## <u>Question 1</u>

## Timeline of Australian advice—shooting of President Horta

## Senator Johnston

## Hansard, p. 18

How long was it, from the time of the firefight surrounding the shooting of President Horta, before we in Australia heard of the event?

## RESPONSE

At 9:25am Australian Eastern Daylight Time (AEDT) (7:25am Dili time) a verbal report was received at Headquarters, Joint Operations Command—Sydney indicating that shots had been fired in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace at 9:05am AEDT (7:05am Dili time), an interval of 20 minutes.

## Question 2

## Senator Trood Status of the Defence Management Review, as at Feb 08

#### Hansard, p. 29

Please provide details of the 16 items in the Proust Review that Defence has actually completed and those which remain to be completed. (would prefer a table)

## RESPONSE

## Status of the Defence Management Review, as at Feb 08

## **Complete**

#### Governance

- 1. Strategic policy and planning capability
- 8. Business Model
- 16. Guiding principles for organisational changes
- 17. Definition of Secretary/Chief of the Defence Force roles. [Not Agreed]
- 18. Align direct reports to Secretary/Chief of the Defence Force roles / Establish Office [Agreed in part]
- 19. Strategic focus of Defence Committee / Review sub-committees [Agreed in part]
- 52. Streamline/consolidate business planning processes

## **Supporting Ministers**

- 2. Minister & staff induction packages
- 3. Improved tasking/Question Time Brief processes
- 4. Support to Ministers

## People

- 5. 360° appraisal for Senior Leadership Group (SLG)
- 25. Flexibility in filling SLG roles
- 27. Churn of SLG positions
- 30. Focus on financial management and systems reform
- 34. Australian National Audit Office performance-orientated approach

## Costing

14. Outsourcing arrangements

## **Information Technology**

- 38. Chief Information Office (CIO) Group product catalogue
- 40. Upgrade CIO to Band 3

# **Ongoing**

## Governance

- 6. Joint vision and priorities
- 7. Streamline governance structures
- 9. Defence Support Group (DSG) management mandate (akin to DMO)
- 10. Enhance service delivery arrangements
- 11. Reinvigorate partnering forums
- 13. Business process mapping
- 20. Committee reform
- 33. Focus on financial reform and risk management
- 43. Strengthen performance reporting
- 48. Defence Management Review implementation team
- 49. Implementation Plan and communications
- 50. Defence Business Improvement Board focus on reform
- 51. Embed reform into performance reporting
- 53. Continuous improvement

## People

- 21. Strategic human resource function
- 22. Group Head responsibility for leadership
- 23. Personnel Executive/DSG functional split
- 24. Review human resource staffing levels
- 26. Star Plot for Senior Executive Service staff
- 28. SLG Development Program
- 29. Business Skilling Program
- 31. Resource management-related skills

## Costing

- 12. Cost visibility & cost models
- 15. Product standardisation
- 32. Focus on long term cost of Defence

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### **Information Technology**

- 35. CIO Group better model of customer engagement
- 36. Benchmark CIO Group services
- 37. Technical control of networks & systems
- 39. Information capability technology (ICT) strategy
- 41. Consolidate ICT service delivery
- 42. CIOG staff has ICT skills
- 44. Defence-wide Management Information Systems
- 45. Review ICT purchasing/acquisition
- 46. IT outsourcing
- 47. Single enterprise system

## **Question 3**

## **Casualties in Iraq**

#### **Senator Trood**

#### Hansard, p. 37

- a) Does the figure of 150,000 casualties referred to in the Iraq Family Health Survey include deaths or is it just injuries?
- b) If available, please provide statistics in relation to not only casualties (deaths) but also injuries?

## RESPONSE

- a) The Iraq Family Health Survey paper titled *Violence-Related Mortality in Iraq from* 2002 to 2006 published in January 2008 in the New England Journal of Medicine reports mortalities over the period as 150,000.
- b) The Iraq Family Health Survey did not address the issue of injuries from physical violence. There are no official or definitive statistics on the number of Iraqi civilian deaths or injuries since the US-led invasion of 2003.

#### **Question 4**

#### **Engagements with Hostile Forces—Iraq**

#### **Senator Nettle**

#### Hansard, p. 37, 38

- a) Do you have a figure for the number of Iraqis killed or injured by the ADF?
- b) How many friendly fire incidents has Australia been involved in?
- c) How many engagements with hostile forces has Australia had post war?
- d) Were these engagements initiated by Australians or others?

## RESPONSE

- a) Incidents in Iraq have resulted in one Iraqi killed, one Iraqi presumed killed, and eight Iraqis injured.
- b) Australia has not been involved in any friendly fire incidents in Iraq.
- c) The following table provides a summary of incidents involving ADF engagements with anti-coalition forces during Operation CATALYST from records collated since 1 January 2006:

Engagement Category	Category Description	Occurrence Total
Contact (Small Arms Fire – SAF)	Engagement involving contact with anti-coalition forces and exchange of fire (small arms)	34 (4 instigated by the ADF)
Contact (Rocket Propelled Grenade - RPG)	Engagement involving the use of RPG attack against the ADF	6
Contact (RPG and SAF)	Engagement involving a combination of RPG and SAF used against the ADF.	7
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack	Engagements against the ADF using IED's	9
Suicide IED (SIED) attack	Engagements against the ADF using SIED's	2
SAF attack against ADF Aircraft	Attacks involving observation of fire against ADF C-130 aircraft	3
Total recorded engagements		61

Note—engagement summaries from before 1 January 2006 are not stored on readily accessible databases and have not been included in this advice. In addition, this data does not include Indirect Fire (IDF) attacks against ADF and Coalition bases which are a common occurrence.

d) There are four recorded instances of the ADF instigating fire during the catalogued reporting period, not including those incidents involving Iraqi civilians at question (a).

## Question 5

## Engagements with Hostile Forces—Afghanistan

## Senator Nettle

## Hansard, p. 40

- a) How many engagements has the ADF had with the Taliban? Can this be broken into:
  - i. IED attacks;
  - ii. Indirect fire attacks;

- iii. Small arms fire;
- iv. Friendly fire incidents.
- b) Can you give a timeframe over which theses incidents occurred?

## RESPONSE

a) The following table provides a summary of incidents involving ADF engagements with enemy forces (Taliban or Anti-Coalition Militia) in Afghanistan, since the deployment of the Reconstruction Task Force:

Engagement Category	Category Description	Occurrence Total
Contact	Engagement involving contact with the enemy and exchange of fire (nominally small arms)	53
Contact/IDF attack	Engagement involving contact and exchange of fire, where Indirect Fire has been used against the ADF or Coalition units	8
IDF attack	Engagements against ADF elements initiated by IDF, but without a resultant exchange of fire	10
IED attack	Engagements against the ADF using IEDs	6
SIED attack	Engagements against the ADF using Suicide IEDs	1
Contact against enemy force (EF) Spotter	Engagements involving the ADF firing against or returning fire at an EF spotter (EF observed spotting as a possible precursor to directing enemy fire)	7
EF target prosecution (IDF)	Deliberate targeting of the enemy using ADF initiated IDF	9
Contact involving ADF vectoring of Coalition air platforms to engage EF	Engagements where ADF elements have had cause to call in air assistance to help with the engagement	7
Attempted engagement against ADF Chinook (CH-47)	Observed attack against ADF CH47	4
Total recorded engagements		105

\* Note—there are no recorded instances of ADF friendly fire incidents in Afghanistan.

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These engagements have been recorded during the period covering the deployment of the ADF's Reconstruction Task Force (RTF) since August 2006 and the Special Operations Task Group since April 2007 until the Additional Estimates hearing of 20 February 2008.

### **Question 6**

**Contact with Reinado** 

#### **Senator Nettle**

#### Hansard, p. 41

What contact, if any, did the ADF have with Reinado over the two months prior to the shooting of President Horta?

## RESPONSE

During the two months prior to the shooting of President Horta, the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) had the following contacts with Reinado:

- On 28 December 2007, 15 km south of Dili, members of the ISF travelling on a narrow road pulled over to the side of the road to allow a civilian vehicle to pass by. As the vehicle passed the stationary ISF vehicle, the civilian driver said to the ISF driver "Hi, how you going?" The driver was identified as Alfredo Reinado.
- On 10 January 2008, 26 km southwest of Dili, members of the ISF were conducting a route reconnaissance and were stopped by Alfredo Reinado accompanied by a group of four heavily armed supporters. The ISF members were later escorted out of the area by Reinado.
- On 6 February 2008, 26 km southwest of Dili, an ISF vehicle-mounted patrol happened upon a meeting between Alfredo Reinado, some of his supporters, three Timor-Leste Parliamentarians and their lawyer. Reinado's party fired what has been assessed as a small number of warning shots. The Australian vehicles withdrew with no return of fire and without sustaining any casualties or equipment damage.

Question 7

Private Industry investment in the JSF

**Senator Minchin** 

Hansard, p. 52

How much has Australian private industry committed to the JSF so far, in approximate terms, in its investment in this project?

## RESPONSE

Defence does not track this information specifically. An approximate estimate would be \$A30 million to date, broadly covering capital equipment, training and marketing in support of global JSF development and production.

It is likely that Australian industry will make no significant investment towards Australian JSF sustainment until an aircraft purchase decision is made.

## Written Question 1

## Australian Defence Force Joint Helicopter School

#### **Senator Payne**

- a) What is the status of Australian Defence Force Joint Helicopter School at HMAS Albatross?
- b) Is the ADF Joint Helicopter School being reviewed under the Government's review of priorities and allocations of funding?
- c) When will the project proponent be advised of the result of the consideration?

## RESPONSE

- a) In consultation with Navy, Army, the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO), Defence Support Group (DSG) and other stakeholders, Capability Development Group is developing the plan for the creation of the Joint Helicopter School at HMAS *Albatross* in Nowra as part of project AIR 9000 Phase 7. Plans are well advanced, with the anticipated release of a Request for Tender to industry in late 2008/early 2009, prior to a scheduled Second Pass Government decision in 2010. It is anticipated that the new School will begin training ADF aircrew in 2013.
- b) All projects in the Defence Capability Plan are being examined for their scope and priority in the context of the development of the new White Paper.
- c) The Government will consider the next Defence Capability Plan in the context of the new White Paper and advice will follow its completion.

## Written Question 2

#### **Government election commitments**

#### Senator Minchin

Provide a complete list of the Government's election promises made during the campaign, and which Department is responsible for the administration of each of these commitments.

## RESPONSE

Refer to the answer to Senate Question on Notice 0162.