QUESTIONS ON NOTICE—ADDITIONAL ESTIMATES, 23 FEBRUARY 2011

Defence portfolio: Department of Defence

Q No.	Program: Division or Agency	Senator	Broad topic	Question	Proof Hansard, page & hearing date or Written Q	Date answer rec'd	Date tabled
1	1.2 Navy	Johnston	HMA Ships Manoora and Kanimbla	When did we first become aware inside Navy that Manoora would never go to sea again because of corrosion and the gearboxes problem and that Kanimbla required 18 months worth of work? I note the Minister said on 28 January: "I was advised that with the decommissioning of HMAS Manoora, and the extended unavailability of HMAS Kanimba" That was before 31 January. CN agreed to check the date.	13	27.05.11	23/06/11
2	1.2 Navy	Johnston	HMA Ships Manoora and Kanimbla	The Minister was told on 28 January that he had no amphibious lift. He said that he asked for advice from the Secretary and CDF as to why Manoora was to be decommissioned and why Kanimbla would not be online for 18 months. When did he ask you for that?	16	27.05.11	23/06/11
3	1.2 Navy	Johnston	HMAS Kanimbla	(a) What was on board the vessel? There was a Tiger helicopter, wasn't there?(b) What other munitions and other contaminant for the Sydney Harbour environment were on board this vessel?(c) How much fuel was on board?	16-17	27.05.11	23/06/11
4	1.1 DMO	Fielding	HMAS Manoora	Survey Report: (a) Was there a specific survey report written about the state of the vessel? (b) Is there any chance of the Committee getting a copy of that report, taking out the sensitive parts? (c) According to the survey report, how long was the Manoora unseaworthy for?	28-29	27.05.11	23/06/11
5	1.2 Navy	Humphries	HMA Ships Manoora and Kanimbla	We have had a decade's worth of problems with the ships and they are coming now to the end of their life, which would be a good time to look back at what the total cost has been? (a) What work was done in the late 1990's to determine the total costs over their projected life? (b) Also consider whether a study of that kind should be commissioned?	39	30.05.11	23/06/11
6	1.1 OSEC/CD F	Johnston	Review into Defence Accountability Framework by Dr Black	Please provide a copy of the Terms of Reference.	44-46	27.05.11	23/06/11
7	1.6 Defence Support	Barnett	Posthumous Awarding of VCs	(a) What date was the matter referred to the independent tribunal?(b) When will the Terms of Reference be finalised and released by the Tribunal?	52	27.05.11	23/06/11
8	1.9 VCDF	Barnett	Obesity in the ADF	In an answer to a question on notice that I put in October, it stated that 8.3 per cent of the ADF personnel were not deployable on medical grounds and that figure is now updated	54-55	27.05.11 at	23/06/11

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				to 31 January to 9.7 per cent, which is one in 10.		7.14pm	
				(a) Why has that figure increased so significantly over that period? Provide reasons			
				why.			
				(b) Are there any initiatives that you can point to that you have undertaken that you think			
0	1.0	F 11	DTCD	are making a difference? In particular, to the huge increase in non-deployability.	56.57	27.05.11	22/06/11
9	1.9	Faulkner	PTSD	WRT the visual test for PTSD:	56-57	27.05.11	23/06/11
	VCDF		Treatment	Has there been an opportunity of the advocates for this type of diagnosis and treatment to			
10	1.6	Kroger and	Options RAAF Base	present their case to those who have responsibility for these matters within Defence? Given that RAAF Base Scherger is also used by the Dept of Immigration:	60-61	27.05.11	23/06/11
10	Defence	Macdonald	Scherger	(a) Who is responsible for the evacuation procedure/plan?	00-01	27.05.11	23/06/11
	Support	Macdonaid	Scherger	(b) Provide details on who actually conducts the evacuation process and if there was a			
	Support			concern at Scherger, whether there was an evacuation plan that was put into place and			
				what the plan was.			
				(c) Who was in charge of the evacuation plan and what happened?			
				(d) Who is responsible for repairs to sewerage, water, buildings damaged as a result of			
				cyclones or other things?			
11	1.6	Macdonald	Defence Bases	With all your Defence bases – the physical structures and buildings:	60	27.05.11	23/06/11
	Defence		in Queensland	(a) Did you suffer any damage from the cyclone/floods? If yes, provide a list and			
	Support			excesses.			
				(b) What is the cost?			
				(c) Are you insured for any capital costs?			
12	1.2	Johnston	Benchmarking	Defence has advised that they have benchmarked our submarine sustainment costs	64-67	27.05.11	23/06/11
	DMO		Submarine	against a Gotland Class Swedish submarine and a US Los Angeles Class submarine.			
			Sustainment	(a) As a result of that comparison, what sort of availability does the Swedish navy get			
			Costs	from its three Gotland Class submarines?			
				(b) What are the annual sustainment costs of the three Gotland Class submarines?			
				(c) What sort of availability does the United States navy get from its 45 Los Angeles			
				submarines in terms of its Unit Ready Days?			
				(d) What are the annual sustainment costs of the Los Angeles class submarines? (e) Provide a copy of the maintenance benchmarking review conducted in 2010 by either			
				Defence or the Australian Submarine Corporation.			
13	1.2	Johnston	Collins Class	(a) What is the percentage share for Defence to participate in an Armaments Cooperation	70-71	27.05.11	23/06/11
13	DMO	Joiniston	Submarines	Program to fund the development of US Navy's combat system?	/ 0-/1	27.03.11	23/00/11
	DIVIO		Submarmes	(b) What is the total cost of the US Combat system used on the Collins Class			
				submarines?			
				(c) Are there any Australian industries getting an onshore benefit from the combat			

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				system?			
14	1.1	Humphries	Top 30	WRT the \$1.102 billion of slippage:	86	30.05.11	23/06/11
	DMO		Projects	(a) Is this level above average?			
				(b) Please provide the total spend versus the total slippage for each of the past 5 years			
				(both as raw data and as a percentage).			
15	1.9	Macdonald	Visits to Cadet	If a local cadet unit invites a local politician to a function:	89	27.05.11	23/06/11
	VCDF		Units	Do you need ministerial approval to visit a cadet base? Please provide information on			
				whether the rules for all three service cadet arms are the same or if there are differences.			
16/	1.9	Colbeck	Australian	In answers to a question on notice at Budget Estimates, the Department stated:	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
W1	VCDF		Women's Land	"Research in relation to the Australian Women's Land Army had been completed. The			
			Army	submission is in its final stages and Defence is now in a position to place			
				recommendations before the Government once cleared within Defence".			
				(a) Have recommendations since been made to Government?			
				(b) If so, has the Government acted upon any of these recommendations? If not, why			
				not?			
				(c) Is the Department aware of any consideration for a national memorial to recognise			
				the Australian Women's Land Army's important contribution to the Australian war			
				effort? If so, what is the nature of this memorial?			
17/	1.11	Kroger	Defence	WRT the updated version of the DCP:	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
W2	Capability	_	Capability Plan	(a) Who in Defence was responsible for proof reading the report?		at	
				(b) How many people actually proof read the report?		7.14pm	
				(c) Who signed off on it before it went to print?			
				(d) Was the printed DCP checked when returned in its published format?			
				(e) What was the date when the mistakes were identified?			
				(f) When were Department officials made aware of the mistakes in the report and when			
				did Minister Smith learn about it?			
				(g) How many copies of the faulty report were printed? What was the cost?			
				(h) How many copies were re-printed? At what cost?			
18/	1.5	Kroger	Security	(a) Please explain what kind of security checks we perform when recruiting servicemen	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
W3	Intelligenc		Checks on	and servicewomen?			
	e		ADF Personnel	(b) Do we consider offences and crimes committed overseas?			
	Capabilitie			(c) How far do we go back in time – 5 years or longer?			
	s			(d) If we consider applicants with a criminal record, what are the guidelines for a			
				possible successful application?			
19/	1.2	Kroger	Fires on Navy	(a) Have investigations into the fires in early December 2010 onboard HMAS Ararat and	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11

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W4	Navy Capabilitie s		Vessels	HMAS Bundaberg been completed? What are the results? What caused the fires? (b) There were also report about a fire on HMAS Kanimbla in late September. Has this fire been investigated? What was the outcome? (c) How many fires have been on board Navy vessels in 2010? How does this number compare to the last 5 years?			
20/ W5	1.6 Defence Support	Kroger	Defence Plaza in Sydney	(a) Can you advise on concerns about drinking water at Level 13 Defence Plaza in Sydney? (b) Is it correct that grey water first came out of the taps in 2008 but it took until mid-2010 before an analysis of the water quality was completed? (c) What happened in the meantime? (d) What has happened since? (e) What has the analysis shown? (f) What conclusions and actions were taken?	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
21/ W6	1.3 DMO	Humphries	Quickstep Announcement	The Minister's media release of 2 February 2011 noted that "\$10 million in assistance from the Federal government had helped lure Quickstep to Bankstown". (a) Is the \$10 million in assistance conditional on Quickstep taking up the Boeing site at Bankstown airport? (b) Are there any other conditions the Government has placed on the \$10 million in assistance? (c) How was the \$10 million figure decided upon by Government? (d) Who made the final decision authorising the \$10 million assistance payment? (e) In which financial years will the \$10 million be paid to Quickstep? The NSW Government provide similar financial assistance to help "lure" Quickstep to Bankstown. (f) Is the Minister aware of how much assistance was provided to Quickstep by the NSW Government? If so, what was the amount of the assistance provided? (g) In light of the NSW contribution to Quickstep, why did the Federal Government deem it appropriate to provide its own financial assistance to "lure" Quickstep to Bankstown? (h) Did the NSW Government request the Federal Government to provide funding to help "lure" Quickstep to Bankstown? (i) Did any other state/territory governments approach the Federal Government for additional funding to help "lure" Quickstep to their state/territory? (j) Has the Minister for Defence Materiel and/or his staff had talks with Quickstep in his capacity as the Member for Blaxland, before or after his appointment as Minister,	Written	30.05.11	23/06/11

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Q No.	Program: Division or Agency	Senator	Broad topic	Question	Proof Hansard, page & hearing date or Written Q	Date answer rec'd	Date tabled
				concerning the possibility of "luring" Quickstep to Bankstown? (k) Has the Minister for Defence Materiel and/or his staff had talks with representatives of Boeing in his capacity as the Member for Blaxland, before or after his appointment as Minister, concerning the closure of the Boeing plant at Bankstown airport? (l) If so, was the possibility of finding a buyer for the vacant plant discussed? "The Long Term Agreement is a binding agreement under which individual contracts are awarded for different components of the JSF. "The agreement now means Quickstep is in a position to secure up to \$580 million worth of work over the next 20 years, building: "access panels; "fuel tank covers; "aircraft skins; and "in-board weapons bay doors." (m) How much of the \$580 million quoted is it likely Quickstep will secure? (n) Is there a minimum amount Quickstep is guaranteed to secure?			
22/ W7	1.3 DMO	Humphries	DMO Staffing	 (a) How many staff are employed by DMO, broken down by: Civilian/military APS classification/ADF rank Work base and Salary band. (b) Are comparative figures available from the first half of 2008 through to present? (c) Does DMO anticipate any staffing cuts as a consequence of the Strategic Reform Program? If so: (i) How many cuts are forecast and during which financial years are they anticipated to occur? (ii) From which classifications are such cuts anticipated? (iii) What savings does DMO anticipate to result from such cuts? (d) If not, why not? 	Written	30.05.11	23/06/11
23/ W8	1.1 DMO	Humphries	Procurement and Sustainment Reforms	 (a) How many complaints has DMO received FY2010-11 to date from SMEs concerning overly complex tenders? (b) How many complaints resulted in action taken on DMO's part to address the concerns raised? (c) In how many tenders has the General Manager (Commercial) personally intervened due to incorrect selection of templates for tenders? (d) Has the General Manager (Commercial) or the DMO broadly established benchmarks 	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11

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Q No.	Program: Division or Agency	Senator	Broad topic	Question	Proof Hansard, page & hearing date or Written Q	Date answer rec'd	Date tabled
				to measure performance of the tender process? (e) Has the General Manager (Commercial) identified deficiencies in the tender process? (f) What improvements can the General Manager (Commercial) identify that result from the creation of his position?			
24/ W9	1.3 DMO	Humphries	Measures of Effectiveness	WRT the ANAO Major Projects Report 2009-10 pp. 35-6 (published 30 November 2010): "The ANAO's examination of MOEs [Measures of Effectiveness], which are drawn from the Materiel Acquisition Agreements (MAAs) between Defence's Capability Development Group (as the purchaser) and the DMO (as the supplier), noted that the MOE framework is not sufficiently developed to ensure consistency in the level and scope of MOEs across projects. "DMO has recently advised that it is unlikely that MOEs will be reported in their current form in the 2010–11 MPR as DMO established a new MAA template at the beginning of 2010 for implementation in 2010-11. The new template does not include MOEs, but instead requires the specification of completion criteria for the achievement of materiel release to the ADF. In this context, the issue of key capability measures is likely to be a matter for consideration by the JCPAA and further examination by the ANAO in the 2010–11 MPR. (a) On what basis did DMO decide to move away from the MOE framework? (b) Can DMO point to any projects adversely affected by the inadequacies identified in the MOE framework? (c) Has the new MAA template been implemented? If not, when will it be implemented? (d) What advantages does the new MAA template carry over the old template?	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
27/				(e) How can we be sure that the new template won't replicate the difficulties the ANAO identified in the MOE framework?			
25/ W10	1.2 DMO	Humphries	Smart Sustainment – Inventory and Maintenance	According to DMO's website: Over the next five years all major fleets of military equipment across the three Services will be carefully scrutinised to identify possible efficiencies. The initial wave of activities is planned to commence in the second half of 2009, starting with one or more major weapon system/capability per Service in July 2009. Building on lessons learned in these early activities, these reforms will be scaled up year-on-year until complete in 2014-15. This approach is expected to produce gross mature savings worth around \$4.4 billion over the decade. Optimising inventory holdings and introducing more efficient management techniques will provide gross savings of around \$700 million over the	Written	27.05.11 at 4.55pm	23/06/11

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Department of Defence, Defence portfolio

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				decade. (a) Which major fleets of equipment have been scrutinised for possible efficiencies to date? (b) What efficiencies have been identified, and have they been enacted? If not, when are they intended to be enacted? (c) What is the extent of the accountable savings for each of the efficiencies identified to date? (d) What major fleets of equipment are planned to be scrutinised for possible efficiencies during 2011? (e) What is the Smart Sustainment savings target for 2010-11? (f) Does DMO anticipate this target will be reached? (g) If so, what efficiencies does it anticipate will need to be further identified in order to reach this target? (h) Will the work of the Rizzo review be incorporated in this process? (i) Will the recommendations of the Rizzo review be constrained by the requirements to find \$4.4 billion in savings in Smart Sustainment, or will the \$4.4 billion savings target be negotiable in light of the recommendations of the Rizzo review? (j) In an environment where the SRP is front and centre to the business of what DMO does, and Smart Sustainment is a huge part of the SRP for DMO, how do you think we got to a situation where sustainment of ships has been shown up to be a wholesale shambles?			
26/ W11	1.1 OSEC/CD F	Humphries	Amphibious Ships Management	 (a) What resources will be allocated to the team of experts comprising of Mr Rizzo, AVM Smith and RADM Adams in terms of: Office space; Salaries; Costs of travel and travel allowances. (b) How many staff will be assigned to the "small secretariat" of the team of experts, and what resources will be allocated to those staff in terms of: Office space; Salaries (denote classifications/rank); Costs of travel and travel allowances. (c) Have there been any internal departmental reports commissioned during the last three 	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11

¹ DMO Website, http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/asr/ss/ss mir.cfm Published June 2010, accessed 15/2/2011

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				years concerning ship management and repair? (d) Was a Departmental review using existing resources considered as an alternative to an external review of ship management and repair?			
27/ W12	1.2 Navy Capabilitie s	Humphries	HMNZS Canterbury	 (a) When did the Minister first approach the New Zealand Government concerning coming to a sharing arrangement for the HMNZS Canterbury? (b) On what terms is the HMNZS Canterbury going to be shared? (c) There was a report last week which noted that: the Canterbury rolls up to 28 degrees in a 6m swell. A quote was used "HMNZS Canterbury can help as long as they stay within the bounds of the NZ coastline and don't encounter any heavy seas" (Canberra Times, "Aust 'humiliated' over SOS to NZ for vessel" 17 Feb 2011). Have any studies been undertaken, or reports received, to assess the capability of the HMNZS Canterbury? (d) If so can they be provided? (e) Is there any evidence of limitations of the HMNZS Canterbury in relation to the quoted article? 	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
28/ W13	1.2 Capability Sustainmen t	Humphries	UK Bay Class Landing Ship Docks	 (a) Has the lease or purchase of a UK Bay Class landing ship dock progressed since AUKMIN talks in January? (b) At what cost does the Minister anticipate a UK Bay Class LSD could be purchased from the UK? (c) What cost does the Minister anticipate a UK Bay Class LSD could be leased from the UK? (d) What is the soonest the Minister anticipates a UK Bay Class LSD could be prepared for operational deployment with Navy? 	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
29/ W14	1.3 DMO	Humphries	DMO Budget Underspend	According to the additional estimates papers, DMO will underspend by over half a billion dollars this financial year. (a) Can the Minister or Dr Gumley delineate the factors contributing to this underspend, and the comparative significance of each of those factors? (b) Does the unspend money rollover in to DMO's budget 2011-12 or is it returned to consolidated revenue? (c) How much of this underspend is attributable to decision-making on the part of DMO? (d) How much of this underspend is attributable to first and second pass decision making processes?	Written	30.05.11	23/06/11

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30/ W15	1.1 DMO	Humphries	Air Warfare Destroyer - Underspend	Air Warfare Destroyer: -\$146 million due to delay and new expenditure plan for the procurement of explosive ordinance. (a) Is this delay largely due to the bungled hull block reported in November? (b) It is noted that there is a new expenditure plan for the procurement of explosive ordinance. (c) What is this plan? Will it be released? (d) How much does this new plan contribute to the downward revision?	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
31/ W16	1.1 DMO	Humphries	Defence Industry	(a) How many industries have been identified as PICs/SICs? Industry paper states: "it is through integration into the global supply chains that industry will prosperthe Government maintains several programs to assist industry with this process". (p. 84) (b) How many companies have applied, by program? (c) How many have received assistance? How much? (d) How many have achieved "integration into the global supply chain"? How is this measured/monitored? KPIs? (e) How many staff per program? Minister Clare's speech to Defence Magazine Conference 16 February 2011: "I have asked Defence to stress test our Priority Industry Capabilities and Strategic Industry Capabilities—PICs and SICs". (f) How is this to be achieved? (g) What is the timeframe for stress testing?	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
32/ W17	1.1 DMO	Humphries	Defence Industry Innovation Board	(a) How often will the board meet?(b) What sort of value do you expect to receive from the convention o f this board?	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
33/ W18	1.2 DMO	Humphries	LAND 17 Phase 1C (Self-propelled Howlitzer)	(a) What is the progress of this project?(b) Has DMO advanced the tender process on time?	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
34/ W19	1.2 DMO	Humphries	LAND 121 Phase 4 (Protected	Second pass approval is coming up next financial year. Is the DMO on track to meet that timeframe?	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11

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Department of Defence, Defence portfolio

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			Mobility Vehicle)				
35/ W20	1.2 DMO	Humphries	SEA 1000 Phase 1A (Future Submarines – Concept Design)	No funds have been allocated for SEA 1000 in the 2010-11 budget. Has SEA 1000 experienced any slippage?	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
36/ W21	1.3 DMO	Humphries	Handling of Cabinet Documents	Dr Gumley's presentation to the Australian Defence Magazine Congress last week noted "Record-keeping practices and rules for handling Cabinet documents pose a major challenge" (slide 18). (a) Can the CEO DMO explain what he was referring to with regard to "a major challenge"? (b) What are the limitations of the current processes? (c) Are there instances of leaks or lost documents in the last 3 years? (d) Are there incidents of documents having been lost en route between Minister's office and Department in the last 3 years?		27.05.11	23/06/11
37/ W22	1.3 DMO	Humphries	Projects	 Minister Clare's speech to Defence Magazine Conference 16 February 2011 noted the following: "This is also a year where a lot of materiel will be delivered." "In Army we are: "In Army we are: "the new Multicam uniform I announced in November will roll out in the next few months; and "the lighter TBAS combat body armour being made by ADA in Bendigo will go with the third Mentoring Taskforce when they deploy in the middle of this year. "We are also enhancing our bushmaster vehicles – to provide even more protection from IED blasts; and "In the next few weeks we will take delivery of the first new G-Wagons vehicles, with modules made by Varley in the Hunter. "In Air Force we will: "take delivery of the final 9 Super Hornets; and "work towards Initial Operating Capability on Wedgetail. "In Navy: 	Written	27.05.11 at 7.14pm	23/06/11

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				 "work on the first Air Warfare Destroyer will keep ramping up. The first blocks will be shipped by barge from the Hunter and Melbourne to Adelaide this year, the first large delivery of Aegis equipment is due in April, and the workforce will keep growing – hitting a peak of about 1200 in early next year; "Sea trials on the Anzac Class Anti-Ship Missile Defence (ASMD) system – designed and developed by CEA here in Australia - will start soon; and "this Friday the first LHD hull hits the water in Spain." (a) Are all of these listed projects on schedule? (b) If not, why not? What is the slippage or delays? (c) Are all these projects on budget? 			
38/ W23	1.1 DMO	Humphries	Naval Helicopter Decision	(a) What is the expected timetable on the naval helicopter decision? (b) According to Jane's Defence Weekly: "1 February when the US Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Australia 10-year through-life support (TLS) package for 24 MH-60Rs." Is it normal that the US Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notifies Congress in stages over several months?	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
39/ W24	1.2 DMO	Humphries	Ammunition for the ADF	(a) Please provide details on the number of weapon systems used by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) which use the following: o 5.56mm ammo o 7.62mm ammo. (b) What is the rationale/benefit of each ammo type for ADF personnel? (c) Has the Department received comment from ADF personnel in the field concerning the effectiveness of either ammo type? (d) How does ADF use of either ammo type compare to international usage?		27.05.11	23/06/11
40/ W25	1.11 Capability Developme nt	Bishop	Procurement costs of Capability Projects	In order to assist my understanding of the actual procurement costs of Defence capability projects, including all attributable overheads: (a) What was the total number of people employed both directly and indirectly (i.e. permanent staff and contractors) in 2009-10 (i) by Defence (actual or estimate), and	Written	30.05.11	23/06/11

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				 (ii) DMO, to perform the functions of: (a) Defence materiel and systems acquisition and (b) Defence materiel and systems maintenance. (b) What were the total (a) payroll and (b) contractor costs to the Commonwealth for the above categories in the same year. (c) What were the total 'on-costs' attributed and budgeted for the employment in the above categories during 2009-2010, including superannuation and other non-salary payments e.g., transport, stationery and other office costs, office accommodation, utilities and services, and training. (d) What was the dollar value during 2009-2010 of the following: (i) all new Defence ADF capability procurement projects placed under contract by the Department of Defence; (ii) all new Defence capability procurements finalised and successfully delivered to Defence, and (iii) all ongoing capability in 2009-10 maintenance contracts current for any period during that year. 			
41/ W26	1.1 DMO	Johnston	LAND 121 – Phase 3	 (a) Was a new, higher, protection standard released to tenderers during the tender process? (b) Were the vehicles put through the CET trials required to meet this new higher protection standard (c) Do all the vehicles competing in the protected vehicle category meet this new higher protection standard? (d) If you add additional armour to provide extra cabin protection to a conventional truck, thereby adding weight, what is the effect on the truck's mobility and steering? (e) In 2007 when the original tender was run for Land 121-phase 3 is it the case that it had to be abandoned because the truck selected proved unsuitable, largely because when protective armour was added it had serious mobility problems? (f) When we already have in our truck fleet around 700 Bushmaster troop carrier vehicles, which have been proven to save lives, why would we accept an inferior protection standard in a logistics vehicle that will have to go into the same operational zones as the Bushmaster? (g) How many vehicles are being purchased under Land 121-phase 3, in both the medium and heavy categories? 	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11

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				 (h) How many medium weight vehicles? (i) And how many of these medium weight vehicles are protected vehicles? (j) Accepting that protected vehicles cost more than unprotected vehicles, has the Army considered adjusting the ratio of protected and unprotected vehicles in order to obtain the higher protection standard offered by the Bushmaster Single Cab Utility but still achieve the same total number of trucks purchased? (k) Given that the Army already has a fleet of Bushmaster vehicles would there be an advantage in sticking to one manufacturer in order to have a common fleet in the medium weight category? (l) Does the assessment take account of the fact that without further orders the capability in protected vehicle design and manufacture built up in Bendigo through the Bushmaster program will be lost? 			
42/ W27	1.6 Defence Support	Payne	Leased Offices at Penrith	I understand that the Department of Defence has leased offices at 311 High Street, Penrith. Reports indicate this was to move staff, including from the Defence Materiel Organisation's Munitions Branch. Can the Department provide details about these offices, including: (a) The cost and details of the lease of these offices, including the duration? (b) The cost and details of any outfitting of these offices, broken down at the most detailed level the Department can provide? (c) The period of time over which outfitting the offices took place, benchmarked against other similar office fitouts? (d) The number of parking spaces at these offices and the cost of each space? (e) The number of staff to be housed at these offices, including details of staffing levels at any offices previously used at this location? (f) Details of the parts of the department that have, or will have, staff located in these offices, including whether all or part of the Munitions Branch is now housed there, and any other parts of the Department of Defence or its constituent parts that have staff in these offices? (g) What the space that was formerly used by staff at Defence Establishment Orchard Hills will now be used for? (h) The process by which the Department decided to lease and outfit these offices (including the business case to relocate staff, the tendering process that took place, alternative locations that were considered, and the tenders that were not accepted)?	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11

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43/ W28	1.11 Capability Developme nt	Johnston	AIR 9000 – Phase 8	The White Paper indicated that as a matter of urgency the Government would acquire at least 24 new naval combat helicopters. The new aircraft will possess advanced antisubmarine warfare capabilities along with an ability to fire air-to-surface missiles. (a) When will a decision be made on this urgently required capability? (b) What will be the purchase price of this capability if the: (i) MH-60R is chosen? (ii) NFH-90 is chosen? (ii) MH-60R is chosen? (iii) MH-60R is chosen? (iii) NFH-90 is chosen? (iv) MH-60R is chosen? (ivi) NFH-90 is chosen?	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
44/ W29	1.11 Capability Developme nt	Johnston	AIR 9000 – Phase 8	I refer to a statement made in the December 2010 Asia Pacific Reporter that says: "Because of the "family" design approach the Romeo uses the same engines as the retiring SH-60 series, albeit improved with the addition of a digital engine control unit. The helicopter also retains an older system of mechanical flight controls, though without adverse impact on reliability or handling. Australia stands to benefit from future USN upgrades to their MH-60Rs, which will be progressively improved, principally through new software insertion. However, a complicating factor for Australia is that the USN actually deploys two types of Seahawk, with the MH-60 Sierra complementing the Romeos, particularly when they are operating as part of a large aircraft carrier battle group. The role of the Sierra is to undertake the workhorse functions of transport, vertical replenishment and so on. It is relatively simple to reconfigure a Romeo to free up internal room by removing the	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11

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				dipping sonar and other items, but this does take some time and the US prefers to have Sierras available whenever possible. Last year when the carrier USS Stennis undertook a 6-month deployment in the Pacific, 11 Romeos and 8 Sierras went along with the battle group.			
				Another reason why the USN has two types of Seahawk is because of pilot training and specialization. The US prefers to have two streams—one for warfare pilots and another for those undertaking more general missions—and has the resources to match the helicopters with the people flying them.			
				Australia is only interested in purchasing Romeos because the RAN can only operate one helicopter per ship. The Romeo is described as a multi-mission helicopter and it is certainly flexible, the only question is whether it is flexible enough for Australian purposes."			
				 (a) If our alliance partner the US deploys two types of Seahawk helicopters, the MH-60 Sierra and the MH-60R and the former is primarily used to be the work-horse of the two why would we be contemplating buying the MH-60R that has to be re-configured to effectively perform this task? (b) What armaments, and in particular missiles, are to be deployed by the: (i) MH-60R if it is chosen? (ii) NFH-90 if it is chosen? 			
				(c) What maximum range does each missile system have that is standard fitted to the: (i) MH-60R? (ii) NFH-90?			
45/ W30	1.11 Capability	Johnston	AIR 9000 – Phase 8	I refer to a further statement made in the December 2010 Asia Pacific Reporter that says: "The reason why the Romeos carry a short range missile is because they typically operate as part of a far larger structure—often a carrier battle group—and attacks on hostile major surface combatants would be carried out by other available assets such as fixed-wing aircraft. The Romeo is optimized for use against swarm and speed boats—though the task of holding the guidance laser onto a small, bouncing, fast moving target cannot be easy. USN operators say that the Romeo could, if required, engage a larger		27.05.11	23/06/11

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				ship—but placing a helicopter within 10 kilometres of a modern surface ship would be an extremely hazardous undertaking. While the Hellfire is proven, extremely reliable and one of the world's best small missiles it could not be considered a genuine anti-ship weapon It has been said that the Hellfires on MH-60Rs could be used in support of ground troops during amphibious operations. This would seem to be a risky use of an expensive naval asset, especially when Australia has already purchased Tiger helicopters—equipped with Hellfire missiles—for precisely this task." If this is the case why would MH-60R be considered as a suitable replacement for our current naval helicopters?			
46/ W31	1.11 Capability	Johnston	AIR 9000 – Phase 8	I refer to a further statement made in the December 2010 Asia Pacific Reporter that says: "The Mk 54 lightweight torpedo that will equip Romeos is also part of the US "family" concept discussed earlier. It is an upgrade of the venerable Mk 46 designed to improve performance in shallow water but maintaining the old propulsion system. This is a uniquely American method, using Otto fuel rather than batteries. This propellant is a mixture of three synthetic substances and for the chemists out there they are: propylene glycol nitrate; 2-nitrodiphenylamine and dibutyl sebacate. Otto fuel is considered toxic and over-exposure to it produces unpleasant effects such as headaches, nausea, loss of balance, poor hand-eye coordination, nasal congestion, eye irritation and breathing difficulties. The effects of long term exposure are unknown. It is also expensive and difficult to procure. The MU90 is an electrically driven lightweight torpedo with excellent performance in all conditions. In fact it is so good is it that it was selected by Australia a decade ago in a direct competition against the Mk 54 and is currently being fitted to RAN's Anzac frigates, FFGs and will go on the new 'Hobart' Class air warfare destroyers— all of which will embark the helicopters being purchased via AIR 9000 phase 8. It has been suggested that in a time of conflict or during operations involving the USN, Australia would be better off with the Mk 54 because of ease of re-supply. This is a	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
				Australia would be better off with the Mk 54 because of ease of re-supply. This is a dangerous and untestable assertion. If Australia was at war and the US was not, then it is possible that the RAN would indeed receive replacement Mk 54 torpedoes quickly. But in the far more likely event that we were in a conflict together the natural instinct of the USN would be to look after their own interests first. Any captain who gave away some of			

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				their key anti-submarine weapons to an ally and whose ship was subsequently sunk by an enemy submarine would be declared insane As the British soon discovered during the Falklands war, anti-submarine torpedoes are used at a prodigious rate—basically being fired whenever an underwater contact is made in case it is a submarine. The consequences of not doing so could be catastrophic—waiting for a submarine to be confirmed as such might allow it enough time to fire torpedoes at surface ships, including aircraft carriers. In a time of war, any navy that has that has lightweight torpedoes will in all probability keep them for their own use. With this in mind, for reasons of self-reliance Australia has an assembly line for MU90s	or written Q	700 0	
				and could produce more of them if required and given some warning time. As is the case for the missiles, it is hard to understand why the matter of the torpedo apparently does not form part of the fundamental decision-making matrix for Phase 8." If this is the case why would MH-60R be considered as a suitable replacement for our current naval helicopters?			
47/ W32	1.11 Capability	Johnston	AIR 9000 – Phase 8	I refer to a further statement made in the December 2010 <i>Asia Pacific Reporter</i> that says: "It has also been convincingly argued that the RAN could make an even more significant contribution with the NFH because it would complement US systems. In any realistic scenario, Australia's contribution to any one operation would be one, two or three ships and therefore a matching number of helicopters. As the USN has 300 Romeos on order and around 20 Romeos and Sierras as part of any battle group, Australia's contribution of up to three additional MH-6ORs would be welcome, but probably not decisive. But if Australia contributed three helicopters with long-range surface strike missiles, a different and arguably more capable torpedo, a different dipping sonar and an ability to carry larger boarding parties—these things could all make a major difference in a coalition operation."		26.05.11	23/06/11
				If this is the case surely this would be a compelling reason to select the NFH as the suitable replacement for our current naval helicopters?			

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48/ W33	1.9 VCDF	Johnston	Force Protection Measures	Ministers Smith and Clare at a press conference on the 1 st Feb 2011 said that in regards to force protection measures and in particular to the "high technology anti-IED measure that will not proceed". (a) Could you please advise: (i) the particular issues with this technology, (ii) the timeframe the "technological application" is likely to be available and; (iii) the extent to which Defence is driving the availability of this technology. (b) SAR radars and/or CCD are already widely employed by other NATO–ISAF partners in the counter IED fight, so why is Australia not proceeding down this path as a matter of urgency in an all out effort to protect our troops on the ground in hostile environments?	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
49/ W34	1.2 DMO	Johnston	Collins Class Submarines – Current Sustainment and Operating Costs	 (a) Between 2003/04 the 2009/10 the cost of submarine sustainment has gone from approximately \$203M to \$325M (60% increase in cost). At the same time, the number of Unit Ready Days has decreased. What are the primary reasons for this increase in cost/decrease in availability? (b) In 2003, what were the DMO's forward estimates for Collins Class Submarine Sustainment Costs through to FY 2009/10. (c) If the forward estimates and actual costs were different, how has this increase in cost been funded? (d) Noting the Collins sustainment and operating costs for last financial year came to \$688 million. (i) What were the total Unit Ready Days achieved in the corresponding period (ii) What was the total cost per Unit Ready Day. (e) Noting that DMO ultimately pays the bill, what has been the cost to date of Deep Blue Tech PTY LTD to the taxpayer? (f) Noting the DMO ultimately pays the bill, what are the projected cost to date of Deep Blue Tech PTY LTD to the taxpayer? 	Written	30.05.11	23/06/11

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50/ W35	1.2 DMO	Johnston	Collins Submarines – Benchmarking	You have advised that Defence has benchmarked our submarine sustainment costs against Swedish Gotland Class submarines and United States Navy Los Angeles Class submarines.	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
				(a) What sort of availability does the Swedish Navy get from its 3 Gotland Class submarines?			
				(b) What are the annual sustainment costs of the 3 Gotland Class submarines?			
				(c) What are the annual operating costs of the 3 Gotland Class submarines?			
				(d) What was the cost per Unit Ready Day for Gotland Class submarines?			
				(e) What sort of availability does the United Navy get from its 45 Los Angeles Class submarines?			
				(f) What are the annual sustainment costs of the 45 Los Angeles Class submarines?			
				(g) What are the annual operating costs of the 45 Los Angeles Class submarines?			
				(h) What was the cost per Unit Ready Day for Los Angeles Class submarines?(i) In respect to your decision to establish "internal benchmarks" with respect to sustainment costs:			
				 (i) Why has the DMO not increased its sample size perhaps with countries like Japan, South Korea or Singapore? (ii) How do you "internally" benchmark sustainment costs to determine that we are getting good value for money? (iii) How can we be confident that the organisations involved in establishing 'internal benchmarks' have the necessary skills and experience to establish achievable, realistic benchmarks that will provide the required availability and represent value for money? 			
51/ W36	1.2 DMO	Johnston	Collins Submarines – Docking Costs	It is accepted that submarine dockings consume a significant proportion of a submarine's sustainment costs. At a previous Estimates hearing VADM Crane said at Estimates, "So the full-cycle docking period that we are currently allocating as we move this forward will be around 30 months".	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
				(a) Has the DMO established how a 30 week full cycle docking compares to a variety of other extant submarine forces—which ones and what are their full docking cycle			

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				periods?			
				(b) In the funded Request for Information to DCNS, HDW, Kockums, and Navantia how does a 30 month full cycle docking regime as applicable to the Collins class compare with the average full cycle docking across the Scorpene, the Types 209; 212 and 214, the A-26 and the S-80?			
52/ W37	1.2 DMO	Johnston	Collins Submarines	A consistent theme in the ANAO's 2009-10 DMO Major Project Report is that upgrades/enhancements to Collins are frequently inhibited by the capacity/resources of ASC to complete installations in the docking cycles.	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
				(a) What equipment/capabilities have been procured but not installed as a result of lack of capacity/resources at ASC?			
				(b) What has been the cost for equipment/capabilities procured for the Collins Class submarines but not yet installed?			
53/ W38	1.2 DMO	Johnston	Collins Submarines – Unit Ready Days	Noting that the DMO is mandated to consider <i>value for money</i> in executing its responsibilities, in terms of cost per submarine Unit Ready Day, what does the recognise as good value for money?	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
54/ W39	1.11 Capability	Johnston	Collins Submarines – Capability	(a) In previous answers to my questions you have indicated that there are a number of areas where Collins has a capability shortfall in relation to well-maintained regional submarines—indiscretion, deep diving depth, main motor efficiency, signatures, sonar and submarine communications. You have also indicated that Collins is assessed as being more capable than regional conventional submarines in many capability areas. In what broad capability areas does the Navy assess itself as being more capable than regional submarines?	Written	27.05.11 at 7.14pm	23/06/11
				(b) In relation to the inclusion of U.S equipment on Australian submarines does any of this equipment incur any penalty in terms of operational restraints or sovereign use?			
				(c) If the answer to question 0 is yes, was the Australian Government clearly advised of this operational restraint or sovereign use during procurement approval deliberations?			
55/ W/40	1.2 DMO	Johnston	Collins	In relation to the Collins Class Submarine AN/BYG-1 Tactical Command and Control	Written	30.05.11	23/06/11
W40	DMO	Johnston	Combat	System:	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	30.03.11	

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			System	(a) There has been a recent negative report from the US Navy's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation suggesting the AN/BYG-1 stactical command and control system as fitted to Collins "is not able to support operations in difficult high-contact density environments". Noting we are a program partner, at what date were we given access to the underlying classified reports behind this public report.			
				(b) How much has the AN/BYG-1 cost the taxpayer thus far in terms of project costs?			
				(c) How much has the AN/BYG-1 cost the taxpayer thus far in terms of sustainment costs?			
				(d) How much has the AN/BYG-1 cost the taxpayer thus far in terms of operating costs?			
				(e) What are the ongoing total sustainment and operating costs for the AN/BYG-1			
				(f) In the year prior to being merged with the Collin Class SPO, how many uniformed, APS, DSTO and PSP personnel were billeted to Collin Class Combat System SPO and from what budget were their salaries and expenses paid.			
				(g) How many uniformed, APS, DSTO and PSP personnel are currently billeted to the Collins Class SPO for purposes related the total combat system and from what budget are their salaries and expenses paid?			
				(h) What are the total overseas travel costs and overseas posting costs for the AN/BYG-1 Tactical Command and Control System to date (including the cost or running the Joint Program Office)?			
56/ W41	1.2 DMO	Johnston	Collins Combat System	It is presumed that the RAN is locked into continuous upgrades of the AN/BYG-1 Tactical Command and Control System to ensure ongoing support: (a) What are the ongoing program participation costs paid to the United States Government in percentage terms (of their program) and absolute cost? (b) What mechanisms are in place to control the ongoing costs?	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
57/ W42	1.2 DMO	Johnston	Collins Combat System	Across the 6 Collins Class submarines: (a) How many different Combat System (note: not just the AN/BYG-1) configuration baselines are there (including legacy baselines)? (b) What effect does each different configuration baseline have on sustainment costs?	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11

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				(c) What effect does each different configuration baseline have on operator training costs?			
58/ W43	1.2 DMO	Johnston	Collins Combat System	Against our funding contribution, what elements of the development path has the Australian Navy driven and which Australian based entities have been brought into the US development program, and to what extent?	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
59/ W44	1.2 DMO	Johnston	Collins Combat System	It is noted that US companies are usually fully funded by the US Department of Defense (e.g. via the SBIR and/or other programmes) to conduct the initial Research and Development required to develop capability suitable for injection into the APB process. By contrast the Australian DoD does not fund company R&D activities. Is Defence concerned that this non-level playing field overly skews the APB process away from Australian industry to the point where it is not viable for Australian companies to participate?	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
60/ W45	1.2 DMO	Johnston	Collins Combat Systems	It is noted that for an organisation's technology to progress through the APB process, complete disclosure of the underlying algorithms and/or source code must be made. It is further noted that in the US industrial context, organisations will often have developed technology via funded (SBIR or equivalent) contracts, and will already have made such disclosures. By contrast, in the Australian industrial context, organisations will have developed technology via their own funding, and such disclosure (which will not have already been made) would amount to handing over the value of their IP investment. What objective evidence can Defence provide to show that it has assisted in overcoming this IP impasse?	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
61/ W46	1.2 DMO	Johnston	Collins Combat Systems	 In the 8 years since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Australian and US Government, and noting the program is designed to rapidly insert new capability into the system: (a) How many Australian companies have had their products/functions pass through stage one (Technology Evaluation) of the Advance Processor Build (APB) process? (b) How many Australian companies have had their products/functions pass through stage two (Algorithm Assessment) of the APB process? (c) How many Australian companies have had their products/functions pass through 	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11

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				stage three (System Real Time Implementation) of the APB process?			
				(d) How many Australian companies have had their products/functions pass through stage four (At Sea Testing) of the APB process?			
62/ W47	1.2 DMO	Johnston	Collins Combat Systems	(a) Does DSTO or suitably qualified Australian APS/Defence personnel participate in APB algorithm assessments as a peer?(b) Have any Australian companies participated in APB algorithm assessments as a peer?	Written	27.05.11 at 7.14pm	23/06/11
63/ W48	1.1 DMO	Johnston	ARCI Sonar System	(a) There has been a recent scathing report from the US Navy's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation suggesting the ARCI Sonar on-board of US submarines is not effective against threat diesel-electric submarines (SSKs) and not suitable for most operations and demonstrate poor situational awareness in high traffic areas. It is reported as not suitable due to problems with reliability, training, documentation, and poor performance of supporting sub-systems. Is that system being seriously considered for the replacement sonar system?	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
				(b) Noting the problems mentioned in that report and the likely cost can you confirm that there are no plans or desire by Defence to bypass standard procurement practices and to sole source the sonar system from the US integrator or using FMS or similar arrangement?			
				(c) If sole source/FMS is being considered:			
				 (i) Is this being done for "Strategic Reasons" and, if so, in broad terms what are these reasons? (ii) Is this being done for "interoperability Reasons" and, if so, in broad terms (and in recognition of the 2002 Review of Strategic Level Interoperability Between the Military Forces of Australia and the United States of America and 2004 Review of Operational Level Interoperability Between the Military Forces of Australia and the United States of America), what are these reasons? (iii) Is this being done is response to security restrictions being imposed upon Australia by the United States Government? (iv) Is this being done as a result of any other direction/representation from the United States Government? 			

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				(d) Noting sonar and acoustics is a Priority Industry Capability, has the Department made an assessment of the impact that selection of a US sonar would have on extant local sonar developers and if so what was that assessment?			
64/ W49	1.2 DMO	Johnston	Ongoing Costs for Collins Class Submarines	(a) The Budget Statements project that sustainment costs of Collins will rise a further 13% this financial year and 36% over the next 10 years. You have also indicated that Navy, DMO and ASC are working on a new Integrated Master Schedule and negotiating a new in service support contract. You have also indicated that as a result of these activities "it is envisaged that higher levels or funding will be required". How is defence ensuring that the IMS does not end up being an unrealistic schedule?	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
				(b) The Auditor General reported on Management of Collins Class sustainment in February 2009. Two years later and the through life support contract has not been renegotiated. Noting both parties to the negotiation are 100% Australian Government owned and the negotiation relates to a strategically important asset, why is it taking so long to get to final agreement with ASC with respect to an amended Through Life Support contract?			
				(c) You have indicated that Collins is in the "red" category on the DMO's Projects List of Concern which means scrapping of the project is a possibility. The Collins class submarines have been in the water since 1993 almost 20 years with, in recent years, increasing cost and generally poor operational availability. At what point would Defence go to Government and advise that the cost of sustaining Collins no longer represented good value to the taxpayer?			
				(d) In respect to the Collins class submarines, what is Defence's contingency plan in relation to poor value for money and poor availability thresholds being crossed?			
				(e) In relation to future availability of the Collins class submarines and noting recent revelations about the poor state of Navy's maintenance and sustainment programs across the fleet what confidence does Defence have that Navy can meet its forecast operational availability targets?			
65/ W50	1.1 DMO	Johnston	SEA 1000 – Future Submarines	The answers previously provided to me in relation to the costs of new submarine are puzzling. In one answer you explain that the cost of the submarine is unknown as "the Government is yet to make a decision on the type of submarine required". In a different	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11

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				 answer you state that the new submarine project is included in the current DCP" and go on to say that therefore, "There is no impact from SEA 1000 on other military capability". (a) What budgetary estimate provision has been allowed for in the DCP with respect to SEA 1000—an upper and lower bound (not the generic >\$1.5 billion figure that is supplied)? 			
				(b) Estimates by defence specialists on the available options have ranged from \$10billion to \$36 billion, a difference of \$26billion. What was the basis that the Department used to determine that the outcome for SEA 1000 would have no impact on other military capability? What, if any, are the assumptions that form part of this determination?			
				(c) Is the budgetary estimate a total cost of ownership or is it just the capital acquisition cost?			
				(d) From the work and studies conducted thus far by the Department, how long would it take for Australia to design from first principles the unique class of submarine that meets Australia's exacting requirements and get the first of class boat into the water? How long till that submarine could be delivered to the RAN?			
				(e) How long does the Department estimate it would take for Australia to evolve the Collins class submarine design to meet Australia's exacting requirements and get a first of class boat into the water?			
				(f) What if any contingencies have been included or applied to the estimate for evolving a Collins class submarine?			
				(g) How long does the Department estimate it would take for Australia to procure a MOTS submarine that approximates Australia's requirements and get a first of class boat into the water?			
				(h) The SEA 1000 project appears to be suffering delays, how far behind schedule is the project?			
				(i) When was the government last briefed on SEA 1000? Who attended that briefing and what was discussed?			
				(j) Over what time frame will our strategic outlook require the capability we intend to acquire in SEA 1000?			

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				(k) When will the Opposition be offered a further detailed briefing on SEA 1000?			
				(l) What are the next stages for the SEA 1000 Project Office in developing an acquisition plan for Australia's future submarines?			
				(m) What are the significant shortfalls in relation to Australia's submarine requirements and the capabilities offered by current state-of-the-art MOTS submarines?			
				(n) Are there alternative approaches for achieving any requirements that might be considered beyond the capabilities offered by current state-of-the-art MOTS submarines?			
				(o) What intellectual property constraints are there in developing the SEA 1000 project?			
				(p) If there are intellectual property constraints what is the government doing to overcome these constraints in developing Australia's future submarines?			
66/ W51	1.13 PSP	Johnston	ADF Personnel	I refer to page 32 of the BPS, Table 17 and note that in 2010/11 the number of uniformed One Star and Senior Officers will rise very marginally in Navy and fall in the Army and Air Force. However, in the APS ranks the number of Senior Executives is set to rise by 3 and in the ranks of Senior Officers—Executive Levels 1 and 2—by 333.	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
				(a) Can you please advise what re-structuring measures are to occur within the non-uniformed sector of the Defence diarchy and why there is such a significant rise in the number of highly paid defence bureaucrats?			
				(b) What will be the total costs, including on costs, of employing another 333 senior officers over the 10/11 period?			
				(c) Is it envisaged that the 333 extra Senior Officers will be employed to service a new organisational structure within an enhanced diarchy organisational structure? If not, where exactly will they be employed and for what purpose?			
67/ W52	1.1 OSCDF	Johnston	Rufus Black Review	(a) Was the Minister formally advised of the decision by the SECDEF and CDF in early 2010 to instigate a review into organisational structures of the Department of Defence by Associate Professor Black? Please provide a copy of that advice?	Written	30.05.11	23/06/11
				(b) What were the terms of reference that were used in developing this report?			

QUESTIONS ON NOTICE—ADDITIONAL ESTIMATES, 23 FEBRUARY 2011

Department of Defence, Defence portfolio

Q No.	Program: Division or Agency	Senator	Broad topic	Question	Proof Hansard, page & hearing date or Written Q	Date answer rec'd	Date tabled
				(c) If the report was completed in September can you advise why it took six months to travel from the Department of Defence offices to the Minister's Office?			
				(d) Who to date has had access to this report and for what reason?			
				(e) When will the 'Black Report' be released and/or tabled in Parliament?			
				(f) What implications are there for the current diarchy structure and the DMO if and when the recommendations of the 'Black Report' are implemented?			
				(g) The Incoming Government Brief commented on the scope of the 'Black Report': "The foundation of the review is the idea that Defence performance is built on its ability to function as a single entity (One Defence) and that the purpose of accountability is to support this.' Can you explain in succinct terms what this means and exactly how such a re-organised structure is going to support our uniformed personnel in performing their tasks, especially those personnel deployed on active service?			
				(h) How has Associate Professor Black examined how accountability can be strengthened to better support the ability of the Secretary and the CDF to exercise strategic control? What were his outcomes?			
				(i) The review by Associate Professor Black focus was on decision making processes and culture. The review proposes changes to the internal Defence decision making architecture to strengthen the capacity of the Secretary and CDF to exercise strategic control. What are the key changes that were recommended? What is the Implementation Plan?			
68/ W53	1.9 VCDF	Xenophon	Fraud Investigators in Defence	 (a) How many fraud investigators (Military Police/ADFIS) of the required minimum standard were available to investigate fraud in Defence (by year) from 2001 through to 2010? (b) How many were employed, year by year, during this time? 	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
69/ W54	1.9 VCDF	Trood	Number of Troops in Afghanistan	According to the <i>Incoming Brief for Defence p.26</i> "Australia's military contribution to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan comprises an annual average of 1,550 ADF personnel deployed within Afghanistan." (a) Does "average" mean that there are at any one time more than 1550 or less than 1550? (b) Does the 1550 just refer to uniforms or does it include other personnel as well?	Written	30.05.11	23/06/11

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				(c) What is the actual size of Australia's commitment?(d) How are the numbers of ADF personnel in Afghanistan monitored?			
70/ W55	1.1 OSCDF	Trood	White Paper – Review of Assessments	According to an answer to questions on notice (Budget supplementary estimates 2010-2011, October 2010) in relation to the white paper "Our assessments are reviewed and updated on a regular basis." (a) How many times has this occurred since 2009? (b) How are the assessments reviewed? (c) Who reviews the assessments? (d) What specific areas have been reviewed?	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
71/ W56	1.9 VCDF	Trood	East Timor	 (a) How many ADF personnel are deployed in East Timor/ Timor Leste? (b) What is their primary role? (c) What is the security assessment of East Timor/Timor Leste? (d) Are reports in <i>The Age</i> last year correct that Australian troops will withdraw from East Timor/Timor Leste in 2012? (e) Is there a timeframe/end date for the withdrawal of troops from East Timor/Timor/Leste? (f) Have discussions between the East Timor/Timor Leste Government and the Australian Government/Department of Defence commenced about a withdrawal? Who initiated the discussions? 	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
72/ W57	1.9 VCDF	Trood	Unity Resources Group – Baghdad Embassy	 (a) Is the transition towards civilian security arrangements at the Baghdad embassy complete? (b) Are any ADF personnel stationed/involved in the security arrangements at the Australian Embassy in Baghdad? (c) What company is now providing the security? (d) What is the price of the contract to supply the security? How does this compare to the costs of Defence's provision of security? (e) (e) According to an answer to questions on notice (Budget supplementary estimates 2010-2011, October 2010) Q.30 states "Research highlight all shortlisted tenders had been subject of violent incidents in Iraq." (f) Who were the other tenderers and what were their "violent incidents"? (g) Did it concern Defence that there were no tenderers that did not have "violent incidents"? (h) Does Defence often contract out its activities to companies that have been subject of 	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11

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				violent incidents? (i) Response to Q.30 also states that "Due to the short timeframe to establish this commercial arrangement, no further security or financial checks were undertaken." (i) Why was there such a short timeframe? (ii) Who determined this timeframe? (iii) Is it often the case that Defence will forgo background checks in order to meet deadlines?			
73/ W58	1.9 VCDF	Trood	Afghan Detainee management	 (a) According to an update from the Defence Minister (Feb 2011 Update: Afghanistan Detainee Management), "Australian officials and humanitarian organisations will monitor the ongoing welfare of detainees". (i) Which officials and humanitarian organisations will assume this role? (ii) How often will the monitoring take place? (b) I note that since the 1 August 2010, 8 allegations (from 6 detainees) have been investigated and one in 2011? (i) What was the nature of these allegations? (ii) Who performed the investigation? (iii) What was the results of each investigation? (c) I understand from the update that the Minister has asked the Australian Defence Force Investigative Service (ADFIS) to investigate allegations made by a Defence member that members of the Detention Management Team in Afghanistan, responsible for managing the ADF detainee screening facility at Multinational Base-Tarin Kot, may not have complied with the procedures relation to the management and administrative processing of detainees. (i) When was this compliant made? (ii) What are the procedures in relation to the management and administrative processing of detainees? (iii) What has been alleged to have happened? (iv) When is the investigation likely to conclude? 	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11
74/ W59	1.9 VCDF	Trood	Compass Integrated Security Solutions (ISS)	 (a) Has the Australian Defence Force contracted the services of Compass ISS? (b) What specifically were they contracted to do? (c) How many contracts? (d) When were they? 	Written	27.05.11	23/06/11

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				 (e) How much was/has been paid to Compass? (f) Does Compass ISS have any current contracts with the Department? (g) Is the Department aware of a report "Report of the Inquiry into the Role and Oversight of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan" released on October 7 2010 by the US Armed Services Committee? (h) Is the Department aware that the one of the companies referred to in the document is the Australian owned Compass ISS? (i) A number of serious allegations about this company are raised during the same time period when Defence held contracts with this company. To what extent did defence investigate these allegations? (j) What processes does Defence have in place to ensure that contracts are being awarded to suitable companies? 			
75/ W60	1.9 VCDF	Macdonald	Memorial to Peacetime Military Casualties	 (a) In relation to the proposed Memorial to Peacetime Military Casualties can the Minister advise: (i) Where will the proposed memorial be sighted? (ii) What funding is being proposed by the Government for the construction of this memorial? (iii) What timetable is proposed for the construction? (iv) What is the status of preliminary designs for the memorial? (b) What action has been taken to compile an accurate list of service personnel who have died in the service of their country in times of peace? 	Written	27.05.11 at 7.14pm	23/06/11