a large contribution to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund?**
- (b) Who requested Australia make this contribution, and when?**
- (c) Will the affect of this contribution for Australia to gain a seat on the United Nations Security Council? Was this the reason or one of the reasons for such a large contribution?**

**Response:**

- (a) The decision by the Australian Government to contribute this amount to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund directly aligns with the strategic aims of our mission in Afghanistan: to deny sanctuary to terrorists; to stabilise the country through military, police and civilian efforts; and to train the Afghan security forces in Oruzgan Province so we can hand over responsibility for security in the province in a reasonable timeframe.
- (b) In March 2009, NATO expanded the scope of the Afghan National Army Trust Fund and made an open request to all ISAF partners for contributions. Subsequently the Australian Government decided to provide a contribution, which was announced by Prime Minister Rudd on 29 April 2009.
- (c) Our contribution to the ANA Trust Fund is directly linked to achieving our strategic aims in Afghanistan, as outlined above. This contribution is not linked to Australia's United Nations Security Council seat bid.

**W11**

**Freedom of Information (FOI)**

**Senator Trood**

**In March the Minister stated: 'Our democracy... has inherited a tendency to weigh the protective features of confidentiality more heavily than the positive aspects of disclosure.'**

- (a) **Does the Minister still agree with this statement?**
- (b) **Is the Minister still eager to replace a culture of secrecy with a "pro-disclosure culture"?**
- (c) **How many FOI requests has the Department received and satisfied in the last financial year?**

**Response:**

- (a) Yes.
- (b) Yes. I have asked the Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Force to take a lead role in facilitating the Government's policy objective of enhancing a culture of disclosure. This includes making it clear to FOI decision makers that the starting point for considering FOI requests should be a presumption in favour of giving access to documents.

Of course, the Government is not suggesting that all documents should be released under the Act. There will always be some documents, including classified documents, for which disclosure is not in the public interest and which should be exempt under the Act.

- (c) For 2008-09, see the Defence Annual Report Vol 1, page 58. For 2009-10 to date (as at 9 November 2009), see below:

Total received	Pending decision	Granted in full	Partial disclosure	Denied	Withdrawn	Transferred
63	24	8	11	9	10	1

### W13

#### **War Graves: Fromelles Dig** **Senator Trood**

- (a) Please provide an update on the archaeological search for the bodies of Australian and British soldiers buried in an unmarked grave in Fromelles, France.
- (b) How many sets of remains have been uncovered?
- (c) What process has been used to identify the remains?
- (d) How many Australians are currently involved in the archaeological dig?
- (e) What process will be used to notify the families of the buried?
- (f) What was the tendering process for the Fromelles dig? How many tenders were received for the work?
- (g) What process was used for determining the award of the archaeological contract?
- (h) Please provide any relevant information on Oxford Archaeology. Has the Department worked with them in the past? What distinguished their bid from the other unsuccessful tenders?
- (i) Is the department aware of the criticisms made about the dig against Oxford Archaeology? Does the Department believe there is any validity to these claims?
- (j) Was there any water damage during the excavations?
- (k) Were Departmental staff present during the dig? At what stages were they present? Did they express any concerns regarding the process of excavation?

#### **Response:**

- (a) The archaeological excavation at Pheasant Wood, Fromelles was completed on 4 September 2009. Eight graves were uncovered and a total of 250 sets of remains were recovered from six graves (two were completely empty).
- (b) A total of 250 sets of remains were recovered from six graves.
- (c) Identification of the remains will be a long and involved process involving a combination of historical, anthropological, archaeological and DNA data. A formal identification board with representatives of both the Australian and British Governments will sit in March 2010 to consider all available evidence to confirm identities if possible.
- (d) There were four Australians working with Oxford Archaeology during the archaeological fieldwork phase of the project. In addition, the Australian Government utilised a forensic anthropologist for quality assurance and specialist advice on the techniques used during the excavation.

- (e) Each relative who is registered with the project, and who is a family member of a soldier identified by March 2010 or later, will be contacted initially by phone and then by letter to inform them of the positive identification.
- (f) On behalf of both governments and in line with Commonwealth guidelines, the Commonwealth War Graves Commission undertook a thorough and transparent procurement process for the archaeological excavation. In late 2008, an invitation to submit an Expression of Interest (EOI) was sent to seven organisations with experience in specialist archaeological excavations. This was to assist in reducing the tender field to the most technically competent and able organisations. Subsequently, in December 2008, three organisations were asked to submit a response to the Archaeological Excavation Invitation to Tender.
- (g) A tender evaluation board comprising representatives from the Australian Defence Force, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence and Commonwealth War Graves Commission considered all tender submissions in late January, before Oxford Archaeology was awarded the contract on 6 February 2009.
- (h) Oxford Archaeology was selected on the basis of their superior bid and the value for money provided by their pricing structure. The major strengths of the bid were Oxford Archaeology's organisational structure and business model, project team construct, experience and expertise, project methodology, level of project detail and the thoroughness of their planning. Additionally, Oxford Archaeology holds an agreement with French authorities to undertake archaeological excavations at sites from any historical period, anywhere in France. This provided a significant benefit to Commonwealth War Graves Commission negotiations with French authorities. The Oxford Archaeology team consisted of specialists from a number of nationalities including Australia, United Kingdom, France and Germany.
- (i) Yes. The claims are not valid. Minister Combet made a statement to the House of Representatives formally refuting these claims on 19 August 2009.
- (j) No.
- (k) Members of the Australian Fromelles Project Group (Australian Army) were on site in early May for the commencement of the archaeological excavation. Head of Defence Staff – London, and Paris Embassy staff, visited the site on an ad hoc basis between May and September. None of these Departmental staff is a qualified archaeologist. The Fromelles Management Board (acting on behalf of the Australian and British Governments) contracted a specialist archaeological and anthropological adviser to oversee the dig. This specialist personally visited the site approximately every six weeks during excavation operations and provided reports of proceeding to the Board. These reports did not raise concerns about the techniques used on site.

## **Program 1.2: Navy Capabilities**

**Q1**

**HMAS Success, Hansard pp15-16**  
**Senators Johnston and Hutchins**

**Please confirm whether or not the report into the HMAS *Success* allegations/investigation was due on 21 October 2009.**

**Response:**

The Inquiry Officer report into the allegations in HMAS *Success* was submitted on the due date, 20 August 2009, not 21 October 2009.

**Q2**

**HMAS Success, Hansard p23**  
**Senator Fielding**

**What was the date the second inquiry into the allegations on HMAS *Success* commenced? Can the Terms of Reference be provided?**

**Response:**

The second inquiry, which was conducted into complaints by three individuals into their removal from *Success* on 9 May 2009, commenced on 25 September 2009. The Terms of Reference for this routine Inquiry are attached.

**W5**

**Navy Ships using commercial ports**  
**Senator Kroger**

- (a) Which Australian commercial port, that is ports other than official Naval bases, are used by Naval vessels?**
- (b) Can you please elaborate on the use of commercial ports by Naval ships? What purposes are they used for?**
- (c) Does the Navy or ADF more generally provide extra security on commercial ports to protect Naval ships when they are docked there?**
- (d) What procedures, if any, are performed on Naval vessels by non-Naval personnel such as dock works etc? Example may but do not necessarily include cleaning and maintenance.**
- (e) Approximately how many workers at commercial ports were involved in these procedures in the past year, if any?**
- (f) Does the Navy or ADF more broadly have a system of background checks in place for workers at commercial ports performing work on Naval ships, such as cleaning, maintenance etc?**
- (g) How many workers at commercial ports used by Naval ships have a criminal record?**
- (h) How many workers were given a non-custodial sentence?**

**Response:**

- (a) Almost every Australian commercial port could be visited by RAN ships at some stage during normal operations, depending on the size of the ship, the suitability of the port and purpose of the visit. Ports visited have included: Weipa, Thursday Island, Cooktown, Cairns, Townsville, Bowen, Mackay, Gladstone, Bundaberg, Brisbane, Southport, Ballina, Coffs Harbour, Port Macquarie, Newcastle, Broken Bay, Sydney, Port Kembla, Jervis Bay, Eden, Hastings, Melbourne, Geelong, Launceston, Devonport, Burnie, Hobart, Port Arthur, Adelaide, Port Pirie, Whyalla, Port Lincoln, Esperance, Albany, Bunbury, Fremantle, Geraldton, Carnarvon, Exmouth, Dampier, Port Hedland, Broome, Derby, Wyndham, Darwin, Gove, Christmas Island, Cocos Island. This is the majority of ports and popular inlets although there may be others where ships may visit when required to support an exercise or operation.
- (b) Operational RAN ships utilise commercial port facilities for re-fuelling, replenishing provisions and stores, mounting Humanitarian or Disaster Relief operations, embarking/disembarking troops, equipment and munitions, conducting minor maintenance/repairs, and to provide crew rest. Ship docking and repair facilities in some key commercial ports may also be accessed for planned or emergency work. Goodwill visits by RAN ships to various Australian ports are designed to engage with local communities and promote recruiting opportunities.
- (c) RAN personnel communicate with appropriate port staff prior to each ship visit. This ensures that naval security requirements are integrated with the port's existing security arrangements, based on an appropriate risk analysis. Additional security may be required in some instances, for example to achieve ship open days and other community-related functions held on board the ship.
- (d) Work conducted on RAN ships outside naval home port facilities, this is generally limited to contracted maintenance or unforeseen maintenance activities.
- (e) Defence is unable to quantify the number, as individual contractors were not required to provide details of the number of workers in support of each maintenance activity.
- (f) Defence (through DMO) and the Government Contracting guidelines reserve the right to require specific levels of security assurances and background checks before any work is undertaken. This is particularly so for classified equipment maintenance.
- (g)and (h). Defence is not privy to this information.

**Program 1.3: Army Capabilities**

**W14**

**Black Hawks**

**Senator Johnston**

- a) What was the nature of the allegations of 30 July regarding the maintenance of the Black Hawk helicopters?**



- b) What was the role of any of the three Warrant Officers who were subsequently suspended from their positions in maintaining the Black Hawks in these allegations?**
- c) How is it possible that experienced contractors employed on the maintenance of the Black Hawks were not aware of the CONFIR system?**
- d) What steps have you put in place to inform contractors of the CONFIR system?**
- e) What Inquiry regarding the maintenance of the Black Hawks was conducted by a Major and a Captain?**
- f) What was the outcome of this Inquiry, including, any punitive action that was taken against any employees of the main contractor?**
- g) Will you provide a copy of the Report of the Inquiry ordered by the Chief of Army on 30 September 2009?**
- h) What guarantees can you give that two whistleblowers employed by the civilian contractors responsible for the maintenance of the Black Hawks will not be punitively affected for reporting inappropriate actions that potentially could have compromised the safety of the operation of the Black Hawks?**

**Response:**

- (a) The allegations of 30 July 2009 related to the incorrect use of the Computer Aided Maintenance Management (Camm2) system passwords involving members of the contract maintenance Fly-in/Fly-out (FIFO) maintenance team.
- (b) The three Warrant Officers were Maintenance Managers and/or Supervisors.
- (c) Even allowing for the periodic nature of the maintenance work, it is difficult to understand as to why the contractors, or any experienced aircraft maintenance person, does not have an awareness of the aviation confidential reporting system. It is part of civil and military maintenance training, and ongoing safety programs. Safety reporting is discussed in the military units during unit safety briefings, in articles and promotions in the *Defence Aviation Safety* magazines which are throughout the unit.

The contractor supporting Black Hawk unit level maintenance in Townsville performs other aviation maintenance work for the Commonwealth as an Authorised Maintenance Organisation. They have advised Defence that during induction, staff are made aware of the Australian Defence Force's (ADF) confidential incident report (CONFIR) system. This contractor also has an equivalent to the ADF CONFIR system, the eDialog system, which could have been used by any of their employees.

An internet search on either the civilian internet or on the Defence Restricted Network using "aviation confidential report defence" provides references to the civilian and military confidential reporting systems. Both confidential reporting systems have the option of printing a form, completing it and mailing it.

- (d) Defence Materiel Organisation has initiated action to remind contractors of the aviation safety system and reporting options including the CONFIR.
- (e) This was a Routine Inquiry into the alleged misuse of Camm2 system passwords.
- (f) An Inquiry Report was delivered to Headquarters 16 Aviation Brigade on 30 August 2009 and a Decision and Implementation Plan has been issued. No

"punitive action" has been taken by Defence against any employees of the main contractor.

- (g) The Chief of Army did not order any Inquiry on 30 September 2009. The Chief of Army was briefed on a further CONFIR regarding another matter on or about 30 September 2009. Commander Forces Command appointed an investigation team and the Terms of Reference were issued on 6 October 2009.
- (h) No individual, military or civilian, will be punitively affected for reporting safety related concerns either through the normal reporting system, which is preferred, or through the Confidential System if the individual feels this is warranted.

Defence actively encourages reporting of all safety related concerns as part of the Defence Safety and Risk Management framework. The Defence chain of command documents and publishes a full commitment to the safety program. Defence contributes extensive resources to assisting all personnel with the implementation of their individual safety responsibilities. Mechanisms have been established to consider the safety reports, and any other relevant matters, to determine the appropriate actions. It is thus preferable for incidents to be openly reported and discussed through the chain of command. As has been demonstrated, should an individual prefer to use a Confidential Report, it is also taken seriously by the chain of command.

Army Aviation System Project Office (AASPO), through contract means, directed Sikorsky Helitech that the two members deemed integral to the human factors maintenance issue (misuse of passwords) were no longer authorised to conduct maintenance work within 16 Aviation Brigade until Sikorsky Helitech could provide assurance that the human factors issues had been resolved. On 9 September 2009 Sikorsky Helitech informed AASPO that Sikorsky Helitech had issued termination notices to the two employees. This action was not at the direction of Headquarters 16 Aviation Brigade or AASPO.

#### **Program 1.4: Air Force Capabilities**

*No questions asked under this category.*

#### **Program 1.5: Intelligence Capabilities**

*No questions asked under this category.*

## **Program 1.6: Defence Support**

### **Q10**

#### **RAAF Base Amberley and Cadet Accommodation , Hansard, pp 82-83**

**Senator Johnston**

**Could Defence please advise on the accommodation situation for the cadets at RAAF Base Amberley? What is the status on the accommodation and what options are being explored?**

#### **Response:**

Number 2 Wing Australian Air Force Cadets (2WGAAFC) is located at RAAF Base Amberley and comprises a headquarters, two squadrons and five flights (sections).

#### Living in accommodation

- There are a total of 382 transit accommodation rooms at RAAF Base Amberley, of which 106 rooms are identified as exclusively for use by 2WGAAFC. These rooms can accommodate 141 cadets in total.
- The remaining 276 rooms are available for use by 2WGAAFC subject to availability and ongoing operational and training requirements. It is not possible to mix cadet accommodation with adult members and this can limit the flexibility of the Base to offer additional accommodation to cadets.
- The 2WGAAFC accommodation does not have climate control or noise attenuation and their general conditions have been assessed as moderate to poor.
- It is anticipated that living in accommodation will be included in the RAAF Base Amberley Redevelopment Stage Four project, subject to budgetary and operational constraints.

#### Current working accommodation

- RAAF Base Amberley elements of 2WGAAFC are currently accommodated at various locations around the Base in facilities which are in poor condition and past the end of their economic life.
- The majority of 2WGAAFC facilities are scheduled for demolition as part of the RAAF Base Amberley Redevelopment Stage Three project.

#### Amberley Sate School

- The Amberley State School is located in an area that is adjacent to both residential and operational support zones. It is also located in an area that is most likely to be developed for additional living in accommodation at RAAF Base Amberley.
- There has been no inspection of the school and as a result the condition of the buildings and the degree to which they satisfy the Building Code of Australia, the Manual of Fire Protection Engineering and Occupational Health and Safety and environmental standards is still unknown.
- Access to the Amberley School will not be possible until February 2010.
- The buildings are not connected to Base infrastructure or IT networks. The cost of such connection is anticipated to be significant.

#### Proposed new working accommodation

- The Joint Standing Committee on Public Works has approved the inclusion of a multiuser depot as a part of the RAAF Base Amberley Redevelopment Stage Three project.

- The multiuser depot is anticipated to be complete by late 2010; and will provide new and customised working accommodation to meet the needs of 2WGAAFC elements based at RAAF Base Amberley.
- 2WGAAFC accommodation identified for demolition has now been removed from the current RAAF Base Amberley Redevelopment Stage Three project demolition program. It will be demolished once the multiuser depot has been constructed and occupied.
- This removes the need, and associated costs, for interim accommodation moves into either Frogs Hollow or the Amberley State School.

**W3**

**Talisman Saber**  
**Senator Ludlam**

**In regards to Exercise Talisman Saber:**

- (a) What was the final number of United States troops and equipment that were brought into Australia for the Talisman Saber exercise?**
- (b) Given the potential dangers of the swine flu being spread at that time, the government outlined stringent safeguards at the last Estimates hearing. Where these adequate, where there any recorded incidents of swine flu amongst the US personnel visiting Australia?**
- (c) What activities did Defence undertake to monitor its environmental performance during exercise Talisman Saber?**
- (d) What environmental data was collected?**
- (e) What activities have been undertaken to implement the undertaking by Defence that at the close of the exercise, redeployment is managed on a policy of 'no footprint', with all exercise materials, equipment and debris removed and all disturbances (e.g. tracks, ditches) rehabilitated.**
- (f) What kind of debris needed to be removed, what kind of disturbances have been rehabilitated?**

**Response:**

- (a) The US deployed 8,684 military personnel into Australia with an additional 9,679 sailors and airmen onboard the ships participating in the exercise. A total of 2,369 short tons (2,000 pounds) of equipment was deployed via strategic airlift to Australia to support the exercise. The III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) conducted amphibious landings, followed by land manoeuvre at Shoalwater Bay Training Area for 10 days. The III MEF landed their vehicles and equipment into the Training Area to support the land manoeuvre. After cleaning, the vehicles and equipment were re-embarked aboard the US Navy amphibious ships. The numbers of III MEF vehicles and equipment, composition and types are classified.
- (b) The precautions put in place to prevent US Military personnel being infected, and control any outbreak of the virus, were generally effective. Of the 18,363 US military personnel deployed to Australia, a total of 78 were placed in isolation. Not all US military personnel that showed H1N1 symptoms were tested to confirm they had contracted the virus. Rather, US military personnel showing H1N1 virus symptoms were immediately placed in isolation to prevent the spread of the virus. All US

Military personnel that showed H1N1 virus symptoms subsequently recovered to full health.

- (c) Defence established an Environmental Management Group (EMG) that monitored environmental performance across all the major exercise locations. Responsibilities of EMG members included:
- managing the day-to-day environmental aspects of the exercise;
  - monitoring compliance with exercise and site environmental protection instructions;
  - advising military commands on environmental protection and mitigation measures;
  - investigating and reporting environmental incidents if required; and
  - reporting on environmental performance post exercise.
- The EMG was made up of representatives from both Australia and the US and formed a part of the exercise control group.

The EMG determined no environmental laws were breached and no incidents that impacted upon important environmental values were reported arising from the conduct of Talisman Saber 09.

- (d) A range of pre and post activity environmental data was collected to monitor the environmental performance of the exercise activities. Some marine data collection was also undertaken which aimed to improve Defence's knowledge about the distribution, abundance and habits of beaked whales in the Coral Sea.
- (e) The requirement for post-activity remediation of areas used during Talisman Saber 09 was specifically briefed to exercise participants before the exercise commenced. All participants were given environmental awareness cards which carried advice about the need to consider and minimise environmental impacts.

The EMG undertook post activity inspections of sites. The majority of impacts identified were of a minor nature and restricted to minor track damage, low intensity grass fires, some litter, minor fuel spills and defensive positions not adequately backfilled. Most of these impacts were remediated prior to units redeploying. In cases where units were not able to remediate damage, contractor support was used to rehabilitate the sites.

- (f) The forms of waste that needed to be removed post-exercise were typical of any large concentration of people in a field environment, including plastic packaging, food and putrescibles wastes and sewage. Small quantities of soil collected as a result of minor refuelling incidents were also disposed to appropriately licensed facilities. In addition, recyclable materials such as metal, used batteries, wood and plastic were collected and disposed into appropriate recycling streams.

The only disturbances requiring active rehabilitation were those areas that were disturbed by earthworks (for example associated with digging in and route denial), vehicle movements or bombing.

**W10**

**Defence Bases: Pappas Report**

**Senator Trood**

**The Defence Department has released the executive summary of the Pappas Report, which outlines the plan to build defence super bases.**

- (a) Does the department intend to release the entirety of the report? If yes, when will the report be released? If not, why?**
- (b) The Minister stated that “defence should establish a super-base model.” Is the Department able to clarify exactly what the Minister means by this statement?**
- (c) The Pappas Report identifies redundant military bases that if closed, could save hundreds of millions of dollars. Which military bases are redundant and have any final decisions been made on their closure?**
- (d) The Minister stated that the proposed super bases should be located in family friendly areas, near strategic infrastructure and with industry to promote knowledge sharing and innovation. Is the Department able to inform the committee where the proposed super bases would be located?**
- (e) Are any military bases recommended to be upgraded in the report? If so, which bases are these?**
- (f) The Pappas report states that a super base model would result in yearly savings, claiming savings could reach a total of \$700 million to \$1.05 billion by the year 2035. Has any clarity been made regarding the potential amount of money a super base model would save?**
- (g) The Minister stated that the decisions to close redundant military bases and to open super bases will be made “some time in the future.” Are you able to clarify when these decisions will be made?**

**Response:**

- (a) The Government has released a public version of the 2008 Defence Budget Audit. The document was publicly released on 17 November 2009 and is available on the Defence internet site.**
- (b) The Defence Budget Audit made a number of recommendations regarding the future of the Defence estate, including consolidating the Defence estate into a ‘super-base’ model. The ‘super-base’ model involves consolidating the Defence Estate into a small number of large, multi-user bases over time to achieve capability and financial efficiencies. The Government does not accept these recommendations.**
- (c) At this time no Defence bases have been identified for closure. However, Defence will continue to undertake its planned property disposals program while undertaking further work on the issue of base consolidation.**
- (d) The Defence Budget Audit made a number of recommendations regarding the future of the Defence estate, including consolidating the Defence estate into a ‘super-base’ model. The Government does not accept these recommendations.**
- (e) No specific base upgrades were identified in the Defence Budget Audit report.**
- (f) Consolidating into fewer, larger and more sustainable multi-user bases will achieve financial savings gradually over the long term. However, as no Defence bases have**

been identified for closure at this time it would be premature to comment on any potential savings. Defence will continue to undertake its planned property disposals program while undertaking further work on the issue of base consolidation.

- (g) The Defence Budget Audit made a number of recommendations regarding the future of the Defence estate, including consolidating the Defence estate into a 'super-base' model. The Government does not accept these recommendations.

While acknowledging that any move to a 'super-base' model would have strategic, economic and social impacts, the Defence Budget Audit was focussed on financial benefits and therefore did not fully examine these broader issues.

It would be irresponsible for the Government to agree to base rationalisation without a more comprehensive examination both of national strategic requirements and community considerations.

Defence is undertaking further work on the issue of base consolidation. A comprehensive departmental review, including a strategic assessment of Defence's basing requirements and a detailed financial analysis of long-term costs and efficiency gains of different basing mixes, will develop options for changes to the estate over a 25-30 year period.

It is envisaged that a detailed study of this type will take 12-18 months to complete. An independent commission will then be appointed to consider the recommendations. This commission will conduct substantial public consultation before reporting back to the Government.

## **W12**

### **Creek Contamination: RAAF Base Amberley**

**Senator Trood**

**The Queensland Government found the Australian Defence Force in breach of environmental regulations after contaminating a creek near the Amberley Air Force Base, west of Brisbane.**

- (a) **How was the contamination originally discovered? When was it discovered? How long has the pollution been taking place?**
- (b) **It is understood that the creek contamination occurred after the RAAF improperly disposed of batteries. Why did the RAAF improperly dispose of these batteries? What sort of batteries were they?**
- (c) **What heavy metals were found in the creek and at what level?**
- (d) **Will the Department be paying for the clean up costs and be conducting the rectification work? How much is it likely to cost?**
- (e) **Is it confirmed that the contamination is isolated to the Warrill Creek and that it did not enter the Bremer River downstream?**
- (f) **Following Department of Environment testing, what damage was found to have occurred to the aquatic life in the creek? Will further tests be conducted in the future?**
- (g) **Will residents in the local area be tested? Will their water sources be tested?**

- (h) Generally, what environmental regulations does the Department implement at defence bases? What further action will be taken by the Department to ensure that this does not happen again?**

**Response:**

- (a) Annual water quality monitoring commenced in 2002 for both groundwater and surface water across RAAF Base Amberley. Heavy metals were apparent in surface water at the sewage treatment plant most years. While the results were generally within the limits set by the Ipswich City Council, it was decided to review the pre-treatment of some industrial waste water sources prior to entering the Sewage Treatment Plant (STP).

Defence commissioned a survey at RAAF Base Amberley to investigate possible contamination legacies. In August 2009, the results of the survey indicated that the levels of heavy metals in the surface water and sediment of the small creek downstream of the STP were above the acceptable levels outlined in the Australian and New Zealand Environment Conservation Council standards.

- (b) The potential sources of the contamination have been investigated, confirming that a major source of heavy metal contamination is the electroplating workshop, not the improper disposal of batteries.
- (c) The heavy metals found to be present include chromium, mercury, copper, cadmium, zinc and nickel. All heavy metals except Cadmium appear to be below Australia New Zealand Environment Conservation Council guidelines for primary human contact (e.g. swimming) but a range of detected heavy metals still exceed guidelines for aquatic ecosystems. The residual heavy metal levels in the sewage water are expected to decrease with cessation of trade waste water input into the sewage treatment plant.
- (d) The need and cost of any clean-up will not be known until results from the environmental investigations are complete. Defence will submit its report and discuss contamination or remediation options with the Queensland Department of Environment and Resource Management.

Defence will carry out whatever actions are necessary to protect the waterways and prevent further contamination.

- (e) Water and sediment sampling below the junction of Warrill Creek with the Bremer River has found no evidence of heavy metal contamination. Sampling upstream on Warrill Creek appears to indicate a very small length of Warrill Creek is affected below the sewage treatment plant outfall.
- (f) The Queensland Department of Environment and Resource Management has not yet completed its testing of aquatic life. Defence intends to continue monthly water quality monitoring along the creek until at least June 2010.
- (g) To date the Queensland Department of Environment and Resource Management has stated that the risks to human health are low. The Queensland Department of Health is responsible for any testing if required.



- (h) The primary legislative framework for environmental regulation at Defence properties is the *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* (Cwlth). Defence also has an Environment Policy and a suite of environmental strategies, guidelines and procedures. RAAF Base Amberley has an Environmental Management System, as do many of the commercial contractors working on Amberley.

Defence is investigating potential sources of contaminants and has ceased the discharge of treated waste water into the sewage treatment plant from potential sources of the problem.

### **Program 1.7: Defence Science and Technology**

*No questions asked under this category.*

### **Program 1.8: Chief Information Officer**

*No questions asked under this category.*

### **Program 1.9: Vice Chief of the Defence Force**

**Q3**

#### **Reconstruction tasks undertaken by MRTF, Hansard p23**

**Senator Trood**

**Please provide a list of the reconstruction tasks completed by the MRTF?**

#### **Response:**

Planned and completed reconstruction tasks by the MRTF are aimed at improving Oruzgan Province's health, education, security and other essential infrastructure. They are planned, designed, funded and managed by Australians and built by local contractors, which also provides employment to local Afghan citizens, and ensures maximum local ownership of the projects.

Completed and on-going reconstruction tasks executed by the MRTF's and previous reconstruction task forces include:

- **Tarin Kowt Eastern Causeway (US\$1,209,000).** This project involved the construction of an all-weather crossing over the Garmab Mandah to the east of Tarin Kowt, providing access to the key provincial centres of Chora, Dorafshan, and Mirabad and was completed in early 2008.
- **Redevelopment of the Tarin Kowt Provincial Hospital (US\$1,250,000).** This was a significant project for Oruzgan Province, and was one of the RTF's largest projects undertaken. This involved the construction of three new buildings; an infectious

disease ward, an out patients department and a kitchen. The RTF also upgraded the main hospital building and constructed a family accommodation building, a dining hall, an ablution block, a guard house, a blood bank and a mortuary facility. The project was completed in December 2008.

- **Afghan Health & Development Services Training Centre (US\$1,660,000).** The construction of a purpose built Provincial Health Training Centre has ensured the provision of professional health care training to all health care providers within Oruzgan Province. Facilities constructed include a headquarters building for the Afghan Health Development Services, kitchen, dining and family rooms, classrooms and refurbishment of existing buildings. Construction was completed in late January 2009.
- **Yaklengah Health Clinic (US\$322,000).** This project involved upgrading the Yaklengah Basic Health Clinic to a Comprehensive Health Clinic. This clinic services a large number of people on the western edge of the Tarin Kowt bowl and was completed in early 2009.
- **Tarin Kowt Waste Management (US\$420,000).** This ADF reconstruction task for the Tarin Kowt local community is nearing practical completion. Outstanding tasks include filling of the ponds with water and waste from Kamp Holland to start the breakdown process, working with Tarin Kowt Mayor's office to finalise a business management plan for ongoing operation of the facility once it is opened, procurement of a sullage truck for the Mayor's office and provision of training to employees of the Mayor's office for the operation and maintenance of the facility and truck. Opening is not expected to occur until February 2010 to ensure the Mayor's department are fully prepared to correctly operate and manage the facility.
- **Tarin Kowt Boy's Primary School Redevelopment (US\$1,590,000).** The Tarin Kowt Boy's Primary School Redevelopment was one of the largest projects undertaken by the MRTF in terms of education infrastructure. The project's scope of works included the construction of a new main classroom facility to cater for up to 1,400 students, in addition to the construction of an administration building, eastern style flushing ablutions, a new compound wall and the development of a sports field and playground equipment. Construction was completed in late October 2009.
- **Tarin Kowt Boy's High School Upgrade (US\$280,000).** This project saw the construction of a book store, guard house, a new ablution block, and water borne septic system, power generation and electrical reticulation. The project was completed August 2009.
- **Dorafshan Basic Health Centre (US\$1,261,000).** This project included the construction of male and female clinics and accommodation for up to 20 staff and was completed September 2009.
- **Sorgh Morghab Bazaar (US\$328,000).** Construction of a 30 shop bazaar and bakery. It was completed and handed over in late September 2009.
- The MRTF is currently planning a further five projects.

**Q6**

**Use of DU munitions in Afghanistan, Hansard p40**

**Senator Ludlam**

**Have any of our coalition partners used Depleted Uranium munitions to Afghanistan at the time or since their deployment in the country?**

**Response:**

There is no specific prohibition in international law on the use of Depleted Uranium munitions. There is considerable international controversy over the alleged health effects of Depleted Uranium. Therefore, as with any weapon system the intended use of Depleted Uranium munitions must be assessed by the State proposing to use them in accordance with its obligations under the laws of armed conflict and other international law.

Use of Depleted Uranium in Afghanistan is at the discretion of other nations, after considering the implications under international law. It is understood that some foreign defence forces may use or reserve the right to use, Depleted Uranium ammunition in Afghanistan, however others do not, based on their own National policies and international agreements.

Coalition partners have not provided any information on their use of depleted uranium munitions.

**W4**

**Women's Land Army**  
**Senator Colbeck**

**On the 22 December 2008, the then Minister for Defence Science & Personnel responded to me regarding the Australian Women's Land Army and recognition of their service. The Minister stated that the Department of Defence has identified an external candidate to undertake the research effort and expected to have a policy response developed by the end of March 2009 and that a final response on this matter should be available before the end of June 2009. No advice has been provided since that letter. What is the status of this nature of service issue?**

**Response:**

Determining whether the Australian Women's Land Army should be recognised as a fourth official women's auxiliary service is a complex matter that remains under close examination by Government. The re-classification of Australian Defence Force operations is subject to a whole-of-government decision-making process. That process includes: seeking advice from Defence, the Department of Veterans' Affairs and central agencies, consideration of any proposals in the context of the Budget; and legislative amendment if required. The classification of the Australian Women's Land Army is being examined according to the process outlined above.

**W7**

**Health Records**  
**Senator Barnett**

**How is Defence progressing to achieve 100 per cent of ADF personnel health records in electronic format? The Department was planning a trial project this year. Please provide a situation report and details of progress.**

**Response:**

The Joint eHealth Data Information system (JEDHI) project was approved by the Defence Committee in July 2009 and the project manager commenced in November 2009. Initial tasking to complete the tender process is currently underway. The Defence solution will align with the National eHealth Strategy commissioned by the Australian Health Minister's Advisory Council. Joint Health Command's Intent is to establish a proto type for the JEDHI project by Jun 2010.

**W8**

**Obesity in the ADF**  
**Senator Barnett**

- (a) **During May Budget Estimates Major General Alexander provided figures on overweight obesity in the Australian Defence Force based on numbers from HealthKEYS that were at the time 13 or 14 months old. (Total number with a BMI above 25 was 62 per cent, BMI above 30 was 14 per cent.) Are you able to provide any more recent data or statistics on overweight and obesity in the ADF?**
- (b) **Has the Department researched the overweight and obesity rates in other Defence forces? If so, what are they? Please provide details. Reference was made in the May estimates to the US Defence Force figures. Do you have any more recent statistics?**
- (c) **Is it possible to break the data down into Reserve and Regular personnel, and by service?**
- (d) **Do you have figures for 2008-09 for discharges for obesity and personnel treated for obesity? (2007-08 figures: 104 discharges because of obesity, 2,000 being treated)**
- (e) **Has the ADF conducted any recent reviews on the success of programs aimed at rehabilitating personnel with obesity problems?**
- (f) **Has the Department responded to the Health Preventative Taskforce Report and implemented any of its recommendations? The Department has previously advised obesity is a serious and important issue. What is the Department doing to combat these issues? Please provide details. And specifically, advise the progress and initiatives undertaken.**
- (g) **In the may Estimates Defence advised 91 per cent of the ADF were deployable even though their BMIs were above 25. Please advise if therefore 9 per cent are not deployable and provide reasons for this. If not, why not, and provide reasons for this.**
- (h) **In response to the Monash University study showing 20 per cent of the ADF were inactive, have any further reports been completed on this? If so, please provide. What measures is the ADF implementing to address this? Please provide details.**

**Response:**

- (a) The overall proportions have not changed from those previously reported. From records examined for the period 2008-09, it is estimated that approximately 14 per cent of the Australian Defence Force population have a body mass index of 30 or above (obese) and 48 per cent have a BMI between 25 and 30 (overweight). The total proportion with a BMI of 25 or above is 62 per cent. This is based on information derived from Defence electronic health database which covers approximately 30 per cent of personnel.
- (b) Data from the United States Tricare health survey of Department of Defense beneficiaries indicate that approximately 15 per cent of the active duty component of the US military is obese. Data from other foreign militaries is currently being sought.
- (c) For Financial year 2008-09, 2,504 records were entered into the electronic health database for ADF Reserve personnel. Of these, 1,147 (45.8 per cent) were overweight (BMI 25 to 29.9) and 383 (14.1 per cent) were obese (BMI 30 or above). This is broken down into Service and gender as follows:
- |            |  |
|------------|--|
| Navy:      | Male 79 (60.8%) overweight, 23 (17.7%) obese   |
|            | Female 5 (23.8%) overweight, 2 (9.5%) obese    |
| Army:      | Male 799 (47.1%) overweight, 276 (16.3%) obese |
|            | Female 94 (29.6%) overweight, 30 (9.4%) obese  |
| Air Force: | Male 145 (57.5%) overweight, 47 (18.6%) obese  |
|            | Female 25 (28.4%) overweight, 5 (5.7%) obese   |
- (d) In 2008-09, 122 Defence personnel were considered for medical discharge by the Medical Employment Classification Review Boards of the three Services where obesity contributed to consideration for further service. This represents 0.2 per cent of the Australian Defence Force population. These personnel are highly likely to have other health conditions such as diabetes, cardiovascular disease or musculoskeletal problems. For the same period, 151 Australian Defence Force members were referred to the Australian Defence Force Rehabilitation Program with their primary condition identified as obesity.
- (e) Existing weight management programs within Defence are currently being examined as part of the redevelopment of the ADF Health Promotion Program.
- (f) Defence notes the National Preventive Health Strategy, whose proposed implementation is phased over a ten year period from 2010, and is responding accordingly. The national response includes several areas of action with respect to the prevention and management of obesity. Defence is revising its existing health promotion program to incorporate these recommendations. The development and implementation of this program will need strong links across several areas of Defence, as it involves changes in the environment, food supply, lifestyle and effective social marketing. There are already structured obesity management programs in several Defence regions. These are being examined as part of the scoping and development of a broader Defence health promotion program.
- (g) Medical status is only one component of deployability. Other components include job competence, physical fitness, weapons proficiency and availability. According to PMKeys, as at 30 October 2009, approximately 8.3 per cent of ADF personnel were not deployable on medical grounds (ie. MEC 3 or 4). In terms of medical conditions for which ADF personnel have been classified as non deployable in the long term (ie. 12

months or longer), the most common are: musculoskeletal conditions and injuries, including fractures; mental and behavioural disorders; and endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases, which include diabetes, hyperlipidaemia and obesity.

- (h) No. As advised in February this year (QON No 7) the Monash report states that “there are no data on the amount and type of physical activity engaged in by ADF personnel. Anecdotal evidence suggests that approximately 60 per cent of personnel engage in three episodes of physical activity per week, 20 per cent undertake higher levels of more vigorous activity, 20 per cent are largely inactive”. Physical activity levels are now captured as part of the annual health assessments. These data are only available electronically for approximately a third of the ADF population and are currently being sought.

## **W15**

### **Restructure of the Army Reserves**

**Senator Johnston**

**Has Chief of Army, or a delegate, proposed:**

- (a) That the Reserves will lose 600 of their 1,200 Australian Regular Army staff?**
- (b) That HQ of 5 Brigade is to be amalgamated?**
- (c) That 9 Brigade is to be downsized with the current elements under command in Tasmania being transferred to 4 Brigade?**
- (d) That 4 Brigade units 4/19<sup>th</sup> Prince of Wales Light Horse and 2/10 Field Regiment are to be disbanded?**
- (e) That all Reserve armoured and artillery corps will be mothballed?**
- (f) With such a significant loss of staff, how will the Reserve be able to meet their training and operational requirements?**
- (g) With such an emasculation of the Army Reserve will these changes see a significant loss of Reservists?**
- (h) Did the CDF, CA, DCA and COMD 2<sup>nd</sup> Division meet with MINDEF to discuss these changes?**
- (i) Did MINDEF reject their recommendations telling them that they were not to do anything until after the next election?**
- (j) Has the Army Reserve been further weakened with the placement of the Director of General Reserves within the Modernisation and Development branch under General Caligari?**

**Response:**

- (a) to (g) The Government has directed the Army to examine the internal balance and mix of full time and part time land force elements and their ability to meet the objectives of the Defence White Paper 2009 – *Force 2030*. Defence is to provide an implementation plan for the Review by the end of 2009, as directed by Government. In developing this Review, the Army will seek to provide a greater operational focus for the Army Reserve. As such, there are likely to be changes to the Army Reserve force structure. However, no proposals have been submitted to Government for decision.
- (h) The Minister for Defence holds regular meetings with CDF and others to discuss progress on the Review into the internal balance and mix of the Army, which includes

examining the role of the Army Reserve. However, no proposals have been submitted to Government for decision on the Army Reserve

- (i) No.
- (j) No.

## **W16**

### **Unavailability of Reserve Ammunition**

**Senator Johnston**

- (a) Why are reserve units complaining that ammunition is unavailable?**
- (b) With ammunition being so seriously cut to the Reserves, is it true that some Reserves will not fire at all this training year?**
- (c) How does this affect Reserve capability and morale?**
- (d) Has Reserves ammunition been restricted because of the need to run an unplanned exercise scheduled by the new Forces Command?**

#### **Response:**

- (a) Ammunition allocation remains prioritised against preparations for operations and the requirements to support trade qualifications and promotion courses. No ammunition has been withdrawn from the 2009-10 allocation.
- (b) In relation to Army, some types of ammunition periodically go into temporary short supply due to increased operational tempo of deployed forces. Ammunition allocation is prioritised against preparations for operations and the requirement to support trade qualifications and promotion courses. Consequently, on occasions there is a requirement to re-prioritise the allocation of these resources to support domestic training activities. This is managed through a quarterly cross levelling process. As at the latest cross level, 2 Division Reserve units will be resourced with small arms ammunition as per their base-line capability requirements. No ammunition has been withdrawn from the financial year 2009-10 allocation, all Reservists (in 2 Division) who are required to live fire this period will be provided the opportunity to do so. Air Force Reservists are integrated with the Permanent Air Force and have varying readiness requirements depending on the Readiness Band of their position. Their readiness has not been affected by ammunition availability to meet live firing requirements as there is no limitation on ammunition for reservists. Similarly, Navy Reservists are integrated into full-time Navy units and do not train as separate units nor fire live ammunition.
- (c) Capability is risk managed in accordance with resource availability and prioritisation. However, as for regular force elements, work-up and pre-deployment training brings all deploying elements to the required level of operational preparedness. The Services make every effort to ensure such decisions, and the reasons behind them, are communicated to all personnel, including Reservists.
- (d) There has been no restriction placed on the allocation of ammunition to the Reserve due to an unplanned exercise within Forces Command.



**W17**

**Restrictions of Pay and Training**

**Senator Johnston**

- (a) Why have Reserve training days been restricted?**
- (b) Why are some units now on 3 training nights a month?**
- (c) Why has pay for Reservists been suddenly restricted?**
- (d) Are you aware Reserve officers are very disillusioned with such restrictions and what are you going to do about this?**
- (e) How many Reservists are currently on continuous full time service?**
- (f) What is the readiness of our Reserve units to be mobilised for deployment, if required?**

**Response:**

- (a) and (c) Within Army, the number of Reserve training days available is directly linked to the availability of Army Reserve Training Salaries (ARTS). Army has not reduced the funding of ARTS in 2009-10 in comparison to previous years. There has, however, been a real increase in the number of days Reservists have been required and/or desired to parade each year. In previous years this increase has been flexibly accommodated within the military workforce budget, however, this can no longer occur in an environment of strong Regular Army recruiting and retention performance. Army must closely manage its ARTS budget to ensure it lives within its means. This means that ARTS will be prioritised to ensure the Army Reserve continues to meet its operational commitments and critical training requirements. While annual ARTS funding has increased, these factors, together with the increased number of Reservists, has, in some cases, reduced the average days available per person per year.
- (b) The prioritisation of some Reserve salaries has resulted in some units receiving more funding than others, in line with the Army's number one priority - support to current operations. The frequency and duration of unit training is managed by formation headquarters in accordance with Defence priorities.
- (d) A number of Reserve members anticipate undertaking similar periods of Reserve service each year. In some cases, the prioritisation of Reserve salaries has reduced the capacity of units to meet these expectations. The Services make every effort to ensure such decisions, and the reasons behind them, are communicated to Reserve personnel.
- (e) The best available information from PMKeyS is as at 1 September 2009: 1,635
- (f) Reserve units and specific groups of Reserve members are held at varying readiness levels as directed by the Service Chiefs and in accordance with their capability directives.

## **Program 1.10: Joint Operations Command**

**Q4**

**Catering in Afghanistan, Hansard p35**

**Senator Johnston**

**When will the ADF have operating capability for the new kitchens in Afghanistan?**

**Response:**

Australia assumed control from the Netherlands of the MRTF catering facilities at Tarin Kowt on 1 December 2009, when a new catering contract commenced between Australia and the existing contractor. A transition period commenced on 1 December 2009, with existing kitchen facilities being used by the contractor to prepare some fresh meals. Initial feedback from deployed personnel has been favourable. From 20 December 2009 an interim kitchen facility is planned to open that will provide a greater capacity for fresh meal preparation and enable an initial operating capability to be reached.

## **Program 1.11: Capability Development**

**Q5**

**C-RAM, Hansard p35**

**Senator Johnston**

**Can Defence please advise the timeline for when our C-RAM capability will be established in Afghanistan?**

**Response:**

Defence is currently finalising a C-RAM capability proposal for the Government's consideration. As part of the process, Defence examined current and developmental C-RAM capabilities around the world, to provide advice on a suitable system to provide warning, and if practical, interception of incoming rockets, artillery or mortars. At present, the only practical options available are sense and warn systems. Based on current information from potential equipment manufacturers and suppliers, Defence estimates it would be possible to deploy a suitable sense and warn system within 12 months of Government approval.

**Q8**

**Staff moving from Oakey to Nowra, Hansard pp70-71**

**Senator Adams**

**Please advise how many flying and maintenance personnel will transfer from Oakey to Nowra due to the move of the Helicopter Air Crew Training System?**

**Response:**

Seven military positions will be relocated to Nowra. Thirty-six contract positions directly involved in the current Kiowa training capability will no longer be required at Oakey. Other indirectly involved contractors may also be affected by the move. The contracted

instructor workforce and maintenance and support elements at Nowra are expected to be greater than that presently supporting Army aviation training at Oakey. This is due, in part, to the increased number of students at the joint Navy / Army helicopter school and the civilianisation of some Navy maintenance positions.

## **Program 1.12 Chief Finance Officer**

**W2**

### **Defence White Paper and Funding**

**Senator Ludlam**

**On budget night, the then Minister for Defence issued a press release in which he indicated that approximately \$30 billion would be spent over the decade to "fill the holes in the Defence budget that had been inherited from the former Government."**

- (a) **Given that under Howard, the defence budget rose from \$A10.6 billion in 1995-1996 to \$22 billion in the 2007-2008 budget – taking the total to 9.3 per cent of government outlays and 2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), what were the "holes" the then Defence minister was referring to?**
- (b) **How are those particular un-earmarked funds being allocated by Defence?**

**Response:**

The answer to the honourable Senator's question is:

- a) The "holes" the then Defence Minister was referring to was a hollowness and degradation in key areas of Defence including:
- The Defence Capability Plan (DCP) – Almost \$6 billion over the decade will be invested over the next decade to remediate the DCP. The DCP remediation fills critical equipment and capability gaps that were not previously budgeted for. This includes acquiring both new technology and replacing current equipment that is reaching obsolescence.
  - Remediation of Budget Provisions – Almost \$18 billion over the decade will be invested in maintaining the current force where inadequate budget provisions had been made in the past. A key part of this reform package includes Net Personnel and Operating Costs (NPOC) for the operation and sustainment of major equipment which includes, fuel, personnel, spare parts maintenance and facilities upkeep.
  - Remediation of Defence Enterprise Backbone – Almost \$6 billion over the decade for remediation of critical support areas of defence that had been run down over a number of years including the Defence Estate and the Defence information and communications technology systems.
- b) All the savings identified through the White Paper process (approx \$45 billion across the decade), as outlined on p16 of the *Portfolio Budget Statements 2009-10*, will be reinvested in Defence capability. This includes the areas outlined at part a) as well as investment in the new capability necessary to deliver *Force 2030*.

## **Program 1.13: People Strategies and Policy**

**Q12**

### **Redress of Grievance Hansard, p 90**

**Senator Johnston**

**Could Defence please advise with regard to the 200 outstanding matters when those 200 will be eliminated?**

**Response:**

Of the 200 grievances, 120 are at Unit level (local command level) and will be finalised within three months. The remaining redresses are at Service Chief level (second level) and will be completed within eight months.

**W6**

### **Public Transport to HQJOC**

**Senator Humphries**

**In relation to the new Headquarters Joint Operations Command at Bungendore:**

- (a) Can the Department advise what public transport options are available to personnel posted at the Command?**
- (b) What were the public transport options available to personnel posted at Headquarters Joint Operations Command when Headquarters Joint Operations Command was based in Sydney?**
- (c) If private motor vehicles are the only viable method of transportation to HQJOC, has the Department considered reviewing the conditions of service for all HQJOC personnel to offer them appropriate remuneration for having to travel to work at personal expense?**
- (d) I understand that the watch keepers at HQJOC are required to work 12 hour watches with no increased conditions of service, such as leave in lieu, or penalty rates, for work done at night, weekends and public holidays. Is this correct?**
- (e) Has the Department of Defence considered the introduction of a watch keeping allowance for watch keepers at HQJOC? If so, when was this considered and what was the extent of the consideration?**
- (f) Can the Department provide a list of allowances available to watch keepers at HQJOC and in a comparative table to an APS-6 employee, employed by the Department of Defence at Russell?**
- (g) Can the Department provide the eligibility criteria for the "Service Allowance"?**

**Response:**

- (a) There is no public transport service available to HQJOC personnel. A commercial bus service was trialled, but was suspended after one month due to lack of patronage.**

Consistent with the broader Australian community, Defence personnel are responsible for getting to and from their usual place of work in their own time and at their own expense. It is not uncommon for civilian and military members to travel in excess of 30 minutes to and from their workplace. For example travel time to RAAF Base Pearce is approximately 40 minutes.

- (b) HQJOC personnel working in Sydney could access the public bus or train services. The nearest train station was a ten minute walk. Personnel who chose to drive to work may have incurred parking costs, although free parking was available at HMAS Kuttabul and Garden Island, both of which were co-located with HQJOC. Costs may have been incurred in the form of road tolls depending on the route travelled.
- (c) Additional conditions of service for HQJOC have been investigated, but as this situation is not unique it was determined that no requirement existed for special consideration. Defence has several establishments that have limited or no access to public transport options. Some examples include Singleton Army Camp and RAAF Base Tindal.
- (d) There are no special conditions of service for HQJOC personnel. Currently all watch keeping duties are performed by ADF members between the rank of Private (equivalent) and Lieutenant Colonel (equivalent). These members work a four day, 12 hour shift pattern, and are then rostered off duty for 4 days. The cycle then begins again. This conforms to normal 12-hour shift-working patterns.
- (e) and (g) A watch keeping allowance would not be considered. Watch keepers are adequately compensated via Service Allowance. Service Allowance is eligible to ADF members that hold the rank of Private (equivalent) to Major (equivalent), or Chaplain Divisions 1 and 2, or are undertaking continuous full time service. Service Allowance has been rolled into the salary for Lieutenant Colonel (equivalent) and Colonel (equivalent). Service Allowance is paid to compensate for factors such as, but not limited to:
- the requirement to be on call and the liability to work long and irregular hours including weekends and public holidays and shifts;
  - the turbulence in postings caused by the liability to be moved frequently, and often at short notice, to meet the needs of the Service and the effects of this on the member and the member's family;
  - the requirement to submit to discipline and control in personal and employment matters in which a civilian generally has some freedom of choice; and
  - the requirement at times to live and work in uncomfortable conditions.
- (f) ADF members and APS employees are covered by separate conditions of service. The following table illustrates what an ADF watch keeper may receive at HQJOC compared to an APS employee at Russell.

<b>12 HOUR SHIFT WORKER</b>	
<b>ADF</b>	<b>APS</b>
Service Allowance - \$11,355 per annum	No equivalent allowance
Uniform Allowance - \$419 to \$682 per annum	No equivalent allowance
Meal Allowance- \$9.20 to \$39.30 per occurrence	Overtime Meal Allowance - \$24.95 per occurrence
No equivalent payments	Shift Penalty Rates: Monday – Friday - 15% where any part of the rostered shift falls between 1800h and 0630h 30% where rostered on shifts for more than four weeks that fall wholly within the hours of 1800h and 0800h Saturday 50% Sunday 100% Public Holiday 150%

**Notes:**

1. This table excludes base salary and other conditions of service personnel may be entitled to (e.g. housing and medical/dental).
2. The entitlements contained in the above table are not specific to HQJOC or Russell, but can apply to any person who meets the eligibility requirements.
3. An APS employee rostered on to perform 12 hour shifts on a regular and ongoing basis, and where some part of a shift(s) falls outside the hours of 0630 – 1800, the employee will be considered a shift worker. Shift workers would:
  - (a) perform on average 37.5 hours per week over the life of the shift cycle;
  - (b) accrue additional annual leave at the rate of 5 days per annum;
  - (c) receive, where eligible, overtime and overtime meal allowance when they have worked in excess of their rostered hours. This will vary in accordance with individual circumstances; and
  - (d) receive penalty payments for working unsociable hours.
4. An ADF members, where eligible, may:
  - (a) receive meal allowance when they have worked in excess of their rostered hours.
  - (b) accrue additional recreation leave. This will vary in accordance with individual circumstances.

**Outcome 2**

**The advancement of Australia’s strategic interests through the conduct of military operations and other tasks as directed by Government**

*No questions asked under this category.*

**Outcome 3**

**Support to the Australian community and civilian authorities as required by Government**

*No questions asked under this category.*

**DEFENCE MATERIEL ORGANISATION**

**Outcome 1**

**Contributing to the preparedness of the Australian Defence organisation through acquisition and through-life support of military equipment and supplies**

*No questions asked under this category.*